The COVID Food Insecurity Crisis in the Western Cape: The Seed for Community Economic Development? - South ...
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The COVID Food Insecurity Crisis in the Western Cape: The Seed for Community Economic Development?
Acknowledgements The Development Works Changemakers (DWC) Research and Evaluation team would like to express sincere thanks to the South African Cities Network (SACN) and the Western Cape Economic Development Programme (EDP). Thank you to all who shared their personal experiences and reflections with us. Case study conducted by: Development Works Changemakers (Pty) Ltd Report prepared by: Lindy Briginshaw – CEO and Founder Alison Goldstuck – Project Coordinator/Senior Researcher Fia van Rensburg – Senior Researcher Visual animation: Camilla Tait Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 2 of 29
Contents Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................. 2 Contents ............................................................................................................................................................... 3 Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 4 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 5 Contextualisation of the Western Cape Food Relief Intervention ........................................................................ 6 Design Principles of the Western Cape COVID-19 Food Relief Intervention .................................................. 6 Pre-COVID Food Insecurity Levels and Safety Net in the Western Cape ....................................................... 8 COVID’s Disruptive Impact on Food Relief Interventions .................................................................................... 9 COVID’s Impact on the Western Cape Food Relief System ............................................................................ 9 Lessons from National and Western Cape Food Relief Efforts during COVID .............................................. 12 The Western Cape Food Relief System: A Cooperative Governance Network Model ..................................... 13 The Public Sector Actors ................................................................................................................................ 13 Intermediary Actor........................................................................................................................................... 14 Macro-level Aggregators and Distributors ...................................................................................................... 14 Community-oriented ‘Last Mile’ Actors ........................................................................................................... 14 The Cooperative Governance Network Model in Practice ................................................................................. 15 Vouchers for Community Kitchens and for Economic Recovery Initiatives ................................................... 15 The Food Relief Forum ................................................................................................................................... 19 Western Cape Food Relief Governance Insights ........................................................................................... 23 Conclusion and Governance Agenda Focus Areas ........................................................................................... 23 Facilitate Greater Collaboration of Network Actors ........................................................................................ 25 Work with Informality Better ............................................................................................................................ 25 Encourage Municipalities to Get More Involved in Food Security Solutions .................................................. 26 Appendices ......................................................................................................................................................... 27 Case Study Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 27 References ......................................................................................................................................................... 29 Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 3 of 29
Acronyms and Abbreviations BEE Black Economic Empowerment CAN Community Action Network CBO Community-based Organisation CoCT City of Cape Town CNDC Community Nutrition and Development Centre CSO Civil Society Organisation CTT Cape Town Together DBE Department of Basic Education DEDAT Department of Economic Development and Tourism (Western Cape Government) DGMT DG Murray Trust DNA Organisation’s ethos DSD Department of Social Development DWC Development Works Changemakers ECD Early Childhood Development EDP Economic Development Partnership FRF Food Relief Forum HCC Humanitarian Cluster Committee HOD Head of Department HSRC Human Sciences Research Council ICT Information Computer Technology NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NPO Non-Profit Organisation NSNP National School Nutrition Programme OTP Office of the Premier SACN South African Cities Network SASSA South African Social Security Agency SMME Small Medium Micro Enterprise Stats SA Statistics South Africa WCG Western Cape Government Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 4 of 29
Introduction
The focus of this case study is cooperative governance when a system is catapulted into crisis mode. The
COVID-19-related lockdown created a chronic food insecurity problem when national government food relief
distribution channels closed. Food insecurity was already a persistent problem in the Western Cape, but the
COVID-19 lockdown accelerated the need and demand for food relief on an unprecedented scale. The Western
Cape Government (WCG) and municipalities, civil society, individuals and the private sector came together and
mobilised their resources jointly to address the growing food insecurity under the banner of a ‘one government’
and ‘whole-of-society’ approach.
Actors organically formed a food relief network with two equally important objectives: to provide immediate food
relief by distributing food parcels and meals in the Western Cape, primarily in the Cape Town city-region; and
to encourage community agency, by empowering community-based organisations (CBOs) and giving
individuals choices to help build dignity. In this way, the role of communities shifted from being passive recipients
to being partners in co-designing and co-implementing food interventions.
This case study investigates how cooperative governance enabled the food relief network to use the food crisis
as an opportunity for social, organisational and technological innovation. More specifically, it examines how
cooperative governance facilitated identifying what needed to be done and by whom (i.e. who was best
positioned), mobilising resources jointly to move into action swiftly as a team, and integrating project learnings
during implementation. The following initiatives illustrate a cooperative governance model working in practice:
• The Food Relief Forum (FRF), a government-led mechanism for coordinating and jointly mobilising
resources.
• Community-led food relief interventions, which started with the Community Kitchens Programme and
evolved into the Community Economic Recovery Programme.
Lastly, the case study asks how can the goodwill and momentum from the crisis be repackaged into the next
iteration before network partners become fatigued and the energy dissipates.
Governance is interpreted not as rule-based compliance, but as understanding how a system’s configuration
informs the selection, implementation and outcomes of interventions. Such an interpretation favours a narrative
approach, and so the case study is written from the perspective and in the voice of practitioners operating at
local government and community levels. Despite the case study’s multi-stakeholder perspective, the main voice
is that of an intermediary: the Economic Development Partnership (EDP). The EDP’s main role is “helping ‘top-
down’ government programmes better connect with ‘bottom-up’ community efforts”1.
The case study examines the governance issues facing the EDP and network partners in providing food support
in the Cape Town city-region between March and November 2020. The analysis explores governance strengths,
challenges, missing capabilities and bottlenecks. To achieve a balanced view, the case study is used as a
transformative tool to encourage innovation and ‘doing things differently’.
The case study also brings together the seemingly unrelated policy spaces of promoting township economies
and addressing food insecurity. This is because mobilising and operating a community kitchen require similar
skills to being a business owner, i.e. having to interface with the government system, forming networks for
accessing resources, managing stock and providing a service. Furthermore, addressing food insecurity requires
a different approach to the traditional short-term emergency measures, such as food parcels and meal
distribution, where communities are recipients. When communities are viewed as part of the food provision
system, food insecurity becomes no longer a welfare issue but an opportunity for developing local economies.
In township economies, existing social-cultural capital and outside investment together provide the conditions
for diverse socioeconomic activities. Community kitchens have a similar goal to township economies, that of
developing social-organisational capital and crowding resources into communities.
The case study is contextualised by looking at the macro and micro factors that influenced how actors in the
Western Cape (predominately in the Cape Town city-region) mobilised a food relief network during the COVID-
19 pandemic. It begins by describing the township economies framework project that influenced the design of
the food relief network, and summarising food insecurity trends in the Western Cape compared to South Africa.
The disruptive impact of COVID on the national food relief system is then explained, highlighting interventions
led by the food relief network to address chronic food insecurity in the Cape Town city-region when the national
system shut down. After presenting an overview of the food relief network’s cooperative governance network
1
https://wcedp.co.za/introduction/
Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 5 of 29model, which involves unpacking the working relationships among actors from a theoretical perspective, the model is applied to the community kitchens initiative, the community economic recovery project and the FRF. The governance insights are then synthesised, and the conclusion highlights governance agenda points for further action. Contextualisation of the Western Cape Food Relief Intervention To understand why and how COVID-19 put food relief programmes under strain and what enabled the Western Cape to respond quickly and co-create an alternative food relief system requires examining the macro and micro issues. Macro issues, such as the extent of food insecurity in the Western Cape and the existing pre-COVID food relief system, provide the basis for understanding the disruptive effect of COVID that resulted in existing feeding programmes being shut down. The micro issues concern the principles that informed the design and implementation of the food relief interventions in the Western Cape. The township economies project provided organisational innovations for creating processes that bring diverse people together to provide ‘real-life’ solutions and quickly move into joint action. These innovations informed the design of the food relief intervention’s working arrangements. Understanding the township economies project provides the background to appreciate why the Western Cape food relief intervention chose a cooperative governance network model, and how this model evolved as the food crisis unfolded during the COVID lockdown. Design Principles of the Western Cape COVID-19 Food Relief Intervention2 The Western Cape is home to a network of academics, politicians, officials and practitioners from the WCG, City of Cape Town (COCT), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) think-tanks, university research centres and consultancies that specialise in township economies. Network members are prolific and regularly publish reports in their own spaces, but collaboration among network members is limited. They have not used their collective knowledge to co-create a township economies development framework or identify joint actions to fast- track township economy development. This lack of integration within the network is reflected in the policy space. Neither the WCG nor the COCT have a township economy strategy, although township economy issues are covered in various departmental strategies. For instance, spatial planning looks at better integration via nodes and corridors; economic development focuses on entrepreneurship, SMME development, ICT connectivity, and the cost of doing business; social development prioritises supporting CBOs, food gardens and social welfare services; while human settlements deals with housing and basic infrastructure. Between August and November 2018, the Department of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDAT) of the WCG, the COCT3, the Human Sciences Research Council4 (HSRC) and the EDP5 pooled their resources to implement a township economies project, based on a multi-disciplinary, participatory, experience-based approach. Project participants were drawn from public, private, civil society and research sectors, and so had different professional backgrounds and diverse experiences with township economies. The project’s purpose was to develop a framework that synthesised network members’ insights to gain a deeper appreciation 6 of the dynamics and complexities of township economies; and to stimulate policy change and action through creating a shared vision of township economies among participants and giving them a toolkit to steer their actions. The methodology was a literature review, a survey of recent projects/initiatives in the Western Cape and four workshops. Two workshops took the form of site visits, which influenced the depth of conversations, as participants experienced the environment together. This created a shared experience from which to appreciate the environment, develop a common vision and co-create interventions. Also, conversations were more action- and solution-orientated and less prone to becoming bogged down in technical detail that can hinder innovation. Insights from the research process were compiled into a township economies framework that comprises three pillars required for township economies to develop and thrive: 2 This section is based on the township economies paper published by the HSRC and EDP (2019). 3 DEDAT and the COCT sponsored the project and facilitated township visits for participants to experience local conditions. 4 The HSRC conducted the research and drafted reports. 5 The EDP acted as a ‘convener’ and ‘intermediary’ by bringing people together, facilitating conversations and reflection and focusing participants’ attention on “so what does this mean” when technical details obscured the ‘bigger picture’. 6 People need to re-imagine township economies beyond survivalist-informal traders, and see these spaces as vibrant communities comprising township residents, entrepreneurs and community-based organisations that have complementary resources and skills. Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 6 of 29
i. Productive places: The creation of spaces where people can live, work and socialise, and that have
density, diversity and connectivity.
ii. Capable enterprises: The ability for businesses to tap into networks in order to access resources that
support their development and growth.
iii. Resilient social fabric: Community networks and organisation, the stability of the local society (especially
safety and security) and the existence of social capital.
The convergence of these three pillars unleashes a positive momentum that unlocks social capital in townships
and attracts external resources, both physical and intangible. Although not explicitly stated, the framework
assumes that economic development in townships is a complex, non-linear journey where many iterations are
made in response to external events and internal learnings.
Five lessons from the township economies project influenced the design and implementation of the EDP’s food
security intervention both during and post the COVID lockdown.
Context matters and drives strategy formation
Every township economy has different dynamics, and so “a standard packaged solution just won’t work because
of the unique specificities of each location 7” (HSRC and EDP, 2019: 3). As local insight is essential for
appreciating and understanding how to harness these dynamics, interventions must be designed from the
bottom-up, drawing on local community insights and in partnership with communities. In addition, a revitalisation
strategy must be based on “the relationship between the township and its wider urban context” (ibid: 3).
Therefore, the issue is not whether a bottom-up or top-down development approach is better, but how the two
approaches can be coordinated to achieve the best result. Ideally, they should meet in the middle, with the
bottom-up approach setting and implementing the framework, and the top-down approach helping to channel
resources into townships.
Township development requires an all-of-society approach
Township development interventions have followed a start-stop pattern, where (for instance) a government
agency invests in housing and, a few months later, another government agency starts a business centre. This
experience is at odds with socioeconomic success stories. Transforming areas requires all the parts coming
together to produce positive feedback loops, which in turn generate virtuous cycles of resource mobilisation,
implementation, monitoring, learning and evolution. Crowding resources into townships in a coordinated manner
to benefit from value-chain synergies requires a spectrum of actors from the public, private, international NGOs,
mid-tier NGOs, universities and CBOs. An intermediary actor is vital to coordinate these entities, steer
everyone’s attention to strategic concerns, and facilitate the co-creation of an overarching meta-logic to avoid
actors getting lost in mandate issues. The many actors involved do not all have the same level of responsibility,
as greater responsibility and resources are required at the community and municipal levels, where actors need
support (e.g. skills, infrastructure, mandates, mentors) from other development network members (e.g. NGOs,
private sector).
Change is an opportunity for innovation
Information gathering and planning paralysis have over-complicated implementation and, consequently, stalled
action. Too much emphasis is on mapping every possible actor in the space and plotting how they will engage,
and then implementing only when a detailed plan exists. Yet detailed plans become outdated quickly in complex
environments, such as townships. The ICT industry shows the value of a Scrum8 and agile thinking when
managing projects:
• Gather enough information and make a good enough plan for sensible, risk-adjusted decision-making.
• Start with a small core team that grows as the intervention evolves.
• Break down the intervention into mini projects, which creates opportunities for experimentation on a
smaller scale.
• Have a formal process for capturing and integrating lessons from the project into the organisation’s
DNA before the next mini project begins.
7 Location is used in a broader sense than physical; it also concerns social, organisational and cultural dynamics arising
from the influence of particular local institutions, groups and personalities.
8 ‘Scrum’ is not an acronym and is borrowed from rugby to stress the importance of teams in complex product development.
https://guntherverheyen.com/2014/01/09/scrum-is-not-an-acronym/
Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 7 of 29Research shifts from providing technical answers to supporting practitioners’ agency
Engagements with practitioners tend to focus on technical knowledge and data access, even though opening
up practitioners to experiences is also important. Equipping practitioners requires a subtle but important shift.
By providing them with limited information, such as a list of core strategic questions and a resource directory,
practitioners are encouraged to have agency and do not expect to be given the answers. This helps them to
navigate complex environments, such as townships that are all different, through questioning and making their
own decisions.
Unlocking social, organisational and cultural capital can drive development in communities
Development has been driven by tangibles (what people can see), such as economic factors, governance-
related issues or infrastructure, and disregarded intangibles, which are difficult to measure, such as social and
organisational capital. This imbalance must be addressed. People working in the township economies space
must understand how “formal and informal rules of behaviour, social order and stability, social networks and the
level of community organisation” affect potential development options and paths (HSRC and EDP, 2019: 27).
CBOs are an important aspect of social capital because they “represent a kind of soft infrastructure that provides
information, transfers skills and competences, shares resources, offers mutual support and goodwill, and
engenders social stability and resilience against sudden shocks and ongoing stresses” (ibid: 25). However,
CBOs are struggling to fulfil their role, as they often lack resources or “get captured and exploited by
gatekeepers for their own selfish interests” (ibid). Therefore, any township economies strategy must have an
empowerment package for CBOs that includes resources, skills and governance.
Pre-COVID Food Insecurity Levels and Safety Net in the Western Cape
Food insecurity
Agricultural sector output and food imports are sufficient to feed the population, but unemployment and poverty
have resulted in households either having inadequate (15.8%) or severely inadequate (5.5%) access to food in
2017 (Stats SA, 2019). In addition, food insecurity is more prevalent among the urban poor living in informal
settlements in South Africa than in poor rural communities.9
In 2017, the South Africa’s General Household Survey (Stats SA, 2019: 15–20) revealed the following:
• 7.3% of households in the Western Cape had “severely inadequate” access to food. This was above
Gauteng (3.1%), KwaZulu-Natal (4.8%) and the national level (5.5%), but below three other provinces.
• 15.5% of households in the Western Cape had “inadequate” access to food. This was marginally below
the national level of 15.8% and the third lowest percentage among the nine provinces, with only
Gauteng (12.9%) and Limpopo (5.3%) reporting a lower percentage.
• 13.3% of households in the Western Cape were vulnerable to hunger. This was above the national level
of 10.5% and the third highest among the nine provinces, after Gauteng (25.2%) and KwaZulu-Natal
(20.9%) – a total of 1.7 million households in South Africa were vulnerable to hunger.
• 14.2% of households with children aged five years or younger experienced hunger. This was the third
lowest percentage of the nine provinces but above the national percentage of 13.1%.
The pre-COVID food insecurity safety net
Government is the main driver of South Africa’s food safety net, which comprises three interventions:
• The National School Nutrition Programme (NSNP), which fed approximately 9.6 million children in
2018/19 (Seekings, 2020). The NSNP services Grade 1 to Grade 12 learners enrolled in an accredited
Department of Basic Education (DBE) facility, and so does not include children in pre-school early
childhood development (ECD) centres. The national and provincial departments of social development
fund feeding schemes at ECD centres, but their reach is miniscule.
• The Social Relief of Distress (SRD) scheme has a negligible reach compared to the NSNP and is
administered by the Department of Social Development (DSD) and the South African Social Security
Agency (SASSA). In 2018/19, the scheme made 444 000 ‘awards’,10 at a cost of R485-million, or about
7% of the NSNP budget (Seekings, 2020). Assistance takes the form of food parcels or food vouchers
or school uniforms. Vouchers are electronic, as either a supermarket ‘gift’ card or a preloaded debit
9 In 2017, 3.3% of households reported experiencing hunger in Limpopo compared to 25.2% in Gauteng. Gauteng’s
population is more urbanised than Limpopo’s, and Gauteng had the lowest proportion of households involved in agricultural
activities than other provinces (Stats SA, 2019: 24). Also, 63.4% of urban households in South Africa reported being
vulnerable to hunger in 2017 compared to 36.6% of rural households (Stats SA, 2019: 18).
10 Over half of these awards were food parcels (288 000) followed by 102 000 food vouchers and the rest was the provision
of school uniforms (Seekings, 2020: 5).
Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 8 of 29card valid for three months. Vouchers can be redeemed at selected shops on the DSD list and can be
used for any product in a store (i.e. not restricted to food).
• Community Nutrition and Development Centres (CNDCs) are a network of feeding centres operated by
local CBOs and overseen by the DSD. They are funded by both national and provincial governments.
National government uses formalised non-profit organisations, such as the FoodBank, to source surplus
food from producers, retailers, restaurants and local black economic empowerment (BEE) or ‘emerging’
farmers11. This produce is delivered to provincial food development centres, from where provincial
governments work with non-profit organisations (that act as food aggregators) to distribute food to
CNDCs. In turn, the provincial government uses a network of NGOs to distribute food to community
food deports and CNDCs.
Civil society also contributes to the food safety net though providing parallel outreach services and supporting
government programmes. A range of organisations are involved:
● Formalised, large-scale NGOs with corporate structures, such as Mustadafin Foundation, Gift of the
Givers, Afrika Tikkun and Ilitha Labantu and Joint Aid Management.
● Corporations, such as the Tiger Brands Foundation and the Sea Harvest Foundation.
● Large-scale food distribution agencies, such as FoodForwardSA which aggregates surplus food from
sources across the food system (e.g. big chain retailers, farmers, independent stores) and redistributes
this food to provincial warehouses or DSD-approved local organisations.
● CBOs that directly engage with people, either through providing a hot meal in a shared space or
distributing food. Organisations range from large NGOs or faith-based organisations (FBOs) to informal
grassroots community-based kitchens operating from an individual’s house.
COVID’s Disruptive Impact on Food Relief Interventions
On 26 March 2020, the president announced that South Africa would enter into a hard COVID lockdown. The
regulations restricted social gatherings, which meant that communal meal centres and schools closed and
government departments operated on skeleton staff for essential services only. The shutdown of the national
food relief system caused a humanitarian crisis, which galvanised actors into action. At the start of the COVID-
induced food crisis, the WCG, municipalities, civil society and the private sector worked independently because
their focus was on providing communities with food. The EDP realised that an all-of-society approach and all-
of-government approach could accomplish more through connecting, communicating and collaborating. The
actors shared the same purpose and vision, and would benefit from pooling resources and troubleshooting
problems together in real time. Early into the national lockdown, in the second week of April, various actors
tacitly agreed to work together and organically self-organised in a food relief network. Between March and
November 2020, this food network evolved, as the focus shifted from giving communities emergency food relief
to co-creating a local food security system with communities that empowers their dignity and socioeconomic
development. This section highlights key milestones in the journey of this food network between April 2018 and
November 2020.
COVID’s Impact on the Western Cape Food Relief System12
The COVID lockdown shuts down the national food relief system
The national hard lockdown had an immediate and severe negative effect on the livelihoods of poorer
communities. Overnight their socioeconomic support system was switched off, when informal activities (i.e.
street traders, spaza shops, small-scale fishers and farmers, and seasonal farm workers) ceased. When service
industries and SMMEs stopped trading, households who were part of the “working poor” became the “newly
poor”, as they had negligible or no savings (EDP, 2020g: 2).
COVID was an unforeseen event, and the national food relief system was not designed to accommodate
COVID-related hygiene and social distancing requirements. The government decided to stop or downscale its
three primary food relief channels. On 18 March 2020, the DBE suspended the NSNP and froze resources
allocated to this programme. Under the Disaster Management Regulations, school nutrition was not defined as
an essential service, which meant that anyone involved in this activity was committing an unlawful act.
11 The government decided to use the CNDCs as an empowerment vehicle creating opportunities for BEE farmers and
emerging farmers to support sustainable livelihoods programmes.
12 This section is based on a working paper by Seekings (2020) and draws on two presentations from SASSA and the DSD
made at a joint portfolio committee briefing on 29 May 2020 (https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/30339/)
Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 9 of 29Furthermore, the conditional grant for the NSNP only allowed school feeding when schools were open on school
days, but all the schools were shut.
Between 27 March and 1 June 2020, many media statements were made about reallocating and redirecting
NSNP resources (e.g. purchased food and allocated budget), but no action was taken. It appears that NSNP
resources remained frozen while DBE and DSD were figuring out issues relating to mandate, communication
and coordination. On 27 March 2020, National Treasury issued a memorandum advising provincial
governments to “use up to 5% of the annual funding for the school feeding scheme to run emergency feeding
schemes for school children – subject to parliamentary approval”, but the DBE failed to organise this approval
(Seekings, 2020: 13).
Unlike the NSNP, the SRD scheme remained operational during the lockdown, but relief measures were not
expanded because national departments operated with skeleton staff and local regional SASSA offices were
closed. During the first two months of lockdown, SASSA distributed 73 000 food parcels nationally, which was
about the same number of parcels delivered pre-COVID over a two-month period in 2019 (ibid: 16). Similarly,
CNDCs were operating during lockdown, but only a few remained open for the first part of the lockdown. In
addition, from 1 April 2020, the responsibility for the CNDCs was reallocated from the national to the provincial
DSD.
The national government introduced a series of measures to help people through the socioeconomic hardships
arising from COVID and to fill the gaps resulting from the curtailing of established food relief interventions during
lockdown. These measures can be grouped into four areas: expanding unemployment insurance,
supplementing existing social grants, introducing a new emergency grant and rolling out an emergency feeding
programme.13
National government increased and introduced grants:
• In May, the child support grant was increased by R300 per child and by R500 per caregiver from June
to October.
• All other existing grants14 were increased by R250 per month from May to October except for the Grant
in Aid.
• A COVID-19 SRD grant of R350 was introduced for unemployed citizens for a period of six months.
DSD focused on addressing food insecurity:
• SRD services were provided.
• Food parcels were provided through the DSD Centre Based Feeding Programmes in partnership with
the Solidarity Fund.
• Meals were provided to shelters for the homeless living on the streets.
• A COVID-19 grant was introduced.
• Mechanisms to introduce the food voucher were explored.
It is beyond the scope of this case study to analyse the national government’s handling of food distribution
during lockdown. Nevertheless, national government struggled to design and swiftly roll out a comprehensible,
integrated, all-of-government COVID food relief package. The most serious problem was the delay between the
suspension of national food relief programmes and the payment of grants to households under the various
COVID relief programmes. In May and June 2020, SASSA transferred nearly R5-billion in supplementary grants,
which was far greater than the estimated R1-billion value of food parcels distributed nationally, although SASSA
did not release “the promised emergency ‘COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress’ grant to adults with no other
source of income” (Seekings, 2020: 34).
National government’s transfer of funds through the existing grant mechanisms went relatively smoothly but
took time, i.e. six weeks after lockdown was announced, large-scale disbursements were made through
extending unemployment insurance and supplementing existing social grants. This time delay meant that
people needed food parcels immediately, to tide them over until the grants were paid out. The result was a spike
in food demand precisely when national food distribution activities either stopped or were operating on a
skeleton basis. Freezing the NSNP feeding schemes was a particularly severe blow to food accessibility. In
effect, the national food relief system was switched off while the replacement system was being built, resulting
in many people being unable to access food. Civil society together with the WCG and local municipalities tried
13 Designed to give people relief while they waited for grants to be paid out and “to fill the distributional gap left due to the
cash transfer programmes’ incomplete coverage of poor people” (Seekings, 2020: 2).
14 The implementation of existing grants (including CSG top-up for May), was affected during the May payment cycle, which
commenced on 4 May 2020 (SASSA, 2020).
Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 10 of 29to fill the food gap. In particular, civil society was the first responder and implementing agent, and played a
catalytic role in marshalling resources from diverse groups and establishing food distribution networks on an
unprecedented scale – in effect, civil society was the primary source of food relief in the Western Cape.
The national government was leading country-wide food relief efforts but had no direct involvement with the
Western Cape food relief system. According to newspaper reports, national food relief aid to the Western Cape
was minimal compared to other provinces, as it based on the extent of the food need, not physical food
allocation. The insufficient national response was the motivation for a united Western Cape response. from
government, the private sector and civil society.
Activation of the Western Cape food relief intervention in response to COVID
Civil society in the Western Cape quickly organised itself to alleviate the socioeconomic fallout from the hard
lockdown. Organically, without any formal organisation, Community Action Networks (CANs) sprang up in
neighbourhoods to address immediate community needs. The WCG recognised the value of the CANs, as a
mechanism for providing communities with the right food relief at the right time and right place:15
Only a whole of society approach through the efforts of all spheres of society can help curb the pressure
we experience on our available services. In this regard, our NGO partners are critical to helping us
deliver this feeding programme during this difficult time, and the existing network in place will ensure
that we can get food to those who need it most, as quickly as possible.
The EDP, an intermediary with a philosophy of connect, communicate and collaborate, facilitated the WCG to
see the bigger picture. On 30 March 2020, the EDP convened an online engagement session between the
Western Cape Premier, Alan Winde, and CAN representatives, at which the parties agreed to work together
and focus on addressing food insecurity and hunger in a responsible manner that minimised the spread of
COVID (EDP, 2020a).
The EDP also facilitated the establishment of the FRF, which brought together actors in the food network to
troubleshoot problems and pool resources. A study of seven CAN food relief efforts identified the need for a
virtual forum to coordinate food-relief efforts, and as a result (on 23 April 2020) an inaugural FRF meeting took
place via Zoom, attended by NGOs delivering food parcels (primarily the large ones), the WCG and the COCT
(ibid).
Within the first two weeks of the lockdown, the WCG had allocated “an additional R30-million for food parcels,
R23-million for cooked meal schemes and R16-million to support municipal initiatives” (Seekings, 2020: 17). In
addition, the WCG allocated R18-million to the provincial Department of Education for “an emergency school
feeding program in approximately 1,000 schools, providing takeaway meals twice per week for children”
(ibid: 17). A further R5-million was allocated “for 10 000 cooked meals per day for one month, for people other
than children, through a network of about 72 soup kitchens operated by NGOs as well as about twenty CNDCs”,
while the provincial DSD reactivated feeding schemes at about two-thirds of the 1100 ECD centres (ibid: 18).
The COCT, which had been supporting community-run soup kitchens from early April, also allocated funds to
food relief efforts (ibid: 8). Although it “argued that food relief was not part of its mandate”, the city made available
R12-million from the Mayor’s Relief Fund for community kitchens and protective equipment, and (later) food
parcels, while other municipalities in the province contributed a further R7-million (ibid: 17).
By mid-May 2020, the Western Cape food relief network was fully operational and providing meals and food
parcels. According to conservative estimates (Seekings, 2020):
● The provincial DSD fed roughly 80 000 children per day through its ECD centre feeding scheme.
● The COCT supported 80 community and civil society kitchens through donations of food and, in some
cases, cooking equipment. These kitchens fed on average 100 people daily.
● The WGC funded on average 100 000 meals per day and up to 200 000 cooked meals on some days.
● Together, the public, private and civil society actors distributed approximately 140 000 food parcels in
the Western Cape, of which about 42 000 were funded by the WGC and less than 15 000 by national
government. Roughly 10 000 parcels were distributed by CNDCs, while thousands were distributed
through municipal schemes, with the remaining parcels funded and distributed primarily by civil society
organisations (CBOs). These included Mustadafin, Red Cross, Islamic Relief and the South African
National Zakat Fund, FoodForwardSA and Afrika Tikkun. The Solidarity Fund also distributed food
parcels either through two large NPOs (FoodForwardSA and Afrika Tikkun) or directly to CBOs and
15
https://coronavirus.westerncape.gov.za/news/additional-r53-million-allocated-food-relief-programmes-
western-cape
Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 11 of 29CNDCs. CANs, which served a defined geographical area, coordinated the flow of resources to CBOs,
making them micro-level resource aggregators.
From the end of May 2020, as larger NGOs focused on aggregating and channelling funding and food to the
CANs, the food relief network was relying more on grassroots organisations to be the contact point with
communities. At the same time, seeing that communities had an increasing need for food, forum members
agreed that a different approach was needed, based on ‘building back stronger’. Despite not having a well-
mapped-out answer, forum members agreed on the new system’s broad characteristics: an all-of-society
approach, more local government participation, a re-imagining of the food system and greater agency for
communities (i.e. from food recipients to food providers). They saw a link between long-term food security and
food system change, and consequently the shift away from individual behaviour within the system to
interventions in the food system.
From July 2020, network members noticed a shift away from emergency-driven, fire-fighting food relief due to
three reasons:
(i) The country entered partial lockdown, with a return to school, university and economic activity – this
signalled that it was time to establish a different normal.
(ii) Food relief lost its urgency, as national food relief programmes were being switched on and national
grants were reaching recipients – politicians’ attention was now on managing public health (e.g.
medical supplies and isolation facilities) and containing hotspots (e.g. testing and providing quarantine
and education).
(iii) Donor and volunteer fatigue was setting in, as people were psychologically and emotionally
exhausted, and were resuming ‘regular life’ activities – the solidarity initiated during the hard lockdown
was fading.
The FRF recognised that its mandate, of assisting with coordinating food relief during lockdown, was too narrow
and that it needed to recalibrate and reconfigure in order to pursue a food security objective. A survey of FRF
members found that a network model based on trust, respect, co-creation and agency was non-negotiable. The
FRF members also wanted civil society to be involved in co-planning and co-implementing with the public sector,
rather than passively participate through commenting on policies and plans. The first chapter of the FRF closed
on 17 September 2020, and the second chapter began on 22 October 2020, with a focus on the food system,
balancing short-term interventions with long-term strategies.
Lessons from National and Western Cape Food Relief Efforts during COVID
Despite good intentions and herculean effort, civil society, provincial government and municipalities distributed
only a fraction of food relief compared to national government’s food relief programmes under normal pre-
COVID circumstances. The food relief network’s efforts had a profound humanitarian impact in communities,
building social cohesion across diverse communities and empowering local community organisations, but its
output was insufficient to compensate for the scaling back of national food relief programmes.
Over a typical three-month period (pre-COVID), the three national food relief programmes distributed 35 000
food parcels or vouchers per month, 9.6 million school meals daily and a minimum of 700 000 ECD centre meals
daily. Between 27 March 2020 and 30 June 2020, the national government distributed 105 000 food parcels
and provided no meals to schools, ECD centres or CNDCs. Over the same period, civil society, provincial
government and municipalities provided roughly two million food parcels (about 240 million meal-equivalents),
or only one-sixth of the total volume of food normally distributed (Seekings, 2020: 28).
This illustrates an important lesson: there is no substitute for the national government, as implementing
feeding programmes at scale requires the State’s capacity. However, the lockdown also showcased the
nimbleness of food relief networks that use localised intelligence to pinpoint where the need is greatest and
serve that need in a way that builds communities’ dignity and restores social capital. Statistics can only convey
physical measures and cannot capture softer issues, such as the relief from desperation and restoring dignity.
The best-case scenario is for the national government to work with these food networks, and for parties to re-
imagine a new food relief system that draws on the reach and scale of the state apparatus, but uses the network
governance model that evolved in the Western Cape.
Collaboration between the government and food networks is a huge ask. Throughout lockdown, communication
was weak, resulting in poor levels of trust, because the actors speak a different language. Government’s
language is centralised authority, strict regulations and top-down planning-decision-making, whereas the
network’s language is risk-adjusted decision-making, learning through action and real-time adaptation. The
following example best illustrates the culture clash. The national government issued complicated permit
Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 12 of 29requirements16 for NPOs and other CBOs to provide food (parcels or meals) that caused two layers of paralysis:
meeting these requirements was unrealistic for smaller, grassroots NGOs and FBOs, but they had the largest
humanitarian impact by helping the neediest communities; and even when NGOs were able to meet the
requirements, provincial government17 had insufficient capacity to process bulk applications.
The Western Cape Food Relief System: A Cooperative Governance
Network Model
The governance model is based on a two-layered analysis. First, understanding the positive and negative
feedback loops between unfolding environmental changes between 26 March and 1 September 2020 and the
demand for food relief in the Western Cape, as well as the ease with which the food relief network could meet
this demand. Second, uncovering how the food relief network mobilised resources and acted jointly by tracing
the interconnections among actors, to see how the network fits together.
Based on the Western Cape’s experience, a food relief system has four core components:
1. Resource planning and aggregation at a macro scale, where funds are raised and food is bought or
collected from food suppliers.
2. After identifying food sources, the selection of centralised, large-scale distribution points and delivering
food to these points.
3. Resource logistics, involving warehousing and packaging bulk supplies of food, generally at a
centralised distribution point, and then distributing food to area-based distribution hubs.
4. Food provision to an individual as a parcel or meal – this stage is referred to as the last mile.
An actor can be involved at multiple points in the food relief system, and many actors are involved in each
component. Furthermore, over time, the role of an actor can change, resulting in an ‘ebb and flow’ pattern where
one actor moves out and another moves in. The system is not static and is in such perpetual motion that, to an
outsider, it looks like a ‘mess’, which is characteristic of a complex, adaptive system.
Acknowledging the messy nature of the food relief system has an important governance consequence. For all
the system’s moving parts to work together, an intermediary is needed to support synchronisation through
collaboration. This intermediary requires a big picture understanding of how the system’s components fit
together, the feedback loops of actors’ actions and using inflection points in the system strategically. In addition,
the intermediary must understand what motivates actors or causes them to retreat. Emotional intelligence is
crucial, as such an intermediary needs to facilitate relationship-building based on mutual respect and trust
among actors, which is crucial in a system characterised by constantly evolving roles and actors experimenting
in real time and being expected to deliver.
Under the traditional approach, an actor’s role is tied to a defined mandate, which determines their position in
the system and thus access to resources and decision-making authority. This approach is not practical for the
food relief system, where agency replaces mandate and actors informally negotiate with other networks
members on what needs to be done and by whom. This results in an actor having different (short term and/or
long term) and even multiple (adaptive) roles at the same time. The actors involved in the Western Cape food
relief system between March and September 2020 are described below.
The Public Sector Actors
In the Western Cape, the WCG was the most active public sector actor, followed by municipalities and the
national government. Their actions cut across the food relief system:
• Mobilising and distributing resources at the macro level.
• Working with large aggregators delivering supplies to provincial warehouses.
• Partnering with civil society in communities that operated kitchens or provided parcels.
• Operating feeding schemes at schools.
• Setting up Wi-Fi hotspots in communities for accessing digital vouchers.
16 Applications for permits must (a) state food parcel contents for each parcel distributed (b) provide distribution details of
when and where and pass them onto the (c) collect personal details from every recipient and pass information on to the
DSD (d) deliver parcels to recipients’ homes. The draft regulations explicitly prohibited cooked meals.
17 According to the WCG, the national government draft directive for issuing and coordinating permits was “impossible to
implement” because there are too many grassroots-based organisations to register considering the resources and capacity
at the provincial government level.
Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 13 of 29Intermediary Actor The EDP helped network members find common purpose for joint action and remain focused on that purpose, ensured no members got lost in mandates and provided an environment that was flexible enough to enable collective action, learning and adaptation. The EDP had a history of working with government, the private sector, civil society and NGOs, and so understood the system dynamics. Therefore, it was able to bridge the gap between institutions and national or subnational levels of government, which could have got stuck in their silos, and help them work beyond their individual mandates (EDP, 2020b; 2020f). This bridge-building, interpreter role was essential to get the government top-down, authorising environment partnering with the civil society bottom-up, mobilising environment, as delivering food relief requires collaboration. Government “brings to bear political decision-making, data-based public policy, state resources, enforcement capabilities, and the ability to scale responses”, while civil society “brings agile local responses, grassroots communication networks, and the space for experimentation and innovation” (EDP, 2020b: 1). However, given the weak trust that has traditionally existed between these two parties, one of the EDP’s key roles was building relationships, especially unlocking communication channels and encouraging conversations. The EDP creatively drew on formal and informal mechanisms to nudge conversations, exchange information and share experiences. For example, the EDP was the only non-state actor invited to the WCG’s bi-weekly (later weekly) Humanitarian Cluster Committee (HCC) where seven provincial government departments, SASSA, the COCT and five district municipalities discussed COVID food relief. The EDP helped the government to understand emerging on-the-ground issues from the perspective of communities. In addition, the HCC gave the government an opportunity to seek the EDP’s insight before approaching communities. Lastly, the EDP packaged insights from the HCC and shared it with the FRF members, so that they could understood the government’s thinking and how to navigate the system better. Macro-level Aggregators and Distributors Macro-level aggregators are typically formal, corporate-type NGOs, with a national reach that engage at the national and provincial government levels. These aggregators collect resources and usually deliver them to provincial government-managed warehouses from where they are distributed by large NPOs. One of the largest macro aggregators is the Solidarity Fund, which is a national initiative. When the lockdown began, the Solidarity Fund was established to channel donations from private individuals and companies to CBOs. It operates on a large scale and, as a result, “one half of [its food parcel] budget was allocated to four large NPOs (FoodForward, Afrika Tikkun, Islamic Relief and the Lunchbox Fund), that “bought food in bulk and delivered it to their networks of more than four hundred local organisations to distribute to poor households” (Seekings, 2020: 22). The other half of its food parcel budget was allocated equally to CNDCs and to CBOs and FBOs at provincial and local levels, especially in rural areas. The Solidarity Fund worked with two logistics companies to source, pack and deliver food to the local organisations. The private sector, including corporates (e.g. Tiger Brands), farmers and agri-processing companies, were actively involved in providing food parcels or made donations to intermediary organisations for distribution to grassroots structures. “The DG Murray Trust and the Western Cape Economic Development Partnership raised just under R3 million to supply 75 Community Kitchens with weekly digital vouchers to purchase food supplies and equipment” (ibid: 25). Community-oriented ‘Last Mile’ Actors The last mile has many actors, and there is no single path to communities.18 The shortest route is from an intermediary NGO to an individual in a community, while the longest route can be a cascading system that involves an intermediary NGO, Cape Town Together (CTT), a CAN and a grassroots community kitchen. In most cases, the last mile journeys were a combination of the short and long routes. In Cape Town, the largest intermediary NGO in Cape Town was the Community Chest, followed by the Ladles of Love that operated out of the International Convention Centre. CTT is a self-organising volunteer network, which formed to co-create a community-led response to the emerging health and socioeconomic fallout of the COVID lockdown. By August 2020, CTT had over 11 000 online members and 2000 registered volunteers across about 150 CANs in the Cape Town metropole. CTT 18A local ‘last mile’ organisation can get funding or resources directly from the provincial or local government or a large aggregator such as the Solidarity Fund or be self-funding. Cape Town_WC_Final Report_June 2021 Page 14 of 29
essentially connects the CANs and individuals in a community with the CAN in their area, and is underpinned
by the philosophy of “[acting] locally, while also drawing on our collective experience and energy to share
lessons and resources across the city”.19
CANs operate on a self-organising, volunteer basis. In the Western Cape, CANs were set up in many areas,
irrespective of socioeconomic circumstances. Anyone can join a CAN, and each CAN has the freedom to decide
its focus, how it operates and who it collaborates with. As each community has its own personality, each CAN
is different. In essence, CANs are community-based hubs, “with the flexibility to do whatever is not being done
by more formal actors”.20 Between April and August 2020, 170 CANs were set up, and their activities varied
from making and distributing masks, to operating community kitchens and communicating COVID stay-safe
practices.
Initially, CANs were formed to help vulnerable communities through the lockdown. However, as the CAN social
movement grew, it also became about building social capital in communities and improving social cohesion
across communities, especially showing solidarity and building bridges among socioeconomically prosperous
and vulnerable communities. CANs in vulnerable areas partnered with CANs in prosperous areas, which
facilitated the channelling of resources (e.g. food parcels, meals, clothing) and, through working together, helped
break down stereotypes. CANs in more affluent areas acted as resource aggregators, while CANs in vulnerable
communities directed resources where they were most needed in the best way.
The Cooperative Governance Network Model in Practice
How the cooperative governance network model works in practice is illustrated through the FRF, which is a
government-led resource coordination and joint mobilisation mechanism, and the Community Kitchens
Programme that evolved into the Community Economic Recovery Programme. Common to all these initiatives
is that they did not have a perfect plan but had to adapt (and still are adapting) to the context in which they
operate. They also approach partnerships from a different angle:
Our experience over the years has been that if you focus on putting up ‘a partnership’ you get stuck in
governance. It is structured around the noun. We have changed it to the verb, ‘partnering’. If you start
trusting each other, you can set up a basic structure. We did not try to over-design it, and we did not try
to make it representative. It was rather about ‘do we have enough of the right people?’
Vouchers for Community Kitchens and for Economic Recovery Initiatives
Many grassroots community initiatives sprung up in response to the rapidly escalating food crisis following the
hard lockdown, which exacerbated the already-existing (pre-COVID) crisis of insufficient food in poor
communities. The community and philanthropic responses included various initiatives, with food parcels
perceived as an effective way to meet the needs of vulnerable people. However, numerous distribution
challenges indicated that food parcels may not be the optimal solution for communities in Cape Town:
• Concerns about the theft of food parcels at different points of the distribution chain.
• The relatively high distribution costs in proportion to the value of the food parcel. “The logistics costs
inflated the cost of a food parcel. It was reported that a food parcel worth R700 was being distributed
at a cost of R1,100” (EDP, 2020c).
• Concerns about the fair distribution of food parcels.
• Food in the parcels that did not always meet recipients’ preferences and requirements.
• The vast difference in the composition of food parcels and in the understanding of how many people
can be fed for how long on a food parcel.
• Concerns about the risk of infection associated with distribution, specifically during the pandemic.
While recognising that food parcels serve a purpose under certain conditions, food vouchers have the potential
to overcome these challenges, as they offer the following benefits (EDP, 2020c):
• Vouchers by-pass the possibility of theft and loss.
• Donors and funders are assured that the vouchers go to the intended recipients.
• Vouchers give recipients a choice (within boundaries) of what they can purchase.
• The voucher’s value can be adjusted according to the purpose and budget of the issuing
organisation/funder, and the beneficiary receives the full amount spent on the voucher.
19 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-08-26-cape-town-together-a-neighbourhood-based-network-of-170-
organisations/
20 ibid
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