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Ian Pool
New Zealand’s population
and development path
Unravelling the
‘when’ ‘how’ and people occur typically
because of complex forces of
and ‘why’
population and development,
or natural events, outside
local control. The trends
Demographic regimes and national identity in the different factors
New Zealand’s demographic regime, moderate to high producing sub-national
population growth for most of the last 170+ years, has demographic changes have
shaped ‘nation building’, especially self-identity (Pool been identified and parsed
2016). Increasing population numbers, the quantum of in other articles in this issue
demography, is the value ‘writ large’ in our consciousness, as (Jackson and Brabyn, infra;
an immigrant country with one of the highest rates of natural Cameron infra).
Slower growth and even population
increase (births minus deaths) among western developed decline are not new in Aotearoa’s history,
countries (WDCs)1. Yet, the spectre of slower or negative as nineteenth century Mäori, and Päkehä
in the 1930s depression show. But, with
demographic rates has now appeared for some regions, the significant exception of Victorian era
Mäori, this was transitory. The Marsden
and even nationally (Jackson and Cameron 2017), invoked
programme, to which this article
popularly by the application to various districts of the contributes, asks: is New Zealand at an
inflection point of a continuing and
inexact and pejorative term ‘zombie towns’. Changes to places deeper decline, with a new mix of factors,
Ian Pool is Emeritus Professor, Demography, University of Waikato. with subnational decreases a key
Page 10 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017component that might be an ‘early empirically. Nevertheless, as Prue Hyman reductionist as the drivers of change are
warning’ sign of negative national growth? (2014: 90) argues, ‘Values and norms complex and interrelated rendering it
The question here is whether the underlie all economic and social impossible to disentangle them; this is not
population dynamics and structures systems…’, 3 and this is certainly true for to eschew ‘causality’ when explaining
unfolding since 1970/1980 simply the demographic system as well, because ‘variance’ as, for example, in regression
represent continuities (or accelerations) population change is very much a function analyses for narrowly defined situations,
of on-going past trends, or whether of both individual and collective ideas. but such narrow applications do not
instead they are far more profound – a For norms, it is useful to distinguish unravel complex interactions. If there
multi-factorial rupture, across major between what people do – norms as were an overriding determinant, it might
segments of the demographic system and ‘modal’ behaviours, which can be be the values-system, but as noted, norms
its development co-variates? Or, more analysed, particularly by looking at are unobservable.
sceptically, are they simply an artefact of demographic trends, which are simply the Population change is interrelated with
the first-time availability of digitalised, sum of what groups are doing in their development in all its dimensions –
anonymised, but individual level data sets daily lives – and norms as ‘model’ cultural, economic, health and social. A
that give an appearance of real change? behaviours, the explanatory variables for model, ‘Total Social Production’, outlined
The key question is whether or not much of sociology and anthropology, below, provides a wider understanding of
Aotearoa has passed a genuine inflection which cannot be quite so easily observed. these interlocking transitions, and was
point, which would signal a deterministic This is not just a handicap for sociology/ elaborated to analyse African
spiral towards eventual widespread sub- anthropology: the dominant explanatory development. Operationalised for New
national, and, ultimately, national decline. variables for economists, ‘market forces’, Zealand by Jackson (1998) to study ethnic
Alternatively, if the inflection point is are equally as nebulous, so that even the stratification, it has many attributes
more apparent than real, then could we
expect to go back – grosso modo – to what
we were before 1980/1970, when growth Population change is interrelated with
was higher, but the population
overwhelmingly Mäori or Päkehä2. This
development in all its dimensions –
second scenario seems unrealistic because cultural, economic, health and social.
of the diversified ‘peopling’ streams since
1980, carrying different normative
systems from those operating between
contact (1769) and then. Prognosis is great Adam Smith had to refer to the essential for the explanation of population
difficult because there are no national ‘Invisible hand, the unobservable market change in relation to development and
precedents in our history since Päkehä force that helps the demand and supply of covers most factors of production and
dominated the country’s demographic goods in a free market to reach equilibrium reproduction. Jackson’s ‘acclimatisation’
regime – from circa 1860. Nevertheless, automatically’ (www.dictionary.com/ of the model is opportunistic, avoiding
we are not alone in this recent transition browse/invisible-hand). the need to test its applicability,
– Australia, Canada and the United States When analysing the recent decades, a particularly apposite when reviewing
face similar situations, although we are simplistic, oft-cited explanation of the Aotearoa’s temporal sequencing of multi-
closer to Canada and Australia than the observable changes is that they are factorial changes.
United States in terms of proportions of economically determined, by (i) The prime role of this paper is to
foreign-born and Asian, and well above globalisation and financialisation4, or (ii) outline history – how we got to where we
European comparators. We have the some recent, seminal exogenous political- are: prognosis is left to other essays in this
additional factor of a large Pasifika economic event (e.g. Britain entering the issue. Since contact in 1769, Aotearoa has
population. European Union, or now its manoeuvring passed through three eras, the
This article argues that the trends seen to ‘Brexit’). The causes and effects of these transformations between which have
since the 1970s are period-bound – are often measured by changing patterns followed a sort of sequence, with demo-
unique to this one era in New Zealand’s of employment and shifts in the industrial graphic changes preceding economic.
history, particularly for national material sectoral labour force, say the explosion of Fundamental changes have come from a
factors, demographic, economic and the Finance, Insurance, Real-Estate (FIRE) fuzzy mix of demographic, economic,
social systems. Yet, perhaps sector. This article questions this social and technological shifts, some of
counterbalancing these are some enduring explanation, showing that population which have been ‘game-changers’, as
factors, especially values, and related changes, which, to reiterate, are shifts in against shocks with short-run effects. The
material factors. The latter are easier to modal social behaviours, preceded most recent era is covered by this Marsden
identify and study, and even measure, but economic, recently, post-1970, and Programme, which plays a seminal role in
values and norms are by their very nature historically. This sequencing implies documenting and theorising about what
difficult to delineate and document causality, but being deterministic is is unfolding as a major question globally.
Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017 – Page 11New Zealand’s population and development path: Unravelling the ‘when’ ‘how’ and ‘why’
At present neither a more comprehensive although health development is valorised. of economic primacy reflects a general
meta-synthesis of findings exists, nor a Unfortunately, neo-liberal development failure to adequately conceptualise and
sustainable theory on its ‘how’ and ‘why’; economics downplayed ‘health integrate the generational replacement of
the ‘when’ seem more concrete – since the development’ as a vexing demand-side, labour power’. This also applies to ‘the
1960s-1980s seems to be a common fiscal burden, best privatised. Recently, genesis of the consumer population,
experience across the WDCs – but that however, mainstream economics sees without which capitalist production would
belies real momenta, which may stretch health as essential for productivity (World have rapidly ceased, and capitalism with it’
back to roots that are earlier (e.g. Merlin Bank 1993, 2007; Stiglitz, 2008; Deaton (Jackson 1998: 30-31). Her arguments
1971, 2009; Johnson et al 2015; Pace and 2013: Chapt 1). point to the impacts of momentum effects,
Mignolli 2016). Integrating demographic factors into of cohort flows, frequently analysed in
development requires models that mortality, fertility and numeric ageing.
Towards an analytical framework: ‘Total recognise that ‘neither production [and But, momenta also have wider roles: they
Social Production’ thus the remainder of the economy] nor constitute the fundamental structural
No systematic corpus of theory exists reproduction [and the rest of demography] factors of population and development.
on sub-national declines, although can take place in the absence of the Such trends are not like those, say, of stock-
observations of particular factors and other…’ (Jackson 1998: 30, drawing on markets or 24-hour news cycles, both of
situation-specific interpretations show Cordell, Gregory & Piché (1994), in which fluctuate dramatically, almost
that this is an important issue across African population studies, and saw minute by minute; instead, structural
forces generate momenta that endure and
are irreversible. For example, a seminal
‘Social organization’ depends on both action of South Africa’s apartheid was
production and social reproduction, coercively to block ‘urban influxes’ of
Blacks, assigning them to non-metropolitan
which includes fertility and child ‘Bantustans’. Even so, the regime failed to
combat natural forces, and, since apartheid
survivorship. ended, agglomeration has accelerated, with
‘townships’, such as those neighbouring
Cape Town, growing rapidly (Pool 2014).
Yet, change can be sudden, even unforeseen;
WDCs. Moreover, conventional models ‘reproduction of the labour force’, often the decision by an absentee corporation to
in population and development have forced or indentured, as vital for labour- close a plant may affect regional
limited utility, as they are factor-specific, intensive colonial production – mining, development (Cochrane & Pool infra).
deterministic and uni-directional. For plantations, public infrastructure). Similarly, migratory ‘churning’ in New
example, Frank Notestein’s (1945) Jackson focused on Aotearoa’s ethnic Zealand’s migration patterns in the 2010s,
demographic transition, really natural stratification, constructing a model has an impact culturally, socially and
increase, excludes long-term natural sufficiently complex to cover most of the economically (Pool 2015a, 2016).
decrease or migration, both pertinent to issues being dealt with here. But, it needs To operationalise the total social
sub-national declines (Casterline 2003; see ‘tweaking’ at its edges – for example, production model, it is necessary to
also epidemiological transition, Omran adding child survivorship and seeing recognise the recent dominance and
1982; industrial sector transformation, migration as merely one process expansion of the U.S. FIRE-sector (see
Chenery & Syrquin 1975; and Maddison producing geographic re-distribution. former Republican strategist, Phillips,
1982). The mobility transition model is Equally, recognition must be given to 2006; Aotearoa, Kelsey 2015). Its financial
not merely deterministic, but confounds structural economic factors. It already sub-sector oils development, while real-
migration with population redistribution covers economic factors – employment, estate facilitates residential development.
(e.g. urbanisation). Focusing on internal the labour force, consumption – but But, often the FIRE-sector diverts
migration makes the model less applicable macro-economic drivers provide the investment from productive activities, has
to the effects of international movements underlying momenta of sub-national a major role in agglomeration, positive or
(Bedford & Pool 2004)5. The World changes. negative, and is an engine of sub-national
Bank (2009), extolled agglomerations, Total social production, with its roots decline. It also drives consumption, yet
downplayed the inverse, regional declines, grounded in social theory, implicitly may be negative: Auckland’s housing for
and simplistically attributed causation to underpins the classical population and example.
‘market forces’. Richard Nelson’s (1956) development literature. Above all, Jackson, drawing on Cordell et al,
powerful model on ‘low level equilibrium ‘economic production and demographic identifies the following traits of total
traps in underdeveloped economies’ may reproduction are both material processes, social production (paraphrasing Jackson
have application to marginalised regions6 and that neither dimension can be 1998: 31-32)7. ‘Social organization’
but it does not cover demographic change, subordinated to the other… [T]he problem depends on both production and social
Page 12 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017reproduction, which includes fertility and today’s dominant workplace-home change have their own momenta and
child survivorship. In low mortality separation, this should apply less than enduring effects whose roots often go
populations, fertility drives levels of when households were central to back very far. Some roots may lie less in
natural increase, but, recently, where production and reproduction (e.g. population-economic factors per se than
regional age-structures are dispro- Aotearoa’s family owner-operated dairy the broader political economy, the wider
portionately older, natural decrease from farms). But overseas, National Transfer society and pervasive ideational
old-age mortality is seen (US, Europe: Accounts (NTA) exercises show that the constructs. Thus, the question of whether
Johnson et al 2015; NZ: Jackson & Brabyn family still remains critical, even in formal or not recent decades are unique in the
infra). Presaging the more recent literature economies with wide workplace-home history of New Zealand’s political
on ‘demographic dividends’, Jackson gaps8. economy is not at all academic.
identifies the importance of the labour Jackson also introduces ‘the concept of
force age-group, responsible for lag time, first as it pertains to the period Aotearoa’s population and development:
production, and also for childbearing and between first births and their eventual Historical eras
childrearing. A demographic dividend arrival at the labour market, and second as Over its post-1769 history, New Zealand
occurs when the costs of social support it pertains to the childbearing patterns of went through three major eras9: a
decline because of fertility decreases subsequent generations’; momentum Turbulent period, 1769-1880s/1890s;
occurring before ageing sets in, and the effects are correlates of this. Because of ‘Recolonisation’, 1880s/1890s-1970s; and
resultant dividend is invested in lags and momenta nation-states continue the current Neo-turbulent period starting
productive sectors. This requires pro- to grow even when reproduction levels in the 1970s. The interest here is the
active policies and efficient management,
whereas diverting economic and social
investment into some rentier activities
Growing competition from settler-owned
will dissipate dividends. In the period extensive grain farms in the 1860s’ wars
from 1970s-2010s Mäori and Päkehä age-
momentum effects provided a ‘Window was reinforced by the destruction of
of Opportunity’ for such dividends, but
Aotearoa squandered this (Pool 2016).
Ma-ori horticulture.
High Mäori (and Pasifika) fertility rates in
the 1970s have produced momentum
effects; at first, high child dependency, have dropped to below replacement. transition from the second to the third,
constraining household savings. But Other non-demographic phenomena, but some important values and tangible
declining natality since then could such as infrastructure projects, are subject determinants of development were laid
generate new dividends through national to lag time, even when completed down in the first era, and so it must be
and sub-national labour markets, but according to plan. Other examples are the briefly discussed.
only if pro-active education, work- installation of new plant; delays between
training and labour market policies were workforce planning, recruiting and new Turbulent Era, 1769-1880s/1890s
implemented (Jackson 2012, 2016). employee(s) being at their workplace(s). First came a Turbulent period, for much
The two functions of production and The discussion above covers natural of which time – to ca.1850 – the country
reproduction typically result in sexual increase, labour markets, population was virtually mono-cultural, Mäori. By
divisions of labour. Gender still affects redistribution, shifts in age-structures and 1901, however, Mäori were only 5 percent
remuneration, status within occupations cohort momentum effects, all of which of the total in what was then bi-cultural,
and choice of job (Hyman 2014). Age also have longer-term provenances. There are with very small numbers of Chinese and
has classificatory effects: in WDCs still survivors of early 20th century birth others. Mäori passed 10 percent of the
retirement affects employment levels. ‘[R] cohorts; the 1930s cohorts were born total only in the final decades of the 20th
eproduction of the labour force,’ is merely closer to the New Zealand Wars (1860s) century. A list of key events for Mäori in
one aspect of its renewal. Others are: than the Global Financial Crisis (2000s). the Turbulent era would include contact;
‘replacement of older workers to respond The total social production model the inter-tribal ‘Musket Wars’; the far more
to new demands [up-skilling], and to directly addresses economic changes significant impacts on Mäori of introduced
offset death and emigration’; maintenance through its emphasis on labour and diseases to which they had no immunity;
of good health; social support systems for production, although less directly on the very successful Mäori enterprises,
non-workers. In-migration affects consumption. But this belies more funda- both domestic and international, in an
replacement, so population geography is mental questions about the drivers of sub- epoch of paleo-globalisation; colonial
critical. national change and differentials, a annexation; two major colonial wars, the
Finally, the family represents the main problem exacerbated by the tendency to second of which (1860s) lasted 12 years,
locus for production, plus the carry out short-term analyses. In reality was highly asymmetric, had very high
reproduction of the labour force. With the population-economic drivers of fatality rates (for Mäori) and at peak
Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017 – Page 13New Zealand’s population and development path: Unravelling the ‘when’ ‘how’ and ‘why’
involved 29 percent of all imperial troops, Päkehä population growth came more South Africa and the United States,
worldwide outside Britain and India. from natural increase than migration, as Native-Americans were enslaved
Growing competition from settler-owned settler fertility levels neared biological (Resendez 2017: chapters 10 and 11) and
extensive grain farms in the 1860s’ wars maxima (1870s) and child survivorship others imported (e.g. Africans to the
was reinforced by the destruction of Mäori the most favoured anywhere. This trend Americas; Malays to the Cape)11. The
horticulture. The cardinal factor, from the and its underlying pro-natalism were to evangelical ethos transmitted itself to the
1840s into the 20th century, was the loss be reprised in the Baby Boom but at a post-war Welfare State, via preferred
of most of their land and other resources lower level (births per woman 1870s, 7.0; settler-recruitment systems (Vogel’s
– thus their capital (so defined, Piketty 1960, 4.0). Such values may persist in Immigration and Public Works Act, 1870),
2014: 46-48, 213). This loss came from a residual form in the maintenance since the Liberal Government’s policy
mix of warfare, invasion (O’Malley 2016) the 1970s of exact replacement, a high ‘experiments’ (Sinclair 1959: Part Two,
and frequently dubious legal means (Pool level for WDCs today. Finally, Päkehä chapter II), the Social Security Act, 1938,
2015a; Parliamentary Commission Report, redistributed geographically. In a seminal and since then by the Accident
Rees & Carroll 1891). For Mäori, land loss study Miles Fairburn, referring to Compensation Act, 1972, the
is a source of enduring bitterness, only ‘bondlessness’, showed that they were Superannuation Act, 1974, aborted by
mitigated since the 1970s by the Waitangi highly mobile residentially, more so than Robert Muldoon, the Treaty of Waitangi
Tribunal/Office of Treaty Settlements North Americans (Fairburn 1989; Nolan Act, 1975 and the New Zealand
processes. They restore some of the 2009; Pool et al 2007). In 1840, three- Superannuation and Retirement Act 2001.
The most persistent and consistent
In Aotearoa, Ma-ori, like Irish or Scottish
example of a values system and related
material development, has been the
peasants/crofters, were forced onto small Päkehä obsession with pastoralism, driven
by ‘land-abundance’ myths – sheep
lots or displaced into other regions, to ‘ranching’ started immediately (1843)
after annexation. ‘Grasslands’ farming has
eke out their living, highly dependent on been essential to nation-building,
potatoes, subject to episodes of blight. economically, in moulding
demography, social structures social
its
organisation and political dynamics. But,
to put it in context, it was part of a land-
grab of immense proportions,
capital essential for development, until quarters were in what became Auckland encompassing the Americas, southern
then reliant on earned income (Cochrane Province, going down to 47 percent Africa, Siberia and Australasia (Weaver
& Pool infra). Conversely, Päkehä gained (1857/58), but still with 74 percent in the 2006), and even in the metropole itself –
that capital and much of New Zealand’s North Island. But, by 1874, goldrushes, Highland and Irish ‘clearances’, Anglo-
development relied on its exploitation; ‘ranching’10, grain booms, ‘bondlessness’ Welsh ‘enclosures (Pool 2015a: passim).
many Päkehä refuse to acknowledge this plus the northern war saw 55 percent in Everywhere, this required the
‘ghost at the party’. the South, with Dunedin briefly being displacement of the native owners, whose
For Päkehä, this era was also turbulent. Aotearoa’s prime settlement. By 1896, mixed land-uses were to yield to beef and
There were numerous commodity however, the North Island once again sheep ranching, and sometimes extensive
‘booms’, from extractive industries; outnumbered the South, and by 1901 grain farming. In Aotearoa, Mäori, like
Michael King says, ‘It is difficult to see Auckland was the leading city, with Irish or Scottish peasants/crofters, were
how New Zealand could have survived as growing ascendancy, accelerating in the forced onto small lots or displaced into
a viable country had it continued to rely Baby Boom, and since 1970. other regions, to eke out their living,
solely on wool and grain and extractive From contact, various nation-building highly dependent on potatoes, subject to
commodities for its national income’ values and determinants of development episodes of blight.
(King 2003: 237). Päkehä fought wars and have been inherited and perpetuated,
skirmished with Mäori. Booms attracted more or less, until the present. For Recolonisation, 1880s/1890s – 1970s
major inflows of gold-diggers; settler- example, Aotearoa’s delayed annexation, James Belich argues, convincingly, that
colonists gained from the dispossession of compared to Australia, although Cook New Zealand then went through a
Mäori from their land; and wars engaged ‘discovered’ both in 1769-70, plus the century of ‘Recolonisation’, ‘a renewal
military and militia-migrants. Net power of evangelicals in Whitehall and reshaping of the links between
immigration was heavily concentrated ca.1840, focused on ‘Aboriginal colony and metropolis after an earlier
into just two quinquennia, 1861-65 and protection’, ensured that Aotearoa was period of colonisation’. In this era, ‘New
1871-75, then after this slowed, with brief never a slave or convict colony – nor used Zealand became the town-supply district
outflows (Pool 2015b). Rapid Victorian indenturing. In other settler-colonies as in of London. London became the cultural
Page 14 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017capital of New Zealand’ (Belich 2001: 29- comfortable living-standards for the passed Dunedin (6th), recently outdone by
30). This was a period of relative stability average family. Paradoxically, the Liberal Tauranga, a small centre (3,000) in 1936.
demographically and economically, Party’s tenurial reform architect, Gaelic- Envisaging ‘Recolonisation’ as a period
sustained by a values-system that went speaking John McKenzie who had of stability seems unrealistic given two
through only gradual transitions, witnessed highland clearances, saw little World Wars and others, depressions
underpinned by the production and dissonance in displacing Mäori from their (1880s; 1930s), the ‘Baby Boom’, Korean
export of pastoral products. lands (Brooking n.d.). War Wool Boom (1950-51), ‘Great/Long
The game-changers shifting Aotearoa Recolonisation was underpinned Boom’ (1935-66, Easton 2010) and the
from turbulence seem to have been economically by pastoralism: New rapid Mäori rural exodus. Nevertheless,
provoked by three demographic changes Zealand, the ‘dairy farm of the Empire’ for dominant Päkehä, loyal subjects of
among Päkehä, now enjoying (King 2003: 237). David Greasley and Les ‘England’, norms and values remained
demographic and political hegemony. Oxley show that grasslands farming relatively stable, adhering to mores and
First (late 1870s), radical volume declines intensified from the 1880s, a shift made ideas they believed characterised the
in immigration occurred, even a brief possible through freezing, dairy processing ‘mother country’. The last Dominion to
loss, presaging several other modest and milking machine technologies, plus ratify the Statute of Westminster (1931),
outflows – 1926, mid-1930s, late-1960s – legislation that ‘dismantled the large Parliament passed the New Zealand
in an era when net immigration generally estates’, thereby definitively precluding Constitution (Request and Consent) Act in
remained steady but not spectacular plantation agriculture. Together, these 1947, over strong opposition from the
(Farmer 1985: Fig 14). Secondly, and
simultaneously (1870s-1901), ‘family
values’ shifted from a colonial reproductive Even after World War II ... economically
regime (early, almost universal, marriage;
high fertility rates) to that prevalent in
(trade), culturally and socially, and
Britain – not achieved through demographically, through British
contraception, which, anyway, was still
very primitive technologically. There were migration preferences – New Zealand
marked increases in the age at first
marriage and in female celibacy (Pool et al
remained closely linked to ‘Home’.
2007: chapters 3 and 4). This reprise of
British patterns of nuptiality coincided
with other values-shifts (Belich 2001: 30): factors created New Zealand’s iconic opposition which viewed the bill as
‘[R]obust and ruthless town- and camp- regime of family-owned and operated disloyal.
led progress was written out, steady and farms, for eight decades providing most During ‘Recolonisation’, Aotearoa’s
farm-led progress was written in… farmers with satisfactory living-standards strategic directions were really dictated by
relations with Britain became more in a country with the highest GDP globally the concerns of the Päkehä majority. Even
deferential … sub-nationalist … [a] per- – at least as late as 1938. Moreover, this after World War II, in a de facto sense –
manently junior partnership…’ Thirdly, affected the population geography, economically (trade), culturally and
inter-provincial migration had been high leading to high levels of urbanisation early socially, and demographically, through
in 1891-96, when the redistributions in the 20th century (Greasley & Oxley British migration preferences – New
northwards and through pastoral 2005, 2009). However, this was an urban Zealand remained closely linked to
intensification reached high levels. system underpinned not by heavy or ‘Home’. In fact, Aotearoa’s metropole-
Tellingly, however, the mobility declined, textile manufacturing, but linked to the dependent mentality persisted until the
and never reached early ‘Recolonisation’ processing and export of pastoral produce, 1960s/1970s: the British flag flew,
levels again until 1991-96 (Brosnan 1989; and the import of manufactured goods alongside its own, ‘God Save the King/
updated by me). from the ‘mother country’. Coastal Queen’ was played before shows, with the
New technologies (1880s) facilitating secondary cities, Gisborne, Timaru, audience expected to stand. Britain’s
‘Recolonisation’ are often cited as Whanganui, Invercargill, Napier and New decision to join the European Union in
overriding determinants, yet, coterminous Plymouth, exported directly to Britain. 1973, although previewed and with
timing with massive demographic shifts During the Baby Boom, some grew at diversification underway from the 1960s
suggest that causal pathways are more rates above New Zealand’s as a whole, but (Easton 2010: 10), was an emotional
diffused. Indeed, two decades ensued from 1976 their growth dropped. The shock. Gary Hawke (1985) devotes a
before most farmers had adopted largest urban areas, Auckland, Wellington, chapter to the significance of 1967-68.
technologies, a process reinforced by land Christchurch, Dunedin and Napier- Two very important demographic
reforms (1891-1911) (McAloon 2008: 5), Hastings consistently retained this events occurred after World War II: Mäori
a product of values-systems favouring ranking from 1936 to 1976, after which urbanisation and the eponymous Baby
property rights, yet guaranteeing access to Hamilton (4th) and Napier-Hastings (5th) Boom. Other demographic changes were
Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017 – Page 15New Zealand’s population and development path: Unravelling the ‘when’ ‘how’ and ‘why’
Table 1: Per annum Growth (%), Major Urban Areas Combined, New Zealand Regions below), a shift-share in the composition
Regions AKL RNI SI NZ of the adult populations occurred,
1936-76 3.0 2.0 1.7 2.3 affecting the nation’s reproductive
1976-96 2.0 0.3 0.2 1.1 capacities. By 2001, the ratio was 51 rural,
AKL = Former Auckland Province; RNI = Rest of North I; SI = South I 86 metropoli. Young adults were now
city-dwellers, but, because of career
unfolding (see below), but cumulatively until 1945; the Boom, 30 years; then pressures and work-family life imbalances,
more muted, typically continuities of fertility fluttering around replacement for urban Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) had
trends seen historically. 40 years since. Most WDCs, including dropped, and levels of childlessness had
Starting in the 1940s, but accelerating Päkehä (ca.1936) reached replacement increased. This was notable in central
in the 1950s, Mäori urbanised very rapidly fertility in some interwar periods, but Auckland and Wellington, where Mäori
– pre-1970, the highest among people there were also marked rural-urban also followed these trends (Pool et al 2007:
anywhere (Pool 1991: 152-55, citing differentials: in 1921, rural Päkehä birth- Fig 4.2, 186-88; Pool et al 2005a: 8-20). By
University of California, Berkeley, study). rates per 100 women, 15-44 years, were 2001, non-metropolitan regions also had
Until then, Mäori had been largely ‘out of almost twice as high as urban (Tiong TFRs approximating national levels,
sight, out of mind’, residing in hilly, 1988: 163-64). except for peripheral North Island areas
marginal regions of the North Island, or The Baby Boom was a ‘fad’ that where Mäori were heavily represented.
in hamlets on tiny pockets of land, for e.g. gripped all the WDCs simultaneously Across WDCs, higher rural fertility
the Waikato. Urbanisation was initiated after World War II, less in Europe, more in spawned rural exoduses, yet ensured
and executed by Mäori themselves, Neo-Europes, intensively but quickly productive and reproductive capacities
although the welfare-state gave housing, curtailed in Japan. The mechanics of what sustaining country life-ways. But when
job-training, welfare and health. The happened are reasonably clear, pointing rural fertility transitions approach urban,
introduction of a new armoury of to period-specific proximate deter- trends in natural increase – ‘natural
chemotherapeutics, and equal access to minants, rather than cohort-effects, but decrease’ – exceed out-migration rates, as
social welfare and health systems, the underlying causes have not been in France, and elsewhere in Europe and
produced a diminution, but not an satisfactorily documented. Andrew the United States (Merlin 2009: 13;
elimination, of health gaps between with Cherlin’s comparison of America’s Baby Johnson et al 2015). The Baby Boom may
Päkehä. Mäori fertility rates remained Boom and Baby Bust (see below) thus have dampened down rural-urban
high until the 1970s (Pool 1991: 152-59). dynamics still does not elucidate for us differences in intended and actual family
Meanwhile, Päkehä entered the whether it was a new trend, or was a sizes, but eventually generated non-
longest, highest, most intense (timing and reprise of tradition harking back to late metropolitan fertility declines.
spacing) Baby Boom in the WDCs. Its Victorian New Zealand family building, With the exceptions of the Baby Boom
duration exceeded the American by as if the WDCs wanted a ‘last fling’ before and Mäori urbanisation, gradualism
almost a decade, and other attributes were entering subsequent transitions to sub- characterised New Zealand’s post-war
more extreme. First births were early, even replacement fertility (Cherlin cited in demography, especially its spatial
younger than in the colonial hyper- Morgan 2003; Pool 2007)12. While Päkehä dimensions. Trends producing shifts from
fertility period (1870s), and intervals fertility increased, differentials (rural- Turbulent to ‘Recolonial’ continued,
between births short (Morgan et al 2001; urban, class and religious) decreased, sometimes accelerating: urbanisation,
Pool 2007). These dynamics have long- except ethnically: Mäori (high) – Päkehä metropolitanisation, and two waves of
term consequences for New Zealand – the (medium)13. There were, however, suburbanisation. The first depended on
simple fact of a second peak ca.1970 significant intra-urban differentials, public transport limits (interwar years)
affects all superannuation metrics – yet mainly because of neo-local patterns of and then post-war extensions became
New Zealand commentators uncritically family building that clustered young possible because of automobiles. Aotearoa’s
cite American perspectives rather than parents into suburbs, in ‘state-house population gradually redistributed
our own. At the time, moreover, fertility rentals’, or State Advances’ financed northward during ‘Recolonisation’, so, for
was not just the driver of growth, but also owned dwellings. Inflows of young Mäori example during 1936-1976 the Auckland
of its fluctuations – disordered cohort couples into these suburbs intensified Province’s share increased, especially larger
flows, a less tumultuous oscillatory factor intra-urban differentials. Nevertheless, urban centres (Table 1). North Island
than migration became in the post-1970 reproductive capacities were still weighted growth was rapid 1936-1976, but in 1976-
era (Pool 2003). towards rural Päkehä New Zealand. In 1996, after ‘Recolonisation’, nationally New
The Baby Boom remains enigmatic, a 1966, in an era when the force of Zealand grew slowly, but differences
deviation from long-term fertility declines childbearing was at young ages, there were between Auckland and the other regions
starting c.1880, and still evident (2010s). 154 young rural adults (15-34 years) for increased – relatively and absolutely. While
Despite its iconic status, the Baby Boom every 100 older (35-64 years); in most ‘Auckland Provincial’ cities –
lasted merely 22 percent of the period metropolitan New Zealand the ratio was Auckland, Hamilton and Tauranga – grew
since 1880: 60 years of fertility decline 89. In the Neo-Turbulent period (see rapidly and Whangarei emerged,
Page 16 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017Gisborne’s increases were like the Rest of since 1871-75 hit exactly a century later, this period. The primary sector gradually
the North Island. but was followed over the next declined (1951-91) from 19% to 11% of
In the last years of ‘Recolonisation’, quinquennium by net-emigration – an the workforce, then withered (2006, 7%).
complex sets of changes were underway inter-quinquennial, intra-decennial The secondary sector remained steady
that would accelerate in the Neo- pattern that continued at least until 2010. around 34 percent into the 1970s, then
Turbulent period. The Baby Boom ended These migratory oscillations have buffeted plummeted, manufacturing alone
not ‘with a whimper but a bang’: the ‘Baby the entire demographic system since then, dropping 1986-2006 from 20% to 12%.
Bust’. The farming sector was becoming a common factor across the WDCs. The tertiary sector grew gradually 1951-
more efficient so the rural workforce Moreover, churning – by age, occupation, 86 (< 10 percentage points), ballooning
gradually decreased; conversely the national origin and ethnicity between thereafter by almost 20 points. Decreases
secondary sector grew slowly, peaking in inflows and outflows and between adjacent in manufacturing were offset by expansion
the early 1970s, while the tertiary sector calendar years – has added to this instability. of tertiary’s FIRE sub-sector, doubling to
grew gradually. Yet, over the long term, migration has 16 percent, 1986-2006. This is strongly
barely affected the net stock of population, reflected in the national accounts: 14
Neo-Turbulent Period, 1970s to the Present by comparison with natural increase: from percent of GDP was transacted in the
The ‘Neo-turbulent Era’14 has erupted 1976 to 2010, its contribution was one FIRE sector in 1986, reaching 25 percent
since the early 1970s. ‘Recolonisation’ has
been supplanted by numerous shocks and
game-changers to the demographic and Functionally, pastoralism continues
economic system.
This era commenced in the 1970s with to hold a highly significant place in
demographic changes of lasting
significance. First came ‘Baby Busts’ for
New Zealand’s economy, despite
both Mäori – the most rapid on record employing but a minute proportion
anywhere (Pool 1991: 166-75) – and for
Päkehä. Both reflected values changes: for of the labour force and being a minor
Mäori, limitation of family sizes; Päkehä a
shift from early to older childbearing. Both
component of GDP ...
demanded resort to effective contraception:
the ‘Pill’, which had been rapidly adopted
by Päkehä married women in the 1960s, percent, despite historically high inflows in 2006; the community, social and
expanding in the 1970s for timing, spacing 2001-05; it contributed merely 20 percent personal services sector, including health
and limitation; sterilisation, limitation; of growth, 2010-14; but exciting and education rose from 4% to 12% of
modern condoms, timing; and the IUD commentators with short memory-spans, GDP, 1986-2006.
(Pool et al 1999). Moreover, this occurred it was a massive contributor over the last Functionally, pastoralism continues to
with little resort to induced abortion, two years (Pool 2015b)15. hold a highly significant place in New
despite a moral panic and controversy In the 1980s, game-changers switched Zealand’s economy, despite employing
(1970s), mainly imported from the United from population to the economic system. but a minute proportion of the labour
States (the Supreme Court case, Roe vs The main features of the neo-liberal force and being a minor component of
Wade, 1973). The abortion debate is a good revolution, passing through ‘Rogernomics’, GDP (8 percent). Quantitatively, however,
example of an accelerating pattern: the ‘Ruthenasia’ and their successors is well grasslands’ products play a major role in
speed of diffusion of values that can documented, so needs no elaboration trade, a direct hangover of ‘Recolonisation’,
become distorted in transit (Sceats 1988: here. Over recent decades, micro- which still accords pastoralism a high
chapters 4 and 6). Since then fertility has economic values – ‘Homo economicus, a status among attributes that dictate
fluttered around replacement, a little calculating subject…’ (Mishra, 2017), national identity. Primary-sector exports
higher for Mäori, counteracting the ‘individualism and self-actualization…’ (pastoral, horticultural, fish, wood and
instability migration has inflicted on the (Morgan 2003) – and their macro-level other minor items) constitute 62 percent
demographic system. Contextually, there analogues, financialisation and of the total.
was a radical shift from marriage as the marketisation, have dominated Pastoralism has gone through major
preferred form of first union to development paradigms, a significant mutations over recent decades, mainly
cohabitation (Pool et al 2007: Figs 6.1, 6.2). effect of which has been increased social further intensification: a growing
There were other values-shifts in the 1970s, and regional inequality (Rashbrooke emphasis on dairying alone, reflected in
such as religious affiliation and rapid 2013; Boston & Chapple 2014; Cochrane the heavy dependence of dairy products,
secularisation (Young 1997: chapter 9). and Pool infra; Pool et al 2005b). First, the at the expense of meat and wool, in export
Secondly, after net-emigration (late industrial sectoral structure of the incomes. There is increasing reliance on,
1960s), the largest wave of net-immigration workforce underwent radical changes in and heavy usage of, artificial fertilisers,
Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017 – Page 17New Zealand’s population and development path: Unravelling the ‘when’ ‘how’ and ‘why’
tenurial changes from family farms to Finally, New Zealand seems to have Projections suggest, moreover, that a point
agri-business, often combining multiple followed international trends in peri- of ‘no return’, of unstoppable decline,
former family farms, a waged farm urbanisation and also rurbanisation. has been reached for some sub-national
workforce, and increased herd sizes, Pierre Merlin (2009) points out that, not areas of New Zealand. These parameters,
whether per dairying enterprise, or cows only are French metropolitan-dwellers indicate complex interrelations between
handled per milking-unit (Jackson suburban, but peri-urban – expanding population and development (Jackson &
unpublished). Additionally, ‘land- dormitory zones have triggered an ‘exode Cameron 2017; Jackson & Brabyn infra).
abundance’ myths have been stoked by urbaine’. This is reinforced by the Three questions were set at this
converting other land into dairying (for functional metropolitanisation of article’s start, two partially answered.
example, sheep farms; exotic pine previously small towns with limited First, for the hegemonic Päkehä, ‘when’
plantations; ranched tussock-grass inland services: Tauranga is New Zealand’s the shift from ‘Recolonisation’ definitively
basins). Accompanying this has been a prototype. Furthermore, Aotearoa also commenced, was the 1970s/1980s,
population-geographic shift: dairy seems to have adopted other WDC-wide depending on the variable. ‘How’ such
farming is still dominant in humid patterns. Already, one-quarter of seminal changes in trajectories occurred
western regions of the country, but it has territorial local authorities have more has also been identified. Demographic
now become significant for less humid than 20 percent of their population aged changes initiated the start both of
eastern regions, requiring major use of 65+ years, one-third saw declines in ‘Recolonisation’ and the ‘Neo-Turbulent’
river- and aquifer-sourced irrigation. population numbers 1996-2013, and by period, but were co-terminous with other
‘game-changing’ events – freezing
technologies (1880s) and Britain’s
Nationally, Pasifika levels are well above entering the EEC (1970s). Furthermore,
replacement; Ma-ori above but declining, both emergent regimes correlated
temporally with fundamental values-
with age-patterns of childbearing shifts, affecting, in both cases, social
converging towards Pa-keha-, who are
organisation’s plinth, the family, as shown
in radical fertility declines. In both cases,
slightly below replacement; and Asians socio-cultural values-shifts preceded, and
possibly opened the road for, major
well below. legislature-driven restructuring. The
Liberal Party’s tenurial reforms reinforced
technology, producing rural
intensification, and other effects;
From 1980 New Zealand became a 2033 a shift will occur between the ‘old’ legislatively-imposed financialisation and
highly diversified multi-cultural society, form of population decline (migration) to globalisation of the 1980s/1990s
in part because of Mäori (15 percent of the ‘new’ (natural decrease) (Jackson and established the development agenda of
the total), but also Asian, Pasifika and Cameron 2017). the neo-Turbulent period.
other migrant waves. In 1981, New Nevertheless, ‘why’ remains
Zealand was bi-cultural: 87 percent were From old to new regimes: unravelling ‘when’, unanswered. The demographic, social and
Mäori or Päkehä. For 2013, it is difficult to ‘how’ and ‘why’ economic interactions, historically or
estimate ethnicity because of ‘total From 1980 New Zealand dramatically today, seem beyond unbundling:
response’ coding routines by Statistics changed the general path of population demography is not destiny, nor are the
New Zealand, but probably 25 percent are and development followed from the 1880, economy, society or ecology overriding
neither Mäori nor Päkehä. Overall, nearly ‘Recolonisation’, itself a radical change from determinants. The Total Social Production
40 percent of New Zealanders are of non- the ‘Turbulence’ that marked Aotearoa’s (TSP) framework proposed here identifies
European descent – far higher levels than 110-year passage from contact between critical parameters: reproduction, and
those stoking xenophobic fires in Britain. Mäori and Päkehä. ‘Recolonisation’ replacement, plus ‘production’, which
Without minimising Aotearoa’s social was a period of relative stability built increasingly also involves consumption of
tensions, like Canada we seem to have around metropole-periphery exchanges, goods and services, confounded by the
avoided extreme ideological divisions. In particularly commodities exchanged for domination of the FIRE-sector by its
the 1960s, both countries chose policies of manufactures, and an imbibing of the contribution to GDP. Whether it
‘integration’ (which assumes that cultures culture and even political direction (for contributes to national wealth, as against
all have equal worth) over ‘assimilation’ example, military command, World War I) product, is a moot question.
(which assumes that the culture being of ‘Mother England’. But, starting in 1970, To add to the complexities, some sub-
assimilated is gaining a superior culture) Aotearoa entered another ‘Turbulent’ era, national areas seem to be in spatio-
(Hunn 196016: clause 9; Royal Commission, radically different from ‘Recolonisation’ as demographic-developmental decline. As
Canada, 1969). much as it differed from the 1769-1880s. Richard Nelson (1956) showed, this could
Page 18 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017and any resulting competition and conflict that are indirectly
become a ‘low-level equilibrium trap’, a because it depends on values-systems and of relevance to Tai Timu Tangata.
notion applying to nineteenth century population structures, fertility cannot be 8 ‘Intra-family’, or private, transfers include material and
non-material supports: e.g. cash gifts and loans to family
Mäori (Pool 2015b: Fig 1.1). This situation freed from traps. Perhaps the most members, gifts of property and goods; cash inputs assisting
could also occur, extend and deepen sub- emblematic attempt to turn around public ‘free’ services such as schooling (e.g. payment of
stationery) and health; etc. The ‘public’, comprise benefits
nationally through declining natural underdevelopment was in southern Italy and other forms of social-security from agencies, including
housing, health, education, income-support, unemployment
increase due to age-compositional in the postwar period, La Cassa per il relief/payments. Few NTA exercises have looked at non-
differentials at reproductive ages (Jackson Mezzogiorno, developed in part by the monetised transfers (e.g. after-school supervision of children
whose parent(s) work(s) by grandparents (Lee and Mason
and Brabyn 2017). ‘Reproduction’ in the World Bank, driven by passionate anti- 2014; United Nations 2013).
9 This postulate comes from a partially-written book by me on
TSP could also enter a ‘low fertility trap’ communist Walt Rostow, fearing that Italy New Zealand’s population and development, 1769-2010.
(Lutz 2007) for diametrically would become a Soviet satellite. He Ideas for it were generated by the Marsden Programme, plus
numerous books, monographs and papers on Aotearoa’s
contradictory reasons: (i) rural areas have believed that the ‘traditional’, enduring demography. I also commissioned and locally edited ESCAP
older age-structures, fewer young parents ideas, should be destroyed and replaced by (1985).
10 I use the more widely understood term ranching for extensive
and thus fewer children, (ii) ‘rurban’ the far superior modern values (Rostow grazing, even though in Australasia these farms are called
‘stations’, or ‘properties’.
settlements have structures that are 1960: chapter 2; Lepore 2013). While the 11 In inter-tribal wars Mäori enslaved the losers, but this ceased
weighted towards retirees, who bear Mezzogiorno programmes had some after colonization, with the sole exception of the Moriori
enslaved by Ngati Mutunga, which, contrary to an empire-
smaller birth cohorts. Yet (iii), metropoli success (Franklin, Harvey 1969: chapter wide abolition, continued after the Chathams were annexed
in 1843.
disproportionately house young adults, 4), much of this came, paradoxically, 12 In different circumstances increases in fertility are seen in
potential parents, who, paradoxically, through development based on the developing countries before a decline, (Dyson and Murphy
1985), and applies to Mäori (Pool 1991: 113).
produce low birth numbers because of enduring ideas and customs - Rostow’s 13 Total fertility rates, per woman, Mäori 6.0+, Päkehä 4.0+
family-building constraints due to anathema, often agro-turismo ventures 14 See note ii.
15 I want to stress that I am very much in favour of
prolonged education, subsequent career- (e.g. in Puglia). Fertility levels (TFR, 2013 immigration, as it enriches New Zealand’s social fabric and
ensures that some services can actually be provided. But, I
development and work-family life = 1.31) are now the lowest in Italy, and at am very concerned about the way it is managed. Because
imbalances. Offsetting these are the effects an historic low (Pace and Mignolli 2016: of the flows of New Zealand residents, strict control is
impossible, but the inflows of the last few years have been
of intra-urban ethnic differences. Table 7.3). Positive trends for Total social partially due to arrivals on study visas being counted as long-
term and permanent arrivals.
Nationally, Pasifika levels are well above production have not been regained. 16 Hunn’s language, which today seems quaint, even
replacement; Mäori above but declining, ambiguous in places, belies the significance of his advocating
1 Anglo-America, Australasia, north-western Europe, Greece, integration over assimilation, segregation – still legal and
with age-patterns of childbearing Iberian Peninsula, Italy, Malta and Japan. enforced in the United States, South Africa and Australia
converging towards Päkehä, who are 2 I summarise a longer paper (Pool forthcoming, a). – and symbiosis (which he dismisses). The Canadian
3 She is particularly concerned about gender issues and Commission’s findings (and implementation) show how
slightly below replacement; and Asians inequalities that I do not address here except in passing. strategic this direction was there, and for New Zealand;
4 Globalisation is hardly new. Soon after contact Mäori had the Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975, made this strategy more
well below. These can translate into successfully globalised their extensive, domestic networks, concrete.
geographic variance. In 2001, central both through their own commodity trading enterprises, and
in extractive industry ‘joint ventures’ (Pool 2015a: chapters
Auckland had a TFR of 1.7, 1.4 in central 6-9). Aknowledgment
5 If one takes Mäori until 1900 one can show that the
Wellington, but 2.5 in Southern Auckland demographic and epidemiological transition models cannot I wish to thank political economist/
Urban Area and Porirua, where Mäori be applied to much of colonial history – (Pool 2015b:
sociologist David Neilson for his helpful,
especially 312-14). Since then, these models and those on
and Pasifika are clustered (Pool et al 2007: labour force transformation have accurately described the incisive comments on an earlier version
chapters 6-9, Tables 8.4, 8.5). Maori experience (Pool 1991: especially Fig 9.1).
of this paper. Any shortfalls are, of course,
6 I drew on his ideas in positing that, by the 1890s, Mäori
If low-level equilibria are to be averted, were in an ‘underdevelopment trap’ (Pool 2015b: Fig 1.1;
mine alone.
his modelling requires data not available for 19th century
material interventions must be effective Mäori).
(McMillan 2016). Most problematically, 7 Most of the others relate to issues of relationships of power,
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