I'm No Longer Applying Straight' Human Resource Practices Institutions: servants - Joel Pearson & Thatshisiwe Ndlovu
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i ‘I’m No Longer Applying Straight’ Human Resource Practices in State Institutions: perspectives of public servants Joel Pearson & Thatshisiwe Ndlovu Working paper (Version 5) • 6 July 2018
ii List of Abbreviations: AGSA Auditor General of South Africa ANC African National Congress AO Accounting Officer CCMA Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration COO Chief Operations Officer CoGHSTA Department of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlements & Traditional Affairs CoGTA Department of Cooperative Governance & Traditional Affairs CV Curriculum Vitae DA Democratic Alliance DG Director General DDG Deputy Director General EA Executive Authorities EFF Economic Freedom Fighters DIRCO Department of International Relations & Cooperation DPSA Department of Public Service & Administration HOD Head of Department HR Human Resources KMC Kyalami Metropolitan Council KZN KwaZulu Natal LLB Bachelor of Law MA Master of Arts MEC Member of the Executive Committee MFMA Municipal Finance Management Act MM Municipal Manager MMC Member of the Mayoral Committee OPSC Office of the Public Service Commission NDP National Development Plan NEC National Executive Committee NEHAWU National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
iii PA Personal Assistant PARI Public Affairs Research Institute PEC Provincial Executive Committee PERSAL Personnel & Salaries Database PR Proportional Representation PSC Public Service Commission REC Regional Executive Committee SALGA South African Local Government Association SARS South African Revenue Service SASCO South African Students Congress SMS Senior Management Service
4 Introduction Appointment, promotion and placement of officials in positions within government administrations is the subject of intense daily discourse by those working within the state and political organisations. It is highly contested, attracting frequent accusations of impropriety and unfairness. In particular, the role of political functionaries in determining human resource processes has attracted furious debate. Concepts like ‘cadre deployment’ and ‘political appointment’ have come to be frequently used in a pejorative sense – perhaps especially during the tenure of President Jacob Zuma. The revelations over ‘state capture’ that proliferated in the media during the final years of Zuma’s term have particularly enflamed these discussions, and polarized what the limits of political influence should be when it comes to human resource practices in the state. This report seeks to contribute to these debates by presenting the experiences of officials within state institutions themselves. Many of these narratives unravel the simple assumptions that have arisen in diagnosing human resource problems afflicting the state in the post-Zuma era. These narratives are the vehicle by which commonly-shared experiences and perceptions are elaborated, and areas of disagreement and contest are brought into relief. While contestation unfolds over appointment decisions in different ways, depending on the institutional context, what these narratives together confirm is that such contests can have destructive effects on institutional stability, employee wellbeing and the effectiveness of the state in fulfilling its service delivery mandate. The primary purpose of this report is not to present an exhaustive and detailed agenda for reform. Rather we aim to sensitize readers to the kinds of experiences faced by those working in government: their perceptions, predicaments, and horizons of possibility – the human dimension which is frequently absent in descriptions of the state. In Part A, we consider longer debates around political involvement in human resource practices of the South African state, its perceived consequences, and impulses towards reform. In Part B, we present narratives of public servants, interspersed with analysis which highlights parallels and areas of contest in the experiences of other officials. This demonstrates the breadth of contest over the involvement of politicians in appointment decisions, but it also highlights broader difficulties in achieving good human resource practices in the state. In Part C, we advance an overall assessment on what respondents believe the appropriate role of politics in human resource processes in the state is, flagging complexities which any potential reforms must take cognizance of. We then note two recommendations for changing the current system of recruitment, both of which stem from existing proposals and which find endorsement in the narratives of those interviewed.
5
Part A: Debating the Place of Politics in Human Resource
Processes
1. Post-Apartheid Imperatives for Cadre Deployment
Legislation in the post-apartheid era responded to the need for political deployment to
positions in state administrations in the context of the transition from white minority rule.1 The
placement of party cadres has been an explicit policy undertaken by the ANC. According to
Chipkin, ‘The African National Congress [ANC] argued that not only had successive National
Party governments implemented racist laws and policies but that the very structure of the
state itself worked to advance white interests’.2 A 1998 policy document declared:
We [the National Liberation Movement] have inherited a state which was illegitimate and structured
to serve the interests of a white minority. […] To attain all these and other objectives, it became the
seedbed of corruption and criminal activity both within the country and abroad. […] The NLM cannot
therefore lay hands on the apartheid state machinery and hope to use it to realise its aims. The
apartheid state has to be destroyed in a process of fundamental transformation. The new state
should be, by definition, the antithesis of the apartheid state (ANC, 1998).
Indeed, as Picard argued, during ‘the four decades under apartheid, the bureaucracy
functioned as a major patronage network’.3 The incoming ANC therefore confronted a
situation, in the words of Dexter, of ‘[a] large number of senior officials, from Deputy-Director
and up, who have through their loyalty to their Apartheid masters achieved their seniority
levels’.4 To transform the bureaucracy from one dominated by white males into one which
was representative of South Africans – and committed to the ethos of the ANC – the decision
to grant politicians extensive control over appointment decisions was expressly taken.5 At the
1
See: Robert Cameron, 2010, ‘Redefining Political-Administrative Relationships in South Africa’,
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 76, 4:676-701; Geraldine Fraser-Moloketi, ‘Public
Service Reform in South Africa: An overview of selected ccase studies from 1994-2005’, Masters in
Administration Thesis, University of Pretoria.
2
Ivor Chipkin, 2016, ‘State, Capture & Revolution’, Public Affairs Research Institute, Working Paper
Series.
3
Louis A. Picard, 2006, The State of the State: Institutional Transformation, Capacity and Political
Change in South Africa (Johannesburg: Wits University Press), p.292. See also Deborah Posel, 2000,
‘Labour Relations and the Politics of Patronage: a case study of the apartheid civil service’ in G. Adler
(ed.), Public Service Labour Relations in a Democratic South Africa. (Johannesburg: Wits University
Press).
4
Quoted in Fraser-Moloketi, ‘Public Service Reform’, p.19
5
In addition to provisions made in the Public Service Act, outlined below, the commitment to
transformation was also expressed in the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998, which specified that along
with formal qualifications and experience, the state should implement ‘affirmative action measures to
redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure
equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce’. See6 same time, provisions were made to decentralise powers of appointment away from a centralised authority – the role historically played by the Commission for Administration6 during apartheid – and grant greater human resource (HR) functions to the political authorities of departments and municipalities.7 In many other developing countries, a Public Service Commission has played a much more interventionist role in HR decisions. In South Africa, by contrast, the PSC effectively underwent a demotion in its mandate, with most of its competencies devolved to Executive Authorities (EAs) – that is, political functionaries – within institutions of state. This was in line with New Public Management (NPM) thinking, which emphasised the need for greater autonomy for state institutions in the interests of delivery. This played a significant role in introducing managerial reforms to the public service in the 1990s.8 Along with HR functions, procurement decisions were also devolved to other spheres of government in a bid to give public sector managers greater discretion and flexibility – to ‘allow managers to manage’.9 In terms of the Public Service Act, political heads, Executive Authorities in national government – that is, the President and his Ministers – and in provincial government – Ministers of Executive Committees (MECs) – have wide discretion in the selection of candidates for positions within departments.10 Thus EAs have powers to determine ‘the internal organisation of a department, including its organisational structure, HR planning and the creation and abolition of posts on the fixed establishment. The EA also has powers regarding recruitment, appointment, performance management, promotion, transfer, dismissal and other career incidents of employees of that department’.11 These capacities may be delegated to senior managers, who may in turn delegate to other employees.12 At the local government level, the municipal Council is vested with powers to ratify the contract https://www.saica.co.za/Technical/LegalandGovernance/Legislation/EmploymentEquityActNo55of1998/ta bid/3041/language/en-ZA/Default.aspx. 6 Renamed the ‘Public Service Commission’ in the democratic era. 7 Public Service Commission, 2016, ‘Building a Capable, Career-Oriented and Professional Public Service to underpin a Capable and Developmental State’, PSC Report, p.6 8 See Ivor Chipkin & Sarah Meny-Gibert, 2012, ‘Why the Past Matters: Studying Public Administration in South Africa’, Journal of Public Administration, 47, 1:102-112; Vinothan Naidoo, 2015, ‘ Changing Conceptions Of Public ‘Management’ And Public Sector Reform In South Africa’, International Public Management Review, 16, 1:23-42. 9 Cameron, 2010, ‘Redefining Political-Administrative Relationships’, p.684. 10 ‘In terms of Section 3 (7) of the PSA, 1994, EAs have powers and duties regarding the internal organisation of a department, including its organisational structure, HR planning and the creation and abolition of posts on the fixed establishment. The EA also has powers regarding recruitment, appointment, performance management, promotion, transfer, dismissal and other career incidents of employees of that department. 11 Public Service Commission, 2016, ‘Building a Capable, Career-Oriented’, p.60. 12 Cameron, 2010, ‘Redefining Political-Administrative Relationships’, p.684.
7 appointment of senior management – including municipal managers and departmental managers.13 The PSC, meanwhile, took on a more limited ‘research, monitoring and watchdog’ role.14 Established in terms of section 196 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa15 and the Public Service Commission Act of 1997,16 the PSC’s mandate is now ‘to investigate, monitor, evaluate, propose measures, give directives, report and advise on the organisation, administration, the personnel procedures and practices, and the effective and efficient performance of the public service’.17 Reports and recommendations for policy change are largely channeled towards the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), whose role ‘has been to create policies centrally while departments are then responsible for tailoring these policies to fit their own contexts’.18 Moreover, a distinction was drawn between the public service and local government.19 The mandates of the PSC and DPSA do not extend to include local government, which instead refers to provincial and national departments of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). 2. Problematic Results There are a number of works which have considered the combined effects of an explicit policy of political deployment, devolved human resource functions, and expanded managerial autonomy. According to Chipkin, these public sector20 reforms have produced some perverse results as the ANC has become increasingly fragmented – a phenomenon that was underway during the administration of Thabo Mbeki, and which was starkly signified by the controversial rise of Jacob Zuma to the Presidency in 2009, which split the party. ‘After 2009 the ability of the ANC to control its own government, officials and cadres has declined remarkably’, Chipkin 13 The appointment of municipal managers, was for a long time governed in terms of s.82 of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998. The appointment of senior managers had been guided by section 56 of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000. These provisions were changed substantially with the Municipal Systems Amendment Act of 2011, which brought far greater and more rigorous requirements for advertising, shortlisting and interviewing of candidates for all of these positions. 14 Cameron, 2010, ‘Redefining Political-Administrative Relationships’, p.684. 15 Act 108 of 1996. 16 No. 46 of 1997. 17 Public Service Commission, 2016, ‘Building a Capable, Career Oriented’, p.2. Five national Commissioners are appointed through the National Assembly, and a Commissioner for each province is appointed by the provincial Premier. 18 Public Service Commission, 2016, ‘Building a Capable, Career Oriented’, p.7. 19 The Public Service is constituted by 150 national and provincial departments, plus government components, that are listed in schedules one (1) to three (3) of the Public Service Act. The Public Service is differentiated from local government, which is governed by its own legislation, principally the Municipal Finance Management Act, the Municipal Systems Act, and Municipal Structures Act. 20 The term ‘Public Sector’ is inclusive of the public service and local government.
8 notes, ‘There is growing contestation about who has legitimate authority in the organisation and where, moreover, power lies’.21 Devolved political authority over the distribution of jobs, it has been argued, has resulted in a variety of negative consequences for the so-called ‘political-administrative interface’.22 In their 2016 report entitled ‘Building a Capable, Career-Oriented and Professional Public Service to Underpin a Capable and Developmental State In South Africa’, the Public Service Commission (PSC) noted that ‘cadre deployment has in recent times assumed a negative connotation as it is taken to mean the appointment, on purely political considerations and patronage of persons who are not suitably qualified for the posts concerned’.23 This has been conceded by the (now former) Secretary General of the ANC, who conceded that ‘mistakes [are] committed by our structures in deploying cadres who no not even meet the basic requirements for the posts they are deployed in’.24 There has also been exceptionally high turnover in the Senior Management Service (SMS)25 – especially HODs. This is borne out in recent research which claimed that 216 Directors-General (DGs) had been fired, shifted or suspended between 2009 and September 2017.26 It claimed that ‘the majority of relationships between ministers and directors-general, around 60 percent, will last 12 months or less and more than 40 percent of all of them will involve an acting director-general’.27 At municipal level, the Auditor General’s 2016/2017 MFMA Report signalled high levels of instability in key administrative positions. This has been flagged as a critical problem.28 Following the local government elections of 2016, the recent Report notes, this has been particularly acute, and a number of positions have remained unfilled. The AGSA reports that ‘at year end, 28% of the chief financial officer positions were vacant (21% for longer than six months) – a slight regression from the 24% at the end of the previous year. Municipal manager positions were vacant at 27% of municipalities (17% for longer than six months) – a regression from the previous year’s 20%. After year end there were further terminations 21 Chipkin, ‘State, Capture & Revolution’, p.18. 22 For a fuller description of the legislated roles of each, and an elaboration of what might constitute a healthy relationship between the two, see Christopher Thornhill, 2012, ‘Effective Political-Administrative Relationship for Policy Making and Implementation’, African Journal of Public Affairs, 5, 1:56-68. 23 Public Service Commission, 2016, ‘Building a Capable, Career Oriented’, p.9. 24 Gwede Mantashe quoted in Naidoo, 2015, ‘Changing Conceptions Of Public ‘Management’’, p.37. 25 The Senior Management Service (SMS) consists of the top four employment categories in the public service – that is, directors-general, deputy directors-general, chief directors and directors. 26 See Gareth Van Onselen, 2017, ‘Political Musical Chairs: Turnover In The National Executive And Administration Since 2009’, Available at: https://irr.org.za/reports/occasional-reports/files/irr-political- musical-chairs.pdf 27 Quoted in Ibid. p.9. 28 See: Mosa Phadi & Joel Pearson, 2017 ‘The Mogalakwena Local Municipality: An institutional case study’ Public Affairs Research Institute; Mosa Phadi & Joel Pearson, 2018, ‘We Are Building A City: The Struggle for Self-Sufficiency at Lephalale Local Municipality’, Public Affairs Research Institute.
9
and resignations’.29 The average overall vacancy rate at senior management level in
municipalities in the North West was 60%.30 Additionally, the report noted that ‘political
infighting at council level and interference in the administration weakened oversight and
implementation of consequences for transgressions, and made local government less
attractive for professionals to join’.31
An earlier PARI report from several years ago broadly summarized some of the problems and
predicaments posed by the ‘open’ bureaucracy operating in South Africa, in which politicians
‘retain substantial lawful discretion over the appointment, promotion and, in extreme cases
dismissal, of public servants’. Researchers noted that such a system:
…can enable politicians to go beyond formal and impartial rules in imposing their will upon public
administrations. Politicians with power over appointments and promotion can place close associates
into key positions and collude with them in non-compliant behaviour. By threatening, even implicitly,
loss of career-progression or even dismissal they can coerce public servants into breaking the rules.
Politicians may, of course, have good or bad reasons for doing this. However, by blurring lines of
accountability and impairing correct lines of control, political and personal appointments can
negatively affect discipline at all levels of the organisation. High-level political and personalised
appointees generally do not follow the career paths necessary to give them knowledge of their
administrations. They also tend not to remain in their positions for long. Furthermore, if a principal
requires political or personal support from her appointee, she loses control correspondingly. If she
makes the appointment with reference to a third party – a friend or a political ally or political party –
she may find herself constrained while her appointee may be enabled by a second line of
accountability.32
Many point to the conflicts that have occurred over positions in government as often being
linked to battles over patronage. Positions come with a number of material benefits for political
networks, including opportunities for tendering. Booysen has pointed to ‘a far-reaching war
for institutional control by individuals and groupings within the ANC’ since Zuma’s rise to the
presidency, characterised by ‘continuous purge attempts’ of deployed politicians and officials
at all levels of the state.33 ‘ANC contests and their repercussions are directly transferred to
the state’, which can result in ‘inaction and paralysis in the public sector’.34 The ANC itself
29
Auditor General of South Africa, ‘Consolidated General Report on Local Government Audit Outcomes:
2016/2017’. Released May 2018. p.18.
30
Ibid. p.73.
31
Ibid. p.22.
32
Public Affairs Research Institute, 2014, ‘The Contract State: Outsourcing and Decentralisation in Post-
Apartheid South Africa’, PARI Report, p.47.
33
Susan Booysen, 2011, The African National Congress and the Regeneration of Power, (Johannesburg,
Wits University Press), p.359, p.371; Susan Booysen, 2015, Dominance and Decline: the ANC in the time
of Zuma, (Johannesburg, Wits University Press), p.95.
34
Booysen, Dominance and Decline, p.2910 admitted within its ranks ‘a silent retreat from the mass line to palace politics of factionalism and perpetual in-fighting’ fuelled by ‘contestation for power and state resources’.35 Beresford has pointed to a widely-held perception that ‘political appointments at all levels of public office, including provincial premiers, mayors, and municipal managers, are made on the grounds of political loyalties over competence, and that those on the wrong side of ANC power holders could expect to be ‘purged’ from their public office’.36 He continues: ‘Positions of public office are hotly contested, but not only because they are an immediate source of wealth for the individual. They are also a means by which powerful patrons can distribute resources and opportunities to their extended networks of dependents’.37 3. The Post-Zuma Reform Impulse With these concerns in mind, the question of how to curb these tendencies and establish an appropriate balance between political power and administrative autonomy has attracted some broader attention in the closing years of Zuma’s presidency and through to the rise of Cyril Ramaphosa. Archbishop of Cape Town, Thabo Makgoba – a vocal critic of Zuma – emphasised that ‘President Ramaphosa and the ANC should see this time as a moment in history to embrace the principles and objectives of the New Struggle – a struggle to which we all should commit: a struggle for equality, a struggle about values and institutions rather than personalities, a struggle to build strong systems which cannot be undermined by one party or person’s whim’.38 Whether this momentum can be sustained remains to be seen, but there are certainly increased hopes that thoroughgoing reform to state institutions might be on the horizon. Chipkin has proposed changes to appointment legislation in relation to key central government institutions.39 He finds that ‘apart from Chapter 9 institutions, appointments, suspensions and disciplinary processes are at the discretion of politicians, who are likely to 35 African National Congress, ‘Organisational Renewal & Organisational Design Document’, (March 2017), available at http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/National%20Policy%20Conference%202017%20Organisational% 20Renewal.pdf. 36 Alexander Beresford, 2015, ‘Power, Patronage and Gatekeeper Politics in South Africa’, African Affairs, 114, 455, p.233. 37 Ibid. 38 Quoted in Paul Hoffman, ‘Green Shoots on the Tree of Constitutionalism’, 2 April 2018, Available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-04-02-green-shoots-on-the-tree-of- constitutionalism/#.WsSGVIhubIU 39 Ivor Chipkin, 2017, ‘Personalising and De-Personalising Power: The Appointment of Executive Officers in Key State Institutions’, PARI Working Paper Series. Chipkin considers the Public Protector and the Auditor General, the National Treasury, the Constitutional Court, the South African Police Services, the National Prosecuting Authority, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate and the State Security Agency.
11
use political criteria’.40 He identifies how President Zuma wielded his powers of appointment
with great effect:
The consolidation of Jacob Zuma’s authority as President has come with purges of the leadership
of key state institutions and the deployment of political friends and allies. This politics of purge and
displacement has wracked the law and order departments (the police, the directorate for
specialised crimes (the “Hawks”)), the National Prosecutions Authority, the South African Revenue
Services (SARS) and some of the state-owned enterprises, most recently Denel, a state arms
company. The unexpected dismissal of the Finance Minister in December 2015 was an attempt to
seize control of the National Treasury.41
However, he notes the important role that the judiciary has begun to carve out in making
determinations of minimum competency for some of these positions. He also recommends
the establishment of a recruitment process similar to that of the Judicial Services Commission
(JSC).
The PSC has long sought to bring changes to policies governing HR matters in state
institutions, and to establish a greater role for itself in guiding these processes. It envisages
a far more energetic role in the public service, intending ‘to become an activist commission
that actively promotes a particular view of public service, which is based on continuous
research, investigation and evaluation’.42 Since at least the mid-2000s, the PSC has drafted
documents calling for reform of procedures governing appointments to the public service.43
In its 2016 report, the PSC recommended that responsibility for advertising jobs should be
taken back from Executive Authority (ministers and MECs) and be lodged with Heads of
Departments. ‘Professionalising the public service implies that appointments are done on the
basis of the inherent requirements of the occupation/job’, the report reads, ‘This means that
political office bearers should have no role in appointments except if appointments are made
on policy considerations, which are allowed by the Constitution Section 195(4)’.44
Accompanying this broad suggestion towards professionalisation, the report furthermore
recommended that internal candidates be considered before advertising the job externally,
and proposed that candidates be considered for promotion only after they had served an
adequate amount of time at their current level and that their suitability be assessed through
a grade exam. The PSC raised the possibility of recruiting middle managers (feeders to senior
positions) via an entrance examination.45 The report maintains that there are certain instances
where political deployment is necessary, however, accepting that ‘policy considerations
40
Ibid., p.32.
41
Chipkin, 2016, ‘State, Capture & Revolution’, p.18.
42
Public Service Commission, 2016, ‘Building a Capable, Career Oriented’, p.vi.
43
Once again, note that the “Public Service” denotes officials working for provincial and national
government. The PSC exercises no mandate over Local Government.
44
Public Service Commission, 2016, ‘Building a Capable, Career Oriented’, p.33.
45
Ibid.12
should play a role at the senior levels (Director-General and Deputy Director-General and
other HoDs) and appointment of ministerial advisors and other staff in ministerial offices’.46
In 2017, Chipkin noted that these calls by the PSC for a move away from the ‘open’ system
were like a ‘cry in the wilderness’.47 But in March 2018, the Chairperson of the PSC noted
optimism that their suggestions for addressing the contentious personnel management
practices would be taken more seriously with the new administration.48 President Ramaphosa
has yet to publically weigh in on long-standing debates about recruitment and
professionalisation of the public sector. He did intimate in his first State of the Nation Address
that, in the interests of efficiency, he was initiating ‘a process to review the configuration‚
number and size of national government departments’, yet the finer details remain unclear.49
He has, however, expressed commitment to the National Development Plan50: ‘We have a
plan’, Ramaphosa told parliament, ‘I have a plan and it is the National Development Plan
[NDP]. That is our plan’.51 Whether this means adherence to the proposals the NDP makes
around human resource practices in the public service and local government is similarly
unclear. Proposals for reforming appointment and career paths of public servants more
generally are dealt with explicitly in Chapter 13 of the NDP. It calls for the professionalisation
of the public service, and summarises its recommendations as follows:
An administrative head of the public service should be created, with responsibility for managing the
career progression of heads of department, including convening panels for recruitment,
performance assessment and disciplinary procedures.
A hybrid system for appointing heads of departments should be introduced, incorporating both
political and administrative elements.
A graduate recruitment programme and a local government skills development strategy should be
introduced to attract high quality candidates.
The role of the Public Service Commission in championing norms and standards, and monitoring
recruitment processes should be strengthened.
A purely administrative approach should be adopted for lower-level appointments, with senior
officials given full authority to appoint staff in their departments”.52
46
Ibid.
47
Chipkin, 2016, ‘State, Capture & Revolution’, p.11.
48
Address by PSC Chairperson Adv. RK Sizani at the PARI Round Table on Public Service Reform, held
10 April 2018 at the University of the Witwatersrand.
49
Kgaugelo Masweneng, ‘Downsize Looms for SA’s Bloated Administration’, Sunday Times, 19 February
2018, Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2018-02-19-downsize-looms-for-
sas-bloated-administration/.
50
The National Development Plan (NDP) was the product of the work of the National Planning
Commission which President Jacob Zuma appointed in May 2010 to draft a vision and national
development plan. The Commission was an advisory body consisting of 26 people drawn largely from
outside government, chosen for their expertise in key areas. The NDP set problem areas in the post-
apartheid state, and set out a vision for their redress by 2030.
51
Makhosandile Zulu, ‘The President says that he does have a plan’, The Citizen, 20 February 2018,
Available at: https://citizen.co.za/news/1828017/the-president-says-he-does-have-a-plan/.
52
National Planning Commission, ‘Our Future: Make it Work. NDP Vision 2030’,p.55.13 Human resource processes thus form a key area of reform in the estimation of the NDP in trying to forge an appropriate ‘political-administrative’ balance. These findings have long been endorsed by the PSC in consecutive reports since the NDP’s release, yet little has come of these recommendations. The PSC has expressed some hope, however, that the new President may be more amenable to these proposals.
14 Part B: The Experiences of Public Servants The next section seeks to contribute to discussions around recruitment in the post-Zuma era by presenting the experiences of public servants. While many of the themes which are highlighted throughout the narratives presented below have been recognised for some time, and have underpinned a range of policy recommendations, we believe that any reform efforts may be enhanced by understanding how challenges over this contentious field are experienced within particular contexts. Taking the perceptions of public servants seriously, for instance, reveals that there is no simple consensus about where and how to instantiate the boundary between political and administrative roles. It shows how public servants are grappling with how recruitment might be done correctly, and about when an appointment is fair and unfair. It will be shown that there is no simple definition of what constitutes a ‘political appointment’ for instance, and that the term itself is rather loosely invoked. It is the subject of rumour. And these rumours can have very real consequences. This is indicated, in one small way, by the hesitancy of officials to broach the subject of appointments. Many are quick to read an implication that they have been employed through manipulating processes, and are frequently very defensive. This is also one reason that we have maintained anonymity in citing the words of respondents in this report. All names have been changed, and as much as possible, details which may identify individuals have been removed. We present interviews from two officials who until recently worked in local government, followed by the testimony of two officials who currently work in provincial government departments, and conclude with the narrative of an official who worked in a national department. We follow each narrative with analysis interspersed with the experiences of a range of other officials who PARI researchers have interviewed in the past, as well as Commissioners from the PSC. The aim is not to present an exhaustive study of the dynamics around recruitment and present a programme for comprehensive technical reform. Rather, we have chosen the narrative genre to illuminate the humans in the machinery of government. We hope that by being attentive to the experiences of individuals - their perceptions, predicaments, and horizons of possibility – the report will challenge some prevailing preconceptions and prejudices. While some modest recommendations are made for increased support for bureaucrats, we also aim to caution against purported ‘quick fixes’ to problems that are deeply historical. We seek to maintain an awareness of the diversity and unevenness of the state and how experiences of recruitment are shaped by these very different contexts. A metropolitan municipality in a highly urbanised province functions in ways that are often vastly different from a small rural municipality, for instance. Where evident, we have drawn common threads between narratives. While the varied histories of institutional settings should be remembered throughout - histories which must inform any proposals for transforming recruitment
15
processes – the narratives nonetheless point to a number of common themes in experiences
of recruitment.
Siyanda Bhengu Part I:
‘That’s where everything started to go wrong’
‘I've been in the public service all my life’, Siyanda Bhengu told us. Having been an
active ANC member in the struggle against apartheid, Bhengu went on to become one
of ‘a new breed, a new cadre of public professionals’ in the post-apartheid
dispensation. Recognised for his role in the struggle, Bhengu was selected to be
trained in a Postgraduate Diploma in Management specialising in Public Policy and
Administration. A partnership between Wits University and the ANC, Bhengu explains,
the programme was guided by the will to transform the bureaucracy: 'Let us train these
people so that they can be able to bring this new ethos in the public service'.
After graduating Bhengu was employed by the Department of Tourism, who along with
other departments and parastatals, had recruited directly from this pool of graduates.
He then went on to work at the Department of Public Service and Administration in a
training capacity. Bhengu would soon move to work in local government, appointed as
a Manager of Economics and Tourism in the Kyalami Metropolitan Council (KMC), a
transitional structure from 1994 until 2000. Bhengu experienced some early
successes, including the creation of a One Stop Shop for investors. Following the
creation of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, Bhengu was head-hunted by the
Mayor for a management position:
'You did such a wonderful job in [the KMC] as a Manager - I want you to be a head', [he said]. He
gave me the position of Executive Director: Economics and Tourism
Bhengu explains that he got the job through his proven track record rather than
involvement in political structures:
I was never appointed through political connections. But I have been involved in politics for a long
time. I was appointed because of the things that I've done.
While Bhengu explains that things had proceeded fairly smoothly immediately after
the amalgamation, by 2005, things had begun to change as political pressures
became more apparent:
Whilst we are busy working with Ekurhuleni and these things, during [the first Executive Mayor’s]
time, you could see that the relationship between us and top management [was good]. Most of us
were considered as politically astute or politically appointed - then we started now being swayed
along by politicians [in Council] who were our bosses. Because now there were tenders involved.
The politicians are getting to the issue of: ‘what is going to happen to me in five years?’. If you don't
dish out as many tenders, you become very much unpopular. Unfortunately my department didn't
have many tenders, but those people who were like in Public Works, Technical Services - they are16 becoming 'good boys' and corrupt. They were giving the politicians in order to become 'good boys'. So I had a small budget and they left me alone. And then I realised that 'No man, I'm no more comfortable in Ekurhuleni'. Because you can see when people are no longer taking you seriously, because you don't have money. Then I started looking for a job. Bhengu explains how he was led to another avenue for employment in the state through the help of an influential political fixer. I met a guy [who was] the personal advisor of Sydney Mufamadi - the first local government minister… When I told him I have a masters degree he said 'No you are educated man!' The advisor would approach Bhengu in 2009 with a new offer of employment: There was I sitting at home one night thinking about this bad [time] I'm having at Ekurhuleni and [he] phones me and says 'Do you want a job?'… I said 'What job?' and he said ‘city manager'. 'Ey! Where?' 'East London'. 'Yoooh East London!'. You see, it's a cultural thing now. Because Xhosas and Zulus... they don't [get along]. Bhengu explains how the Minister’s advisor spoke to the Mayor of Buffalo City. Despite his initial hesitancy, Bhengu flew down to East London with the advisor for a meeting with the Mayor: She just told me 'You know I wanted [the advisor], but [he] said he is got the best person and that's you' I said ' You don't even know me'. She said 'No, no, no. As long as [the Minister’s advisor] knows you I want you as my MM'. Bhengu explains how there was a small administrative obstacle in the way of his appointment, which was quickly by-passed: They had already closed the day for the applications for MM… But now that they were headhunting me, they phoned the head of Corporate Services to say 'Look there is an application that is coming. You must take it. It is an instruction'. So that guy was told to take my application. I gave in the application. I was shortlisted. So one rule has been broken. They broke the rule. I was called into an interview very soon - within a week - had a very good panel of people, I passed the interview [and] went through this very difficult psychometric test, finished it. However, Bhengu’s appointment would ultimately be derailed by competing political interests. He soon learned that the Regional Executive Committee (REC) as well as the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) of the ANC were firmly against Bhengu’s appointment as City Manager – as they had been against the Mayor – since they viewed it as an imposition by the National Executive Committee (NEC): The PEC and REC are unhappy with [the Mayor] and me. And politics started. That's where everything started to go wrong… the [ANC] factions started to work on my case. The final step in the appointment of a City Manager takes place through the passing of a resolution by a majority vote of Council. Bhengu explains that the ANC caucus in Council was split over the matter. While some believed that Bhengu should be appointed, others were furiously against it. In his estimation, the distribution of tenders lay at the heart of the division:
17
One faction which had been promised tenders, who were told [by the REC] 'If you employ this guy,
we will never get anything'. The f action of the ANC that was promised things did not go to Council
meeting. The faction that wanted me in went to the Council meeting. But they made one very, very
costly mistake which is costing me up till today: they did not count how many councillors were there
to reach quorum. So they were one councillor short.
Unaware that they had not reached quorum the Council passed the resolution – which
would soon be overturned:
I was appointed, they gave me the contract. These people are crooks - the REC - knew that the
council didn't have a quorum. T hey went to court - they went to King Williamstown - they won the
case. My appointment was nullified… So I could not start. No job. Nothing
To make matters worse, Bhengu was struck by another tragedy:
In all this process, [the Minister’s advisor] is the key. He is facilitating my appointment. When he
realised that I won't get the job, he got a terrible headache, an insufferable headache in the morning
he was dead by night. Killed by stress. I lost [him], lost the job, lost everything. I have been in hell.
Bhengu’s narrative portrays a complex picture of the role of political loyalty in the
determination of appointment decisions. Having worked as an official in the state since the
transition, he offers a perspective of an official perceiving the modes and motivations
underpinning recruitment practices shifting, and adapting to these changing realities.
Of his experiences in gaining employment in Ekurhuleni, Bhengu insists that he was not
‘politically connected’, and got his job through merit.53
During our time, to be honest, the politicians had nothing to do with the appointments. They would
appoint maybe the Municipal Manager. And then they'll appoint the [councillors who would serve
as] Members of the Mayoral Committee (MMCs). How the MM appoints the other guys - it was
merit at that time. You would be politicised once you are in. But the MM would want the best team,
and that's it - during that time. That was the early stages - 2000 to 2005. It was still very much
based on merit. Then [more intrusive appointment demands by the REC] started afterwards.
Speaking of his tenure at Ekurhuleni, he nonetheless notes that he was ‘politically astute or
politically appointed’. By this he means that he was actively involved in ANC politics, and it
was the ANC in the municipal Council who had ratified his appointment. At this point, he
believes, it was the latter that left senior managers vulnerable to being ‘swayed’: ‘Councillors
53
This runs contrary to arguments by Amusan, for instance, who argues that post-1994, the ANC
government adopted ‘a radical, socialist approach through a spoils system, where the politically
connected individuals will get the job of administration as red bureaucrat as against expert bureaucrat,
irrespective of administrative experiences’ (emphasis in original). And indeed, Amusan appears to take
little cognizance of the affirmations in both the Public Service Act and the Employment Equity Act that
merit and some form of representativeness should form the basis of public service appointments. Lere
Amusan, 2016, ‘Spoils and Meritocracy: Post-Apartheid Challenges in the South African Public Service’.
Journal of Public Administration, 51, 2, p.297.18
were our bosses’. And, in his estimation, it was the connection of Councillors to Regional
structures of the ANC which brought the pressures for the distribution of tenders:
Obviously it starts from the Region. Because all of these councillors report to the REC. So the REC
comes with this self-enrichment agenda, to say 'Look, you - we deployed you to Technical Services
and Member of the Mayoral Committee. So we must eat there'. So even if you don't want to be
corrupt, but you are reporting back to the REC - and the REC is giving a mandate to say 'There is
a guy who is going to come up with a tender to build roads - and this guy must get this job. And it
is your responsibility that he gets this job'. So you start talking to your Head of Department to say
'Hey, this is the mandate. This guy must get this job'. So the HOD is under pressure [from the
councillor] and now has to ensure he sits down with his team, he fixes things so that it meets this
guy.
The Region is formally an oversight and coordinating structure of local Branches of the ANC.
Branches elect a REC every three years through elections, which have become increasingly
contested over the years. It is partly because of the overwhelming power that Regions have
come to wield over recruitment in municipalities that positions on the REC attract such intense
struggle. As part of the ANC’s Constitution, the Region holds powers of selection over
Councillors and Mayors. They are responsible for holding list conferences to determine who
makes it to the proportional representation (PR) list for local municipalities. In the process, in
most cases they also have the determining say about who is appointed as Mayor. Yet it is
clear that, in many places, the powers of the REC extends well beyond these explicitly political
roles, reaching into processes that govern the appointment of municipal administrators and
overseeing their career incidents.
Across multiple municipalities where PARI has conducted research, RECs determine both
who gets appointed to positions in the municipality, and how those appointed should distribute
the business opportunities that such positions provide. As Crispian Olver points out in his
2017 book: ‘There is a standing joke in ANC circles that Regional Secretaries walk around
with two files under their arms: one contains all municipal tenders, and the other is the list of
staff vacancies and appointments in the municipality.54
Since the formalisation of local government structures after the transition period, the
appointment of Municipal Manager (MM) – the top administrative position within a municipality
- has been understood as a mandate of the REC. This has been confirmed in a great many
places where we have conducted research. A former mayor of the Mogalakwena Local
Municipality in Limpopo described this as a ‘tradition of the ANC’. He described how three
names are drawn up by the REC for the final selection of the Provincial Executive Committee
(PEC) – more specifically, the ‘deployment committee’ of the provincial ANC. Yet both he and
Bhengu intimated that the need for more direct influence over tender distribution and
recruitment has, over the years, seen greater intrusion of the Region into appointment
54
Crispian Olver, 2017, How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay, (Johannesburg:
Jonathan Ball Publishers), p.48.19
decisions – to the point where the REC is selecting candidates for most levels of the
administration.
There is a widely-held view in other municipalities in which PARI has conducted research that
due to the political nature of their deployment, section 56 managers55 are required to toe the
line of their political principals – both within Council and within the Regional structures of the
party more generally. Two clerks in the HR offices of a local municipality told us:
Section 56: they are political appointments and you are basically told to go there … obviously
somewhere along the times you start having a conscience or whatever you stop doing whatever
you are told to do so obviously you are going to go very soon… it’s just unreasonable because you
are pressured to do certain things then you end not following policies and everything else then you
start doing things that are not in line with your duties.
This has been confirmed by a host of senior managers themselves. During an interview with
the Manager of Technical Services in a particularly troubled municipality, he received a text
message from the Mayor to action the payment of a water and electricity bill for the Regional
offices of the ANC.
Yet it is possibly the MM that comes under the greatest pressure. As we have argued
elsewhere, the position of MM56 is one of the most contested positions in all of government.57
The MM is recognised as the Accounting Officer (AO) of the institution who provides the final
signature on most processes. Conflicts over this position have resulted in some damaging
consequences for the functionality of municipalities. Bhengu discovered just how contested
the position of MM was – to his detriment. Without the support of the Provincial and Regional
powers of the ANC, his appointment could not be ratified.
Bhengu narrates his decision to leave Ekurhuleni in terms of the creeping influence of tender-
based corruption and the associated pressures that were being imposed on senior managers
by councillors in the Mayoral Committee. Looking back, he sees this as the onset of a style
of influence-wielding that came with the rise of Jacob Zuma to the ANC presidency. Under
Zuma, the powers of the Regions and Provinces became emboldened, in contrast to ‘when
Thabo and Mandela were Presidents of the ANC, [when] the center used to have control’. He
frames his experiences as part of the decline that, in his estimation, set in under Zuma, and
recounted a warning that the Minister’s advisor gave him: 'Siyanda I know you are not happy
in Ekurhuleni, and I can tell you right now these guys who came in now after Polokwane are
going to loot the government'. Nevertheless, his narrative shows how this politically-influential
connection at the national level helped ‘facilitate’ his path to the position of city manager at
55
Senior managers in municipalities appointed on a contractual basis in terms of Section 56 of the
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, as amended by the Municipal Systems Amendment Act 7 of 2011.
56
City Manager in the case of metropolitan municipalities
57
See Phadi & Pearson, 2017, ‘Mogalakwena Local Municipality: An Institutional Case Study’, Public
Affairs Research Institute.20 Buffalo City, and flout recruitment procedures. Political connection in the appointment process is not, per se, problematic for Bhengu; rather it is the expectations of corruption that he regards as evidence of degeneration. In his view, it was the consequence of an increasingly fractious and corrupt ANC that punctured his chances of becoming MM. In the concluding section of his narrative, however, we see how Bhengu came to terms with aspects of what he calls the ‘Zuma culture’ that he saw creeping into the state, and ultimately to his great detriment, he followed strategies he had seen practiced elsewhere to gain another position in government. Siyanda Bhengu Part II: ‘I’m No Longer Applying Straight’ After the abortive appointment at Buffalo City, Bhengu began job-hunting again: I was looking in the paper for a job… I realised that in [a small town municipality in KwaZulu-Natal] they are looking for a Strategic Executive Director. That time, the Zuma culture is now beginning to build up: if you don't know anyone politically, you won't get a job - especially in this top position. And that person, when he employs you, he employs you because you are going to push tenders for him. Through another acquaintance in the national office, Bhengu managed to get the number of the Regional Chairperson under whose authority the municipality fell: [So I] phone him, he picks up the phone. 'Hey my name is Siyanda Bhengu, I need to talk to you… really honestly if I don't speak to you, I don't know whether I'll be able to get this job, and I don't want to waste my time'. [He replies] 'No, no, no take this number'. He gives me the number for the [Regional] Secretary, and I arrange a meeting with the Secretary. I drive all the way to [the town] and I find this guy. When I get into the office of this guy, and this guy looks at me. I'm busy marketing myself, I've given my CV. This guy is looking at me - he is not concentrating. [He says] ‘I know you… You were in a memorial service of one of our comrades here, about a year ago. And you told us nonsense - that we are useless as ANC, that we are being beaten by IFP all the time, [that] the ANC is not doing anything here, the IFP is winning here. Not delivering services what, what, what'. I said 'Ja - it's me!' He said, 'You don't even have to apply for this job. We want people like you!' He takes the CV, phones the MM… [gives her] the CV and says 'Hey this guy must get the job'. I got a job in [this small town]. Bhengu identifies the change that he had undergone: It started from the Zuma era, I'm no longer applying straight. And I got the job as Strategic Executive Director from 2012 till last year. That was one of the biggest mistakes I've ever done - to take that position. Bhengu would be one of many officials selected by the REC for a position in the municipality. He explains how the Regional Chairperson essentially governs the institution from a distance through strategic appointment decisions. When it came to the position of Mayor, for instance:
21 He is a chairman. He doesn't want to be a mayor. They 'remote control'. He employs the Mayor on his behalf. He put him there from the IFP. Crossed the floor, came to the ANC. He was told 'Come to the ANC, I'll make you a mayor'. Bhengu’s appointment came with strings attached. The following year, he set out to campaign for the Regional Chairperson in an elective conference that would change everything for Bhengu: Elections take place. He is beaten. From where I come from, in terms of elections of the ANC, when you are beaten, you shake hands with the guy who has won, you work with him, come together for the ANC. Only to find that [in this case], no, I didn't read it [correctly]. In Gauteng they do that. In KZN, it's war. So I just go straight to the new chairman: 'Ey Chairman, I'm going to work with you. Congratulations'. Yeeee. I messed up. I messed up big time... I was labelled as the camp of this other guy. The guy who employed me hated me with passion. I'm not even a year in the job. Bhengu describes how the former Regional Chairman, despite having lost the elections, continued to use his considerable sway in the municipality to try to fire him: All the councillors belong to the old chairperson, all the administration to the old person. Everything is still his. So he is manipulating everything… He calls the Mayor - he calls the entire staff - and says ‘Get rid of him. Find something. Fire him'. He found himself the repeated target of accusations of impropriety which were never substantiated. For a period of almost five years, he was repeatedly placed on suspension. Ultimately, a disciplinary hearing found him guilty of just one offence, for which the maximum punishment prescribed was several months without pay. Yet soon Bhengu would find himself in the firing line again: The [newly appointed Regional Chairperson] said he wanted to work with me. He says 'Look, the previous Municipal Manager’s… term has come to an end'. He says 'You're going to be acting MM'. He calls these guys who are very much anti-me… The mayor and his [executive committee]… Right then the Mayor said 'No I can't work with this guy'. Machinations at the provincial level would prove determinant in this deepening stand-off. While the new Regional Chairperson had been supported in the province by the Provincial Chairperson, the previous REC had been supportive of an opposing faction in the province. When this latter faction won the provincial elective conference – in a process that a high court subsequently ruled was procedurally invalid – the new PEC moved to dissolve the Region: They were trying to nullify [the Region’s] influence, so they can keep a stranglehold in terms of the resources and their people. So I was like naked. They made my life very difficult. And then, when my contract came to an end, all the other contracts of the senior managers who were nice and good to [the old chairperson] were renewed. Mine was never renewed. So that's the thing. Simple as that. At the time of interviewing Bhengu, an elective conference was due to be held the following weekend to constitute a new REC. Bhengu has placed his hope for future employment on his ally winning once again: We spoke. He said 'No problem. If he gets something he will definitely do something [for me]'.
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