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Special Warfare
The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
PB 80–99–4 Fall 1999 Vol. 12, No. 4From the Commandant
Special Warfare
In November, the U.S. Army Special
Operations Command will mark the
29th anniversary of the Son Tay Raid by
dedicating a statue to “Bull” Simons,
who led the raid. Simons is remembered
as a dedicated soldier who was loyal to
the men who served under him. In hon-
oring his memory, we recognize his serv-
ice, his duty and his loyalty as qualities
for which all SOF soldiers should strive.
“Bull” Simons richly deserves such
recognition.
Yet in all our memorialization, we have
not yet recognized the man who did much
to make our modern Army special-opera-
tions forces possible. The man whose the creation of the Psychological Warfare
vision and efforts did most to make psy- Center at Fort Bragg and to the founding
chological warfare and unconventional of the 10th Special Forces Group.
warfare permanent capabilities in the Those of us who serve in Army SOF
U.S. Army is unknown to many soldiers today owe a great debt to Major General
who have spent the majority of their McClure. As we search the past for
careers in SOF. I refer to Major General heroes, we could find no one more deserv-
Robert Alexis McClure. ing of honors than the man whom Dr.
In this issue, Dr. Al Paddock details Paddock has rightfully called the forgot-
Major General McClure’s service and the ten father of Army special warfare,
role that Major General McClure played Robert Alexis McClure. I am confident
in the creation of Army SOF. Through that Major General McClure will receive
diligent research, Dr. Paddock has recon- the proper recognition that he has so
structed the early days of Army special well earned.
warfare. His article shows the planning
and the effort that were needed to make
an Army special-warfare capability a
reality.
From his assignments during World
War II, Major General McClure acquired Major General Kenneth R. Bowra
a unique appreciation of the value of UW
and PSYWAR capabilities. He envisioned
a permanent special-warfare capability,
and his commitment to that idea caused
him to pursue the concept with military
and civilian officials after the war. Major
General McClure never gave up, despite
resistance within the Army and from
other agencies. His persistence led to the
formation of the Office of the Chief of
Psychological Warfare and, ultimately, toPB 80–99–4
Contents
Fall 1999 Special Warfare Vol. 12, No. 4
Commander & Commandant
Major General Kenneth R. Bowra
Features
Editor 2 Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of Army Special
Jerry D. Steelman Warfare
Associate Editor by Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr.
Sylvia W. McCarley 10 Steel Wings and a Wielded Sword: The 160th SOAR
Graphics & Design by General Henry H. Shelton
Bruce S. Barfield
14 Cognitive and Personality Assessment in Special Forces
Automation Clerk
Assessment and Selection
Gloria H. Sawyer
by Major Gary A. Hazlett and Dr. Michael Sanders
21 The 1999 SF Conference: Setting a New Standard
by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein
24 Theory, Research, Practice: Three Ways to Increase PSYOP
VE R
IT
AS
LI B
E RT
AS
Effectiveness
ET
by Dr. Mark F. Dyer
Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the
United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission 31 Army Values: Loyalty — Bull Simons
is to promote the professional development of special-
operations forces by providing a forum for the examination
of established doctrine and new ideas.
32 Military Legitimacy in OOTW: Civilians
Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do as Mission Priorities
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This
publication does not supersede any information presented by Colonel Rudolph C. Barnes Jr.
in other official Army publications.
Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and
should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,
44 Armageddon 2000: Military Implications
USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: of the Y2K Problem
DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.
Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. by Dr. James J. Schneider
Published works may be reprinted, except where
copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare
and the authors.
Official distribution is limited to active and reserve
special-operations units. Individuals desiring private
subscriptions should forward their requests to:
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special
Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web
(http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Eric K. Shinseki
General, United States Army
Departments
Chief of Staff 50 1999 Index
52 Letters
Official:
56 Enlisted Career Notes
58 Officer Career Notes
Joel B. Hudson
Administrative Assistant to the 60 Foreign SOF
Secretary of the Army 62 Update
9920302
64 Book Reviews
Headquarters, Department of the ArmyRobert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father
of Army Special Warfare
by Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr.
McClure was born March 4, 1897, in
W
here is the monument to honor
the man who provided the vision Mattoon, Ill. After graduating from Ken-
and the impetus for establishing tucky Military Institute in 1915, he served
U.S. Army special warfare? More than 42 with the Philippine Constabulary as a sec-
years after his death, visitors to Smoke ond lieutenant. On Aug. 9, 1917, he earned
Bomb Hill still find no evidence of his place a Regular Army commission and was pro-
in special-operations history. In fact, most moted to first lieutenant. From then until
SOF soldiers are unfamiliar with his name. the eve of World War II, he served in a vari-
Robert Alexis McClure is the forgotten ety of infantry and service-school assign-
father of Army special warfare. ments in China and in the United States.
During the interwar years, McClure, like
Robert A. McClure as a other career officers, found promotion
cadet at the Kentucky Mil- excruciatingly slow: he served in the rank
itary Institute, December
of captain for 17 years.
1912.
By 1941, however, McClure was a lieu-
tenant colonel with orders to London,
where he was to serve as the assistant mil-
itary attaché. In swift succession, he
earned promotions to colonel and brigadier
general, and he became the military
attaché to the American Embassy in Lon-
don. As an additional duty, he served as
military attaché to nine European govern-
ments in exile. In September 1942, Gener-
al Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed
McClure to his Allied Forces headquarters
as chief of intelligence for the European
theater of operations. During the next
three months, McClure’s career took a new
direction — one that would immerse
McClure in a new and different field for
most of the rest of his life.
In December 1942, from “somewhere in
Africa,” McClure wrote to his wife, Marjo-
Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure ry: “My new job — for which I was called by
2 Special WarfareAs a brigadier general,
McClure was assigned
as military attaché to the
American Embassy in
London. Here, he stands
outside No. 10 Downing
Street, next to British
Prime Minister Winston
Churchill.
Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure
Ike — very hurriedly — is a continual cables, telephone for all of North & West
headache — I have what I call the INC Sec- Africa, Sicily, etc., over 400 personnel &
tion — I am just creating it.” In prepara- supervising 700 French. Public relations —
tion for the North African landings, Eisen- press and correspondents — 150 correspon-
hower had put McClure in charge of the dents — 250 personnel — a total “com-
Information and Censorship Section, or mand” of 1500 in an organization never
INC, of the Allied Forces headquarters. It contemplated in the Army.
was McClure’s job to consolidate several By the end of the North African and
functions for which most Army officers had Sicilian campaigns, McClure believed that
little preparation: public relations, censor- psychological warfare had become, for him,
ship and psychological warfare. As the “big job,” and he felt good about its con-
McClure colorfully stated, the job also car- tribution: “Our propaganda did a lot to
ried with it a “slop over into civil affairs.” break the Wops — as their emissaries
The INC was, indeed, an ungainly organ- admit — now we have to turn it on the Ger-
ization that included military and civilian mans,” he wrote to Marjory. But the “big
personnel from the U.S. Office of War Infor- job” was to become even bigger.
mation, or OWI; the U.S. Office of Strategic In early 1944, General Eisenhower
Services, or OSS; the British Political War- authorized the establishment of the Psy-
fare Executive, or PWE; and the U.S. Army. chological Warfare Division of the Supreme
McClure vividly outlined the scope of his Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force,
new responsibilities in a September 1943 or PWD/SHAEF, to support the European
letter to Marjory: campaign against Nazi Germany. McClure,
We operate 12 high powered radio sta- as its director, controlled and coordinated
tions — 6 of them are stronger than WLW psychological warfare in continental
in Cincinnati. My Psychological Warfare Europe. For years afterward, he empha-
staff — radio, leaflet, signals, front line, sized that PWD was built upon the trial-
occupation, domestic propaganda person- and-error experience of his ordeal in start-
nel, exceed 700. In censorship — troop, ing up and running INC in North Africa —
mail, and cables, civilian mail, radio, press, in particular, the Psychological Warfare
Fall 1999 3General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower presents the Distin-
guished Service Medal to
Brigadier General McClure
in 1944. The award recog-
nized McClure’s accom-
plishments as chief of psy-
chological warfare, SHAEF.
Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure
Branch. In North Africa and in Europe, quite different backgrounds and tempera-
McClure’s definition of psychological war- ments. It was one of his most successful
fare was quite concise, yet inclusive, by leadership traits.
today’s standards: “The dissemination of But even after V-E day, McClure’s job
propaganda designed to undermine the was far from finished. Eisenhower once
enemy’s will to resist, demoralize his forces again called upon McClure, directing him
and sustain the morale of our supporters.” to participate in planning for the occupa-
In Europe, PWD made radio broadcasts tion of Germany. McClure jubilantly wrote
from OWI transmitters and over the to Marjory on May 8, 1945:
British Broadcasting Corporation; conduct- The shooting war is over, here! Signed
ed loudspeaker broadcasts on the front yesterday. Paris is wild with excitement. …
lines; and conducted large-scale leaflet With one phase over I am now up to my
operations using specially designated air- neck on the control phase. We will rigidly
craft squadrons. PWD even provided control all newspapers, films, theatre, radio,
leaflets to be dispersed by the then-novel music, etc., in Germany! My division now
method of specially designed artillery publishes 8 newspapers in Germany with
shells. McClure had four deputies, each 1,000,000 circulation and sends 2 million+
representing a civilian agency that con- language papers each day by air for dis-
tributed personnel to PWD: OWI, OSS, placed persons and POWs. Biggest newspa-
PWE, and the British Ministry of Informa- per enterprise in the world.
tion. By the end of the war in Europe, PWD Essentially, McClure’s Psychological War-
controlled the activities of more than 2,300 fare Division changed names, becoming the
military and civilian personnel from two Information Control Division, or ICD. ICD
countries. As he had in the North African took on a new role as a key player in the
and Italian campaigns, McClure demon- reorientation and de-Nazification of Ger-
strated his ability to manage personnel of many. The change was not totally abrupt —
4 Special Warfareduring the combat phase PWD worked Pentagon, whose office serviced and con- closely in support of Civil Affairs with its trolled all military government in occupied “consolidation propaganda,” the purpose of areas. As he had done in his previous which was both to gain the cooperation of assignment in Germany, McClure organ- the German population in restoring essen- ized the New York field office into sections tial services, and to create a public opinion for press, periodicals, motion pictures, favorable to post-war Allied aims. ICD thus radio, theater, music, arts, exhibits, became an integral part of the U.S. military- libraries, and book rights. government (or Civil Affairs) effort in the There was, however, another aspect of U.S. portion of occupied Germany. McClure McClure’s activities during the postwar reported to General Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. period that would bear importantly on the military governor. future of Army special warfare. After the The reorientation of the German popula- massive demobilization of U.S. military tion was a formidable task. McClure forces during 1945-46, American concerns undertook it in three phases: first, the com- about the Soviet Union’s intentions grew in plete shutdown of all media; second, opera- intensity, ushering in the Cold War. tion by U.S. forces of selected instruments For four years, McClure engaged in a of information (radio, newspapers, etc.); dialogue with a number of high-ranking and, third, a gradual turnover of these instruments, by licensing them to carefully In June 1947, McClure sent a memo to his selected Germans. McClure’s aims were to cause individual Germans to renounce old boss from World War II — now Army Nazism and militarism, and to help them Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower — urging, take their place in a democratic society. McClure’s ICD organization mirrored the ‘Psychological warfare must become a part German media, with five “control” branch- es for radio, press, film, theater and music, of every future war plan.’ and publications. A sixth branch, intelli- gence, focused on public-opinion research, officers and civilian officials in an effort to with emphasis on German bureaucracies, rebuild the military psychological-warfare youth, and the church. ICD had a wide- capability that had essentially been dissi- ranging charter, indeed, as McClure wrote pated during the general demobilization. to his friend and vice-president of Time- In a letter to the War Department in early Life, Inc., C.D. Jackson, in July 1946: 1946, McClure advocated the integration of We now control 37 newspapers, 6 radio material on psychological warfare into stations, 314 theatres, 642 movies, 101 mag- service-school curricula, stating, “The igno- azines, 237 book publishers, 7,384 book rance, among military personnel, about dealers and printers, and conduct about 15 psychological warfare, even now, is public opinion surveys a month, as well as astounding.” In June 1947, McClure sent a publish one newspaper with 1,500,000 cir- memo to his old boss from World War II — culation, 3 magazines, run the Associated now Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhow- Press of Germany (DANA), and operate 20 er — urging, “Psychological warfare must library centers. … The job is tremendous. become a part of every future war plan.” In In the summer of 1948, the Army decid- November of that year, McClure gave ed that McClure’s experience could best be Eisenhower a list of former PWD/SHAEF used in a similar assignment in the U.S. As staff members that he recommended for chief of the New York field office of the forming a psychological-warfare reserve. Army’s Civil Affairs Division, McClure was McClure continued his correspondence, responsible for supporting U.S. reorienta- consultations and exhortations with the tion and re-education efforts in the occu- War Department, but it was not until the pied countries of Germany, Austria, Japan North Korean invasion of South Korea in and Korea. He reported to Major General June 1950 that his efforts bore fruit. Short- Daniel Noce, chief of Civil Affairs in the ly after that shocking event, Major Gener- Fall 1999 5
McClure as chief of the
New York field office of
the Army’s Civil Affairs
Division.
Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure
al Charles Bolte, the Army Staff G3, tions, the Army first established a psycho-
requested that McClure report to Washing- logical-warfare division in the G3, with
ton for a few days to help him determine, McClure as its first chief, and then made it
with respect to psychological warfare, “the a special staff office reporting directly to
further organizational steps necessary to the Army chief of staff. Because of his asso-
meet the operational requirements of the ciation with the OSS during World War II,
Korean situation or of a general war.” The McClure appreciated the potential of
latter contingency was key: Even during unconventional warfare, and he lobbied for,
the Far East crisis, the Army believed that and received, staff proponency for UW as
the greater threat lay in a potential inva- well. On Jan. 15, 1951, the Army formally
sion of Western Europe by the Soviet recognized the Office of the Chief of Psy-
Union, and it wanted to create an uncon- chological Warfare, or OCPW — the first
ventional-warfare capability primarily for organization of its type in Army history.
the conduct of guerrilla warfare in Europe Although McClure’s new office started out
in the event of a Soviet invasion. Bolte with a staff of only five men, that number
added, “I know of no one better qualified to eventually grew to more than 100.
assist us in that respect.” For McClure, “a OCPW’s mission was “to formulate and
few days,” became the formative years of develop psychological warfare and special
Army special warfare. operations plans for the Army in conso-
On the basis of McClure’s recommenda- nance with established policy and to recom-
6 Special Warfaremend policies for and supervise the execu- available from disbanding the Ranger com-
tion of Department of the Army programs in panies in Korea, the Army chief of staff
these fields.” McClure organized his office approved the activation of Special Forces
into three divisions: Psychological Warfare, in early 1952.
Requirements and Special Operations. The Creating an unconventional-warfare
latter was particularly significant, because capability was not the only challenge on
it formulated plans for the creation of the OCPW’s plate. When the Korean War broke
Army’s first formal unconventional-warfare out in June 1950, the Tactical Information
capability: Special Forces. Detachment at Fort Riley, Kan., was the
Realizing that his firsthand experience only operational psychological-warfare
was basically in psychological warfare and troop unit in the Army. After its deploy-
Civil Affairs, McClure told his staff early ment to Korea, the detachment became the
on that he was “fighting for officers with 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet, or L&L, Com-
background and experience in special oper- pany, and it served as the 8th Army’s tacti-
ations.” He brought into the Special Opera- cal-propaganda unit throughout the con-
tions Division several officers who had flict. By April 1951, McClure had requested
World War II or Korean War experience the activation of the 1st Radio Broadcast-
either in guerrilla warfare or in long- ing and Leaflet, or RB&L, Group to assist
range-penetration units.
Two officers who played particularly key
roles in developing the plans for the cre-
McClure assumed a leading role in ‘selling’ the
ation of Special Forces were Colonel Aaron need for an unconventional-warfare capability
Bank and Lieutenant Colonel Russell Vol-
ckmann. Bank had fought with the French to the senior military and civilian leadership.
Maquis as a member of OSS. Volckmann
had organized and conducted guerrilla-
In the face of fierce resistance, … Special
warfare operations in the Philippines dur- Forces became a reality largely through the
ing World War II; during the Korean War,
he had planned and directed behind-the- persistence of McClure and through the
lines operations in North Korea.
Volckmann later remembered that
efforts of Bank and Volckmann.
McClure had approached him in Walter
Reed Hospital (where Volckmann had been the Far East Command, or FECOM, in con-
evacuated from Korea) with a request to ducting strategic propaganda; the 2nd L&L
help organize the Special Operations Divi- company at Fort Riley, a prototype unit; the
sion. It was only after being assured that 5th L&L Company at Fort Riley, scheduled
the Army was interested in organized to be sent to FECOM); and the 301st
behind-the-lines operations that Volck- (Reserve) RB&L Group, to be trained at
mann agreed to take the job. Bank later Fort Riley and then shipped to Europe.
gave Volckmann considerable credit for the Thus, while he was in the process of
“development of position, planning, and staffing his own unprecedented office —
policy papers that helped sell the estab- OCPW — McClure moved quickly to assist
lishment of Special Forces units in the FECOM in its organization and conduct of
active Army.” both psychological warfare and unconven-
McClure assumed a leading role in “sell- tional warfare, while he concurrently
ing” the need for an unconventional-war- helped the European Command prepare
fare capability to the senior military and for the employment of both capabilities in
civilian leadership. In the face of fierce the event of a war with the Soviet Union.
resistance, not only within the Army but One other part of McClure’s vision
also from the CIA, Special Forces became a remained to be accomplished — centraliz-
reality largely through the persistence of ing the functions of what he called, “the
McClure and through the efforts of Bank whole field of OCPW.” Psychological war-
and Volckmann. With personnel spaces fare possessed a formal lineage and a tra-
Fall 1999 7dition in the Army, which unconventional niques and tactics for psychological war-
warfare did not, and McClure believed that fare and for Special Forces), and the 10th
the two capabilities should be combined Special Forces Group. Colonel Charles
under a single headquarters. Karlstad, former chief of staff of the
During that period of postwar budgetary Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Ga., was
austerity, McClure encountered consider- the first to serve as commander of the Cen-
able resistance to this idea, but he was able ter and commandant of the Psychological
to convince the Army chief of staff, General Warfare School. The Psychological Warfare
J. Lawton Collins, that a central organiza- School’s organization reflected the Center’s
tion was necessary for consolidating the mission. It consisted of a headquarters
training activities for psychological war- staff and two instructional divisions — one
fare and Special Forces. Accordingly, in for psychological warfare, the other for
May 1952, the Army formally announced Special Forces.
the activation of the Psychological Warfare Initially, the 6th RB&L Group was the
Center at Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission was: largest unit in the Center’s force structure.
To conduct individual training and Formed at Fort Riley and then shipped to
supervise unit training in Psychological Fort Bragg in June 1952, the 6th consisted
Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to of a headquarters company, the 7th Repro-
develop and test Psychological Warfare and duction Company, the 8th Mobile Radio
Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, Broadcasting Company and the 2nd L&L
and techniques; to test and evaluate equip- Company. In May 1953, OCPW activated
ment employed in Psychological Warfare the 12th Consolidation Company under the
and Special Forces Operations. 6th RB&L Group. The organizational con-
As it was originally established, the Psy- cept of the 6th RB&L Group, the forerun-
chological Warfare Center consisted of the ner of today’s psychological-operations
Psychological Warfare School, the 6th group, was first employed in Korea. The
RB&L Group, a psychological-warfare ancestry of the mobile radio company,
board (to test materiel, doctrine, tech- however, can be traced to McClure’s
PWD/SHAEF, which used several such
McClure with the Shah of companies to support front-line combat
Iran in 1955. McClure forces in Europe during World War II.
developed a close rap-
McClure selected Bank from the OCPW
port with the Shah and
staff to command the 10th Special Forces
with his senior general
officers. Group. Bank’s “command” in June 1952 con-
sisted of seven enlisted men and one war-
rant officer — a rather inauspicious begin-
ning. But by April 1953, with the aid of vig-
orous OCPW recruiting efforts throughout
the Army, the 10th had increased to 1,700
officers and enlisted men.
Essentially, the 10th Special Forces
Group represented a pool of trained man-
power from which units or combinations of
units could be drawn to execute specific
unconventional-warfare missions. At the
heart of the group’s organization was the
operational detachment, or “team,” estab-
lished along the same lines as the OSS
operational group. Commanded by a cap-
tain, the team, with a first-lieutenant exec-
utive officer and 13 NCOs, was capable of
infiltrating behind enemy lines to organize,
Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure train and direct friendly resistance forces
8 Special Warfarein guerrilla warfare. Early training focused tation on the origins of the Army’s special- on the individual skills of the various mem- warfare capability. Having served several bers of the team: operations and intelli- tours with Special Forces during the 1960s gence, light and heavy weapons, demoli- without ever reading or hearing about him, tions, radio communications, and medical. I was amazed to discover the central role Each man trained thoroughly in his partic- that McClure played in the creation of a ular specialty, then participated in cross- permanent psychological- and unconven- training to learn the rudiments of the other tional-warfare capability. This article is skills. drawn from that dissertation in history at By early 1953, most of McClure’s major Duke University; from my subsequent book, programs had been launched; nevertheless, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins he was surprised to learn that he was being (National Defense University Press, 1982); assigned to Iran as chief of the U.S. Military and from my more recent research in Gen- Mission. The rationale was that he had been eral McClure’s personal papers. I am deeply in a specialized activity too long. The Army indebted to Colonel Robert D. McClure, U.S. chief of staff, General Collins, implied that Air Force (Ret.), and his wife, Betty Ann, for McClure’s chances for promotion would be giving me complete access to General enhanced by the new assignment. McClure’s papers. In Iran, McClure formed close associations with the Shah and the Iranian senior mili- tary. As Collins had predicted, McClure was Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr. promoted to major general. In 1956, McClure completed his 31-year Army retired from the Army, ending more than 39 career as a colonel in October years of continuous active service. While dri- 1988. His military career ving cross-country with Marjory to San included command and staff Clemente, Calif., where they planned to build assignments in Korea, Laos, their dream home, McClure became serious- Okinawa, Vietnam and the ly ill. He died of a heart attack at Fort U.S. He served three combat tours with SF Huachuca, Ariz., on Jan. 1, 1957, two months units in Southeast Asia. Among his varied prior to his 60th birthday. assignments, Paddock was an instructor of Robert A. McClure’s position as the strategic studies at the U.S. Army Com- founder of Army special warfare seems mand and General Staff College; he served indisputable. Over a critical period of 10 in the Politico-Military Division of the years, he made vital contributions to psy- Army Staff in Washington, D.C.; he com- chological warfare, to Civil Affairs, and to manded the 6th PSYOP Battalion and the the creation of Army Special Forces. But his 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg; and he most important legacy may have been the was the military member of the Secretary’s establishment of the Psychological Warfare Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. Center. From its humble beginning, that Paddock completed his military career as institution grew, becoming the Special War- the Director for PSYOP, Office of the Secre- fare Center in 1956 and later evolving into tary of Defense. A graduate of the U.S. Army the U.S. Army Special Operations Com- Command and General Staff College and mand and the U.S. Army Special Warfare the U.S. Army War College, he earned a B.A. Center and School. Yet despite the fact that in political science from Park College. Pad- McClure made all these things possible, his dock also holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in role has gone largely unrecognized. Robert history from Duke University. A. McClure remains the forgotten father of U.S. Army special warfare. Author’s note: I first read about Major General Robert A. McClure during the 1970s, while I was conducting research in the National Archives for my Ph.D. disser- Fall 1999 9
Steel Wings and a Wielded Sword:
The 160th SOAR
by General Henry H. Shelton
As I was winched up through the jungle
T
hroughout my career I have served
with, fought alongside, and had canopy, I could see where the rotor blades
admiration for the Army aviators were striking the treetops. Bob had had to
who accompany special-operations forces hover that low, risking himself, his crew, and
into battle. In Vietnam, few served with his aircraft just to reach us. As I looked into
more courage or with more distinction the cockpit, I could see Bob’s fiercely deter-
than the pilots, crew chiefs and gunners mined face, a look of intense concentration
who supported Special Forces. Hovering and absolute focus, tinged by apprehension
overhead, often in the face of withering about enemy fire and whether the blades
enemy fire, they provided critical fire sup- would survive the beating they had taken
port and a vital lifeline to their comrades from striking the treetops.
fighting on the ground below. I have never forgotten the feel of that
There is not a day in my life that I do not vibrating Huey as it rolled out and gained
pause for a moment and reflect on the altitude; nor have I ever forgotten the
bravery displayed by one of those aviators, courage of that warrior and his crew as they
Captain Bob Moe- accomplished a very dangerous mission.
berg. Bob was the Those aviators who flew with and fought
pilot of a helicopter alongside Special Forces in Vietnam will
that extracted my always have a special place in my heart,
Special Forces Pro- and their valor is without question. How-
ject Delta team ever, during the war and throughout the
from the jungle 1970s, there was no permanent special-
after we had spent operations aviation organization. The trag-
seven days evading ic experience at Desert One in Iran in 1980
North Vietnamese was the event that finally, and with unmis-
forces. As Bob ma- takable clarity, demonstrated the need for
DoD photo
neuvered the air- the superb rotary-wing capability that the
craft overhead, the crew chief lowered the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regi-
jungle penetrator; however, even when ment now provides. In a very real sense,
fully extended, it did not reach all the way Desert One was the catalyst that led to the
down through the triple-canopy jungle, and creation of special-operations aviation.
it was just out of reach for most of my If we compare the venerable Huey of the
team. We were finally able to lift the team Vietnam era with the highly sophisticated
members up to reach the penetrator, and aircraft in the regiment today — aircraft
then I jumped up, barely snagging it. that are air-refuelable and that are outfit-
10 Special WarfareToday’s special-opera-
tions helicopters, like this
MH-60, with their sophis-
ticated avionics and capa-
bilities for night-vision
and for in-flight refueling,
are a far cry from the
Huey of the Vietnam era.
DoD photo
ted with the latest avionics and night- elements of the 160th deployed to Somalia
vision capabilities — it is easy to see how as part of Task Force Ranger. The heroism
far we have come in developing special- displayed by the regiment’s members in
operations aviation. While the technology that war-torn country forged a record that
has changed dramatically, the courage, will endure forever.
skill and determination of the men who On Oct. 3, 1993, the regiment lost five
flew with Special Forces in Vietnam crewmen and two MH-60 aircraft in
remain and have flourished in those who Mogadishu to hostile ground fire, and three
fly with the 160th today.
Throughout the short history of the Throughout the short history of the 160th, its
160th, its aviators have pioneered night
flight tactics and techniques, led the devel- aviators have pioneered night flight tactics and
opment of new equipment and procedures,
met the call to duty wherever it sounded, techniques, led the development of new equip-
and earned a reputation for excellence and ment and procedures, met the call to duty
valor that is second to none. From their
1983 baptism of fire in Grenada to today, wherever it sounded, and earned a reputation
the 160th aviators have always lived up to
their motto, “Night Stalkers Don’t Quit. ” for excellence and valor that is second to none.
Indeed, the history of the regiment is a
tale of courage, honor and glory against more aircraft were hit so badly that they
seemingly insurmountable odds in faraway had to make emergency landings. In the
places and in skies filled with danger. midst of this chaos, in the most intense
While there are many noteworthy chapters firefight since Vietnam, the pilots and crew
in the annals of the 160th, an unforget- chiefs of the 160th displayed incredible
table episode was written in an ancient, bravery and valor, as well as a tremendous
windswept city on the Horn of Africa dur- sense of self-sacrifice.
ing the hot, terrible summer of 1993, when On that day, in a valiant attempt to res-
Fall 1999 11A Black Hawk helicopter
from the 160th SOAR flies
over burning oil fields in
Kuwait during Operation
Desert Storm. The aviators
of the 160th have earned a
reputation for valor and
excellence.
U.S. Army photo
cue wounded comrades on the ground automatic weapons and rocked by explo-
below, two very special, special-operations sions from volleys of rocket-propelled
soldiers, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon grenades, Super 62 remained in position,
and Sergeant First Class Randy Shugart, kept aloft by its pilots, Chief Warrant Offi-
jumped from a Black Hawk into a blazing cer Mike Goffena and Captain Jim Yacone,
firefight. The nation knows about the while its crew, Staff Sergeants Paul Shan-
deeds of these two great NCOs, deeds for non and Mason Hall, covered their fellow
which they were posthumously awarded soldiers on the ground. To those who were
watching, the aircraft seemed, at times, to
While there are many noteworthy chapters in the defy the laws of physics, and it became so
badly damaged that Goffena had to make
annals of the 160th, an unforgettable episode an emergency landing.
While their heroism was noteworthy, it
was written in an ancient, windswept city on the was the norm that day, repeated in innu-
Horn of Africa during the hot, terrible summer of merable other incidents that took place in
the center of Mogadishu. Two other unas-
1993, when elements of the 160th deployed to suming pilots, true “quiet professionals,”
Chief Warrant Officers Keith Jones and
Somalia as part of Task Force Ranger. Karl Maier, were flying an MH-6 “Little
Bird” with the call sign Star 41. Star 41
the Medal of Honor, but few know about was literally the cavalry coming to the res-
the countless acts of valor performed by cue of the soldiers trapped in a hellish part
the members of the 160th in that battle. of that ancient city.
After inserting Gordon and Shugart into Jones and Maier landed in an alley with
a hail of fire, the Black Hawk, with the call just two feet of rotor clearance from the
sign Super 62, went into an overhead orbit walls on either side. Jones leapt out, fought
to provide close air support. Despite being his way over to two wounded special oper-
pounded by extremely heavy fire from ators and then struggled back to the air-
12 Special Warfarecraft with them. Meanwhile, Maier held response reveals the matchless courage, the controls of the helicopter with his right the spirit of service and self-sacrifice, and hand while firing his MP-5 submachine the willingness to do or die that lie at the gun with his left. Amid a hail of small-arms very heart of what the Night Stalkers do, fire, and with enemy soldiers dead and who they are, and why they and all of our wounded all around, Star 41 and its crew other special operators are a national lifted off with the wounded special opera- treasure. tors on board. Not long after Star 41 had taken off, another Black Hawk, flown by Warrant General Henry H. Shelton Officer Dan Jollata, was hovering over the is chairman of the Joint city while two Air Force pararescuemen, or Chiefs of Staff. Prior to PJs, Master Sergeant Scott Fales and Tech- assuming this position, he nical Sergeant Tim Wilkinson, fast-roped served as commander in in. As Jollata held his hover, a rocket-pro- chief of the U. S. Special pelled grenade exploded on the left side of Operations Command, Mac- the aircraft. Realizing immediately that Dill AFB, Fla. General Shelton’s other his aircraft had been hit and that it was assignments include commanding general, badly damaged, Jollata nevertheless avoid- XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg; com- ed his natural inclination to pull up and mander, 82nd Airborne Division; and assis- get away, knowing that such a move would tant division commander for operations, doom Fales and Wilkinson. Despite the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He helicopter’s damaged main rotor housing also served as the Joint Task Force com- and a destroyed cooling system, Jollata mander during Operation Uphold Democ- held his hover. Only when the PJs were on racy in Haiti. General Shelton holds a the ground did he attempt to fly his crip- bachelor’s degree from N. C. State Universi- pled aircraft back to base. ty and a master’s degree in political science While all of this was going on, four of the from Auburn University. He is a graduate Night Stalkers’ AH-6 “Gunbirds” made of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced scores of gun runs — in all, 280 runs over courses, the Air Command and Staff Col- 18 consecutive hours! — providing deadly lege and the National War College. and accurate fire, some of it “danger close,” to help the soldiers on the ground hold their perimeter. All told, the gunbirds fired more than 50,000 machine-gun rounds and 70 rockets during the battle. How do you describe these actions to the average American? They are almost unbe- lievable, even by today’s action-movie standards. The fact that the events took place as described here defies comprehen- sion. Uncommon valor was indeed a com- mon virtue that day in the 160th. There is a passage from scripture that helps us understand such courage. In words that might have been written espe- cially for the Night Stalkers, the Lord speaks to the prophet Isaiah, asking, “Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?” Isaiah answers: “Here am I; send me!” Whenever the nation calls, the 160th responds: “Here am I; send me!” That Fall 1999 13
Cognitive and Personality Assessment
in Special Forces Assessment and Selection
by Major Gary A. Hazlett and Dr. Michael Sanders
a significant correlation to one’s al technical, or GT, score is consid-
I
n the Winter 1999 edition of Spe-
cial Warfare, Lieutenant Colonel overall intelligence. While other ered the best indicator of a sub-
Manuel Diemer and Major measures may be used to provide ject’s overall cognitive potential. In
Thomas Joyce, authors of “Special supplemental data, these four an adequately normed group, a GT
Forces Entry-Level Training: Vision indicators represent the core score of 100 indicates that the sub-
for the Future,” state, “Mental evalu- components of the cognitive ject’s performance is average; i.e., it
ations are not a significant part of assessment of SF candidates. is as good as or better than that of
the current assessment-and-selec- 50 percent of the recruits who
tion process.” This statement sug- Education level made up the normative sample. A
gests that Special Forces Assessment The average SFAS candidate has a GT score of 100 is not equal to an
and Selection, or SFAS, makes no high school education and one year IQ score of 100 (suggesting aver-
formal attempt to assess the cogni- of college or equivalent training. age-range cognitive potential). A
tive aspects of SF candidates. But in Of 4,561 candidates assessed dur- GT score of around 108 is roughly
fact, the current SFAS program uses ing the past four years, 168 had a equivalent to a score of 100 (aver-
a variety of measures to assess each general equivalency diploma, or age) on a standardized test.
candidate’s behavioral stability and GED, vs. a traditional high-school The minimum GT score for
cognitive aptitude. diploma. The SFAS success rate for acceptance into SFAS is 100, which
This article will show how the these candidates was about half ensures that candidates possess an
currently available indicators of that of the candidates overall. Can- average cognitive aptitude or high-
cognitive aptitude and behavioral didates with GEDs had a 26.8-per- er. Over the years, the minimum
stability relate to the candidate’s cent success rate in SFAS — in GT score has varied from 110 to
performance in SFAS and in the other words, nearly three out of four 100, but despite the changing crite-
Special Forces Qualification were not selected. Of all the soldiers ria, the average scores of those who
Course, or SFQC. with GEDs who attended SFAS volunteer for SFAS and of those
To assess a candidate’s academ- from 1989 to 1998, only 14.4 percent who complete the program have
ic potential and cognitive func- graduated from SFQC. That success changed little over the past decade.
tioning, SFAS relies mainly on rate is also about half that of the The average GT score for SFAS
four indicators: the soldier’s group as a whole. candidates is 115, indicating that
record of formal education; scores in terms of cognitive aptitude and
from the Armed Services Voca- ASVAB testing academic abilities, the average
tional Aptitude Battery, or The ASVAB yields a number of candidate ranks among the upper
ASVAB; an achievement test in subscores that reflect a candidate’s third of all soldiers.
the area of basic education, or aptitude for various kinds of mili- The ASVAB GT data chart
TABE; and the Wonderlic Person- tary activities. However, the gener- reflects the scores of SFAS candi-
nel Test, a brief measure that has dates from 1989 to late 1998.
14 Special WarfareASVAB GT Score Range and SFAS Success
80%
GT SCORES
70%
A. 109 or below
60% B. 114 or below
50% C. 115 or above
D. 120 or above
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
A. B. C. D.
NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS success rates for soldiers at various GT-score levels.
Because GT scores are not avail- than for those with average used in SFAS. SFAS developed its
able for most officers, the data pri- scores. own set of norms, based on a pool of
marily reflect the performance of several thousand candidates who
enlisted soldiers. Wonderlic Personnel Test attended SFAS in the early 1990s.
The graph depicts the success The Wonderlic Personnel Test is a A recent validation check of that
rates for soldiers whose GT scores brief, timed test that measures one’s normative data, involving more
were in the ranges indicated. Sol- mathematical skills and, to a lesser than 4,000 candidates who attend-
diers who scored from 100 to 109 extent, one’s verbal abilities. The ed SFAS between 1995 and 1998,
typically had a significantly lower Wonderlic norms, developed in indicated no shift in the distribu-
success rate in SFAS. In fact, 1992, are based on the test scores of tion of scores.
there was a marked drop in suc- more than 118,000 job applicants The average SFAS candidate
cess rates for soldiers who scored throughout the civilian population. scores at about the 70th percentile
below 115. An increase or a The Wonderlic correlates closely to on the larger civilian population
decrease in the GT score usually other standardized tests of intelli- norms. When SFAS Wonderlic data
results in a corresponding in- gence, which suggests that it is an are divided into officer vs. enlisted
crease or decrease in the success excellent indicator of an individual’s categories, the officers score, on
rate in SFAS. A difference of one likely cognitive potential. average, above the 80th percentile
or two points in the GT score may Ever since SFAS began intellec- for civilian norms; the enlisted
seem trivial, but in data from a tual testing, it has used the Won- remain, on average, at or above the
recent four-year sample, candi- derlic. Early in-house studies 70th percentile.
dates who scored above 110 had a established that the average SFAS Like other test scores, lower
25-percent higher success rate candidate’s Wonderlic score was Wonderlic scores generally predict
than those who scored below 110. well above that of the national lower success rates in SFAS. Can-
At the same time, the success rate average, which is consistent with didates who score at the 20th per-
for soldiers with scores signifi- observations in almost every other centile or above have about a 46-
cantly above the average (120 or measure that has been or is being percent chance of being selected.
higher) was not markedly better Candidates who score below the
Fall 1999 15Wonderlic Percentile Scores and SFAS Success
80%
PERCENTILE SCORES
70%
A. 5% or below
60% B. 11% or below
C. 20% or below
50%
D. 24% or above
40% E. 37% or above
30% F. 51% or above
G. 67% or above
20%
H. 80% or above
10% I . 95% or above
0%
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I.
NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS success rates for soldiers in various percentile ranges.
20th percentile are selected about that they will not complete train- school — in other words, the per-
32 percent of the time. Candidates ing, primarily because of anticipat- formance level of the average grad-
who score at the 8th percentile or ed academic problems in Phase II uating high-school senior. Even if a
below (around the 27th percentile of the SFQC. It is worth noting that candidate’s performance level is
for civilians) have a 28.8 percent despite the fact that SFAS places actually higher than that, his GE
chance of selection. These data only minimal cognitive demands will be 12.9.
demonstrate three points: on candidates, those with higher During 1995-1998, 46 percent of
• Lower Wonderlic scorers per- Wonderlic scores typically are more SFAS candidates earned GE scores
form significantly poorer in successful. The critical point of 12.9 on all four measures. Forty-
SFAS. appears to be around the 20th per- two percent of the enlisted candi-
• The general population of sol- centile: Soldiers with scores above dates scored 12.9s on all four mea-
diers attending SFAS today are that have a higher-than-average sures, and 61 percent scored 12.0 or
on a par with those who attend- selection rate. higher on all four measures. The
ed a decade ago, in terms of cog- data indicate that with any drop
nitive aptitude. TABE testing from an all-12.9-score, candidates
• The average SFAS candidate is The TABE test provides four are less likely to succeed in SFAS. In
a cut above the average soldier basic measures of academic skills terms of predicting future success in
and the average civilian job and achievement: the ability to training, the math score is the most
applicant. identify word meanings; basic definitive of the four measures.
The graph above depicts the reading skills and reading compre- To attend SFQC, candidates
relationship between a candidate’s hension; basic math skills; and must achieve a minimum score of
percentile scores on the Wonderlic written-communication abilities. 10.6 in all TABE categories. Candi-
(based on norms for all SFAS can- TABE scores are reported as grade dates may retake the TABE repeat-
didates) and his success in SFAS. equivalents, or GEs. The maximum edly prior to attending SFQC.
Generally, candidates who score GE is 12.9, which represents the As the TABE graph demon-
below the 11th percentile are iden- ninth month of the 12th year of strates, when any of the four sub-
tified as facing a high probability test scores falls below the 12th-
16 Special Warfaregrade level, there is a significant defined as the likelihood that a several tests developed by the
increase in the SFAS-failure rate. candidate will not complete train- United States Army Research
Initially, one might assume that ing because of academic deficien- Institute (the principal one being
the failure rate increases because cies or personality vulnerabilities. ARI Biodata80); the Minnesota
candidates are dropped by the final On the basis of their psychologi- Multiphasic Personality Inventory,
board because of their poor acade- cal test data, SFAS candidates are or MMPI; clinical-interview evalu-
mic grades. For the most part, this categorized as either low-, moder- ations conducted by psychologists
is not the case, as a later graphic ate- or high-risk. These categories during SFAS; and observations by
will demonstrate. do not suggest the likelihood of the SFAS cadre. Research to date
psychiatric problems; they refer to indicates that the ARI Biodata80
Behavioral reliability the likelihood that a candidate and the MMPI are the most useful.
In addition to assessing a candi- may fail to complete SFAS or
date’s intellectual potential, SFAS SFQC. A fourth group of candi- ARI Biodata80
uses several measures of personal- dates may be identified as high- The U.S. Army Research Insti-
ity and behavioral tendency to risk because of deficits in their aca- tute developed ARI Biodata80 in
reveal a candidate’s strengths and demic or cognitive-aptitude scores. response to requests for a test of
vulnerabilities, and to identify any High-risk candidates who complete personal integrity. The test is
risk of behavioral tendencies that SFAS are subsequently inter- designed to provide a variety of
might prevent the candidate’s viewed to determine whether they information about the candidate,
becoming a productive SF soldier. are indeed high-risk. The final including his level of social maturi-
It is important to point out that selection board collects and analy- ty in comparison to his peers, and
SFAS candidates very rarely pres- ses the information acquired from the likelihood of his performing
ent any tendencies that approxi- the interviews as part of the candi- inappropriately under stress. The
mate a formal psychiatric condi- date-selection process. test uses a unique approach: Test
tion. “Risk,” in this context, is To evaluate behavioral stability items are keyed to actual behaviors
and emotional maturity, SFAS uses
TABE Score Range and SFAS Failure
80%
SUBTEST SCORES
70%
A. 12.9 on all
60% B. Below 12 on any one
C. Below 11 on any one
50%
D. Below 10 on any one
40% E. Below 9 on any one
30% F. Below 8 on any one
G. Below 7 on any one
20%
10%
0%
A. B. C. D. E. F. G.
NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS failure rates for soldiers in various subtest-score ranges.
Fall 1999 17ARI Biodata80 Delinquency Score and SFAS Failure
80%
SF DEL SCORES
70%
A. Equals 0
60% B. Equals 1
50% C. Higher than 1
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
A. B. C.
NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS failure rates for soldiers with various scores on the SF delinquency scale.
rather than to personality con- cy scale will complete training. ent settings. The norms estab-
cepts, as in the MMPI. The ARI Although the SF delinquency lished for SFAS differ in many
Biodata80 provides information scale is the most predictive of the respects from the norms used in
that is strongly predictive of a can- ARI Biodata80 scores, ARI Bioda- mental-health settings or in other
didate’s inability to complete ta80 also provides other useful civilian settings. Test results are
SFAS. Although such cases may scores. The U.S. Army Research helpful in identifying candidates
also be identified by the MMPI, Institute is currently refining a who vary significantly from the
ARI Biodata80 is able to pinpoint measure that is linked to a candi- SFAS norms. These results are
individuals with significant vul- date’s flexibility in thinking and in then integrated with other data
nerabilities who were not identi- problem-solving. That measure, and serve as a starting point for
fied by the MMPI. which may hold substantial the interviewing of candidates.
One set of scores on the ARI Bio- promise for early identification of However, the majority of candi-
data80 provides a measure called soldiers who have the intensive dates are not interviewed.
the SF delinquency scale. Scores on thinking abilities valued by Special In the graph depicting the rela-
this scale range from 0 (the best) to Forces, is scheduled to be field-test- tionship between risk ratings and
5 (the worst). Nearly 80 percent of ed next year. performance in SFAS and SFQC,
the candidates score 0. During the the first cluster depicts the repre-
past two years, we have established MMPI sentation of the different groups at
that candidates who score higher Since SFAS’s inception, we have the start of SFAS, at which time
than 1 are likely to drop out of SFAS used the MMPI. It is the most com- the testing is conducted. Note that
at a fairly high rate. During the mon psychological test in the by the end of SFAS, low-risk candi-
next year, we will assess the rela- world, and it is used in a broad dates have survived the program
tionship between the SF delinquen- range of military and civilian at a slightly higher rate than
cy scale and the candidate’s per- assessment-and-selection pro- expected. In contrast, soldiers in
formance in the SFQC. We predict grams. Norms vary considerably the high-risk (nonacademic) group
that few, if any, candidates with an for different populations and differ- compose a smaller proportion of
elevated score on the SF delinquen- graduates than expected, given
18 Special Warfaretheir representation at the start of SFQC tends to produce stress suffi- limited set of tests, the categoriza-
the class. The greater attrition rate cient enough to highlight any vul- tion demonstrates substantial pre-
among this group of candidates is nerabilities among its students. dictive power in terms of identify-
due to a higher voluntary with- The graph demonstrates the low ing those candidates who have a
drawal rate and the results of the likelihood of course completion by poor chance of success.
review by the final board. individuals who are considered
At the start of SFAS, about 8 per- high-risk for failure because of Conclusion
cent of the candidates are placed in their psychological vulnerabilities, The SFAS incorporates method-
the high-risk category, based on cognitive aptitude or academic ologies that assess candidates’
their low Wonderlic scores (high- deficits. intellectual capabilities and relates
risk-for-academic-failure group). The few soldiers in the high-risk those capabilities to success in
By the end of SFAS, these individ- academic group who graduated training. The program also assess-
uals compose 10 to 11 percent of from SFQC most likely were sol- es psychological strengths and vul-
the graduates. Generally, these are diers with reasonable cognitive nerabilities that are predictive of
soldiers who are physically tough aptitude who scored low on the success in SFAS and in SFQC.
but possess only average intellect. Wonderlic. Soldiers in the high-risk These methodologies are continu-
The third cluster in the graph nonacademic category who gradu- ally being evaluated and improved,
depicts the graduates of the SFQC: ated from SFQC most likely were with the twin goals of providing
soldiers who will subsequently fill identified as being high-risk for accurate, reliable and critical infor-
team slots in the SF groups. The failure on the testing, but who were mation to the command, and of
SFQC is much more demanding subsequently identified as low-risk enhancing the effectiveness of the
than SFAS in regard to academic after they were interviewed at the overall assessment-and-selection
skills and cognitive aptitude, par- end of SFAS. process. Psychological testing is
ticularly in the academic portions The key point is that even with a only one of many tools that can
of Phase II. A training program as somewhat unrefined strategy of help Special Forces acquire the
demanding and as long as the categorization based solely on a
Risk Ratings and Success in SFAS and SFQC
80%
RISK GROUPS
70%
Low risk
60%
50% Moderate risk
40% High risk – psychological
30% High risk – intellectual
20%
10%
0%
Start SFAS End SFAS End SFQC
NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS and SFQC success rates for soldiers in various risk groups.
Fall 1999 19You can also read
