NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
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NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
Content New NATO Strategic Concept: Baltic States Perspective 03 NATO and the Black Sea region: security challenges and solutions 14 Baltic Sea Region security: Nordics, Baltics, and NATO 20 This publication has been prepared as part of a NATO Public Diplomacy Division CO-SPONSORSHIP GRANT
NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 3
IEVA KARPAVIČIŪTĖ is an Associate Professor at Jo-
nas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania and at the
Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas
Magnus University. Her research is focused upon Re-
gional Security Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis and
Theories of International Relations. She carried out
a research and published on the following topics: re-
gional security, regional security orders, regional pow-
er dynamics, NATO, transnational security threats,
defence and deterrence, arms control, and Lithuania’s
foreign and security policy.
VYTAUTAS KERŠANSKAS is a Defence Policy Group
Advisor at the Ministry of National Defence of the Re-
public of Lithuania. Prior to that Vytautas spent two
years at the European Centre of Excellence for Coun-
tering Hybrid Threats, where he led a Hybrid threats
deterrence project. Besides hybrid threats and disin-
formation, he previously researched and published
on Lithuania’s foreign and security policy, Russia’s
foreign policy, regional security and EU’s Eastern part-
nership policy.
New NATO Strategic Concept:
Baltic States Perspective
Dr. Ieva Karpavičiūtė, Vytautas Keršanskas1
In the eight decade long history of NATO, 2022 will be marked as a year of
the new Strategic Concept. It will be the eighth NATO Strategic Concept,
and the fourth in the post-Cold War period. The NATO Summit in Madrid will
finalize the process of strategic reflection, which started a few years ago.
The Strategic Concept is “an official document defining NATO’s purpose,
4 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
nature and fundamental security approach to deterrence and defence adapta-
tasks in the contemporary security tion. The Eastern European Allies naturally
highlight the strong transatlantic bond and
environment2”. Indeed, the strate-
US security assurances for the Allies, along
gic environment has fundamentally with sound collective defence as essential
changed since 2010, when the pre- elements of the security and stability in the
vious Strategic Concept was adopt- region. The set of normative democratic prin-
ed. So, along with the environment, ciples along with the commitment to collec-
the Alliance has to review its major tive defence and credibility of Article 5 of the
goals, tasks and strategic directions. Washington Treaty should remain pivotal and
unquestionable.
Historically, NATO Strategic Concepts had
In fact, the Allies are looking for the right bal- multiple goals. They provided strategic di-
ance between NATO as a collective defence rections for the Alliance, “prioritized threats,
alliance and a political international organisa- fundamental tasks and geographical points
tion. The threat perception and the very prin- of concern, and established guidelines for
ciples of defence, as well as the security en- the force posture of tomorrow”4, also they
vironment have changed. So, the Alliance has institutionalised, summarized the decisions
to address the military threat stemming from taken by the Alliance during previous Sum-
Russia along with its close integration with mits. So, the Strategic Concept is to provide
Belarus, while it also has to evaluate the rising future directions of the Alliance, to define the
challenge of China. And those challenges and Alliance in the context of contemporary secu-
threats are accompanied by a broad range of rity environment, to give tasks and guidelines
smaller, yet equally important challenges that to political and military structures. It should
might have direct impact on NATO’s reaction, correspond to the existing strategic environ-
evaluation, and decision-making. ment, provide guidelines and suggest means
for Alliance adaptation.
It has to rethink the future collective defence
and military force structure, reconsider the
role of partnerships, and take into account The Strategic Concept
emerging disruptive technologies, hybrid
of 2010
security challenges, “a range of policy com-
The strategic environment in 2010 was abso-
petences in cyber, resilience, outer space,
lutely different to the one of today. However,
capacity-building and more is indeed a tall
at that time, it was perceived as complex as
political order. Strategy is about priorities,
never before5. In Lisbon, the strategic envi-
however, and NATO’s priorities must bridge
ronment was defined as rather peaceful, ma-
the political– military divide.”3
jor challenges were perceived as stemming
By looking for the right political and military from regional disputes and unconventional
balance, NATO has to review and rebrand threats such as terrorism or proliferation of
its major core tasks, focus on the principles weapons of mass destruction. The percep-
of collective defence and deterrence and its tion that “an effective defence against theseNATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 5
unconventional security threats must begin decision to develop ballistic missile defence
well beyond the territory of the Alliance”6 . capability, and in 2012, the Deterrence and
was predominant. The future directions and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) stipulated
expectations were quite optimistic. The Stra- that a sound mix of nuclear, conventional and
tegic Concept underlined that: missile defence capabilities
“ “
The Euro-Atlantic area is at peace Underpinned by NATO’s integrat-
and the threat of a conventional ed Command Structure, offer the
attack against NATO territory is low. That strongest guarantee of the Alliance’s
is an historic success for the policies of security and will ensure that it is able to
robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration respond to a variety of challenges and
and active partnership that have guided unpredictable contingencies in a highly
NATO for more than half a century.7” complex and evolving international secu-
rity environment.”10
So, the complex but relatively peaceful stra-
tegic environment called for a flexible Alli- However, the inclusion of missile defence
ance focusing on non-Article 5 out-of-area was not perceived as a substitute for other
operations. capabilities that the Allies deem essential
In 2010, NATO defined three core tasks, name- to deterrence and their security.11 D. Yost
ly, collective defence, crisis management and observed similarly that the “missile defenc-
cooperative security. By that, the collective es and contingency plans and exercises in-
defence was in principle downgraded, as it be- volving conventional military forces are no
came one out of 3 core tasks of NATO and it substitute for retaining US nuclear weapons
was supposed to be achieved by the lowest in Europe as a key element of the Alliance’s
level of forces. In fact, collective defence was deterrence posture12.
almost overshadowed by crisis management.
The Baltic States and other Eastern European
The Strategic Concept focused on expedi-
Allies argued for more attention to collective
tionary forces and out-of-area operations. It
defence and realistic evaluation of the securi-
highlighted „robust, mobile and deployable
ty environment, as they observed the increas-
conventional forces to carry out both our Ar-
ingly assertive Russia. The Munich speech of
ticle 5 responsibilities and the Alliance expe-
Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in 2007, the
ditionary operations8“. There was a predomi-
suspension of implementation of the Trea-
nant perception, that NATO needed “improved
ty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
expeditionary capabilities not only for crisis
along with Russia’s military aggression in
response operations distant from alliance ter-
Georgia in 2008, violating territorial integrity
ritory but also for collective defence itself.9”
and undermining its sovereignty were espe-
In 2010, the Alliance introduced missile de- cially worrisome. Russia continued its claims
fence as the third element of deterrence and for zones of privileged interests disregarding
underscored its role in the NATO defence the major UN Charter and Helsinki Founding
and deterrence posture. The Allies took the Act principles.6 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
Notably, the Alliance reaffirmed its open-
Security Environment
door policy with regards Ukraine and Geor-
gia and in 2010, agreed “to prepare contin- in 2021
gency plans for the defence of the Baltic While looking at the security environment and
states”13, but NATO-Russia cooperation af- NATO adaptation, the Alliance has to evaluate
ter a short suspension period was back to whether the security threats that are relevant
business as usual and further developed. today will be actual in the foreseeable future.
The Strategic Concept underscored that So, the new Strategic Concept of 2022 will not
NATO poses no threat to Russia. only have to depict the major changes in secu-
rity environment, but also to provide the future
In addition, the Strategic Concept distin-
directions for the Alliance.
guished cooperative security as a third core
task, which was seen as the means to en- Since 2010, the strategic environment has
sure a stable, transparent, and predictable been significantly deteriorating, Russia con-
security environment. Despite the fact that tinued its military aggression against Georgia
“since 2007 Russia has become increas- and Ukraine, annexed the Crimean Peninsula,
ingly assertive14” against the Alliance, in and carried out military action in the eastern
2010, NATO sounded quite optimistic with part of Ukraine. Russia actively modernized its
regards to NATO-Russia partnership. Rus- military capabilities, started developing new
sia was perceived distinctively as a partner missile systems including hypersonic ones,
of strategic importance and the agenda of and expanded A2/AD capabilities that can cut
the NATO-Russia Council was expanding to off Allied support to the Baltic region, or de-
include a broad set of issues related to re- couple the US from its European Allies. “Since
gional and global security. 2008, Russia has strengthened its quantitative
and qualitative advantage in the Baltic Sea
Evidently, the 2010 Strategic Concept is
region and could potentially muster around
outdated and does not correspond with
125,000 high-readiness ground forces in the
strategic contemporary realities. Actually,
region in 14 days16”. The NATO Secretary Gen-
it was outdated few years after its incep-
eral highlighted:
“
tion. In 2010, NATO attempted to transform
from “old-style regional perceptions of se-
curity to a more recent global perspectives
The Russian regime is aggressive
of security15”, after 2014, this transfor-
abroad and oppressive at home. It
mation proved impossible, as traditional
has massively expanded its military pres-
military threats to collective security and
ence from the Barents Sea to the Mediter-
the need to focus on collective territorial
defence reappeared. Russia continuously ranean. Its military build-up on Ukraine’s
pursued the old-style regional muscle flex- borders, with around a hundred thousand
ing approach based on building zones of troops, heavy armour, drones and missiles,
so-called privileged interests and claiming is of great concern.17”
distinctive rights in the region and in this
aspect NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2010 In the last decade, Russia has “set up three
might even seem naïve. army commands, five new division headquar-NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 7
ters, and 15 new mechanized regiments in riety of sub-threshold challenges should not
the Western Military District (MD). ZAPAD ex- divert the Alliance’s attention from the real
ercises exemplify Russia’s ability to rehearse military threat.
large, combined operations, including live-fire
The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 de-
and realistic, unscripted scenarios, and Rus-
signed on the three core tasks – deterrence
sia’s dominance of the escalation ladder.”18
and defence, crisis management and collab-
Russia proved its ability to move large num-
orative security – does not reflect contempo-
bers of troops in a short period of time. Its
rary strategic realities. John R. Deni argues
military has been at the highest readiness
that the three core tasks model “is outmoded
and preparedness to act quickly since the end
for the twenty-first century, one in which the
of Cold War19. Russia’s military integration
alliance’s primary state adversaries—primari-
with Belarus is especially worrisome, it has a
ly Russia but also China—employ hybrid tac-
significant impact on transatlantic security.
tics iteratively across multiple domains”22.
The military threats stemming from Rus-
Indeed, fundamental shifts in the security en-
sia are accompanied by growing challenges
vironment require recalibration of the three
from China, which is developing its military
core tasks. Conventional military threats to
capabilities including missile systems that
the Alliance are much more acute now than a
can carry nuclear weapons. Western depend-
decade ago, especially in the Eastern flank, so
ence on China’s technologies might have se-
deterrence and defence should be prioritized
rious impact on NATO security in the future20.
as the key mission and the essence of NATO.
Threats from Russia, challenges from a rising
While the other two tasks are significant, from
China, the spread of terrorism in the South
the Baltic States perspective, collective de-
are accompanied by a number of below Arti-
fence should be clearly exclusive compared
cle 5 threshold threats that might strengthen
to the other two.
the effect of military threats or divert the at-
tention from the real intentions of potential
adversaries, to include emerging disruptive
technologies, cyber-attacks, terrorist threats,
Collective defence
challenges stemming from outer-space, the and deterrence
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. after 2014
Indeed, “security needs are constantly rising, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was a
and faced with Russia, terrorism, hybrid and real wake-up call for the Alliance, as it had
cyber threats, pandemics and maybe soon to rethink the very fundamental principles
China, NATO’s raison d’être seems to be as of defence and deterrence and adapt to the
clear as ever.”21 The contemporary securi- altered security environment. The NATO mis-
ty environment is more volatile, more com- sion-specific mobile command structure, as
plex and less predictable, than the one that approved in 1994, seemed inappropriate in a
existed 12 years ago. Despite the fact that post-2014 environment; NATO started adapt-
the security environment is under constant ing its commands, bringing back the principle
change, the most challenging and dangerous of territorial defence23.
is the threat stemming from Russia, so a va-8 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
NATO shifted from expeditionary defence es of coherence and capacity. Two decades
back to territorial defence, started institu- of focus on counterterrorism and stabiliza-
tional, political and military adaptation, devel- tion efforts in Afghanistan have not left NATO
oped reassurance measures for the Eastern well-equipped, well-trained, or well-postured
European Allies, established multinational to confront the new dynamics of great pow-
battalion-size battle groups of the Enhanced er rivalry. NATO needs to reorient and retool
Forward Presence in the Baltic States and itself.28” Tierry Tardy, while discussing the
Poland, and started long-term deterrence and major questions of the NATO self-reflection
defence adaptation. The adaptation is aimed process, underlined the following directions:
at “reinforcing the Alliance’s presence and mil- “continuity; refocusing on collective defence;
itary activity in Eastern Europe and introduc- morphing into a security organization; stand-
ing substantial long-term changes to NATO’s ing up for China; and marginalization”29. The
force posture, enabling it to respond more most relevant and sustainable direction of the
quickly to future challenges and threats”24. Alliance is refocussing on collective defence.
For the Baltic States, the continued Allied mil-
Against the backdrop of the development of
itary presence in the region is of critical im-
the New Strategic Concept, the Allies have
portance, it is an integral part of NATO’s deter-
to find the best way to meet the contempo-
rence and defence posture, which needs to be
rary security challenges and adjust the politi-
strengthened. The Baltics stress viable NATO
cal-military system of NATO. The major focus
reinforcement strategy25, and preparedness to
of this adaptation has to be on credible col-
react immediately in crisis and conflict.
lective defence system based on strength-
The deterrence and defence adaptation is ened and modernised force structure along
marked by responsiveness, readiness and re- with , preparedness, rapid reinforcement and
inforcement. It is closely interconnected with emphasis on swift reaction time. The Baltic
the defence spending pledge, the Allies com- States believe that NATO should commit it-
mitted to 2 per cent of their GDP by 2024, the self to continued adaptation of collective de-
decision was made to “reverse the trend of de- fence and increased preparedness to react
clining defence budgets, to make the most ef- rapidly in case of crisis or conflict.
fective use of funds and to further a more bal-
anced sharing of costs and responsibilities”26.
This principle has to be highlighted in the new Enhancing resilience –
Strategic Concept, as it is critically important together, but individually?
for sustainable collective defence commit-
Part of NATO’s adaptation to cope with emerg-
ments. The NATO Secretary General highlights
ing security threats is a growing emphasis on
the need to have the right forces in the right
resilience. In the 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO
place27, it might be added, and that those forc-
leaders agreed to boost resilience by commit-
es have to be prepared to react rapidly.
ting to achieve seven baseline requirements
Indeed, NATO needs to strike the right balance for civil preparedness, considering resilience
between the ability to defend Allied territory as the first line of defence30. The Brussels
and deter major threats. NATO has to focus Summit Communique notes an even greater
on collective defence and “confront challeng- commitment to enhancing resilience:NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 9
“ Emerging challenges in
Noting that resilience remains
a national responsibility, we will
adopt a more integrated and better co-
NATO’s agenda – a selective
ordinated approach, consistent with our and reserved approach
collective commitment under Article 3 What NATO looks like today is much closer
of the North Atlantic Treaty, to reduce to the ideal the Baltic States in particular and
vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries the Eastern European Allies more broadly
were thinking off when they were joining the
can effectively operate in peace, crisis
Alliance. Yet, many of the changes that arose
and conflict.31”
during the last 7 years are still half-way and
require further efforts, funding and focus.
Although the consensus is that resilience
This is the main reason the Baltic States in
building is important and should be en-
general are not enthusiastic about the broad-
hanced32, the level of ambition to deepen its
ening of NATO’s agenda.
presence in NATO’s agenda is still debated:
is it an underpinning element that blends On the other hand, the strength of the Euro-At-
into NATO’s core tasks33, should it become lantic alliance comes not only from its unity
a fourth core task, or should it be strictly and cohesion, but also the ability to adapt to
kept a national responsibility (despite it be- the changing security environment and keep
ing a collective commitment)? This ques- itself at the technological edge. NATO will
tion boils down to very practical questions have to consider how it operates in non-tradi-
where the devil lies in the details: should tional domains, such as cyber or outer space,
resilience goals be more strictly overseen or what military and non-military tools it pos-
by NATO (similarly to the Alliance defence sesses to respond to ‘hybrid threats’. This
planning process)? What resources it would seems to be among the US’ priorities while
require, and would it come from defence looking at NATO’s adaptation to future chal-
spending? And, in the end, will that have a lenges as well34.
tremendous impact on the calculus of the
In this situation, the Baltic States, who tradi-
adversary to really boost the deterrence?
tionally regard collective defence as the fun-
The Alliance will need to answer these and damental essence of NATO, need to accom-
other questions as the political commit- modate support for a 360-degree approach
ment will be operationalized. To that end, and growing interest to expand NATO’s agen-
the Baltic States’ stance on resilience will da into new areas to ensure the cohesion and
be supportive in general, cautious of the unity of the Alliance.
possibility for the topic to grow too wide
The list of the ‘new’ possible items in NA-
and divert resources from the collective de-
TO’s agenda is rather broad. The NATO 2030
fence task, and very vocal about the need
Reflection paper discusses emerging and
to do resilience building work much closer
disruptive technologies (EDT), climate and
together with the EU.
green defence, human security, energy secu-
rity, pandemics and natural disasters, cyber
and hybrid threats or tackling disinforma-10 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
tion as the topics where NATO’s role could quickly labelled ‘hybrid warfare’ and was met
be enhanced35. And this is not the end list. It with surprise in the West, although others see
is assumed that the contemporary security it as traditional Russian statecraft37. Despite
threats go far beyond the traditional military the still ongoing debate if Russian strategy is
domain and, therefore, the Alliance has to new or not, hybrid tactics, which could involve
step up in addressing these issues. kinetic elements at the earliest stages of the
crisis, are frequently presented as the most
The NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué
pressing issue of today, especially if they could
recognizes the growing importance of mod-
lead to a fait accompli scenario favourable to
ern threats:
“
the aggressor. Hybrid tactics along with reflex-
ive control principles might mislead, misguide,
revert the attention of the Alliance and hinder
We face multifaceted threats, sys-
effective decision-making processes.
temic competition from assertive
and authoritarian powers, as well as grow- Therefore, some of the ‘emergent’ issues are
ing security challenges to our countries easily passing this exam: cyber, hybrid or
and our citizens from all strategic direc- disinformation are the topics where the Bal-
tions. […] We are increasingly confronted by tic States are not only vocal, but also trying
cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats, hard to be the flagbearers in countering these
threats. Tallinn is well known for its expertise
including disinformation campaigns, and by
on cyber, Riga hosts NATO’s Strategic Com-
the malicious use of ever-more sophisticat-
munications Centre of Excellence, while Lithu-
ed emerging and disruptive technologies.
ania has activated the Counter Hybrid Support
Rapid advances in the space domain are
Teams mechanism first and foremost to signal
affecting our security36.” that NATO has a role in responding to hybrid
attacks against its members. All three believe
This wide array of new topics or issues of hybrid threats are the ‘new normal’ of today’s
growing concern is, to some extent, a collec- security landscape, so the Alliance must not
tion of the wish-list of 30 Allies and not all only build resilience to such challenges but
necessarily will become part of NATO’s agen- also develop capabilities to mitigate, deter or
da. However, the proliferation of the topics respond to these threats properly.
NATO addresses in the Baltics is perceived
as a distraction to the focus on the essence Combined with the notion that Russia is the
of the Alliance – the collective defence pillar. only challenge, which is threatening NATO ex-
istentially, some argue that a broad approach
In this regard, the Baltic States will be using
to security should first and foremost be adopt-
a ‘red lens’ to judge any new initiative – is it
ed for the Eastern European Allies. Moreover,
relevant in terms of deterrence and defence
European security and stability lies also on its
against Russia?
ability to deal with aggressive Russian poli-
Russia combined military and non-military cy towards non-NATO countries in the East38.
tools, such as cyber, disinformation or polit- This should not only be acknowledged in the
ical subversion, to achieve desired results – new Strategic Concept but should also guide
the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This was the review of NATO’s partnership policies.NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 11
However, other ‘emergent’ topics are not re- last two decades were marked by a deep fo-
ceived with much hype. That does not mean cus on counter terrorism efforts, which was
they are seen as unimportant; they just do not an important basis for NATO partnerships.
seem to carry much weight when it comes to
The priority partnerships for the Baltic States
dealing with Russia.
are Nordic partners Finland and Sweden,
Although having limited (but not none, as there along with Eastern European countries,
are some cutting edge technologies developed Ukraine and Georgia in particular. From the
in the Baltic States) capabilities to contribute Baltic States perspective, those partnerships
much with expertise, all three Baltic States contribute to greater security and stability
showed their support to the common effort in the region, they have to be developed and
in responding to EDT challenge by joining NA- strengthened.
TO’s first innovation fund DIANA, dedicated to
An open door policy, especially with another
retaining the Alliance’s technological edge39.
attempt from the Kremlin to become a veto
Building relations in the defence industry sec-
power in European security architecture, is of
tor is an opportunity to develop stronger links
crucial importance and will be among the top
with key Allies. At the same time, the approach
priorities for the Baltic States in the new Stra-
is rather reserved, as there is no general under-
tegic concept42.
standing where this initiative will actually lead
to and what its impact will be for collective de- The changing security environment is driven
fence and deterrence. by US-China competition, whose importance
will only grow in the next years or even dec-
When it comes to issues like climate change,
ades. The US emphasizes that its global pow-
human security or responding to pandemics or
er is strongly enhanced by its partnerships
natural disasters, the Baltic States are not be
across the globe, and this notion is being
enthusiastic about the expanding NATO’s role
broadcast to NATO as well43. Increasingly
in these issues. Yet they will not be the ones
many Allies are voicing the need to build clos-
that would start blocking these initiatives.
er relationships with like-minded countries
in the Indo-Pacific region to counter-balance
Beijing’s growing power there44.
Partnerships – focus
on the closest and Lithuania is among them, as its incumbent
like-minded partners government pursues a ‘values-based’ foreign
policy, where building tangible relationships
As argued in the NATO 2030 Reflection pa-
with democratic and like-minded countries is
per, “NATO’s partnerships are crucial instru-
an important objective to ‘diversify’ relation-
ments of cooperative security, knowledge
ships in the region and minimize any possible
and information sharing, collaboration, and
impact dependencies with China can bring.
capacity building”40. NATO has a multilayer
Such objectives are even enshrined in the
partnership, from its closest neighbours to
newly adopted National Security Strategy45.
the countries far overseas41. The changing
security environment has had an impact on The partnerships with democratic and
NATO‘s approach to partnerships as well. The like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific could12 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
boost NATO’s ability to understand the Chi- But the heating situation at the Ukrainian
na threat better, enhance resilience against border caught the Baltic States in limbo. The
hostile Chinese influence in the Euro-Atlantic Kremlin’s ‘proposals’ to mitigate the situa-
area, and strengthen political ties between tion might have implications to the entirety
democracies across the globe. However, like of Eastern Europe. The Kremlin’s proposals
in any other issue, the calculus for the Baltic might be viewed as divisive and driving wedg-
States will be: how much time and, especially, es between Allies, therefore Allied unity is
resources will this draw from deterrence and essential. The Baltic States are concerned
defence against Russia? In this vein, the Bal- that Russia is attempting to limit the sover-
tic States will resist any attempt to pursue a eignty of Ukraine and create so-called “zones
NATO military role in the Indo-Pacific46. of privileged interests”. Dialogue should not
legitimize such Russian claims.
NATO-EU partnership is the most natural but
at the same time one of the most challeng-
ing elements. While recognizing its limiting
Conclusion
factors, the Baltic States will still be strong
The renewal of the NATO Strategic Concept is
proponents of deeper strategic cooperation,
significant for the Baltic States, they expect
especially when it comes to resilience, re-
a realistic approach towards the strategic en-
sponding to emerging security challenges
vironment along with a greater focus on col-
and cooperative security. However, in defence
lective defence and deterrence, to include the
matters NATO is the primary and most impor-
preparedness of the Alliance to react urgently
tant security provider for the Euro-Atlantic
in case of crisis or conflict.
area, so any EU attempt to expand its military
capabilities should be based on non-duplica- Indeed, the Alliance has a great opportunity
tion and complementarity, and openness to to address the altered and deteriorating se-
practical inclusion of the transatlantic allies. curity environment in the new NATO Strate-
gic Concept. It has to address the adaptation
NATO-Russia relations will also be debated.
of the deterrence and defence posture along
Although supportive of a dual-track approach
with Allied defence spending pledges, com-
towards Russia in principle, the Baltic States
mitment to allocate at least 2 percent of na-
usually voice their scepticism towards practi-
tional GDPs to military expenditures by 2024.
cal-technical cooperation and moves towards
business as usual between NATO and Russia, Reaching agreement on the new Strategic
as the decision to suspend NRC cooperation Concept is not the easiest task, NATO has to
was due to Russia’s annexation of the Crime- address a great number of complex and inter-
an Peninsula. The Baltic States highlight related issues. These include, Russia, China,
reciprocity as a fundamental principle in NA- also a number of different topics that are find-
TO-Russia relations. It is not the case for Rus- ing their way to the agenda of the Alliance,
sia, which mainly used the platform to voice namely, resilience, hybrid security, emerging
criticism, blame NATO and request without disruptive technologies, outer-space and cli-
any space for negotiations. mate change. NATO has to reconsider the
role of partnerships so as to include NATO-EU
strategic cooperation.NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 13 The Baltic States will evaluate the elements of the document in the process using a ‘red lens’: is a particular item relevant to NATO’s funda- mental task – collective defence and deterrence – which for the East- ern European Allies first and foremost mean ensuring security from the threats emanating from Russia. Without any doubt their priority will be a consensus, which contributes as much as possible to the strength- ening of NATO as a collective defence Alliance and finding the right balance between the broad list of new political issues looming before the NATO agenda.
14 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
COL. (RET.) GINTARAS BAGDONAS is an advisor at the Min-
istry of National Defence of Lithuania. Prior to that he was
posted as a Military Representative of NATO Military Staff in
Georgia and Military Liaison Officer in the South Caucasus.
He has held positions including Director of NATO Energy Se-
curity Centre of Excellence, Head of the Lithuanian Special
Mission in Afghanistan, Commandant of the General Jonas
Žemaitis Lithuanian Military Academy, Director of Military In-
telligence of the EU Military Staff, Director of the Lithuanian
Military Intelligence and Security organization.
NATO and the Black Sea
region: security challenges
and solutions
Col. (Ret.) Gintaras Bagdonas1
INTRODUCTION
Next year, NATO’s nations are committed to redraft the Strategic Concept
of the Alliance, which will replace outdated Concept of 20102. Undoubtedly,
the future Concept will prioritise collective defence, emphasising it as an es-
sential core task of NATO. Nevertheless, next to the main goal, the security
situation within the Black Sea region, including the South Caucasus nations
and Ukraine should be reflected in the forthcoming Concept, as the region
is of great importance to both European nations and the Alliance in terms
of economic growth and geopolitics as well as development of democracy.
Geopolitically, the South Caucasus cannot be assessed separately without
embracing the Black Sea region as the security of both is indivisible andNATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 15
complement each other by providing How can NATO and the Allies counter the
opportunities for economic growth Russian threat in the region and improve the
security there, especially in a time when Rus-
and development. The South Cau-
sia has deployed its forces along the border of
casus and Black Sea connect Eu- Ukraine and escalates the security situation?
rope with Asia and the Middle East. Having “an elephant” in the region, to answer
Maritime and land transport roads, this question there is a need to understand
fibre-optic communication cables, the nature of this “elephant’s” relationship
gas and oil pipelines pass through with Western democracies and their policies
towards Russia.
the region.
The Black Sea connects six nations. While Defensive democracy
three of them – Bulgaria, Romania and Tur- and aggressive revisionism
key – are NATO members, two – Ukraine of Russia
and Georgia – are NATO’s closest partners
Allies and Western democracies in general
and aspirant nations to join the Alliance, and
disregarded Russia after the latter brutally
Russia who, after the occupation of Georgian
invaded Georgia and annexed part of its terri-
Abkhazia and annexation of the Ukrainian
tory. Until the invasion of Ukraine the Western
Crimea, illegally expanded its coastline. Mol-
countries had carried out policy of appease-
dova, Armenia and Azerbaijan belong to the
ment towards Russia. Although the reaction
broader Black Sea region, as these countries
towards Russia has become tougher when it
are dependent on the development of this
intervened in Ukraine, captured Crimea and
region. Although only 421 km of coastline of started the military conflict in Donbas, in gen-
the Black Sea legally belongs to Russia out eral, they were trying to maintain dialogue
of a total 4869 km3, the sea is considerably and cooperation with Russia, at the same
controlled by Russia. Having strongly mili- time imposing some sanctions on a number
tarised the fortress of Crimea, enhanced by of Russian enterprises and individuals. There
the Southern Military District, the Black Sea have been no major policy changes applied
is increasingly becoming an internal water regarding Russia even after the use of chem-
of Russian Federation. The Russian military ical weapons on the UK’s territory (the Novi-
footprint is also enhanced by its militaries chok case in Salisbury), its secret services’
in occupied Georgian Tskhinvali region (also attempt to poison the opposition leader Nav-
known as South Ossetia) and military troops alny and a number of other malign attacks in
in Armenia and in the Nagorno Karabakh re- the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, the Netherlands
gion. Another feature of the Russian posture and elsewhere. Western countries have been
in the region is that it employs the Black Sea applying a policy of something of a balance
as the launchpad in projecting its military using the “stick and carrot” method, sanc-
forces beyond the region: to the Mediterrane- tions and leaving some room for a dialogue
an Sea, Syria and African countries. and cooperation. There are many areas of en-16 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
gaging in cooperation with Russia: on climate NATO and Allies do not respond in favour
change, trade and economics and especially of Moscow’s demand. Ukraine has become
in energy sector. The NATO Allies do not have a centre of gravity in Russia’s efforts to ex-
a unified policy in relationship with Russia. pand its power. On a broader scale, Russia
When the United States applies tougher pol- has launched a new Cold War with the West,
icy on Russia, some Europeans, mostly Ger- but it is still not fully recognized there.
many and France tend to appease Russia, the
Nord Stream 2 project can serve as an exam-
ple of this. As an outcome of such policy, the The options
Kremlin is given an expectation to get some
of confronting Russia
awards in terms of regaining the status of a
Facing the threatening Russian challenge, re-
global power, at least within the perception of
alizing that further continuation of the “stick
the Russian population.
and carrot” and in many cases passive de-
When it comes to the relationship between the fence policy towards Russia is hardly possi-
democratic world and Russia, the main feature ble, the Allies have to build a strategy to con-
is the difference of behaviour: the Western de- front Russian aggression against its Eastern
mocracies have been still pursuing the princi- neighbours, including the Black Sea region. It
ples set out in the Paris Charter of 19904, sup- is high time to introduce containment of Rus-
posedly adhering to the post-Cold War order sia and proactively fight for democracy.
defined by the Charter, which has long been
forgotten by the Kremlin. Meanwhile, Russia Based on open source analysis we can con-
applies Machiavellian geopolitics, which have clude with certainty that from the Kremlin’s
been adopted by contemporary Kremlin’s poli- perspective, control of the Black Sea is a top
cy makers and policy technologists. priority for Russia’s national security. The
current escalation against Ukraine is supple-
Such asymmetry has led to the turning point mented by actions, supporting both Kremlin’s
of a new global era of geopolitics, which com- policy to force Ukraine to bow down and to
menced on 1st December 2021 when the Rus- gain a foothold in the Black Sea. As Anders
sian president demanded Western guaran- Åslund aptly observed in his article, apart
tees to not expand NATO’s borders further to from its military muscles, Russia is very weak.
the East. Later, on 10 December, the Ministry Once military force is used, there would be no
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation more trump cards6.
released an official statement demanding
to recall the 2008 NATO Bucharest decision What options should the Allies have in place
on the future membership of Georgia and to confront Russia? Firstly, the NATO mem-
Ukraine and adding a list of other demands bers Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have to
(suggestion to divide into territories of influ- enhance their defence, while NATO and Allies
ence)5. Currently, Russia is introducing a mili- have to support those nations firstly in build-
tary build-up around Ukraine and threatening ing air defence and maritime capabilities. The
to launch a full-scale military invasion of this option to rely on the reinforcements from oth-
country or at least blackmailing to do so, if er NATO countries’ naval forces in the BlackNATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 17
Sea is difficult due to the restrictions imposed Admitting Georgia and Ukraine to NATO
by the international convention of Montreux would be an effective response to Russia’s
of 19367. The movement of warships belong- growing threat. Their accession should be
ing to non-littoral nations across the Bospho- supplemented with robust military planning
rus and Dardanelles straits is limited by the to enhance their defensibility and deterrence
Convention8. Therefore, NATO should focus against Russia. There is another option to
on strengthening its posture in the region ensure a continuation of democratic develop-
based on the three littoral Allies’ Naval ca- ment of both countries, that is “boots on the
pabilities, developing NATO air defence and ground” of US and/or other Allies, empowered
other non-naval military capabilities and on with bilateral military treaties. This option as
the partnership with the two partner nations, a possible case for Georgia was elaborated in
Ukraine and Georgia, which since the 2008 a study paper published by the Georgian Insti-
Bucharest Summit, have been aspirants to tute of Politics11. Although the option of a bi-
join the Alliance. lateral Georgian-US treaty was rejected in the
study paper as unrealistic12. However, having
Both Georgia and Ukraine are the closest
a significant change in the security situation,
partners of NATO and their aspirations to
the option of bilateral US treaties with Geor-
join NATO and the Europe Union are based
gia and Ukraine could be considered again at
on the will of their societies. A public opinion
least for a transitional period until the nations
survey published by the National Democratic
join the Alliance, as a provisional tool to en-
Institute (NDI) shows that support for NATO
sure deterrence.
membership in Georgia is 74% of the popula-
tion, and 82% of the country’s society support As elaborated above, Moscow has been stick-
the EU membership9. While 58% of Ukrainians ing to a policy of aggressive revisionism. The
support joining NATO and 62% – accession Kremlin reiterated several times about its “red
to the EU10. The aspirations of both countries lines” – demands of “legal guarantees” to
to join the Alliance and the EU are enshrined not accept Georgia and Ukraine into NATO.
in their constitutions. The will of these na- Moreover, Putin does not recognize Ukraine’s
tions provides a strong legal and moral basis right to its independence13. It would be naive
for admitting these countries to the Alliance to expect the situation will suddenly change
and no less important is the fulfilment of the and the issue of membership for both coun-
commitments made in Bucharest Summit in tries will be resolved. Especially in the context
2008. Then Allies agreed that Georgia and of the approaching date of elections of the
Ukraine will become a NATO members, but a Russian president in 2024. The Kremlin des-
consensus on the joining date is still absent. perately needs to continue trying to prove the
NATO has provided both countries with all success of the current regime, and even more
necessary programmes and other tools pre- necessarily - to prevent, most likely at any cost,
paring these countries and their armed forces the democratic and economically successful
to join the Alliance, although the granting of development of Ukraine, as well as of other
Membership Action Plans (MAP) to the as- post-Soviet countries (Georgia, Moldova, Bela-
pirant countries has been excluded from the rus). Having taken into consideration all of the
partnership agenda. above, Western democracies have no choice18 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
but to accept the new reality, introducing a cy and defence for the sake of the peace and
permanent tough stance against the aggres- security of their countries. The possible ways
sive Russian revisionism. The Allies should and policies of how to overcome the issue of
take a lead on that. The policy of balancing occupied territories should be addressed in
and conceding to Russia (as well as the ab- the plans. This should not sound like an im-
sence of unity amongst the Allies) will further possible task. Georgia’s independent secu-
strengthen the Kremlin regime. Continuing the rity experts have already begun discussing
current course of action, Georgia and Ukraine various options for resolving the dilemma
will inevitably fall into Russia’s sphere of influ- with the occupied territories14. Georgia and
ence, and their democracies will be lost. In the Ukraine should cooperate bilaterally on the
context of the ongoing tensions with Russia, drafting of their accession plans.
spreading doubts within the West countries
about an obscure chance for Ukraine to join Secondly, the Alliance and Allies should
the Alliance in the near future means contrib- provide enormous support to Georgia and
uting to the Kremlin’s efforts. This situation Ukraine in reforming their institutions,
undermines the confidence of the people in strengthening their defences and devel-
both countries in the institutions of the West oping the resilience of their societies. The
and in democracy. If Russia achieves its goals support should also include the economic,
in Ukraine, it would be very likely that later, we financial and judicial sectors. In parallel, the
will have to restrain Russia at the borders of arrangements on strengthening the defen-
the Baltic States and Poland or Romania. sibility of the countries should be prepared
and implemented, including the “boots” of
The most serious challenge is the admission Allies’ troops. All this support should be
of Georgia and Ukraine to the Alliance with- clearly driven by the impetus of fighting for
out provoking an immediate military reaction democracies.
from Russia, but rather ensuring the security
within the region. This can be possible, apply- Thirdly, Brussels and Washington, along with
ing the complex of actions in advance or in Ankara, should take over the initiative from
conjunction. Moscow in resolving the Armenia-Azerbai-
jan conflict. After all, the US and the EU have
Firstly, strong and clear initiative should come immeasurably more resources to devote to
from both capitals, presented to NATO and the countries’ development than Moscow
the Allies as plans (or strategies) on the pro-
can offer.
cess to join the Alliance and agreed internally
by major political parties. NATO membership Lastly, the Western countries should not try
should be a top priority within the countries. “to reinvent the wheel”, the main policy ele-
All positive political, diplomatic and societal ments and lessons learnt regarding the con-
forces in both countries should mobilize to- tainment of the Soviet Union should be used
ward the achievement of this goal, applying and adapted in the containment geopolitical
their diplomatic efforts in the Allies’ capitals, foreign policy to restrain the Kremlin regime.
especially in Europe, seeking consensus and Furthermore, a clear message should be
implementing reforms, strengthening resilien- sent to Kremlin indicating the clear a clearNATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 19 NATO “red line” in order to establish deterrence, which should be en- hanced with a solid package of preventive measures (including tough sanctions and other means). Once again, it is necessary to point out that doing nothing is the worst solution. Moreover, as we know, Russia respects the strong. Conclusion As defined by the founders of the Alliance, NATO was established to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peo- ples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”15, or otherwise to defend the values of Western democra- cies. The NATO Strategic Concept is a key document for the Alliance, which outlines the “fundamental security tasks, and the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment”16. The aggressive Russia has been changing the principles of the Charter of the United Nations inter alia to maintain the peace and security by militarily threatening the independence and democratic development of neighbouring states. The Allies should cope with this security chal- lenge and focus on taking the initiative from Russia in order to defend democratic values in the Black Sea region. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept should address the challenge by providing guidance on how to contain Russia’s revisionism. There is no other way to defend de- mocracy than to move from a passive, reactive defensive position to a proactive one, taking initiative and exploring Russia’s weakness. As the Kremlin regime is determined to deny the right of Ukraine and Georgia to choose their own security arrangements and even Ukraine’s independence, the ultimate goal of the Kremlin is to halt the develop- ment of democracy in these countries and in the Black Sea region, as well as to embed Russian power there. The releasing of Ukraine and Georgia from the captivity of the resurgent Russian Empire would pave the way for economic growth and development of democracy in the Black Sea region.
20 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
DOROTA SOKOLOVSKA is a project assistant at
the Eastern Europe Studies Centre, she joined
the team in July 2021. Dorota contributes to
project administration and implementation, she
is also engaged in analytical content creation,
co-authored several studies on transatlantic re-
lations and NATO’s next strategic concept.
Baltic Sea Region security:
Nordics, Baltics, and NATO
Dorota Sokolovska
In the context of the growing Russian military presence and its increasingly
aggressive posture in Eastern Europe and the eastern NATO flank, the Baltic
Sea region is once again regaining its strategic importance for NATO, neutral
states and Russia. The Russian Baltic fleet’s activity in the Baltic sea just
few miles away of the Swedish capital, reinforced anti-air and ballistic mis-
sile capabilities in Kaliningrad, provocative manoeuvres near allied warships
and the already customary sights of violations of NATO airspace by the Rus-
sian air force have increased chatter in Stockholm and Helsinki about closer
cooperation with NATO and the US. Not to mention Russia’s play of coercive
diplomacy vis-a-vis Ukraine and the US, using the deployment of a substan-
tial number of its forces next to the Ukrainian border. Hence, “keeping a Bal-
tic focus” must stay on the Alliance’s agenda if we are to present a credible
deterrent against Moscow and keep the status of regional security stable.NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE 21
The security puzzle of the Baltic Sea region is points of departure could be policy proposals
characterised by the intersection of the two presented by Thorvald Stoltenberg to the ex-
main Western alliances, NATO and the EU, as traordinary meeting of Nordic foreign minis-
each country in the region is a member of ei- ters in Oslo on 9 February 2009. In his report1,
ther one or both. This complicates common he endorsed the mutual declaration of soli-
coordination in defence and security – up to darity by which each country committed itself
this date, there is no comprehensive coordi- to respond if any other Nordic country was
nated response mechanism that could ena- subject to external attack, undue pressure or
ble all countries on both shores of the Baltics hybrid threats.T. Stoltenberg put forward the
to counter immediate security threats, most idea of strengthening the Nordic Five’s part-
notably those coming from Russia. While the nership in: peacebuilding, air surveillance,
Nordic states take advantage of long-stand- maritime monitoring and arctic issues, soci-
ing traditions of mutual partnership in areas etal security, foreign services, and military co-
that certainly extend beyond (non)-conven- operation. What the document demonstrates
tional military, the Nordics are still somewhat is that the Nordic Five pursues security co-
detached from the Baltic trio and NATO, as operation which cuts across institutional EU–
there are no robust binding cooperation NATO boundaries, as the format includes both
mechanisms. non–EU (Iceland and Norway) and non-NATO
However, since the 2014 illegal occupation of (Finland and Sweden) members. A clear ex-
Crimea and the Russian incursion into East ample of it is The Nordic Defence Cooperation
Ukraine, Sweden and Finland have intensi- (NORDEFCO), the purpose2 of which consists
fied their ties with NATO and the US. In 2014, of “strengthening the participants’ national
Sweden and Finland were recognised by defence, exploring common synergies and fa-
NATO as Enhanced Opportunities Partners. cilitating efficient common solutions”.
This framework allows for more flexible co- Moreover, not only multinational – as in the
operation between Scandinavia and NATO.
case of NORDEFCO – but also bilateral coop-
Both Sweden and Finland agreed with NATO
eration successfully takes place. In the case
to host joint training exercises on their soil
of Finland and Sweden, A “Solidarity Declara-
and allow NATO member states’ forces to be
tion”3 was issued in both countries in 2009,
deployed on their territory. The annexation of
declaring that their countries would not re-
Crimea also changed the outlook of Swedish
main passive if another EU country or a Nor-
society on potential NATO membership, as a
dic neighbour (Norway and Iceland included),
record 37% of Swedes were in favour of NATO
was a target of an outside attack or struck by
membership in 2014.
disaster. This statement, although semanti-
cally similar to NATO Article 5, seems to in-
dicate underlying similarity between the two
Nordic cooperation:
countries, namely a particular kind of self-suf-
long-lasting but reserved ficiency and reluctance to join NATO, popular-
When discussing security cooperation be- ly coined as “non-alignment” and “neutrality”.
tween the Nordic states one of the possible Nonetheless, the weight of the NORDEFCO22 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE
“Solidarity Declaration” is still far from NATO lems on which to focus for Finland: “Russia,
Article 5, as Nordic deterrence does not equal Russia, and Russia”. Although Russia occu-
the whole NATO alliance, including the U.S. pies an important part of both Finnish and
Swedish foreign agendas, only for the former
However, despite the joint statement, Swed-
is it of primary or even existential importance;
ish and Finnish security doctrines arise from
moreover, it is essential to understand that
strikingly different historical backgrounds,
the Nordic foreign policy agenda covers top-
noticed in an Atlantic Council report4. Swed-
ics such as the High North, maritime issues,
ish nonalignment is of political nature since
cyber security and Iceland’s air space. Ergo,
it derives itself from the activist Swedish for-
for some analysts Russia seems6 more like
eign policy pursued during the Cold War. From
an “elephant” in the Nordic security “room.”
the Swedish point of view, the two hegemons
were seen as morally and politically indis- Whatever the differences in security frame-
tinguishable, despite the radically different works, both Finland and Sweden have tak-
ideological systems they represented. Thus en advantage of the window of opportunity
Sweden saw itself as a “moral superpower” opened after the collapse of the Soviet Un-
standing between the U.S. and Soviet Union, ion – in 1995 the two countries joined the
actively engaging in overseas affairs and sup- EU and, more importantly, reinforced their
porting radical, often strongly anti-American, ties with NATO. They were the first to enrol
regimes, for instance, Cuba, the Sandinistas in the Partnership for Peace program in 1994
in Nicaragua, or Vietnam. However, once the and since then have participated in almost
Berlin Wall had fallen, what was revealed to every NATO mission as non-aligned partners.
the public was that in the second part of the At the 2014 Wales Summit7, the Allies identi-
XXth century, Sweden supported several bi- fied five countries as Enhanced Opportunities
lateral agreements with NATO countries to Partners, Sweden and Finland, among others.
assure their assistance in the case of Sovi- Since then they have obtained a special sta-
et aggression. Eventually, having supported tus to discuss the further deepening of dia-
“double doctrines” rather than neutral poli- logue and practical cooperation with NATO.
cy, Sweden began to be called an “unofficial More generally, the Wales Summit marked a
member”, though this labelling has not result- new shift in the Alliance’s strategic orienta-
ed in factual membership yet. tion – in 2014, NATO started to develop an
absolutely new Baltic Sea focus, as well as
Finland, on the contrary, grounds its non-align-
an agreed upon Readiness Action Plan (RAP)
ment stance primarily in geopolitics. Both his-
which implies large-scale reinforcement and
torical reminiscences of two wars fought with
reorganisation of defence capabilities. Fortu-
Russia and a physical 1,300-kilometre-long
nately for the Baltics, collective defence has
border with an antagonistic neighbour com-
thus been underlined as NATO’s core task.
prise the essence of Finnish neutrality. This
‘realpolitik’ logic fuelled by fear to be ab- Both Nordic countries have also hosted a
sorbed was best concluded in a statement of number of NATO exercises, including air and
then-Finnish defence minister Jyri Häkämies sea exercises in Finland and Loyal Arrow ex-
who said5 that there are three strategic prob- ercises on the ground in Sweden. On top ofYou can also read
