Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
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Issue 12
1st Issue 2016
ISSN: 2242-439X
nmiotc
NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONAL
Maritime Interdiction Operations
Journal
TRAINING CENTRE
1
NATO
Maritime Interdiction Operational
Training Centre
1 Conference
st
on
Cyber Security
CYBER SECURITY
IN THE
MARITIME DOMAIN
04 - 05 OCTOBER 2016
2
CONTENTS nmiotc
COMMANDANT'S EDITORIAL
MARITIME INTERDICTION
03 Editorial by Georgios Tsogkas
Commodore GRC (N)
OPERATIONS
JOURNAL
Commadant NMIOTC
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE AND SECURITY
Director
Commodore G. Tsogkas GRC (N)
06 Energy Secyrity in the Maritime Environment Challenges and Oppor-
tunities emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean
Commandant NMIOTC
by Dr Marina Skordeli
13 Illicit Trafficking at Sea Training opportunities at NMIOTC
by Ioannis Arguriou Lieutenant Commander GRC (CG)
Executive Director
Captain C. Campana ITA (N)
Director of Training Support
15
Trends in Global Energy Economics and Their Implications for Mari-
time Energy Infrastucture Secutity and Related Interdiction Training
by Stephen L. Caldwell
Editor
24 Risks and Interdependencies in the LNG Supply Chain
by David Incertis
Lt Commander N. Tiantoukas GRC (N)
Head of Transformation
MARITIME SECURITY
Layout Production
CPO E. Miskou GRC (N)
34 Cyber Security within Maritime Domain
by Lt Commander N. Tiantoukas GRC (N) and Journal Assistant Editor
Lt Commander D. Megas GRC (N)
TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES
36
Unerstanding & Mitigating Cyber Threats in the Maritime Domain.
Lessons Learned From Others Sectors
by Robert Hayes
41 Energy Saving Measures for Naval Operations
by G. Gougoulidis, PhD.
The views expressed in this
issue reflect the opinions of
the authors, and do not nec-
essarily represent NMIOTC's
or NATO’s official positions.
HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS
All content is subject to Greek
52 VIP visitors to NMIOTC Copyright Legislation.
Pictures used from the web
are not subject to copyright
restrictions.
NMIOTC TRAINING You may send your comments to:
tiantoukasn@nmiotc.nato.int
56 Photos from NMIOTC Training Activities
3
NMIOTC
Commandants Editorial 12th edition
During the last two years from Whales Alliance Maritime Strategy, along with framework of cooperation with NATO.
to Warsaw Summit, concrete deci- Partners’ involvement and broad col- Its operational capacity has been rec-
sions were reached for the adapta- laboration in the areas of training, in- ognized by those who have been fol-
tion of the Alliance. The maritime formation exchange and others such lowing its evolution since its establish-
domain holds a significant part of this as energy security and illicit trafficking, ment. NMIOTC stands ready to better
adaptation effort. The way though would empower all stakeholders to be support NATO’s partners following rel-
from Whales to Warsaw is paved by prepared to face these challenges in a evant decisions, in addition to existing
new security challenges. Conditions timely manner and at further out dis- programs and synergies.
are set in order to cope with potential tances.
emerging challenges to our collective NATO’s adaptation calls for enhanced Emerging security challenges, such
security proactively. The environment opportunities for training. It is antici- as Critical Infrastructure Protection,
has fundamentally changed as re- pated that the Warsaw Summit out- Countering Proliferation of Weapons
gards Alliance’s Eastern and Southern comes would call for enhanced train- of Mass destruction, C-IED in the Mari-
flanks security. At the same time, USA ing opportunities with security provider time domain, illicit activities and orga-
is shifting its interest to the Pacific, and partners. This is exactly why NMIOTC nized crime at sea, interdiction at range
NATO members are requested to take is more relevant than ever. In its ca- and cyber defense in the maritime do-
over increased responsibilities in and pacity as a NETF, awarded by ACT main, has been timely identified and
around Europe. This burden, regard- with a Quality Assurance Accredita- are tackled in a comprehensive man-
less how heavy it could be, it creates tion, focused on the maritime domain, ner by both NMIOTC’s training and
opportunities for collaboration espe- offers education and training opportu- transformation departments. Having
cially in the maritime domain. NATO’s nities to Allies and Partners within their said that and referring to this journal, I
4
wish to draw your attention to the fact ply Chain” refers to the maritime part Nikolaos Tiantioukas GRC (N) and Lt
that it presents articles focused on cur- of the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) Cdr Dimitrios Megas GRC (N) at their
rent and future challenges to maritime supply chain, identifying its main links, article present the content and the
security. In particular; their interdependencies and related mentality of our Centre in its efforts to
risks which could hamper the normal provide effective and efficient training
In the lead article, Dr. Marina flow of this very energy source. Dr to counter cyber threat in the maritime
Skordeli on “Energy Security in the George Gougoulidis within his article environment through cyber security
Maritime Environment Challenges and “Energy-saving Measures for Naval awareness. Last but not least Lt Cdr
Opportunities emerging in the Eastern Operations”, examines the feasibility Ioannis Argiriou GRC (CG) presents
Mediterranean” articulates the par- and application of various operational NMIOTC efforts regarding countering
ticular importance that energy secu- and technical measures aiming out en- Illicit trafficking at sea.
rity in the maritime environment of the ergy saving for maritime vessels.
Eastern Mediterranean region has for Finally, taking this opportunity, I would
the Euro-Atlantic community. On the The remaining part of the Journal like to announce with great pleasure,
same spot Stephen L. Caldwell within deals with the maritime sector’s vul- the 7th Annual NMIOTC Conference
his article‘’ Trends in Global Energy nerability to cyber-attacks. Mr Robert which will be held at our premises
Economics, and Their Implications for Hayes article “Understanding &Miti- (Souda Bay – Crete) from 7th to 9th
Maritime Energy Infrastructure Secu- gating Cyber Threats in the Maritime June 2016, with topic “Challenges to
rity and Related Interdiction Training” Domain’’ describes how organizations Maritime Security Derived from Trans-
analyzes trends in energy econom- can develop an effective strategic ap- national Organized Crime at Sea” and
ics and their impact on the security of proach to cyber-security, and discuss the 1st Conference on Cyber Security
maritime energy infrastructure. David how examples of global best practice in the maritime domain, which will also
Incertis within his article “Risks and from other industry sectors can help take place at our premises, from 4th to
Interdependencies in the LNG Sup- the maritime sector. Finally Lt Cdr 5th October 2016.
Georgios Tsogkas
Commodore GRC (N)
Commadant NMIOTC
5
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
Energy Security in the Maritime
Environment
Challenges and Opportunities emerging
in the Eastern Mediterranean
by Dr Marina Skordeli
Director of the Jean Monnet European Centre of
Excellence, National and Kapodistrian University of
Athens, Greece, jmcenter-athens@pspa.uoa.gr
Abstract emergence of enhanced risks in the context, the Euro-Atlantic community
maritime environment is increasingly should pay special attention on the
In recent years, technological advanc- raising the issue of securing the ex- Eastern Mediterranean, due to the im-
es have drawn attention on the extrac- traction as well as the transfer of en- mense geopolitical importance of the
tion of energy from the sea, while the ergy via maritime routes. Within this region and the particular challenges it
6
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
is facing. A traditionally volatile envi- towards risks at sea is becoming more ies, oil storage depots), of off-shore
ronment in the Eastern Mediterranean, systematized both by NATO and the oil and gas rigs and of Energy related
as was defined in the past by both con- EU. assets are particularly vulnerable,
ventional and asymmetric threats, has The identification of the numerous EU especially when they extend beyond
now been further aggravated by new interests and policies related to the borders and attacks on them by hos-
developments. The maritime dimen- sea, as codified in its Integrated Mari- tile states, terrorists or hacktivists can
sion of the Eastern Mediterranean, in time Policy (Commission of the Euro- have repercussions across regions.
particular, is its basic feature, which pean Communities, 2007), pointed to Political instability or conflict, in areas
involves special risks that need to the need to explore the military aspect where these assets are being devel-
be better analyzed and addressed. of protecting these interests. The oped, is a main source of concern.
Nevertheless, a collective approach collective surveillance and manage- As regards Europe’s energy security
toward risks can also bring new oppor- ment of maritime areas was set as a policies in particular, the EU Maritime
tunities to the fore. first step for the EU (ibid; European Security Strategy stresses that energy
Council 2008). The European Parlia- security largely depends on maritime
Keywords ment’s study The Maritime Dimension transport and infrastructures. Accord-
of CSDP (European Parliament, 2013) ing to the document, the strategic
Eastern Mediterranean; energy; mari- raised the need to strengthen the maritime security interests of the EU
time security; NATO; European Union. maritime dimension of the Common and its Member States include the
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) preservation of the freedom of naviga-
1. Introduction and develop more synergies between tion, the protection of the global EU
CSDP and the Integrated Maritime supply chain and of maritime trade, the
This paper will explore the particular Policy. Once more, this development right of innocent and transit passage
importance that energy security in the marked a growing awareness of the of ships and the security of their crew
maritime environment of the Eastern interconnection between maritime se- and passengers. The protection of the
Mediterranean region has for the Eu- curity and increasing global economic EU’s economic interests, in particular,
ro-Atlantic community. It will present interests. All these culminated in the include the safeguarding of maritime
shortly the respective NATO and EU recent Maritime Security Strategy of energy resources, the sustainable
policies on maritime and energy secu- the EU, adopted in June 2014 (Euro- exploitation of natural and marine re-
rity. Subsequently, it will analyze the pean Commission 2014). NATO, for sources in the different maritime zones
geopolitical importance of the East- its part, adopted the Alliance Maritime and the high seas, the delimitation of
ern Mediterranean and it will examine Strategy (NATO 2011), which identifies maritime zones, which presents a po-
the risks and challenges emanating four roles for NATO’s maritime forces: tential for growth and jobs, the protec-
from this region in the maritime envi- deterrence and collective defence, cri- tion of off-shore installations (e.g. gas
ronment, as well as how they could sis management, cooperative security or oil platforms), of port infrastructures
threaten vital Euro-Atlantic interests and aritime security. (e.g. LNG facilities), of energy supply
related to energy security. Finally, it Maritime security and energy security by the sea and of underwater pipelines.
will explore the opportunities arising are closely interrelated in the sense Maritime security threats to these in-
for a collective approach toward these that a safe maritime environment and terests, as identified by the Strategy,
challenges with a view to safeguarding safe lanes of communication ensure include threats or use of force against
energy supply and security. the security of energy extraction from Member States’ rights and jurisdiction
the sea and shipments via the sea. over their maritime zones, threats to
2. The Euro-Atlantic Energy security in the maritime envi- the security of European citizens and
Approach toward Maritime ronment includes the protection of the to economic interests at sea.
and Energy Security vessels themselves (e.g. tankers), of As regards NATO’s role in energy
ports, of energy related infrastructure security, the 2010 Strategic Concept
In recent years, a collective approach near ports (e.g. pipelines, oil refiner- (NATO 2010) calls for a capacity to
7
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
contribute to energy security, includ- of powers in the region and threaten its litical importance. Especially in cur-
ing by the protection of critical energy stability even further: the Arab Spring rently crises-ridden areas, pending on
infrastructure and transit areas and and the recent offshore energy find- developments, such pipelines could
lines, cooperation with partners, and ings. As a result, the risk factor at sea end up at Turkish, Syrian or Israeli
consultations among Allies on the has been augmented in this region, shores, in the future. For example,
basis of strategic assessments and thus jeopardizing the transit use of the with the normalization of the situation
contingency planning. NATO seeks wider area. in Iraq, much of the oil there will most
to increase its competence in sup- More specifically, the economic and likely be transported to the Eastern
porting the protection of critical energy energy security importance of the Mediterranean through pipelines end-
infrastructure, mainly through training Eastern Mediterranean is strongly ing in its shores. Another parameter
and exercises. Protecting energy in- connected with its value as a key tran- adding to the importance of this region
frastructure is considered primarily a sit route. The Eastern Mediterranean, is its own oil and gas reserves. The
national responsibility, hence NATO’s together with the Red Sea, plays a EU already covers a great part of its
contribution focuses on areas where it crucial role for international and, es- energy demand from sources in the
can add value, notably the exchange pecially, European shipping by facili- Middle East and North Africa and Eu-
of best practices with partner countries tating easy access between Western ropean states seek to rely more on the
and with other international institutions markets, on the one hand, and those Mediterranean states, in order to avoid
and the private sector. With its mari- of the Far East, the Middle East and dependence on Russia. The recent
time presence, through Operations the Black Sea, on the other. Conse- offshore energy findings in the Eastern
Active Endeavour and Ocean Shield, quently, the Mediterranean is one of Mediterranean could add significantly
NATO is also making an indirect con- the most used maritime corridors glob- to its importance. As a consequence,
tribution to energy security. ally, as a significant part of the world the EU and NATO are now increas-
shipping activity flows through it. ingly exploring the potential future role
3. Geopolitical Importance of What enhances the region’s impor- of the Mediterranean for transatlantic
the Eastern Mediterranean tance dramatically is that a remark- energy security. Recently, the Italian
able percentage of the energy re- Presidency of the EU and the Com-
The Eastern Mediterranean is an area sources traded internationally, almost mission announced the promotion of
of major geopolitical and geostrategic 1/3, flows through the Mediterranean, a Mediterranean gas hub, taking into
importance. In economic terms, the whether via ships or through pipe- consideration that the region is a stra-
location of the Eastern Mediterranean lines. Energy resources coming from tegic gas supplier to the EU and to its
makes it a crucial transit point for trade the Persian Gulf and Russia pass Mediterranean neighbours, it has im-
in general and for vital energy resourc- mainly through this region. Oil is be- portant gas reserves and it is located
es directed to Europe and the United ing transferred from the Persian Gulf in the midst of the world’s busiest wa-
States in particular. This transit aspect primarily to Europe, but also to the terways for global shipping.
of the Eastern Mediterranean has a US, through the Suez Canal. Rus- The EU has also expanded its renew-
strong maritime dimension. In po- sia is attempting to transfer its energy able energy plans towards the south.
litical and security terms, for the past resources through southern corridors, Producing electricity from renewable
decades, the Eastern Mediterranean in order to avoid what it perceives as sources in countries of the South-
has been characterized by a complex hostile neighbors, such as Ukraine. ern Mediterranean is indeed a viable
security context made up of all sorts The flow of natural gas and oil from option. Submarine connections for
of conventional risks as well as what the Caucasus and Central Asia via this electric power transmission have
we call asymmetric threats. On top region is also expected to increase. been proposed and such a grid could
of those, in the past few years, we The number of pipelines already ex- transmit to Europe significant shares
have been witnessing the emergence isting in the Eastern Mediterranean, of electricity produced from renewable
of a couple of new developments that but also those expected to be con- sources in the future.
could ultimately lead to a rebalancing structed there is adding to its geopo- While the region’s importance for
8
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
Euro-Atlantic energy security is be- severe risks to maritime traffic and attempts to damage tankers or disrupt
ing increasingly enhanced, in political energy flows could be posed. Hence, loading operations in or near overseas
and security terms, the Eastern Medi- Europe and the US demonstrate a ports, such as the attack of a small
terranean has long been known for a renewed attention toward this region, ship with explosives on the French
list of conventional and asymmetric since such issues can threaten the tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen,
threats that could potentially affect vi- security of their citizens and their vital in October 2002.
tal interests of the EU and the US, in interests. As regards the Mediterranean, the
addition to their energy security. The We can conclude that stability in the disclosure of a number of attempted
gravity of these threats made many Eastern Mediterranean is of particular terrorist attacks on ships leads to the
scholars, as well as numerous EU and importance for the Euro-Atlantic and conclusion that such scenarios are
NATO policy documents, characterise global economic interests in general, becoming increasingly possible for the
the Mediterranean as the new security since it allows for the flow of energy Eastern Mediterranean. Organiza-
front for the West after the end of the resources from areas in the periphery tions, such as Hezbollah, the Jemaah
Cold War. Conventional threats in the of Europe, such as Russia, the Middle Islamiyah, the Popular Front for the
Eastern Mediterranean take the form East, Caucasus and Central Asia, but Liberation of Palestine, have long tried
of a significant number of rivalries, also from the region itself and, there- to develop capabilities, in order to un-
regional crises and high intensity con- fore, it allows for stability of the world dertake similar action.
flicts (e.g. the Arab-Israeli wars), as economy. Thus, it must be ensured, Cargo ships crossing the Mediter-
well as what until recently was charac- in order to safeguard uninhibited and ranean could either be placed under
terised as rogue states (Syria, Libya) cost-effective shipping and the smooth the control of terrorists or suffer from
and dangerous non-state actors (e.g. operation of energy infrastructure. attacks on their journey. Energy infra-
Hezbollah). Stability in this region has structure at sea, such as oil and gas
also been threatened by asymmetric 4. Challenges to Energy Se- rigs, could be damaged or hijacked.
threats, such as terrorism and the use curity in the Maritime Envi- Terrorists could, also, use the sea to
of Weapons of Mass Destruction. ronment of the Eastern Medi- infiltrate and attack land-based tar-
Today, the security environment in the terranean gets. Pipelines, refineries, pumping
Eastern Mediterranean is being fur- stations have been among terrorists’
ther aggravated. Political transforma- The maritime dimension of the Medi- targets in recent years. In the Mediter-
tions in Egypt and Libya, the on-going terranean is its special feature that in- ranean, possible attacks on tankers,
turmoil in Syria and frozen relations volves special risks. These risks could terminals or pipelines flowing there
between Turkey and Israel are re- be associated both with conventional would have a significant impact on a
shaping longstanding balances and as well as with asymmetric security global scale. The same is true for at-
correlations, causing uncertainty and concerns. tacks at crossing points to and from
instability. With the emergence of the Starting with asymmetric threats, pre- the Mediterranean. The morphology
so-called Islamic State (ISIS), terror- venting the entry of terrorists into the of the Mediterranean, which requires
ism emanating from this region takes territorial waters of Western states, passage through straits, such as the
a new form, the dimensions of which as well as terrorist attacks at sea and Suez Canal, the Bosporus and Gibral-
cannot be assessed in full, yet. The from the sea, is a major European and tar, makes ships particularly vulner-
possibility of the loss of state control American concern. This is not a new able. Such scenarios include the risk
over coastal areas and of the creation threat. To date, there have been inci- of a potential environmental terrorism,
of lawless maritime zones, as a result dents of terrorist attacks on American affecting the environment and, there-
of state collapse in the Mediterranean, or European warships, tankers or pas- fore, tourism, which is one of the big-
could have an immediate impact on senger ships. Such incidents demon- gest sources of income in the region.
maritime security. In case that non- strate that maritime terrorism is a fact These scenarios become even more
state actors are able to take hold of and that it is one of the most serious nightmarish, if there was an attack
these coastal and maritime areas, security threats. These have included with a ship trapped with a weapon of
9
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
mass destruction. While previous at- infrastructure and vessels. get ships passing through the Suez
tacks have used ships loaded with Piracy is another dimension of mari- Canal. Closure of the Suez Canal
explosives, one could also imagine an time risks and some acts of piracy would have significant financial impli-
attack using aircraft. have targeted oil shipments. The cations, one example of which would
The consequences from energy-relat- vast majority of pirate attacks against be the addition a time-consuming and
ed maritime terrorism in the Mediter- energy vessels occur against oil tank- more costly detour around the Cape of
ranean can include human casual- ers. Pirates have also demonstrated Good Hope.
ties, a blow on the economy and an the ability to attack LNG carriers and Finally, technological advances now
environmental impact. As regards the offshore drilling platforms successfully. allow new opportunities to emerge
implications for the global economy in There have been a few notable cases related to the exploitation of various
particular, these could be huge. Apart where tankers have been hijacked and maritime resources. The sea can offer
from jeopardizing the safe flow of oil the crews held for ransom. It should, almost one third of the oil and natural
and gas, implications could include ris- also, be noted that many of the mod- gas worldwide consumption. It is esti-
ing oil prices, disruption of trade, the ern times pirates are terrorists coming mated that 40% of the oil and 60% of
use of more time-consuming detours from Islamic extremist groups. Inter- the gas currently consumed in Europe
that would increase the cost of trans- national efforts to freeze financial re- are drilled offshore. Gradually the sea
portation, crowded passage points sources of terrorist organizations have also provides more renewable energy
and ports, more expensive insurance led such groups to piracy as an alter- resources.
premiums, environmental disasters native means for their financement. The ability of coastal states to protect
and a blow on tourism. The straits, in Today, piracy is being addressed by their territorial integrity and ensure
particular, could be blocked for several the international community in the Gulf their sovereignty on their maritime
days, depending on the size of the of Aden, around the Somali coast and zones is, therefore, expected to be-
damage caused and controls or safety in the Indian Ocean. However, piracy come increasingly important in the
measures taken, and therefore cross- is being spread worldwide. It appears future. The anticipated growth of hu-
ing them would slow down, with again already in the Red Sea and it could be man activity in the seas and the need
financial implications. The same goes extended to the Mediterranean. Eu- to produce energy from the sea will
for hits on ports and oil terminals. ropean officials have recently been contribute to this. This can cause con-
A very alarming scenario is posed by alarmed by the possibility of ISIS also flicts at sea between state, but also
the possibility of ISIS securing terri- bringing Somali-style piracy to the non-state, actors, because of competi-
tory on Libya’s Mediterranean coast. Mediterranean. While ISIS is gaining tion for these scarce resources. As a
ISIS has recently been making in- control of ports and vessels in Libya, consequence, the majority of states to-
roads along the coast of Libya tak- it could launch pirate attacks in the the day extends or wishes to extend their
ing control of the port city of Derna Mediterranean. territorial waters to 12 n.m. and their
and nearby Sirte, just a few hundred Political instability in the region can Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 n.m.,
miles across the water from mainland also cause the disruption of energy which creates vast maritime surfaces
Europe. Greater ISIS access to the flows. Conflicts or hostile action can for surveillance and protection and dis-
Mediterranean would be deeply trou- impede the freedom of navigation or putes with neighbouring countries on
bling to the region and a large strategic they can cause damage on infrastruc- the delimitation of these zones.
advance for the terrorist group. Such ture. Recent instability in Egypt, for One such great challenge is posed by
a development could increase ISIS’s example, has caused concern, since the energy factor in recent develop-
potential for attacks in Italy, Greece the country has been struggling to ments in the Eastern Mediterranean.
and elsewhere in Europe. With the keep the peace in the area around the The discovery of gas implies that the
use of small boats, ISIS could launch Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula. region will remain an important energy
terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean A recent rocket attack on the Cosco provider for Europe in the foreseeable
that could expose it to hijacking, kid- Asia, a giant container ship, was not future and that it can also provide in-
nappings and damage of vital energy the first time that terrorists tried to tar- digenous resources (in the case of
10ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
Cyprus). The new energy resources companies for that, private security community makes it imperative that
of the region overall could comple- guards might be able to prevent rigs these challenges be properly ad-
ment the Southern Corridor in the from being taken over, but are unlikely dressed.
medium term. This challenge will only to help them withstand an outright at-
be reinforced by existing plans to con- tack. A more remote threat scenario is 5. Energy Security in the
struct large-scale solar projects in the posed by the possible future transfer Maritime Environment of the
Southern Mediterranean, as well as by of energy from renewable sources via Eastern Mediterranean as an
possible future plans on new forms of undersea cables, which are much less Opportunity
renewable energy from the sea, such vulnerable to attacks. Nevertheless,
as wave energy, floating photovoltaic this possibility has also been referred The fact that the seas are associated
panels and biofuels produced from al- to. For the purpose of protecting such with critical economic interests that
gae. installations off-shore and along the require protection by military means
The risk implications of the offshore coast, Israel recently launched a plan is not new. All major trading powers
energy findings in the region add a sig- of adding new warships and subma- have always protected their interests
nificant new security dimension in this rines to it’s naval fleet and of deploy- with powerful Navy. What is new is
maritime environment. Disputes of the ing hundreds of soldiers in the area, the collective approach and coopera-
riparian states over maritime zones in order to protect above and beneath tion among partners in this field that
and possible asymmetric threats the water. In addition, Israel Air Force now acquires a central role in interna-
against energy assets in the region “Shoval” drones will patrol the area tional strategic planning. NATO and
reinforce fears. Turkey, Israel, Cy- and intelligence-gathering and radar the European Union are in a process
prus, Greece, Lebanon, the Palestin- equipment will be installed on the plat- of developing a particular strategy on
ians have already entered the fray and forms. Also, intelligence efforts have maritime security. They have also pri-
Egypt, Libya and Syria could follow. been refocused toward threats to the oritized energy security within this con-
Moreover, drilling platforms, expected maritime facilities. The threat is quite text and in their overall policies.
to be built at sea, and other related real, since, given the situation in the Modern challenges in the maritime
installations or transfer means are po- region, advanced weaponry fired from environment are particularly demand-
tential targets. Recently, Israel called Lebanon, the Gaza Strip or the Sinai ing for one country to face alone. The
on the EU to support the East Med Peninsula could threaten offshore fa- threats are common and the interests
pipeline project that would connect the cilities. For example, Hezbollah has that need to be safeguarded are mu-
natural gas fields in Israel and Cyprus threatened to protect the maritime tual. Moreover, this is a costly un-
to the EU via Greece. An LNG termi- assets of Lebanon warning Israel not dertaking, especially at this time of
nal at the coastal area of Vassilikos in to try to steal Lebanon’s resources. financial strain. It will, therefore, take
Cyprus is a complementary project of The organisation is thought to have a greater part of the financial burden
extreme importance that is still on the an arsenal of thousands of rockets, to be undertaken jointly. For all these
table. These energy assets could be midget submarines, exploding boats reasons, collective approaches are
highly vulnerable in case of a terrorist and armed private planes, which could deemed NATO and the EU should fo-
attack or during an armed conflict. A potentially reach targets in the Eastern cus on three main areas, namely the
possible attack on the rigs, for exam- Mediterranean. operational, the relevant infrastructure
ple, could include missiles launched Both the conventional and asymmet- and maritime diplomacy. The overall
from tens of kilometres away, proxim- ric challenges described above draw aim would be to prevent threats, such
ity attacks by frogmen, a collision with a rather complex and alarming pic- as terrorism, piracy, proliferation, and
an approaching boat or the intentional ture as regards energy security in the to ensure a safe environment for the
crashing of manned or unmanned air- maritime environment of the Eastern extraction and transport of energy.
crafts. While the drilling companies Mediterranean. The importance of the Maritime operations in the region are
are responsible for security within region for the economic and energy- important. NATO’s Operation Active
the rigs and they hire private security related interests of the Euro-Atlantic Endeavour is considered of utmost
11ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
importance for monitoring maritime time environment for energy transfer is now enhanced by its possible se-
communications in the Mediterranean. and production in the Eastern Medi- lection for the transit of future energy
The operation has proved valuable terranean and by cultivating a trust- resources from the periphery of Eu-
for the safe transportation of energy ing and cooperative environment with rope, by the increasing use of gas and
resources, but also for securing eco- Euro-Atlantic partners in the region, oil from the countries of North Africa
nomic activity in the Mediterranean in NATO and the EU could tap into the and the Middle East, as well as by its
general. multiple opportunities that the area own energy reserves. At the same
Infrastructure, such as the NATO Mari- can provide as regards energy secu- time, the Eastern Mediterranean has
time Interdiction Operational Training rity. been the scene of longstanding secu-
Centre (NMIOTC), plays an important rity challenges, while in recent years
role in enhancing maritime security by 6. Conclusions many more have emerged. These
providing expertise in boarding tech- challenges have a strong maritime
niques, by contributing to counterter- Energy security in the maritime envi- component and they could threaten
rorism missions in the Mediterranean ronment is one area that NATO and energy security in the maritime envi-
and by offering the relevant training. the EU are increasingly including in ronment. Due to the importance of the
Maritime diplomacy and multilateral their strategic planning, threat asses- region for Euro-Atlantic energy secu-
defense cooperation in the Eastern ments and policy making. The East- rity, a robust collective approach to the
Mediterranean should bridge inter- ern Mediterranean in particular is now security challenges emanating from
ests and threat assessments between emerging as a region, which requires the Eastern Mediterranean is required,
Euro-Atlantic institutions and the coun- special attention in this regard. The so that opportunities arising from this
tries of the region and it would cultivate geopolitical importance of the Eastern area can be better exploited.
trust with Euro-Atlantic partners. Mediterranean, a key maritime route
By ensuring collectively a safe mari- for the transfer of energy resources,
Marina Skordeli
Dr Marina Skordeli is the Director of the Jean Monnet European
Centre of Excellence of the University of Athens. In 2004-2009, she
served as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Greece,
Kostas Karamanlis. In 2002-2004, she held the position of Political
Advisor on European security and enlargement at the European
People’s Party, in Brussels. She holds a PhD on “The CSDP and
security in the Eastern Mediterranean”. She has been teaching,
lecturing and publishing in Greece and abroad on European defence,
security in the Eastern Mediterranean, maritime security and Greek foreign and defence policy.
12ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
Illicit Trafficking at Sea
Training opportunities at NMIOTC
by Ioannis Argyriou
Lieutenant Commander GRC (CG)
Instructor at NATO Maritime
Interdiction Operational Training
Center (NMIOTC)
Shipping is an important factor for the where these are committed. tion Operational Training Center
world trade as well as for the universal An imperative prerequisite for the (NMIOTC), an accredited NATO train-
economy, social cohesion and prosper- elimination or restriction of illegal acts ing center located in Crete-Greece,
ity of the people. Its safe conduction, at sea is to enhance the political and has proven a very successful tool. In
however, raises issues of maritime se- economic stability throughout the this Center, with its high value training
curity, which troubles the international world. Within this context the global infrastructure and certified educational
community to a great extent. In order community in cooperation with inter- expertise and procedures, a series
to take all the necessary measures national organizations (e.g. the Inter- of trainings are conducted as well as
to ensure the safe transportation of national Maritime Organization - IMO) training and developing bonds for fu-
people and goods in the marine en- are undertaking initiatives to eliminate ture collaboration among personnel
vironment, we have to be aware of a illegal acts through regional capacity from very different states. Theoreti-
wide spectrum of illegal actions that building or multinational allied law en- cal and practical training provided re-
are committed at sea, such as piracy, forcement operations. However, apart spond to a wide spectrum of maritime
armed robbery, human trafficking, drug from international initiatives or allied operation issues, while the conduc-
trafficking and the illegal transport of operations in international waters, a tion of joint practical exercises help to
weapons and dangerous substances/ key factor for controlling and hinder- evaluate the effectiveness of proce-
materials that can be used by terror- ing illegal acts at sea is the role and dures and any improvements required
ist organizations. The legal evaluation responsibilities of coastal states in the thereof. To enable learners to act in
and proper response to such actions region of their sovereignty. a realistic environment, the practical
depends highly on the maritime area To that aim, the Maritime Interdic- training takes place on fully equipped
13ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
mock ships as well as perfectly up-to- issues on Illicit trafficking and inter- public health, democratic institutions,
date simulators. All current trainings rogation Tactics. Moreover practical and economic stability across the
are focused on issues of criminal acts training is provided on mock up ships globe.
investigation in the maritime environ- on the subjects on crew control as well Global criminal activities are trans-
ment, providing a wide range of knowl- as on the techniques of searching of forming the international system,
edge from intracurricular fields, with area. changing the rules, creating new play-
the participation of officers from US/ The trafficking of human beings is ers and reconfiguring power in interna-
DEA, the Hellenic Police, the Interpol, viewed by the international community tional politics and economics. States
the US National Security Agency/Na- as a major concern and has been de- and international organizations have
val Criminal Investigation Service lo- scribed as amounting to modern day largely failed to anticipate the evolu-
cated in Chania and the Naval Hospi- slavery. A large number of men, wom- tion of transnational organized crime
tal of Crete as subject matter experts. en and children are victims of human into a strategic threat to governments,
One of the trainings which is going trafficking for different reasons (sexual, civil societies and economies.
to be conducted this year is the “Il- forced labor and other forms of exploi- Summarizing we can say that various
licit trafficking at Sea”. The particular tation). Moreover, drug trafficking is forms of illegal activities can take place
course covers extensively the need for another pervasive form of illicit traffick- in the marine environment. The inter-
training on the suggested subjects and ing that remains highly profitable and national community has taken steps to
aims to provide quality, sustainable, extremely difficult to control, despite reduce these phenomena by conduct-
and effective training for government increasing efforts by the international ing naval allied operations. However,
and state officials and practitioners community to contain and then reduce while the presence of coalition forces
who are engaged in policy develop- it. The mission of the traffickers is to may have reduced phenomena of il-
ment, law enforcement, intelligence get the drugs from the suppliers to the licit trafficking, it has not entirely elimi-
and interdiction operations aimed at consumer as efficiently as possible nated them. The coastal states play
countering illicit trafficking. Such traf- without being detected. In addition the an important role in this effort. Within
ficking may involve the illegal trade in illicit trafficking of firearms occurs in all this context, the NMIOTC is taking ini-
drugs, small arms and light weapons parts of the globe but is concentrated tiatives intended to enable the coastal
(SALW) as well as the smuggling of in areas afflicted by armed conflict, states to train their staff so as to per-
human beings and/or human organs. violence and organized crime, where form their duties more efficiently. Ad-
The objectives of these trainings is to the demand for weapons is often high- ditionally, one of the main objective of
improve the knowledge and skills of est. All of the above issues related these course is the exchange of views
trainees on human trafficking, drug with transnational organized crime. among the staff of these countries in
trafficking, firearms trafficking, Crime Transnational organized crime (TOC) order to achieve better and more ef-
Scene Investigation and Evidence poses a significant and growing threat ficient cooperation between them to-
Collection, Illicit trafficking related to national and international security, wards the common cause of enhanc-
organized crimes, biometrics, legal with dire implications for public safety, ing maritime security.
Ioannis Argyriou
Lieutenant Commander GRC (CG)
Instructor at NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC)
In 2001, he joined the Hellenic Naval Academy (Coast Guard Officers’ Cadet School) and in 2002 he
was sworn in as Ensign of the Hellenic Coast Guard. During his career in the Hellenic Coast Guard he has
served in a number of local Port Authorities. In March 2014 he was appointed a National Briefing Officer
and liaison by FRONTEX on issues of illegal immigrants. Since April 2014 he has been serving at NATO
Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC) as an instructor and an officer of primary
responsibility for the conduction of training events by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and
East Africa Standby Force (EASF). Moreover he coordinates the training for various groups from NATO
state members and other affiliated countries.
E-mail: argirioui@nmiotc.nato.int - johnarg00@yahoo.gr Mobile: (0030) 6974014100
14ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
TRENDS IN GLOBAL Energy
Economics, and Their
Implications for Maritime
Energy Infrastructure Security
and Related Interdiction
Training. byStephen L. Caldwell
Member, US National Maritime Security
Advisory Committee
15ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
Abstract
This paper discusses trends in energy ognizing this, NATO’s Strategic Con- also exploited tanker vessel vulnerabil-
economics and their impact on the cept emphasizes the importance of ities. Somali-based piracy off the Horn
security of maritime energy infrastruc- emerging threats that include counter- of Africa rose rapidly in 2008, peaked
ture. After revisiting selected terrorist terrorism and energy security. The in 2011, but has fallen to almost zero
and pirate attacks on tankers and off- Strategic Concept also emphasizes in recent years. According to GAO,
shore facilities, the paper summarizes an enhanced awareness of border and the recent decline in attacks was due
programs to protect such infrastruc- port security. Related to this, NATO to broad efforts to protect vessels in-
ture. The paper then discusses more has a designated organization—the cluding industry best management
recent trends such as the rise (and NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation- practices, private security companies,
subsequent fall) of piracy off the Horn al Training Centre (NMIOTC)—with and naval escorts—such as NATO’s
of Africa. More recently in other parts the mission to train member forces “Operation Ocean Shield.” However,
of the world pirates and other criminal for maritime interdiction. This paper, even during the peak in piracy off the
networks have specifically targeted developed for the June 2015 NMIOTC Horn of Africa, the impact on energy
energy infrastructure. Other develop- 6th Annual Conference, examines tankers was limited because many of
ments, such as sanctions against pa- several trends in energy economics, them were not the “slow and low” prey
riah countries provide additional chal- both long-term and short-term, and that the pirates preferred. One early
lenges in monitoring and interdicting discusses their implications for the exception was the tanker Sirius Star
tankers through international waters. NMIOTC program of training. which was slow and low, and reported
The paper also weaves in recent eco- to have stopped when approached by
nomic trends in energy markets—such Continued Threats to the pirates. But even in that case, the
as the fall in energy prices, the Ameri- Maritime Energy ransom of $3 million paid to pirates to
can Energy Renaissance and the rise release the tanker was far below the
of Liquefied Natural Gas as both a One of the long term trends in energy value of the oil cargo. This is a far dif-
commodity and vessel fuel. The pa- markets is continued security threats ferent situation than the more recent
per concludes with the implications of to maritime energy infrastructure— pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
these trends for maritime interdiction both vessels and facilities. Reports of and Southeast Asia, which will be dis-
and training the U.S. Government Accountability cussed later in this paper.
Office (GAO) have documented that
Key Words for more than 10 years, terrorist have GAO documented several steps that
exploited the vulnerabilities of energy have been taken to protect tankers.
Maritime; security; energy; offshore; tanker vessels. In general, tankers In response to the terrorist and pirate
piracy. are vulnerable to attack due to their threats, several protective measures
predictable schedules and routes, and have been taken at the national and in-
Introduction long voyages in open seas and politi- ternational level. In the United States,
cally unstable waters. As an example as in other nations, there are regula-
As an alliance that stretches across of predictable routes, tankers also sail tions and operations to protect tankers
many oceans and seas—the Atlan- through well-known choke points such visiting their ports. These activities,
tic, Baltic, and parts of the Mediter- as straits and canals. During these generally led by the U.S. Coast Guard
ranean—the North Atlantic Treaty Or- voyages, tankers are vulnerable to a (USCG) ensure that tankers—regard-
ganization (NATO) has the maritime number of types of attacks, including less of flag—meet national and inter-
security mission of protecting its sea suicide attacks, armed assaults, and national requirements to have security
lanes of communication. And as an al- stand-off missile attacks. Terrorist officers and security plans in place.
liance that produces and imports much have exploited these vulnerabilities, USCG and other federal agencies
of its oil and gas within and across the attacking the MS Limburg in 2002, and run security checks on the crews of
maritime domain, NATO must pay more recently, the MV Star in 2011. inbound energy tankers. Within U.S.
particular attention to the maritime ports, USCG and state and local har-
security of energy commodities. Rec- In addition to terrorists, pirates have bor police may escort tankers in and
16ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
out of port, based on risk, location and cost almost $40 million in lost revenue. facilities in the Gulf of Mexico. One
the availability of resources. In addi- Further, the explosion and sinking of threat to both tankers and facilities is
tion, based on a risk matrix, USCG the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the the so-called “small vessel threat” from
and other federal, state, and local part- Gulf of Mexico (which was admittedly anonymous and agile smaller boats
ner agencies may board and inspect not a terrorist attack) showed that a that could evade detection and use ex-
high-risk energy tankers arriving at major incident on an offshore facility plosives to attack energy infrastructure
U.S. ports. At the international level, could cause economic and environ- or other maritime targets. To address
the International Maritime Organiza- mental consequences in the billions this threat, the U.S. Department of
tion (IMO) adopted global standards of dollars. As late as 2011, US intelli- Homeland Security developed and is
for maritime security (the International gence reported that Al Qaeda was still working to implement its Small Vessel
Ship and Port Facility Security Code or interested in targeting maritime energy Security Strategy.
“ISPS” code). Also on the international infrastructure in western countries These past and ongoing threats to
front, USCG also visits and assesses (e.g., NATO members). More recently, maritime energy infrastructure do not
the security at foreign ports that are terrorist groups such as MEND in the necessarily indicate that any changes
departure points for vessels (including Niger Delta have attacked onshore are needed in NMIOTC interdiction
tankers) coming to the United States. and offshore energy facilities as part of training. While the threats to tankers
Finally, and as mentioned earlier, U.S. their political agenda. and facilities remain, protective mea-
and allied navies patrol high-risk inter- sures—such as those against small
national waters, such as piracy-prone Similar to tanker vessels, several vessel attacks—have been in place
waters off the Horn of Africa. steps have been taken to protect facili- by the United States and other NATO
ties. Of some 4,000 offshore energy members for several years. The chal-
Energy facilities, both in port and off- facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, GAO lenge in past years and continuing into
shore, also have vulnerabilities that found that about 50 meet the threshold the present is that military and law
have been exploited by terrorists. for USCG security regulations. These enforcement agencies have limited re-
GAO’s report on offshore facilities 50 offshore facilities—as with water- sources to ensure the security of tank-
noted they are particularly vulnerable side terminals—must have security of- ers and facilities against an unknown
due to their location in open waters, ficers and plans in place. The USCG threat that could strike in any place
far away from military or law enforce- approves such plans, and inspects the at any time. Also, the lack of action-
ment response assets. The locations facilities once per year to ensure com- able intelligence or a credible threat to
of these facilities is common knowl- pliance with their security plans. For domestic US ports—a situation that is
edge because of their concentration waterside terminals, and to a lesser several years old—makes it more dif-
in well-known areas such as the Gulf extent offshore facilities, USCG and ficult to justify more resources for mari-
of Mexico and the North Sea. Officials state and local harbor police conduct time security programs. But the limits
at some facilities are concerned that patrols based on risk, location and on resources to train or conduct pro-
small vessels carrying fishermen or the availability of resources. For the tective operations is a separate issue
divers frequently violate safety zones offshore facilities, USCG also estab- than whether the current tactical train-
around them and, in some cases, try lished an Area Maritime Security Com- ing needs to be changed. Given the
to attach their small vessels to the mittee for the Gulf of Mexico, to help long standing nature of these threats,
facilities. Terrorist have targeted and identify vulnerabilities, share informa- NMIOTC has already developed and
attacked such facilities, including two tion, and develop response and recov- delivered tactical training for these
offshore of Iraq in 2004. In that case, ery plans. Finally, US agencies have standard terrorist and piracy scenar-
terrorist using a speed boat with explo- held major exercises, such as the ios—and should continue to do so.
sives attacked the Al-Basrah and Kh- National Law Enforcement exercise in But the continued existence of these
war Al’Amaya oil terminals, killing three 2009 (also known as “NLE 2009”) to threats does not indicate that any ma-
U.S. sailors. In addition to the human test the US response to a terrorist at- jor change is needed in NMIOTC train-
cost, the loss of two days of operations tack on, among other things, offshore ing.
17ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SECURITY
Increasing Use of of goods throughout maritime termi- time interdiction mission. One thing to
Technology nals using conveyor belts or pipelines. monitor might be the development of
These systems are now frequently more sophisticated Mobile Offshore
Another long term trend in energy eco- networked to business operations sys- Drilling Units. It is not hard to think of
nomics is the continued transition to tems, and remote control centers, thus a scenario where NATO maritime forc-
new technology, sometimes in ways creating potential cyber vulnerabilities es may have to board such a vessel.
that create additional security chal- for hackers and criminals to exploit. Cyber technologies also should be
lenges. For several years, industry monitored, but raise more fundamen-
has worked to become more economi- Cyber security weaknesses in the tal questions about their relationship to
cally efficient by using more sophisti- maritime industry, including the energy the missions under discussion. While
cated technologies to find, recover, sector, are now widely recognized. the cyber threat is real, to what extent
store and distribute energy. Offshore Several recent studies in the United is cyber security a maritime interdic-
production continues to use new tech- States (by the Brookings Institution, tion issue? For example, is there a role
nology to move to deeper water (e.g., and GAO), Europe (By the European for offensive cyber operations to inter-
beyond 10,000 feet) and operate in Network and Information Security dict vessels that are suspected of be-
more harsh environments (e.g., the Agency), and Australia (by the Office ing hijacked or carrying contraband?
Arctic). The development of hydraulic of the Inspector for Transport Security) Cyber security also raises questions
fracturing (or “fracking”) of shale de- looked at maritime cyber security is- about the roles of industry versus
posits has led to significant recovery sues. The Australia study specifically government to secure cyberspace.
of oil and gas in previously unproduc- focused on offshore energy resources, Currently there is an ongoing debate
tive regions. The more sophisticated and made specific recommendations within NATO countries and NATO itself
facilities, and the desire to increase ef- related to cyber security. The several about who in their respective govern-
ficiency of operations, has led to more reports, while differing in their scope ments or militaries should take the
networked facilities with remote ac- and methodology, collectively raised lead for defensive and/or offensive
cess control. As an example, DNV GL five areas of concern and related rec- cyber operations. NATO needs to
recently announced its plans for “Soli- ommendations. These similar con- plan out its role, and then determine
tude” an unmanned floating LNG con- cerns were (1) maritime operations whether NMIOTC also plays a part
cept for remote offshore areas. And are growing more automated and in- in that role. If NATO does designate
with the continued trend toward com- terconnected, (2) stakeholder aware- cyber security as a role for NMIOTC,
plex technologies, the related regula- ness of cyber threats and their cyber then appropriate technical tactics and
tory regimes have also become more hygiene has been weak, (3) cyber training would need to be developed.
complex for national governments. vulnerabilities exist, with potentially And such cyber training would need to
harmful consequences to ports, (4) be integrated into the existing training
A key part of the transition to new tech- risk assessments to date have gener- program at NMIOC as appropriate.
nology has been the use of automa- ally focused on physical security and
tion in ways that create cyber vulner- not cyber security, and (5) threat infor- Falling Energy Prices
abilities. GAO found there has been a mation sharing is ad hoc and needs to
continued increase in the use of Indus- be improved. Moving from long-term energy trends
trial Control Systems, which are auto- to more recent trends, the prices of en-
mated systems used to control indus- The long term technology trends and ergy have fallen dramatically in the last
trial processes such as manufacturing, their implications for security—es- year. From June 2014 to June 2015,
product handling, production and dis- pecially cyber security—will require the market price of benchmark North
tribution. Specifically, these systems continued monitoring and decisions by Sea Brent oil fell from $115 to $50
are used to operate motors, pumps, NATO and NMIOTC. Overall, NMIOTC per barrel, and looks to continue fall-
valves, signals, lighting, access con- should monitor the development of any ing. Some observers, such as energy
trols, and to facilitate the movement technologies that may impact the mari- analyst G. Allen Brooks, most observ-
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