SUNDAY WRAP - UNICREDIT RESEARCH
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
28 March 2021 Macro Research
Chief Economist´s Comment
Sunday Wrap
Happy Palm Sunday,
There is little prospect for Easter peace, let alone a Good Friday agreement, in the epic battle between powerful German
institutions over the country’s participation in the European project of ever closer union.
Possibly the single most complicated aspect of European integration is the transfer of competences from independent, and
therefore powerful, national institutions to common European institutions. The examples of quiet, or not-so-quiet, resistance by
national institutions to accept post-war Europe’s move towards integration are plentiful, and in too many cases the political
compromise (nationally and pan-European) has been to leave the national institutions in place, build the desired European
institution and accept grey zones of competences between them.
In constitutional matters, the lines between the competencies of the European Court of Justice, established in 1952, and the
national constitutional courts were never drawn clearly, but they have in most cases fallen into place over time, although
unevenly so between different countries. More recent examples over overlapping institutions include the establishment of the
European Medicines Agency in 1995 (we didn’t get one new and common medical agency, but one more along with the
national ones), and when the ECB became a bank supervisor in 2014, we didn’t really get one new and common supervisor,
but one more along with the national ones.
In particular, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe (the BVerfG) never seemed to accept any transfer of competences
to the ECJ in Luxembourg but rather dug in its heals as the guardian of Germany’s sovereign constitution. Yet, as we know, in
an interconnected world, let alone in a deeply integrated Europe, sovereignty is not a discipline of national laws, but of
management of interconnected relations.
So, on Friday, only a few months after the German government and Bundestag had to jump through a number of rather
meaningless loops to satisfy the BVerfG’s objections to the Bundesbank’s participation in the ECB’s QE program, the BVerfG
was back with an injunction to stop President Steinmeier from signing into law the legislation for Germany’s participation in the
NGEU’s EUR 750bn recovery fund until the court has considered its legality. The Bundestag and Bundesrat had approved the
law facilitating Germany’s participation with solid majorities on Thursday and Friday, respectively.
Like in the case against (de facto) the ECB’s QE, the BVerfG acted on Friday in response to a complaint by a small group of
German citizens closely associated with the AfD, which, according to Süddeutsche Zeitung, seems largely financed by a Swiss
based billionaire with strong anti-EU views. The plaintiffs claim the NGEU is a step towards a “debt union”, which would be
unconstitutional under German law.
Yet, there can be no doubt that the NGEU is the right response to the crisis and that it is also in Germany’s interest. Whether it
is a step towards another political decision that could be unconstitutional is surely a political question rather than a legal one, so
my guess is that this latest BVerfG-spanner in the wheel of the European project will be resolved after a brief delay, maybe a
few weeks. That said, the risk of a bigger battle looms because Friday’s motion reflects a bigger institutional problem for
Germany - and for Europe. And whether the BVerfG chooses a big fight with Germany’s other branches of the state over the
NGEU issue (I think not), or wait for a different case, e.g. the Bundesbank’s participation in the ECB’s PEPP (more likely), I
don’t know.
To be sure, it’s part of democracy that laws can be challenged on constitutional grounds, but the BVerfG’s willingness to accept
even questionable challenges to German policies related to European integration stands in sharp contrast to the practice of the
constitutional courts in other EU member states, it stands in contrast to the will of elected politicians and other institutions, and
(as far as opinion polls suggest) in contrast to the majority of Germans. Not surprisingly, its stance is being challenged by
several prominent German legal experts, including by constitutional law professor Franz Mayer of the University of Bielefeld.
UniCredit Research page 1 See last pages for disclaimer.28 March 2021 Macro Research
Chief Economist´s Comment
In today’s note:
■ I’ll first outline the Friday injunction (from what little has been made public), and suggest a possible way out.
■ I’ll then summarize the bigger issue posed by the BVerfG’s practice and rulings so far, which places Germany (and
Europe) in what Joe Heller would have called a Catch-22.
■ Finally, I’ll briefly outline what needs to happen for this Gordian knot to be cut.
1. The BVerfG’s injunction.
On Friday, the BVerfG stopped President Steinmeier from signing the law for German participation in the NGEU after it has
been approved by both houses of parliament with sizable majorities. The BVerfG’s intervention came after AfD co-founder
Bernd Lucke and a group of some 2000 people filed a motion to the court to block the legislation. They claim the NGEU will
limit the budgetary power of the Bundestag as the EU plans to develop its own resources with which to service the debt, and
that it may lead to a “debt union”.
Dubious as the motion seems on present information, two weeks ago the Federal Audit Office released a highly critical report
about the German participation in the NGEU, so this may have influenced the judges’ decision to take the AfD complaint
seriously. Nevertheless, it is surprising that the BVerfG didn’t provide any clear justification for its injunction, but only promised
to spell out their concern later on. I’m not a legal expert, but this sounds like thin ice to me.
To be clear, motions by the BVerfG to delay the ratification of laws is not unusual in Germany. However, usually, when the
BVerfG needs time to consider an appeal, the court asks the president informally to delay his signature, rather than making a
public statement. (I have to say that when I learned of this “normal” practice by the BVerfG, my jaw dropped: To learn that the
highest court in the land, the guardian of due process of all things legal, itself, when in a bind, gets on the phone to the
president (or his office) and asks informally for a delay in his signature, rather than formally notifying the institution of the
presidency really leaves you wonder about the consistency and accountability across institutions of the application of the rule of
law.)
Why this normal (if highly questionable) practice of informality wasn’t used this time, I don’t know. Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung suggests that an informal request night have been sent to Schloss Bellevue, but Steinmeier had declined, or that there
was a simple communications error between the two institutions. Or maybe the BVerfG – feeling bruised by the public uproar
and the government’s handling of their last (ECB-related) attack - wanted a public statement to remind us all of its importance?
Take your pick. My guess is that Steinmeier was indeed notified but that he had had enough and replied something like: Not
again! If you want a fight over this, it’s gonna be public! – but that’s obviously just a guess (and a hope).
Either way, well informed folks in Germany mostly seem to agree that there’ll be a solution to this specific case within a few
weeks. The point is that the BVerfG frequently issues such injunctions and then withdraws them after having had time to study
the issue - or following some clarification.
Also importantly, while the BVerfG is an immensely powerful institution in Germany, its standing rests on people’s trust in its
competence and determination to do the right thing – and, in today’s world of general distrust in politicians - its willingness to
confront Berlin. Yet, as former deputy chancellor Joschka Fischer of the Greens observed on its challenge to the ECB, “the
judges do not have a mandate to undermine Germany’s overall Europe policy.” Furthermore, in the view of the German
population, one thing is to challenge to the ECB (via the Bundesbank) and particularly the risk of quasi-fiscal policies out of
Frankfurt, a stance with which the also highly respected Bundesbank agrees, it seems a rather different thing to challenge
Germany’s participation in Bundestag agreed upon fiscal policy commonality – which is precisely what the Bundesbank has
been calling for - not least to help alleviate the pain of the pandemic.
In a more concrete sense, here are my two cents worth on how the present stalemate may be resolved:
As noted above, one of the few specific concerns expressed by the plaintiffs is the risk of this legislation leading to a “debt
union”, and the judges may have noted language in the auditors’ highly critical report which point in the same direction: A
UniCredit Research page 2 See last pages for disclaimer.28 March 2021 Macro Research
Chief Economist´s Comment
concern that the NGEU becomes permanent and that a “debt union” emerges. In that report, the auditors noted – and I quote
from the English Executive Summary:
“The Union budget is designed to serve as a guarantee for the debt of the Recovery Fund. This means that all member states
will be held jointly liable for the debt via their future contributions to the EU budget. If a member state is either unable or
unwilling to meet its debt repayment obligations, the other member states must step in to cover any pending repayments,
without renewed consent. Such a liability mechanism sets wrong incentives and weakens the Economic and Monetary Union.
The finance ministry stated that the member states would not need to step in for
pending repayment obligations of other member states directly. In case of non-compliance with repayment obligations, the EU
Commission would first have to search for liquidity within the Union budget. In a next step, the EU Commission could
reschedule maturing EU bonds at short notice. Only once these initial steps would not solve the liquidity problems, the
Commission could demand the other member states to cover the pending balances.
As a result, the finance ministry confirms that the EU Commission will always use money from other member states if a
member state defaults. Once a member state fails to meet its payment obligations, the other states eventually step in without
renewed consent on their part.”
The English executive summary is here: Special purpose report on the potential impact of community borrowing of the member
states of the European Union on the federal budget (Recovery Fund)
But the auditors’ quote of the German finance ministry must rest on a misunderstanding when they say that “only once these
initial steps would not solve the liquidity problems, the Commission could demand the other member states to cover the
pending balances”. If “demand” means “legally demand”, then it implies that the NGEU debt will be issued with a legal Joint and
Several clause, i.e. if one member state doesn’t pay its share of the debt service obligations, then – if various attempts by the
Commission to sort it out with its own resources fails – then the debt would become a legal obligation of all other member
states, including Germany. If so, I can see why someone could argue that the NGEU holds the potential to lead to a “debt
union”. If “demand” means “political pressure”, then … well …it’s not legal but political.
And to be clear, the Commission’s debt issued for the NGEU will not enjoy a legal Joint and Several status. (My colleagues,
Luca Cazzulani, Matthias Dax and Julian Kreipl discussed these issues in a paper on February 1, poetically titled: “Mirror,
mirror on the wall, who is the safest of them all?” and concluded that bunds will remain safer than EU bonds precisely because
of the lack of legal “Joint and Several”. Their paper is here, in case of interest: Rates Perspectives, No.87).
So maybe communication between the finance ministry and the auditors broke down, and the auditors confused legal and
political issues? Either way, this can easily be clarified by specifying that while there is no such legal clause in the EU debt, the
German government – like all other governments – would accept a “political joint and several” obligation.
Again, I’m not a legal expert, but it does seem to me that this impasse should be resolved within a few weeks.
But bigger and more complex issues loom ahead:
2. The bigger issue posed by the BVerfG’s practice and rulings so far.
As I argued at the time, the battle over the Bundesbank’s participation in the ECB’s QE did a good deal of damage to the
standing of the BVerfG in the informed part of German (and European) society. They put their name to on flimsy case brought
by political motivation (and maybe financed by an expatriate individual), and to help educate them on monetary policy matters,
the court called in a group of so-called expert witnesses mostly consisting of lobbyists and people with clearly vested interests.
In the end, the BVerfG found that the German government had not assured that the ECB had proven “proportionality” in its QE
related decisions – and forgot, in the process, to explain how this finding rhyme with central bank independence. Their demand
of proportionality wasn’t difficult to address for the simple reason that ECB documents are littered with analytical equivalent
UniCredit Research page 3 See last pages for disclaimer.28 March 2021 Macro Research
Chief Economist´s Comment
terms and analyses of “proportionality” (which possibly had gone over the head of the lobbyists standing in for experts).
Frankly, for anyone following the ECB and with any decent understanding of monetary policy issues, the case did not make the
BVerfG look good.
But for monetary policy experts, the elephant in the room was not really the traditional QE on hand in that specific case, but the
PEPP with its much greater flexibility. The PEPP, of course, celebrated its one-year anniversary this week. As you may recall,
when it was introduced as a EUR 750bn emergency program in March last year, the ECB said, “The Governing Council will
terminate [it] once it judges that the coronavirus Covid-19 crisis phase is over”. In December, it was raised (for the second time)
to EUR 1,850bn and extended to at least March 2022, and ECB President Lagarde (rightly) wrote in her blog this past week
that this decision “strengthened public confidence in our commitment to remain a reliable and steady source of support even as
vaccines are rolled out”.
In my assessment, the PEPP ranks with the OMT (aka “whatever it takes”) not only as the most important policy tools in ECB
history, but as essential to the functioning of the eurozone. Without a degree of fiscal union, the ECB needs the PEPP’s
flexibility, including the ECB’s willingness to deviate from the capital keys as needed, to preserve the transmission mechanism
in all its constituencies.
But while it has been extended twice – and most likely will be again later this year to cover probably all of 2022 – the PEPP’s
existence is “crisis dependent” and temporary. How you define the crisis can be debated, but once the BVerfG gets the case
and rules on it (and they surely will if they maintain their insistence on playing a role in European affairs), I would be shocked if
that doesn’t spell the end of PEPP. Of course, knowing this, and under pressure from the more hawkish part of the Governing
Council, the ECB will end it before that time. But what if the BverfG ruling forces an end to reinvestments?
Ending the PEPP will be tricky in the best of circumstances, and a court-dictated end to the Bundesbank’s reinvestments would
be extremely disruptive. On present fiscal policies, and under no realistic scenario will the eurozone have closed its output gap
– and begun to generate an inflation outlook that meets its target – this side of 2025. This means that unless the ECB will then
want to withdraw monetary stimulus (with the inflation target still not in sight), they’ll have to replace the PEPP with something
different but with broadly similar effectiveness – which will surely invite the BVerfG right back in to express its views on
monetary policies.
So here is the dilemma: The respectable “QE sceptics”, including Bundesbank President Weidmann, argue that the line
between “quasi-fiscal” and “pure” monetary policy instruments should be drawn at a further distance from quasi-fiscal
operations, and that it’s for the fiscal authorities to legislate for fiscal related transfers. While that line is opaque in theory, it’s
extremely unclear in practice, and the further the central bank has to stay on the “safe side”, the more fiscal union is required to
bring about an acceptable degree of uniform transmission mechanisms across the eurozone. While temporary, the NGEU can
be seen as one step in this direction, not necessarily to be made permanent, but to be replaced by something better designed
to address these specific currency union issues (after all, the biggest recipients, as a share of GDP, of the NGEU are several of
the non-eurozone EU members.)
Now, if BVerfG argues that the implicit debt incurred by Germany from the NGEU could be unconstitutional under German law,
we’ll be a very long way away from squaring the circle between adequate eurozone fiscal and monetary policies. I think that’s
what Joe Heller would have called a Catch-22.
3. What’s the long-term outcome?
I can think of two paths through this German institutional battlefield to a sustainable outcome.
Each of the BVerfG’s two senates is made up of eight judges, and the interpretation of the law is – after all – in most cases a
matter of judgment by these judges. If in doubt, check out the drama about the appointments to the US supreme court.
And while professionals, judges are susceptible to public opinion, not least if it shifts and thereby begins to undermine their
status and power in society. The drama over the Bundesbank’s participation in the ECB’s QE less than a year ago is a good
UniCredit Research page 4 See last pages for disclaimer.28 March 2021 Macro Research
Chief Economist´s Comment
example of the vulnerability of even the BVerfG when it makes a questionable call. The nervousness that descended on
Karlsruhe at that time was pretty visible in the unprecedented PR offensive they launched in defense of their ruling.
Similar confrontations between constitutional court interpretations of the law and public (and government) opinion are frequent
in most democracies, not least in the US, of course. But the justice system – like the government and parliament – is a branch
of the state, and hence of society, and as society changes over time, the branches of the state must change as well for
democracy to work.
So, one path to sustainability is a gradual shift in the outlook of the majority of judges at the BVerfG to either begin to reject
some of the most obscure challenges, as called for by, e.g., Professor Mayer and as practiced in most other countries. And
when cases are taken, then call on an appropriate representation of real expert witnesses to help them inform their judgement,
rather than handpick a bunch of people with vested interest, which suggests a political bias.
If this process doesn’t get under way, then – ultimately – Germany needs to consider a change to its constitution to faclitate
European integration, as suggested (on earlier occasions) by several influential Germans, including President of the Bundestag
and former finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble. The world has changed since the German constitution was written, and so has
German society – and, while it’s too early to draw conclusions for the September election, the opinion polls provide no
indication that the overwhelming German commitment to an ever-closer Europe Union is about to be interrupted.
Thomas Jefferson, a mentor to the key author of the US constitution and an important influencer of it, observed: “I’m not an
advocate of frequent changes in laws and Constitutions. But laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and
manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.”
Wise words indeed.
And with that I wish you a continued good Palm Sunday. I’ll take an Easter break from writing next weekend, but I’ll be back on
April 11. I plan to then elaborate on my concerns about how the ECB gets to phase out the PEPP one day.
Best
Erik
Erik F. Nielsen, Group Chief Economist, Global Head of CIB Research (UniCredit Bank, London)
+44 207 826-1765
erik.nielsen@unicredit.eu
UniCredit Research page 5 See last pages for disclaimer.28 March 2021 Macro Research
Chief Economist´s Comment
Legal Notices
Glossary
A comprehensive glossary for many of the terms used in the report is available on our website: https://www.unicreditresearch.eu/index.php?id=glossary
Disclaimer
Our recommendations are based on information obtained from or are based upon public information sources that we consider to be reliable, but for the completeness and
accuracy of which we assume no liability. All information, estimates, opinions, projections and forecasts included in this report represent the independent judgment of the
analysts as of the date of the issue unless stated otherwise. We reserve the right to modify the views expressed herein at any time without notice. Moreover, we reserve the
right not to update this information or to discontinue it altogether without notice. This report may contain links to websites of third parties, the content of which is not controlled by
UniCredit Bank. No liability is assumed for the content of these third-party websites.
This report is for information purposes only and (i) does not constitute or form part of any offer for sale or subscription of or solicitation of any offer to buy or subscribe for any
financial, money market or investment instrument or any security, (ii) is neither intended as such an offer for sale or subscription of or solicitation of an offer to buy or subscribe
for any financial, money market or investment instrument or any security nor (iii) as marketing material within the meaning of applicable prospectus law . The investment
possibilities discussed in this report may not be suitable for certain investors depending on their specific investment objectives and time horizon or in the context of their overall
financial situation. The investments discussed may fluctuate in price or value. Investors may get back less than they invested. Fluctuations in exchange rates may have an
adverse effect on the value of investments. Furthermore, past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. In particular, the risks associated with an investment in
the financial, money market or investment instrument or security under discussion are not explained in their entirety.
This information is given without any warranty on an "as is" basis and should not be regarded as a substitute for obtaining individual advice. Investors must make their own
determination of the appropriateness of an investment in any instruments referred to herein based on the merits and risks involved, their own investment strategy and their legal,
fiscal and financial position. As this document does not qualify as an investment recommendation or as a direct investment recommendation, neither this document nor any part
of it shall form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with or act as an inducement to enter into, any contract or commitment whatsoever. Investors are urged to contact their
bank's investment advisor for individual explanations and advice.
Neither UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, UniCredit Bank AG Vienna Branch, UniCredit Bank Austria AG, UniCredit
Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka d.d., UniCredit Bank Czech Republic and Slovakia, ZAO UniCredit Bank Russia, UniCredit Bank Czech Republic and Slovakia Slovakia Branch,
UniCredit Bank Romania, UniCredit Bank AG New York Branch nor any of their respective directors, officers or employees nor any other person accepts any liability whatsoever
(in negligence or otherwise) for any loss howsoever arising from any use of this document or its contents or otherwise arising in connection therewith.
This report is being distributed by electronic and ordinary mail to professional investors, who are expected to make their own investment decisions without undue reliance on this
publication, and may not be redistributed, reproduced or published in whole or in part for any purpose.
This report was completed and first published on 28 March 2021 at 15:00.
Responsibility for the content of this publication lies with:
UniCredit Group and its subsidiaries are subject to regulation by the European Central Bank
a) UniCredit Bank AG (UniCredit Bank, Munich or Frankfurt), Arabellastraße 12, 81925 Munich, Germany, (also responsible for the distribution pursuant to §85 WpHG).
Regulatory authority: “BaFin“ – Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Marie-Curie-Str. 24-28, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany.
b) UniCredit Bank AG London Branch (UniCredit Bank, London), Moor House, 120 London Wall, London EC2Y 5ET, United Kingdom. Regulatory authority: “BaFin“ –
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Marie-Curie-Str. 24-28, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority, 12
Endeavour Square, London E20 1JN, United Kingdom and Prudential Regulation Authority 20 Moorgate, London, EC2R 6DA, United Kingdom. Further details regarding our
regulatory status are available on request.
c) UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch (UniCredit Bank, Milan), Piazza Gae Aulenti, 4 - Torre C, 20154 Milan, Italy, duly authorized by the Bank of Italy to provide investment services.
Regulatory authority: “Bank of Italy”, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Roma, Italy and Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Marie-Curie-Str. 24-28, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany.
d) UniCredit Bank AG Vienna Branch (UniCredit Bank, Vienna), Rothschildplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria. Regulatory authority: Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA), Otto-
Wagner-Platz 5, 1090 Vienna, Austria and subject to limited regulation by the “BaFin“ – Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Marie-Curie-Str. 24-28, 60439
Frankfurt, Germany. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht are available from us on request.
e) UniCredit Bank Austria AG (Bank Austria), Rothschildplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria. Regulatory authority: Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA), Otto-Wagner-Platz 5, 1090
Vienna, Austria
f) UniCredit Bulbank, Sveta Nedelya Sq. 7, BG-1000 Sofia, Bulgaria. Regulatory authority: Financial Supervision Commission (FSC), 16 Budapeshta str., 1000 Sofia, Bulgaria
g) Zagrebačka banka d.d., Trg bana Josipa Jelačića 10, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Regulatory authority: Croatian Agency for Supervision of Financial Services, Franje Račkoga 6,
10000 Zagreb, Croatia
h) UniCredit Bank Czech Republic and Slovakia, Želetavská 1525/1, 140 92 Praga 4, Czech Republic. Regulatory authority: CNB Czech National Bank, Na Příkopě 28, 115 03
Praga 1, Czech Republic
i) ZAO UniCredit Bank Russia (UniCredit Russia), Prechistenskaya nab. 9, RF-119034 Moscow, Russia. Regulatory authority: Federal Service on Financial Markets, 9 Leninsky
prospekt, Moscow 119991, Russia
j) UniCredit Bank Czech Republic and Slovakia, Slovakia Branch, Šancova 1/A, SK-813 33 Bratislava, Slovakia. Regulatory authority: CNB Czech National Bank, Na Příkopě
28, 115 03 Praha 1, Czech Republic and subject to limited regulation by the National Bank of Slovakia, Imricha Karvaša 1, 813 25 Bratislava, Slovakia. Regulatory authority:
National Bank of Slovakia, Imricha Karvaša 1, 813 25 Bratislava, Slovakia
k) UniCredit Bank Romania, Bucharest 1F Expozitiei Boulevard, 012101 Bucharest 1, Romania. Regulatory authority: National Bank of Romania, 25 Lipscani Street, 030031,
3rd District, Bucharest, Romania
l) UniCredit Bank AG New York Branch (UniCredit Bank, New York), 150 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017. Regulatory authority: “BaFin“ – Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Marie-Curie-Str. 24-28, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany and New York State Department of Financial Services, One State Street, New York, NY 10004-1511
Further details regarding our regulatory status are available on request.
ANALYST DECLARATION
The analyst’s remuneration has not been, and will not be, geared to the recommendations or views expressed in this report, neither directly nor indirectly.
All of the views expressed accurately reflect the analyst’s views, which have not been influenced by considerations of UniCredit Bank’s business or client relationships.
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
You will find a list of keys for company specific regulatory disclosures on our website https://www.unicreditresearch.eu/index.php?id=disclaimer.
RECOMMENDATIONS, RATINGS AND EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
You will find the history of rating regarding recommendation changes as well as an overview of the breakdown in absolute and relative terms of our investment ratings, and a note on the
evaluation basis for interest-bearing securities on our website https://www.unicreditresearch.eu/index.php?id=disclaimer and https://www.unicreditresearch.eu/index.php?id=legalnotices.
ADDITIONAL REQUIRED DISCLOSURES UNDER THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF JURISDICTIONS INDICATED
You will find a list of further additional required disclosures under the laws and regulations of the jurisdictions indicated on our website
https://www.unicreditresearch.eu/index.php?id=disclaimer.
E 20/1
UniCredit Research page 6 See last pages for disclaimer.28 March 2021 Macro Research
Chief Economist´s Comment
UniCredit Research* Macro Research
Erik F. Nielsen Dr. Ingo Heimig
Group Chief Economist
Head of Research Operations
Global Head of CIB Research
& Regulatory Controls
+44 207 826-1765
+49 89 378-13952
erik.nielsen@unicredit.eu
ingo.heimig@unicredit.de
Head of Macro Research
Marco Valli
Head of Macro Research
Chief European Economist
+39 02 8862-0537
marco.valli@unicredit.eu
European Economics Research
Dr. Andreas Rees Dr. Loredana Federico Stefan Bruckbauer
Chief German Economist Chief Italian Economist Chief Austrian Economist
+49 69 2717-2074 +39 02 8862-0534 +43 50505-41951
andreas.rees@unicredit.de loredanamaria.federico@unicredit.eu stefan.bruckbauer@unicreditgroup.at
Tullia Bucco Edoardo Campanella Walter Pudschedl
Economist Economist Economist
+39 02 8862-0532 +39 02 8862-0522 +43 50505-41957
tullia.bucco@unicredit.eu edoardo.campanella@unicredit.eu walter.pudschedl@unicreditgroup.at
Dr. Thomas Strobel
Chiara Silvestre Economist
Economist +49 89 378-13013
chiara.silvestre@unicredit.eu thomas.strobel@unicredit.de
International Economics Research
Daniel Vernazza, Ph.D.
Chief International Economist
+44 207 826-7805
daniel.vernazza@unicredit.eu
EEMEA Economics Research
Dan Bucşa Gökçe Çelik Mauro Giorgio Marrano
Chief CEE Economist Senior CEE Economist Senior CEE Economist
+44 207 826-7954 +44 207 826-6077 +43 50505-82712
dan.bucsa@unicredit.eu gokce.celik@unicredit.eu mauro.giorgiomarrano@unicredit.de
Artem Arkhipov Dr. Ágnes Halász
Head, Macroeconomic Analysis Hrvoje Dolenec Chief Economist, Head, Economics and
and Research, Russia Chief Economist, Croatia Strategic Analysis, Hungary
+7 495 258-7258 +385 1 6006-678 +36 1 301-1907
artem.arkhipov@unicredit.ru hrvoje.dolenec@unicreditgroup.zaba.hr agnes.halasz@unicreditgroup.hu
Ľubomír Koršňák Anca Maria Negrescu Kristofor Pavlov
Chief Economist, Slovakia Senior Economist, Romania Chief Economist, Bulgaria
+421 2 4950 2427 +40 21 200-1377 +359 2 923-2192
lubomir.korsnak@unicreditgroup.sk anca.negrescu@unicredit.ro kristofor.pavlov@unicreditgroup.bg
Pavel Sobíšek
Chief Economist, Czech Republic
+420 955 960-716
pavel.sobisek@unicreditgroup.cz
UniCredit Research, Corporate & Investment Banking, UniCredit Bank AG, Am Eisbach 4, D-80538 Munich, globalresearch@unicredit.de
MR 20/2
Bloomberg: UCCR, Internet: www.unicreditresearch.eu
*UniCredit Research is the joint research department of UniCredit Bank AG (UniCredit Bank, Munich or Frankfurt), UniCredit Bank AG London Branch (UniCredit Bank, London), UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch
(UniCredit Bank, Milan), UniCredit Bank AG Vienna Branch (UniCredit Bank, Vienna), UniCredit Bank Austria AG (Bank Austria), UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka d.d., UniCredit Bank Czech Republic and
Slovakia, ZAO UniCredit Bank Russia (UniCredit Russia), UniCredit Bank Romania.
UniCredit Research page 7 See last pages for disclaimer.You can also read
