Risk Analysis for 2019 - ReliefWeb
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Risk Analysis for 2019
Risk Analysis for 2019
Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland T +48 22 205 95 00 F +48 22 205 95 01 frontex@frontex.europa.eu www.frontex.europa.eu Warsaw, February 2019 Risk Analysis Unit Frontex reference number: 1218 / 2019 Cover photo: Border guards on patrol – Indalo Operation © Frontex, 2018 – Francesco Malavolta All rights reserved. Paper version: PDF version: TT-05-18-089-EN-C TT-05-18-089-EN-N ISBN 978-92-9471-316-2 ISBN 978-92-9471-315-5 doi:10.2819/224322 doi:10.2819/86682 FPI18.0143 DISCLAIMERS This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used on the maps. WThroughout the report, references to Kosovo* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Frontex Risk Analysis for 2019 has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude. 2 of 52 Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019
Table of contents
1. Preface 6
2. Summary 8
3. Introduction 11
4. Methodology 12
5. Situational analysis of 2018 15
5.1. Surveillance: Overview 16
5.2. Border checks: Clandestine entry 18
5.3. Border checks: Refusals of entry 19
5.4. Border checks: Fraudulent documents 20
5.5. Situation of asylum in the EU by EASO 22
5.6. Illegal stayers and arrested people smugglers 24
5.7. In the EU: Returns 25
6. Featured analyses 27
6.1. Interviews of migrants 28
6.2. Children in migration: overview of arrivals at the external borders in 2018 30
6.3. Making return data more useful and an outlook for 2019 34
6.4. From crisis response to preparedness: changing priorities in Member States’ migration policy 36
7. Outlook and conclusions 38
8. Statistical annex 40
3 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019
4 of 52 Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019
List of acronyms used
BCP border-crossing point
CRI common risk indicator
EASO European Asylum Support Office
EASO EPS European Asylum Support Office Early Warning and Preparedness System
EC European Commission
EDF European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EMN European Migration Network
EU European Union
EU+ 28 EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
Eurodac European Dactyloscopy
Eurojust European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit
Europol European Police Office
Eurostat Statistical Office of the European Union
FRAN Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency (formerly European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
the European Union)
FTF foreign terrorist fighter
ICJ International Court of Justice
ID identification document
IOM International Organization for Migration
JO Joint Operation
MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
MS EU Member State
NGO non-governmental organisation
SAC Schengen-Associated Country
SAR search and rescue
UK The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution
5 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019
Portuguese Navy on patrol – Themis Operation, 2018
© Frontex
1. Preface
In 2018, the number of detections of illegal The Eastern Mediterranean saw only migratory flows, but also for the effec-
border-crossings reached its lowest level slightly fewer detections than the West- tive identification of vulnerable groups.
in five years, but migratory pressure re- ern Mediterranean route. With 56 561 il- Checks at the external borders are one
mained relatively high at the EU’s exter- legal border-crossings, the pressure was of the main safeguards of the Schengen
nal borders. The total figure fell 27 % from 34 % higher than in the preceding year Area. Frontex monitors Europe’s borders
the previous year to 150 114 and was 92 % be- due to the increase in land crossings 24 hours a day, seven days a week, help-
low the peak of the migratory crisis in 2015. from Turkey to Greece. ing the EU face challenges and threats
This was in large part due to the dramatic Frontex, the European Border and at its borders, including threats related
fall in the number of migrants on the Cen- Coast Guard Agency, maintains a strong to cross-border crime and prevention of
tral Mediterranean route, where the num- presence at Europe’s external borders. terrorism. The Agency is able to respond
ber of detections plunged 80 % to 23 485. The Agency ran three permanent oper- quickly and effectively to challenges at
Meanwhile, both the Western Med- ations in Spain, Greece and Italy, as- the external borders, shoulder-to-shoul-
iterranean and the Eastern Mediter- sisting EU Member States that faced the der with EU Member States and Schen-
ranean routes saw an increase in the highest migratory pressure. On average, gen Associated Countries. This integrated
detections of illegal crossings last year. some 1 500 border guards are deployed approach, which brings together the ef-
The Western Mediterranean became in Frontex joint operations, along with forts of Frontex and other EU agencies,
the most frequently used route into Eu- vessels, planes, helicopters, patrol cars along with EU institutions and national
rope. The pressure on Spain has been ris- and other equipment. authorities, is a key factor to address ir-
ing over the last years, and the number Last year, Frontex began to collect de- regular migration and cross-border crime
of detections in 2018 reached 57 034, dou- tailed data on the sex and the age of ir- at the external borders.
ble the number from 2017. The number of regular migrants. Nearly one in five of all Despite the falling migratory pres-
departures from Morocco increased five- the detected migrants last year claimed sure in the Central Mediterranean, the
fold. Most of the migrants taking this to be under the age of 18. This new de- fight against criminal smuggling net-
route last year came from sub-Saharan velopment is crucial not only for a bet- works at the external borders remains
countries, but the number of Moroccan ter monitoring and understanding of the in our focus. In 2018, Frontex continued
nationals also increased significantly. dynamics and composition of incoming collecting information from voluntary
6 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019
© Frontex
interviews with migrants in the Cen- reinforcing and coordinating border con- The situation in the countries out-
tral, Eastern and Western Mediterranean trol activities in Member States. side the EU also has a direct impact on
area in the framework of PeDRA (Pro- In 2018, the Agency substantially Europe’s borders. Frontex is monitoring
cessing Personal Data for Risk Analysis). strengthened its activities aimed at the countries neighbouring the EU iden-
The vast majority (84 %) of the migrants returning irregular migrants to their tified through risk analysis as countries
interviewed claimed that they were fa- countries of origin. Last year, we helped of origin and / or transit for illegal immi-
cilitated by smuggling networks. Bor- Member States return 13 729 people who gration. The aim is to better address chal-
der guards are also the first filter at the do not have the right to remain in the EU lenges at EU borders. Frontex has become
external borders when it comes to the to their countries of origin. We launched more active in countries neighbouring
detection of potential terrorist threats. a successful trial of conducting returns the EU that are affected by migration
This is done through screening, registra- on commercial flights to nearly 50 des- and cross-border crime, including the
tion, document checks or voluntary in- tinations and we have significantly in- Western Balkans, where the EU signed
terviews. We work closely with Europol creased our pre-return assistance to an agreement on cooperation on bor-
and other European agencies sharing Member States. der management between Albania and
this information. To help Member States better prepare the European Border and Coast Guard
Over the last few years, the European for potential challenges at their borders, Agency. The Agency also has three liai-
Union and its Member States have been for the second year Frontex conducted son officers outside the EU based in Tur-
facing major challenges related to mi- the vulnerability assessment to evalu- key, Niger and Serbia.
gration and security. As a response, a ate the border control capabilities of EU Together with its partners, Frontex,
number of changes have been imple- member states. the European Border and Coast Guard
mented when it comes to border con- Last year, the Agency further devel- Agency, will continue to contribute to
trol and management. These include oped its network of liaison officers to EU the safety and security at the EU’s ex-
the amendment of the Schengen Bor- Member States. Those officers help Fron- ternal borders and its citizens and to the
ders Code, the establishment of the EU tex in the exchange of information with well-functioning of the European Area of
Entry / Exit System and the adoption of partners at national level, and contribute Freedom, Security and Justice.
the regulation establishing the Euro- to the vulnerability assessment by col-
pean Travel Information and Authori- lecting relevant information and data.
sation System (ETIAS). The European Border and Coast Guard
Frontex will play a central role in im- Agency is moving towards owning or
plementing the regulation governing the leasing an increasingly larger portion
ETIAS, a system for granting electronic of its equipment, including vehicles,
pre-authorisation to travellers who do planes and vessels, to be able to better
not need a visa to visit the Schengen support Member States. Last year, the
area. The Agency will set up and man- Agency leased surveillance planes and
age the ETIAS Central Unit, which will tested the use of remote piloted aircraft
provide operational support, as well as systems in its operations.
7 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019
2. Summary
Member States reported 150 114 illegal On the Eastern Mediterranean route, remained the most common nationality
border-crossings in 2018, 27 % fewer than the most significant development of 2018 due to the effects of the Turkish reloca-
in 2017. The most decisive development was arguably the implementation of a re- tion and return programme only tak-
for the overall level of migratory pressure location and return programme in Tur- ing effect during the second half of the
in 2018 in fact dates back to July 2017, key for irregular Syrian migrants, which year, Moroccans were the second most
when the sudden reversal in the num- shifted the nationality makeup on the common, before Afghans and Iraqis.
ber of irregular migrants detected in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea route in the Turkish nationals, as mentioned above,
Central Mediterranean took place. This second half of the year. increased in number and were the fifth-
reversal continues to stand as the most The Western Balkan route in 2018 saw most common nationality in 2018.
significant development at the EU’s ex- shifts between the Greek-Albanian cor- In 2018, Member States reported an
ternal borders since the implementation ridor and the Serbian-centred corridor. increase in the detection of clandestine
of the EU-Turkey statement. The decreas- Throughout the year, most of the migra- entries. Nevertheless, the number of
ing trend in migrant arrivals on the Cen- tory pressure on the route materialised detected attempts of clandestine entry
tral Mediterranean route, which lasted at the Bosnian and Herzegovinian-Croa- continued to be arguably below that to
throughout 2018, was the primary rea- tian border, and also, to a lesser extent, be expected in times of tightened bor-
son for the decrease in the number of il- on Serbia’s border with Hungary, Croa- der surveillance at the green and blue
legal border-crossings vis-à-vis 2017. On tia and Romania. borders.
this route, the other third countries of At the Eastern Land Border in 2018, Secondary movements continued on a
departure – Tunisia, Algeria and Turkey – another third country, Russia, created large scale during 2018. Countries with-
equally had fewer successful departures. with a temporary change in its visa pol- out external land and sea borders re-
Egypt in 2018 did not see any departures icy an opportunity to reach the EU’s ex- ported thousands of inland detections
of migrants to Europe on the sea route. ternal borders. For the 2018 FIFA World of illegal stay. These could however be
With the number of illegal border- Cup™, Russia allowed travelers visa-free overstays after having entered via the
crossings plummeting on the Central entry to the Russian Federation for those air borders. Yet Eurodac hits of both cate-
Mediterranean route, the spotlight in possession of match tickets. This ena- gories, combined having registered a to-
moved onto the Western Mediterranean bled migrants to reach the EU’s external tal higher than illegal border-crossings
route, where in 2018 in particular Moroc- borders via Russia, but also via Belarus in 2018, are evidence of the scale of sec-
can and sub-Saharan migrants crossed and Ukraine, with migrants attempting ondary movements. In this context, the
the Strait of Gibraltar or the Alboran Sea to enter the EU illegally. This contrib- increase in the inland detection of peo-
in record numbers, making the West- uted to an increase in detections com- ple smugglers (+13 %) is also an indica-
ern Mediterranean route the most fre- pared with 2017, however remaining at tion of the reliance on organised crime
quently used route into Europe in 2018. much lower level than on other routes. networks to smuggle migrants to their
Morocco was also the country of depar- Corresponding to the changes in the countries of destination. In addition, a
ture for a little more than half of the mi- flows of the main migration routes, the significant increase in document fraud
grants that targeted the Canary Islands migrant population in 2018 changed its detections on secondary movements was
on the Western African route. nationality makeup – while Syrians recorded in 2018. In fact, the number of
8 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019Latest situation (2017)
2018 Reported cases 2018
(1 622) Detections of illegal
2 258 border-crossing at BCPs
Detections
(6 670) of fraudulent
6 667 document users
(10 246) Detections
10 642 of facilitators
document fraud detections on second- The number of effective returns in
ary movements inside the EU/Schengen 2018 once again fell short of the decisions
area reached its highest level since 2013. issued by Member States to return mi- (155 945) Returns
The year 2018 once again signified a grants: Around 148 000 migrants who
year of heavy workload for border guards were not granted asylum or subsidiary
148 121 (effective)
in Member States, who were faced with protection were returned to their coun-
another increase in entry and exit checks tries of origin, little more than half the
to be performed at border crossing points total number of return decisions issued.
with a further rise in passenger flows In particular, no measurable progress
Detections
and the 2017 expansion of systematic was made as regards returns to West Af- (204 750) of illegal
checks on those passengers enjoying the rica – while the number of return deci- border-crossing
right of free movement under EU law. sions issued increased by roughly 80 % 150 114 between BCPs
This meant at times delays for passen- compared with 2017, effective returns
gers at certain border-crossing points. remained unchanged, reflecting defi-
The second line, too, was in many Mem- cits in cooperation and administrative
ber States kept busy by for instance an capacity in countries of origin.
increase in refusals of entry along the Looking ahead, there is no indi-
external borders, but also by the afore- cation that the workload for border
(183 019) Refusals
of entry
mentioned increase in document fraud guards will decrease anytime soon, 190 930
detections on secondary movements. In with systematic checks in an environ-
particular, at the borders with Ukraine, ment of increasing passenger flows
the increase in issued refusals of entry to on the one hand and persistent mi-
Ukrainians was significant. The catego- gratory pressure on the green and
ries of refusals reported imply that visa blue borders on the other. Eu-
(282 075)
liberalisation wrongly suggests to trav- ropean border management
ellers that they no longer need to justify will continue to be tested by Returns
the purpose and conditions of stay and unforeseeable events and (decisions)
present sufficient means of subsistence
on request. As regards exit checks, ille-
factors – beyond irregular
migration and into cross-
286 875
gal stay detections on exit at air, land border crime.
and sea borders increased slightly. This
too then meant an increase in workload
in particular for the second line of bor-
der checks.
(435 084)
Detections
of persons
staying
361 636 illegally
9 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 201910 of 52 Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019
3. Introduction
The Frontex Risk Analysis for 2019 has cooperation, cooperation with third coun-
been specifically designed to provide an tries, measures within the Schengen area
overview to help in making informed related to border control, return of third-
decisions on both common European country nationals, use of state-of-the-art
investments and concerted actions to technology, quality control mechanisms
improve the management of external and solidarity mechanisms. These com-
borders and uphold the internal secu- ponents, together with the three hori-
rity of the Union. zontal components – fundamental rights,
Frontex operational activities aim at training, research and innovation, col-
strengthening border security by sup- lectively form the main elements of the
porting Member States’ actions regard- technical and operational strategy for Eu-
ing the implementation of EU measures ropean Integrated Border Management.
for the management of external borders. Clearly, this major change has im-
The coordination of operational activi- portant implications for the analytical
ties contributes to a more efficient allo- work performed by Frontex as its risk
cation of Member States’ resources and analysis should cover all aspects of Inte-
better protection of the area of freedom, grated Border Management and develop
security and justice. In this context, the an early warning mechanism. Therefore,
Risk Analysis for 2019 concentrates on as much as possible, these new elements
the scope of Frontex operational activi- have been integrated into this annual
ties and, in particular, on irregular mi- risk analysis.
gration at the external borders of the EU This annual report is structured as
and the Schengen Associated Countries. follows: (1) situational picture for the
Since the Regulation (EU) 2016 / 1624 European Border and Coast Guard with
came into effect, the mandate of Frontex emphasis on identified migratory trends
has significantly been enhanced to en- and surveillance activities utilising a set
sure an efficient implementation of Eu- of reliable indicators on irregular migra-
ropean Integrated Border Management tion; (2) featured analyses on key risks
as a shared responsibility of the Union, affecting the security of the external bor-
the Agency and of the national author- ders and / or internal security; and finally
ities of the Member States. (3) a presentation of outlook.
The European Integrated Border Man- The Agency and in particular its Risk
agement consists of 11 strategic compo- Analysis Unit would like to express its
nents defined in Article 4 of the Agency’s gratitude to all members of FRAN in
Regulation. These are: border control, Member States and third country part-
including measures in relation to traf- ners for their efforts in providing data
ficking in human beings and terrorism, and information, as well as EASO,
search and rescue operations, analysis Europol, the EU Agency for Fundamen-
of risks for internal security, coopera- tal Rights, and all colleagues involved in
tion with Member States, inter-agency the preparation of this report.
© Frontex, 2018
11 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20194. Methodology
A coherent and comprehensive analy- of facilitators; detections of fraudulent Member States’ data processed by
sis of the risks affecting security at the documents; return decisions; effective Frontex are not treated as official statis-
external borders requires, above all, the returns and passenger flow data (when tics and thus may occasionally vary from
adoption of common indicators. Consist- available). Data on asylum applica- those officially published by national au-
ent monitoring of these indicators al- tions for 2018 were still being collected thorities. Throughout 2018, some FRAN
lows effective measures to be taken on within the FRAN, but Frontex increas- members performed backdated updates
the ground. The analysis needs to iden- ingly works with data collected by EASO, of their 2017 statistics. These updates
tify the risks that arise at the external which has provided the dedicated sec- have been accounted for in this docu-
borders themselves and those that arise tion on asylum. ment, hence some data presented here
in third countries. The data were categorised by border may differ from those presented a year
The backbone of the Risk Analysis for type (land, air or sea) and those on land ago in the Risk Analysis for 2018.
2019 is the monthly statistics exchanged borders were additionally grouped by Member States were not requested to
among Member States within the frame- border section with neighbouring third answer specific questions in support of
work of the FRAN. For the Risk Analy- countries. The data exchanged within this analysis. Rather, bimonthly analyt-
sis for 2019, the key indicators collected the FRAN are compiled and analysed on ical reports and incident reports of Mem-
through the FRAN were: detections of a quarterly basis. Priority is given to the ber States routinely collected within the
illegal border-crossing at the green and use of the data for management purposes FRAN, as well as other Member States’
blue border or at BCPs; refusals of en- and to their fast sharing among Member contributions submitted in 2018 were im-
try; detections of illegal stay; detections State border-control authorities. portant sources of i nformation, e specially
12 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019© Frontex, 2018
as regards the analysis of routes and modi contrast, the borders between the Schen- Consistent with other law-enforce-
operandi. Additionally, the outcomes of gen Associated Countries and Schengen ment indicators, variation in admin-
debriefing activities carried out in the Member States are considered as internal istrative data related to border control
framework of Joint Operations consti- borders. For the indicators on detections depends on several factors. In this case,
tuted essential analytical material. of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, the number of detections of illegal bor-
Open-source information was also ef- statistics are also reported for detections der-crossing and refusals of entry are
fectively exploited, especially in identify- at the land borders between Schengen both functions of the amount of effort
ing the main ‘push and pull factors’ for Member States and those Member States spent, respectively, on detecting mi-
irregular migration to the EU. Among that have either not joined the Schen- grants and the actual flow of irregular
others, these sources included reports gen area yet in full (Bulgaria, Croatia, migrants to the EU. For example, in-
issued by government agencies, inter- Cyprus, Romania) or have opted to stay creased detections of illegal border-cross-
national and non-governmental organ- out of it (the UK, Ireland). Thus, a total ing might be due to a real increase in the
isations, as well as mainstream news for Member States and Schengen Asso- flow of irregular migrants, or may in fact
agencies and official EU reports. ciated Countries as a whole can be pre- be an outcome of more resources made
External borders, a term often used sented. It was not possible to make the available to detect them. In exceptional
in this report, refer to the borders be- aforementioned distinction for air and cases, increased resources may produce
tween Member States and third coun- sea borders because Member States do a rise in reported detections while effec-
tries. The borders between the Schengen not habitually differentiate between ex- tively masking the actual decrease in the
Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland, tra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connec- migratory flow, resulting from a strong
and Switzerland) and third countries are tions but tend to aggregate data for all deterrent effect.
also considered as external borders. By arrivals per airport.
13 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20195. Situational analysis of 2018
Operation Themis, 2018
© FrontexEastern Borders route
Detections of illegal border- 1 084
(872)
crossing at the EU’s external
borders, 2018
150 114
(204 750 in 2017)
Black Sea route
Route Western Balkan route
in 2018 Top three nationalities Afghanistan 1 669 0
Syria 14 378 5 869 Pakistan 1 017 (537)
(in 2017) Morocco 13 269 (12 179) Iran 980
Afghanistan 12 666
Circular route from
Albania to Greece
4 550 Eastern Mediterranean route
(6 396) Syria 13 906
56 561 Afghanistan 10 738
(42 319) Iraq 8 970
Western Mediterranean route
Unknown 25 293
57 034 Morocco 11 723
(23 063) Guinea 4 971
Western
African route
Central Mediterranean route
1 531 23 485
Tunisia 5 182
Please note that selection of these border sections does not
(421) Eritrea 3 529
(118 962) Sudan 2 037 adequately capture developments at other, internal, sections of the route.
5.1. Surveillance: Overview
For the third year in a row following detections stands at its lowest level since route. Departures from Algeria fell by al-
Europe’s migration crisis of 2015, the 2013. Thanks to enhanced data collection, most half compared with 2017, while de-
number of detections of illegal border- the share of women in the overall irreg- partures from Turkey via the Aeagan and
crossing along the EU’s external bor- ular migrant population can be more ac- Ionian Sea fell by 37 %. The route hence re-
ders fell significantly. In 2018, Member curately determined at 18 %. Nearly one corded its lowest number of intercepted
States reported 150 114 detections of il- in five of the detected migrants claimed migrants since 2012. The share of claimed
legal border-crossing along the EU’s ex- to be under the age of 18. minors on this route increased slightly
ternal borders, which represents a 27 % in 2018 compared with 2017, recording a
decrease compared with 2017 (around a Central Mediterranean route share of 19 % (84 % of them unaccompa-
twelfth of the 1.8 million detections at nied). Tunisians and Eritreans were the
the height of the migration crisis). The On the Central Mediterranean route, two most represented nationalities on
decrease in 2018 was almost exclusively departures from all third countries this route, together accounting for more
due to fewer detections on the Central dropped in 2018. Noteworthy, Tunisia than one third of all detected migrants.
Mediterranean route. The continuously replaced Libya as the main country of
mounting migratory pressure on the departure for migrants detected on the Western Mediterranean route
Western Mediterranean route and the Central Mediterranean route in Septem-
once again rising pressure on the East- ber, October and December (in the other After more than doubling between 2016
ern Mediterranean route caution – inter months it was Libya). Importantly, de- and 2017, detections on the Western Med-
alia indications attesting to the persistent partures from Libya, having fallen by iterranean route once again more than
migratory pressure – against overempha- 87 %, accounted for the vast majority of doubled between 2017 and 2018, to 57 034
sising the fact that the total number of the drop in detected migrants on this detections, thus making this route the
16 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019most frequently used route into Europe were enhanced and reinforced in certain Eastern Land Border route
in 2018. Hence, Morocco was the main areas. Both, the central route via Serbia
departure point to Europe for irregular and the route stemming from the Greek- The Eastern land border in 2018 saw an
migrants. The majority of the increase Albanian border section projected pres- approximately 24 % increase in detec-
stems from departures from Morocco, sure northwards, along the Bosnian and tions compared with 2017, partly due
which more than doubled. Most of the Herzegovinian–Croatian–Slovenian cor- to migrants abusing the FIFA Fan ID,
migratory pressure registered on this ridor and to a lesser extent on Serbia’s which allowed travelers visa-free entry
route was linked to migrants originating EU borders with Hungary, Croatia and to Russia, from where, coming also via
from sub-Saharan countries; however, Romania. The top nationalities detected Belarus and Ukraine, the migrants at-
towards the end of 2018, the number of transiting the region were largely simi- tempted to enter the EU illegally. With
Moroccan migrants began to increase. lar to those reported on the Eastern Med- a share of around 34 %, Vietnamese na-
On this route, those that claimed to be iterranean route, with the exception of tionals represented an even larger por-
minors accounted for a 9 % share of ar- Iranians who reached the Balkans via tion of illegal border-crossings at the
rivals in 2018. Overall, on both land and Serbia having mostly abused visa-free Eastern Land Border route compared to
sea routes, Moroccans were the top de- access to Serbia, which was rescinded 2017, followed at a distance by Iraqis,
tected nationality, followed by Guine- in October. Russians and Ukrainians.
ans, Malians and Algerians.
Western African route
Eastern Mediterranean route
On the Western African route, a strong
With only slightly fewer detections than increase in detected irregular migrants
on the Western Mediterranean route, was registered (+264 % to around 1 500),
the Eastern Mediterranean route regis- mostly in the second part of the year and
tered 56 561 illegal border-crossings in mostly Moroccans who had the Canary
2018. Because of Turkish preventions of Islands as their final intended destina-
departure, the number of detections in tion, oftentimes with family links on the
the Eastern Aegean Sea was roughly un- Islands. A little more than half of these
changed. The implementation of a relo- migrants departed from Morocco while
cation and return programme in Turkey the rest mostly departed from Senegal.
for irregular Syrian migrants slightly
shifted the nationality makeup on the
Eastern Mediterranean route in the sec-
ond half of 2018 with smuggling net-
works increasingly offering Afghans the
possibility of reaching the Greek Eastern
Aegean islands, thereby offsetting the Figure 1. Detections of illegal border-crossing, by main nationalities
lower number of Syrian migrants. Never- (scale in absolute numbers, with labels showing percentages of total) in 2018
theless, Syrians were still the most com- 28%
monly detected nationality. The number 150 000
of recorded Turkish migrants more than
tripled in 2018 with 7 918 arrivals thereby
120 000
becoming the fourth most common na-
3%
tionality on this route behind the afore- 4%
4%
mentioned nationalities and Iraqis. 4%
90 000 6%
7%
Western Balkan route 8%
60 000 9%
The Western Balkans continued to be
transited by irregular migrants trying to 10%
reach Western Europe from Turkey. Two 30 000 17%
Afganistan
All Others
main routes through the region stood
Morocco
Unknown
Tunisia
Guinea
Algeria
Turkey
out in 2018 with pressure shifting be-
Syria
Mali
Iraq
tween them as border control activities 0
17 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
by border section (people hiding in vehicles), 2018
2 258 (1 622)
Number in parenthesis is for 2017
200 Croatia-Serbia
Bulgaria-Turkey
Italy-Sea
Spain-Morocco
5.2. Border checks: Clandestine entry
In 2018, Member States reported the
highest total in detections of clandestine
entry (people hiding in trains, lorries
and other vehicles seeking to enter the
EU at the external borders on both land
and sea routes) since 2015, testimony to
a persistency in migratory pressure, in
particular at certain border sections at
the EU’s external borders. At the same
time, falling detections at many border
sections in times of tightened border
surveillance at the green border – which
could increase the incentives for clandes-
tine entry – actually reveal differences in
procedures and data reporting among
Member States.
At EU seaports, a lower number of
clandestine entry attempts reported by
Italy have led to a significant decrease
in the total (-35 %), whereas all other sea
borders reported fewer or roughly sim-
© Frontex
ilar numbers. As regards Italian ports,
the nationalities of persons attempting
to enter clandestinely reflected both di- Figure 2. A Czech police officer checking a vehicle, Joint Action Day Mobile, 2018
verse port connections southwards (Tu-
nisians and Moroccans) and eastwards
(Iraqis and Turks).
18 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019Refusals of entry
per border type, 2018
(only values higher than 1000 are stipulated)
131 641 (126 456) 54 780 (48 924) 4 481 (7 639)
Number in parenthesis is for 2017 Number in parenthesis is for 2017 Number in parenthesis is for 2017
Land Air Sea
United
Kingdom
Poland Germany
Romania
France
Hungary
Croatia Italy Italy
Spain Spain
Greece
Trend of the total
Land Air Sea
2017 126 456 48 924 7 639
2018 131 641 54 780 4 481
5.3. Border checks: Refusals of entry
In 2018, 190 930 refusals of entry were Refusals of entry issued to Ukraini- visitors were unaware of the existing re-
reported along the external borders of ans have been steadily increasing since quirements to be fulfilled to enter the
the EU, a slight increase compared with 2014, but the increase from 2017 to 2018 Schengen zone.
2017. While the increases were at the air was more pronounced than in the pre- At sea borders, a decrease in refusals
and land borders, refusals issued at sea vious year. Unsurprisingly, nine out of of persons for whom an alert had been
borders decreased by 41 %. ten refusals were issued at the EU bor- issued in the Schengen Information Sys-
More than half of the refusals con- ders with Ukraine. The increase was in tem or in a national register is notable.
tinued to be issued to three nationali- particular due to increases in refusals is- Italian seaports reported much of the de-
ties – Ukrainian, Russian and Albanian. sued because of a lack of appropriate doc- crease with refusals being issued to pas-
Refusals issued to Ukrainians increased umentation justifying the purpose and sengers coming from Albania.
by almost 60 %, whereas Russians (by conditions of stay and the inability to At air borders, there was little change
roughly one-third, meanwhile the present sufficient means of subsistence. in the airports that issued most refus-
number of Russians at the EU’s borders The increases in both categories of rea- als of entry.
without a valid visa or residence permit sons for refusals was most likely linked
decreased) and Albanians (by roughly to visa liberalisation, which started in
one-fourth) recorded strong decreases. June 2017, oftentimes meaning that the
issued alert for the purpose of refusing entry
in the SIS or national register (H) 2017
no sufficient means of subsistence in relation to
2018
period and form of stay, or the means to return (G)
already stayed for three months
during a six months period on MS territory (F)
no appropriate documentation
justifying the purpose and conditions of stay (E)
no valid visa or residence permit (C)
0 5 000 10 000 15 000 20 000 25 000
Figure 3. Selected reasons for refusals of Ukrainain nationals, 2017–2018
19 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019Russian
Federation
Belarus
Ukraine
Moldova
Turkey
Afghanistan
Syria
Morocco Iraq Iran China
Pakistan
Algeria
Egypt
Dominican India
Republic Senegal
Nigeria
Ghana
Guinea
Cameroon
Sri Lanka
Cote d'Ivoire
Congo
Congo, DRC
Serbia
Bolivia Angola
Nationality
of users
Kosovo2
≤100
≤150
Albania
≤250 Percentage change Trend between 2017 and 2018
≤400 Increase (from 1% to 120%) Decrease (from -10% to -49%)
≤977
5.4. Border checks: Fraudulent documents
In 2018, Member States reported 6 667 in- as in the previous year were Moroccan the South-East EU border with Serbia
dividuals from third countries present- (977), followed by Iranian (450), Ukrain- in 2019.
ing fraudulent travel documents at BCPs ian (401) and Turkish (394). The number In 2018, the top five most reported
on entry to the EU/SAC. The number of of Ukrainian fraudulent document users nationalities detected with fraudulent
detections continues to follow its de- decreased dramatically from 785 in 2017. documents on entry to the EU/Schen-
creasing trend started in 2014, when ex- The remarkable progress recorded gen area from third countries remain al-
ceptionally high numbers were reported in the case of Ukrainian nationals was most the same as in the 2017 apart from
on account of the Syrian diaspora. In mostly brought about by visa liberalisa- Turks, who have replaced Albanians (due
contrast, the number of document fraud tion for the rightful holders of Ukrain- to their lower number) amongst the top
detections on secondary movements in- ian biometric passports, which entered five. The anticipated increase during and
side the EU/Schengen area increased in into force in June 2017. The same goes for immediately after the 2018 FIFA World
2018 for the second year in a row. The fig- Georgian nationals due to visa liberali- Cup™ did not materialise and figures
ure increased by almost 42 % compared sation in March 2017. Apart from Turks, have been not particularly affected, apart
with 2017 and reached its highest level the number of Nigerians and Chinese de- from a few cases registered mainly in
since 2013. Following a trend already ob- tected with fraudulent documents cross- the Baltic republics on entry from Rus-
served during 2017, this development was ing the external EU borders recorded a sia and Belarus.
mainly caused by the significant increase slight increase. After the relatively high
in departures from Greece involving Syr- number of Iranians detected on exit from Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport remains the
ian, Afghan, Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish Serbia, the trend has become stable dur- top departure airport for detections
nationals. Of these nationalities, Turks ing 2018 until the decision of the Serbian of fraudulent documents from third
recorded the most marked increase com- authorities to revoke visa-free travel for countries despite a sharp decrease in
pared with 2017. Iranians in October 2018. Serbia’s deci- numbers
At EU level, of the 135 nationalities sion to rescind visa-free travel for Ira-
detected using fraudulent documents to nians will probably result in a further As in previous years, most detections
illegally enter the EU/SAC from a third decrease in the number of arrivals of of fraudulent documents were reported
country, the most commonly detected Iranian fraudulent document users at on air routes. With 335 detections, the
20 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019Passports check – Joint Action Day Danube III 2018
© Frontex, 2018
number of document fraud cases from 2017, however, already led to a decrease and Spain. As a consequence, these mi-
Istanbul’s Atatürk airport decreased by in the number of Ukrainians abusing grants explore any possible option to
30 % in 2018 compared with 2017. Both fraudulently obtained visas in the lat- move further towards their final des-
Atatürk and Sabiha Gökçen (Istanbul) ter part of that year. tination, even purchasing fraudulent
airports reported the lowest number of At the external sea borders, no signif- travel documents.
document fraud cases since 2013. icant change was observed in compari-
The second – most reported last air- son with previous years.
port of departure in 2018 was Moham-
med IV airport in Casablanca with 211 Abuse of fraudulent documents for
detected persons using fraudulent doc- secondary movements is more and
uments in their attempt to cross the ex- more in the spotlight
ternal EU borders.
While detections of fraudulent docu-
At the land borders most of the ment users inbound from third coun-
detections of document fraud tries were stable, the same cannot be
continued to be inbound from Ukraine said about fake document users on sec-
and Serbia but to Hungary, instead of ondary movements. The sustained in-
Poland, as the primary destination crease in demand from within the EU
for fraudulent documents has prompted
Whilst in 2017 most of the document established counterfeiters to increase
fraud cases at the land borders were re- their production and to establish new
ported between Ukraine and Poland, dur- print shops.
ing 2018 the border between Hungary The number of irregular migrants
and Serbia saw the brunt of cases. The stuck in a nation different from their
visa liberalisation regime for Ukrainian final destination increased in frontier
nationals that entered into force in June Mediterranean states like Greece, Italy
21 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20195.5. Situation of asylum in the EU by EASO
Until the end of December 2018, some applications fluctuated between some (28 797), and Iran (25 397), jointly repre-
634 000 applications for international 47 000 and 57 000, except for Octo- senting about a third of all applicants
protection were lodged in the 28 EU ber when it went up to some 61 700. (Fig. 5). All of these countries, except for
Member States plus Norway and Swit- Throughout 2018, detections of illegal Iran, were also in the top five in 2017. In
zerland (EU+), about 10 % fewer than in border-crossing continued to be at a con- addition to Iran, there were considera-
2017.1 At least one in 10 applicants in sistently lower level than asylum appli- ble increases in the number of applicants
2018 had previously lodged an applica- cations, similar to the pattern in 2017 as from Venezuela and Turkey. Similar to
tion in the same EU+ reporting country well as prior to the migration crisis. This 2017, the population of applicants re-
(repeated applicants). difference is probably related to multi- mained diverse with citizens of about
After the peak in asylum applica- ple factors, including applications by 60 countries lodging over 1 000 appli-
tions in the second half of 2015 and the persons crossing external borders unde- cations in the EU+. There was a notable
high level sustained in 2016, the num- tected, repeated applicants in the same increase in the share of applicants from
ber of asylum claims began to decrease, reporting country, secondary movements Schengen-visa exempt countries, from
and has remained relatively stable ever across the EU+, and applications by na- 13 % in 2017 to 18 % in 2018. The rise was
since (Fig. 4). In 2018, the number of tionalities who entered the EU+ legally. most notable for citizens of Venezuela,
The latter category includes arrivals with Georgia and Colombia.
1 EASO Early warning and Preparedness
genuine visa, and also those from coun- In 2018, over 67 000 applications were
System (EPS) data are shared between tries exempt from a Schengen visa which withdrawn in the EU+, about four fifths
EASO and the EU+ countries. They in 2018 represented 18 % of all asylum ap- of them implicitly which is when an ap-
are provisional, unvalidated data and plications (Fig. 5). plicant is no longer present and thought
therefore might differ from validated
The main countries of origin of appli- to have absconded. The citizenships of
data submitted at a later date to
cants for international protection in the applicants with most withdrawn appli-
Eurostat (according to Regulation (EC)
No 862/2007). The data included here are EU+ were Syria (74 680 applications), Af- cations were Iraqi, Pakistani, Afghan,
the latest as of 24 January 2019. ghanistan (45 273), Iraq (42 042), Pakistan Nigerian, and Syrian.
Asylum application Illegal border-crossing detection
500 000 80 000
400 000
60 000
300 000
40 000
200 000
20 000
100 000
0 0
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
2018
Figure 4. Asylum applications in the EU+ and illegal border-crossing detections, March 2014 – December 2018,
and a focus on 2018 (Source: EASO EPS data as of 24 January 2019 and Frontex public data)
22 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019Afghanistan Pakistan Nigeria Venezuela Georgia
Syria Iraq Iran Turkey Albania Other
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
SCHENGEN-VISA
EXEMPT COUNTRIES
Figure 5. Main nationalities of asylum applicants in the EU+, 2018 (Source: EASO EPS data as of 24 January 2019)
In 2018, over 590 500 decisions were protection was 34 %, declining for a sec- Conversely, the lowest rates in this group
issued at first instance, a decrease by two ond year. As earlier, this recognition were for applicants from Georgia (3 %),
fifths compared to 2017. As in previous rate differed substantially across na- The Gambia (4 %), and Bangladesh (5 %).
years, fewer decisions were issued over tionalities. Among the applicants with At the end of December 2018, about
the summer months (Fig. 6). The share more than 10 000 issued decisions, Syr- 440 000 cases were pending at first in-
of positive decisions i.e. those grant- ians (87 %) and Eritreans (82 %) continued stance in the EU+ countries.
ing either refugee status or subsidiary to have the highest recognition rate.
RECOGNITION RATES
47% 41% 46% 50% 51% 61% 60% 56% 58% 60% 58% 52% 43% 41% 40% 39% 35% 36% 32% 33% 32% 34% 38% 37%
50% 40% 44% 44% 44% 60% 57% 55% 55% 60% 59% 53% 46% 43% 37% 41% 36% 35% 33% 30% 34% 33% 35% 38%
140 000
120 000
100 000
80 000
60 000
40 000
20 000
0
2015 2016 2017 2018
Refugee status Subsidiary protection Negative decision
Figure 6. First-instance decisions on asylum applications in the EU+ and recognition rates,
January 2015 – December 2018 (Source: EASO EPS data as of 24 January 2019)
23 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019Illegal stayers
Number of detected cases
Poland
of illegal stay, 2018
361 636 (435 084) Germany
Number in parenthesis is for 2017
France
50 000
(only highest values are displayed) Italy
Greece
815
713
263
218
5.6. Illegal stayers and arrested people smugglers
Illegal stayers to a lesser extent on the Eastern Med- People smugglers
iterranean routes. Among the general
In 2018, Member States reported a sig- trend of falling detections, unsurpris- Member States reported 10 642 detected
nificantly reduced number of detections ingly Greece and Spain buck this trend. people smugglers in 2018, only slightly
of illegal stay, entirely due to a decrease So too does Portugal, which however is more than in 2017. The Member States
in inland detections. Detections on exit not altogether related to the traditional that are reporting the most detected peo-
at air, land and sea borders on the other migration routes but rather is the result ple smugglers equally have not changed
hand increased slightly. of migrants having arrived on air routes in order. Considering the nationalities
Illegal stay detections inland fell by from Latin America. Brazilians were by of the people smugglers involved, while
23 % compared with 2017, which is un- far the largest group detected, with de- there are some increases and decreases,
surprising considering its inherent link tections more than doubling compared it is more or less the same mix of na-
to the overall number of irregular mi- with 2017. tionalities from transit countries, coun-
grants arriving on EU territory. A look As regards illegal stay on exit, totals tries of entry, countries heavily affected
at the Member States reporting the most on land, air and sea borders all increased by secondary movements, and finally
detections – as well as at the national- moderately. Looking at the nationalities countries associated with well-known
ities – confirms the continuing link to concerned, Ukrainians were the most organised crime groups. Increases in de-
the strong increases in irregular migra- commonly detected by a distance, re- tections associated with migratory pres-
tory movements on the Western and cording an almost linear increase since sure from the Western Balkan route and
data collection on this indicator began, secondary movements thereafter are no-
Detected facilitators mostly attributable to exit checks at the table in Croatia and Slovenia. At the sea
Polish and Hungarian land borders. Il- borders, a disproportionate decrease in
Number of detected
legal stay on exit at air borders saw few detections beyond the overall decrease
facilitators, 2018
changes – however, the number of Al- in illegal border-crossings on sea routes
Spain banians detected for illegal stay on exit suggests that smuggling groups have
France at airports, who in 2017 were the most further excelled in successfully operat-
Italy common nationality detected, fell by ing out of the reach of Member States’
Greece half compared with 2017. law enforcement.
Slovenia 1 000
24 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019Ukraine 33 682
27318 Others
107 209
50 418
19 026 14 242
Morocco 10 893 Pakistan 4 311
18 364 10 348 Russian Fed. 5 165
Afghanistan 2 565 Guinea 412 4 641
Georgia 5 270
5 077
16 604 9 460 5 790
Albania 19 274 Algeria 5 057 Tunisia 3 857
5 481
India 3 700
Return decisions in 2018: 286 875
Effective returns in 2018: 148 121
Iraq 15 689
4 893 Mali 8 781
164
Turkey 5 931
2 455
Return decisions
Brazil 5 833 Effective returns
3 086
Please note that the number of effective returns may sometimes be larger than return decisions, as a return decision issued in a given month may be effectively enforced at a later date. Also, return decisions may be issued
without prejudice to the person’s right to apply for asylum. Readmissions between Member States are not included (for example between France and Italy). Effective returns do not necessarily mean returns to the country of
origin and, for example in the case of Syrians, they include returns of persons to third countries considered to be safe (for example from Hungary to Serbia).
5.7. In the EU: Returns 2018, 1 114 Georgians and 114 Ukrainians
were returned in the framework of Fron-
tex-supported operations. Current Fron-
In 2018, Member States reported around In relation to most Member States, tex data do not only show an increase in
287 000 return decisions issued to third- both return indicators correlated and cases of abuse of the new visa policy by
country nationals, which is around 2 % showed a similar annual downward or these two nationalities, but also a level of
more than in 2017. The absolute total upward trend. A decline in the number cooperation with the Ukrainian and Geor-
number of migrants subject to return of issued return decisions and conducted gian authorities that allows the return of
decisions might still be higher, as data effective returns in 2018 was particu- an increasing number of their citizens.
on decisions were unavailable from Aus- larly visible in those Member States that Albanians are the nationality with
tria, France and the Netherlands. Ger- were most affected by the migration peak the largest absolute decrease in effective
many and the UK also do not report all of 2015/2016, e.g. Germany, Sweden or returns compared to 2017 (-25 % to fewer
data on return decisions to the FRAN. Hungary. On the other hand, countries than 20 000). Similar to other Western
As in previous years, the number of that played a larger role as transit or Balkan nationalities, this was in line
return decisions was much larger than destination countries in 2018 reported with a general decline in the irregular
the total number of effective returns to higher figures in relation to the return migration pressure of Albanian nation-
third countries, which decreased by 5 % indicators, e.g. Spain and France. als, reflected by a lower number of asy-
to around 148 000 in 2018. Between 2012 In general, within the number of ef- lum applications, illegal stays, illegal
and 2015, this indicator has remained fective returns to third countries, around border crossings, refusals of entry, and
rather unaffected by peaks in irregular 50 % were reported to be on a voluntary issued return decisions.
migration, varying between a level of basis and 50 % were forced returns. In contrast, the number of effective
150 000 and 175 000 effective returns. A breakdown by third-country na- returns of Afghan nationals decreased
The main reasons for non-return are re- tionalities reveals clearly diverging de- by 32 % in 2018 in spite of a 67 % increase
lated to practical problems in the iden- velopments. The nationalities with the in illegal border-crossings compared to
tification of returnees and in obtaining largest increase in effective returns com- 2017. The reason for these converse trends
the necessary documentation from third pared to 2017 were Ukrainian and Geor- is that the number of irregularly arriving
country authorities. In addition, many gian nationals, who have in common Afghans started to rise only by the second
decisions to return voluntarily do not that their Schengen visa obligation was half of 2018, and that the national asy-
materialise as the persons decide to ab- waived in 2017. Frontex-supported opera- lum authorities have not yet concluded
scond and stay illegally. tions have contributed to this increase: in the related asylum procedures.
25 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20196. Featured analyses
Documents check, Minerva Operation
© Frontex, 20186.1. Interviews of migrants
In 2018, Frontex continued collecting networks. In terms of the smugglers’ na- Interviews found that Somali mi-
information from voluntary interviews tionalities, the top ranking nationalities grants were mainly smuggled by Somali
with newly arrived migrants in the Cen- were Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi, Libyan and suspects and to a lesser extent by Libyans
tral, Eastern and Western Mediterra- Moroccan followed by suspects from Tur- and Eritreans. The same pattern appears
nean area in the framework of PeDRA key, Tunisia, Algeria, Guinea and Iran. for all the other groups of migrants. They
(Processing Personal Data for Risk Anal- Regarding smuggling networks the are primarily in contact with fellow na-
ysis). Migrants coming from more than three main observations are: tionals or individuals from their neigh-
60 countries were interviewed upon their ▪▪ Migrants turn to their fellow na- bouring countries who cooperated with
arrival in Italy, Greece and Spain. tionals to be smuggled into the EU. smuggling networks.
As regards the nationalities inter- These persons usually play the role In 2018, Iraqi and Syrian migrants
viewed Iraqis, Syrians, Algerians, Tu- as recruiters. headed mainly to Izmir and were smug-
nisians and Afghans featured among the ▪▪ The people smugglers are not only gled by criminal networks involving pri-
top five, followed by Moroccans, Guine- based or operate in the country of de- marily Syrian and Iraqi suspects and to
ans, Pakistanis, Ivorians and Eritreans. parture but operate mainly in third a lesser extent Turkish suspects. Simi-
Most of the interviewed migrants be- countries bordering the EU (Turkey, larly, migrants from Afghanistan and
longed to the age group 18–35 years old Libya, Morocco, etc.) Pakistan showed the same pattern of be-
(82 %) and were unmarried (65 %) males ▪▪ The people smuggling networks are haviour, being smuggled via Istanbul by
(89 %) from the Middle Eastern, African, well established and have been ac- fellow Afghan and Pakistani.
and Asian countries – together account- tive for many years. Although the It appears that the journey of mi-
ing for 60 % of interviews. leading figures are often nationals grants who can afford to spend more
In 2018, a significant number (77 %) of of the last country of departure the money to get into Europe are planned
the interviewed migrants stated a pref- associates of the smugglers are from in advance, before their departure. For
erence regarding their final destina- different countries. example, the majority of the migrants
tion countries. Based on their answers, who reached Italy by sailing boats from
France was the most common final des- Where are the people smugglers Turkey, spending around EUR 5 000 per
tination country, followed by Spain, Ger- from and where are they based? person, claimed that they had access to
many, Italy, and Greece. In 2017, Italy, the smuggling networks before their de-
France, Germany, Spain, Greece and Even though some of the interviewees parture and agreed on the route, method
United Kingdom were at the top of the claimed that the people who smuggled and the amount of money before they
list. This reoccurring trend suggests that them were based in their country of or- started their journey.
migrants prefer a few final destination igin, arranging the whole journey, the The people smugglers offering full-
countries. This represents a stable trend vast majority of the interviewed mi- package migration function almost
observed at least over the last three years. grants claimed that the people smug- similar to a travel agent and they are
The vast majority (84 %) of the mi- glers were based in the last country of multinational as well. They maintain re-
grants interviewed in 2018 claimed that departure (71 %). This does not necessar- cruiting agents/contacts in the country
they had been smuggled and only 7 % ily exclude the possibility that networks of origin who possess the same nation-
declared that they had arrived in a Eu- organised the whole facilitation from ality or are from the same country as the
ropean country without using a people beginning to end, although it strongly migrants. The interviews suggest that in
smuggler. About 9 % did not reply to this indicates that the presence of people 2018, there were criminal networks ac-
question. This high number shows the smuggling networks is predominant at tive in Turkey who were in a position to
massive role played by people smuggling the last point of departure. offer these services, entailing complex
28 of 52
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2019You can also read
