Next Generation Lebanon - July 2020 - British Council
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Next Generation Lebanon – July 2020
Acknowledgements
A special thanks to all of the young Saddem Jebali, Expert Reece Waldron, Research Adviser
people who took time to participate in and Project Manager
Jinan Arab, Field Trainer
Next Generation Lebanon and share Christine Wilson, Head of Research/
Yara Issa, Sophie Benson, and
their views and opinions. Director, Next Generation
Reem Al Ahmadieh, Coordination
Connecting Research to Joanna Abi Karam, Youssef Karaki, Disclaimer
Development (CRD) Stephanie Rouhana, Nour Tamer, The views expressed are those of the
Karina Goulordava, Researcher Rozana Tarabay, and Jana Yassine, authors and contributors and do not
Field Team necessarily reflect those of the
Racha Said, Researcher
Dr. Ziad Mansour, Senior Researcher British Council. Any errors and
Joe Estephan, Researcher omissions remain our own.
British Council
Lina Torossian, Researcher
Petra Kiwan, Project Manager
Atallah Al-Salim, Researcher
David Knox, Director, British Council
Hany Imad, Expert Lebanon
Contents Acknowledgements Forewords2 Executive summary 4 Introduction10 Youth identities in Lebanon 16 Daily lives of youth in Lebanon 28 Youth civic and political engagement 42 Effect of violence and conflict on youth in Lebanon 58 Youth aspirations, dreams and a global outlook 64 Conclusion: Social contract 72 Recommendations74 Appendix I: Research methodology 77 References82
2 > Next Generation Lebanon
Forewords
I am delighted to write the foreword to We heard the voices of young people Young people reported more
the Next Generation Lebanon report, as calling for an end to corruption and engagement in political discussions and
I was involved in developing the concept greater accountability; our research seeing new potential in formal political
for the first studies in the series over suggests that young people believe that processes, translating into an intention
10 years ago. I have seen colleagues in wasta is more important than qualifications to vote.
other countries gain valuable insights for obtaining a job. The survey shows
As conditions in Lebanon become more
and evidence for policy development that youth suffer from high unemployment,
challenging, there is a warning in our
from the young people with whom we which is getting worse as the economic
research that tensions are rising and that
work, both to inform our own crisis and the current Covid-19
sectarian divisions at the community
programming and to build a stronger pandemic impact further.
level have increased. Young people are
dialogue with host governments and In spite of this, the findings show that fearful that this tension and the growing
other stakeholders. young people value education, although economic and unemployment problems
The Next Generation research series we see that the financial burden will increase the likelihood of young people
seeks to understand and give voice to increasingly limit access. The current being drawn into violence or conflict.
economic crisis will make this burden Another worrying finding is the
young people, highlighting their
greater; we are seeing parents struggle proportion of young people who have
concerns and aspirations and feeding
to meet fees, and schools struggle to a desire to migrate to achieve their
these into policy and practice. The
remain viable. ambitions.
studies focus on countries undergoing
critical moments in transition. When we The research finds that those young Our research partners present
commissioned the research earlier in people who have missed out are conclusions and recommendation for us
2019, we did not know what a significant interested in routes back into ‘second and for others with a shared interest in a
year it would be – we were looking back chance’ education and training – we peaceful and prosperous Lebanon: to
to mark the 30th anniversary of the Taïf should see this as an opportunity. In begin to rebuild trust between young
Accord and, in part, to understand the addition, young people reported an people and the government, to provide
legacy of war on a generation of young interest in entrepreneurship, creating opportunities for education and
people who were born after the conflict. their own futures rather than waiting for employment, framed as building a new
employment in either the private sector social contract. The British Council is
The events of the 17 October uprising committed to making our small
(viewed as more attractive for better
gave us a view of the aspirations of contribution through working with all
career opportunities) or the public sector
young people, some of which are stakeholders, particularly young people
(viewed as offering greater job security).
captured in the findings of this report; if themselves, to meet these aspirations.
we had been listening more carefully, we Our data collection was interrupted by
might have predicted events. It is clear the events following 17 October, but we David Knox,
from our findings that the majority of are able to compare findings over this Director, British Council Lebanon
young people identify themselves as period: youth interest in politics grew,
Lebanese, and we later witnessed as whilst their support for political parties
young people rallied in the streets under fell. Trust in government fell, whilst their
the national flag. belief in their own agency grew.
Next Generation Lebanon > 3
I was born in Lebanon right after the end In Lebanon, as around the world, Lebanon has, time and time again, faced
of the civil war. I grew up thinking that financial and political power is jealously events that test the resilience of its
power had been relinquished by those guarded by a minority, and this has led people and their susceptibility to slide
who should not have it, and that peace not just to despair for some people, but back into conflict. But for the first time in
would abound. It did not take long for to disengagement and apathy. its fraught recent history, the political
me to discover that this was not the power sharing model is not only in serious
Yet the digital age has exposed young
case. The war had a legacy - for question, but it is virtually paralysed.
people to new ideas and concepts,
individuals, for the community, and for And the threats facing it are real.
growing their appetite for change. The
the region. That legacy does not only
communities that had for so long The World Bank is projecting that
belong to our parents, but also to us.
defined themselves by division and poverty will affect more than 50 per
The end of the war did not bring separation learned instead what cent of the population. The currency has
sustained reconciliation in the law or connects them. lost close to 70 per cent of its value to
wider society. Although the Taïf accord date. However, it is hard to see a
On 17 October, like many young
brought an end to the bloodshed, it did sustained push for genuine reform. We
Lebanese men and women, I was on the
not resolve the grievances and divisions still risk becoming polarised along
streets of Beirut to witness and partake
that led to it. After 15 years of conflict, identity and class lines. We need to
in an uprising with youth at its heart. We
displaced communities of varying break out of a political system that offers
spoke out not only against the sectarian
religious persuasions established new only benefits to small groups rather than
system and its ruling elite, but against
cities along post-war sectarian lines and trying to develop genuine change for
our own apathy. It was not only an
the diversification of the collective the benefit of all.
uprising against the old mindsets and
Lebanese character and conscience
stereotypes, but a public airing and Still, in the midst of this bleak context,
turned into its greatest challenge.
reckoning of our inherited traumas. there is hope. I do not believe that we
Within these newly delineated will repeat the mistakes of previous
We thought that this was the opportunity
boundaries, the post-war generation did years. And I do not believe that the
to capitalise on our failed experiences,
not grow up alongside one another. We answers lie only with political parties,
to unite, and to create a new Lebanon,
grew up separately, just as the regime nor with the ruling elites. This research
but our early optimism quickly faded.
had intended, and the promise of a offers answers that the outdated system
Standing on what would become one of
better, more egalitarian future was cannot, and allows space for voices of
the epicentres of the revolution in Beirut,
withheld. Due to our patriarchal system, the next generation to be heard, and
the Ring Bridge, we feared the sound of
the masculine rhetoric of ‘the glory of their energy and agency put into
violence was louder than the sound of
war’ has always prevailed; it is an attempt practice.
reason. Watching some political actors
to justify what comes after. As a result,
attempt to manipulate the situation, we Here, then, is an opportunity as well as
it has taken precedence over another
realised the complex nature of the an invitation for thinkers, academics,
more searing truth, which is the forgotten
system we were trying so hard to policymakers and youths to seize the
suffering during the war years.
dismantle, and that positive change is moment and start thinking of a new
In this hostile environment, in which hard to attain. This resurrection of model, a new social contract that is
inequality pervades and where there is sectarian rhetoric and beating of the more reflective of the aspirations of the
little imagination or intellectual rigour in drums of war made us question our Lebanese and the next generation. It is
civic leadership, young people looked ability to make that change. the only choice we have.
elsewhere for their future. Nevertheless, we persisted.
Ralph Baydoun
4 > Next Generation Lebanon
Executive summary
Thirty years since the end of the Civil Lebanon’s– but also raised questions Key findings
War and signing of the Taïf Accord, related to trust between state and
which gave rise to new peace and hope society, the quality of and access to Youth identities in Lebanon
for Lebanon, the country finds itself in healthcare systems, as well as This theme explored how Lebanese,
another period of crisis and uprising, highlighting the resounding resilience Syrian, and Palestinian youth construct
and young people’s voices are at the and spirit of communities. their identities and how these constructs
centre of the outcry. influence their views on and
As part of the Next Generation research
relationships with youth from religious,
At the time of data collection and series, which uplifts youth voices in
political, and national backgrounds
writing, Lebanon continued to be in the countries undergoing a period of
different than their own.
midst of profound change. The uprising significant change, the aim of Next
that began on 17 October 2019 Generation Lebanon is to provide an The construction of a national identity
vocalised the increasingly difficult honest perspective on young people’s by young Lebanese is a complex and
circumstances of life in Lebanon lives in Lebanon, drawing on the diverse convoluted process. Two-thirds of
cemented by a multi-layered financial, voices of youth in the country, including Lebanese youth overwhelmingly identify
banking, and debt crisis, with youth at Lebanese, Palestinians, and Syrians. themselves as Lebanese, and the other
the forefront of demands for change. British Council Lebanon commissioned third build their identity along religious
Young people across Lebanon have Connecting Research to Development lines. Family narratives and oral history
taken to the streets and social media (CRD) to conduct the study. remain the key routes through which
and established new platforms to voice Using quantitative and qualitative youth acquire knowledge about the
their opinions, criticisms, and priorities methods, CRD was able to thoroughly country’s history in the absence of
and engage in less-formal modes of assess different aspects of youth lives. unified history curricula in schools. For
political participation. Youth are fighting Data collection was conducted between this reason, 62 per cent of Lebanese
to bring about a new political system to September and December 2019, with youth do not believe that there is a
not only improve their daily lives but also 2089 participants aged between 15 and unified Lebanese identity. The lack of a
to allow for a brighter future for 29. Data collection was temporarily unified Lebanese identity 30 years after
themselves and their country. They are disrupted by the general security the end of the Civil War highlights the
also using this opportunity to wash away conditions in the country between potential need for a renewed social
entrenched sectarianism within the October – December 2019. However, contract that prioritises social
country’s social structures and to pave these events also provided an reconciliation and finds a ‘label’ under
the way for a more unified Lebanon. opportunity to better gauge the which Lebanese can find unity.
Furthermore, the write up of this demands and aspirations of the youth of
Living in prolonged displacement, Syrian
research was finalised at a time when Lebanon at this critical point, and these
and Palestinian youth in the country
Lebanon, and the wider world, faced findings were integrated into the report.
battle questions of identity in a context
unprecedented uncertainty caused by
The report explores and is organised of uncertain futures. As Palestinians
the Covid-19 pandemic. This global according to five key research themes: have been living in exile for over 70
challenge has not only negatively youth identities, daily lives, civic and years and face an increasingly stagnant
affected economies and worsened political engagement, conflict and conflict, their given citizenship and
those already struggling – including violence, and dreams and aspirations. ‘sharing a common enemy’ are the key
Next Generation Lebanon > 5
constructs of their identity. While Syrians Youth in Lebanon are motivated to the statement that ‘people from other
hold a low sense of belonging to pursue education, yet many struggle countries living in Lebanon take jobs
Lebanon, a large number of Palestinians due to financial barriers, leading to 20 away from the Lebanese’. Female youth
– who have lived their entire lives in the per cent of youth dropping out of in Lebanon face even more challenges
country – expressed feelings of school. In higher education, accessibility related to employment. While most
belonging during discussions and a is again limited due to the high cost of surveyed youth believe that women
demand for a basic set of rights, which tertiary education and the scarcity of should have the same rights to work
are currently denied to refugee scholarships for those who are in
outside the home as men, the majority
populations in the country. financial need. While financial burdens
of youth agreed that employment
limit access to higher education, youth
Young people’s identities lead them to opportunities remain unequal between
also question the relevance of their
hold a variety of values and beliefs young men and young women. Of youth
degrees with over half of working youth
regarding how they relate to individuals who were not already self- employed,
holding a university degree stating that
from ‘other’ backgrounds. At the most nearly two-thirds expressed interest in
the diploma they obtained is not relevant
intimate levels, when seeking to build a setting up their own business. However,
to their current employment.
family, Lebanese youth are unlikely to youth require increased access to
marry someone from a different Overall, while they acknowledge the
capital and skills training on running a
religious or political background or importance of education, 71 per cent of
business, as these are the main barriers
someone who is Syrian or Palestinian. youth in Lebanon also believe that
to launching businesses and becoming
Lebanese youth have diverse sets of personal connections or wasta are more
entrepreneurs.
friends that include youth from various important than their qualifications for
religious, political, and national obtaining a job. Youth civic and political
backgrounds. This positive social engagement
With high youth unemployment rates
cohesion was demonstrated in the
and the ongoing financial crisis, youth At the community level, generally youth
survey as youth perceived themselves
face an increasingly challenging labour are not members of any organisations,
to hold more tolerant and accepting
market. Approximately 17 per cent of associations or scout groups,
attitudes than those of older
surveyed youth were unemployed. demonstrating low levels of community
generations.
Youth outside of the capital particularly participation. In political engagement,
Daily lives of youth in Lebanon youth also exhibit low levels of
struggle to find opportunities, as
To develop a more nuanced centralisation in Lebanon has involvement in the formal political
understanding of the struggles in young concentrated most jobs in Beirut. Tight process. Three-quarters of youth are not
people’s daily lives, this study focused competition in the labour market has members of any political group or
on youth employment and education increased tension between Lebanese organisation, and 63 per cent do not
and identified prospects for potential and non-Lebanese youth, with 81 per support a political party, regardless of
intercessions. cent of Lebanese youth agreeing with their nationality and voting eligibility.
6 > Next Generation Lebanon
Our study reveals multiple reasons for Second, support for political parties fell, country. Further, in discussions with
this low political engagement, such as and support for a new political system youth across the country, the section
youth believing that the existing political increased. Third, while Lebanese young sought to solicit their opinions on the
parties do not represent them and are people’s trust in their government culture of violence present in Lebanon.
corrupt, and that youth voices are not decreased (down to 20 per cent from 33
per cent), their belief in themselves as Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian youth
heard when political decisions are being
agents of influence and change grew are no strangers to the armed conflicts
made. Youth engagement is likely
significantly (up to 42 per cent from 19 that have taken place throughout their
to increase only under a different
per cent). Fourth, since the start of the countries’ histories. While half of
political system.
uprising, surveyed Lebanese youth Lebanese youth believe that the
As the study included 1,030 complete reported that they began to engage generation that lived through the Civil
surveys prior to and 1,059 after the more frequently in political discussions War holds views different from their own,
uprising, the collected data were with their friends and were more likely to a substantial one-third see the younger
disaggregated pre/post October 17 to use social media to express their populations as still affected by the
explore how youth engage with politics. political opinions on an issue. Finally, history of the war. Although many youth
although youth have engaged in politics feel less affected by past conflicts, they
Despite the monumental nature of the through various means and platforms
1989 Taïf Accord, prior to the uprising are increasingly worried about the
throughout the uprising, an increased
51 per cent of Lebanese youth stated outbreak of future war or fighting. More
number stated that they intend to vote in
that they had never heard of the than half believe that over the past ten
the next scheduled elections, meaning
agreement. Following the start of the years, tensions in Lebanon have
that they saw new potential in formal
uprising, 75 per cent of Lebanese youth political processes. The ongoing worsened due to sectarian divisions at
had heard of Taïf. Most youth criticised uprising demonstrates how youth the community level and that, overall,
the accord for deepening sectarianism communicate their needs and the tensions among different sects in
in the country, generating a system that platforms that are effective. These Lebanon are growing.
was more corrupt than before, and should be studied and understood by The rise in these tensions is the main
consolidating international influence stakeholders working with youth to
concern regarding the outbreak of
over Lebanon. The October 17 uprising improve youth outreach and
future conflict. Furthermore, one-
brought about a new source of programming.
quarter of youth also consider the
confidence among youth regarding Effects of violence and conflict economic crisis as a potential factor that
political participation that is reflected on the youth in Lebanon could lead to a future struggle, and
in this research.
In this theme, survey questions explored significantly, most youth believe that
First, Lebanese youth interest in politics young people’s relationship to the Civil unemployment increases the likelihood
in the country grew to 40 per cent from War and their considerations regarding of a young person becoming involved in
27 per cent. the potential for future conflict in the armed violence or conflict.Next Generation Lebanon > 7
Youth aspirations and Conclusion and The initial findings of this research were
global outlook recommendations presented at a roundtable to an
audience of stakeholders which included
This theme explores the hopes and Overall, the report findings across the
dreams of youth in Lebanon, as well as a discussion on recommendations
five themes culminate with an
the reasons why most youth seek to based on the findings. Considering the
understanding that the existing
emigrate. It concludes with a look at how undeniable change that will take place
sectarian system limits national unity in a
youth view other countries as negatively during and after the Covid-19 pandemic,
Lebanese identity, results in personal
or positively impacting Lebanon. the recommendations propose solutions
connections or wasta being more
to the challenges raised in this report.
At present, youth regard the lack of important than education to obtain
The recommendations explore effective
employment opportunities, financial employment and other opportunities,
pathways for community and political
difficulties, and corruption as an diminishes young people’s enthusiasm
engagement, to build trust between
interwoven web of challenges that for political engagement, and is the most
communities and the state, improving
prevents them from achieving their likely cause of a future conflict. Finally, it
access to and quality of education, and
dreams. Thereby, migration remains one creates a system that withers the hopes
of the key aspirations for youth in supporting youth participation in the
and dreams of youth and results in youth
Lebanon, with 71per cent stating that labour market.
considering leaving Lebanon for better
they would like to migrate to another livelihoods and opportunities. However,
country for better job opportunities; a young people’s continued resilience and
decision of conflict due to having to enthusiasm, as well as a strong belief
leave their friends and families. that many in their generation have
From a global perspective, Lebanese moved beyond the sectarian mind-set of
youth view European countries, the their parents and grandparents, provide
United States and the UK as the a unique and timely opportunity to
countries with the most positive engage with youth to create a stronger
influence on Lebanon. The and more prosperous Lebanon for the
concentration of perceived positive current youth and future generations.
influence among Western countries is Situating this within the context of the
unsurprising, as they do not fall along October 17 uprising, a clear need for a
sectarian lines, in comparison to new social contract between the citizens
regional countries such as Saudi Arabia and the state has emerged. The needs
or Iran. While Lebanon remains of the people, including youth, are not
negatively affected by several regional being met under the current structure,
conflicts, Israel was viewed as the and youth are demanding more from the
country with the most negative
ruling institution.
influence on Lebanon, followed by the
United States, who is thus viewed both
positively and negatively by youth.10 > Next Generation Lebanon
Introduction
Next Generation series Next Generation Lebanon Study sample and
Next Generation Lebanon is part of the and research aims thematic focus
British Council’s Next Generation global
Next Generation Lebanon was initiated The focus of the project was on young
research, initiated in countries that are
in light of the various changes taking adults aged between 15 and 29 across
experiencing a period of significant
place and leading up to the 30th each of the regions of Lebanon. The
change. The aim of Next Generation is to
anniversary of the Taïf Accord that in research looks at Lebanese, Syrian and
ensure that young people’s voices are
heard and their interests are properly 1989 brought an end to the country’s Palestinian youth living in Lebanon for at
represented in decisions that will have 15- year Civil War. At the beginning of least 5 years. A total of 2,089 participants
lasting implications for their lives and this research, Lebanon was were surveyed, with 1,591 being Lebanese,
futures. It gauges young people’s views experiencing a period of political 260 Syrian, and 238 Palestinian. The gender
around education, employment and change due to the formation of a new breakdown was nearly equal, at 52 per cent
lifestyle, as well as uncovering their government, which gave hope for the male and 48 per cent female. Youth were
hopes and fears for their country, their creation of opportunities for youth. divided into three age categories of
degree of political engagement, their During fieldwork and towards the study’s 15-18, 19-24, and 25-29 years old to
views on the wider world, and the values conclusion, Lebanon experienced a allow for age disaggregation within the
and beliefs that affect their lives. Next popular uprising across the country. analysis phase and understand the
Generation research seeks to support The October 17 uprising is unique in the particular challenges and opportunities
better youth policymaking to ultimately period following the Civil War, as it has faced by each age group. Participants
encourage youth engagement to allow particularly targeted the current were asked to provide their confession,
young people to become the next
sectarian system and highlighted the with options including Christian
generation of influencers, leaders, and
corruption of the ruling elite. The denominations (Maronite, Catholic,
shapers of their countries.
uprising was spurred by a financial crisis Orthodox, and Armenian Orthodox),
This introduction details and situates the plaguing the country. The uprising Muslim denominations (Shiite, Sunni),
research within Lebanon’s historical and continues, and its outcomes are still as well as Druze and Alawi. Participants
more recent events, providing an unfolding. could also state no affiliation, other, or
understanding of youth in Lebanon and refuse to respond. While most data were
an overview of how Lebanon reached its Because of this critical juncture in
not disaggregated by religion, when
current circumstances. The introduction Lebanon’s trajectory, as well as the likely
relevant, analysis includes disaggregation
also explains how the report is fallout of Covid-19, this research can
along confessional lines. Overall, the
structured and offers some details on shed light on the thoughts, aspirations
demographics included age, gender,
how we identified the youth of Lebanon and opinions of youth before and during
marital status, physical disability,
and what topics we focused on in a profound moment of uncertainty, hope
economic class, religion, and region of
the research. and undeniable change.
the participants for all three nationalities.Next Generation Lebanon > 11
As a note on how the data are presented, Note on Covid-19 Chapter 3 – Youth civic and political
‘youth’ or ‘all youth’ refers to the full engagement in Lebanon first
sample, regardless of nationality. When As the data was collected prior to the discusses youth understandings of and
nationality is relevant to a finding, the Covid-19 pandemic, and with Lebanon’s
engagement with their communities,
first recorded case being confirmed in
nationality of the youth will be specified, youth political engagement, as well as
February 2020, the data does not reflect
for example, ‘Lebanese youth’ or their opinions of the current political
insight into the impact Covid- 19 has had
‘Palestinian youth’. system. Furthermore, the chapter
on youth in Lebanon. However, many
highlights populations, such as
Although Syrians and Palestinians are pertinent discussions that were raised
Palestinian and Syrian youth, who
generally not citizens of Lebanon, they by young people prior hold pressing
are largely excluded from political
comprise a significant per centage of importance and relevance when thinking
processes. Finally, the chapter
the total residents of Lebanon. Nearly all about how Lebanon and the wider world
concludes with a discussion on
Palestinian youth were born in Lebanon, will be changed and impacted by the
changes observed in young people’s
and since 2011, upwards of 1.5 million global pandemic. Throughout the report,
political engagement since the
Syrians have sought refuge in the country. preliminary reflections are included.
October 17 uprising.
These two refugee populations play
Report structure
significant roles in the country and affect Chapter 4 – Effects of violence and
social dynamics, politics, and the economy. Chapter 1 – Youth identities in conflict on the youth in Lebanon
Lebanon examines and compares how examines the type of violent conflicts
The October 17 uprising began while
Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian youth that youth encounter at the macro and
the study was halfway through data identify themselves and which affiliations micro levels. Furthermore, this section
collection, resulting in 1,030 survey help construct these identities. This probes the generational differences in
responses prior to and 1,059 after the chapter details young people’s views on the effects of the country’s Civil War on
uprising began. During analysis, the discrimination, acceptance of others,
youth and their parents’ generation.
data was disaggregated pre/post and relationships with individuals from
uprising to identify any significant backgrounds different than their own. Chapter 5 – Hopes and dreams of
differences in responses. The data the youth in Lebanon explores young
Chapter 2 – Daily lives of youth in
remained largely consistent across all people’s aspirations and the barriers
Lebanon delves into experiences in
themes, except for political that stand in the way of those dreams.
education and employment. In particular,
engagement. Thus, Chapter 3 includes it details the challenges faced by youth The chapter discusses migration trends
a section on how the uprising has and their views on the educational and the views that youth hold about
influenced youth political engagement. system and the labour market. other countries.12 > Next Generation Lebanon
Lebanese context Education Minister Hassan Diab with Lebanon one of the most economically
forming the country’s next government affected countries by the pandemic
The aim of this section is to define the and designated him prime minister. (Reuters, 2020). Around 50 per cent of
context in which the Next Generation On January 21, 2020, Diab formed a Lebanese are said to be under the poverty
study takes place, first by discussing the 20-minister cabinet consisting mostly line, and Social Affairs Minister Ramzi
impact of the ongoing uprising, followed of technocrats who were chosen by Moucharafieh declared that 75 per cent
by a look at the history and recent events political parties. On February 11, of Lebanese require some type of aid
in Lebanon that led to the current situation the cabinet managed to win a vote of (Azhari, 2020b). At the level of public
in the country. A brief overview of the confidence in Parliament. However, health, Lebanon avoided a catastrophic
present context will ensure a better hundreds of people protested that day, outbreak of the virus, and the overall
understanding of the study’s findings. voicing their resentment of the new public health response has been seen
Since 17 October 2019 cabinet, which resulted in clashes as effective (Sly, 2020). However, the
between protestors and security forces. government’s socio-economic response
On 17 October 2019, mass protests
demonstrated a lack of capacity by
spread across Lebanon shortly after the Since the October 17 uprising, increasingly the government to help its citizens.
government announced new austerity limited capital controls have been put in The government announced plans to
measures, including a planned tax on place. Unofficial exchange rates on the distribute 400,000 LBP to 150,000
free phone calls over the instant black market have skyrocketed. The families in need, although the number of
messaging application ‘WhatsApp’. After severe shortage of US dollars threatened approved families is far below the target
years of concealed rallying against to disrupt supplies of imported goods, at time of writing (Azhari, 2020b).
electricity and water shortages, as well in particular fuel, medicine and medical Otherwise, most economic and food
as government mismanagement and supplies, and food. The Lebanese assistance has been provided by NGOs,
deterioration of economic conditions, economy is extremely dependent on community led initiatives, religiously
hundreds of thousands of peaceful imports, as local production is severely affiliated associations, and some
protesters gathered in cities across limited. Food prices have already municipalities. Disregarding the
the country. People of different ages, exhibited significant increases since the lockdown, protests have broken out in
religious sects, and social backgrounds middle of October, affecting families and many cities, with anger over the further
took to the streets, blaming the ruling most critically those under the poverty fall of the Lebanese Lira, rising cost of
elite for corruption and the financial line (World Food Programme, 2019). At basic needs, hikes in unemployment
crisis engulfing the country. the time of this writing, many consider rates, political inaptitude, and the
Shortly after the start of mass the devaluation of the Lebanese lira additional financial hardships brought
demonstrations, the government imminent – and with it, a substantial loss on by the pandemic (Azhari, 2020b).
announced a set of measures aimed at of income for the lower social and
While the long-term effects of the global
pacifying the street. The suggested economic classes in particular (Halabi
pandemic, the uprising and the
economic reforms announced by the and Boswall, 2019). The crisis is
effectiveness of its tactics will continue
cabinet included the cancellation of expected to further worsen poverty
to be studied and debated in the coming
proposed taxes and slashing the state among Lebanese citizens and refugees,
years, three effects from the uprising
deficit. Demonstrations continued in as well as widen income inequality.
can be identified that also mirror the
main Lebanese cities, with protestors The Covid-19 pandemic and the findings discussed throughout the
chanting, ‘All of them means all of them’, subsequent nation-wide lockdown report in more detail.
and demanding accountability from the which began on March 15, 2020 has
First, media coverage and literature on
entire ruling class. After nearly two further exacerbated the financial crisis
the uprising highlight that youth in
weeks of protests, under popular in Lebanon.
Lebanon are eager and willing to
pressure, Prime Minister Saad Hariri The closure of all but essential
participate in political and civic
announced his resignation. businesses surged financial worries
processes. This is also supported by the
among most residents of the country.
After multiple setbacks, on December 16, study’s data on political participation
The country’s economy is expected to
President Michel Aoun tasked former when disaggregated pre/post October
shrink by 12 per cent this year, makingNext Generation Lebanon > 13
17 uprising. The nation-wide uprising issues that have been exacerbated by The war decimated economic and
has seen significant youth participation, the global pandemic and issues relating physical infrastructure resulted in severe
including strikes by both high school to the state’s response. human losses, and led to radical
and university students, as well as the divisions along sectarian and political
History and recent events
organisation of discussion or debate lines. Sectarian and political divisions
of Lebanon
tents in the squares of major cities were accentuated significantly after the
(Osseiran, 2019). The protests that have The Republic of Lebanon was established assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq
filled the streets and squares of many by the enacted Lebanese Constitution of Hariri in 2005 and resulted in the
cities are replete with youth expressing 1926 and won its independence from formation of two major blocs: March 8
their opinions. France on November 22, 1943. Lebanon (pro-Syria) and March 14 (pro-Western
is a parliamentary democracy and allies), which both dominated the political
Second, the sectarian system is losing formally based on the principles of sphere for more than 10 years after
further support at the social level, as separation, balance, and co-operation Hariri’s assassination. Divisions
demonstrations took place across the amongst the powers. For all important escalated further following the 2006
country and chants targeted every political and administrative functions, Israeli War, which resulted in 1,200
sectarian leader. Indeed, a resounding quotas have been established along the
message in media coverage of the casualties, over 4,000 wounded, and
lines of the 1932 census, as stipulated in 15,000 homes destroyed. Most recently,
uprising showed that the Lebanese were the National Pact of 1943, with the census
proud to highlight the unity that existed Lebanon came under increased pressure
yet to be updated. The president of
amongst the people on the street. as a result of the Syrian conflict, which
Lebanon (a Maronite Christian) is the
began in 2011 and resulted in an influx
Third, the Taïf Accord was rejected by head of state and the symbol of its unity.
of approximately 1.5 million refugees
the people, as voiced throughout the Parliament elects the president for a
into the country (Tan, 2015).
uprising and supported in the survey single term of six years. Executive power
data with youth. A popular discussion is entrusted to the Council of Ministers, Despite historically being active in civic
throughout the uprising declared that which drafts general policy and oversees and political life, the Lebanese
finally, the Civil War had ended amongst its execution in accordance with the institutional system and policymaking
the people, thereby revealing that Taïf effective laws. The president appoints process typically regard the country’s
had never achieved social reconciliation the head of the council, i.e., the prime youth as a marginal group. Throughout
in its 30 years of implementation. minister (a Sunni Muslim), in consultation Lebanon’s history, youth have been
Collectively, these effects lead to the with Parliament. involved in the conflicts, struggles, and
argument for the need of a new social uprisings of the country as fighters,
Legislative power is in the hands of
contract between society and the state. peacemakers, activists, and protesters.
Parliament, with the speaker of the
While Lebanese society has expressed Alongside the conflicts listed above,
Chamber of Deputies being a Shia
this need through protests in the streets popular uprisings and protests have
Muslim. The 128 parliamentary seats are
and squares, many commentators and taken place in the country, with patterns
distributed according to confession, with
actors (including in politics) have also of high youth involvement, including in
members elected in general elections
publicised the discussions on the push the country’s struggle for independence.
for a four-year term. According to the
forward to develop a new social contract In recent history, youth have witnesses
constitution, local elections are held
(Al-Monitor, 2019; Itani, 2019; Mikdashi, and participated in the 2005 Cedar
once every six years.
2019; Yahya, 2019; Yahya, 2020). Such a Revolution which ousted the Syrian
contract we argue, would need to have Since its founding, Lebanon has faced Army from Lebanon, 2015 ‘You Stink’
the voices and ideas of young people at significant internal power struggles, protests as a response to the country’s
its centre in order to address not only combined with economic inequality, and waste crisis, and now the ongoing
youth concerns and challenges, but ultimately culminating in the Civil War October 17 uprising. Youth have also led
those facing the country as a whole. that began in April 1975. Nearly 15 years numerous political, social, and
Such a contract would also need to later, in November 1989, the Taïf Accord humanitarian activist efforts across
ensure a way of dealing with the pressing was ratified, ending the Civil War. various fields.14 > Next Generation Lebanon
In 2016, Michel Aoun1 was elected of young people in Lebanon, exploring women and men aged 15–29 who are
president of the republic. Two years political, economic, educational, and Lebanese, Syrian, or Palestinian and
later, Lebanon saw the first parliamentary social experiences and histories to have lived in Lebanon for at least five
elections since 2013. Following, a national provide a strong contextual understanding years. Topics covered by the survey
unity government was formed that was of young people in Lebanon. include demographic characteristics,
headed by Prime Minister Saad Hariri identity, political participation and trust,
For data collection, a mixed-methods
and included representatives of different education and employment, aspirations
approached was utilised. Qualitatively,
and the future of Lebanon. Qualitative
political factions. Nevertheless, the two tools were used: auto-driven photo
and quantitative data collection was
government was challenged by severe elicitation (APE) and photovoice
conducted in parallel between
socio-economic conditions with increased discussions (PVD). APE can be understood
September and December 2019.
levels of poverty and unemployment. as a type of interview with participants
Furthermore, trouble in the banking who explain the images they have Within the report, each of the five
sector lessened the investment of foreign captured and their experiences as they themes are discussed in a chapter, using
currency in Lebanon, which also led to understand them. Participants took relevant quantitative and qualitative data
an economic decline (Halabi and photographs of their environment to collected throughout the phases of
elicit information about their experiences research. When relevant, the results
Boswall, 2019). Although it committed to
and opinions. PVDs are a community- have been compared with other recent
reforms made under the 2018 CEDRE
based method that allows participants to findings from previous national and
Conference —an international aid
identify the barriers they encounter in international research studies to ensure
conference for Lebanon—the government
life and their possible causes. This method a deeper understanding of the political,
failed to implement any of the measures economic, educational, and social
is a type of focus group that uses
agreed upon with the donors. International impacts on youth residing in the country
photography to guide the conversation
donors at the conference pledged to and placing the conversation about
and in which participants become
grant soft loans for the establishment youth in Lebanon.
co-creators of knowledge; researchers
of investment projects totalling
facilitated the process. These tools More detailed information about
$11.8 billion in value. helped to delve deeper into young the methodology can be found in
people’s inner thoughts regarding Appendix I.
Methodology different aspects of their lives.
For the Next Generation report, data Quantitatively, the research relied on a
collection and analysis took the nation-wide household survey adopting
following approach. A literature review a stratified two-stage cluster sampling
was carried out to provide an overview design. The survey targeted young
1 > Aoun is a former army general and Head of the Lebanese Army from 1984 and 1988. He opposed the Taif Accord since it allowed Syrian troops to remain in
Lebanon. In 1990, Aoun was forcibly ousted by Syrian-led forces and he was exiled to France. Soon after Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in spring 2005,
Aoun returned to the country. Aoun was the former head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) – one of the major political parties in Lebanon.16 > Next Generation Lebanon
Youth identities
in Lebanon
Constructing identity Despite a Palestinian presence in the These four districts are homogenously
country dating back to 1948 and Christian, with only minority populations
in Lebanon Palestinian youth being born in Lebanon, of other religions, and are historically
Lebanon, a country of 6 million people,2 they do not hold a full set of basic rights, Christian dominant. Regardless of the
is one of diversity and difference, and this creates barriers to education, age group, ‘Lebanese’ as an identity
resulting in individual, communal and employment, residence, home ownership, remains the most common, and
national identity being contested across and political participation, amongst other significantly increases with age (Figure
sectarian, political and cultural divides. areas. For Syrian youth, the prolonged 1); conversely, identifying by religion
The vernacular expression of identity crisis in their country has imposed declines with age. Identifying as ‘Arab’
has often been seen as a product of tremendous political, economic and was the third most common choice;
one’s sectarian community, resulting in socio-cultural effects that have influenced thus, a regionally ethnic understanding
the perpetuation of social stigmas that all aspects of their lives and subsequently of the identity of Lebanese youth trails
attach citizens to a labelled identity. As their identity. Discrimination against behind national or religious adherences.
mentioned by our respondents as a them has fomented exclusion. The legal
common practice, simply revealing an contests regarding labour and residency
individual’s hometown often results in raise new and challenging questions
assumed stereotypes related to religion, regarding the future of Syrian displaced
politics, and sect. Since the end of the identity in a context of fervent national
Civil War in 1990, subsequent governments debate and bilateral tensions between
have failed to produce a unified history
Syria and Lebanon.
curriculum that includes events post
1943, leaving a certain liberty for The question of identity for
schools to decide how and whose Lebanese youth
particular post-1943 history is taught Many indications point to the fact that
and thus the creation of numerous the majority of Lebanese youth hold
narratives that impact how young firmly onto their Lebanese identity.
people in Lebanon understand When asked ‘Which of the following best
themselves and others. describes your identity?’3 68 per cent of
In this chapter, the research dives Lebanese youth responding to the
deeper into how identity is constructed, survey chose ‘Lebanese’, while 35 per
understood and impacts the lives and cent identified themselves along
relationships of young people in Lebanon. religious lines (Figures 2 and 3), most
In addition to Lebanese youth, the chapter commonly among Christians of the
also explores experiences of Syrian and north, mainly in the districts of Koura,
Palestinian youth living in Lebanon. Zgharta, Bcharre, and Batroun.
2 > Including Lebanese and refugee populations, according to latest World Bank data.
3 > Lebanese youth, 15-29 years old (N=1591); the question asked participants to select all that apply from a list of 8 choices.Next Generation Lebanon > 17
Figure 1: To the question, ‘which of the following best describes your identity?’ answers disaggregated by age4
100%
80%
74.0%
69.3%
60%
54.7%
40%
27.9%
24.1% 25.2%
20%
22.5%
19.8% 19.4%
17.9%
15.1%
13.0%
10.0% 8.7%
6.2%
0%
15–18 years 19 –24 years 25–29 years
Lebanese Christian Arab Islamic Phoenician
Figure 2: Lebanese youth who identified along religious lines; answers disaggregated by religion5
70%
60% 64.5%
50% 53.3%
51.3%
40%
41.9%
30%
33.3%
20%
19.9%
10%
2.2% 0.0%
0%
Orthodox Maronite Catholic Sunni Armenian Shiite Druze Alawi
Orthodox/
Catholic
4 > Lebanese youth, 15-29 years old (N=1591), question asked participants to select all that apply from a list of 8 choices.
5 > Lebanese youth who identified along religion lines N=56918 > Next Generation Lebanon
Figure 3: Lebanese youth who identified along religious lines; answers disaggregated by age
15 –18 years 43.4%
19 –24 years 36.8%
25–29 years 27.3%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
In Lebanon, the sectarian system is Lebanon is divided into different sects, Their [youth] identity is constructed
formed along religious denominations. each region is characterized by its based on how they were raised at
Since the country’s independence, sect. Each sect has its own believes, home or how they’re being raised in
sectarian groups have affiliated with and based on it, the individual starts school. [This] doesn’t give them any
various regional actors to leverage power, building their identity. space to freely express who they are
political gain, security and protection for Female, 25, Lebanese, Mount Lebanon and who they want to become. […] They
their communities. These affiliations would just have to follow what their
came with a conflicting conception of When Lebanese youth were asked what parents do or have as ideas, whether
Lebanon’s identity and role in the region affiliation defines their identity most, it’s political, religious, or anything else.
(Berkley Center for Religion, 2013). 62 per cent connected themselves most And not just their parents, sometimes it
While it is encouraging that identifying with their family, followed by 49 per cent depends on the area they’re from and
as ‘Lebanese’ remains the most with Lebanon as a nation (Figure 4).6 the dominant political party there.
prevalent and has gained momentum Additionally, and reiterating the central Female, 21, Lebanese, South
since October 17, the 35 per cent who role that families play in shaping identity
identify along religious lines may be an in Lebanon, youth in Lebanon primarily
indicator of persistent sectarian identity learn about their cultural heritage and
being engrained in younger populations. history through family (67 per cent),
I was raised on being Lebanese, followed by school/university (53 per
I respect my identity and I love my cent), community (29 per cent), and
country […] They [my family] taught me friends (27 per cent) (Figure 5).
that my nationality is my country, my Family narratives and oral history remain
identity, my home. the key routes through which youth
Female, 22, Lebanese, Mount Lebanon acquire knowledge about the country’s
history - including contemporary topics
I think that identity is established and the Civil War - in the absence of a
before you are born, it depends where unified post - 1943 history curriculum
you are born, your religion. That’s the
and in the presence of different
nature of the country. When you are
narratives taught in schools.
born you are limited to certain
categories. It’s pre-packaged.
Male, 17, Lebanese, Mount Lebanon
6 > Youth were asked to select all that apply from a list of 11 answers.Next Generation Lebanon > 19
Figure 4: Answers to the question ‘most of what defines your identity is your affiliation to?’ 7
Your family / parents 62.0%
Lebanon 49.4%
Your friends 34.3%
Your area / town 27.0%
Your sect 20.1%
Your profession 16.2%
Humanity 14.5%
Your political party 10.7%
The Arab world 6.1%
Islamic nation 3.8%
No one, you are a unique and 1.0%
independent person
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Figure 5: Top answers to the question, ‘which of the following were most important in informing you about your cultural
heritage/history?’8
80%
70%
67.4%
60%
50%
52.6%
40%
30%
28.8%
27.0%
20%
18.2%
10%
11.8%
10.4%
0%
Family School / Your Friends Individual Your Political
University community research religion party
7 > This question was asked only to Lebanese youth (N=1591). The question asked youth to select all that apply from a list of 11 options.
8 > Lebanese youth, N=1591, question asked participants to select all that apply from a list of 7 options.20 > Next Generation Lebanon
Understanding how Lebanese youth In our discussions, Lebanese youth All the youth have a unified suffering.
identify, and where identities are learned confirmed that they share common All the catastrophes they pass through
and passed on, Lebanese respondents traditions and customs, values and unifies them. […] when recently
were also asked what makes them morals, and problems and challenges. [October 2019] the forests were
Lebanese. Figure 6 shows the top three burning across the country, everyone
answers, with 64 per cent of respondents participated in extinguishing the fires,
stating language, 53 per cent culture, everyone went, all the areas assisted.
and 53 per cent history.9 Male, 21, Lebanese, Beqaa
Figure 6: Answers to the question, ‘what makes you Lebanese’10
70%
60%
63.7%
50%
52.8% 52.7%
40%
39.6%
30%
32.2%
29.7% 29.1%
20%
18.9%
10% 14.6%
0%
Language Culture History Your given Your Common Your Common Your
citizenship passport interest family enemy religion
While the majority of youth identify When asked why Lebanon does not We do not have a common definition of
themselves as ‘Lebanese’ – with numerous have a unified identity, 52 per cent of civic identity. Lebanon is still not a civic
commonalities about what this may respondents stated the cause as being country. There is still sectarianism.
mean - 62 per cent do not perceive the present political system, 52 per Some people define themselves as
being Lebanese is a unified identity. cent to religious partitions, and 30 per Druze or Muslim or Christian rather
The distinctiveness of being Lebanese cent to memories from the Civil War than saying Lebanese.
might carry in its essence different (Figure 7). Highlighted below, many feel Male, 27, Lebanese, Beirut
meanings rather than an undisputed that the political system and society’s
understanding around common language, sectarian divisions hinder the formation
culture, and history. With history being of a unified civic identity.
a key marker of identity that is learned
from family, not through a unified and The Lebanese identity should reflect
agreed historical narrative in education the presence of several political parties.
or at a national level, each individual If someone tells me ‘the presence of
holds a different story that is particular several political parties and each
to their family’s experiences, perceptions individual is affiliated with a different
and wider sect. Perceptions of Lebanese party’ I would guess that they’re talking
identity amongst youth is simultaneously about the Lebanese identity.
united yet divided. Male, 29, Lebanese, Beirut
9 > Lebanese youth, N=1591; the question asked participants to select all that apply from a list of 9 options.
10 > This question was asked only to Lebanese youth, N=1591. Participants were asked to select all that apply from a list of 9 options.Next Generation Lebanon > 21
Figure 7: Reasons why Lebanese people do not have a unified identity11
70%
60%
50%
52.0% 51.9%
40%
41.8%
30%
30.0%
20%
22.5% 22.4%
16.9%
10%
0.1%
0%
The political Religious Political Memories People External Individual Others
system / divisions divisions from the in positions affiliation / choice
Political Civil War of power Loyalty
differences
The question of identity for (UNHCR, 2019). The long-displaced When asked, ‘Do you think that Syrians/
Syrian and Palestinian youth status, the uncertainty of a potential Palestinians have a unified identity?’
Nine years after the beginning of the return, and the ambiguity governing the 40 per cent of Syrians and 59 per cent
Syrian conflict and 72 years after the prospects of their countries all present of Palestinians answered ‘No’ (Figure 8).12
expulsion of Palestinians from their challenging questions related to the
land, Lebanon finds itself hosting the construction of identity for Syrian and
highest density of refugees in the world Palestinian youth in Lebanon.
Figure 8: Answers to the question, ‘Do you think that Syrians/Palestinians have a unified identity?’
60%
58.9%
50% 54.7%
40%
40.0% 39.9%
30%
20%
10%
3.8% 1.5% 0.8% 0.4%
0%
Syrian Palestinian
Yes No You do not know You refuse to answer
11 > This question was asked only to Lebanese youth who don’t believe in a unified identity, N=992. Participants were asked to select all that apply from a list of 7 options.
12 > The question was asked to participants including only their respective nationality. Syrian N=260, Palestinian N=238.You can also read
