Pandora's box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism - Antonin Tisseron
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FES
Antonin Tisseron
Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense
militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadismAntonin Tisseron Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
About the author Antonin Tisseron is an associate researcher at the Thomas More Institute. He holds a PhD in History and has worked in recent years for the United Nations and the French Development Agency on security issues in West Africa. Imprint Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Competence Centre Sub-Saharan Africa Point E, boulevard de l’Est, Villa n°30 P.O. Box 15416 Dakar-Fann, Senegal Tel.: +221 33 859 20 02 Fax: +221 33 864 49 31 Email: info@fes-pscc.org www.fes-pscc.org © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2021 Illustration: Amidou Badji Layout: Green Eyez Design SARL, www.greeneyezdesign.com ISBN : 978-2-490093-23-6 Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements 04
List of acronyms 05
Executive Summary 06
Introduction 08
I. Long-standing local security initiatives 09
1.1. A dual process of expansion and militarization 09
1.2. Bottom-up security in the long term 10
1.3. A symptom of a security crisis 12
II. The fragmented landscape of self-defense militias 14
2.1. Koglweogo in the plural 14
2.2. Traditional Dozo hunters 17
2.3. Da Nan Ambassagou Militia 19
III. Militias involved in the fight against jihadism 21
3.1. A commitment prior to the VDP law 21
3.2. Creation of Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland 22
3.3. Gradual operationalization of the VDP law 23
3.4. A divisive measure 25
IV. A double-edged tool 27
4.1. An operational impact in question 27
4.2. A significant risk of exacerbating violence 29
4.3. A medium-term destabilizing potential 30
V. Recommendations 32
Bibliography 36Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
Acknowledgements
This publication is the result of intense field research carried out by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung´s
Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa (FES PSCC) to analyze the role of
militias in Burkina Faso. Militias are in this study understood as non-jihadist, armed actors which are
supporting the state of Burkina Faso in its challenge to guarantee inner security for its citizens. A
new national law of Burkina Faso recognizes volunteers, as security actors since January 2020.
FES PSCC would like to express its sincere appreciation to all the experts who actively participated
in this joint work. Special thanks go to Prof. Vincent Zakane, Lecturer and researcher in Public and
International Law at the Training and Research Unit in the Legal and Political Sciences department
(UFR/SJP) at the University of Ouaga II in Burkina Faso and to Dr. Issa Diallo, Regional Director of
Scientific Research and Innovation at the National Centre for Scientific and Technological Research
CNRST in Burkina Faso.
Last but not least, a very special thank you goes to Dr. Antonin Tisseron who conducted and coor-
dinated this publication on behalf of FES.
Mr. Philipp M. Goldberg
Regional Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Peace and Security Centre of Competence
Sub-Saharan Africa
4Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
List of acronyms
ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AKDN Koglweogo Association of the Department of Namissiguima
CDR Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
CISC Collective against Impunity and Stigmatization of Communities
CJTF Civilian Joint Task Force
CODOCI The Dozo Brotherhood of Côte d’Ivoire
DSF Defense and security forces
ENABEL The Belgian development agency
FENACODOCI National Federation of Dozo Brotherhoods of Côte d’Ivoire
GFSN The Northern Security Forces Group
NGO Non-governmental organization
VDP Volunteers for the defense of the Fatherhood
PARSIB The European Union’s Projects to Support the Strengthening of Internal
Security in Burkina Faso
UNDP United Nations Development Program
RDR Rally of the Republicans
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
5Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
Executive Summary ing between collaboration, autonomy and ten-
sion, depending on the situation and the local
actors. Collaboration has been notable in sev-
eral regions, particularly in the East, to secure
Local security initiatives in West Africa have a the 2014-2015 political transition process. The
long history, whose roots can be traced back to movement is also strongly rooted in local struc-
colonial history. In Burkina Faso, they continue tures and its members are sometimes actors in
to be part of the post-independence political political life. However, the presence of these
and security landscape, driven by the state, militias creates at the same time a logic of com-
local governments or citizens. petition with state actors responsible for main-
taining public law, and the atrocities attributed
The recent period has seen a very strong expan- to them fuel tensions while polarizing society.
sion of these local security initiatives, marked
in particular by the proliferation of self-defense On November 7, 2019, following the attack on
groups known as Koglweogo. According to a mining convoy by jihadists, President Roch
sources, the first Koglweogo groups appeared Marc Christian Kaboré called for the mobiliza-
in the 1990s or 2000s, before expanding after tion of civilian volunteers to support the state
the fall of President Blaise Compaoré in 2014 as in fighting jihadist groups. Two and a half
a result of a rise in banditry, followed by attacks months later, Burkina Faso’s Parliament unani-
by jihadist groups on Burkinabe territory. While mously adopted a law allowing for the recruit-
the Koglweogo have a national representative, ment of “Volunteers for the defense of the
they are not a unified movement. From one Fatherhood” (VDP). Its objective is twofold: to
region to another, from one commune to an- train and equip communities to enable them
other, or even within the same locality or group, to fight jihadist groups, to support the armed
the movement is diverse. This movement, which forces or to protect communities from which
is virtually national, is present at the regional the defense and security forces are absent; and
and local levels, while being inseparable from its to provide an institutional framework for the
Mossi identity. Similarly, although the Koglweo- militia dynamics that have emerged beyond the
go have been the focus of media attention, they government’s control.
coexist with other groups such as the Dozo -
with whom they have clashed - and Da Nan The operationalization of the VDP law is gradu-
Ambassagou militiamen, as well as with local al. It is rapid in the months following the adop-
non-militia peace initiatives. tion of the law in January 2020 in the North
of the country, before accelerating in the East
The relationship between the state and self- and then in the West. This implementation of
defense groups is a blend of tolerance, pragma- the VDP law – amid both political and security
tism, and leadership. Thus, Burkinabe authori- pressure - gives a feeling of improvisation with
ties have adopted a legal framework intended variations depending on military regions, very
to regulate the actions of the Koglweogo by weak coordination with the police and lack of
embedding them into a community policing, resources. In a report by the National Assembly
which the latter have refused to do. Locally, the following a series of meetings organized in June
attitude of the Koglweogo towards the public 2020 in the East, North, Sahel, Center-North
authority and its representatives is also oscillat- and Boucle du Mouhoun, the authors stressed
6Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
the inadequacy of resources allocated to train, In the longer term, militias also have the poten-
supervise, care for and administer VDPs, while tial to destabilize, fuel crime and weaken state
calling for improved operational coordination authority.
between VDPs and the armed forces and great-
er recognition of the VDP status. Against this backdrop, the Burkinabe govern-
ment must ensure a coherent increase in VDPs
While they can help strengthen the country’s se- as part of a strategy to beef up security and
curity network and support the defense and se- involving all relevant government agencies.
curity forces, militias are a double-edged sword. It must also reduce the risks associated with
The main risk is the exacerbation of inter-com- the use of armed militias through inclusive re-
munity violence, in a context of stigmatization cruitment, enhanced training, and penalties
of certain communities, non-inclusiveness of for VDPs guilty of abuses, and place improved
VDPs and the increasing circulation of weapons trust between the state and communities at
of war. On several occasions, VDPs have been the heart of its priorities.
accused of abuses committed against civilians.
7Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
Introduction These massacres are not specific to self-defense
groups. On 29 and 30 May 2020, around 30
people were killed in an attack on a livestock
market near Pama, in the east, and at least
Self-defense groups are not new to the Bur- 25 in attacks on two convoys in the north, all
kinabe landscape. Since 2014, however, amid attributed to jihadist groups. Burkina Faso’s
growing insecurity and the subsequent exten- armed forces have also been accused by sev-
sion of the activity of armed jihadist groups, eral civil society organizations of being respon-
they have gained prominence with the emer- sible for extrajudicial executions specifically
gence of local groups known as Koglweogo, targeting the Fulani community. However, af-
i.e., “forest guards” in Moore, the language ter the government adopted in January 2020 a
of the largest ethnic group in Burkina Faso. law allowing for the recruitment of the Volun-
Emphasizing the absence of the state and the teers for the Defense of the Fatherland and the
poor quality of public services in some locali- control of the use of armed civilians in the fight
ties, their members display a rhetoric in which against armed jihadist groups, the dangers of
they portray themselves as responding to the the use of armed militias by the State came to
absence of the defense and security forces, the forefront.
their ineffectiveness when they are present,
and the low number of prosecutions in cases In this context of institutionalization of self-de-
of theft or robbery. fense groups by the state, this report examines
the militia phenomenon in Burkina Faso - the
The increase in the number of Koglweogo militias being understood here as non-jihadist
groups, tolerated and sometimes encouraged armed actors recognized or tolerated by the
by the state, has led to violence against alleged government - and the challenges related to the
delinquents and is at the core of many debates operationalization of the January 2020 law by
on their threats to national cohesion and their placing it in a historical perspective, as well as
impact on the communitarization of conflicts the diversity of local security dynamics in the
and the development of jihadist groups. Two country and in West Africa. The VDP law, an
killings have been particularly striking. The first ambitious but dangerous initiative, has yet to
one, which took place in the North-Central be convincing in its implementation and in its
region of Yirgou, in January 2019, follows the capacity to reduce insecurity and the activity of
assassination of 6 people, including a Mossi jihadist groups.
village chief, by jihadists. In retaliation, 49 people
were killed by militiamen according to official In addition to an analysis of the documentation
figures, and nearly 210 according to civil soci- on the issue (academic publications, grey litera-
ety organizations. The second one took place ture, press articles, etc.), this report is based on
in the villages of Barga, Dinguila-Peulh and more than twenty interviews with government
Ramdolla-Peulh, in the Northern Region, on actors, representatives of armed groups en-
March 8, 2020. A self-defense group opened gaged in self-defense, civil society representa-
fire on people and burned down houses. At tives, journalists, researchers and external part-
least 43 people were reportedly killed, with ners. These interviews were conducted by tel-
several witnesses accusing the Koglweogo of ephone and in Ouagadougou in October 2020.
being responsible for the executions.
8Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
I. Long-standing local on the factors behind their involvement in law
security initiatives enforcement and their expansion. On the one
hand, their switch to tracking down thieves was
a response to the resurgence of crime, the trivi-
The militia phenomenon in Burkina Faso has alization of violence, and the inadequacy of the
gradually imposed itself in public debate and state’s response. On the other hand, some Kogl-
research in recent years, in a context of grow- weogo have been successful in securing certain
ing insecurity that has considerably fostered its roads and entire villages, their model is being
expansion. However, this phenomenon, and emulated and the phenomenon experienced
more broadly local security initiatives, are not territorial expansion from 2015-2016. The crea-
new in Burkina Faso or in West Africa. They tion of similar groups then quickly becomes
are part of national and even regional histori- anarchic with Koglweogo who do not declare
cal trajectories of co-production of security themselves to the national authorities and do
between local and national actors. not enjoy official recognition. This expansion
began in the rural areas of the Central Plateau,
mainly Mossi, where the police and gendarme-
1.1. A dual process of expansion rie are not very present, before spreading out
and militarization through mimicry into peri-urban areas and more
ethnically mixed regions where the police and
The Koglweogo appeared during the 1990s or gendarmerie are sometimes present.
2000s, in a context of a flurry of informal and
local security initiatives that took various forms The increase in the number of Koglweogo
(private security, self-defense associations, hunt- investing in public security in Burkina Faso in
ers’ associations). The word Koglweogo, which recent years is inseparable from two dynamics.
comes from the Moore language, the language
of the largest ethnic group in Burkina Faso, is • The first one is an amplification of banditry
composed of the verb Kogl which means “to after the 2011 mutinies within the army
guard, to preserve” and the word weogo which and demonstrations against the ruling
designates “the bush, the forest”. One of the power. This banditry is not new. In some
first Koglweogo is said to have emerged from parts of the Eastern Region, various forms
the “Namissiguima Vigilance Committee” be- of crimes have been observed for the past
fore its transformation into the Koglweogo As- 30 years, particularly near the borders with
sociation of the Department of Namissiguima Togo and Niger. However, this criminal
(AKDN) recognized by the Burkinabe adminis- activity has expanded considerably and is
tration in 2005. The Koglweogo are said to have spreading in a climate of questioning the
formed organized groups to deal mainly with ruling regime and the weakening by the
environmental issues, protecting forests and latter of the defense and security forces
nature reserves from illegal hunting and abu- considered a threat to political stability. It
sive logging in cooperation with State services is fostered by a sense of impunity that is
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). such that even the markets of large cities
like Fada are targeted. Moreover, locally,
While several versions coexist on the genesis of the state is perceived as not satisfactorily
the Koglweogo, there is however a consensus carrying out its missions of securing people
9Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
and property. When suspects are appre- 1.2. Bottom-up security in
hended by the population and handed over the long term
to the authorities, they are usually released
without trial, leading communities to believe Although the Koglweogo are a response to
that the police are complicit with criminals. a sense of abandonment of communities by
In addition, members of the defense and the State, the roots of the phenomenon are
security forces (FDS) demanded payment older and go back a long term. Studies on the
for travel or investigation, and in some lo- functioning of law enforcement agencies during
calities, they refused to work at night. the colonial period, in West Africa or in other
parts of Africa, have indeed shown the scope
• The second factor accelerating the and limits of the processes of bureaucratization,
Koglweogo has been the increasing trend centralization or pacification of police services
of attacks attributed to jihadist groups on operating in the colonies. Indeed, the govern-
Burkinabe territory from 2015, with two ing authority delegated its police, justice and
consequences. The first was a withdrawal prison duties to various local actors: colonial
of state officials from certain rural areas. The companies, private security companies, settlers,
result was a call for local safety initiatives. indigenous police, committees for self-defense,
The second was that self-defense groups etc. Village self-defense committees were thus
have become essential partners for the state numerous in the first decades of the 20th cen-
in the fight against jihadist groups. Thus, tury and, although they were not independent
in November 2019, shortly after the attack of the monitoring networks set up by the colo-
on a convoy of mine workers that killed nial administration, they interacted on an im-
38 people, President Roch Marc Christian provised basis, on a daily basis as well as during
Kaboré called on all Burkinabè to support periods of rising crime.
the army in its fight against jihadist groups.
After Burkina Faso’s independence, this confu-
The Koglweogo are not only a response to the sion between the actions of internal security
fallout of the popular uprising of 2014, seen forces and those of non-state actors continued,
as the interference of the angry citizenry in the mainly due to the state’s desire to engage com-
public spaces of the country’s towns and vil- munities in maintaining public order.
lages, following the Sankarist legacy. They also
constitute a bottom-up response to an unsat- • In the 1970s and 1980s, “vigilance com-
isfied need for security due to a combination mittees” were created in Bobo-Dioulasso
of three different factors: rising insecurity, and they worked closely with the city
ineffective State responses in this area, and council. In 1983, Thomas Sankara’s regime
finally, citizen mistrust of the institutions of the set up Committees for the Defense of the
Republic, which are perceived as lax and even Revolution (1983-1987), which brought
gangrenous with corruption. together citizens responsible for securing
urban and rural areas and defending the
ideals of the Revolution, as part of a broader
nation-building project by the people. In
the Western Region of Banfora and, more
generally, throughout the Grand Ouest of
10Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
the country, Dozo hunters - whose origins Leone, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire) in the 1990s,
date back to the Middle Ages - began to the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007) or
organize themselves in the early 1990s more recently in Mali against jihadist groups
in order to play a role against rural delin- since 2012, the militias have indeed asserted
quency. Instead of waiting for the police themselves as key actors, acting autonomously
or gendarmerie to intervene, they take the or taking sides with one of the belligerents,
lead by patrolling at night and, if a thief sometimes with the support of state officials
enters the village, they apprehend him and but at the same time being inseparable from
hand him over to the security forces. a power struggle with the public authority. As
a case in point, Dozo’s contemporary involve-
• In 2005, Local Security Committees were ment in security in Côte d’Ivoire dates back to
created in several areas as part of efforts the 1990s, when their successes strengthened
to adopt the community policing doctrine their influence in the country, before some
in 2003 and develop complementary ap- joined the rebellion and President Laurent
proaches to the more traditional operations Gbagbo’s opponents after the outbreak of the
carried out by the defense and security rebellion in 2002.
forces against delinquency and banditry.
According to article 8 of the 14 March One of the narratives on the birth of one of the
2003 law on internal security, “community first Koglweogo in Burkina Faso is that it would
policing consists of integrating into the op- be a duplication of an initiative conducted in
erational mandate of the internal security Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, its founder says he was
forces, the participation of communities inspired by an experience observed in Côte
in the management of security and crime d’Ivoire and intended to reduce insecurity to al-
through the concerted identification of low the sale of coffee and cocoa in the Douék-
local security issues, the quest for solu- oué area. Similarly, in the west of the country,
tions and their participation”. Three princi- the idea of creating the Dozo Benkadi Asso-
ples are emphasized: bringing DSFs closer ciation in the 1990s is said to have come from
to the population, strengthening conflict hunters who had carried out oversight activi-
prevention and addressing local problems. ties in Côte d’Ivoire. Whether these stories are
The Local Security Committees are not true or not is not the most important thing.
endowed with police powers and their role The actors position themselves and anchor
is limited to crime prevention through the their discourses in a regional space made of the
provision of information to the police and movement of people and ideas, as well as the
acting as a relay in the communities. dissemination of experiences and local security
practices.
Local security initiatives in Burkina Faso are
also part of a West African regional context
marked by a proliferation of multifaceted mi-
litias in recent decades, whether in the form
of armed groups opposed to the state during
civil wars or as auxiliaries to the DSFs more or
less under their supervision. During the con-
flicts in the Mano River region (Liberia, Sierra
11Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
1.3. A symptom of a security crisis erment of groups rejecting the state authority),
to the detriment of approaches stressing the
The state’s relationship to local security initia- hybrid nature of security or the existence of
tives has been far from linear and antagonistic. security oligopolies.
While it was estimated at the beginning of the
2000s that nearly half the population lived in Historically, we rather observe a phenomenon
areas not covered by the police and gendarme- of co-production of security, with forms vary-
rie, the authorities have in fact regularly tried ing from place to place and time to time. “This
to delegate certain parts of the population, fluidity implies thinking in terms of a histori-
creating structures for this purpose or toler- cal and sociological continuum, i.e., conceiv-
ating existing ones, sometimes at the instiga- ing the social practices of policing as processes
tion of external partners seeking to bring the in permanent reshaping, exposed to criticism
populations and the State closer together. This and objects of negotiation between public ac-
is the case of the European Union’s Projects to tors, sometimes divided, and private interests”,
Support the Strengthening of Internal Security Gilles Favaral-Garrigues and Laurent Gayer
in Burkina Faso (PARSIB), implemented by the recalled in an article on vigilantism and polic-
Belgian development agency ENABEL, or the ing. Likewise, the Koglweogo or Dozo do not
UNDP’s Project to Support the Strategic Council position themselves in a rejection of the state,
for the Governance of the Security Sector in unlike the jihadist groups and their allies, but
Burkina Faso. rather as alternatives and responses to a defi-
cient and deplored presence, which does not
To this end, restricting the proliferation of prevent them from maintaining a balance of
self-defense groups in Burkina Faso to an ero- power with the national authorities and op-
sion of the governing powers of the State is posing state representatives or their decisions.
not without limits. Such an approach glosses
over the older historicity of these local security The fact remains that the dual process of ex-
practices, does not question the multiplicity pansion and involvement in policing of local
of their forms and the modalities of their link- security initiatives in recent years refers to a se-
age with the State and its representatives. curity crisis resulting from long-standing limits
Indeed, as Researcher Tanguy Quidelleur ob- to State action but which, in recent years, due
serves, the field of security has “never been to the rise in banditry, has created a vacuum
the State monopoly and parts of the popula- favoring the emergence and increased role of
tion have always felt legitimate to take part in alternative actors in a position of permanent
it”. A second limitation is that of confining the redeployment depending on the actors and
analysis to an irenic vision of the State as the local dynamics. As summarized by Journalist
holder of a monopoly of legitimate use of vio- Ismaël Compaoré, co-director of the Koglwe-
lence, structured around approaches centered ogo Land documentary (2017), for the local
on the strengthening of the State (for exam- people who support them, “the Koglweogo
ple, through a phenomenon of absorption or are legitimate when the State has failed to en-
reduction of self-defense groups considered sure the safety of the population”.
anachronistic) or, conversely, its bankruptcy
(due to its inability to provide security, its lack
of control over militia actors and the empow-
12Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
Box 1. The Dozo in Côte d’Ivoire
In the early 1990s, the failure of the Ivorian state from the North. According to the United Nations
and its representatives to provide security acces- Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), they were
sible to all, against the backdrop of impoverish- responsible for the deaths of 228 people between
ment and the expansion of crime in urban and March 2009 and May 2013.
rural areas, fostered the emergence of Dozo as-
sociations on the security market, from the north Three main organizations form the Ivorian Dozo
to the south of the country. This situation and movement, to which should be added laymen
the media coverage of the Dozo have popular- claiming to be Dozo hunters: Benkadi, the Dozo
ized their action and reinforced beliefs in their Brotherhood of Côte d’Ivoire (CODOCI) - the latter
magical-religious powers as an effective weapon being the largest - and the National Federation
to combat banditry. of Dozo Brotherhoods of Côte d’Ivoire (FENACO-
DOCI). At the national level, the State has tried to
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Presidents unify the movement without succeeding because
Bédié - after having used Dozo to his advantage of political rivalries between Dozo leaders, the
in the 1995 elections - and Gbagbo attempted financial benefits of the associations’ involvement
to ban the Dozo brotherhood, suspected of in private security and the donations they receive
links with Alassane Ouattara’s RDR (Rally of the from politicians and even the military.
Republicans). In response to this opposition from
the national authorities at the time, some Dozo While the Dozo are a political resource, they also
associations joined the rebellion in 2002, with have a strong influence in the Ivorian security
the support of Dozo from Mali and Burkina Faso. system. This influence refers to the attraction of
However, this political commitment somehow the Dozo mystique to members of the defense
eroded the positive image Dozo enjoyed in the and security forces and to the professional inter-
west and south of the country. They were also actions between Dozo and actors in the official
blamed on several abuses, particularly during the security apparatus, the latter facilitated by Dozo’s
2011 post-election violence, but also during land integration into the army and the administration.
conflicts between local populations and migrants
13Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
II. The fragmented ble of protecting people and property. While
landscape of self-defense not all are armed, most use hunting weapons
and knives. Once the alleged per-petrators are
militias
arrested, depending on local practices, the
Koglweogo would hand them over to the au-
In recent years, the Koglweogo have played an thorities or prosecute and punish them. Judi-
important role in the public debate on self-de- cial practices vary from one group to another.
fense groups in Burkina Faso because of their Some who were close to political and admin-
proliferation, their methods of action, their istrative authorities officially claimed to have
impact on conflict dynamics and the abuses stopped public flogging or particularly degrad-
they have been accused of. However, they do ing treatment because of the debate over the
not present a unified and homogenous face practice, but they reportedly con-tinued to col-
and they are not the only non-jihadist militia lect fines. Others, in addition to the violence
actors. They coexist with the traditional Dozo and the imposition of fines, add a mystical di-
hunters, who are heavily involved in local secu- mension to the punishment. Koglweogo jus-
rity in the west of the country, and to a lesser tice is constructed in opposition to the bureau-
extent the Da Nan Ambassagou militia in the cratic red tape of the judicial administration
north and in the Boucle du Mouhoun. and administrative acts that are considered
socially discriminatory because they are stated
and written in language inaccessible to rural
2.1. Koglweogo in the plural residents who have not all attended school. For
example, most of the trials organized by the
Koglweogo are formed from local initiatives Koglweogo are public and conducted in the lo-
structured by local political entrepreneurs. The cal language.
countryside and peri-urban areas, where there
are no police or gendarmerie stations, are In addition to transparency and efficiency, the
the breeding grounds for these self-defense construction of the local legitimacy for the
groups. Koglweogo rests on the use of a form of tradi-
tion coupled with a certain mimicry with state
They include young breeders and farmers whose organizations.
involvement in local safety initiatives is the first,
as well as people who have forged a “career” in • On the one hand, Koglweogo members
these initiatives. Women are present. For exam- must take an oath on the Koran and the
ple, in the Koglweogo of Tenkodogo (Centre- Bible before joining the movement, and at
East), created in November 2017, there were 8 trials the accused is not only placed under
women out of 180 members in February 2018. the authority of judges. Both books are
The number of Koglweogo members through- invoked at trials, alongside animist refer-
out Burkina Faso was estimated at 45,000 at ences. At the end of a trial, for example,
the beginning of 2020, although this figure rituals related to land and water some-
cannot be confirmed. times take place. The accused is thus
placed under the gaze of the ancestors,
The Koglweogo present themselves as coming who are supposed to inflict death on him
from the people, close to the people and capa- in the event of a repeat offence.
14Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
• On the other hand, the Koglweogo copy gendarmerie and army) are the exclusive hold-
the practices and organization of public ad- ers of legitimate force. As such, they have the
ministrations. Fines are also set according sole power to ensure public order and security,
to the act committed. A vocabulary similar just as the public courts have exclusive jurisdic-
to that used in the security and justice tion to judge misdemeanors and crimes. This
sectors was used. The Koglweogo conducted issue is all the more sensitive given that Kogl-
“investigations”, took “statements”, staged weogo suspected of violence against civilians
“trials”, distributed “receipts”, modeled their have neither been tried nor convicted in recent
national organization on administrative of- years. This is particularly the case with the Yir-
ficials, and call themselves soldiers, judges, gou massacre: despite an investigation, deposi-
agents, counselors, etc. When an individual tions, and testi-monies, no one had yet been
goes to the Koglweogo headquarters in a prosecuted in early November 2020. Moreover,
locality, he or she must also provide proof the leader of the Koglweogo of Boulsa, Bourei-
of identity whose photocopy is kept in the ma Nadbanka, arrested in December 2019, was
group’s archives. Finally, the Koglweogo released in February 2020 after strong pressure
wear a uniform. and several demonstrations by his supporters.
According to a survey conducted in 2017 From a formal standpoint, the Koglweogo are
among the populations of the Eastern, Upper under the authority of Rassamkandé Naaba,
Basins, Center-Western and Central regions, appointed by Moogho Naaba, Emperor of the
90% of respondents said they fully or partially Mossi tribe. Customary chief of the village of
agreed with the “community security struc- Rassamkandé, in the south-central province of
tures”, whether Koglweogo or Dozo. “Because Bazèga, Naaba is the national chairman of the
of their proximity with the communities and Koglweogo. In order for a new Koglweogo
their knowledge of the area, the Koglweogo group to be created, Naaba and the traditional
are quick and efficient in their interventions chiefs of the locality must give their consent.
and do not ask for travel expenses, unlike the
police”, an inhabitant of Kaya (Center-North) In January 2017, the self-defense group was
observed in 2018. structured around three bodies: a staff, a coun-
cil of elders and a national supreme council.
If the Koglweogo have seduced part of the pop-
ulation, their expansion has raised eyebrows In practice, however, the Koglweogo move-
on two issues. On the one hand, their way of ment is not a homogenous entity. In fact, it
rendering justice and the abuses they are ac- has been marked by several dividing lines.
cused of differs sharply from the elementary
principles of respect for human dignity and the • There are three Koglweogo “schools”. The
rule of law and undermines the country’s social first one restricts its actions to water and
cohesion. Several abuses have indeed made the forestry. Its members are still active in a
news, of which the massacres in Yirgou and in residual way, for example in the North and
the villages of Barga, Dinguila-Peulh and Ram- South of the country, but most Koglweogo
dolla-Peulh are only the most visible part. On have chosen to invest in public security.
the other hand, in a state governed by the rule The second, sometimes referred to as the
of law, the law enforcement agencies (police, “Mané” spirit, in reference to the locality
15Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
where they were born, promotes action step in a local or national political career,
based on apprehending bandits and a financial motivation linked to the income
handing them over to the police or gen- that can be obtained through the collec-
darmerie. The third school, which is in the tion of taxes, donations received from the
majority in Koglweogo born after 2015, community or members of the commu-
brings together groups that do not hesitate nity to fight banditry, or the marketing of
to take the law into their own hands. They security services whether for the benefit of
arrest, investigate, interrogate, prosecute, the mayor or other individuals. For some
and punish offenders. groups, involvement in Koglweogo is more
a matter of law enforcement business
• There is also a division between several practices, private security activities, than
spaces. For example, in Central Burkina citizen self-defense.
Faso, in Mossi country, Koglweogo are
centralized and tend to follow the rules The relationship with the state and its repre-
laid down by the movement as well as the sentatives is ambiguous. The Koglweogo ini-
authority of Rassamkandé Naaba. In the tially consider the regime that emerged from
East, alongside the Koglweogo recogniz- the popular uprising of 2014 to be hostile to
ing the authority of Rassamkandé Naaba, them. Rapidly, however, against a backdrop of
others, such as those of Fada N’Gourma, an increase in jihadist attacks, the popularity
put forward a culture distinct from that of these groups, and the municipal elections
of the Mossi. Since the end of 2016, the of 2016, the national authorities recognize
Gourmantché self-defense groups have these actors. “We are in a democratic State that
in fact joined the association “Tin Kubi cherishes a number of values, including human
u dogu”, which means in Gourmantché dignity and life. This must be respected”, Simon
“let’s protect the city”. This change of Compaore, then Security Minister, told a news
name, far from being insignificant, testifies conference on 7 March 2016, adding “These
to an emancipation and a will to achieve self-defense groups [the Koglweogo] must be
autonomy with regard to the Koglweogo legally exercised and be recognized […] One
“central power”. Their leader is a prince cannot think for a moment that it is possible
of the Gourmantché ethnic group called for the central government to set up gendar-
Django, who has moreover publicly de- merie brigades in every village. Our human and
nounced the behavior of the Koglweogo material resources are limited”. Thus, to put
present in other regions of the country, an end to the existing limbo, the authorities
which testifies to the heterogeneity of the have developed a legal framework intended
movement and the influence of regional to regulate the actions of the Koglweogo by
leaders. integrating them into a community-based po-
licing of which they must be the main leaders,
• Lastly, people joining the Koglweogo do with limited powers to deal with crime pre-
so for various reasons, contributing to vention and the arrest of delinquents in cases
drawing specific local forms from one of flagrante delicto. However, the national
Koglweogo to another or within the same leadership of the Koglweogo, under pressure
Koglweogo. These may be a means of from its supporters, refused their integration
acquiring social status or even prestige, a into the community policing and the decree
16Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
remains unimplemented. Several arguments ditional pharmacopoeia. To become a Dozo,
are put forward: the poor functioning of the any applicant must be initiated and take an
community police and its working methods, oath, which does not prevent people from
which differ from those of the Koglweogo, the presenting themselves as Dozo and wearing
fact that not all Koglweogo will be able to join the traditional hunters’ attire without having
the community police and benefit from the taken an oath.
associated remuneration, and the feeling that
accepting this integration into the community Dozo hunters’ movements have grown in
police would mean the end of the Koglweogo. Burkina Faso in recent years and shifted from
hunting game to robbery in the 1990s due to
Locally, the attitude towards the public authority an increase in theft and crime and, apparently,
and its representatives is wavering between col- the “Christmas war” (1985-1986) between
laboration, autonomy and tensions depending Mali and Burkina during which both states
on the situations and local actors. Collaboration mobilized Dozo hunters. A third factor played
has been notable in several regions, particularly a role in their rise in Burkina Faso: relations
in the East, to secure the 2014-2015 transition. with the Dozo in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, who
The movement is strongly rooted in local power were then active in surveillance missions and
structures. Several Koglweogo leaders are also the fight against banditry. These movements
affiliated with political parties and, for some, are structured around a hunter leader. One
are openly militant. On the side of the internal of the most important federations of Dozo
security forces, members of Koglweogo have hunting brotherhoods in Burkina Faso is the
been arrested and jailed several times in re- National Union of Dozo, led by Ali Konaté.
cent years, not without provoking strong reac- It claims 17,000 members from 142 brother-
tions. At the same time, however, local forms hoods. Another figure in the Burkinabe Dozo
of cooperation have emerged. For example, in movement is Yacouba Drabo. He is head of
Tenkodogo (Center-East), the national police the Confrérie des Dozo sans Frontières, for-
and gendarmerie relied on the Koglweogo to merly the National Union of Dozo Traditional
obtain information, report incidents, and hand Health Practitioners of Burkina.
over those arrested or even punished.
In September 2020, during the General As-
sembly of the Dozo of Burkina Faso, the rep-
resentatives present decided to create a High
2.2. Traditional Dozo hunters Council of the Dozo of Burkina, intended to be
the common interlocutor of the brotherhood
While the Koglweogo have a strong presence within the context of the fight against terror-
in the Eastern, Northern and Central regions ism. “We cannot remain indifferent because
of Burkina Faso, the West is a Dozo territory. this is our country”, Yacouba Drabo told the
Associated with the Mandingo country, Dozo Minister of Defense. “In this struggle already,
hunting brotherhoods are notably present in more than 65 of us have fallen. That is why we
Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, launch this appeal to all the Dozo so that we
following a tradition dating back to the hunter can speak the same language for the security
kings at the origin of the Mali empire. Some of our country”. However, the creation of this
Dozo are traditional practitioners skilled in tra- structure is divisive. The National Union of Dozo
17Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
does not recognize it and considers it a ground- 2016, Boukary Kaboré, known as “the lion”,
less political initiative. In addition to this division was denied the creation of a Koglweogo move-
and the political rivalries it reveals among Dozo ment in the village of Makognandougou (Upper
national leaders, the Dozo movement also fac- Basins) by the local Dozo chief, who claimed
es tension between its national and local bod- that hunters already provided security in close
ies. Dozo associations operate according to a collaboration with the defense and security
network approach, with each association being forces. A few months later, tension mounted
autonomous within its territorial jurisdiction, following the torture of two men by Koglwe-
while having to follow the rules set at the na- ogo. Despite a decision by the governor of the
tional level. Upper Basins region banning Koglweogo from
settling in the region and opposition from some
Dozo associations in Burkina Faso maintain earth priests from the West, in December 2017,
ties with those in other countries. In 2016, Ya- the Koglweogo imposed a 25,000 CFA fine on
couba Drabo told the press that he had cre- two people in the rural commune of Karangas-
ated a partnership between the Dozo associa- so Vigué (Upper Basins) for stealing sheep. One
tions of Mali and Burkina Faso “to act when- month later, on 27 January 2018, a woman,
ever there was a suspicious case” in the border accused of stealing a cell phone, was stripped
region between the two countries. In February naked and tied up in the market square of the
2019, a meeting was also convened in Nio- village of Djosso. In response, the leader of the
bini, in the Southwest region, by the Regional National Union of Dozo challenged the author-
Union of Dozo, bringing together Dozo from ities and reiterated that Koglweogo were not
this region but also from the Cascades, the welcome in western Burkina. “We don’t want
High Basins and Mali to discuss security issues. the Koglweogo today, we don’t want them
More broadly, the cultural days of the National tomorrow, and it’s not just here in Karangasso
Union of Dozo organized in recent years have Vigué. It’s the whole West of Burkina Faso. [...]
been graced by the presence of delegations The Greater West Region of Burkina Faso does
from Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea Conakry. not want Koglweogo on its territory. There is a
In this context of regional movement of peo- decree that has come out, the earth priests, the
ple and relations among the Dozo in the sub- guardians of customs, the Dozo and the popu-
region, the National Union of Dozo Hunters of lations themselves, do not want Koglweogo,
Burkina Faso is seeking to better control the why insist? They can head to the North if they
movements of its members across countries - want to fight”.
through a reporting system on departure and
arrival - and denounces the abusive use of For the Dozo, the arrival of the Koglweogo
the Dozo identity by laypersons. Similarly, to challenges their authority. More broadly, how-
reduce the risk of ethnicization of conflicts in ever, these tensions also refer to the opposi-
the West of the country, the National Union tion between the traditions of the Plateau
of Dozo is said to have initiated young Fulani Mossi embodied by the Koglweogo and those
following a call by a Fulani chief from Bobo- of the Mandingo, of which the Dozo are the
Dioulasso to join the movement. representatives, but also to demographic dy-
namics. Since the 1980s, Mossi people have
The expansion of the Koglweogo in the West been migrating to western Burkina Faso to de-
has led to conflicts with the Dozo. In November velop lands before taking control of localities.
18Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
More broadly, in a country where the Mossi is headed by Youssouf Toloba, and a political
make up half the population, the Dozo’s re- branch, intended to serve as an interface with
fusal to allow the Koglweogo to settle reflects the outside world, headed by Mamadou Goudi-
a sense that the Mossi control the state and enkilé. These two branches are based near Ban-
are seeking to extend their influence and take diagara. Although officially dissolved by the Ma-
over more land. In other words, the clashes be- lian government because of the abuses against
tween the Dozo and Koglweogo are part of civilians of which its members are accused, the
Burkinabe social and political cleavages as well movement continues its activities.
as identity, cultural, ethnic and power issues at
the national and local level in a context of in- This militia is mainly present in Mali, where,
creasing Mossi migration. although officially dismantled, it still controlled
checkpoints on the roads between Sévaré,
Bandiagara, Bankass and Koro in mid-2020.
However, it is also active in Northern Burkina
2.3. Da Nan Ambassagou Militia Faso, where its influence is very limited. Da
Nan Ambassagou’s militiamen are notably
Created at the end of 2016 in Mali, Da Nan Am- present in the Boucle du Mouhoun, in the
bassagou is presented as a force for protecting commune of Kombori, where they report-
the Dogon community against attacks by armed edly cooperate with local Dozo. Indeed, the
groups, at first essentially jihadist. It is a federa- Malian elements of Da Nan Ambassagou use
tion of defense camps set up near towns and the Burkinabe villages as rear bases. In addi-
villages where Dogon communities are concen- tion, Burkinabè who fought in Mali with the
trated. It recruits mainly Dozo, but it has also Dogon militia have formed their own groups in
welcomed many other combatants from various Burkina Faso.
backgrounds. The movement’s leadership is di-
vided into two: a military branch, whose staff
19Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
Box 2. Non-militia security initiatives
In 2012, a National Union of Rugga, “representa- CDR (Committees for the Defense of the Revolu-
tives of the herders”, was created in response to tion), the Dozo [...] so that we can strengthen in-
the challenges faced by pastoralists: nibbling of telligence and undertake any action to strengthen
pastoral lands through agriculture and land spe- the operational capacity of our national army”. In
culation, decline in fodder and water resources, February 2020, the movement claimed a presence
obstruction of transhumance routes or lack of in 30 of Burkina’s 45 provinces and, eight months
enforcement of laws, etc. Their role is to organize later, throughout the country, but these claims
transhumance, manage livestock mobility and pro- could not be verified.
tect herders from abuses and attacks by preven-
ting conflicts and ensuring peaceful cohabitation It is seen as a patriotic and political initiative in-
between herders and farmers. They are supported tended to support the implementation of the VDP
by local and regional representatives. The Rugga law, launched by educated urban dwellers who
are therefore not a militia or a self-defense group, want to see the population more involved in the
even if clashes may have occurred in the East security of the country in close coordination with
between the Koglweogo and people in charge of state officials. “We have developed a strategy
defending the herds who are locally called Rugga with our DSFs and training courses are underway
by their opponents or who call themselves Rugga. at the village level”, the movement’s coordinator
“There are shepherds who call themselves Rugga announced in February 2020. The monitoring
and defend [their] interests. But the Rugga do not committees that are in the villages are credible
recognize them”, observed a Burkinabe journalist. movements. All the lists are centralized at the staff
level with all the identities. We filter the registra-
On 5 October 2019, the Movement for Popular Re- tions and we have established identities so that
sistance was launched in Kongoussi (Centre-North), there are no people of questionable morality”.
Bam province, to support the defense and secu- The coordinator has publicly opposed the weapo-
rity forces. Its ambition, however, goes beyond the nization of the movement, despite demands from
borders of this province. As one of its founders his supporters and most likely local practices that
stated in the Burkinabè press, it is “a national mo- go against this orientation. Following the vote
vement whose main objective is to organize local on the law establishing the VDP in January 2020,
populations. In each locality of Burkina Faso, [...] the leadership asked its members and supporters
we are going to set up village, provincial, regio- to enlist, while making arrangements to provide
nal surveillance and defense committees that will the VDPs with equipment to strengthen their
mobilize around resource persons, notably tradi- operational capacities and communicating in the
tional chiefs, religious leaders, the Koglweogo, the regions in favor of the arrangement.
20Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
III. Militias involved in the gressive mobilization. Whereas previously the
fight against jihadism discourses emphasized the fight against insecu-
rity and banditry, the year 2019 seems to mark
an acceleration in the involvement of the Dozo
in the fight against armed jihadist groups. Fol-
The involvement of self-defense militias in the lowing several clashes between the Dozo and
struggle against jihadist armed groups pre- alleged jihadists, Yacouba Drabo called, in No-
dates the 21 January 2020 law allowing for vember 2019, on the Dozo to mobilize and take
the recruitment of the Volunteers for the De- responsibility: “It is time to stand up and come
fense of the Fatherland (VDP). However, this together. We need to realize that the authorities
law constitutes a break on both sides. On the and the DSFs alone cannot protect Burkina. We
one hand, they are no longer simply tolerated must not think that it is the cause of such and
and not legalized groups, but groups created such or that the terrorists want such and such.
and supervised by the state. Their operation, They want everyone. They don’t sort out their
organization and use in the fight against jihad- victims. They attack everyone, so it is time for all
ism are in fact governed by legislation. On the of us to stand up”. While this call underscores
other hand, it paves the way for a growing use the reluctance within the movement about
and a change of scale in the use of militiamen Dozo involvement in the fight against jihadist
alongside the defense and security forces. groups, the leader of the National Union of
Dozo said he would have a thousand fighters
ready to support the defense and security forc-
3.1. A commitment prior to es, for intelligence and surveillance missions,
the VDP law some already deployed between Banfora and
Mandogara with checkpoints.
The involvement of Burkinabe self-defense
groups in the fight against jihadist groups pre- Concerning the Koglweogo, the movement’s
cedes the adoption of the VDP law. Since its national authorities took a public stance on
creation in October 2019, the Movement for the issue of the struggle against jihadist groups
Popular Resistance, born in response to the in a communiqué dated August 25, 2019. In
insecurity resulting from the expansion of the response to the publication of a press article
area of action of these groups, has publicly whose title referred to Koglweogo’s commit-
stated that it has begun working with the mili- ment to “fight terrorism”, Rassamkande Naaba
tary institution to strengthen territorial securi- denied any directive to this effect. Certainly, he
ty. And it is not the only movement that wants recalled then, the Koglweogo have the mission
to work with the DSFs, although among the to “ensure the security of the population and
Dozo and Koglweogo, the issue has divided their property”. Because of their non-recogni-
their members in recent years, with divisions tion by the state and their lack of supervision
among local groups and between national and and equipment, the national supreme council
local officials. announced that it “declines any responsibility
for any involvement of any Koglweogo chief
The main national Dozo associations have re- in the so-called fight against terrorism”. The
peatedly called on the authorities to take up formulation is interesting and deserves a brief
the fight against jihadist groups, with a pro- look. On the one hand, at a time when the law
21Antonin Tisseron | Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
on volunteers for the defense of the fatherland 3.2. Creation of Volunteers for the
is on many lips, it refers to a logic of bargaining Defense of the Fatherland
with the state. On the other hand, it is not a
prohibition for those who would like to com- On 7 November 2019, following the attack on
bat jihadist groups, but rather a reminder of a mining convoy by jihadists, President Roch
the primary purpose of the Koglweogo and Marc Christian Kaboré, in an address to the na-
the dangers for the movement to become offi- tion, called for the mobilization and recruitment
cially involved. In the East however, due to the of civilian volunteers to assist the defense and
action of armed jihadist groups, some of the security forces. Subsequent to this announce-
Koglweogo have laid down their arms, joined ment, a commission was set up. Intended to
the jihadists or refocused on criminal practices. define the status of “Volunteers for the Defense
of Faso”, to determine their rights and obliga-
In this regard, “some Koglweogo have decided tions and to supervise their activity, it is made
to move on to the fight against terrorism, others up of representatives from the Presidency, the
have not. The reason is purely materialistic. Ministry of National Defense and Veterans,
Each Koglweogo makes the decision according the National Intelligence Agency, the Ministry
to their means and the interests of their of Territorial Administration, Decentralization
members”, Journalist Ismael Compaore sums and Social Cohesion and the Ministry of Secu-
up. The Koglweogo most active in the fight rity. Following the work of the commission, on
against armed jihadist groups have particularly 21 January 2020, Members of the Parliament
proliferated in the North-Central, Sahel and adopted Law No. 002-2020/AN on the creation
Central Plateau regions. This commitment dates of the “Volunteers for the Defense of the Fa-
back to the end of 2016 with, from that date, a therhood” whose objective is to allow for the
shift from the rhetoric of anti-banditry to that recruitment, training and equipping of citizens
of anti-terrorism, which has sometimes been a to support the defense and security forces in
pretext for the settlement of local community their mission of securing the national territory.
conflicts. The Koglweogo chief of Boulsa,
Bouheima Nadbanka, is said to have played Article 2 of the law, relating to general provi-
a crucial role in this mobilization, claiming to sions, defines the VDP as “a national of Bur-
have sent Koglweogo for several months, at his kina Faso, auxiliary to the Defense and Security
own expense, to the village of Kerboulé (Sahel). Forces (DSFs), voluntarily serving the security
Moreover, since the Koglweogo are not paid, interests of his or her village or area of resi-
this activity is combined with those relating to dence, pursuant to a contract signed between
economic predation and public security. the VDP and the State”. The law specifies that
the mission of the VDP is to contribute, if nec-
essary, by force of arms, to the defense of per-
sons and property of his village or area of resi-
dence. Its recruitment “is made at the village or
residence on a pro bono basis, subject to the
approval of the local population”.
Volunteers receive 14 days of training from
the military, at the end of which they must be
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