SUMMARY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) - OF THE MEETING OF THE - NATO Parliamentary ...
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) Sunday 16 May 2021 By videoconference 089 STC 21 E | Original: English | 21 May 2021
089 STC 21 E
ATTENDANCE LIST
OFFICERS OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE
Chairperson Kevan JONES (United Kingdom)
Vice-Chairperson Njall Trausti FRIDBERTSSON (Iceland)
General Rapporteur Nusrat GHANI (United Kingdom)
Special Rapporteur Karl-Heinz BRUNNER (Germany)
NATO PA BUREAU MEMBERS
President Gerald E. CONNOLLY (United States)
Treasurer Wolfgang HELLMICH (Germany)
Secretary General Ruxandra POPA
MEMBER DELEGATIONS
Albania Myslim MURRIZI
Belgium Els AMPE
Leo PIETERS
Bulgaria Hristo Georgiev GADZHEV
Canada Ziad ABOULTAIF
Leona ALLESLEV
(Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security)
Michel BOUDRIAS
Jane CORDY
Cheryl GALLANT
Dan MAZIER
Croatia Stjepan KOVAC
Czech Republic Josef HAJEK
Denmark Mads FUGLEDE
Estonia Ants LAANEOTS
Andres METSOJA
France Christian CAMBON
Philippe MICHEL-KLEISBAUER
(Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security)
Germany Dagmar FREITAG
Jürgen HARDT
Greece Manousos Konstantinos VOLOUDAKIS
Hungary Agnes VADAI
(Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and
Security)
Andrea VARGA-DAMM
Italy Andrea CANGINI
Fabrizio ORTIS
Latvia Ojars Eriks KALNINS
Ivans KLEMENTJEVS
Lithuania Tomas BICIUNAS
Luxembourg Nancy ARENDT KEMP
Sven CLEMENT
(Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and
Security)
Montenegro Danilo SARANOVIC
North Macedonia Ilija NIKOLOVSKI
Norway Sverre MYRLI
1089 STC 21 E
Poland Przemyslaw CZARNECKI
Mariusz GROMKO
Romania Sorin-Dan MOLDOVAN
Slovakia Juraj KRUPA
Slovenia Andrej CERNIGOJ
Spain Xavier CASTELLANA
Begona NASARRE
Juan VÁZQUEZ
Turkey Hisyar OZSOY
Kamil Okyay SINDIR
(Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and
Security)
Taner YILDIZ
United Kingdom Stuart ANDERSON
Harriett BALDWIN
United States Jack BERGMAN
Dina TITUS
ASSOCIATE DELEGATIONS
Azerbaijan Elshan MUSAYEV
Sweden Kenneth G. FORSLUND
Switzerland Pierre-Alain Roger FRIDEZ
Thomas MINDER
Ukraine Galyna MYKHAILIUK
REGIONAL PARTNER AND MEDITERRANEAN
Algeria Abdelhak BENBOULAID
PARLIAMENTARY OBSERVERS
Assembly of Kosovo Driton HYSENI
Kazakhstan Erlik TAIZHANOV
Speaker Dr Tarja CRONBERG,
Distinguished Associate Fellow, European Security Programme,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
Steffen SACHS Director, Science and Technology Committee
Sarah-Claude FILION Coordinator, Science and Technology Committee
Sophia MASON Research Assistant
Jacob ROSS Research Assistant
2089 STC 21 E
Opening remarks by Kevan JONES (United Kingdom), Chairperson of the Science
and Technology Committee
1. After welcoming attending parliamentarians and thanking the Swedish delegation for
hosting the meeting, Kevan Jones (UK), Chairperson of the Science and Technology
Committee (STC), declared the Committee meeting open.
2. Mr. Jones proceeded by laying out the structure of the meeting and introducing the
speaker as well as the rapporteurs. He then familiarised attendees with the KUDO platform
and gave some technical recommendations regarding requests to speak and sound settings.
Adoption of the draft Agenda [076 STC 21 E]
3. The draft Agenda [076 STC 21 E] was adopted unanimously.
Adoption of the Summary of the meeting of the Science and Technology
Committee held on Friday 20 and Saturday 21 November 2020 [204 STC 20 E]
4. The Summary [204 STC 20 E] was adopted unanimously.
Consideration of the preliminary draft General Report on Enhancing NATO S&T
Cooperation with Asian Partners [023 STC 21 E] presented by Nusrat GHANI
(United Kingdom), General Rapporteur
5. After sharing her personal motivation for drafting the report, Nusrat Ghani (UK), General
Rapporteur, stressed that NATO’s partnerships with likeminded nations are crucial for the
Alliance. Ms Ghani emphasised that the importance of Science & Technology (S&T)
cooperation for NATO’s relations with partners is underappreciated. In this context she
highlighted the valuable role of NATO’s Science and Technology Organisation (STO).
6. S&T cooperation is crucial for the development of Emerging and Disruptive
Technologies (EDTs), including artificial intelligence, biotechnology, or space technology. As
the Asia Pacific region is emerging as the global hub for S&T and also of global economic and
strategic importance, not least due to the rise of China, the Committee’s General Report is
focused on NATO’s S&T cooperation with Asian partners.
7. Ms Ghani then concentrated her remarks on Japan, which had recently been invited as
an Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP) to the STO. Other than Japan, she mentioned South
Korea and Singapore as potentially promising partners for NATO, also mentioning the STC’s
visit to Singapore in 2019.
8. Ms Ghani finished her presentation with an overview of the draft report’s preliminary
conclusions. She welcomed NATO’s Science and Technology Board’s (STB) decision to invite
Japan as an EOP before expressing her hope that the STO network could also be used to
promote the participation of women in the sciences. Ms Ghani invited attendees to promote
dialogue between their respective governments and Asian partner countries on S&T topics.
9. In the ensuing Q&A Sven Clement (LU) inquired about intellectual property rights
protection. He reminded his colleagues that Allied countries had repeatedly encountered
problems with China, respectively Chinese companies in this regard. Galyna Mykhailiuk (UA)
argued that the updated Committee report could mention potential benefits through S&T
cooperation programmes for NATO’s partner countries and to reinforce the report’s
3089 STC 21 E
recommendation for a stronger participation of women in the S&T field. Ms Mykhailiuk also
suggested that the Rapporteur could refer to the STC 2020 report on hypersonic weapons in
the update.
10. Mr Jones expressed his conviction that a broadened cooperation with South Korea,
especially on 5G technologies, held great promise for the Alliance. Finally,
Philippe Michel-Kleisbauer (FR) invited Ms Ghani to get involved in the preparation of the
Committee’s trip to Japan, planned for 2022.
11. Ms Ghani welcomed the remarks, underlining that her former role as Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Aviation and Maritime in the United Kingdom’s Department for
Transport would especially qualify her to contribute to S&T cooperation in the maritime realm.
She argued that Western countries had taken their technological dominance for granted for
too long and that cooperation with Asian partner countries was a welcomed shift in that sense.
Ms Ghani shared Mr Clement’s view on the importance of protecting property rights. She
called for equal partnerships with regards to technological cooperation. She thanked Ms
Mykhailiuk for her remarks, promising that she would carefully review the proposals.
Presentation by Dr Tarja CRONBERG (SIPRI), Distinguished Associate Fellow,
European Security Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), on Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Nuclear Diplomacy for Arms Control
12. After thanking the Swedish delegation for organising the session, Mr Jones handed the
floor to Kenneth G. Forslund (SE), Deputy Head of the Swedish Delegation, who introduced
the speaker, Dr Tarja Cronberg.
13. Ms Cronberg started her presentation by providing a brief academic and political
background, and particularly her recent involvement in the negotiations of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The speaker then reminded the Committee of the
genesis and history of the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme. She underlined
that the goal of the negotiations, international control of the Iranian programme and the
avoidance of a military confrontation, remained the same as when the E3 (France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom) began taking diplomatic steps towards Iran. Ms Cronberg shed light
on the transformations of the negotiations process. The period following the JCPOA’s entering
into force in July 2015 enabled renew investments and trade all the while Iran was careful to
comply with the limitations agreed on its nuclear programme, according to Ms Cronberg.
However, the maximum pressure policy towards Iran following the exit of the Trump
administration from the deal isolated Iran from the international community. The Iranians
replied by gradually exceeding the limits of the JCPOA, thereby signalling that the measures
they had implemented in compliance with the agreement are reversible.
14. With the change of the U.S administration political will to negotiate is back. For the time
being, negotiations are between the P4+1 and Iran with the U.S. delegation on the sidelines,
the speaker said. However, while there is political will on both sides, the negotiations face a
classical problem in nuclear diplomacy, namely who goes first: The Iranians have demanded
that the U.S. should remove the sanctions first. The U.S. has required that Iran returns to the
approved limits of the JCPOA first. The issue is being addressed by two working groups which
seek a stepwise procedure to balance the situation. The second challenge is the issue of
“sunset” clauses as some of the limitations of the JCPOA will expire within a short period of
time. The original vision was that when the time approaches these clauses could be
renegotiated in good faith. Whether or not these questions will be referred to later negotiations
or be taken up in Vienna is not clear, Ms Cronberg informed the Committee. Another
controversial issue are Iran’s ballistic missiles. Regional issues will be referred to a different
forum, although there is no indication as of yet where, she explained. Regional states,
4089 STC 21 E
particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, have been excluded from the JCPOA negotiations and
several acts of sabotage have occurred, ostensibly to spoil the negotiations, the speaker
noted.
15. The greatest hindrance for an agreement is domestic politics, particularly within two key
countries, the United States and Iran, Ms Cronberg suggested. In the U.S., the Republicans
and conservative hardliners continue to strongly criticise the JCPOA for various reasons. In
Iran, the conservatives in the Iranian parliament have tried to block the negotiations by issuing
a deadline for sanctions relief. Pundits interpret this move as also linked to the upcoming
presidential elections in Iran. Both the U.S. and Iran need the JCPOA, but it is too early to
forecast the outcome of the negotiations, Ms Cronberg said. She finished her presentation by
stressing that the JCPAO is not only about the Iranian nuclear programme but also about the
credibility of nuclear diplomacy and the ability to reach, through negotiations, an agreement
that prevents a state obtaining nuclear weapons. The alternative to nuclear diplomacy is the
military option, which the JCPOA so far has prevented, she concluded.
16. In the following Q&A, Mr Clement asked Ms Cronberg about the implications of a
potential failure of the negotiations. Ziad Aboultaif (CA) expressed concern that the Iranian
regime wants to develop a nuclear arsenal. He also asked if the West, and the international
community, can be certain that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons. The Chairperson,
Kevan Jones, inquired about Iran’s missile programme and about Russia’s and Israel’s
respective roles in the negotiations.
17. Ms Cronberg said she is convinced that Iran is committed to remain party to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While Iran seems intent on mastering
nuclear weapons technology it does not want to have a nuclear arsenal of its own, the speaker
suggested. In case the JCPOA talks failed she expected new negotiations to unfold in a
different format. Russia has been very active in the nuclear discussions, she said. Moscow
has commercial interests as it wants to get involved with Iran’s civil nuclear sector and in
conventional arms sales to Iran. Finally, the speaker expressed her concern about parts of the
Israeli government who were trying to sabotage the ongoing talks, making reference to the
recent explosions that took place in an Iranian nuclear facility.
Consideration of the preliminary draft Special Report on Space and Security –
NATO’s Role [025 STC 21 E] presented by Karl-Heinz BRUNNER (Germany),
Special Rapporteur
18. Special Rapporteur Karl-Heinz Brunner (DE) provided a brief overview of current
developments in space technology, focusing of course on security-related developments. He
highlighted that the Allies, and the world as a whole, are increasingly dependent on
space-based hardware and related services. He also underlined the importance of space for
NATO. Although space has officially been declared the Alliance’s fifth operational domain only
in 2019, it has already been an “enabling domain” for Allied operations for many years, he
underlined. He mentioned secure communications, geolocation, and precision targeting as
examples.
19. The Rapporteur identified three main reasons why NATO's increased attention to space
is overdue. First, while increasingly crucial for operations, as noted in a previous NATO PA
report, Allied space assets are threatened by increasing numbers of anti-satellite weapon
systems. Second, the sheer numbers of satellites launched into orbit – whether of civilian or
military nature, private or public – have already created congested orbits and increase the risk
of accidents. Third, the existing international legal framework regulating space activities is no
longer adequate, as identified by another NATO PA report.
5089 STC 21 E
20. The Rapporteur reminded the Committee of the importance of space for commercial and
scientific purposes and stressed that space-based assets are important both for Allied security
but also for the prosperity of Western societies. NATO’s role in space is limited today, among
others because it does not have space assets of its own, Mr Brunner explained. However, he
said that the Alliance could make a significant contribution in coordinating the security-related
aspects of space policy among NATO member states. NATO could position itself as a forum
for the exchange of information on interoperability or technical standards. In the future, this
would perhaps enable the development of joint capabilities - initially within the Alliance and
later possibly also with interested partner countries. Mr Brunner concluded his presentation
by saying that space offers unimagined opportunities, but also poses some risks. He called
upon his colleagues to explore the former and avoid the latter. Space is a "global commons" -
which requires cooperation, not confrontation between all space-faring nations, he stressed.
21. Mr Clement underscored the increasing importance of satellite communications, also as
an alternative to cable communications. The Luxemburg member stressed the growing
number of actors, particularly private companies, and the rapidly increasing number of satellite
launches. He inquired about the heightened risks of collisions in orbit and how these risks
could be mitigated. Njall Trausti Fridbertsson (IS) broached the role of satellites for
navigation and geolocation, particularly in the High North and the northern Atlantic. He noted
that satellites are now also being launched from northern Europe and wondered whether
European and North American GPS systems could be combined in the future. Ms Mykhailiuk
shared the view of the Rapporteur that cooperation, not confrontation, is needed in space.
She remarked that partnerships are important to realise this goal and also to adapt the existing
international legal framework governing space activities. She suggested that the Rapporteur
may further evaluate China’s space efforts, also with regard to its investments in European
states, and also Russia’s activities in space. She offered to contribute to the latter subject.
Finally, Mr Michel-Kleisbauer thanked Mr Brunner and the German delegation for the
organisation of the virtual visit to Germany and the cooperation on the discussed report.
22. Mr Brunner expressed appreciation for the comments and questions he received. He
iterated that, like Mr Clement and other members, everything needs to be done to prevent an
arms race in space. The international community needs a rules-based order for space, he
said. Steps in this direction could initially be undertaken on a bilateral basis which would
potentially lead to multilateral agreements. He thanked Ms Mykhailiuk and said he would
welcome her contribution to the preliminary draft report. He also approved of Mr Clement’s
suggestion and
Mr Fridbertsson’s remarks that earth-bound cable communications should be gradually
replaced by more satellite communications in the northern Atlantic region. Mr Jones thanked
the Special Rapporteur for a very informative report and said he particularly appreciated the
call for modernising the outdated legal framework for space.
Consideration of the preliminary draft Report of the Sub-Committee on
Technology Trends and Security on Biological Weapons: Technological Progress
and the Spectre of Bioterrorism in the Post-Covid-19 Era [024 STCTTC 21 E]
presented by Leona ALLESLEV (Canada), Rapporteur
23. Leona Alleslev (CA) introduced her preliminary draft report by placing the debate on
biological weapons within the broader context of the recent COVID-19 pandemic. She pointed
out that the pandemic generated broad public attention to questions related to societal
resilience against pathogens.
24. Ms Alleslev then proceeded to highlighting the rapid progress that biotechnology and
related emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are making and the opportunities they
offer. As an example, she reminded Committee members of the opportunities these
6089 STC 21 E
technologies provide for the detection, containment, and defeat of biological threats. However,
she cautioned that these technologies could also be used for harmful purposes in the future,
as decreasing costs and easier access via public sources may facilitate the proliferation of
biological agents to non-state actors.
25. Turning to NATO’s role, Ms Alleslev noted that the main responsibility for preparing
against biological attacks and preventing bioterrorism lies with individual member states.
However, the Alliance has a role to play as well, she argued, as NATO develops biodefence
and deterrence policies and supports national biodefence efforts through multiple platforms.
Moreover, The Alliance’s ability to respond to biological threats is underpinned by its Science
and Technology network. The Rapporteur argued that Allied states should use the heightened
awareness of biological threats to good use and review, and where necessary, update existing
biodefence policies and capabilities. The Canadian member also warned that the cornerstone
of global efforts to prevent and protect against the use of biological weapons, the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC), faces multiple challenges to its implementation and is no longer
adequate to meet today’s biothreats. The convention’s shortcomings include difficulties in
ensuring compliance with its core obligations; the lack of an implementing body; and
inadequate funding. Moreover, due to the fast pace of technological innovation the treaty is
also ill-equipped to address the security applications of rapidly developing scientific research,
she stressed.
26. Ms Alleslev finished her presentation citing several conclusions of her preliminary draft
report, including the recommendation to move robust biodefence higher up on the security
agendas of NATO and of individual Allies as well as the re-examination of existing biodefence
capabilities. Finally, she pointed out that 2021 seemed to be a good moment to strengthen the
Biological Weapons Convention, with the Review Conference scheduled later this year.
27. Gerald E. Connolly (US), President of the NATO PA, welcomed Ms Alleslev’s work and
encouraged Committee members to examine lessons learned from the pandemic. He said
that the Sub-Committee on Technological Trends and Security (STCTTS) can play an
important role in this process.
28. Fabrizio Ortis (IT) briefly shared a few Italian experiences of the pandemic. He
suggested that the update of the report could include a proposal on how to generate increased
confidence in government action in the face of pandemic risks. Cheryl Gallant (CA) asked
how NATO could help improve research on vaccines that could be used against viruses
developed by potential aggressors. Andrea Varga-Damm (HU) voiced concern that COVID-
19 had weakened Allied societies and that some officials might use a future pandemic to
impose measures that could have a lasting impact on civil liberties. Finally, Ms Mykhailiuk
proposed to include lessons learned regarding the resistance against disinformation
surrounding the vaccination process in Section 4 of the report.
29. Ms Alleslev thanked for the comments and acknowledged the importance for the
Committee to assess the longer-term sociological aspects of the pandemic, including the loss
of trust in state institutions. She suggested that the Committee should take a closer look on
challenges such as disinformation and include lessons learned in during the COVID-19
pandemic.
Future activities of the Science and Technology Committee and the
Sub-Committee on Technological Trends and Security
30. Mr Jones briefed the Committee on pending activities of the STC for the remainder of
2021. He informed about the visit to France, planned for 2 July. Considering the continued
7089 STC 21 E
uncertainties linked to the pandemic situation, the Committee, together with the French
delegation, decided to organise the visit virtually.
31. Mr Jones then briefed attendees on recent exchanges with Japanese representatives,
who had decided to postpone a STC visit to the country to 2022. As Japan had been currently
caught in the fourth wave of the pandemic and foreign visitors were excluded from other major
events such as the 2021 Summer Olympics, the postponement was deemed the safest option.
Mr Jones indicated, however, that the STCTTS was looking into alternatives for a visit in 2021.
32. Prompted by the invitation of the Chair on possible future Committee report topics
Ms Alleslev noted that creativity has always been a critical element of warfare and the
preparation of armed forces for possible future violent conflicts. She stressed the importance
of Allies challenging assumptions of how violent conflict can evolve and work toward “flexibility”
to adapt to changing nature of conflict. Mr Jones agreed with Ms Alleslev and said that the
Committee will discuss this further.
Any other business
33. Mr Jones then reminded the Committee of a vacant position of Vice-Chair of the STC.
He then welcomed and introduced Dina Titus (US), new member of the US delegation.
Referring to Ms Titus’ background in science and her renowned expertise in research on
nuclear power, Mr Jones proposed to name her as Vice-Chairperson ad interim until the
Annual Session. No objections were registered, and Ms Titus was named
Vice- Chairperson ad interim.
34. Finally, Mr Jones informed members of the Committee that a pilot project on a
STC-related cooperation with students from different universities was currently planned. The
Committee Director provided a brief overview of the planned project, announcing that more
detailed information will be available soon.
Date and place of the next meeting
35. Mr Jones informed members of the Committee that the next meeting will take place in
Lisbon during the Annual session, scheduled from 8 – 11 October 2021.
Closing remarks
36. Before closing the meeting, Mr Jones thanked attending members for the constructive
discussion, the Swedish delegation for hosting the session, and interpreters for allowing
smooth communication. Finally, he thanked NATO PA staff for their work on reports and the
organisation of the 2021 Spring Session.
37. Mr Jones closed the meeting at 17:15.
A recording of the meeting is available on the NATO PA YouTube Channel here.
_____________________
www.nato-pa.int
8You can also read
