Places that matter: Australia's crisis intervention framework and voter response
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Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society
doi:10.1093/cjres/rsab002
Places that matter: Australia’s crisis intervention
framework and voter response
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Sally Weller
Business School, University of South Australia, Level 5, Way Lee Building, City West
Campus, Adelaide 5000, South Australia, sally.weller@unisa.edu.au
This article contributes to understandings of geographies of discontent by focusing on the
way that political frameworks condition the demand for fringe or protest voting. It discusses
how Australia’s federal political framework, preferential voting system and timely crisis
intervention policies combine to reduce the demand for fringe voting. The local effects of
this system are illustrated via an examination of voting patterns in two disadvantaged and
deindustrialising locations in the State of Victoria. The conclusion suggests that European
jurisdictions have much to learn from the Australian example.
Keywords: deindustrialisation, regional policy, electoral systems, crisis intervention, voting pat-
terns, Australia
JEL Classifications: D72, F63, F68, O18, R11
The problem of places that do In an important contribution to this litera-
not matter ture, Spicer (2018, 116) argues that extant ex-
planations of this shift have paid insufficient
The academic and policy literatures are awash
attention to ‘the interaction of globalisation-
with articles attempting to comprehend and
induced, rising regional disparities with ma-
address the waning support for mainstream
joritarian national political systems’. He shows
political parties across Western democracies
how the majoritarian systems of the UK and
(Emmenegger et al., 2015; Essletzbichler et al.,
US contribute to political discontent via the
2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Spicer, 2018).
combination of a declining ‘ideological con-
The rejection of established political options
gruence’ between the political platforms of
in favour of fringe and populist parties has a
major parties and the sentiments of voters, cre-
distinctive spatial expression, concentrating
ating a ‘representation gap’ that is often col-
in disadvantaged locations in what has been
oured by the perception of inadequate policy
called a ‘geography of discontent’ (McCann,
responses to persistent spatial disparities.
2020; Nel-lo and Gomà, 2018). Alternatively,
Spicer (2018; citing Manow, 2009) observes
Goodwin and Heath (2016) associate discon-
that nations with preferential electoral sys-
tent with places ‘left behind’ by globalisation
tems are more ideologically congruent, more
and market-driven development processes,
likely to retain redistributive policies and more
while Rodríguez-Pose (2018) characterises the
likely to maintain policy settings that deliver
phenomenon as a revenge of people and places
inter-regional equity.
that ‘don’t matter’.
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All
rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comWeller
Following from these insights, this article supply factors in the context of electoral ar-
contributes to uncovering the sources, manifest- rangements (Golder, 2016). However, most of
ations and consequences of ‘geographies of dis- the literature focuses on the demand for popu-
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content’ by explaining how Australia’s political list politics, rather than on the electoral struc-
framework and crisis intervention systems com- ture or the factors influencing the supply of
bine to mollify discontent and to contain the populist candidates. These explanations agree
political alienation that, in majoritarian jurisdic- that a combination of socio-economic, political
tions, has been associated with deindustrialisa- or cultural factors produce a sense of discon-
tion. The focus of this article is how Australia’s tent and a consequent rejection of the status
framework of localised and timely crisis inter- quo, but there is considerable disagreement
ventions following economic shocks influences about the exact nature of the processes and
voting patterns and the degree of support for their causal pathways.
fringe parties in disadvantaged locations. This is A growing literature associates discontent
illustrated by means of a close analysis of voting with the material inequalities between regions
patterns in two contrasting deindustrialising (McCann, 2020), and some argue these material
neighbourhoods in the Australian State of differences underpin and produce the observed
Victoria. It confirms that the demand for pro- social and cultural influences (Essletzbichler
test voting is generally weak in crisis locations, et al., 2018). Some socio-economic explanations
but it is stronger in the location marked by re- are concerned with the impact of long-term tra-
peated intervention policy failures. jectories of change and some with the impact
The article is structured as follows. The next of short-term crises. The longer view identifies
section reviews the literature on the relation- the plight of people ‘left behind’ by globalisa-
ship between voting patterns, regional dispar- tion and marketisation (Ford and Goodwin,
ities and redistributive funding. It is followed 2017; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Gordon,
by a description of the Australian political 2018), a view supported by qualitative studies
system, its preferential electoral framework revealing the ‘slow violence’ of entrenched
and crisis-based regional interventions. The socio-economic deprivation and the way it
empirical section begins with a brief discussion concentrates spatially to produce particularly
of methodological issues before introducing disadvantaged places (McQuarrie, 2017; Pain,
the two case study localities—Norlane and 2019). The shorter-term view emphasises the
Morwell in the southern State of Victoria—and effects of economic shocks, such as those pro-
contrasting their voting patterns. The discus- duced by austerity policies, industrial change
sion suggests that preferential political systems and local plant closures (MacLeod and Jones,
produce more spatially sensitive policies and 2018; Meek, 2019).
are more responsive to voter discontent. Voter How material conditions affect voting behav-
confidence in mainstream political options is iour is less well understood. Wiertz and Rodon
influenced by local perceptions of the efficacy (2019) suggest that political preferences vary
of interventions. The conclusion points to les- with short-term personal hardship, although
sons for majoritarian jurisdictions. people often revert to an earlier position after
the negative experience has receded from aware-
ness. Some research suggests that economic
Economic conditions, redistribution hardships increase the likelihood of abstaining
and voting patterns from voting, consistent with a sense of disillusion-
Explanations for the surge of anti-establish- ment or despair; others suggest that it stimulates
ment voting preferences in Europe and the voting for fringe and protest parties, consistent
USA draw in a complex mix of demand and with notions of discontent (Emmenegger et al.,
Page 2 of 16Places that matter
2015; Gallego et al., 2016; Hacker et al., 2013). development programmes in most advanced
Fear and uncertainty about the future also play economies have the objectives of improving
a role. Wiertz and Rodon (2019) suggest that the economic performance of lagging regions
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voters veer to the political left when their liveli- while at the same time endeavouring to build
hoods are actually compromised—say by the ex- ‘social cohesion’ or the political legitimacy of
perience of plant closure or job loss—but to the systems of governance. Interventions are ex-
political right when feared adverse outcomes are pected—either explicitly or implicitly—to
yet to materialise. As pork-barrelling politicians translate into support for their supplier govern-
repeatedly demonstrate, promising tangible im- ments, and there is some research confirming
provements to peoples’ personal circumstances this outcome (Dabrowski, 2012). Yet positive
can influence a significant proportion of votes electoral effects seem to follow only if the inter-
(Hicken, 2017). ventions are well received, and on that score,
Cultural explanations focus on nativist and the evidence is contradictory. Some research
racist dispositions that coalesce around migra- suggests that regional interventions deliver
tion issues (Poutvaara and Steinhardt, 2018). positive economic benefits (Barca et al., 2012;
They also take account of social and cultural Camagni and Capello, 2015), some suggest that
divisions on issues like same-sex marriage and the benefits are short-lived and tend to evap-
climate change that disrupt traditional ‘left’ orate when funding is discontinued (Barone
versus ‘right’ political allegiances. Cultural fac- et al., 2016; Crescenzi and Giua, 2016), and
tors complicate and perhaps compromise ex- others suggest that they are less effective than
planations that equate voting preferences with policies targeting individual welfare (Kline and
material interests or with voters’ relatively Moretti, 2014). Even if the material outcomes
stable class-based ideological commitments of intervention are positive, the magnitude of
(Lipset, 1960). In the UK’s Brexit vote, for ex- the effect may still not be adequate to counter
ample, moral economy or moral panic appears market processes that concentrate wealth and
to have played a decisive role (Los et al., 2017; power at central places. This debate seems to
Morgan, 2017). be resolving in favour of place-based policy
Politically oriented explanations focus on the (Bailey et al., 2019).
perception of a crisis of political representa- Qualitative and place-based examinations
tion. Attentive to the neighbourhood scale and see the political effects of crises and the
lived experience, this research discerns a sense quality of policy interventions as two sides of
of abandonment by mainstream political par- the same coin. From this perspective, the pol-
ties (Telford and Wistow, 2020); rising contempt itical mood is not determined by a material
for the dominant social, cultural and political crisis, like plant closures or inequalities, but
arrangements and their deceptive language of rather depends on how local debates about
consensus and cooperation (McKenzie, 2017); the future play out in the context of strug-
and the numbing effects of the realisation that gles to create new employment opportunities
the established political system is no longer and to secure redistributive funding (Telford
capable of making a difference to ordinary and Wistow, 2020; Willett et al., 2019). This
peoples’ lives (Jessop, 2018). The resulting per- perspective reveals deindustrialisation as a
vasive sense of disillusionment, hopelessness political and cultural process, as well as an
and nihilistic despair concentrates in so-called economic one. Viewing adverse events and
‘left behind’ places. policy responses as inseparable components
A central point of contention concerns the of a continuous process reveals local views
role of redistributive interventions in mitigating of the quality of interventions at any time
or exacerbating these processes. Regional to be filtered through the lens of previous
Page 3 of 16Weller
experiences. In contexts coloured by the ill- Australia’s re-distributional political
effects of austerity policies, for example, structure
well-meaning interventions that are per-
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Australia is a relatively sparsely populated
ceived locally as being imposed by external
settler economy, where the deep cultural and
decision-makers or as mis-targeted relative
language differences that separate European
to local priorities are likely to fuel local frus-
regions are largely absent. However, as in
tration and anger (Telford and Wistow, 2020).
other places, there is an increasing divide be-
Politically speaking, the effectiveness of re-
tween rapidly growing urban centres and
distributive funding depends on emotional re-
often stagnating regional areas. The Australian
ception, which in turn depends on the extent
economy is dominated by a handful of large
of local integration of funded projects and
entrepot cities where incoming population
the extent to which local people have a sense
fuels growth in specialised consumption and
of ownership of them (Willett et al., 2019).
trade-related services. The thin economies
Thus, whether or not interventions generate
of non-metropolitan areas, in contrast, rely
political support depends on local percep-
on export-oriented primary production and
tions of the utility and appropriateness of the
(mainly overseas-owned) branch plant indus-
interventions as well as the extent to which
tries. Since Australia’s post-1990s shift to open,
benefits are captured by elites or cliques; the
market-oriented policy settings, growth has
time gaps between crisis events and subse-
concentrated in the city centres. Many regional
quent interventions; and the convolutedness
areas have been ‘left behind’ by the closure of
of chains of association (Willett et al., 2019,
manufacturing plants, the withdrawal or pri-
Telford and Wistow, 2020). Long gaps and
vatisation of government services, declining
convoluted accountabilities weaken the asso-
employment opportunities and declining popu-
ciation between crisis and response.
lations (Pritchard and McManus, 2000).
What is striking about this literature, to
Nonetheless, despite the advance of market-
someone observing it from afar, is the ex-
isation and liberalisation, the Australian system
tent to which it takes for granted European
retains a core re-distributional framework
institutional arrangements and political sys-
(Weller and O’Neill, 2014) that continues to
tems as an unquestioned frame and backdrop.
sustain the economies of regional areas. The
Consideration of the wider arrangements
framework has three components: the federal
that structure the relationship between local
form of organisation and the political settle-
places and regional policy authorities are
ment it provokes, the effects of a compulsory
overlooked, as are the macroscale economic
and preferential electoral framework and fi-
and financial arrangements that sustain and
nally the tradition of re-distributional funding
intensify inter-regional differences (Harvey,
to places experiencing crisis. This political
2011; Hadjimichalis, 2017). This closes off any
structure makes less competitive places ‘matter’
discussion of how improvements to govern-
more, in government and politics, than compar-
mental processes or democratic institutions
able places in Europe or the USA.
could potentially contribute to closing the
‘representation gap’ that politically oriented
explanations position at the heart of local dis- The federal system
content (Spicer, 2018, see also Mudde, 2007). All federal systems of government are to some
These missing questions are brought into view extent characterised by ‘contestation, conser-
by way of the contrast to the Australian model vatism and compromise’ (Taylor, 2000, 107),
described in the next section. and in this respect, Australia is no exception.
Page 4 of 16Places that matter
Australia was created by the Federation, in government cannot initiate regional develop-
1901, of the continent’s previously quasi- ment projects without active State government
independent (British) colonies (which there- support. Moreover, the Federal government has
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after became the federation’s States). Under no authority to bypass State governments to fund
the new Constitution, which was written prior local government directly, so in this context, there
to the emergence of ‘party’ politics, the States is no possibility of European-style devolution
retained authority over most internal matters, (that is, of devolving responsibility for welfare or
while the Federal jurisdiction gained respon- crises to the local scale). This structure produces,
sibility for inter-State and inter-national co- and demands, a high level of inter-scalar cooper-
ordination. The division of powers was (and is) ation on regional development matters.
imprecise, creating space for contestation and This structure has important implications for
endemic inter-governmental rivalries (Graycar ways of doing policy. First, the relatively weak
and Jamrozik, 1989). authority of the national government creates
Over the years, the Federal Government has the incentive for cooperative rather than dir-
gradually increased its authority, boosted by ective policymaking. It encourages the com-
its control of taxation and its capacity to draw promises necessary to coordinate multiple,
power from international treaties (Weller and often competing, and ideologically disparate
O’Neill, 2014), but Constitutional authority governments. It tends to preclude dramatic
over many aspects of economy and society policy shifts; a Thatcher or Reagan revolution
remains with the States. One outcome of this would not be feasible in this context. It makes
arrangement is that the shift to market-based it difficult for the Federal government to avoid
policies could not ‘hollow out’ national au- responding to crises that cannot be addressed
thority in the same way as it did in Europe. To within routine funding arrangements (for ex-
date, the semi-autonomy of the State jurisdic- ample, bushfires, trade disputes and pandemics).
tions has made it very difficult for any Federal
government to impose its will on the States or
to delegate responsibilities to the States. The electoral framework
Nonetheless, since the States have modest The design of Australia’s electoral system drew
revenue-raising capacity, they are obliged to from both English and American precedents.
cooperate with the Federal scale. A system of The federal government structure comprises
‘fiscal equalisation’ distributes Federal funds a (lower) House of Representatives and an
among the States using a formula based prin- (upper) Senate. The elected members of the
cipally on population. The States then provide House of Representatives represent geograph-
most services directly (such as health, educa- ically defined local areas (electorates). These are
tion, and social and community services) and recalibrated routinely to accommodate popula-
distribute funds to local government adminis- tion change, although the result is by no means
trations to finance a small range of locally pro- ‘one vote-one value’; rural votes carry more
vided services. This entrenches redistribution weight. In the contemporary world, local mem-
into the overall system: in contrast to the USA, bers are aligned to political parties and the party
for example, a major local plant closure has with the most House of Representatives seats
limited impact on local social and community governs. The Senate was designed to represent
service provision because these services are the interests of the States, with each State having
funded and coordinated from the State level. an equal number of senators regardless of its
Regional development in Australia remains size or economy. The Prime Minister’s role is
primarily a State responsibility. The Federal constrained by the Cabinet (of portfolio-holding
structure means that, in practice, the Federal Ministers); there are no Presidential powers.1
Page 5 of 16Weller
To become law, legislation must pass in both in their interests (see also Cusack et al., 2007).
Houses. Yet, the Senate’s structure enables the Preferential systems, on the other hand, im-
smaller (and more resource-dependent) States prove the ‘ideological congruence’ between
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to together muster more votes than the urban- voters and political parties and lead to more
ised east coast States (New South Wales and redistributive arrangements (Manow, 2009).
Victoria). As a consequence, it is a challenge for In Australia’s electoral system—where vote
any government to pass legislation perceived counting is preferential, and voting is compul-
to disadvantage regional and rural places. In sory—every vote is effective since every voter
effect, the Senate functions as a structural pro- is forced to order their preferences.2 Even in-
tection against the growth of inter-State and re- eligible ‘informal’ non-votes are counted and
gional inequalities. reported.
An additional conservative force is the ab- With preferences determining the outcome
sence of coordination of Federal- and State- of most closely fought elections, preferential
level elections or electoral boundaries. Coalition voting impels the major parties’ policies to ac-
Federal policy initiatives can be blocked when commodate the political fringes with a view to
the majority of States have Labor governments, capturing the all-important second preference.
and vice versa. The rhythms of the electoral As shown in Figure 1, this system has not pre-
cycle seem to encourage an oscillation in which vented declining support for the major parties,
one of the two main political parties (Labor or especially in the post-global financial crisis era,
Coalition) dominates Federally and the other but it has returned the wayward votes to the
dominates among the States. two-party mainstream. Figure 1 shows that in
Voting systems affect the extent to which recent times Labor has lost more in the decline
local dissatisfactions filter up to parliamentary of stable first preference votes, but the effect is
decision-makers. According to Spicer (2018, offset because Labor also attracts more second
122), the ‘representation gap’ produced by the preferences. Because preferential voting impels
UK’s and USA’s ‘undemocratic’ majoritarian the major parties to court preferences, it shifts
systems is a major factor leading people to be- the policies of both major parties in belated ac-
lieve that the political system is not working cord with the popular political mood. This, to an
80 80
Stable Labor Don't Know/Not Sure
70 Stable Liberal-National 70 Labor
Always voted for same party Liberal-National
60 60
50 50
% 40 % 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
1967 1969 1979 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
Stability of Voting Intentions Direction of Preferences
Figure 1. First preference votes and preference distribution.
Source: Adapted from Cameron and McAllister (2020).
Page 6 of 16Places that matter
extent, closes the representation gap, although of bringing people out to vote. This makes
arguably it also produces inconsistencies in Australian elections less vulnerable to emo-
overall party platforms. tive political campaigns. Compulsory voting
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In the all-important Senate, preferential also makes it impossible for charismatic or-
voting frequently enables a minor party candi- ators to position themselves as representing a
date to win one Senate seat in each State. As silent non-voting majority. As such, compulsory
a result, minor parties often hold the balance voting has a civilising effect on elections.
of power in the Federal Senate. People like this Nonetheless, as in other places, Australia has
arrangement because it prevents the major pol- seen the growth in recent years of many pro-
itical parties from controlling the Senate, and test, nationalist and anti-globalisation political
as such, it ‘keeps the bastards honest’ (Chipp, parties. Australia’s preferential system makes
2004).3 This forces governments to make deals it easy for people to decide to vote for these
to pass legislation and increases the difficulty parties, since ultimately their vote will revert
faced by all governments in implementing rad- to their second or third preference, but it also
ical political programmes. This is especially so makes it harder for these parties to win seats
when proposed changes undermine disadvan- (since they tend not to pick up preferences from
taged places or groups.4 the main parties). However, these parties have
A feature of preferential voting systems succeeded in a limited range of locations. The
is that they tend to spawn multi-party polit- appeal of populist One Nation, for example, is
ical landscapes (Manow, 2009). At face value, concentrated in rural and regional Queensland
Australia has four major political parties—the where discontent is fuelled by a lack of employ-
conservative-leaning Liberals, the Australian ment opportunities and a perceived lack of rep-
Labor Party (ALP), the rural-oriented National resentation. In Queensland, the merger of the
or Country Party and the environment advo- Liberals and Nationals into a single conserva-
cates, the Greens.5 Beneath the surface is a cru- tive party—the Liberal Nationals—diminishes
cial network of political alliances. The Liberal the National Party’s distinctive rural voice.
Party cannot form a government without the
support of the (socially conservative and pro-
agriculture) National and Country Parties, and Local crisis interventions
the Australian Labor Party (which was formed These forces encourage both sides of Federal
by, and continues to be structurally tied to, politics to support crisis intervention policies
trade unions), similarly, cannot win elections targeting deindustrialising or trade-exposed re-
without the active support of organised labour. gional areas. Accordingly, timely interventions
The price the Liberals pay for the Coalition is in places facing local crises are a routine feature
support for redistributive transfers to rural and of Australian policy. Beer (2015) sees them as
regional Australia. The price the Labor party a ‘de-facto’ Federal regional policy and reports
pays for union support is (modest) protection expenditure of over $AU 88 billion on 135
of labour rights and the promise of orderly in- separate adjustment programmes in the years
dustrial restructuring in deindustrialising loca- 2000–2012. A feature of these interventions
tions. Thus, the redistributive core of Australia’s is their direct responsiveness to local crises,
long-standing class settlement continues in a with adjustment assistance packages often an-
muted form through the dependence of the two nounced in the media as a local crisis unfolds
major parties on two crucial constituencies. (for example, Gillard et al., 2013). Typically,
A final point concerns compulsory voting. these interventions offer a combination of la-
It changes the political complexion because bour market programmes, industry restruc-
it absolves politicians from the responsibility turing incentives, assistance to local enterprises
Page 7 of 16Weller
and investment attraction strategies, although As in other places, the effectiveness of this
the emphasis is on labour adjustment. With sort of intervention has been questioned on
such a large number of programmes, there is hard cost-benefit grounds (Daley and Lancy,
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now some accumulated experience of ‘what 2011; Productivity Commission, 2001; VAGO,
works’ in most contexts. The short-term nature 2019). In addition, the responsiveness of the
of the interventions and their emphasis on assistance to events—and therefore also to
longer-term developmental outcomes sidesteps the political profile of events—means there
the market fundamentalist accusation that has never been a clear criterion of what quali-
places are relying on hand-outs. This interven- fies for funding or of what level of assistance
tion strategy has emerged from the institutional is warranted in the circumstances (VAGO,
context in which the Federal government is not 2019). This means that some places can miss
primarily responsible for regional develop- out (for example, central Queensland, where
ment, but in which it is expected to intervene in One Nation flourishes). The direct link between
exceptional circumstances. Crisis intervention events, funding allocations and political parties
initiatives were first implemented as a part of enables voters to respond to these redistribu-
the Hawke government’s (mid-1980s) corpor- tive transfers (or their absence) at the ballot
atist Accord. The original programmes were box. If populist means ‘popular’ (Laclau, 2005),
designed to secure worker cooperation and these programmes make all Australian gov-
maintain government legitimacy at a time of ernments to a degree populist in their general
rapid change as Australia opened its economy orientation.
to global forces (see O’Neill, 1996). As such,
they can be understood as a key component
of Australia’s established political (class) com- Electoral effects
promise (Connell and Irving, 1992). Do these interventions actually have a direct
Contemporary examples are delivered via effect on voting patterns? Are people more
multi-level task forces that include all three likely to support the mainstream parties in
levels of government as well as business and places that attract interventions? Or con-
union interests. They have a discursive role, versely, are they attracted to fringe political
as well as an economic one, with activities parties in places that are not favoured by inter-
including explicit efforts to convey to affected vention, or where intervention is mistargeted
local communities—through the media, con- or ineffective? If Rodrik (2017, 49) is correct
sultations and other communications—the im- that ‘it is not inequality per se, but perceived
pression that they do ‘matter’ to the polity. Key unfairness’ that drives the abandonment of
to the interventions is recognition: even if the the political mainstream, then the deliberate
assistance fails to bring new industries and de- fairness of the Australian system would be
velopment, at least local people know that the expected to encourage support for the main-
government tried, that they were not forsaken. stream parties in places where interventions
This conveys a sense of procedural justice are well-regarded. The direct connection be-
(Brockner et al., 1994) that works to mask tween crisis events and policy responses makes
the underlying process of disinvestment and for relatively transparent lines of account-
thereby helps to neutralise local discontent. The ability and responsibility, making Australia an
market-oriented Productivity Commission’s illuminating site for examining the relation-
(2001) conclusion that these programmes func- ship between left-behind-ness, policy interven-
tion to ‘buy off’ opposition to structural change tions and voting patterns. Because this context
recognises their role in securing the (Federal) normalises making places in crisis matter, the
state’s political legitimacy. analysis focuses on a critical case in which
Page 8 of 16Places that matter
intervention has consistently failed. The advan- modest analysis aims to fill a gap between these
tage of critical cases is their capacity to shed two sets of insights.
light on causal pathways (Gerring, 2007). The two locations of interest—Morwell in the
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The analysis begins with the assumptions Latrobe Valley and Norlane in Geelong—were
that, in this context, crisis and intervention selected because the detail of their histories is
are inseparable and that local responses are familiar to the author, having conducted quan-
framed by past experiences. The aim is to con- titative analysis and qualitative field work
trast two traditionally working-class neigh- related to plant closures and subsequent inter-
bourhoods that are close to the epicentres of ventions in both places: Latrobe Valley since
major plant closure events and that have had 2009 and in Geelong since 2016. Figure 2 shows
recent experiences of remedial interventions. the location of these sites relative to Victoria’s
The neighbourhood closest to the crisis event is dominant capital city of Melbourne.
also contrasted to the larger electorate in which The two neighbourhoods of interest are
it is embedded. At this fine scale, geographical similar in some ways and different in others.
boundaries relate in a meaningful sense to the They are both disadvantaged working-class
phenomena of interest, which is the relation- neighbourhoods, and both are the most disad-
ship between crisis, intervention and voting. vantaged locale in an already disadvantaged
Taking this approach reflects a dissatisfaction regional area. Table 1 shows that Norlane is
with large-scale empirical studies that associate more disadvantaged, in objective terms, than
discontent with economically disadvantaged Morwell, but that both perform poorly in
regions but which—since they rely on correl- comparison to their surrounding area, which
ation—cannot establish a causal sequence. in turn underperforms relative to Victorian
Moreover, such studies assert a triggering emo- State-wide averages. Both places could be
tion—whether discontent, despair, envy, lack of described as ‘left-behind’ relative to their
recognition, ‘not mattering’, being left behind, neighbours.
or something else entirely—but in fact offer The two places are in the same State, so they
no information to distinguish among these face a similar policy environment. Both places
options. The comparisons between regional had experienced a sustained process of de-
territories is too large a container to draw in- industrialisation over the last 20 years. Both
ferences about processes, and the compari- places have a history of union activism, albeit
sons undervalue historical factors in a way that with a more oppositional bent in the Latrobe
makes them unable to discern the slow violence Valley. Both places had faced uncertainty and
of repeated injuries. The qualitative literature crisis in the years immediately before the 2016
suggests that disillusionment and discontent election: the closure of automotive produc-
flourish at a much finer scale of resolution—at tion near Norlane and the anguished politics
the neighbourhood, street or even individual leading to the closure of the Hazelwood power
level (respectively, Berlant, 2011; Pain, 2019; station in Morwell. Importantly, Norlane and
Telford and Wistow, 2020)—and suggests that Morwell are similar to the extent that recent
the impacts on voting are complexly bound interventions in their respective crises have
up in perceptions and anticipations. However, tended to provide funding to developmental
these studies are not able to make the empirical initiatives in (more ambitious) adjacent places
connection between votes and perceptions. In and not in the most-affected neighbourhoods
jurisdictions where voting is voluntary, neither (Weller, 2019). This creates a sense that crisis
approach can plausibly link material privation, interventions are mis-targeted, which is known
emotional responses and voting behaviour. This to fuel local disaffection.
Page 9 of 16Weller
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Figure 2. The positioning of the case study places.
Table 1. Socio-economic disadvantage, case study locations
Norlane (SSC) Geelong (SA3) Morwell (SSC) Latrobe Valley (SA3) All Victoria
Median weekly household 728 1234 807 1077 1419
income ($AU)
Education: Degree 4.7 18.2 6.9 10.8 24.3
and above (%)
Unemployment (%) 17.9 6.6 14.5 9.7 6.6
Both parents not working 37.5 21.8 33.8 24.7 19.5
(couple families) (%)
Source: ABS (2020).
The two places are different in three im- manufacturing centre; it experienced major job
portant ways. The first is with respect to their losses in the 1990s, but its declining industries
experience of past interventions, which is attracted generous Federal structural adjust-
known to condition perceptions of contem- ment interventions (for example, automotive,
porary assistance. Geelong was historically a textiles and clothing). Geelong has also been
Page 10 of 16Places that matter
the target of a series of State-government re- The third difference is the position in pol-
development initiatives since 2000 (Johnson itical landscapes. Norlane and Geelong are
et al., 2021). The Latrobe Valley was histor- located in the safe Labor electorate of Corio,
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ically specialised in coal-based electricity while Morwell and Latrobe Valley are Labor-
production. It had also lost a substantial pro- voting enclaves in the safe National-held rural
portion of its employment in the 1990s, but electorate of Gippsland. This might in part ex-
as a part of the Victorian State government’s plain the Latrobe Valley’s difficulty in attracting
pre-privatisation rationalisation of the elec- intervention funding. Although both Corio and
tricity production sector. These job losses did Gippsland are safe seats, the electorate, imme-
not attract Federal or State intervention, which diately west of Geelong (Corangamite), was in
led to an enduring sense of injury centred in 2015 held by the Liberals by the smallest of mar-
the most-affected Morwell area (Weller, 2017). gins, making it one of the 2016 election’s most
A series of State government revitalisation contested electorates. A portion of Federal
efforts in the 2000s failed to bring new indus- government funding associated with the Ford
tries to the Valley. In 2014, the State govern- closure had been distributed to promising ven-
ment was slow to respond to a major fire in an tures in the Corangamite territory, potentially
open-cut coal mine close to Morwell, despite it raising questions about pork-barrelling.6
compromising the health of local residents. In The analysis below focuses on the 2016
the years before 2016, promised Federal inter- Federal election, the election immediately after
ventions in the Latrobe Valley to smooth the a period of crisis in the locations of interest.
effects of the impending closure of coal-fired The discussion here is restricted to votes in the
power stations did not materialise (Weller, House of Representatives, where candidates
2019). In fact, in 2013, when the US-based Ford represent their local area, rather than the less-
Motor Company announced the closure of its locally specific Senate voting. From the discus-
Geelong operations, the Federal government sion above, the expectation is greater demand
redirected funds promised to the ‘transitioning’ for fringe parties in Morwell.
of the Latrobe Valley to the urgent need in Discontent is often associated with waning
Geelong. This of course rekindled disaffection support for mainstream parties (Essletzbichler
and resentment in the Latrobe Valley. et al., 2018). Australia-wide in 2016, more than
The second major difference between the three quarters of all first preference votes
two places is their position relative to economic (76.8% of votes) were directed to the two
opportunities. Geelong is commuting distance major parties, and just under 25% to all other
from Melbourne, making it an attractive site parties. In Corio, a de-industrialising place sup-
for construction-led urban re-development, ported by government interventions, the vote
especially along its waterfront precincts. The for the two major parties was above the na-
Latrobe Valley is too far from Melbourne to tional average, at 77.1% of the vote, while in
benefit from commuter-based decentralisation Norlane, it was just below the national average
(see Figure 2). Although Norlane is quite disad- (at 74.7%). Fewer people in Gippsland sup-
vantaged socio-economically, its location allows ported the major parties (71.1%), but the vote
residents to access work, education and enter- fell sharply in Morwell to 66.5% of votes. Put
tainment opportunities in both Geelong and another way, a third of voters in Morwell denied
Melbourne, whereas Morwell’s physical isola- the two major parties a first preference vote.
tion and poor transport networks make it dif- Figure 3 graphs the percentage of first pref-
ficult for low-income residents to expand their erence votes for the different parties in the
opportunities beyond the immediate local area. electorates and suburbs of interest in 2016. The
Page 11 of 16Weller
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Figure 3. First preference votes, percent, 2016, case study locations.
Source: AEC (2019).
voting patterns show, in both places, the rela- (2018) suggests that across Victoria about a half
tive unimportance of fringe parties relative to of informal votes are protest votes (blank or
the three mainstream options (Labor, Coalition defaced votes). This pattern suggests perhaps
and Greens). Gippsland attracted a larger field that disillusionment is at least as widespread in
of candidates than Corio. In Gippsland, conser- these crisis locations as discontent.
vative Christian and family-oriented parties at- Examining the change in voting in 2016 com-
tracted more votes than right-fringe nationalist pared to the previous 2013 election reveals an
and anti-immigration candidates, and the total overall swing towards the sitting member in
number of right-fringe votes barely exceeded both electorates. Perhaps the message is that at
the number of informal votes. In Corio, fringe times of uncertainty voters prefer the security
parties fared poorly: there were more informal of the familiar. In Norlane—the most disadvan-
votes than votes for right-oriented fringe par- taged area materially—the swing to the Labor
ties. All this is consistent with the proposition incumbent was stronger than the seat average.
that the Australia system builds political legit- Morwell—a Labor enclave in a National-held
imacy in crisis locations. seat—bucked the trend by swinging away from
In Australia, compulsory voting means that the sitting member, as would be expected from
failure to vote attracts a fine, but people who the failure to secure Federal funding assistance.
are disaffected or feel disenfranchised have the Consistent with national trends, there was a
option of complying with the law but defacing swing to the Greens in both electorates. There
their ballot rather than voting for any of the was also a swing to fringe parties in the 2016
candidates. In both the seats, Gippsland and election relative to 2013, but the 2016 minor
Corio, the informal vote declined in the 2016 party votes mostly replaced 2013 votes for
election relative to 2013. However, the informal other, now-defunct, minor parties. The net result
vote increased in percentage terms in both the is no discernible shift to fringe parties associated
local epicentres of industrial change to account with the short-term crisis conditions. Historical
for 8.0% of the vote in Morwell and 8.7% in electoral data show a sharp decline in the sup-
Norlane (compared to only 4.9% in Corio and port for Labor in the Latrobe Valley from the
7.1% in Gippsland). Of course, the preferen- 2007 election, which local experts attribute to
tial system is also relatively complicated when a combination of demographic change and en-
there are large numbers of candidates, so many ergy sector workers switching their support to
informal votes are genuine errors. The AEC the conservative parties.
Page 12 of 16Places that matter
Overall, these data do not suggest a signifi- described by Pain (2019), then a new bridge,
cant trend to fringe parties in areas described as museum or business park will without doubt be
disadvantaged, left-behind or in crisis. In fact, poorly received. The scope of what is called re-
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with the exception of Morwell, the uncertainty gional policy needs to expand to encompass the
of the time led many voters in these places to arrangements that allow policies like austerity
support the sitting member. In Morwell, the to happen (Hadjimichalis, 2017).
place that had experienced repeated disap- Second, the European literature too often as-
pointments, there was less support for the major sumes that reducing inequality will also reduce
parties, more support for fringe candidates and local resentments. This echoing of the old idea
more informal voting. The contrast between that the economic base determines the social
Norlane and Morwell illustrates the central superstructure is not necessarily true of con-
point that Australia’s crisis intervention system, temporary societies. The Australian system’s
in conjunction with a redistributive overall gov- strength is that it asks implicitly ‘What needs
ernmental framework, does function to mollify to be done to neutralise local dissent?’, which
discontent. is quite a different question to the European
question of ‘What can be done to reduce in-
equality?’. Of course, the question is asked in
Conclusion: the importance of a context where most people live above the
structural arrangements poverty line, a situation made possible by the
The literature struggling to comprehend the Federation’s overall redistributive structure.
rise of populist and fringe parties in Europe is Third is the idea that regional assistance
focused on socio-economic inequalities. These needs to be designed to lead to economic-
are assumed to be responsible for the discon- ally sustainable outcomes, by which is meant
tents that motivate support for populist politics. local self-sufficiency in a market economy.
The disenchantment with mainstream politics As this suggests that interventions must be
in left-behind places is also often attributed to targeted to potentially competitive places
the failures of regional policy interventions, in and activities, it also justifies withdrawing
particular to their remote ‘top down’ impos- assistance from uncompetitive places. If it is
ition and to their insufficient incorporation of agreed that ‘Local inhabitants…want oppor-
local concerns and priorities. While there is an tunities rather than assistance and aid; they
emerging consensus supporting place-based want a future rather than permanent sup-
policy, this is interpreted as meaning more local port’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018, 16), then there
control and, by implication, therefore more local also must be a strategy to achieve that end in
responsibility for policy failures. The Australian places that are unattractive to investors. The
exemplar provides an opportunity to rethink Australian framework of in-built redistribu-
the problem and its range of solutions. tion provides ‘permanent support’ that is not
First, the regional policy literature tends to perceived negatively, as a hand-out. This ac-
focus on the specifics of particular regional knowledges that in places that do not offer
policy initiatives in isolation from the wider global capital opportunities for a better than
policy frameworks of which they are a compo- average return on investment, permanent
nent. This enables the local reception of inter- cycles of redistributive assistance are cur-
ventions to be discussed independently of the rently the only realistic option.
effects of policies like austerity in local com- The overall conclusion suggested by this article
munities. If ordinary people are struggling to is that European debates about voter rebellion
put food on the table or living in the squalor are not taking enough note of the bigger picture
Page 13 of 16Weller
of democratic representation and the responsive- support of the Australian Research Council (grants
ness of governments to the plight of places facing FT110100854, LP170100940 and SR200200446) is
crises. That wider picture suggests that explan- gratefully acknowledged. The author also thank to
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ations for the rise of populism in Europe could Cheryl Wragg for her insights on Latrobe Valley
voting patterns.
spend more time asking why political frameworks
have not responded in a timely way to localised
crises, and why they have not sufficiently acknow- References
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