The social construction of scarcity. The case of water in
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Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233 – 245
www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon
SPECIAL ISSUE
SOCIAL PROCESSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION
The social construction of scarcity. The case of water in
Tenerife (Canary Islands)
Federico Aguilera-Klink *,1, Eduardo Pérez-Moriana 2, Juan Sánchez-Garcı́a
Department of Applied Economics, Uni6ersity of La Laguna, Campus Guajara, Camino La Hornera s/n, 38071 La Laguna,
Tenerife, Canary Islands, Spain
Abstract
Water has traditionally been considered a physically scarce resource in the Canary Islands. Paradoxically, one of
the reasons behind the conquest of the Islands in the 15th century was the existence of abundant water which allowed
sugar to be grown in Tenerife and Gran Canaria. This article aims to show that the water scarcity in Tenerife is not
physical or natural, but rather a socially constructed one, stemming from a set of social processes that reflect the
conflicts concerning the desirable kind of society and social order. These processes also consolidate the notion of
aquifer and water as a capital asset and commodity, as opposed to the notion of water as an ecosocial asset or
common property. The change in mentality with respect to water momentarily led to abundance, with availability
multiplying tenfold in less than a century and, at the same time, to the social construction of scarcity, given that the
groundwater aquifer was overexploited rapidly because successive changes in the institutional framework were
impeded which might have regulated water extraction. The overriding concern was to maintain private ownership of
water, even if this entailed eventual exhaustion. We study water shortage as the result of the articulation between the
natural system (aquifer) and the social system. © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Water management; Social scarcity; Environmental valuation
The support of the funding received from DG XII of the European Commission under contract ENV4-CT96-0226 for the
project entitled ‘Social Processes for Environmental Valuation: Procedures and Institutions for Social Valuations of Natural Capital
in Environmental Conservation and Sustainability Policy (VALSE)’ is gratefully acknowledged, as are the helpful comments of
Martin O’Connor and the three journal referees.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: + 34-922-317012/13; fax: +34-922-253742.
E-mail address: faguiler@ull.es (F. Aguilera-Klink).
1
Second E-mail address: jusangar@ull.es.
2
Research assistant during the VALSE project.
0921-8009/00/$ - see front matter © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 9 2 1 - 8 0 0 9 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 1 6 0 - 9234 F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245
1. Introduction society understands and accepts as a socially ade-
quate solution.
It is customary for social scientists to speak of In the case of Tenerife we endeavour to show
natural resource shortage, which is self-evident if that, as compared to the widespread and widely-
one acknowledges that we live in a finite world. accepted notion of the physical scarcity of water,
For this reason, the approach we take seeks to the notion of socially constructed scarcity is more
study and understand shortage not as a physical relevant and has greater explanatory power. To
statistic or as a point of departure, but rather as do so, we will examine the social processes that
the result of the articulation between the physical have led to the creation of this type of scarcity. In
and social systems, i.e. an arrival point. This the first part of the paper, we show the existence
articulation can be understood in terms of coevo- of a constant social conflict over distribution,
lution (Norgaard, 1984), although it should be arising out of the criteria used to appropriate and
noted that little mention has been made of the then distribute surface water. These criteria fa-
fact that coevolution and coevolutionary develop- voured in particular those with some degree of
ment are not the same thing. Whereas coevolution power, who from the 18th century onwards took
can lead to a more artificial and vulnerable physi- for themselves public and communal water, and
cal (and by extension social) system, coevolution- went unpunished in the process. In the second
ary development would require constant and real part we examine the process of the privatisation
institutional change, one that translates into a and exploitation of groundwater. This was done
change in attitudes (thinking habits) and in con- using the ‘catchment’ rule and at the expense of
ducts regarding the withdrawal, distribution and rapid exhaustion of surface water, so much so
use of water which would enable the social system that the documents from the 19th century speak
to be maintained and make it compatible with the literally of drilling ‘fever’. Thirdly, we look at the
physical system. uncontrolled drilling of underground aquifers, a
Both options implicitly bring out the kind of process carried out under the formal umbrella of
questions that need to be addressed if we are to numerous Water Laws, which in practice merely
understand the articulation between the two sys- sought to ensure that private ownership was
tems. More specifically, in the case of the subject maintained. This was not always the result given
under discussion here (water), we need to examine that more recognition was given to withdrawal
in greater depth, among other issues, the under- rights than to the groundwater aquifer’s recharge
standing of the social processes related to the and accumulation capacity. Although it is true
perception of the causes of scarcity; the forms of that groundwater availability did increase enor-
participation in the determination of the criteria mously, it was at the expense of a multiplication
and institutions for water appropriation and use; of the number of drillings (many of which hardly
the distribution conflicts generated by the forego- produced water), more expensive withdrawal
ing; knowledge of how the hydrologic cycle func- (competitive rather than cooperative drilling, due
tions; the role of technologies which reduce water to an intensification of the catchment rule) and
scarcity; and the capacity to evaluate the implicit the continued depletion of the aquifer. Lastly, we
technological risks of said technologies (such as examine the importance of the valuation of the
where desalination of brackish water from the sea social processes which form the notions of water
allows more sea water to enter and deteriorate and water scarcity in order to complete the water
aquifers), etc. These are questions related in part valuation exercise.
to scientific and technological knowledge and
partly also to power, that is, the social conflict
between the values and interests at stake, how this 2. Tenerife water resources: the case study
conflict is addressed by society and how society,
in reaching a consensus, defines which problem is Tenerife (Canary Islands) is a very mountain-
socially and politically relevant and, lastly, what ous island of volcanic origin, with recent erup-F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245 235
tions (early this century). In spite of its small size sea); horizontal rain, generated by trade-winds
(2034 km2), it has a wide variety of local climates in contact with vegetation (however, the true
which make for enormous variations in rainfall amount involved does not figure in the water
(from 100 mm on the south coast to over 900 mm balances because there is no precise evaluation
in the highest northern and northeastern parts) methodology); desalination of sea-water with
and the resulting difficulties in calculating the true fossil energy; purification of urban waste water
amount that filters down to the aquifer. Indeed, for agricultural use.
experts from the Tenerife Water Council are just The extraction of underground water. This is
now beginning to admit that the data used to done using wells and galleries (which are hori-
determine water balances are rather hazy as re- zontal, although slightly sloped to allow grav-
gards the levels of evapotranspiration and infiltra- ity outlet of the water), or a combination of
tion, as can be seen in Table 1. In just 5 years, the both, such as when a horizontal gallery is
calculations have had to be corrected by around constructed at the bottom of wells. To give an
50%. Doubts also surround the amount of water idea of the type of drilling, conventional gal-
withdrawn from the aquifer. The reason is that leries usually measure 3 km on average, but
private water owners are against the Canarian many are in fact over 5 km long. The most
government’s plans to fit meters to measure with- productive wells are between 170 and 300 m.
drawal directly and the authorities are not strong Tenerife is riddled with over a thousand hori-
enough to enforce a mandatory meter scheme. zontal galleries, totalling between them some
Tenerife’s current hydrologic system is made up 1620 km, and over 400 wells with a combined
of a groundwater aquifer which is the remains of depth of approximately 52 km.
a broader — surface and groundwater — system The distribution of water. The main feature of
that was ruined by constant overexploitation dur- the distribution networks, both agricultural
ing the last century and the present one. Usable and urban, is their extensive deterioration (with
recharge — the sum of natural infiltration plus some exceptions, such as the capital, Santa
irrigation returns less natural coastal underground Cruz de Tenerife), which causes considerable
run off — is less than the volume of withdrawals. water loss, in some cases over 50% of the
Hence, withdrawals more or less eat into reserves amount actually distributed.
and gradually lower the water table. The immedi- Uses of water. Farming is the biggest consumer
ate result is a reduction in the volume of water of water, accounting for over 50% of the total
strikes (Tenerife Water Plan, 1993). (109.2 Hm3 in 1991). Agriculture is a vital
In Tenerife, the following phases in the hydro- sector both in terms of its repercussions on the
logic ‘cycle’ can be discerned: land and its cultural connotations. 46 000 Ha
Contributions to the aquifer. These include the are devoted to farming land, taken up for the
following direct and indirect sources: vertical most part by irrigation crops for export (ba-
rain (some of which filters down into the nana and tomatoes mainly). These crops ac-
aquifer, some evaporates and some reaches the count for over 50% of cropland. Household use
accounts for 30% (62.7 Hm3 in 1991), while
Table 1 water consumption in the tourist areas is less
Water balance HM3/YRa
than 10% of the total (14.1 Hm3) (Tenerife
Year 1993 1998 Water Plan, 1993). While water consumption
by the farm sector has been falling of late (due
Rain 865 865 to the low financial return of farming com-
Evapotranspiration 606 480 pared to other activities and, secondly, the
Infiltration 239 365
introduction of water-saving technologies in
Runoff 20 20
new irrigation systems), both household con-
a
Source: Tenerife Water Plan, 1993 and 1999 (personal sumption (due to population growth) and that
communication). of the tourist areas (rise in the number of236 F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245
Table 2 rural minority allowed it to control (nominate)
Water consumption in Tenerife, Projection 2000a
political offices. However, for this ‘social order’ to
Consumption Year 2000 Variation (%) be maintained, social cohesion mechanisms (or
1991–2000 cushioning) were needed, first and foremost
among them common and public ownership of
Hm3 (%) water and land. Hence, although after the con-
quest of the Canaries (15th century) the Spanish
Non used resources 2.6 1.21 −42.22
Crown distributed and granted (for private use
Losses in water 11.1 5.16 −3.48 but without private ownership) water and land,
transfers both with restrictions, a large proportion of these
Agricultural use 96.8 44.96 −11.36 waters and lands were common and public
heritage.
Urban use 69.6 32.33 11.00
As is well known, although this property for-
Tourism use 23.4 10.87 65.96 mat allowed the Ancien Regime to be maintained,
it satisfied neither rich nor poor. It curtailed the
Industrial use 11.8 5.48 122.64 possibilities of the former to open new mercantile
activities and obtain greater profits — which were
Total 215.3 10 000 3.86 restricted because of the limited availability of the
a
different types of property — and it imposed
Source: Tenerife Water Plan (1993).
difficult living conditions on the latter, in spite of
the existence of this more common form of
holidaymakers) have increased in recent years. ownership.
The consumption levels forecast for the year It was against this backdrop that the ideas of
2000 by Tenerife’s Water Plan point to a con- the Enlightenment gained ground. These may be
siderable rise in urban and tourism use (Table summed up as the glorification of private interests
2): as the sole motor and destiny of all economic
The resident population in 1996 was some activity and the need for unrestricted competition
690 000, to which one has to add the 2 993 084 by economic and social agents as the most ade-
tourists who between them spent over 25 million quate form of allocating resources to social neces-
nights on the island. sities. The application of these ideas required
institutional change, a break with the previous
institutional framework, and necessitated also the
3. Appropriation and distribution of surface shaping of content for a new one which would
water. Social conflicts and the strengthening of allow free trade to enable the country to progress.
the idea of private property Here ‘progress’ means using (for crops) the lands
and waters not used commercially (common prop-
For a proper understanding of the process of erty) or in the hands of the church, and at the
the social construction of scarcity, one first must same time making available to the State an impor-
outline the historical context to show how current tant source of finance for public spending. For its
values and interests have been shaped. The con- part, nature was viewed as a capital asset avail-
text which, without any doubt, has conditioned able for human exploitation (Harvey, 1996).
water problems in the Canaries was Spanish soci- In the case of the Canaries, in addition to the
ety of the end of the late 18th and early 19th above, it is important to note the corresponding
centuries, one which underwent a major process economic incentive of export crops, which since
of transformation from the Ancien Regime to the Conquest had been one of the basic pillars of
Capitalism. The Ancien Regime was a state the Canarian economy and society, and needed
regime — the monarchy — based on privilege new arable land and water for irrigation. Al-
and in which the economic power held by the rich though much land was disentailed, the economicF. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245 237 and social results of the successive disentailments less power to create opportunities for economic (1836 and 1855) did not fulfil expectations (Ojeda, activities through exploitation of land and water. 1977). Indeed, one could say that property be- The results obtained, however, were a far cry came more concentrated than before the process from those initially sought because only the rich and the situation of those who had neither water were in a position to buy — or to take possession nor land worsened considerably. The cushioning of — water and land. Moreover, the situation mechanism that existed in the form of common worsened for the majority due to the disappear- property had been eliminated. Besides, the rapid ance of common land and (surface) water which collapse of some export crops in the Canaries they might have been able to use free of charge to triggered the highest rate of emigration in the improve their lot. region’s history (1835 – 1855), with many heading Among the disentailed lands, forest areas were for Cuba and Puerto Rico. Although surface wa- sold off fraudulently by means of deliberately ter was initially allocated to the land on which it false classification of the woods as uncultivated fell, the challenging of the notion of property land. This was the official response to the request (both public and common) encouraged owners of of certain sectors of Canarian society (Royal Eco- land without water for irrigation to seek a means nomic Society of Friends of Las Palmas Area in of obtaining it. Here, following Nieto (1968), we 1868) who asked that forests should not switch to can distinguish two ways of appropriating surface private hands in the disentailment process: ‘‘The water. destruction of trees without replanting will kill the The first was to ask municipal governments forests, this natural heritage of the air, water, land with surplus water — once urban supply has been and spontaneous production. Destroying the guaranteed — for a concession, with a volume forest destroys springs, humidity and fertility’’ similar to that of the surplus water. The problem (quoted by Ojeda, 1977). In a way this perception arose when these concessions were distorted by reflects scientific knowledge of the environmental those who obtained them and then claimed full functions performed by forests and also the need ownership of the water granted. According to to protect these functions for the benefit of society Nieto (1968), the mechanisms most commonly in general and not just for a few private owners. used to generate this distortion were as follows: Since both ways were insufficient to meet the (a) ‘to convert the concession of surpluses of growing agricultural needs arising out of the ex- public water into private property encumbered pansion of agriculture at the end of the 19th with an unavoidable obligation in favour of the century, a third way commenced, one involving neighbours’, which is then disputed and denied; the private appropriation of groundwater. (b) perversion of the original title ‘at the time of its constitution by a real fiddling of concepts’; and (c) perversion of the original title ‘as a conse- 4. Appropriation and distribution of groundwater. quence, in conclusion, of a phenomenon of hy- From public and common property to ‘common postasis’. The previous mechanisms led to the pool’ private appropriation of surface water usurping the rights of use contained in the aforementioned It should be noted that, as far back as 1873, concessions. debate had already commenced among the En- The second was to buy at public auction disen- lightened as to the consequences drilling for tailed lands with a given volume of surface water groundwater would have for surface water allocation which was initially set according to courses. In other words, concern arose for a better crop water needs. The philosophy underlying Dis- understanding of the hydrologic cycle. The reason entailment was to challenge a social organisation for this was that with the passing of the Mines that was based on privilege and governed by the Act of 1868, applications were being made for power of large properties that barely created mineral extraction licences, even though the min- ‘commercial wealth’, and thus to allow those with erals did not exist in the Canaries. The real aim
238 F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245
was to drill for groundwater. Within a short space tween the extractions. Waters that had been com-
of time, 1000 applications for licences were filed in mon and public property were thus transformed
Gran Canaria, thus opening the debate on the into individual private property, but without
relationship between surface water and groundwa- clearly-defined property rights (common pool)
ter, and also on the extension of existing rights over since it was impossible to know: (a) whether the
surface water to groundwater. Documents of the drilling would hit water; (b) the volume of water
time speak literally of ‘water fever’ in describing that could be withdrawn; and (c) the volume of
the situation. Behind this fever was a desire to water that could be maintained over time. Hence
place Nature at man’s service and to use early the beginnings of an all out ‘race’ or fever for water
machinery to drill for groundwater. As a result, in withdrawal. Within a few years a situation of
much disentailed land groundwater was appropri- physical scarcity (there was little water to satisfy
ated, even though this represented a total lack of the needs created by the new commercial export
regard for and usurpation of rights over surface crops) was transformed into a situation of socially-
water. conditioned scarcity (explained by a given social
It must be said that the extraction of groundwa- behaviour in the models of water withdrawal,
ter did increase the volume of water available for distribution and use).
agricultural uses and encouraged an increase in This activity led to the eventual creation of
farm activity, although in doing so it caused the companies with capital to finance the purchase of
disappearance (drying up) of public sources and expensive steam-driven drilling machinery, in turn
springs, i.e. of surface water. Thus, even if the leading to better knowledge of the hydrogeological
‘economic’ result is positive for those who with- workings of the aquifer. However, the social confl-
drew groundwater and sold it to farmers, legally ict surrounding the legal appropriation of water —
speaking it is a second usurpation or ‘a real and or the unpunished usurpation thereof — has per-
massive usurpation’ that entirely alters the owner- sisted until the present day, mainly because people
ship of water — some of which was also the result (a minority, it must be said) question how a
of usurpation, as we saw above — and the previ- resource as badly needed as water could be owned
ous owners of surface water were displaced by the privately, can generate an impressive business in-
new water owners (Nieto, 1968; 106). Another cluding speculation in the sale of water and, be-
result was that most of the island’s springs dried up sides, be tax-free. Still, this conflict did not deter
and, although in the 18th century the entire popu- (‘willingness to play’) many from putting their
lation usually had enough water, in fact they were small savings (and frequently losing them, because
forced to buy it from the ‘new owners’. no water was found) in this new activity. There was
Water became consolidated — out of necessity, always the hope of finding a small water supply,
albeit in a very favourable ideological context (the which would provide irrigation for a small plot and
Enlightenment) — as yet another commodity, and would earn a fee when sold. A clear social percep-
the search for and extraction of groundwater be- tion existed that water owners were very powerful
came an important and risky (uncertain result) and that, in an essentially agricultural economy, if
activity at the end of the 19th and beginning of the you did not have water and could not buy it,
20th century. Once most of the surface water emigration was the sole alternative.
courses had disappeared due to the spiralling Although the whole process was based on
increase in underground drilling, which was fa- usurpation, one of the chief worries of the ‘new
voured by the privatising philosophy of Disentail- owners’ was how to obtain legal recognition (legit-
ment, water became a private good and now had imacy) of the new property redefining the institu-
to be taken from underground. This property right tional capital.3 They did not find it too difficult
was exercised only through extraction, applying
the catchment rule — i.e. if I don’t extract it, 3
Stock of rules and underlying human organizational skills
someone else will — because there was only one which coordinate human behaviour in its interaction with
aquifer and there was great interdependence be- natural resources (Hanna, 1997).F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245 239
to pressure the country’s lawmakers and thus with natural springs, resulting from hanging
obtain the ‘acquired’ rights in the new laws affect- aquifers. Many of these became exhausted.
ing water (Water Act of 1866, Mines’ Act of 1868, Stage 2: 1910–1930. Galleries reach the aquifer
Water Act of 1879). Ultimately, once the heredi- core. Slight lowering of water table. The island
tary, individualistic concept of underground water becomes virtually dependent on groundwater.
was imposed, it led to permanent conflict over Stage 3: 1930–1945. Exploitation of aquifer
rights between landowners and water withdraw- core begins to affect volume of reserves. Water
ers, to the detriment of ‘the stable economic con- table lowered by over 100 m in areas with
tent of the property’ and the social use of the highest concentration of galleries.
water. In the middle of the present century this Stage 4: 1945–1965. Gallery system for
conflict (which was not an obstacle to the respec- groundwater extraction spreads throughout is-
tive private interests in the Canaries) made it land. 90% of current galleries opened by 1965.
necessary to draw up and apply regulations (1956 Extracted volume reaches 7000 l/s, compared
Landed Property Law — Heredamientos) to ac- to 700 l/s for surface water in 19th century.
commodate the conflicting interests of landowners Sharp fall in water levels. Uppermost galleries
and water entrepreneurs. The accommodation begin to dry up.
also served to deter untrustworthy public law Stage 5: 1965–present day. Total extracted vol-
experts from exposing and denouncing the social ume reaches ceiling, and constant fall of over
consequences of the system, including the poten- 2000 l/s seen over last two decades (Table 3).
tial for serious abuse on the part of the landown- The problem is that the institutional framework
ers and those withdrawing the water. regulating surface water use was done away with
and replaced by one which, in practice, encour-
ages open access to the aquifer. Moreover, to date
the various Water Acts have merely brought for-
5. Uncontrolled drilling of the underground mal institutional change, but have not enriched
aquifer: application to the full of the catchment the institutional capital since they fail to acknowl-
rule edge the existence of coevolution or coevolution-
ary development. Rather, they assume evolution
Up until the end of the 19th century mining in the sense of a lack of real articulation between
fever dominated, with the following stages dis- the physical and social systems. The reason is that
cernible in the exploitation of the aquifer (Tener- although they regulate drillings (which required a
ife Water Plan, 1989): public concession and had to be physically sepa-
Stage 1: 1850–1910. Extraction of groundwater rate in terms of space) and extractions, they main-
begins, with 90% of galleries opened in areas tained free access because, in practice, no control
is exercised over water withdrawals even today in
Table 3
Volume withdrawn (groundwater)a
1999. Indeed, there are no public statistics show-
ing how much is withdrawn by each well or
Year Volume (l/s) Total km drilled gallery.
In sum, throughout the history and manage-
1930 1500 100 ment of Tenerife’s aquifer the maintenance of a
1940 2000 220
1950 4600 480
kind of institutional capital (and the ensuing in-
1960 5600 830 centives) has been assured and this has permitted
1965 7000 1.040 the transition from a situation of permanent po-
1970 6300 1.180 tential water availability (sustainable aquifer man-
1980 5200 1.450 agement) to one of scarcity which is socially
1990 4700 1.550
1998 4250 1.630 determined in terms of aquifer depletion. The
combination of entrepreneurial risk-taking, inno-
a
Source: Tenerife Water Council (personal communication). vative technological development in the physical240 F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245
Table 4
Distribution of water ownership in La Isla Baja, Tenerife (1975)a
Amount of Owners Shares Owners Shares Accumulated Accumulated
shares (%) (pi) (%) (pi) (%) (qi) (%) (qi) owners (%) shares (%)
Less than 1 18 8265 2.66 0.14 2.66 0.14
1–2 165 183 155 24.41 3.19 27.07 3.33
2–3 112 247 553 16.57 4.31 43.64 7.64
3–4 87 288 414 12.87 5.02 56.51 12.66
4–5 43 181 943 6.36 3.17 62.87 15.82
5–10 117 800 742 17.31 13.93 80.18 29.75
10–15 51 605 178 7.54 10.53 87.72 40.28
15–20 32 557 119 4.73 9.69 92.46 49.98
20–25 10 225 334 1.48 3.92 93.93 53.90
25–30 8 216 958 1.18 3.77 95.12 57.67
30–50 18 658 116 2.66 11.45 97.78 69.12
50–100 9 590 917 1.33 10.28 99.11 79.40
More than 100 6 1183.85 0.89 20.60 100.00 100.00
S 676 5747.544 100.00 100.00
a
Source: Aguilera and Nunn (1989).
capital used and increases in the level of ground- lem. In short, the major owners can be said to be
water output capacity led groundwater resources the holders of structural power.
from a stage of socially determined surplus (com- The history of Tenerife’s water has thus been,
plex water resource cycle) to one of full utilisation to borrow from Hanna’s terminology, a move-
in a relatively short period of time (simplification ment ‘‘from the stewardship needs of ecosystem
of such complexity) (Hanna, 1997). This situation sustainability to the growth phase of frontier de-
can be illustrated in the following terms: low or velopment; movement which has proceeded in the
no-control over the levels of extraction of natural presence of two powerful underlying tensions:
capital; high rate of application of physical capi- economy versus the environment and individual
tal; and relatively undeveloped institutional capi- versus the community’’. That movement has been
tal for sustainable path management. reinforced by a path dependence technology pro-
The social legitimisation of this water appropri- cess (drilling and pumping technologies in the first
ation process is currently defended on grounds phase, with desalination and water treatment
that equal opportunities now exist for everyone technologies added in the second) and an evolu-
and water ownership is divided up extensively. tion of property rights regimes, where those are
Although information in this respect is scant, a attained at the point of the resource capture and
sample obtained (Table 4) indicates that water where the decisions on resource use are made by
ownership is distributed very unequally, with a individuals who interact with other resource de-
handful of owners having much of the water and velopers only through the depletion effect of the
a large number of small owners having very little. aquifer (Goodstein, 1995; Hanna, 1997).
This unequal distribution has very important im- Physical evidence of the above-mentioned
plications for water control, since it indicates that movement can be seen in Tables 5 and 6.
the handful of big owners have extensive powers The Tables show the evolution of the physical
to: (a) fix prices; (b) fix the rules of the game with yield of the volume of groundwater over the
respect to withdrawal; (c) establish the distribu- period 1930–1998 and the percentage variation of
tion conditions; (d) guide any rule changes; (e) the number, physical returns, flows and drilled
break the rules with impunity; and (f) influence meters of galleries and wells during the period
the dominant social perception of the water prob- 1973–1990 in Tenerife. We can see in Table 6F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245 241
Table 5 and the new technologies for desalinating brack-
Extracted volume (groundwater)a
ish water have had very damaging effects on the
Year Physical yield (m3/day/km drilled) aquifer, as evidenced in wells where previously
exploitation would cease when the water quality
1930 1269 worsened as a result of intrusion by sea water
1940 769 beyond certain limits (mainly the minimum qual-
1950 811
ity required for irrigation use) but which are now
1960 571
1965 569 being exploited again thanks to the new technolo-
1970 452 gies that help perpetuate the damage to the
1980 303 aquifer (one single well contaminated by sea water
1990 257 intrusion can lead to the contamination of an
1998 221
entire and vast area). At present, the authorities
a
Source: Tenerife Water Council (personal communication). require a detailed study and compliance with cer-
tain minimum water quality conditions before
how the number of kilometres drilled has multi- they will grant a licence for a brackish water
plied. The consequence of this massive drilling has desalination installation at the bottom of a well.
been not just a fall in the yield of the galleries and Very often, however, the authorities are unable to
exercise control due to resistance by the well
wells, but also an alarming reduction in the
owners. As a result, situations that are disastrous
aquifer (in some places clearly irreversible). Avail-
for the aquifer are not avoided and wells are
able data on the evolution of underground extrac-
being exploited which are totally contaminated by
tions of water, both in galleries and in wells, as
sea water intrusion.
well as the evolution of the springs (a natural
indicator of the state of the aquifer in as much as
springs function as aquifer regulators) corrobo-
rate the above statements. It can be seen that, in 6. Water perceptions and environmental valuation
the period observed, the choice made has been for as a social process
exploitation by wells. Given the state of the
aquifer this seems consistent as the coastal areas Given all the above, it seems to us very impor-
are the least affected by over-exploitation. The tant to emphasise — as has already been said —
reduction in the yields is seen, however, in both that the most common social perception of the
types of exploitation. It should be said also that problem of water is essentially linked to a gener-
advances in techniques (pumping and drilling) alised notion of physical scarcity, i.e. the belief
Table 6
Evolution of wells, galleries (number, drilled meters, flows and physical return), Tenerife, 1973–90a
Wells Galleries
1973 1980 1990 Var. 73–90 1973 1980 1990 Var. 73–90
(%) (%)
No 291 370 437 50.17 986 1001 1047 6.19
Drilled 14 000 27 000 52 000 271.43 1 327 000 1 453 000 1 627 000 22.61
meters
m3/day 78.624 133.661 134.784 71.43 548.640 487 555.2 445 824 −18.74
m3/day/drille 5616 4950 2592 −53.85 0.413 0.336 0.274 −33.72
d m.
a
Source: Rodrı́guez Brito, (1995); author’s own elaboration.242 F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245 that the water scarcity is due to ‘natural reasons’ potentially serious environmental impacts that (for example, low rainfall), and not to the idea of could lead to an increasingly artificial hydrologic social scarcity, i.e. the scarcity has more to do cycle, with ever-growing costs in terms of mainte- with the application of a particular rationale that nance, energy dependence, and the environment. renders some conducts and some social processes Which is why we consider these proposed solu- ‘legitimate’. In other words, our considerations tions as ‘non-solutions’, in the sense that they do would suggest that the problem of water (water not involve coevolutionary development, nor are valuation) can only be adequately understood by they sustainable. Consequently, in order to be studying the social processes responsible for said able to speak of the social perception of water we conduct and for the guidelines for extraction, must first define what we mean when we speak of distribution and use. Only then will we be in a water. position to understand why this social perception The physical renewability of water can be im- does or does not exist, and the different types of paired by human behaviour in two ways: convert- social perception that do exist. We cannot carry ing what used to be renewable into something out a water valuation from the perspective of exhaustible, either by extracting more water than social processes without, at the same time, valuat- is collected through precipitation; or by interfer- ing the social processes behind the notion of water ing in the workings of biochemical cycles through and water scarcity. One could say that an under- the various types of pollution, which would in- standing of social processes is needed for water clude global warming. Secondly, although the hy- (environmental) valuation and an understanding drologic cycle itself functions with renewable of the environment (water) is needed for social energy, most of the energy used thus far to repro- process valuation. duce the cycle artificially (mainly for sea water Even though water is turned into a commodity, desalination) comes from fossil sources, which are it has to be said that the social perception related exhaustible. This not only considerably limits any to water is actually multi-dimensional, condi- attempt to generalise the use of desalination tioned, fragmented and complex. Put another plants, but also poses the problem of the gas way, it should first be clarified what is meant — emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. and what we mean — by social perception in the Any valuation made of the reserves or case of water, because we may be referring to availability of a natural resource — water, in this different things at one and the same time. We specific case — is meaningful only if related to should not forget that water means different the technological and institutional structures of things for different people, and the perception the society in which the resource is found. Thus, may be so different that everyone can point to a in the case of groundwater, it seems clear that different quality or aspect of water or of its cycle. with water-wheel technology the availability of Thus, an urban user who has been influenced by water is limited by the wheel’s capacity and also ‘save water’ campaigns may have a perception of by the rules or laws regulating withdrawal. Im- the water problem in terms of physical scarcity, provements in drilling and pumping technology, but may not realise (or know) that urban distribu- however, and changes in the laws regulating water tion networks lose more than 50 percent of their exploitation have made extraction of groundwater water (Tenerife Water Plan, 1993). Nor will they easier (even leading to over-exploitation of the be aware that, until recently, in winter water was aquifer) and have increased the availability of this usually discharged into the sea so that the price resource or have turned into a resource something did not fall in the summer (Cruz, 1958) or that the which was not a resource with other technology. aquifer is deteriorating irreversibly (Braojos, At present, the installation of desalination plants 1988). Moreover, it is difficult to understand that now means that sea water can be considered a the very techniques put forward as a solution to resource that is always renewable as long as the the alleged physical scarcity — such as desalina- energy used in the desalination is renewable in tion of sea water with fossil energy — will have nature (wind and solar energy, for instance).
F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245 243 Where this is not the case, desalination of sea rarely mentioned. Indeed one can read that the water would exacerbate the exhaustion of fossil Canaries have been successfully resolving all such resources and increase CO2 emissions. problems (Hoyos, 1997; Simpson and Ringskog, Just as with other environmental questions, per- 1997), and can now ‘‘offer our experience, our ception is rendered difficult because, in the West- knowledge and our techniques to help in the ern world at least, most people live in the artificial always difficult and stormy ‘sea’ of world water environmental medium formed by cities, and as resources’’ (Alsina, 1997). In other words, official ‘‘most of the population reacts mainly with this water policy is really a ‘‘symbolic policy of decon- medium, which is increasingly interposed between tamination’’, that is, a policy which has hindered man and nature, the illusion is created that each the social perception of the water problem and time one is less dependent on it’’ (Sunkel, 1980; therefore the capacity for ‘collective understand- 19). The perception at urban user level is thus ing’ (Vatn and Bromley, 1993; 143). very limited and fragmented, i.e. it refers almost exclusively to the quality and continuity of tap water, with no relation to the hydrologic cycle. 7. Conclusions This perception is quite normal given that ‘‘in economically developed countries, the emotional Access to water resources in the Canary Islands relationship with water has been obscured because has been a source of conflict for centuries. Since of the smooth working of the institutions which the 19th century, surface water, until then largely make sure that the water supply is guaranteed; the a public and common property resource, has been availability of water just requires turning on the transformed into an individual and privately tap. In economically developed countries, how- owned resource, a commodity. Profit opportuni- ever, when the control of water is in danger, the ties opened by new export crops, which were force of the emotional returns’’ (Brown and In- curbed by the physical scarcity of surface water, gram, 1987; 197–198). Moreover, not even the led to groundwater pumping and within a few ‘scientific body’ has one sole perception about years caused the disappearance of most of the groundwater and about how the aquifer works. surface water courses. In an agricultural society, On the contrary, the debate, in its many facets the need for water created a real ‘water rush’, (legal, hydrogeological, economic, etc.) is open leading within a short time to aquifer overex- and on many occasions is confused, ambiguous ploitation and to (at times irreversible) damage. and contradictory. One could say therefore that As a result, the physical ‘surface water resource groundwater can be viewed, according to Fun- scarcity’ condition was transformed into a socially towicz and Ravetz (1993), as a problem character- conditioned ‘groundwater resource scarcity’ (and ised by uncertainty, conflict of values and aquifer depletion). In spite of the large numbers interests, the importance of what is at stake and of people involved in water withdrawal, water by the urgency (the need for quality information) ownership was concentrated in the hands of a few of decision-making. big owners, with the majority owning small quan- In the case of Tenerife, drilling, pumping, de- tities only. The big water owners become a real salination and water treatment technologies are ‘structural power’, with the power to lay down the now firmly entrenched and have secured the water rules of the game (water laws), to change them supply from the tap for any use, with no account and even to violate them with impunity. In sum, taken of aquifer sustainability management. Pol- the power to make water decisions. Attempts to icy has been nudging the choice of technology declare water a public good and to make coherent along a non-sustainable track. The water problem decisions to ensure (renewable) aquifer manage- in the Canaries can be described as a case of ment have generated important social conflicts, ‘organised irresponsibility’, to use Beck’s term particularly in the last decade, and resulted in the (Beck, 1991). The appearance given is that every- adoption in 1990 of the new Water Act 1990 thing is under control and water problems are which formally at least sets out the need for
244 F. Aguilera-Klink et al. / Ecological Economics 34 (2000) 233–245
sustainable management of the aquifer, and yet at been determined; how technological risk, environ-
the same time acknowledges something which is mental hazards and possible future scarcities have
totally incompatible with this goal, namely, recog- been addressed; the political choices behind the
nition of private ownership for the next 75. The institutions and the forms of compromise in the
permissive implementation of the Act reflects an social processes that have defined water environ-
implicit accord between water owners and certain mental valuation in Tenerife.
politicians, whereby groundwater is the property Any serious option to confront the situation of
of the owners until it is exhausted, and the au- ‘organised irresponsibility’ requires the opening of
thorities undertake to invest heavily in small public discussion fora to facilitate the diffusion of
reservoirs to store the winter surpluses of rainfall, information and to allow the re-creation of a
in waste water treatment and in sea water desali- social perception which was lost some years ago.
nation. The prevailing approach now is that This would serve to build a collective understand-
aquifer management is outdated and what are ing of the problems associated with sustainable
important now are new technologies, particularly management of the aquifer as well as the eco-
those for desalination. This approach has resulted nomic, social and environmental implications of
in, on the one hand, a reinforcement of water maintaining the current situation.
owners’ power (‘water is ours’) and, on the other,
the search for technological ‘solutions’ to the
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