STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
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Center for Security Studies
STRATEGIC
TRENDS 2021
Key Developments in Global Affairs
Editors: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert
Series Editor: Andreas Wenger
Authors: Brian G. Carlson, Julian Kamasa, Linda Maduz,
Niklas Masuhr, Lisa Watanabe
CSS
ETH Zurich
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 1 April 2021. © 2021, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-76-9
CHAPTER 2
Franco-German-British Security
Cooperation After Brexit
Julian Kamasa
The departure of the United Kingdom from the EU has considerable implica
tions for the European security architecture. Although the UK continues to be
part of NATO, it might not suffice to use NATO as a forum for comprehensive
coordination, since it is primarily a military alliance. Therefore, new settings
for the coordination of essential policies between London and its key European
partners seem necessary. In the short and medium terms, a trilateral form of
security cooperation among France, Germany, and the UK such as the E3 could
bridge the gaps created by Brexit.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor
Angela Merkel attend the 2019 G7 summit in Biarritz, France. Andrew Parsons / Pool via Reuters
37ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
The United Kingdom has left the EU useful points of contact with selected
for good without any agreement on fu- EU member states and build on exist-
ture structured cooperation in foreign ing cooperation formats such as the
and security policy. However, London E3 with France and Germany. This
can still be expected to cooperate with format dates back to 2003, when the
individual European states. On the foreign ministers of the three coun-
one hand, the loss of formalized secu- tries traveled to Tehran to sign the first
rity cooperation between London and agreement with the Islamic Republic
the EU should not be underestimated, of Iran with the aim of bringing that
since many channels of communica- country back into full compliance
tion, coordination, and cooperation with its obligations under the Nu-
are now disrupted. On the other hand, clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
the absence of the UK in security co- However, E3 cooperation since then
operation should not be overestimated has included many other policy areas,
either. EU foreign and security policy essentially extending the scope of this
for the most part is still based on in- format. The E3 has issued joint state-
tergovernmental cooperation. The UK ments on many international issues,
will continue to be surrounded by the which most recently included political
same strategic environment regardless tensions in the Gulf region, terror net-
of its relationship with the EU. Brexit works in Iraq and Syria, the military
will not fundamentally transform core coup in Myanmar, challenges posed
values of British foreign policy such as by China, the global distribution of
the promotion of liberal democracy, vaccines against the coronavirus, and
rule of law, human rights, free trade, the upcoming Climate Change Con-
or the increasingly essential topic of ference. Now that the UK has left the
climate change. These values are largely EU, the E3 format may become even
shared with the majority of EU mem- more important. The choice of policy
ber states. Both the UK and EU mem- area in which it would be used may be
ber states have strong incentives to con- rather hard to predict, since it would
tinue cooperation. London wants to be unrealistic to assume that there is a
know what is going on inside Brussels, structured agenda in such an informal
and the EU simply cannot ignore the setting. The areas in which the three
UK’s diplomatic and military weight. European powers could be active are
geographically and thematically di-
For the time being, the enduring sim- verse. However, cooperation in many
ilarities between UK and EU policies policy areas could be constrained by
could mean that London will seek a lack of coherence. The E3 need to
38F R A N C E , G E R M A N Y, A N D B R I TA I N
base their cooperation on a case-by- in political alienation between the
case basis, given that this loose form UK and the EU. The 2021 Integrat-
of cooperation is ultimately a function ed Review titled “Global Britain in a
not only of a convergence of national competitive age” implies that London
interests, but also of external devel- will try to establish itself as a commit-
opments such as the efficiency of EU ted partner of individual EU member
policymaking. This means that ini- states, bilaterally or in “minilateral”
tial disagreement among EU member formats, which may consist of several
states on international issues allows a like-minded states cooperating on an
coherent E3 to deal with those issues ad-hoc basis on a specific policy is-
on an ad-hoc basis. When the E3 can sue.1 Such minilateral formats already
act swiftly and coherently, this format exist, and perhaps the best example
may be a useful tool to purposefully is E3 cooperation. Since 2003, when
complement the rather lengthy policy- the three countries began to focus on
making process of the EU. the Iranian nuclear program, it has
expanded to cover many areas of in-
Post-Brexit Power Dynamics ternational importance such as free-
The EU’s Common Foreign and Se- dom of navigation in the South Chi-
curity Policy (CFSP) and Common na Sea, conflicts in Syria and Yemen,
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the implementation of the Paris
can no longer be used as fora for the Agreement to tackle climate change.2
coordination and exchange of infor- The issues dealt with by the E3 can
mation with the UK for the remain- be characterized as a mix of joint re-
ing 27 EU member states. The lack of sponses to current security challenges
a UK-EU security agreement means and entry into specific policy fields
that new forms of cooperation may that have initially been neglected by
evolve. The UK should not sudden- the EU.3 Given the UK’s changing re-
ly be expected to be “less European.” lationship with the EU, the E3 and
At the same time, British foreign and similar structures may therefore gain
security policy is unlikely to mirror in importance.
too closely that of the EU, as such
intense collaboration could provoke It is important to take into account
criticism from Brexit hardliners. Con- that, within the Franco-German-Brit-
ducting foreign and security policies ish triangle, security relations between
independent from the EU was one of London and Berlin are comparatively
their main arguments for leaving the weak and essentially the missing link in
Union. However, this need not result the effort to build more equal security
39ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1 cooperation among the three states. the heads of state meet on a regular France, comparatively, is in a comfort- basis to discuss current challenges. able position, as it has strong relations However, given that Germany is not with both countries. In the 2010 Lan- a nuclear power and does not belong caster House Treaties, France and the to the P5, and against the backdrop UK agreed to reinforce their bilateral of Germany’s reluctance to use mili- defense cooperation in a number of tary force, France is likely to view its areas. This even included intensified partnership with Germany in a very collaboration in the most sensitive field different light from that with the UK. of nuclear weapons, where Paris and London agreed on improving their nu- The scenario of stronger E3 cooper- clear stockpile stewardship programs ation will pose a new task for Paris in support of both countries’ inde- and Berlin, namely, to bridge the gap pendent nuclear deterrent capabilities. between remaining committed EU They are the only European states with member states and anchoring Lon- nuclear capabilities. Moreover, they are don in Europe. Neither France nor the only European states belonging to Germany are interested in creating the five permanent members (P5) with the impression that E3 cooperation veto power of the UN Security Council with the UK is more important than (UNSC). As a result, Paris and London the EU’s CFSP or CSDP. However, are used to intense bilateral coopera- London is not obliged to cooperate tion. Furthermore, the two states have with the two exclusively and is free similar strategic cultures, as expressed to build significant partnerships with in globally oriented foreign and secu- other EU member states as well. As rity policies based on their historical the graphic on page 41 shows, the self-perception as former colonial pow- future of the Western Balkans for in- ers. Paris’ links to Berlin are different. stance appears to matter comparative- The establishment of Franco-German ly more for the UK than it does for friendship after the end of the Second France and Germany. Hence, coun- World War constituted the basis for tries such as Austria, Slovenia, and the founding of the European Union. Croatia could be the UK’s partners of Most recently, these ties have been re- choice for minilateral cooperation on iterated through the Treaty of Aachen this specific policy issue. In the con- in January 2019, which among other text of recent diplomatic tensions in items includes a comprehensive mutu- the Eastern Mediterranean, London al defense clause.4 Within the format of might build on its historically strong the Franco-German Security Council, ties with Cyprus and initiate some 40
F R A N C E , G E R M A N Y, A N D B R I TA I N
41ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
sort of ad-hoc forum by including that London should continue to
Greece and possibly France, which is cooperate closely with EU member
already quite present in the region. states on global issues including cli-
Thus, Brexit may lead to a wide range mate change, policies towards China,
of interesting new cooperation for- rule of law, and foreign policy coop-
mats among European states. eration. Experts also agreed that the
UK should continue cooperation on
Driving Forces for Trilateral certain “European issues,” such as
Cooperation policies towards Russia, the Western
The E3 format can capitalize on two Balkans, and migration.5 Paris and
decades of good experiences of cooper- Berlin appear to be useful points of
ation. The question of how to prevent contact for London. The UK may be
Iran from building nuclear weapons is able to use those channels to help in-
the raison d’être of the E3 format, and fluence the EU’s positions on points
remains “unfinished business.” Against of interest important to the UK. This
the backdrop of their long-standing may prove particularly feasible in
collaboration on the Iranian file, the cases where the UK is acting faster
E3 knows there is mutual understand- than the EU. One prominent exam-
ing and that it is possible to pursue ple is the issue of 5G telecommuni-
shared interests on a complicated cations networks. European nations
problem consistently. This confidence are fragmented in their responses to
in the partnership is a crucial driving concerns about vulnerabilities created
force when dealing with other issues, by 5G infrastructure, and a poor EU
which would likewise demand a lot of response may risk undermining the
patience and consistency. protective work London has already
undertaken. Not only has London
Each one of the E3 members has a created cybersecurity centers with a
different motivation for cooperating state-of-the-art insight into the ac-
trilaterally. For the UK, an important tivities of so-called high-risk vendors
factor is Brexit. Despite its nuclear ca- since 2010, but it has also stopped the
pabilities, a well-embedded strategic installation of equipment from such
culture, veto power in the UN Secu- vendors by September 2021.6
rity Council, and NATO membership,
the decoupling from EU institutions In contrast to the UK, France per-
will influence the UK’s foreign, securi- ceives European defense and secu-
ty, and defense policies. A poll of Brit- rity as a core of its foreign, security,
ish policy experts found agreement and defense policy. For instance, the
42F R A N C E , G E R M A N Y, A N D B R I TA I N
notion of L’Europe de la défense (a Eu- is of crucial importance for France
rope which protects) is an essential since the UK is a permanent member
component of the “2017 Strategic Re- in the UNSC and a nuclear power.
view of Defence and Security” clearly
prioritizing cooperation with Europe- Germany’s strategic culture differs
an states.7 Paris places strong emphasis sharply from those of the UK and
on the EU’s geopolitical role, which France. It is not a permanent member
is reflected in the French-led debate of the UN Security Council, nor does
about strategic autonomy as well as the it possess nuclear weapons. Moreover,
European Intervention Initiative and Germany often hesitates to make use
the idea of a European pillar in NATO. of its military. In light of its history,
Berlin has a different view on Europe- some pockets of German society are
an strategic autonomy, with Germany’s averse to the deployment of its mili-
defense minister even calling it an “il- tary. Hence, Germany’s military, the
lusion.”8 This divergence is an import- Bundeswehr, is by many standards sig-
ant driving force for France to promote nificantly under-equipped. In direct
close security cooperation with Berlin comparison to the UK and France,
and London. For France, the dynamics Germany lacks both diplomatic and
of the relationship with Germany are military power. However, Germany
different when the UK is present and has the fourth-largest economy in the
discussions occur outside of an EU world in terms of GDP and is a ma-
setting. Whereas Paris may feel like a jor trading power, particularly with
“lonely leader”9 when pushing towards China and the US. This imbalance
a more geopolitical EU, the dynamics between economic and diplomatic/
are different in the Berlin-London-Par- military weight can be partly mitigat-
is triangle. Here, Germany does not ed through E3 cooperation; Germany
enjoy the same influence as it does in- is able to participate in high-level de-
side the EU structures and, with its dif- bates where, in comparison to other
ferent strategic culture and reticence to fora such as the UN, it enjoys much
acknowledge its position in the world, greater influence. Unlike an elected,
may find that its positions are in the non-permanent seat in the UNSC, the
minority. Thus, for France, this infor- E3 format also has low barriers to en-
mal triangle provides an opportunity to try and no rotation mechanism. Just
engage Germany in the area of security like France, Germany has a keen in-
and defense with more leverage and, at terest in trying to anchor the UK in
the same time, ensure that the UK re- Europe. Hence, trilateral cooperation
mains a close European ally. The latter seems beneficial for Berlin. Being part
43ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1 of a security cooperation format with arms control, especially in the field of both the UK and France could poten- emerging technologies such as lethal tially allow Germany to develop a more autonomous weapons (LAWs). The strategic mindset. A stronger German question is, however, whether the three profile in security and defense policy states can find a coherent stance in or- would essentially meet external expec- der to do so. For instance, Germany tations that were set during the Munich does not procure weaponized drones, Security Conference in 2014, when whereas both the UK and France do. German leaders declared their inten- This issue creates divergences among tion to assume more responsibility in the E3 when regulatory questions on this area, which was called the “Munich an international level arise.13 Although Consensus.”10 Germany’s March 2021 there is agreement on some aspects of declaration that it would send a frigate the technology, notably an empha- to the Indo-Pacific by August 2021 can sis on human control, resistance by be interpreted as an important signal to France and the UK to restrictions on like-minded states such as France and the development and procurement of the UK, which are already present in such systems may still prove a signifi- this region, of Germany’s readiness to cant point of contention in their rela- assume greater responsibility.11 tionship with Germany. Potential Policy Areas Furthermore, there are regions or of E3 Cooperation sub-regions of potential interest to It is obvious that the Iranian nuclear France, Germany, and the UK that program will remain crucially import- could be significant sites of future ant for the three states. The withdrawal cooperation. A region closely linked of the US from the Joint Comprehen- to the complex topic of maritime se- sive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May curity is the so-called “Indo-Pacific,” 2018 challenged the European states which describes the geographical area but resulted in their renewed cohesive- encompassing the Indian and Pacific ness rather than division. The main goal oceans. It is strategically important to is still finding a solution with Tehran France and the UK as a tool to project based on diplomacy. With US President global power, specifically by ensuring Joe Biden, the hope is that both the US freedom of navigation in the South and Iran will return to full compliance China Sea as guaranteed in the UN with the JCPOA.12 Furthermore, les- Convention on the Law of the Sea.14 sons from the experience could be ap- Germany recently issued guidelines plied to future negotiations concerning on this region, which include the 44
F R A N C E , G E R M A N Y, A N D B R I TA I N
45ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
option of “various forms of maritime of Hormuz (EMASoH) with a coali-
presence.”15 Engagement by European tion of willing states outside of the EU
states would be a strong signal of sup- framework. When EMASoH became
port for the US, which is placing pri- fully operational in February 2020,
ority on this region as part of a com- Germany offered political support,
prehensive strategic shift. Thus, the the Dutch navy provided a frigate,
preconditions for engagement by the and Denmark and Belgium support-
E3 appear to be promising. A stronger ed the military operation Agénor with
European engagement in the Indo-Pa- personnel.18 The fragmented respons-
cific would be welcomed by countries es from France, Germany, and the UK
in the region, too.16 The E3 could, show that even though in principle all
therefore, try to raise awareness of states sought to achieve a similar goal,
this approach among other European namely safe passage at sea, their prior-
states, and both France and Germany ities were not sufficiently in alignment
could take a leading role in a strength- to act cooperatively.
ened EU engagement in this region.
Similarly, in the Sahel region, all states
The difficulties of E3 cooperation in share the same ends, namely political
maritime security in practice were par- stability and the prevention of in-
ticularly visible following attacks by creased terrorism in the region. How-
Iran on international oil tankers in the ever, the presence of a variety of actors
Strait of Hormuz in July 2019. Both in the region increases the E3’s diffi-
Germany and France were opposed to culty in acting coherently. As France
siding with the US in its “maximum started its own military operations
pressure” approach following Wash- Serval in 2013 and later Barkhane in
ington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. 2014, both the UN and the EU were
London, on the other hand, had ini- on the ground, too. Under the umbrel-
tially reached out to Berlin to seek a la of the EU training mission in Mali
“European answer,” but joined the US- (EUTM Mali), both Germany and the
led mission after Germany expressed UK (as a non-EU member state) are
its reluctance to act outside of the EU contributors. In Germany, the exten-
structures.17 France has also empha- sion of the deployment related to the
sized the need for an EU mission, but EUTM Mali earned the support of a
it grew impatient with the lengthy EU sizeable majority in parliament.19 Both
decision-making procedures and in- Berlin and London are, therefore, any-
stead established the European Mari- thing but passive, though they need to
time Surveillance Mission in the Strait issue more than their political support
46F R A N C E , G E R M A N Y, A N D B R I TA I N
for the French-led military operation. China. Essentially, Germany trades as
Instead, operational contributors are much with China as France and the
smaller EU member states such as Bel- UK combined. However, recent events
gium, Denmark, Estonia, the Nether- in Hong Kong have triggered surpris-
lands, and Portugal.20 A meeting of the ingly strong reactions from London to
French, German, and British defense Berlin. Therefore, it is conceivable that
ministers in August 2020 revealed that proposals by the UK to address this is-
stability in the Sahel region is of cru- sue could win the support of France
cial importance, which could indicate and Germany. In this context, the role
deeper E3 cooperation and increased of the US matters, too. The Biden
engagement moving forward.21 administration is already pursuing an
approach of coalition-building, which
On an EU level, insufficient unity exists may prove fruitful. For example, Ger-
at present to forge common policies and many faced a particularly vexing di-
strategies for dealing with major glob- lemma over its crucial car industry.
al powers such as Russia and China, In 2019, the German auto industry
though there is a growing consensus on faced threats from both China, in the
China, as shown by the targeted sanc- form of retaliation if Germany were to
tions against Chinese individuals and ban the Chinese 5G supplier Huawei,
one entity for human rights abuses that and also from the United States under
were imposed in March 2021. Notably, Trump, which threatened to impose
this step appeared to have been a coor- tariffs were Huawei not banned. The
dinated approach among the EU, the absence of politically motivated pu-
UK, the US, and Canada. Therefore, nitive tariffs by the US government
for states like France and Germany that towards European exports might thus
are trying to limit Chinese influence on create incentives for many Europe-
a EU level, the Franco-German-British an states to take a tougher stance on
triangle could prove extremely useful. China.
However, there are diverging views on
how to approach powers such as Rus- This situation may be different with re-
sia and China even among these three spect to Russia. In fact, all E3 countries
nations. For the UK, China’s policy to- have different kinds of relationships
wards its former colony Hong Kong is with Moscow that appear to be mutual-
a far bigger priority than for France and ly incompatible. France did not achieve
Germany.22 Berlin’s comparatively soft much with its unilateral approach of
political stance towards Beijing is large- “renewed dialogue.” Berlin, compar-
ly a product of its economic ties with atively, is interested in maintaining
47ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
well-balanced relations with Moscow. the main obstacle preventing closer
Germany reacted relatively softly to the cooperation among EU members in
killing on German territory by Russian the field of foreign and security pol-
intelligence officers of a Georgian na- icy. Given that other EU members
tional who was a former rebel military were also protective of their national
commander in Chechnya. Further- sovereignty at times, this might be an
more, the German government, despite exaggeration. However, it seems telling
substantial domestic and foreign criti- that in parallel to the Brexit negotia-
cism, continues to support both Nord tions, projects such as the Permanent
Stream pipeline projects. The UK, like Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or
Germany, strengthened economic ties the European Defense Fund have be-
for a long period while paying little heed come operational quite rapidly by EU
to the potential geopolitical implica- standards. For the first time in the EU’s
tions. Nevertheless, the UK was a leader history, defense has become part of the
in the process of imposing EU sanc- EU budget. Whether these intra-EU
tions against Russia. The poisoning of developments will have a push or pull
Sergei and Yulia Skrypal on British soil effect on London remains to be seen.
in 2018 and the comparatively strong The Integrated Review, the biggest re-
reaction in Britain shows an altered ap- assessment of British foreign, security,
proach from a similar incident in 2006. and defense policy since the end of the
Overall, the divergence of approaches Cold War, has revealed the ambition
towards the Kremlin seems to be too big to be a more globally oriented UK
in order to develop a coherent trilateral emphasizing cooperation in bilateral
Russia policy.23 A scenario similar to the and ad-hoc formats with a group of
Skrypal attack on French territory could like-minded states complementing the
change the dynamics, however. On the UK’s membership in important insti-
other hand, the absence of further mali- tutions such as the UN, NATO, or the
cious Russian activities in Germany and OSCE. The declared increase in de-
the UK may tilt these countries’ posi- fense spending is designed to underpin
tions closer to the French one, opting ambitions of a “Global Britain”. How
for dialogue. this spending will actually play out in
practice remains to be seen. As indicat-
Obstacles to E3 Cooperation ed in the Integrated Review, Paris and
The United Kingdom’s foreign and se- Berlin may become key partners in
curity policy has never really been tru- many venues, since London’s approach
ly “European.” Even while it was part is shifting towards a more global ori-
of the EU, many perceived the UK as entation. How much focus can be put
48F R A N C E , G E R M A N Y, A N D B R I TA I N
on international matters, of course, will party Front National, openly rejects
depend in many ways upon domestic Macron’s policy on Europe. Although
stability. Growing dissatisfaction in a Le Pen presidency seems rather un-
Scotland and Northern Ireland about likely, Macron’s re-election should not
the actual consequences of Brexit could be taken for granted, either. Measures
force London to focus inward at the ex- to contain the spread of the corona-
pense of “Global Britain.” virus have given rise to widespread
frustration and economic uncertainty
France also has a distinct interpretation among voters, which populist parties
of what European security should be. such as Front National could poten-
Even for many committed EU member tially exploit.
states such as Germany, Paris’ positions
represent unrealistic ambitions. In ad- Germany’s relatively strong commit-
dition, French leaders have a tendency ment to foreign and security policy-
to adopt “go-it-alone” approaches as making within the EU framework
soon as they determine that an issue could be an obstacle to extended E3
is moving too slowly within an EU cooperation. Due to its history and
framework, or sometimes even from geography, Berlin has to be cautious
the very outset, in anticipation of slow of engaging in additional projects like
EU procedures.24 This approach of the Nord Stream pipelines, which
“talking European, acting French” is were heavily criticized in Poland and
controversial. Eastern European EU reinforced some states’ fears of being
member states, for instance, were dis- sidelined in the EU. Germany could
pleased with the lack of consultation address such concerns by reviving
prior to Emmanuel Macron’s renewal the Weimar Triangle, together with
of dialogue with Russia. Should trilat- France and Poland, in parallel with
eral security cooperation with the UK deeper E3 cooperation. This may
and Germany intensify outside of the alienate southern European states like
EU framework, France’s credibility Spain or Italy, however. Both Germa-
within the EU might suffer, especially ny and France need to take this into
in discussions of increased defense co- account when considering intensified
operation. How France will position cooperation with the UK. Domestical-
itself within Europe may also depend ly, Germany is still working to define
on the outcome of the upcoming pres- its role in a rapidly changing strategic
idential elections, scheduled for April environment.25 Berlin has declared
2022. President Macron’s opponent its intention to assume increased re-
Marine Le Pen, from the right-wing sponsibility in international affairs.
49ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
To this end, the German government as EU members are concerned, they
may have to re-define its economic pri- align with the US and not with Chi-
orities, as some of its current activities na. They have recently reinforced this
undermine the ambition of being a by calling China a “systemic rival”
responsible power. This applies to the and imposing targeted sanctions for
Nord Stream pipelines with Russia and human rights abuses.26 In addition,
a production facility that Volkswagen, EU member states are increasingly
the largest German car manufacturer, interested in establishing themselves
operates in Xinjiang, the province in as key players in the global system.
northwest China where mass human However, the key question is how a
rights abuses are taking place. The in- coherent European Foreign and Secu-
tensity of economic interdependence rity Policy can be put into practice.
with autocratic regimes may become The departure of a powerful country
problematic, especially with regard to like the UK from the EU may have
China. The key question in this context far-reaching implications, but they
will be how to weigh normative and do not necessarily have to be neg-
economic interests against one another ative. Rather, Brexit could make it
when tradeoffs become necessary. easier for the remaining EU members
to make headway with their CFSP. At
To some extent, an external obstacle the same time, London and individ-
to E3 cooperation could arise from the ual EU member states, particularly
streamlining of EU foreign, security, France and Germany, could increase
and defense policymaking. The E3 has their cooperation or establish a wide
often been active on those occasions range of new cooperation formats.
when decision-making in the EU was
too lengthy. Thus, a truly effective EU For both France and Germany, it is
could mean constrained windows of clear that strategic long-term objec-
opportunity for the E3 to add value. tives requiring the EU’s economic
weight cannot be dealt with outside
The E3 within Eroding of the EU structures or at national
Multilateralism levels. This principle of subsidiarity
Given that the world is increasing- was made especially clear in the case
ly dominated by the competition of economic sanctions against Iran.
between the US and China, many The E3 became the E3+EU as soon as
countries are struggling to find a suit- the economic leverage of the EU was
able position on the global stage. This required. Furthermore, in accordance
also applies to European states. As far with EU treaties, issues concerning
50F R A N C E , G E R M A N Y, A N D B R I TA I N
trade and economic policy are preroga- potential to complement the EU with-
tives of the EU Commission. On many out substituting it and vice versa. It is
other issues, including investment likely, for instance, that the French-led
screenings, 5G, cybersecurity, and data operation in the Strait of Hormuz may
protection, the EU likewise possesses have paved the way for an EU mission
the necessary means to act most effec- in the mid- to long-term.
tively. Regardless of Brexit, the UK’s in-
terests may continue to converge with As a minilateral engagement, the E3
the EU’s. Under such circumstances, could thus complement the EU and
the UK will autonomously apply EU contribute to what Brussels has yet
measures such as economic sanctions, failed to achieve: a coherent, effective,
which was particularly pronounced in and rapid answer to global develop-
the case of recent EU sanctions against ments promoting European norms
China. The economic leverage that the and values. A strong E3, on the one
EU possesses as a large trading bloc is hand, runs the risk that other EU
its biggest strength, but this is also its member states may feel excluded at
weakness. EU Commission President times. On the other hand, from the
Ursula von der Leyen tellingly admit- UK’s perspective, France and Germa-
ted in the context of the Covid-19 vac- ny are not the only useful partners in
cination campaign that “alone a coun- Europe. Depending on the issue in
try can be a speedboat, while the EU is question, Sweden, Poland, Greece,
more like a tanker.”27 Italy, Spain, and Austria may offer
London what France and Germany
This assessment applies to the area of do not. This could result in many new
European Foreign and Security Policy, speedboat-like informal cooperation
too. A wide range of security challeng- formats accompanying the tanker of
es, often unforeseeable, that require the EU. This increased ad-hoc mini-
rapid and immediate answers are like- lateralism should, however, comple-
ly to arise. Even a mid-sized speedboat ment and not substitute EU foreign
such as the E3 format can fail to re- and security policy. Such a division
spond coherently, as events in the Strait of responsibilities has the potential
of Hormuz have shown. Bringing 27 to maximize Europe’s footprint in the
nation-states together in order to define world, not despite Brexit, but rather
a common position under significant as a result of a new set of post-Brexit
time constraints is, however, an even power configurations. The key will be
more difficult task. So-called mini- a convergence of national interests,
lateral cooperation formats bear the fortunate timing, and political will.
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1 HM Government, Global Britain in a competitive 15 Die Bundesregierung, Leitlinien zum Indo-Pazi-
age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, fik, August 2020.
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16 Linda Maduz / Simon Stocker, “South-East
2 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Of- Asia: A Hotspot in Great Power Rivalry,”
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from E3 and the United States, February 2021.
17 Carlo Masala / Christian Mölling / Torben
3 Alice Billon-Galland / Richard G. Whitman Schütz, “Ein Schiff wird kommen? Deutsch-
/ Thomas Raines, “The Future of the E3: lands Optionen für einen Marineeinsatz in
Post-Brexit Cooperation Between the UK, France der Straße von Hormus,” DGAPkompakt 15
and Germany,” Chatham House, July 2020. (2019).
4 France Diplomacy – Ministry for Europe and 18 France Diplomacy – Ministry for Europe and
Foreign Affairs, Franco-German Treaty of Aachen, Foreign Affairs, Mission européenne de surveil-
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6 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & 19 Deutsche Welle, Germany extends Bundeswehr
Sport, Roadmap to remove high risk vendors from mission in Mali, 29.05.2020.
telecoms network, November 2020.
20 Ministéres des Armées, Task Force Takuba:
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Foreign Affairs, European Defence, July 2019. Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France,
Germany, Mali, Niger, the Netherlands, Norway,
8 Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, “Europe still Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom,
needs America,” Politico Opinon, 02.11.2020. 27.03.2020.
9 Mathilda Ciulla / Tara Varma, “The lonely 21 Ministry of Defence, Defence Secretary’s speech
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foreign policy,” ECFR Commentary, 06.01.2021. ministers, 21.08.2020.
10 Tobias Bunde / Laura Hartmann / Franziska 22 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, National
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23 Billon-Galland et al., The Future of the E3, p. 14.
11 Verteidigungsministerium, In den #Indopazifik
werden wir von August 2021 bis Februar 2022 24 Ciulla, Varma, The lonely leader.
eine Fregatte entsenden, https://twitter.com,
03.03.2021. 25 Ariane Reimers, “Mehr Verantwortung – nur
wie?,” ARD Tagesschau Analyse Deutsche Sicher-
12 FCDO, Iran and other international issues: heitspolitik, 15.11.2020.
statement from E3 and the United States.
26 European Commission, State of the Union Ad-
13 Human Rights Watch, Stopping Killer Robots: dress by President von der Leyen at the European
Country Positions on Banning Fully Autonomous Parliament Plenary, 16.09.2020.
Weapons and Retaining Human Control, August
2020. 27 Daniel Boffey, “Ursula von der Leyen: UK is
Covid vaccine ‘speedboat’ compared with EU
14 Tuan Anh Luc, “Are France and the UK Here ‘tanker’,” The Guardian, 05.02.2021.
to Stay in the South China Sea?,” The Diplomat
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