Progress with Parliamentary 'Power over the Purse': The Case of South Africa
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Parliamentary Affairs (2021) 00, 1–20 https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab055
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Progress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the
Purse’: The Case of South Africa
Nokwazi Makanya*
School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
*Correspondence: n.makanya@sms.ed.ac.uk
Renewed interest in legislative ‘power over the purse’ has seen a growing de-
mand in modern democracies for parliaments to strengthen their authority over
national budgets. However, weaknesses in legislative and institutional reforms
intended to bring about more assertive parliaments with powers to amend budg-
ets raise issues on how parliament’s role in influencing the budget differs from
what formally conferred powers anticipate. Specifically, to what extent can for-
mal parliamentary institutions be expected to advance the aspiration of greater
legislative influence on the budget? This article critically considers the institutional
arrangements of the South African parliament that inhibit effective execution of
its role in budget decision-making. In particular, it explores three determinants:
extent of formal powers, institutional capacity, and incentives facing individual
MPs.
Keywords: Budget, Decision-making, Incentives, Institutions, Parliament, South
Africa
There is renewed interest and a growing demand across many democratic coun-
tries for parliaments to strengthen and play a more active role in budget processes
(Posner and Park, 2007; Santiso, 2008; Wehner, 2014; Siebrits, 2017). Since one
of the core functions of legislatures in modern democracies is to represent the
interests of the electorate, this means that in the budget process, legislatures have
the responsibility to ensure that government policies expressed in budgets match
the needs and priorities of citizens (Krafchik and Wehner, 1998; Pauw, 2011).
Greater legislative influence in the budget process is considered essential for
strengthening democracy, increasing transparency and keeping the checks and
balances on state power and the risks associated with excessive executive discre-
tion in the use of public resources (Santiso, 2008; Lienert, 2013). Legislative au-
thority in budget processes varies, however, modified by the extent of formally
# The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creati-
vecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, pro-
vided the original work is properly cited.2 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
conferred powers, institutional arrangements and procedures and political condi-
tions (Posner and Park, 2007; Forestiere and Pelizzo, 2008; Wehner, 2010).
This article considers the legal, institutional and political settings for the South
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African parliament’s involvement in budget decision-making. It discusses the
specific steps and progress that the parliament has made over the past few years
towards achieving its aspiration of strengthening legislative influence on budget
decisions and budget policy. South Africa’s democratic transition in 1994 was fol-
lowed by a series of legal, electoral and budgeting reforms aimed at drastic insti-
tutional changes that promote the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of
law, and a national budget process that fulfils constitutional requirements
(Fölscher and Cole, 2006)—among other things. A concerted effort was under-
taken to reform the institutions of budgeting to shape the nature of budget
decision-making and decision outcomes (Mkhize and Ajam, 2006).
Parliamentary power over the purse is advocated as a policy goal in the 1996
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Section 77 of the Constitution calls
for national legislation to provide a procedure to amend money bills1 before par-
liament. Such legislation, the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related
Matters Act, was enacted in 2009. The Act reinforces the authority of parliament
in budgeting while establishing the balance of power between the legislature and
executive in budget decision-making (Wehner, 2010; Pauw, 2011). With this leg-
islation, the South African parliament is granted formal powers to amend the
executive’s budget proposals as well as other money bills before it.
The South African parliament presents a suitable case study for examining
how formal institutional arrangements influence parliament’s role in budget
decision-making, and the extent to which budget amendment powers are exer-
cised. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa establishes parlia-
ment as an authority with amendment powers in the budget process. Despite
what is well-established in literature about the elusiveness of budgetary control in
parliamentary systems (Wehner, 2010), South Africa has pursued legal and other
institutional reforms granting parliament power over the purse. Significant
changes to its electoral system with the 1994 democratic transition, polity charac-
terised by enduring single-party dominance, and reforms to parliamentary insti-
tutions aimed at enhancing budget scrutiny and participation, have left South
Africa with unique dynamics of formal and informal rules and procedures
impacting budgetary politics.
The combination of all these characteristics makes South Africa’s case fitting
for assessing the extent to which formal powers and parliamentary institutions
can be expected to advance the aspiration of greater legislative influence in budget
decision-making. Centralised budget decision-making, in the hands of the
1
Money bills allocate public money for a particular purpose, or impose taxes, levies or duties.Progress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the Purse’ 3
finance ministry, is advocated due to the ability of finance ministries to consider
the full costs of decisions, their incentives to defend fiscal discipline and the fact
that they possess comprehensive information about the budget (Alesina and
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Perotti, 1996; Krafchik and Wehner, 1998). A legacy of parliamentary indiscipline
in budgetary matters, particularly in the context of many developing countries
who are more affected by issues such as electoral clientelism and patronage poli-
tics (Santiso, 2008), also supports this perspective. However, a push to decentral-
ise budget decision-making power to the legislature is justified on the basis of
democratic political systems, which consider power of the purse a democratic
fundamental (Siebrits, 2017); a ‘fundamental function of representative assem-
blies’ (Wehner, 2014, p. 1). Legislatures are more representative of the interests
and needs of their electorates and should therefore have power over the purse
(Pauw, 2011).
The study’s findings show that while much of the South African context rein-
forces and confirms propositions of party systems theories about the nature of ex-
ecutive–legislative relations, prospects about parliamentary budgetary control are
not translated into practice. Insufficient institutional capacity, the influence of in-
formal practices and expectations, and a lack of political incentives for MPs to ex-
ercise their budget amendment power weaken the authority of the formal
legislation that establishes parliament’s authority in budget decision-making. The
ability of the South African parliament to meaningfully influence the budget is
constrained by the same factors that are theorised to enable parliamentary power
of the purse.
With an institutional analysis framework narrowing analysis to the confines of
rules and procedures within which the behaviour of politicians can be under-
stood, this article provides empirical insight into why legislative and institutional
reforms intended to bring about more assertive parliaments may be challenged
by contextually embedded factors.
1. Contributing factors to parliament’s budget amendment powers
The extent of parliament’s influence on budget decisions and its budget amend-
ment ability is defined by its formal powers to amend the budget proposals of the
executive, effective parliamentary committees and other institutional arrange-
ments (Krafchik and Wehner, 1998; Lienert, 2013; Wehner, 2014). Institutions,
in this context, is understood as the rules and practices that guide and constrain
political behaviour; the structures and rules that affect how power and authority
is legitimated and exercised (March and Olsen, 2006). Such institutions can be
formal constitutions and procedural structures, as well as informal and unwritten
conventions; both of which influence and can explain political behaviour and
decision-making (Lowndes, 2018).4 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
In the budget process, institutions are not only the rules to which budgets are
drafted, approved and implemented, but they are also rules that establish actors’
roles and authority, shape actors’ interaction and guide decision-making (Alesina
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and Perotti, 1996; Raudla, 2014). Budgetary institutions are considered necessary
to avoid the common-pool resource problem of budgeting, where decision-
makers fail to internalise the full cost of their actions (von Hagen and Harden,
1995). Centralised decision-making, in the hands of actors who are more likely to
consider costs of budget decisions—the finance ministry, as well as other institu-
tionalised arrangements—mitigates the pro-spending bias of legislatures
(Wehner, 2010, 2014; Raudla, 2014).
Wehner (2010) explains two categories of legislative budget amendment pow-
ers as unfettered and constrained. Unfettered power refers to no numerical limits
on the extent to which legislatures can increase, reduce or amend the executive’s
budget proposals. Constrained power does not allow amendments to the execu-
tive’s budget proposals, and the legislature can only approve or reject the budget
in its entirety. Norton (1993) describes these legislative roles in budget processes
as budget-making, where legislatures have legal authority and technical capacity
to amend the executive’s budget proposal and substitute it with their own, and
budget-approving, where legislatures have no authority or capacity to do any-
thing other than approve the executive’s budget proposals. A third classification
is described by Schiavo-Campo (2007) as balanced power, where the legislature
can amend the executive’s budget proposals, but within the limitation of main-
taining a balanced budget (no changes to the aggregate budget).
The extent to which formally conferred legislative budgetary powers are exer-
cised is also conditioned by other factors. This include whether legislators possess
sufficient technical capacity to scrutinise the budget, what local political condi-
tions are, the individual incentives that Members of parliament (MPs) face, and
how conducive the broader governance environment is to parliament fully
exercising its powers (Santiso, 2008). Also, as Lowndes (2018) explains, the im-
pact of formal institutions on political behaviour must be considered in light of
contextually embedded informal conventions that can also have distributional
effects on power.
An understanding of how these factors influence political behaviour and
decision-making, as well as how they interact, are important in explaining how
formal budget amendment powers translate in practice.
2. Methods and data
Using a single-case study design, the emphasis of this study is in-depth under-
standing of the contextual conditions affecting South Africa’s legislative budget
decision-making process, and how institutional and political variables interact toProgress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the Purse’ 5
influence the use of parliament’s budgetary powers. Focus is on understanding
the behaviour of budget actors in terms of their power and position within a local
political system—taking into account formal institutional arrangements, infor-
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mal rules and other incentives and constraints.
Semi-structured elite interviews (N ¼ 30) were conducted with key actors in
the legislative phase of South Africa’s budget decision-making process. The inter-
views targeted elected politicians, senior government officials and other high
ranking non-government actors that are directly involved in political structures
of budget decision-making. These include current and former MPs of the finance
and appropriations committees in the two Houses (Chambers) of parliament—
the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces; current and for-
mer senior treasury officials involved in the legislative phase of the budget pro-
cess; and key non-government actors involved in this phase of budget decision-
making. Non-government actors that are influential in the budget process include
senior officials from institutions such as the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO)
and the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). Interviews were conducted on
virtual platforms, and lasted between 45 and 70 min.
The research also draws on non-participant observation. Non-participant ob-
servation provides an opportunity to observe parliamentary politics from a van-
tage point of everyday practices and traditions, witnessing the presence of any
unwritten rules and how politicians interact with each other in their own meet-
ings (Geddes, 2020). Over a period of 13 weeks, the researcher observed 26 virtual
meetings of the finance committees and the appropriations committees where
MPs discussed and voted to pass the budget and other money bills, and meetings
where submissions on the budget and the money bills were made by other key
actors that directly participate in parliament’s decision-making process on the
budget. This amounted to 80 hr of observation of interactions between MPs, se-
nior officials from the National Treasury, and other key budget actors.
To supplement the data collected from the elite interviews and observation,
document analysis of the finance and appropriations committees’ reports on the
budget and other money bills was carried out, as well as minutes of proceedings
of finance and appropriations committees’ meetings on the budget and other
money bills held in the previous parliament (2014–2019). These are publicly
available documents; compiled by the finance and appropriations committees in
the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, and by the Parliamentary
Monitoring Group of South Africa—an independent non-profit organisation
that provides record of parliamentary committee proceedings.2 A review of these
documents allowed some corroboration of the data obtained during the study,
2
https://www.pmg.org.za6 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
while also contextualising data collected during interviews by providing back-
ground information and historical insight (Bowen, 2009).
Extensive notes were collected during the interviews and observation of budget
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committee meetings, documenting both descriptive and reflective information
about the discussions with interview respondents and the interactions observed
between politicians and other elite budget actors. Deductive and inductive strate-
gies were used for thematic coding and analysis. Pre-determined themes and
propositions from new institutionalist theories were used to deductively code
and analyse the interview transcripts. An inductive approach was also used to de-
rive emerging themes from the content of the data.
3. Discussion and analysis
South Africa’s journey to legislative budgetary powers is rooted in Section 77 of
the 1996 Constitution, which calls for national legislation to provide a procedure
to amend money bills before parliament. In 1997, a draft memorandum for a
Money Bills Amendment Act was introduced by the Department of Finance, led
by the then Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel. This draft bill was strongly op-
posed by parliament, various civil society organisations and Congress of South
African Trade Unions3—South Africa’s largest trade union federation and a
strong alliance partner of the African National Congress (ANC). Opposition to
the Bill was primarily about the dominance it (still) allowed the Minister of
Finance over parliament, and a number of contentious provisions that, contrary
to the intent of the Bill, significantly constrained the role of parliament in the
budget process, and provided parliament with no real powers in budget decision-
making (Lefko-Everett et al., 2009; Wehner, 2010). Provisions such as written
consent being required from the Minister of Finance before the finance commit-
tee can table any amendments, and that the Minister of Finance could veto any
significant amendments to revenue proposals (Wehner, 2010). The bill was never
formally tabled nor enacted.
A second attempt at introducing legislation granting parliament budget
amendment powers was made in 2008. Reasons for the delay of more than a de-
cade in passing this piece of legislation vary, but many commentators mentioned
National Treasury’s aversion to having critical budget decisions arbitrated by pol-
iticians who have no knowledge or technical expertise in economics and public fi-
nance and are considered a threat to fiscal discipline (Wehner, 2010; Pauw,
2011). Year 2008 was a particularly pertinent time in modern South African poli-
tics. Following the 52nd National Conference of the ANC in December 2007, the
3
COSATU, an ally of the ANC, represents organised interest that was able to, at the time, exert sub-
stantial influence on government decision-making.Progress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the Purse’ 7
political transition from the Thabo Mbeki to the Jacob Zuma administration
resulted in fundamental changes in the character of political authority, and de-
scribed as a major turning point in the ANC and in South African politics
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(Booysen, 2011; Tsheola and Nkuna, 2014).
With the new Jacob Zuma administration, a clear shift was evident from an
executive dominated ANC political committee to a legislative one, where the bal-
ance of power within the party shifted in favour of stronger parliamentary over-
sight of the executive (Lefko-Everett et al., 2009; Wehner, 2010). This change in
administration is associated with the beginning of the ‘state capture era’.4 A pe-
riod of the Jacob Zuma administration, from mid-2009 to early 2018, was charac-
terised by high levels of corruption, patronage, governance failures, a parliament
ineffective in its obligation to the executive accountable, abuse of public resources
for private gain, state institutions being repurposed to serve the private accumu-
lation interests and subversion of constitutional and other formal institutions
(Swilling et al., 2017; Notshulwana and Lebakeng, 2019; Ajam, 2020).
Pauw (2011) suggests that the 2009 change in administration expedited the ta-
bling of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. The
Act was tabled in July 2008 and approved into law in April 2009.
Perhaps when it was first introduced in 1997, there was an attempt, a
genuine attempt, right? [. . .]. But in 2008, it was for political expedience
[. . .]. The intention was to strengthen the arm of the Zuma faction,
which was in parliament at the time. Because the intention was never re-
ally to strengthen parliament and to ensure its effectiveness, to give it
the power to be able to amend the budget. No. That was never the inten-
tion (Interview 14).
3.1 Extent of formal powers
Schiavo-Campo (2007) describes balanced legislative budgeting power as legisla-
tures that can amend budget proposals, but within the limitation of maintaining
a balanced budget. South Africa’s Money Bills Amendment Procedure and
Related Matters Act of 2009, amended in 2018, provides parliament with such
balanced power, where amendments to the various money bills5 are permitted
with a number of conditions and detailed procedures. Conditions in the Act in-
clude: the budget balance and reasonable debt levels are maintained; the short- to
4
Phrase used in South Africa referring to the high levels of systemic corruption, where private individ-
uals and companies seized organs of state to redirect public resources into their own hands.
5
These include Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposals, Division of Revenue Bill (and adjustments),
Appropriation Bill (and adjustments) and other Bills8 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
long-term implications of the budget on long-term economic growth are consid-
ered; proposed amendments should be accompanied by motivations; provincial
and local governments affected by any amendments should be given an opportu-
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nity to respond; and the impact of any budget amendment on the affected depart-
ment and service delivery should be demonstrated.
Executive and legislative budget actors interviewed had similar views on the
detailed and onerous procedures in the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and
Related Matters Act. The intentions of the legislation are lauded, but the onerous
procedure is heavily criticised. A former senior Treasury official commented:
How would they amend the budget? The legislation itself is terrible be-
cause it’s almost like giving the power grudgingly, by wrapping them up
in so much process that in effect they can’t amend (Interview 15).
The legislative phase of the budget process, whereby the budget and other
money bills are adopted, is prescribed in detail in the Money Bills Amendment
Procedure and Related Matters Act. A national budget is tabled in February of
each year, and a mid-term budget called the Medium-Term Budget Policy
Statement (MTBPS) is tabled in October. Following the tabling of the national
budget by the Minister of Finance, the finance and appropriations committees in
both Houses of parliament have 16 days to report to the National Assembly and/
or the National Council of Provinces on the fiscal framework. The fiscal frame-
work is the total resource envelope for government across all three spheres at na-
tional, provincial and local level. Such a report must include a clear statement
accepting, rejecting or amending the fiscal framework.
After parliament adopts the fiscal framework, a Division of Revenue Bill must
be passed within 35 days. The Division of Revenue Bill provides the distribution
of the provincial equitable share to the country’s nine provinces, and distribution
of the local government equitable share to the 257 municipalities. Finally, parlia-
ment must approve the Appropriation Bill, with or without amendments, within
four months of start of the financial year. The Appropriation Bill is the legislation
that distributes the national share of the budget across all national votes. In
October, the time allocated for the finance and appropriations committees to re-
view the MTBPS and propose amendments to the National Assembly and the
National Council of Provinces is 15 and 30 days, respectively. During this time, as
part of its constitutional requirement, the finance and appropriations committees
also convene public hearings where members of the public are invited to make
oral and written submissions on the fiscal framework, the Appropriation Bill and
the MTBPS.
Reflecting on this demanding legislative phase of the budget process, an MP
serving on both the committees on finance and appropriations commented that
‘the timeframes are often insufficient for proper interrogation. In practice, theProgress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the Purse’ 9
ability to amend the budget is an impossibility’ (Interview 6). The enabling bud-
get amendment legislation therefore becomes a constraint in itself, by design,
rather than an instrument for parliament to exercise its budgetary powers.
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3.2 Institutional capacity
Without additional support, MPs in the finance and appropriations committees
do not have the requisite technical knowledge to effectively scrutinise budget
documents. Not unique to committees responsible for passing the national bud-
get, the lack of MPs with an academic or professional background, or knowledge
and basic understanding of economic principles is, according to McLennan
(2018), one of the biggest challenges in the South African parliament. Despite a
significant increase in organisational capacity since the first democratic parlia-
ment, from 10 researchers in 1997 to over 50 in 2019, MPs remain dissatisfied
with quality and efficiency of support they receive (Ajam, 2020).
The MP interviewees, particularly those from the ruling party, rank political
experience and seniority in political parties as more important than academic or
professional backgrounds in parliament. Instead, research and analytical support
necessary to engage in fiscal and economic matters is provided to MPs by internal
parliamentary resources as well as external expertise. The Upper and the Lower
House of parliament each have a finance committee and an appropriations com-
mittee. The main function of the finance committees is to consider and report on
the national macro-economic and fiscal policy, the fiscal framework, revised fiscal
framework, revenue proposals and money bills. The appropriations committees’
key function is to influence budget policy decisions through effective implemen-
tation of the Money Bills Act and facilitate public participation in the govern-
ment’s budget processes. Each of these four committees has one content advisor
and one researcher; the exception being the appropriations committee in the
National Assembly, which has two researchers.
The committees also receive additional analytical support and advice on bud-
get-related matters from the PBO and the FFC. Typically, PBOs are intended to
enhance the technical capacity of legislatures to not only exercise oversight over
budgets, but to also amend budgets (Santiso and Varea, 2013; von Trapp et al.,
2016); something particularly important in executive-dominant contexts where
parliaments are considered marginalised in the decision-making process
(Stapenhurst et al., 2012).
The South African PBO was established in 2013, in terms of section 15 of the
Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act of 2009, and is
mandated to provide independent and objective analysis and advice to parlia-
ment on the budget and other money bills. The FFC, established in 1994, is an in-
dependent constitutional advisory institution that makes recommendations on10 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
fiscal matters to parliament and other organs of state. The FFC however, unlike
the PBO, derives its mandate from the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa and provides its services to other stakeholders outside of parliament.
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Interview respondents believe that the technical capacity and advice provided
by researchers, content advisors and the PBO is insufficient for effective budget
scrutiny. A capacity of five parliamentary researchers, four content advisors and a
PBO with a research staff complement of 10 (including the Director)6 was de-
scribed as too small to deliver on the range and depth of analysis that the budget
requires. Additionally, the availability of analytical support and advice does not
necessarily mean that MPs will have the capacity to absorb, or have the will to use,
the information provided to them. A number of budget actors interviewed
expressed a lack of confidence in the finance and appropriations committees’ abil-
ity to meaningfully scrutinise the budget. ‘Some of them are just not au fait with
the subject matter. They just don’t know it. And they don’t read’ (Interview 9).
Furthermore, the independence of the PBO to provide objective and impartial
analysis and advice was questioned by most of the opposition MPs interviewed.
Opposition party MPs and senior Treasury officials also referred to what Messick
(2002) cautions, that unlike countries with presidential systems, the majority of
countries with parliamentary systems have no need or interest for information,
that is, provided independently of government—the exception being opposition
parties. The issue of independence has plagued the South African PBO for many
years since its establishment, and is attributable to a number of factors. These in-
clude how the advisory board tasked with overseeing the PBO are finance and
appropriations committee chairpersons who are all ANC MPs (The
Conversation, 2017a), that the PBO is funded by parliament, and that the
Director of the PBO reports to parliament. Factors that McLennan (2018, p. 95)
asserts contribute to the PBO’s ‘blurred accountability lines’.
A finance committee member commented: ‘I don’t feel that they’re indepen-
dent either at all, in fact they’re far less independent than the FFC. I feel that the
PBO is quite partial in fact’ (Interview 6). Reflecting on the issue of an indepen-
dent and impartial PBO, a member of the appropriations committee said:
Ultimately, they know who their master is. And their master is the ma-
jority party. So that’s that. So, I would say that they’re as independent as
the majority party allows them to be, but not any more so than that
(Interview 17).
It appears likely that the independence that the PBO is intended to have is be-
ing challenged or emasculated by the same highly politicised institution it is meant
6
Staff complement as of May 2021. Four of the ten positions were vacant at the time.Progress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the Purse’ 11
to serve. The majority and dominance that the ANC has in the parliamentary pro-
cess ensures that no independent institutional powers emerge (Schrire, 2008).
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3.3 Incentives created by the electoral system
One of the key factors incentivising MP behaviour is South Africa’s closed-list
proportional representation electoral system, which, it is argued, significantly
shapes the behaviour and decisions of MPs (Gumede, 2018)—including how
MPs vote in the annual budget process. In proportional representation systems,
seats in the National Assembly are distributed in proportion to the total votes
each political party receives, and MPs are not elected as individuals but as party
representatives. Additionally, in South Africa, the list of candidates that end up in
parliamentary seats are individuals that are ranked and selected by the party by
means of a closed-list system, where neither voters nor potential MPs themselves
have input or influence on the list of candidates that political parties submit to
serve in the legislature. This closed-list proportional representation system has
contributed to the enduring dominance of the ANC in parliament where mem-
bers are expected to obey and show loyalty to the dictates of the party, rendering
the self-interest and rational choice discretion of party members irrelevant
(Notshulwana and Lebakeng, 2019; TimesLive, 2021).
South Africa’s adoption of a proportional representation system, since 1994,
was designed to ensure inclusivity in elections and that virtually no constraints
exist on the number of political parties that can win seats in the legislature
(Ferree, 2018). However, what is evident in the case of South Africa is that despite
a proportional representation system that would in theory see a multitude of par-
ties in parliament that can provide robust opposition party impact, the country
has had single-party dominance since its democratic transition where the ruling
party ANC enjoys a commanding position as the dominant party in the executive
and in the legislature.
Two key factors explain this single-party dominance. One is South Africa’s
strong history of racial divide that has translated into a racially polarised electorate.
The ANC has always been considered as the anti-apartheid, liberation movement
party and opposition parties as enemies of transformation who lack legitimacy
with black voters (Nijzink, 2001; Ferree, 2018)—black voters who constitute the
majority of South Africa’s population. The consequences of a racially defined elec-
torate have made the ANC confident that its position is unassailable, where despite
the party’s frequent policy failures and controversial actions, voters have yet to
meaningfully punish the party by eliminating its majority (Schrire, 2008).
Another factor explaining the ANC’s enduring dominance is democratic cen-
tralism, an approach adopted by the ANC in the late 1990s. Democratic central-
ism in South Africa’s case concentrates all public policy decision-making in the12 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
National Executive Council (NEC)—the ANC’s highest decision-making body—
and it requires all ANC members to adhere to NEC decisions (Choudhry, 2009).
ANC NEC decisions have authority over a wide range of state institutions, includ-
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ing those created under the Constitution to serve as checks on political power
(Choudhry, 2009). Both of these factors contribute to ANC dominance that
Booysen (2011, p. 210) describes as an ‘uninterrupted line of commanding party
political and state power’.
One of the key implications of this electoral system in a single-party dominant
democracy is that it incentivises MPs to be wholly accountable to their party, and
only minimally accountable to voters (Nijzink, 2001; The Conversation, 2017b).
ANC MPs rarely take an opposing position to the ANC-led executive. The major-
ity of MPs interviewed, particularly those from the ANC, emphasised the impor-
tance of their constituents and representing their needs in the budget process.
Ironically, South Africa’s current electoral system does not empower direct con-
stituency representation; it instead creates accountability and loyalty lines to the
political party—not constituents.
ANC MPs are expected to be highly disciplined and ‘toe the line’ when it
comes to defending their party’s positions in parliament. Failure to do so may re-
sult in a range of penalties such as lowering of one’s position on the ANC’s list at
the next election, denial of renomination or redeployment to another position
(Choudhry, 2009). In finance and appropriations committees, this means always
voting to approve budgets tabled by the executive.
Participants reflected strongly on how undesirable it would be for the ruling
ANC to show any signs of dissonance between its executive and legislative major-
ity. Citing the likely penalties from the party leadership, some ANC MPs sug-
gested that even their self-interested and self-seeking colleagues would be
reluctant to publicly disagree with the budget proposals of the executive. Even in
instances where budget amendments are inarguable, as suggested by many oppo-
sition party MPs, ‘the reality is that politically, you’ve got the majority party,
which is the executive party as well, so they’re unlikely to have a huge different
position’ (Interview 6). Another MP explained: ‘we basically accept it as a politi-
cal directive from the governing party. It basically must get passed’ (Interview 4).
Another budget actor summarised the impact of South Africa’s electoral system
on the behaviour of MPs as ‘ANC members are deployed to parliament and nec-
essarily, therefore, they’re going to follow the party line’ (Interview 22).
Those are our bosses in the political party. This budget, when it comes
to us, it means it has been signed with an invisible ink, they’ve signed it
off when it comes to us (Interview 13).
Every single MP must do what the party says. If you do not, the party
reserves the right to remove you from parliament for not voting on theProgress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the Purse’ 13
party line. If you don’t toe the line, you will lose your seat; it’s pretty
simple. So, you can never vote against your party line (Interview 17).
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These quotes demonstrate a pervasive understanding from various budget
actors about the relationship between the ANC-led executive and ANC majority
in parliament, as well as the importance of cohesion between these two arms of
government. Political stakes would be raised if parliament rejects or significantly
amends the executive’s budget, and would be equivalent to a vote of no confi-
dence (Schiavo-Campo, 2007; Forestiere and Pelizzo, 2008; Wehner, 2010;
Raudla, 2014). A number of interviewees expressed this understanding of the
implications of legislative budget amendments. Participants also emphasised that
amendments adopted in the legislative phase of the budget process would be
highly disruptive to a process, that is, subject to severe time constraints, with po-
tential undesirable implications of delayed allocation of funds for service delivery.
The dominance of the ANC-led executive over parliament is extremely power-
ful in influencing political behaviour and budget decisions, and has contributed
to predictability in the outcomes of budget voting. According to Nijzink (2001),
the ANC as a former struggle movement and liberation party does not have a
strong history of individualised and independent behaviour. Over time, the
ANC’s dominance has reduced the influence of MPs in legislative processes,
eroded checks on executive power and oversight mechanisms provided by formal
institutions, and shifted the point of accountability from institutions of parlia-
mentary democracy to the party itself (Choudhry, 2009, p. 12).
The impact of single-party dominance and the tight party discipline of major-
ity party MPs is strengthened by relatively weak opposition parties. There are 14
political parties represented in South Africa’s sixth parliament. There are six par-
ties represented in the two appropriations committees and five in the two finance
committees—all of which have an ANC majority and are chaired by ANC MPs.
The ANC majority, and the relative size and strength of opposition parties is
too small and weak to meaningfully swing votes or influence policy in committee
meetings, or seriously challenge government power more broadly. Reflecting on
the partisanship evident in committee meetings, one interviewee recalled how
ANC MPs blatantly made the power of their majority known when challenged by
the opposition, stating: ‘you know what, we will outvote you, so you might as
well just keep quiet’ (Interview 3). The relatively weak position of opposition par-
ties in finance and appropriation committees, as within the broader South
African polity, undermines their ability to demand greater scrutiny of the budget
or propose budget allocations different to what the majority party decides.14 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
3.4 Executive–legislative relations
In parliamentary systems, the legislature and the executive are inherently inter-
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twined. The executive is dependent on majority support in the legislature and
budget proposals tabled by the executive are routinely approved by the legislature
(Schiavo-Campo, 2007; Wehner, 2010). The result is a cooperative executive–leg-
islative relationship. Much of this can be attributed to South Africa’s democratic
parliamentary system; a model of politics inherited from the British colonial pe-
riod, which has continued throughout the establishment of the Union of South
Africa in 1910, and the pre- and post-1994 apartheid era, and is considered an
important influence on democratic South Africa’s Constitution (Nijzink, 2001).
A historic relationship that Booysen (2011, p. 422) describes as ‘subservience of
the legislative powers to the executive, even if subject to ebbs in legislative
assertiveness’.
This cooperative executive–legislative relationship however, in South Africa’s
context, should be understood not only within the implication of its parliamen-
tary system, but also within the context of its local political setting. A relationship
defined in its Constitution, the legislature is required to exercise oversight over
the executive, notwithstanding the interdependent relationship between these
two arms of government. As discussed earlier, ANC dominance in the executive
and the legislature influences political behaviour to a large extent. This influence
also shapes executive–legislative relations. This cooperative relationship was
highlighted by a number of interviewees as desirable to display a unified ANC
government, and also one of the main reasons why to date, parliament has not ta-
bled any budget amendments. Ajam (2020) refers to the first and only amend-
ment made to the 2017 Adjustments Appropriation Bill during the fifth
parliament. This amendment however, as explained by this study’s interviewees,
was effected through consensual agreement. The appropriations committee
requested that the National Treasury makes minor changes by shifting money be-
tween two departments. A request described in its committee report7 as an ami-
cable solution.
In the finance and appropriations committee meetings that the researcher ob-
served, a high level of comradeship among ANC MPs was evident. The National
Treasury was seldom robustly challenged—except for opposition party MPs at
times. Meetings often proceeded efficiently and with little debate or impasse on
voting or budget recommendations; the exception again being opposition MPs
challenging some recommendations at times. Reflecting on the lack of robust en-
gagement in many meetings, one member of the appropriations committee stated
7
Report of the Standing Committee on Appropriations on the Adjustments Appropriation Bill [B25–
2017] [National Assembly (Section 77)], dated 29 November 2017Progress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the Purse’ 15
that ‘engagement is very superficial [. . .] we engage in non-sensical ideological
debates, rather than talking about pragmatic approaches and issues’ (Interview
14); another saying, ‘I’d rate the engagement as rather poor’ (Interview 17).
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Contributing to the many finance and appropriations committee meetings
proceeding with no challenges to budget proposals by ANC MPs, is the agree-
ment that takes place beforehand in ANC Caucus study groups8 on the stance to
be taken in committee meetings. Study groups are officially recognised as struc-
tures that work on the legislative programme before parliamentary committees
and formulating ANC policy (African National Congress Parliamentary Caucus
n.d.). Interviewees mentioned that these study groups were also used for prepara-
tion of questions for the executive in committee meetings, and to take a position
on the matter at hand. Attendance of study group meetings for finance and
appropriations committees at times included senior treasury officials who are not
MPs—unlike the Minister and Deputy Minister of Finance. In these study
groups, ANC MPs would get access to information that opposition party MPs in
the same committees would not. Interviewees familiar with this practice charac-
terised it as a planned performance for committee meetings and an opportunity
for ANC MPs to address any potential conflicts behind closed doors, to avoid any
appearances of disagreement in committee meetings.
They were good cops, and they were bad cops, but actually they were all
working towards the same objective. But if you sat in on that meeting,
you’d think, oh, these ANC MPs are disagreeing with each other or
they’re taking very different approaches (Interview 22).
In some of those meetings [. . .] you could almost tell that the ANC
members look like they have been briefed basically about what’s going
to happen, and the questions that are asked are actually rehearsed
(Interview 23).
3.5 High MP turnover in committees
Another factor that not only influences MPs’ behaviour in the budget process but
also presents a constraint to parliament’s budget amending ability relates to the
fact that not only is parliament elected for a five-year term, but there are extensive
changes in MPs serving in committees in each parliamentary term. This leaves
MPs with a relatively short period of certainty about their seats, creating a disin-
centive for MPs to build up the expertise necessary to improve their scrutiny and
oversight of the budget, which requires a few years. Statistics from the
Parliamentary Monitoring Group of South Africa shows that during the fifth
8
Other political parties also have parliamentary caucuses.16 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
democratic parliament (2014–2019), the finance committee in the National
Assembly made nine replacements to its 22-member committee composition. In
the current parliament (2019–2024), all except one of the members in the finance
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and the appropriations committees in the National Assembly are new. These
changes leave the committees at a significant disadvantage in the budget process,
as the lack of MPs with accrued expertise and institutional memory weaken the
committees’ capacity to effectively engage with the budget and to influence bud-
get policy.
The limitations of five-year terms with high turnover of MPs in finance and
appropriations committees were highlighted as a major challenge by interviewees.
Despite the tenure of most researchers and content advisors in committees
extending beyond the five-year term of each parliament, they face the same hur-
dle of starting afresh with each new set of committee members that need induc-
tion and years of experience in their roles before they can gain the specialised
knowledge of public finance and budgeting. The uncertainty of returning to the
finance and appropriations committees leaves little incentive for MPs to invest
time building up specialised knowledge on budgeting. MPs themselves reflect
negatively on this limitation, lamenting the lack of continuity from previous par-
liaments and the steep learning curve that they face themselves as new MPs.
4. Concluding remarks
Since the first democratic parliament in 1994 and the enabling legislation in 2009,
to date, the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa has not made amend-
ments to the national budget. Factors that, in theory, act as enablers to parlia-
mentary budgeting power have proven to be constraints in South Africa’s case.
The budget amendment legislation is elaborate and the procedures for amending
the budget are onerous. This makes the legislation itself, by design, a disincentive
for MPs to make budget amendments. The formal budgetary powers in South
Africa’s parliament therefore serve to enhance parliament’s legitimacy in the bud-
get process, rather than aiding legislative authority and influence on budget deci-
sions and budget policy.
Other institutional arrangements also constrain rather than enable parliamen-
tary budget power. Capacity for effective budget scrutiny to enable budget
amendments where required is inadequate to deal with the complexity contained
annual budgets and other money bills. The establishment of additional analytical
capacity for budget related matters, in the form of a PBO, is not (yet) big enough
to have an impact and it faces a considerable lack of confidence from key budget
actors. These factors are weakened even further in the context of South Africa’s
political system of single-party dominance, weak opposition and the disincentives
that a closed-list proportional representation system creates.Progress with Parliamentary ‘Power over the Purse’ 17
Parliament’s budgetary power in South Africa has proven markedly inferior to
what its formally conferred powers anticipate. This is not unique to South Africa. A
combination of institutional and political factors constrains many parliaments’ abil-
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ity to influence the budget, despite what their formal powers suggest (Forestiere and
Pelizzo, 2008). In South Africa’s case, the enactment of formal legislative budget
amendment powers—derived from a constitutional requirement—and the support-
ive institutional arrangements in parliament have not resulted in budget amendment
powers being exercised. Many ANC MPs in the finance and appropriations commit-
tees have neither the analytical capacity, political will, nor the individual agency to
challenge the executive’s budget proposals. Perhaps more importantly, incentives
simply do not exist in South Africa for ruling party MPs to amend the budget.
What are the implications of this study? First, it responds to the need for in-
depth case studies to provide richness, context and explanatory power to the
quantitative measurement of formal legislative budgeting powers that are often
discussed in comparative research. Contextual qualitative studies like this can not
only contribute to improved iterations of comparative, quantitative measures of
parliamentary budget power, but can also strengthen the case for further qualita-
tive in-depth research that clarifies how formal institutions interact with contex-
tual and often informal practices and incentives in explaining political behaviour.
Findings from the South African case could provide insight and lessons for other
countries that are currently adopting similar institutional reforms for greater leg-
islative influence on the budget.
Secondly, aspects of South Africa’s political–historical context which explain
the extent of parliamentary budgetary power could inform new standardised vari-
ables or factors in comparative research if other studies find similar effects over
time. Comparisons within and across contexts could also be useful for under-
standing and explaining why observed similarities and differences between South
Africa’s case and other cases exist.
Thirdly, the study highlights the importance of informal, unwritten rules and
practices that guide political behaviour. This warrants a better understanding of
the nexus between formal and informal institutions, and how they establish and
maintain power relations in the budget decision-making process.
The study also raises further questions about parliamentary power over the
purse. Does the absence of amendments to the national budget over a number of
years indicate a lack of ability to make changes, or consistent satisfaction with the
budget? Are budget amendments the only measure of parliamentary power over
the purse?
Conflict of Interest
The author has no conflicts of interest to report.18 Parliamentary Affairs, 2021
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