The Iran Narrative: The Ideational Context of US Foreign Policy Decision-Making toward the Islamic Republic of Iran
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Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
The Iran Narrative:
The Ideational Context of US Foreign Policy Decision-
Making toward the Islamic Republic of Iran
Christopher Ferrero
John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations,
Seton Hall University
Abstract
The United States and Iran have been estranged for over thirty years. Conventional wis-
dom in the US holds that Iran is chiefly responsible given its threatening actions and harsh
rhetoric. Yet, between 1990 and 2003, Iran presented successive American presidents with
opportunities for rapprochement. Each declined to fully seize the opportunity. Why? This
article posits the causal significance of ideas and discourse in the United States. What the
author calls the Iran Narrative is comprised of the vast collection of frames, myths, carica-
tures, news reports, “expert” analyses, and ideas that cohere and portray Iran as a uniquely
evil, hostile, and irrational enemy of the United States. Domestic actors leverage the Narra-
tive to increase the political costs and reduce the normative desirability of rapprochement
with Iran. Perceptions of high political cost and low normative desirability dissuade
American presidents from more actively pursuing engagement with Iran. In this article,
the author tests the evidence for the existence of an Iran Narrative through a media con-
tent analysis and suggests that the Narrative has causal significance for policy decisions.
Further explication of the Narrative is an interdisciplinary task that ought to leverage the
tools of political science, psychology, anthropology, and other fields. The policy implica-
tions of the Iran Narrative are critical. If the Narrative does, indeed, constrain American
presidents from taking bold risks for peace with Iran, then a fuller explication and decon-
struction of the Iran Narrative is a necessary condition of rapprochement between Wash-
ington and Tehran.
Keywords
Iran, United States, Foreign Policy, Constructivism, Myth-Making, Narrative, Norms,
Framing, Middle East, Media, Terrorism, Public Discourse, Threat Perception
The camera pans a collection of vintage memorabilia and news clippings,
faintly echoing the epic clash between American wrestling hero Randy
“The Ram” Robinson and his arch-nemesis, The Ayatollah. So begins the
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/1573384X-2013010542 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
award-winning 2008 film The Wrestler, in which an aging Ram struggles to
find meaning in life and maintain relevance in his profession. The story
culminates in a reprise showdown with The Ayatollah. The Ayatollah en-
ters the ring and waves the Iranian flag to jeers—a clear villain in juxtapo-
sition to the honourable if tragic protagonist. The match does not begin
well for the American hero. The crowd bursts into chants of “USA!
USA!”—willing him to endure and strike back against the shared Iranian
enemy. As the tide inevitably turns, The Ram grabs the flag of the Islamic
Republic and, to raucous approval, emphatically shatters its staff over his
knee.1
The United States and Iran have been estranged for over thirty years.
This cinematic vignette illustrates how deeply the estrangement has per-
meated the American imagination. Yet, the underlying logic of this es-
trangement is not so clear-cut. The countries’ strategic interests have at
times coincided, and Iran has presented the United States with opportu-
nities for rapprochement.2 The United States has either rebuffed or failed
to seize each opportunity. Why? This question grows increasingly salient
as Iran reportedly moves closer to a nuclear weapon and as Israel and the
United States weigh increasingly coercive measures.
Western conventional wisdom holds that the responsibility for es-
trangement rests squarely on Tehran’s shoulders; Iran demonises the
United States and adamantly opposes reconciliation. However, a review of
successive American presidential administrations suggests otherwise.
Prior to President Obama, three successive presidents faced what many
Iran experts consider credible chances to repair relations with Tehran.
Each wavered or rejected the opportunity. I argue that an explanation for
this behaviour lies in American public discourse.
1
This film is not the only example of an Iranian being cast as a wrestling bad-guy. The
wildly popular Hulk Hogan defeated The Iron Sheik in 1984 to win the World Wrestling
Federation’s heavyweight title. Supposedly Iranian, the Sheik dressed and looked more
like a cartoonish Arab. This did not seem a problem for the actor who played the role, even
though he was an actual Iranian who had once served as a bodyguard for Shah Mоham-
mad Reza Pahlavi.
2
“Rapprochement” is defined as “a coming together again in friendship of former ene-
mies; and the reconciliation, restoration, and renewal of relations, especially between
states”, according to Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 2003, as cited in Komi-
ne 2008.Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 43
Though Iran certainly cannot be absolved of its inflammatory rhetoric
and its share of responsibility for the estrangement, the United States
holds its own destructive set of ideas about the Islamic Republic. I call this
set of ideas the Iran Narrative. The Iran Narrative is comprised of the vast
collection of frames, themes, myths, caricatures, news reports, “expert”
analyses, and ideas that cohere and portray Iran as a uniquely evil, hostile,
and irrational enemy of the United States. Domestic actors leverage the
Narrative to increase the political costs and reduce the normative desira-
bility of rapprochement with Iran. Perceptions of high political cost and
low normative desirability dissuade American presidents from more ac-
tively pursuing engagement with Iran.
I do not posit a single, purposive source of the Iran Narrative. To a
large extent, its genesis is a function of shared American experience, es-
pecially the trauma of helplessly witnessing the 1979 Iranian Revolution
and subsequent Tehran Embassy hostage crisis. This experience of inter-
subjective meaning construction with the new Islamist Iranian entity
could be metaphorically described as a “Big Bang” that unleashed a uni-
verse of ideas, stereotypes, and interpretive habits with regard to Iran in
American political life and discourse. This universe of ideational matter
has evolved through both witting and unwitting social and political pro-
cesses. Actors as diverse as Executive Branch policymakers, Members of
Congress, scholars, journalists, and lobbyists have played a role in sus-
taining the Narrative either through internalisation of, acquiescence to, or
purposive manipulation of the universe of negative ideas about Iran.
PUZZLE AND APPROACH: LEVERAGING FRAMING RESEARCH TO UNDERSTAND
FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign policy realists may scoff at the notion that ideas and discourse
explain the persistence of the US-Iran rivalry. Their alternative explana-
tions cite factors, such as the incompatibility of strategic interests and
hostile Iranian actions.3 Yet, cursory consideration of the strategic ben-
efits of rapprochement with Iran shows realism to be indeterminate in ex-
plaining American policy. The potential strategic benefits to the US of an
improved relationship with Iran are extensive. Rapprochement could aid
3
Pollack (2004), Takeyh (2006), and Parsi (2007) all effectively describe the realist logic
against US rapprochement with Iran.44 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
American efforts to achieve the long-sought objective of Israeli-Palestin-
ian peace by removing a critical source of funding and moral support for
extremists. It could buttress the development of friendly and sustainable
governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could enhance American efforts
to apprehend al-Qaeda and other terrorists. It could improve security in
the economically-vital Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, hedging against
any disruption in world energy supplies. Finally, it could reduce the risk of
costly arms races and war, most clearly manifested in the crisis sur-
rounding Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons programme. However, these
many benefits have not yet prompted America to embrace a comprehen-
sive peace process of its own with Tehran. Why? Is it because Iran is an in-
tractable foe? In fact, Iran has not been consistently hostile in its disposi-
tion. We must look beyond both geopolitical realism and the flaws of Iran
to fully understand the persistent American reticence.
I employ a two-part research strategy to measure the role of discourse
in US foreign policy toward Iran. I first conduct a content analysis of
mainstream media in order to establish the existence and nature of the
Iran Narrative. This content analysis employs nominal data and descrip-
tive statistics. Findings are presented as percentages; where appropriate, I
support the significance of my findings with the statistical method of chi
square testing.4 I then conduct historical process tracing to determine the
Narrative’s role in decision-making. My findings proffer strong evidence
for both the existence of the Iran Narrative and its causal role in prevent-
ing American presidents from taking fuller advantage of opportunities to
engage Tehran. This article is limited in scope to a demonstration and de-
4
A chi square goodness-of-fit test is a useful way to compare nominal, qualitative data
and assess probabilities. It examines whether frequency distributions fit predicted distri-
butions. I use the term “incidence” several times in the article as a synonym for frequency.
For example, how frequently a frame appears (in a single year or from year-to-year) is the
observed frequency distribution. The critical chi square that one calculates reveals the
chance that differences between expected and observed frequencies are random or statis-
tically insignificant. The problem with using a chi square test for my purposes is the rela-
tive subjectivity of establishing expected frequency distributions. Simple averages can be
used to establish empirical probabilities, but one must also account for changes in Iranian
behaviour that might affect observed and expected frequencies. I use chi square testing for
the terrorism frame because terror attacks are most easily quantified and because it is the
leading frame in the Narrative.Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 45
scription of the Iran Narrative. I provide limited, preliminary insight into
the Narrative’s policy significance. I intend to more fully explicate evi-
dence of the Narrative’s role in policy formation in a forthcoming series of
publications.
Why examine mainstream media coverage of Iran? Scholarly work in
the field of political communication suggests that through framing, politi-
cal, intellectual, and media elites influence public opinion of foreign af-
fairs in ways that ultimately effect presidential decision-making.
Framing is an intuitive concept that eludes a single definition (Druck-
man 2010). One of the most comprehensive definitions describes a frame
as “a central organising idea for news content that supplies a context and
suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclu-
sion, and elaboration” (Tankard 2001: 100-101). Orienting headlines, spe-
cific word choices, rhetorical devices, and narrative form are all charac-
teristics of frames (Druckman 2001: 227). Karen Johnson-Cartee refers to
frames as “the structuring devices of cultural narratives” (Johnson-Cartee
2005: 27). Frames make extensive use of the symbols, language, and values
of a political culture. The mass media is a primary source of frames. John-
son-Cartee thus argues that understanding the ‘construction of news’ is
critical to understanding public policy because “the dominant framing of
[a] public issue ultimately determines policy outcomes” (ibid.: 60).
James Druckman, a leading researcher of framing, breaks the concept
down into more digestible bits. Frames can be understood in two ways: as
rhetorical weapons (such as the spoken or written word) and as cognitive
structures (sets of ideas or frames of mind, for example) (Druckman 2010:
282). These two manifestations can be referred to as frames in communi-
cation and frames in thought, respectively. When a frame in communica-
tion—or a statement that places clear emphasis on particular considera-
tions—affects a person’s frame in thought, a framing effect has occurred
(ibid.: 283). For Druckman, individual preferences are a key variable of in-
terest when studying frames (ibid.: 280). What impact do frames have on
the preferences of voters and decision-makers? In the case of Iran policy,
do media and popular depictions, which emphasise terrorism or nuclear
weapons cause Americans to prefer estrangement to engagement? This is
an especially salient question in a democracy with a free press. As Dahl
states, “a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsive-46 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
ness of the government to the preferences of its citizens” (apud: Druck-
man 2001: 232).
Sometimes what is not said or reported is just as important as what is
said or reported. Tversky and Kahneman have shown that excluding cer-
tain information from a framed story can affect the way people interpret
an issue (apud: Maher 2001: 87). According to this logic, if a story selects
and deems relevant Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s infamous remark about
wiping Israel off the map but excludes and deems irrelevant Iran’s geopo-
litical environment and interests, readers should be expected to respond
more negatively to Iran’s nuclear programme than may otherwise be the
case.
Multiple scholars believe that news frames are especially important to
foreign policy. The media is the main educator of the public on foreign
affairs since most people have no direct experience with the issues. Wan-
ta, Golan, and Lee find that negative media portrayals of foreign countries
affect public opinion of those countries. Iran scores especially low in their
study of American news coverage and public opinion of multiple coun-
tries (Wanta et al.: 2004). Robert Entman states that “arguably, a few top
editors, correspondents, and editorialists exercise more sway over the
spread of ideas than all but the most powerful public officials” (Entman
2004: 11).
Finally, frames appear to matter to policymakers. Powlick and Katz
find that policy deliberations do not often involve empirical measures of
public opinion, such as polls; instead, decision-makers most often look to
the media and to each other (Entman 2004: 125-126). A 1998 Pew survey of
Congress, presidential appointees, and Senior Executive Service person-
nel found that media reports were more important than polls to officials’
perceptions of public opinion (ibid.: 126). Instead of reacting to polls
about foreign policy, Entman posits that decision-makers react to per-
ceived and anticipated majorities. Perceived majorities “consist of the
perceptions held by most journalists, political elites, and members of the
public themselves of just where the majority of the public stands,” while
anticipated majorities are projections of how the public will respond to a
prospective policy or outcome (ibid.: 127). Entman ultimately determines
that media frames can constrain realist foreign policies and that presiden-
tial consideration of the media and public opinion “has sometimes led theCh. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 47
US government to make or persist in foreign policies that do not ration-
ally maximise US interests” (ibid.: 164).
THREE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN US-IRAN RELATIONS
I limit the scope of my media content analysis to the fourteen-year period
of 1990 to 2003. I choose this timeframe because it coincides with three
opportunities for rapprochement spread across three presidential admin-
istrations.5 For each president and opportunity, I identify a “decision year”
(or in the case of Clinton, decision years) in which the administration laid
its cards on the table and in which the opportunity for rapprochement
passed unrealised. The missed opportunities are as follows:
OPPORTUNITY № 1 – The Post-Cold War Opportunity.
The George H. W. Bush (Bush 41) administration witnessed an historic
systemic geopolitical shift with the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat
of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. The US emerged as the world’s sole super-
power. Meanwhile, promising developments inside Iran included the
death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the rise of a pragmatic President Raf-
sanjani. Bush and Rafsanjani cooperated on releasing American hostages
in Lebanon and settled financial claims, yet an April 1992 policy review
judged that engagement of Iran would be too politically costly (Litwak
2000: 165). President Bush had famously assured Iran of “goodwill” should
it assist in securing the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. Rafsan-
jani was gravely disappointed when Bush failed to deliver.6 In October
1992, Bush signed the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, ushering in
the era of containing ostensibly rogue states (ibid.: 166). Why did Bush 41
pass on an apparent opportunity for improved relations in his decision
year of 1992, and why was engagement deemed too politically costly?
Could frames in thought or communication have played a role?
5
It is currently too soon to ascertain the impact of public discourse on Obama admin-
istration policy, but Trita Parsi (2012) offers an excellent, highly-informed analysis of the
evolution of Obama’s Iran policy.
6
United Nations diplomat Giandomenico Picco, who served as a special envoy to Raf-
sanjani during the hostage release efforts, gives an authoritative account of the Iranian
president’s desires, expectations, and reactions in his memoir (see Picco 1999).48 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
OPPORTUNITY № 2 – The Khatami Opportunity.
In 1993, the new Clinton administration quickly adopted a hard line
against Iran under the guise of Dual Containment.7 National Security Ad-
viser Anthony Lake warned in a famous 1994 Foreign Affairs article that
Iran was one of a new brand of “rogue states” that sought to undermine
international order by sponsoring terrorism and acquiring weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) (ibid.: 2). Clinton held this hard line until the
surprising 1997 election in Iran of a reformist president, Mohammad
Khatami. Khatami famously reached out in a January 1998 CNN interview
in which he called for a “Dialogue of Civilizations”. For the next two years,
the Clinton administration slowly rolled out tentative initiatives to im-
prove relations, culminating in the March 2000 lifting of sanctions on car-
pets and foodstuffs—Iran’s largest exports after oil. Yet, Khatami’s politi-
cal standing at home had declined by the summer of 1999, and with it the
opportunity for rapprochement. While Iran’s domestic politics certainly
played a role in the passing of this opportunity, can domestic American
political discourse help reveal why the Clinton administration acted tep-
idly? Khatami’s interlocutors had repeatedly stated that tangible gestures
were needed to help the new president maintain momentum for engage-
ment.8 Did the famously political Bill Clinton feel constrained by the
Narrative? Was he perhaps held back by the demonising rogue rhetoric
that his own administration contributed to the Narrative during the pre-
vious five years?
OPPORTUNITY № 3 – The Grand Bargain Opportunity.
The occupation of Iraq in 2003 completed an American encirclement of
Iran. The US military presence, coupled with threatening rhetoric about
regime change from the United States, moved Iran to propose terms for a
grand bargain in May 2003. The proposal had the unprecedented acquies-
7
Dual Containment is the name given to the Clinton administration’s policy of con-
taining both Iran and Iraq while focusing its engagement efforts on the Levant to resolve
the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict.
8
Interviews with Ruhi Ramazani and Shaul Bakhash, Spring 2011 (see also Slavin 2007:
186-187).Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 49
cence of Iran’s Supreme Leader.9 In it, Iran suggested that it would end its
support of Palestinian terrorist groups, advocate the disarmament of Hez-
bollah, assist in fighting and apprehending al-Qaeda, accept a Saudi plan
for comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace (thereby effectively recognising Is-
rael), actively work with the US to ensure the development of stable,
democratic, non-religious political institutions in Iraq, and open its nu-
clear programme to more intrusive inspections. In exchange, Iran asked
that the US recognise the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and its secu-
rity concerns, desist from rhetoric suggesting regime change, remove all
sanctions, support Iranian demands for war reparations from Iraq, assist
Tehran in apprehending members of an Iranian expatriate terrorist group,
and respect Iran’s right of full access to chemical, biological, and nuclear
technology (Parsi 2007: 243-247).10 The George W. Bush (Bush 43) admin-
istration rejected the proposal out of hand. Why did Bush 43 reject even
exploring a proposal that could have realised several longstanding US se-
curity objectives without having to fire a single additional shot?
The following sections go about establishing the existence and nature of
the Iran Narrative in order to eventually answer these questions about
American policy toward Iran.
CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Frames are the basic organizing structures of narratives (Johnson-Cartee
2005: 159). By analysing public discourse and the framing of Iran in
American mainstream news media, I seek not only to demonstrate that an
unflattering Narrative exists but also to determine whether any notewor-
thy counter-narrative might exist. If the mainstream news media portrays
Iran in a predominantly negative light that de-emphasizes Iran’s positive
gestures and security interests and emphasises Iran’s ideologically and
materially threatening disposition, then an anti-Iran narrative (Iran Nar-
rative) can be said to exist.
9
This remains a point of contention among scholars and officials, but multiple schol-
ars and officials have corroborated the claim directly to the author. The Supreme Leader’s
support was probably qualified by skepticism.
10
Copies of the proposal are available in the appendices of Parsi (2007) and Slavin
(2007).50 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
The timeframe of my content analysis matches the period of policy
decision-making which I analyse in forthcoming installments of my
broader research project. This enables time-series assessments of the rela-
tionship between public discourse and decision-making and between
public discourse and the actual facts of Iranian behaviour. Plotting
American presidents’ decisions against a time-series backdrop of media
depictions of Iran allows one to generate hypotheses about the effects of
an Iran Narrative on decision-making. It may also provide insight into
who is driving the Narrative. For example, if the Narrative spikes while
Clinton is cautiously pursuing engagement of Khatami, one might hy-
pothesise that the Narrative is driven by media elites or policy stakehold-
ers outside of the administration who oppose engagement. It is also pos-
sible that presidents are less purely reactive than some of the aforemen-
tioned scholars suggest; they might be participants in constructing the
Narrative—in which case the Narrative may be as much an instrument
and effect of policy as a cause. Should an administration-driven Narrative
appear to be the case at any point, this would yield the interesting ques-
tion of whether framing and rhetoric is a purely functional aspect of a
policy sales pitch or whether it reflects the actual beliefs of the country’s
top leaders.
As with any constructivist pursuit, endogeneity is nearly certain to rear
its head. Identifying a media-based Narrative does not tell us where the
Narrative comes from. The news media is, after all, a medium for public
officials, scholars, experts, and journalists alike to have their say. I attend
to this dilemma by coding not just for frames, but for actors cited by jour-
nalists. Do news articles depicting Iran as a terrorist state cite administra-
tion officials? Who are the talking heads on television? Are they scholars
or experts employed by think tanks with an ideological agenda? Are well-
intentioned and ostensibly objective journalists reflexively repeating
stock phrases and contributing half-wittingly to what William O. Beeman
(2008: 1) decries as “truth by repetition?”.
I examine 854 randomly-sampled mainstream news media items
(sampling units). I consider a sampling unit to be an individual news re-
port, editorial, op-ed, letter to the editor, or broadcast transcript. Two-
thirds of sampling units are from print media and include news articles,
editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editor from four major newspapers:Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 51
New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Washington
Times. Television broadcast transcripts constitute one-third of sampling
units and include transcripts from CBS News, NBC News, ABC News, Fox
News, CNN, and MSNBC. Overall, 41 percent of sampling units are ostensi-
bly objective print news reports, 26 percent are print opinion pieces, and
33 percent are television broadcast transcripts of either a straight news or
editorial variety. Sampling is conducted largely evenly across the fourteen
years of the study (1990-2003); the availability of relevant material from
certain sources leads to some variation in the number of sources analysed
for each year. Cable news channels are only included in the final few years
of the study given the late arrival of MSNBC and Fox News on the media
scene.11
I code sampling units for frames that would suggest either an unflat-
tering narrative (i.e., Iran is a fanatical, terror-sponsoring rogue state) or a
more sanguine counter-narrative (i.e., Iran is a normal state with legiti-
mate security concerns with which the US should engage). I code each
sampling unit for fifty attributes, including arguments, frames, and
sources (i.e. who is quoted/cited). If a sampling unit possesses an attribute
of interest, it receives a score of “1”. For example, if a sampling unit in-
cludes four references to Iran as a terrorist state, the code for Iran as a
supporter of terror receives a value of “1”, not a value of “4”. Codes/attrib-
utes include, but are not limited to: Iran is a threat, Iran supports terror-
ism, Iran seeks nuclear weapons/WMD, Iran opposes the Middle East
Peace Process (MEPP), Iran is a rogue actor, Iran is a fanatical/ideological
actor, Iran is a threat to Israel, Iran is undemocratic, Iran has standard ge-
opolitical interests, Iran has standard economic interests, Iran’s govern-
ment is moderating, Iran is a heterogeneous actor, Iran is complicit in
11
I choose the four listed newspapers because three are widely regarded as papers of
record and the fourth, the Washington Times, carries a significant readership in the na-
tion’s capital. While there has been a proliferation of Internet and video/ satellite/cable
sources for news, choosing mainstream media outlets reflects attention to the argument of
James Druckman (2001). He argues that citizens look to credible elite news sources for
guidance on how they should think about certain issues. For the period under study, I
judge the selected newspapers and television channels to have been the most popular and
ostensibly credible news sources in the United States—and thus most likely to have had
an impact on framing effects and policy formation.52 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
hostage-takings, the US should engage Iran, the US should pursue regime
change in Iran, the Iranian threat is exaggerated.
An overall coder reliability test returns a score of 84 percent. I provide
information about coder reliability scoring for each frame in the notes
below.12
The following section reveals the relative and cumulative frequency
distributions of these frames and attributes expressed as percentages.13
Complete content analysis data can be found in the Appendix.
12
I conduct an inter-coder reliability test by randomly selected ten percent of the me-
dia sample and providing it to two capable university students. Their coding reveals an 84
percent inter-coder reliability for the media content analysis overall. Two important
frames/attributes emerged as problematic: the Iran as Threat frame returns 65 percent in-
ter-coder reliability, and the Iran as Geopolitical Actor frame returns a coder reliability
score of 67,5 percent. While these individual scores are a little disappointing, they do not
necessarily undercut the study’s findings. The inter-coder reliability testers, themselves
relatively young Americans presumably exposed to the hypothesised Iran Narrative, inter-
pret more depictions than the author of Iran as a threatening, fanatical, rogue actor. As
such, the author may underestimate the extent to which these communicative frames are
present and affect frames of thought. The somewhat problematic frame of Iran as Geopo-
litical Actor (67,5% reliability) also leaves room for insight from the political communica-
tions and political psychology literatures. Druckman (2010: 284) writes that “strong frames
emphasise available considerations; a frame focused on unavailable considerations cannot
have an effect”. In other words, readers unfamiliar with the nuance of geopolitics may
have a difficult time recognizing when a state is engaged in realpolitik. Concepts, such as
threat, terror, and fanaticism are much more familiar and accessible to the average con-
sumer of news media—perhaps even to those with some university training. I provide my
working standard for applying the Geopolitical Actor code in a later footnote. The implica-
tion of this reliability test is that the author’s coding may over-represent the prominence
of the geopolitics frame. If true and if combined with the previous observation that inter-
coder reliability testers see Iran as more threatening and fanatical than the author, then
this article may actually underestimate the extent of the Iran Narrative. Individual scores
are as follows.
Complete inter-coder reliability scores are: Iran a Threat: 65%; Iran Supports Terrorism:
96%; Iran a Fanatical Actor: 77,5%; Iran a Geopolitical Actor: 67,5%; Iran a Rogue State:
81%; Iran Violates Human Rights: 94%; Iran Undemocratic: 87,5%; Iranian Threat Exag-
gerated: 99%; Iran a Heterogeneous Actor: 87,5%; Iranian Government Moderating: 85%;
Iranian People Moderating: 90%; Iran’s Internal Politics an Obstacle to Cooperation: 84%;
Iran Resistant to Cooperation: 82,5%; US-Iran Cooperation Reported: 76%; US Rational In-
terest in Cooperation with Iran: 82,5%; Iran Rational Interest in Cooperation with US:
84%; Iran and US Geopolitical Rivals: 76%; Favours Engagement: 82,5%; Favours Regime
Change: 93%.Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 53
CONTENT ANALYSIS FINDINGS
Iran remains the country Americans love to hate.
(Wall Street Journal news article, 3/18/1992)
Let's face it…in our country, all Americans are spies. And in your
country all Iranians are terrorists.
(Iranian diplomat, quoted in The Washington Post, 12/6/2000)
The essential question that this article asks is whether an anti-Iran narra-
tive (Iran Narrative) exists in the United States. I find that a predomi-
nantly negative Narrative about Iran does, indeed, exist in the main-
stream American news media for the period studied. According to the
Narrative, Iran is a threatening, fanatical, terror-sponsoring state that has
been complicit in the taking of hostages and seeks weapons of mass de-
struction. Iran is also depicted as a heterogeneous actor, yet nearly half of
these treatments of Iran as heterogeneous point to fanatical actors within
Iran who stand in the way of cooperation. While 16 percent of media
samples suggest that the Iranian government is moderating, 16 percent
equally suggest that Iran is intransigently resistant to cooperation.
TABLE 1
Most Common Frames/Themes, 1990 – 2003 (minimum 20 percent)
Frame/Theme Percentage
Iran supports terrorism 47%
Iran seeks nuclear weapons or WMD 34%
Iran is a threat 33%
Iran is a heterogeneous actor 28%
Iran is a fanatical/ideological actor 24%
Iran complicit in hostage-taking 23%
As Table 1 demonstrates, the most common frame encountered in
American media coverage of Iran is the frame of terrorism; nearly half of
the media sources collected for this study attribute terrorism to Iran (47
percent). Iran’s second greatest sin is its pursuit of weapons of mass de-
struction. One-third of media stories sampled between 1990 and 2003 cite
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons or “weapons of mass destruction”. This
13
As noted previously, the frames and attributes that I measure are a nominal form of
data and thus not amenable to extensive statistical analysis. However, where possible and
appropriate, I use chi square testing to support the significance of the descriptive data that
I present as evidence of the Iran Narrative.54 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
figure does not include separate and specific references to Iran’s ballistic
missile programme (12 percent) or chemical/biological weapons pro-
grammes (7 percent)―suggesting that 34 percent is a low measure of
overall concern about weapons of mass destruction. One-third (33 per-
cent) portray Iran as a threat and one-quarter (24 percent) portray it as a
fanatical actor. In comparison, only 4 percent judge the Iranian threat to
be exaggerated and 11 percent portray Iran as a geopolitical actor with
standard state interests. Iran’s complicity in the taking of hostages―
whether it is the 1979-1981 Embassy Hostage crisis in Tehran or the taking
of Americans by purported Iranian clients in Lebanon―remains notably
salient throughout the period of study. The hostages garner the most cov-
erage during the first two years of the study leading up to the release of
Terry Anderson in December 1991, yet references to the hostage crises oc-
cur at a rate of 20 percent or higher for seven of the remaining twelve
years of the study (a high figure relative to other codes), including 28 per-
cent in 2001. These findings lend credence to the idea that the hostage cri-
ses still weigh heavily on the American psyche and remain a cornerstone
of the Iran Narrative.
The prevalence of most of these negative frames is unsurprising, but
the relative scarcity of other negative frames is somewhat surprising to
the author. One surprise is the scarcity of the “Iran is a threat to Israel”
frame. Only 11 percent explicitly depict Iran as a threat to Israel (this, inci-
dentally, is equal to the percentage that depicts Iran as having standard
geopolitical interests), and only 12 percent explicitly presents Iran as op-
posed to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).14 Depictions of Iran as
opposed to the MEPP fall in between depictions of it as a rogue state/
voutlaw (13 percent) and violator of human rights (11 percent). Perhaps
most remarkably, more media coverage suggests that the Iranian threat is
exaggerated (4 percent) than explicitly suggests that Iran wants to de-
stroy, nuke, or “wipe Israel off the map” (2 percent).
Another somewhat surprising finding is that equal numbers favour
engagement and regime change (8 percent). There is also symmetry in the
numbers positing a rational Iranian and a rational American interest in
14
It is worth noting, however, that an Iranian threat to Israel is implied in many of the
sampling units depicting Iran as a sponsor of terrorism.Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 55
cooperation (10 percent). Unfortunately for those who favour engage-
ment, these figures suggest that no more than 1 in 10 media treatments of
Iran suggest that the US should be doing more to improve relations.
WHO IS FRAMING IRAN?
Responsibility for the Narrative is fairly evenly distributed across print
news, print opinion, and television (see Table 2). Print opinion offers the
most diversity.15 It leads the way in depicting Iran as a fanatical state in
pursuit of WMD but also leads in arguing that the Iranian threat is exag-
gerated, that the US has a rational interest in cooperation, and that the US
should engage Iran.
Somewhat surprisingly, cable television’s arguably most conservative
and sensational news network, Fox News, does no more than other cable
and Big Three networks to perpetuate the Narrative, with the notable ex-
ception of regime change advocacy.
TABLE 2
COMPARING MEDIA SOURCES
MEDIA SOURCE: Newspaper Report Newspaper Television
Opinion/Editorial
Share of Overall Sample: 354 221 279
Frame/Argument
Iran a Threat 120 (34%) 77 (35%) 98 (35%)
Iran Supports Terrorism 156 (44%) 109 (49%) 135 (48%)
Iran Seeks Nukes or WMD 122 (34%) 81 (37%) 88 (32%)
Iran a Fanatical Actor 72 (20%) 67 (30%) 67 (24%)
Complicity in Hostage-Taking 100 (28%) 38 (17%) 58 (21%)
Iran Threat Exaggerated 11 (3%) 14 (6%) 5 (2%)
Rational US Interest in Co-op 30 (8%) 29 (13%) 29 (10%)
Favours Engagement 18 (5%) 33 (15%) 16 (6%)
Favours Regime Change 7 (2%) 27 (12%) 35 (13%)
The views of the President of the United States are cited in few sam-
pling units (6 percent). Likewise, the opinions of members of Congress are
cited in only 6 percent of sampled sources. When the media have sought
15
Given the increasingly partisan and sensational tone of American cable television
news over the last decade, the author would be unsurprised to find that television has be-
come a more extreme purveyor of Narrative frames if the study were to be extended be-
yond 2003.56 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
specialised opinion, they have turned most often to scholars and other
purported experts outside of government―and to administration offi-
cials. Scholarly/expert opinion appears in 21 percent of sampling units for
this study, and administration officials are cited in 17 percent of units.
What I call “scholar-experts” are members of universities, think tanks, and
professional associations. They are also former government or military
officials employed as expert analysts and commentators by the television
networks.16 Administration officials include Cabinet officials and official
spokesmen, as well as the ubiquitous anonymous “administration offi-
cial”.
TABLE 3
SCHOLAR/EXPERT AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL CONTRIBUTION TO LEADING
NEGATIVE FRAMES
(Expressed as Percentage)
Year à 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Tot.
Terror +
17 29 14 25 33 31 22 18 40 12 10 11 24 33 23%
Admin Official
Terror +
33 7 29 21 33 10 11 29 0 24 10 31 48 44 26%
Scholar/Expert
Nukes/WMD +
0 100 50 50 56 37 38 16 35 0 18 22 22 25 29%
Admin Official
Nukes/WMD +
0 25 17 14 67 8 6 37 6 17 27 28 41 37 26%
Scholar/Expert
Fanatic. Actor +
13 38 7 33 29 31 0 13 9 5 10 0 14 22 17%
Admin Official
Fanatic. Actor +
53 23 21 22 41 8 0 20 0 5 30 25 57 50 26%
Scholar/Expert
This table shows the confluence of leading frames and citations of administration offi-
cials and scholars/experts. For example, in 1990, 17 percent of sampling units that pre-
sented Iran as a terrorist state also cited an administration official; 33 percent of units
employing the terrorism frame in 1990 cited a scholar/expert. This suggests that “scholar-
experts” did more than administration officials in 1990 to present Iran as a terrorist state.
Scholar-experts and administration officials undoubtedly play a role in
the Narrative. Scholar-experts are cited in over one-quarter of sampling
units that frame Iran as a terror sponsor, as a fanatical actor, and as a
16
Perhaps a more cynical―and sometimes accurate―title for such figures would be
“pundit”.Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 57
seeker of nuclear weapons/WMD (26 percent for each of the three
frames). Administration officials are cited in nearly 30 percent of sam-
pling units that portray Iran as a nuclear/WMD seeker and in nearly a
quarter of those that associate Iran with terrorism. Overall, administra-
tion officials appear to have done more than scholar-experts over the
years to perpetuate the frame of Iran as a weapons-of-mass-destruction
proliferator, while scholar-experts have done more than administration
officials to paint Iran as a fanatical terrorist state. I provide more detail
about select frames in the following subsections, including preliminary
observations about how well they track with actual events and with
American presidents’ respective dispositions toward Iran.
TERRORISM
Iran was consistently portrayed as a sponsor of terrorism from 1990 to
2003. More than 50 percent of coverage in seven of the fourteen years of
the study made reference to Iran’s terror links. Terrorism appeared in
more than a quarter of media coverage for every year except 1999, when
the terror frame fell to 22 percent (which still qualified it as a leading
theme for that year along with Iranian heterogeneity).
The terrorism frame was most prominent during the Bush 43 admin-
istration; an average of 61 percent of stories about Iran mentioned terror-
ism during the period of 2001-2003. This may be a function of the salience
of terrorism to Americans after the attacks of September 11, 2001. It may
also be a function of Iran’s actual support for terrorism. Though Iran had
no role in the 9/11 attacks, it is known to support Hezbollah and Palestin-
ian rejectionist groups. Terrorism-related deaths in Israel more than
quadrupled from 2000 to 2001 with the launch of the Second Intifada, and
more than doubled from 2001 to 2002 before returning to 2001 levels in
2003.17 Iran’s precise contribution to these deaths cannot be determined,
but the figures are a suggestive proxy. However, the content of news cov-
erage does not instill faith that reporting is based purely or even pre-
dominantly in fact. Very little corroborating evidence is used to support
boiler-plate claims that Iran supports terrorism. The only specific affront
cited in reference to Iran’s involvement in the Levant is the Karine-A af-
17
“Chronology of Terrorist Attacks in Israel” by Wm. Robert Johnston, http://www.
johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/terrisraelsum.html.58 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
fair. Not a single reference is made to the Second Intifada or Iranian sup-
port for specific attacks. Though I do not code for references to Levantine
terrorist groups, I notice their conspicuous absence from Bush 43-era dis-
course relative to al Qaeda―a group to which Iran can be much less con-
vincingly tied.18
The most likely explanation for the increase in the terrorism frame
during this period of 2001-2003 is the strategic and ideological disposition
of the Bush administration and the elevation of neoconservatives to posi-
tions of power both in government and in public discourse. Administra-
tion officials’ contribution to the terrorism frame increased from 11 per-
cent in 2001 to 33 percent in 2003. Scholar-experts also did far more than
they had previously to paint Iran as a terrorist state in op-eds and on tele-
vision (high of 48 percent in 2002). Indeed, a chi square goodness of fit
test demonstrates statistically―with a level of confidence over 95 per-
cent―that the increase in incidence of the terrorism frame under George
W. Bush is neither random nor proportional to the facts of Iranian be-
haviour.19
18
Various scholars and analysts report that al-Qaeda members are in Iran, but the na-
ture of their relationship with the government is in question (for a recent analysis, see
Jones 2012).
19
The average incidence of the terrorism frame during the second Clinton administra-
tion (1997-2000) is 41,5 percent. This period corresponds to the presidency of Mohammad
Khatami in Iran. This figure of 41,5 percent can serve as a basis for projecting the expected
frequency of the terrorism frame under Bush, holding the Khatami presidency and Iranian
behaviour largely constant. During the Bush administration, the Second Intifada wrought
havoc in Israel, and the 9/11 attacks occurred. Yet, Iran was not implicated in the 9/11 at-
tacks, and as mentioned in the body of the article, media sources failed to detail Iranian
involvement in any attacks on Israel. Moreover, Iran cooperated with the US in its wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Including these situational factors in a measure of subjective proba-
bility, we could generously boost our expectation of terror frame frequency under Bush to
50 percent, which exceeds by 3 percent the average incidence for the entire study. When
working with this figure and comparing expected versus observed incidence, I calculate a
critical chi square of 4,857, meaning that I can reject with over a 95 percent level of confi-
dence the null hypothesis that the spike in the terrorism frame is random or a clear func-
tion of Iranian behaviour. Instead, the statistical analysis supports the idea that the Bush
administration deliberately harnessed the Narrative to support hardline policies against
Iran.Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 59
The first Clinton administration was also characterised by high inci-
dence of the terror frame; an average of 54 percent of stories about Iran
from 1993 to 1996 referenced terrorism. Single-year highs for the entire
study were reached in 1996 and 1997, when 67 percent of stories attributed
terrorism to Iran. Incidence of the terrorism frame first surpassed 50 per-
cent in 1993, the first year of the Clinton administration (after having
stood at 27 percent in 1992). President Clinton promulgated Dual Con-
tainment in May of 1993, and administration officials’ contributions to the
terror frame rose from 14 to 25 percent―suggesting a role for the Clinton
administration in fostering the Narrative.
The facts of Iran’s behaviour may, prima facie, have something to do
with the increased incidence of the terrorism frame in 1993. Trita Parsi, a
highly-regarded scholar of Iran-Israel relations, notes that Iran first began
providing operational support to Palestinian rejectionist groups during
this year. This support, however, did not begin until late in the year―after
the signing of the Oslo Accords in September, (nearly five months after
the articulation of Dual Containment) (Parsi 2007: 174-177). According to
Israeli Foreign Ministry figures, only eleven more people died in Israel
from terrorism in 1993 (45) than in 1992 (34).20 Even if one accounts for
this increase in terror-related deaths, the leap in incidence of the terror-
ism frame exceeds statistical expectations with utter certainty (0,0010
level of confidence).21
Deaths and injuries from terrorism in Israel would skyrocket in 1994
(109 dead, 456 injured). Curiously, incidence of the terrorism frame
20
“Chronology of Terrorist Attacks in Israel” by Wm. Robert Johnston, http://www.
johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/terrisraelsum.html.
21
The terrorism frame averaged 26 percent during the three years of the Bush 41
administration included in this study (1990-92). The incidence doubled to 52 percent in
1993, the first year of the Clinton presidency. I use a chi square goodness of fit test to ascer-
tain whether this increase is random or can be plausibly written off as a function of
changed Iranian behaviour. Using the 1992 incidence of 27 percent and accounting propor-
tionally for the 32 percent increase in terror-related deaths in Israel in 1993 (32% increase
over 27 = 8), I estimate an expected frequency of the terrorism frame in 1993 of 35 percent.
The observed frequency is 52 percent. The observed and expected frequencies yield a criti-
cal chi square score of 12.7, which is well in excess of the 10,828 score required to establish
virtual one-hundred percent certainty of statistical significance (0,0010 level of confi-
dence).60 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
dropped to 41 percent in 1994. Deaths in Israel then dropped off to fewer
than 100 per year for the balance of the first Clinton administration
(though injures remained in the hundreds). In 1997, when the terrorism
frame reached a peak of 67 percent, Israel sustained the fewest terror-re-
lated deaths (41) of the entire Clinton presidency to that point. As in 1993,
the reporting and the discourse did not match the facts on the ground.
One might hypothesise that these inconsistencies are attributable to
lagging or cumulative effects. By 1997, discourse may have only been
showing the fatigue and disgust of Americans in response to Iranian-
sponsored mayhem. But Israel was not the sole or even major focus of
media stories depicting Iran as a terrorist state. The high incidence of the
terrorism frame in 1996 and 1997 can be largely attributed to the June 1996
bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the media engaged in
widespread conjecture about Iranian involvement in the attack. Yet,
overall, as with the Bush 43 administration, conspicuously little corrobo-
rating evidence accompanies boiler-plate claims about Iran’s support for
terrorism during Clinton’s first term. Not a single sampling unit references
a specific suicide or other attack in Israel that Iran is presumed to have
supported. The Clinton administration appeared to be well out in front of
the actual terrorism threat from Iran in 1993, and rhetoric does not seem
to have consistently reflected the facts for the remainder of his first four
years. As with Bush 43, it appears the case can be made that the first Clin-
ton administration worked to frame Iran as a terrorist state in order to
buttress a hard line policy.
Depictions of Iran as a terror sponsor dropped in 1998 to their lowest
level (38 percent) since the Bush 41 administration. Incidence of the terror
frame fell to a study-low 22 percent in 1999 before returning to 1998 levels
(39 percent) in 2000. This drop-off corresponded with the rise of a moder-
ate Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, as well as a marked decline
in Israeli terror casualties. Half as many terrorism stories in the media
cited administration officials in 1999 (17 percent) as in 1997 (34 percent),
suggesting that the Clinton administration sought to rein in the terrorism
frame. Indeed, Kenneth Pollack suggests as much. Ironically, Saudi Arabia
provided evidence of Iranian complicity in the Khobar Towers attack in
1999, the year in which the terrorism frame reached its lowest frequency.
The Clinton administration downplayed the information about KhobarCh. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 61
Towers and declined retaliation against Tehran, judging that to air or act
on grievances would undermine Khatami, as well as make it harder to
pursue engagement. Says Pollack: “In the partisan atmosphere… White
House political advisers were concerned that the president’s opponents
would seize on this evidence [re: Khobar] to go after him again” (Pollack
2004: 324). After years of painting Iran as a frontline terrorist state, Clin-
ton seemed concerned that such an image of Iran would hamstring his al-
ready tenuous efforts to reach out to Khatami.
The Bush 41 administration saw the lowest incidence of the terrorism
frame, which remained consistent from 1990 to 1992 at an average of 26
percent.
CHART
1
Incidence
of
the
Terrorism
Frame
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Iran
S upports
Terror
FANATICAL VERSUS GEOPOLITICAL ACTOR
As noted above, “Iran as fanatical/ideological actor” is one of the most
common frames revealed by the study. It is perhaps most interesting to
examine this frame in comparison to the standard frame used by real-
ists―that of states as geopolitical actors.22 The study begins with a rela-
tively high incidence of the fanatical frame in 1990 (33 percent). The
frame declines for the balance of the Bush 41 administration (but dips no
lower than 25 percent). On balance, Iran is depicted as more of a geo-
political than fanatical actor during the Bush 41 years. The frames receive
equal time in 1990 and 1992; in 1991, Iran is portrayed as more geopolitical
(38 percent) than fanatical (25 percent). Incidence of Iran as a geopolitical
22
I determine that Iran is being portrayed as a geopolitical actor if a sampling unit de-
scribes Iran as seeking or expressing concern about its sovereignty and physical security
(i.e., security dilemma). Attempts to acquire material assets and to utilize such material
and/or diplomatic assets in a conventional (non-ideological) manner consistent with re-
alism are also indicators used to apply the code of Iran as Geopolitical Actor.62 Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76
actor plummets during the Clinton years. The geopolitical frame enjoys a
brief renaissance during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars of the early 2000s,
but it never comes close to the levels of the Bush 41 administration. In-
stead, Iran is consistently portrayed as more fanatical than geopolitical
during the Clinton and Bush 43 years. The highest incidence of the fanati-
cism frame occurs in 1993 and 1994 (39 percent), and the largest gap with
the geopolitics frame occurs in 1994, the springtime of Dual Containment.
CHART
2
Iran:
Fanatical
or
Geopolitical
Actor?
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Fanatical/Ideological
Actor Geopolitical
Actor
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Iran as seeker of nuclear weapons or “weapons of mass destruction”
(WMD) in general is the second most frequent frame in media coverage of
Iran. The issue barely registers until the Bush 41 decision year of 1992,
when 23 percent of stories about Iran mention nuclear weapons or WMD
(compared to 8 percent in 1991 and zero in 1990). All stories in 1991 por-
traying Iran as a proliferator cite administration officials. Concern over
Iran’s pursuit of WMD never drops below 20 percent for the balance of the
study, and reaches highs of 73 percent in 1995 (height of Dual Con-
tainment) and 79 percent in 2003 (Bush 43 decision year and height of US
military achievement in Middle East). Concern over Iranian proliferation
is even greater than these figures indicate when factoring separate codes
for ballistic missiles and chemical/biological weapons. Overall, 12 percent
of sampling units express specific concern about Iran’s ballistic missile
pursuits, and 7 percent express specific concern about chemical and bio-
logical weapons. These incidents in some cases overlap with incidence of
nuclear weapons and “weapons of mass destruction”.Ch. Ferrero / Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013) 41-76 63
For Bush 41 and Bush 43, the nuclear/WMD frame reaches highs in the
respective decision years of 1992 and 2003. Whether these highs are a
cause or a symptom of decisions to forego rapprochement is an issue for
further examination. Concern about nuclear weapons/WMD averages 46
percent in the three years preceding the Clinton decision years of 1998-
2000; it drops almost in half―to an average of 24 percent―during those
decision years. Iran did not experience any known technical setback in its
nuclear programme that would warrant such a decrease in concern. Inci-
dence of the nuclear weapons/WMD frame instead seems linked to
changing political circumstances; the decrease in incidence tracks with
the rise of Khatami and Clinton’s cautious efforts to reach out. Indeed, not
a single sampled media source that mentions Iran’s nuclear or WMD pur-
suits in 1999 cites a Clinton administration official.
IRAN AS A THREAT
Iran barely registers as a threat in the first two years of the study; only 7
percent of sampling units depict it as a threat in 1990 and only 2 percent
do so in 1991. Incidence of framing Iran as a threat jumps to 38 percent in
the Bush 41 decision year of 1992. It rises again considerably to 63 percent
in 1993, the year that Clinton rolls out Dual Containment. The “Iran as
threat” frame reaches a study-high of 77 percent during Dual Contain-
ment in 1995 and a study-low of 13 percent in 1999, the core period of Clin-
ton’s decision years of feeling out engagement. Incidence of the threat
frame begins to rise in 2000 and shoots up to 48 percent in 2002 and 49
percent in 2003.
IRANIAN OPPOSITION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS (MEPP)
Iranian opposition to the MEPP is clearly, to even a casual observer of
news coverage of Iran, part of the trinity of Iran’s major sins alongside
support for terrorism and pursuit of WMD. It is thus surprising to see how
relatively few sampling units specifically mention Tehran’s opposition to
the Peace Process. Only 12 percent of sampled media sources for the en-
tire study address this issue, with a high of 37 percent in 1997, the year
before Clinton’s decision years.
The “Opposition to Middle East Peace” frame reaches its lowest level
since 1991 during the Bush 43 administration. The frame appears in only 6
percent of news coverage of Iran from 2001 to 2003 despite the Second In-You can also read
