Modern Irregular Warfare & Counterinsurgency
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KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT
DISKUSSION &
DEBATT
Modern Irregular Warfare & Counterinsurgency
– today’s military challenge within Campaigns and Operations, by,
through and with people
By Michael Gustafson
P eace and stability seems more and
more difficult for conventional military
forces to win or even shape conditions for
formerly mostly unconventional aggressor.
Is it thus a matter of waiting the answer
out? Will the conventional traditional joint
in the modern operational environment. forces, after a period of time, again engage,
Afghanistan and Iraq shine bright as warn- and at last win linearly?
ing signals or maybe even stop signals. This is, however, not the focus of this
The military solutions have not been sat- discussion. The scope is, rather, to elabo-
isfactory and the military – civilian efforts rate the more common situation, i.e. how
that have been deployed and are so-called to educate, train and engage what forces
“comprehensive” have a long way to go. from the beginning of a crisis that for some
The question is how to turn this wheel and political reason are to be engaged. The
why the problem is so hard to solve. nucleus of the discussion is some thoughts
This paper will address some of the of a possible development for a military
problems of how to militarily adapt to the coalition enterprise for crisis response
irregular operational environments today. operations or stability and reconstruction
This comes with the paradox that the more operations. The goal is to be able to deliver
mature the irregular fight gets, the more a trustworthy utility of military force for Ir-
regular or conventional capabilities are regular Warfare1 and Counterinsurgency.2
usually required to engage and win over the This implies that the utility must be trust-
1 irregular warfare – A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over
the relevant population(s). Irregular Warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may
employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence,
and will. Also called IW. US DoD JP 1-02 As Amended Through 17 October 2008 http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/jel/doddict
2 counterinsurgency – Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions
taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. US DoD JP 1-02 As Amended Through
17 October 2008 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict
1-2009 82KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT
worthy to the people that are to be supported tions to think outside the way of conven-
as well as to one’s own people back home. tional war have been very limited.
Regarding Irregular Warfare, however, When now facing “the other wars” also
there is, compared to conventional war and within a multinational coalition the prob-
warfare, a very limited theoretical basis, lem expands. Various national caveats, the
and, within the military systems in the absence of a common doctrine and diffe-
western world, a fundamentally negative rent training levels and mindsets for COIN-
attitude. Real warriors do not want to deal operations form a fragmentized military
with small wars. This attitude, elaborated framework. Also, many CROs/PSOs have
on with great depth and analytical insight started with conventional warfare and
by John Nagl,3 could be a core problem the transition to the stabilization phase
for adapting to postmodern military opera- with parallel warfighting and the mainly
tions. Also, the academic world has mostly non-combat profile of Coin-operations
studied the big war, leaving the theory with the same units is a challenging issue.
foundation for small wars more limited. Frequent security operations from contrac-
This, in turn, makes the educational pos- tor firms add to the difficulty of shaping
sibilities problematic, which could be a the vital connection and trust from the
root problem. people living there. All this comes within
an environment of a multitude of civilian
Background non-governmental organizations, NGOs,
Today’s Crisis Response Operations, CRO, and different private relief organizations
and Peace Support Operations, PSO, often that reject cooperation with the military
take place in a challenging irregular warfare force. The problem of reaching a compre-
context. To engage in counterinsurgency hensive approach for the military and the
operations has been something as reluctant employment of different civilian resources
as well as difficult for conventional military is well known and forms the problem of
forces as long as the big war has been the “multifunctional coordination”.
main reason for existing military forces at Within the military dimension, the
all. Recollections of the world wars, includ- two different capabilities of warfighting
ing the Cold War, and the Clausewitzian and counterinsurgency outline the main
theories understood and explained the Jo- aspects of warfare and operational art
minian way, have formed a way of thinking that are both necessary but seldom to be
and training for war. The willingness and found within the same units. This is even
even possibilities for the military institu- more problematic when both the troops,
3 Nagl, A. John: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgensy Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.
The University of Chicago Press, 2005 (first published in 2002).
1-2009 83KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT commanders and staff personnel rotate carried out with partners6. Probably most every 6-12 months. Finally, the operational engagements have to be executed under planning and execution processes within the hat of a coalition and this will bring the staff work are originally designed for forward questions for action and political conventional battles between armed forces explanation as to when and what has been and not for handling multiple insurgents, done covertly and by whom. terrorists, criminal formations and pure This hybrid and dominantly irregular mercenary forces supported by other na- war, as General Rupert Smith describes it tions or structures. in his highly acknowledged ”The Utility of The pendulum seems to have swung Force”,7 is waged among the people. It is not rather far from yesterday’s Revolutions to be argued that irregular struggles against in Military Affairs. We are moving from stronger rulers or states is about being with, sensor to shooter to the opposite, i.e. hearts of, by and thus, among the people. and minds and comprehensive counter- When seeking new ways of succeeding guerrilla boots on the ground. One can also against irregular adversaries, the scope notice a trace of the Cold War cloak-and- and reach for the military system becomes dagger activities in the U.S. Department of an issue. As irregular fights focus more Defense’s Irregular Warfare Joint Opera- on ideas than on physical targets, secret tions Concept (JOC)4. In this context, even ways and means of influencing one’s in theoretical conceptual ideas, mixing opponent become as interesting as just overt and covert actions5 within the same the use of blunt military armed forces. framework, has to be considered challeng- Even more ways and means than the con- ing especially when it has been said that ventional military “unconventional and the new irregular warfare effort has to be secret spearheads”, the Special Opera- 4 DoD IW JOC Version 1.0 11 sept 2007, section 4.a. The Key Elements of the Central Idea, p. 20, the 5th paragraph “Attack adversaries using a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods and means rather than relying only on conventional military forces. Nonconventional methods and means might include clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces,or the nonconventional uses of conventional capabilities.“ 5 covert operations – An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. US DoD JP 1-02 As Amended Through 17 October 2008. 6 IW JOC, p. 1 “IW will not be won by the United States alone, but rather through the combined efforts of our partners”. 7 Smith, Rupert: The Utility of Force, Alfred Knopf, New York 2007 1-2009 84
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT tions Forces,8 are under discussion and the regarding mindsets on operational art and outcome here will impact on a coalition’s tactics. In order to handle this situation, military possibilities. As a reminder of the both long-term educational efforts for many different actors in today´s complex the next military and political generation, operational areas Jeremy Scahill Blackwa- and short-term realistic transformation as ter. The rise of the world’s most powerful regards training, capabilities, operational mercenary army is recommended.9 art and tactics, doctrinal and concept de- The challenges are both strategic and velopments have to be formulated in order operational and they are indeed multidi- to reach more and better military utility in mensional. The problems embrace person- today’s modern Irregular Warfare opera- nel, mindsets, multifunctional realism and tions. possibilities, operational art and tactics, The following parts of the article will doctrines, training and education, military discuss some of these areas linked to the conventional warrior ethos versus a “peace- main question of “What are the military keeping ” mentality, leadership and, at the forces to do in Irregular Warfare and how end of the day, a thrust-potentiality for the will this be possible without losing the whole operational concept and thus the warfighting core capability?”. utility of military force. Finally, in officer training in western countries, War Studies The problem of understanding and has until today almost totally focused on practising war conventional warfighting, fostering a gen- Before we discuss the previous problem eration of commanders and officers who areas for military forces in an irregular are single-mindedly programmed for “the environment, we must say something about big war”. This is perhaps the most severe the time-consuming preconditions for problem for the need of the transforma- understanding and waging war or military tion of a whole system and a generation operations. The theory basis, the definition 8 special operations – Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 3-05) 9 Scahill, Jeremy: Blackwater. The rise of the world’s most powerful mercenary army. Nation Books, New York, 2008 1-2009 85
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT language and the possibilities for reflection explained from either a “regular” or an on the work after real-life military experi- “irregular” perspective could make us end ences are but all essential parts. up with a rather complicated pattern of First, it is fundamentally hard to under- oversimplifications that more brings in “ a stand different aspects of war and power fog of words” than clarification. Trying to struggles in general when one tries to de- do the explaining from different perspec- fine them in distinct boxes with different tives, for example the case of “irregular “explaining labels”. Every effort to give warfare”, soon develops into discussions aspects a frame and a label soon becomes of how to produce military capabilities, the focus of different opinions and under- instead of developing a deeper and more standings. The original scope of trying to fully comprehensive understanding of make possible a fruitful discussion of the the nature and aspects of war and power actual subject sometimes vanishes in favor struggles. of the military mental obsession for defini- Aspects of power struggles are con- tions, traceability and distinct borders for nected to each other regardless of the last every activity. Also, the way of waging war 500 years’ experiments on tasking some has nowadays, in its extreme form, been activities to people in uniform and other process-oriented. So, in a way, what the activities to people without uniforms. The process guide does not explain in detail civilian power structures, depending on will be difficult to handle and sometimes, what is at stake, will employ ways and sadly to say, inflict more frictions than the means of influencing the opponent, when art of war . suitable with uniformed actions and other- More emphasis on education and less wise without military involvement.10 They focus on training is the answer, according will even do so secretly and this is regard- to the academic world. A problem here is, less of belonging to “east” or “west” or however, that the limited time for training “south” in the world. Here we have forces officers, and also for soldiers and sailors, outside the military structure. does not allow for both an academic basis The clash of possibilities to understand and the expanding process training that “ways of warfare”, military or political, the NATO GOP and CJTF model demands as different or as some sort of sequential without more aviliable time. activities in a “peace-war” linearity, occurs Linking the conventional military men- when the phase of “irregular warfare” is tality with the perception that war can be analyzed in the same one-dimensional 10 Aldrich J. Richard: The Hidden Hand. p. 637-645. Behind the scenes of history. John Murry, London 2001. The book gives a very good picture of the UK and US use of non-military power structures for secret influences on each other as well as on some other nations during the Cold War. 1-2009 86
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT way. This clash of theories is even more forces and what are not to be? This ques- obvious if one includes the secret ways of tion is even more vital now when the needs war that Irregular Warfare and Unconven- for many forms of non-military tasks are tional Warfare are linked with. When one quite obvious and also when suggestions brings forward the overt-covert dimension might be put forward that military opera- of power struggle, it is possible for more tions are to handle covert activities. As for fully understandable structures or models covert activities, it should be clear that it to emerge. is for obvious reasons difficult to handle A conclusion of this is that it could be them in a military force structure. Special counterproductive to study, plan and ad- organizations have to do what they are or- dress war in boxes of what is regular and ganized to do in order to provide facilities irregular. Also, it could be counterproduc- that cannot be linked to any actual govern- tive to discuss the challenges as different ment. This is the whole point. Difficulties wars. The question is more how will the in handling covert activities within an ir- military forces of today develop in order regular environment is described in Mark to deliver utilities in all aspects of war and Urban’s interesting book Big Boys’Rules11 power struggles. What different perspec- about the British Army, Special Forces, tives have to be handled when the opposite Police and Intelligence operations, and, number is not a state? Where is the limit in particular, the covert actions of the SAS or utility for conventional warfighting and against the IRA during 1976-87. what aspects could be stretched somewhat? As for being able to “understand” war The bottom line is that actors striving for and actual ways of war, the possibilities of power in any way will always do so. When being educated in theory and being trained not being able to bring in conventional in execution are fundamental. Practical ex- military forces, they will fight clandes- periences linked back to ongoing research tinely and covertly, also armed, as seems and new theory-building then becomes the suitable for different reasons. The context quality control of the theories. The situa- of war is all around us, but pure military tion today for understanding the “military wars occur rarely and very seldom in the problem”, however, is problematic. fully armed utility. Still, the power strug- In a simplified way, one can say that yes- gles and different kinds of wars are ever terday the balance of theory available and in existence. the training possibilities were somewhat in Thus, regardless of how we label “war”, balance. The 20th century’s focus on the the question remains; what are to be the Big War fostered a generation of military tasks and the capabilities within the armed people and politicians with a definite view 11 Urban, Mark: Big Boys’ Rules, The Secret Struggle against the IRA. BCA, London 1992 1-2009 87
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT
on military utility of force, theoretically forces must work both abroad, for a long
gone through and in practice experienced period of time, and multinationally. The
many times in real-life war. expeditionary profile is also underlined as
Today, the same generation as well as necessary for relevant civilian agencies
a new one is facing irregular warfare and and state functions that, it is said, have
counterinsurgency, not only as a small war, to work fully side by side, with, by and
but as new small wars with a global reach through the military function. The latter
and short of big war solutions. This is with has become more and more addressed as
almost no theoretical background but with the one of many but not only necessary
uncountable opportunities for practice. tools for stability operations, particularly
At the same time, with the warfight- when counterinsurgency operations and
ing theories still at hand, the possibilities strategies are employed.
for practising big war and upholding the In short, the dominant operation context
knowledge and experience are almost non- is a new one, and at least very different
existent. This is the situation for Swedish from what western military forces have
officers, which understandably forms a been designed for. Also, the multinational
new problem regarding the old war that coalition force for dealing with opera-
still had to be handled. tions in an irregular environment must
Yesterday’s both educational and train- be multifunctional in capabilities and in
ing possibilities have turned to today’s command, although it is not exactly clear
situation with a limited educational basis yet how this is to be achieved. The tools
and almost escalating needs for practical in the box have to be much more mix-able
execution. and versatile both from a military and a
civilian point of view, especially regarding
Some views of today on military COIN-capabilities.
forces for Irregular Warfare As for the “Forces” or “direct security
A question of today is about the U.S. structures”, which, in a simplified way, can
concept of Irregular Warfare and thus in be described as military units including
what direction the defence transformation Special Forces, Police and Intelligence
of NATO and the EU countries will take, structures, a wider scope and somewhat
all with the goal of being able to handle deeper toolbox is now narrowing the de-
today’s and tomorrow’s demands for their sign table. The exact meaning of this and
armed forces. These forces now have to be to what extent what is to be “deployed”
“expeditionary“ in deployment ability and and “employed”, are but many questions
also be in a mindset especially for the not yet to be discussed. In turn, this brings forward
so “expeditionary-oriented” nations. The a deeper dimension. What tools shall or
stress is that there is an emphasis that the will states and nations deal with at all,
1-2009 88KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT
by themselves and particular in coalition September 2007.14
operations – open, clandestine and even One thing is what it takes to handle an
covert? irregular warfare context, even more so
The Pandora’s box for a traditional if Unconventional Warfare seems to be
military force or structures is the area of an old/new golden key. Another matter is
Unconventional Warfare,12 which, for ex- whether an operation should be carried out
ample, includes subversion and sabotage. in a civilian, military or mixed way. Before
The border to police and law enforce- diving into discussions of possibilities,
ment work on the one hand and, on the it might be good to recapitulate the near
other hand, the border to other govern history when the political struggle of West-
mental special activities or actions,13 as East brought forward some solutions for
covert actions seem to be called nowadays handling the three areas of forces: political/
in the U.S. DoD dictionary, is unclear. diplomatic, intelligence/special operations
The debate for the creation of new Un- and, the most frequently discussed area
conventional Warfare capabilities in the regarding “utility”, the military forces.
USA is interesting. Even more interesting The classic internal wars between foreign
are the voices for a new Office of Strategic affairs, intelligence and covert activities
Service outside the Department of Defense, and the uniformed military services are
obviously with many different meanings, here to be considered again.
as always with political speeches, but still With a deeper historical view on the
very straightforwardly addressed in John “utility of forces”, there may be different
McCains`s Speech in Foreign Policy, 27 ways ahead, at least regarding in which
12 unconventional warfare – A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long
duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized,
trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is
not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted
recovery. Also called UW. (JP 3-05)
13 special actions – Those functions that due to particular sensitivities, compartmentation, or caveats cannot
be conducted in normal staff channels and therefore require extraordinary processes and procedures and
may involve the use of sensitive capabilities. (JP 3-05.1)
special activities – Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives that are planned
and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or intended to influence US political
processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and
production of intelligence or related support functions. (JP 3-05)
US DoD JP 1-02 As Amended Through 17 October 2008 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict
14 John McCains speech on foreign policy at the Hudson Institute on September 27, 2007 “I would also set
up a new civil-military agency patterned after the Office of Strategic Service in the World War II……”
www.cfr.org/publication/14336/john_mccains_speech_on_foreign_policy.html
1-2009 89KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT
areas the military forces should develop bring forward some bonus regarding
and become more comprehensively as- military thinking. As small states usually
sessed. experience war and other armies than their
own on their soil, from time to time COIN
Irregular Warfare, Special Operations and unconventional warfare moves from
and Unconventional Warfare distant troubles in remote countries to
Irregular Warfare is an item that is so old very intense questions of life or death for
yet it is quite new, also with some quite freedom in one’s own backyard. At least in
new attributes that will challenge the train- traditional western defence forces the inter-
ing for the boots on the ground as well as est for “small wars” is usually somewhat
for the whole military business as it has underdeveloped and with Cold War glasses
been shaped in modern times. Not only regarded as “a distant problem”.
that, however, the context is also seen as The equation could thus be laid out as
being more demanding than ever for the “expeditionary coalition-comprehensive”
civilian part of the crisis management ap- civilian and military formations for coun-
paratus. This is because the heart of COIN terinsurgency within the bigger umbrella,
is in civilian resources and strategies, not Irregular Warfare around the globe and
in military operational art and tactical when needed, also within coalitions,
capabilities. The latter are merely support and military warfighting capabilities – a
functions. dagger in one boot and one hand on the
Although there is a need for more COIN- combined – joint direct approach military
trained troops and staff elements, the need machinery (a blueprint from the global
for stringent heavy force-on-force war defence industry).
fighting has definitely been endorsed by As Irregular Warfare is said to be a direct
most actors – both in a scenario of tomor- link, even more than regular conventional
row in the spirit of General Rupert Smith warfare, to the political sphere it could be
as supporting COIN, and as of course in a start to glance at principal structures of
the next bloody centuries as outlined by “Forces” in the state arsenal for influences.
Colin S. Gray.15 Both of them rest, in their Being seen as “war short of open state-on-
own ways, on Clausewitz grammar and on state clashes”, irregular war includes more
the views of Sun Tzi as regards clandestine dimensions of influences than “military
and covert activities. war” traditionally deals with. There are
Seen from the small state perspective, more “force structures” in operation than
the new focus on Irregular Warfare will on-top-acting military units.
15 Gray, S Collin: Another Bloody Century – Future Warfare. The Orion Publishing Group Ltd. London
2005.
1-2009 90KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT If diplomacy is the fuel for politics and itself also has to be very firmly connected the armed forces are the guard to armed to the triangle and within the intelligence aggressions, we have to see clandestine sphere the most secret and clandestine, and diplomacy and intelligence as the search- also covert, functions are established. All lights for correct political directions and four tools have to be firmly led. decisions. As part of the global power The most different forms that the mili- struggle, or when being severely threat- tary organizations are used to is the fact ened or occupied, covert activities and that the operations are led by the police influencing actions have their place. These and the intelligence services, as Irregular four tools; diplomacy, military, intelligence Warfare is waged among the people . The and secret actions can be seen as the basic military forces are a support. Thus it is of arsenal for making politics. vital importance that police functions in These four tools have to be considered quality, quantity and experience are very when entering an Irregular Warfare envi- quickly involved in the planning of the ronment. Is there already work going on operation. The military seizes the area and in the area with some of the tools when defends against more open attacks or raids the multinational force arrives? If so, by from irregulars; the police organize and whom and where and how? We just have to start almost immediately with the police mention civil security contractors beyond work, which also includes gendarmerie the influence of the Force Commander operations. A challenge here is that police and subsequently the secret formations of organizations mostly work on a tactical different intelligence organizations that are level. Only some part of the police have also beyond military control. an operational or strategic perspective. Between utility of military force and Possibly there has to be established here a utility of humanitarian aid, there is the top-down (EU) police structure that brings paramilitary constabulary dimension on together all different police branches (fo- the horizontal line. For internal security rensics, narcotics, special branch, inves- the police, with its many different forms, tigations, etc) to a unified police “force” constitutes a fifth tool that is essential for including a gendarmerie that deploys into a state’s survival. the COIN-area of operations. Instead of Linking to the Malayan Emergency, the having the gendarmerie in the military box, basic triangle of the State (Administration) it should strengthen the police structure. at the top and below, the military and the Then on the vertical side, between police became a model for how to organize open military armed force actions and efforts against irregular warfare and for day-to-day diplomacy are two different, conducting counterinsurgency. Here one sometimes overlapping, grey area struc- may say that the intelligence dimension in tures. The intelligence organizations and 1-2009 91
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT the covert or clandestine diplomacy ac- a start for those who are unfamiliar with tors with active action/special operations views of vertical forces’ utilities. As for capabilities are to be found here. covert activities in Sweden during World This development could be looked War II, the recent research of Pia Molan- upon also from a historical perspective. der17 is of great interest. After World War II, the civilian special The linkage to Irregular Warfare and operations services first closed down, Special Operations Warfare in general then opened up as a new organization for illustrates in particular the area of Uncon- a while and then closed again. Some parts ventional Warfare. This is even more the were transferred into the new CIA and case when it comes to today’s discussions some to the armed forces with the birth of who should best handle a development of U.S. Army Special Forces. of capabilities for unconventional warfare A slightly similar approach in Britain in the U.S., which is within the idea that resulted in some capacity for covert ac- unconventional warfare could be a new tions transferred to the MI6 (the bitter rival key for success in irregular warfare. At of SOE) and some resources and tasks least it is a necessity compared to special were directed to the rebirth of the Army’s forces, air strikes and headhunting as the Special Air Service. prominent special operations warfare For obvious reasons it is hard to do utility at hand. If this is the case, the chal- research on how it is organized today, but lenge has emerged as to who and where it is possible enough to obtain its charac- this old-new capacity is to be established, teristics in history. As some parts of the and within the coalition context, who is archives of World War II British Special to have the lead and command these re- Operations Executive and their younger sources? Already special forces command U.S. cousin the Office of Strategic Serv- in parallel with conventional forces is a ice (OSS) were opened up in 2007 and complex matter. research is ongoing, there is the possibility The Naval Postgraduate School pro- of getting a grip on the “vertical struc- fessor and former career SF officer Hy tures” of political force and how western Rothstein argues for a new organization states have thought of their utilities. for unconventional warfare outside the Richard Aldrich’s enlightening The U.S. Department of Defense and thus may Hidden Hand16 is highly recommended as be narrowing down today’s mission area 16 Op. cit. footnote 10 17 Molander, Pia: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Swedish Dilemma: The Special Operations Executive in Neutral Sweden, 1939-45. Intelligence & National Security, Vol 22, Routledge, 2007 1-2009 92
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT for Special Forces in America.18 The U.S. sensitive tasks at the strategic level, easily Department of Defense’s lead for the Ir- end up as a Potemkin village doing more regular Warfare Joint Operations Concept, harm to everybody, especially to them- the US Special Operations Command, selves, than bringing forward sustainable seems, not surprisingly, still to include the new capabilities. UW-field inside the department. As usual As for understanding more of the very in the USA, the power struggles between circumstances that many of the more the rather large organizations often lead secret, but existing, force structures are to long and hard internal battles and the engaged in and live under, a small-state outcome has yet some hills to climb. perspective can be found in the memoirs The point is to be aware of how covert of the Swedish head of the T-office during actions or clandestine diplomacy for quite World War II, especially regarding how he different reasons has been the hidden util- was directed and tasked from the govern- ity of state forces over time. If Irregular ment.19 The key word is trust and here we Warfare is now to become the main overt find the very essence also in Irregular War- coalition answer to today’s evil, and pre- fare activities, Unconventional Warfare, viously hidden hands are dusted off and Special Operations and Intelligence, and one tries to apply them not only side by definitely regarding other covert activities side with conventional forces, but also short of intelligence aims. multifunctionally, what will then happen? From bottom to top and between soldier Will this not risk collapsing the IW-balloon or operator and the people they have not before it has even begun to lift? only to be among but have to live among, There is, due to unorthodox techniques trust is the only sustainable fuel for the and little insight, a clear mistrust from the machinery. Trust takes time and is not conventional military branches and de rotational every 6-12 months. finitely also across the civilian humanita In a way we are standing here with six rian area of activities for Special Forces in new trends for war among the people as general, not to mention covert activities. General Smith outlines it;20 condition- Rightly or wrongly, attempts to boost shaping as the goal instead of destruction and enlarge activities where the reasons are of the opponent’s military forces, the battle to provide small and discrete resources for is among the people and not in a traditional 18 Rothstein, Hy: Afghanistan and the Troublesome Future of Unconventional Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006 19 Palm, Thede: Några studier till T-kontorets historia, sid 96-97, Kungl Samfundet for utgivande av hand- skrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia, handlingar del 21, Stockholm 1999. 20 Op. cit. footnote 7, p. 269. 1-2009 93
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT military battlefield. Conflicts that tend to A challenge is, however, how to play this be never-ending fighting in a striving to piano and to be sure all keys are available: preserve forces, implies not taking any from the classic infantry formations to risks at all. New uses for industrial war extremely well-trained civil affairs units, material and organizations are invented in culturally (trustworthy) capable training the new conflicts. We now find sides where teams for the people’s own security forces we have mostly non-state actors and a core and to the “first tiers” of mature special of multinational armed groupings on one forces consisting of women and men who side and non-state groupings or parties on can both be provided with unconventional the other. warfare capabilities that never degenerate In a way the irregular method of warfare to a low standard performance and who in with the classic guerrilla modus operandi the utmost degree can be heavily engaged of only fighting on one’s own conditions in direct action utility, when and where and foremost at the tactical level, could, most strategically/operationally needed. ironically, be seen as being welcomed by the industrial armed forces of today. Al- The development for the armed forces though they are unfamiliar with the people to more utility in irregular warfare who occupy the battle spaces, the almost In one aspect, for “deploying”, there is a complete lack of resupply of material and need for the industrial war machine, but it personnel would no longer permit indus- should go from planning to execution, with trial force-on-force engagements. This is in the civilian resources forming the bulk order to be able to deliver utility of force to of the “comprehensive” approach. When the politicians for today’s diplomacy with “employing” we see a need for a military arms around the world. Today’s western and civilian formation more adaptable to politicians apparently need armed forces irregular warfare. Also, something that is on a nearly day-to-day basis, and for long repeatedly addressed from the military commitments. In a way the opponents have side, it needs to be functioning directly adapted to this very well so far. with the security forces, working within the The problem in the irregular arena is, framework of a joint comprehensive com- however, not static. One fact that is rather mand under a supreme civilian “Director commonly shared today is that industrial, of Operations“ with, most importantly, a tactical, and in some way operational, strong and resourceful structure of civilian formations and capabilities still stand. capabilities. Thus, conventional capabilities definitely If what has been stated above still for have their place as the genuine framework some time will not occur, the leadership for delivering traditional armed utility of of the world will have to accept the com- force. prehensive frictions that both Iraq and 1-2009 94
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT Afghanistan have shown very clearly and coalition intelligence cooperation. A vital the pressure on the military forces will focus is the attitude of the people and the continue. This both involves handling the intelligence service has to look into this hybrid irregular case with armed force and area for threats and not only have an obses- “waiting for civilian assistance”, trying sion for “key actor” analysis. to accomplish the civilian affairs side of The blue services, the Air Force and the coin. Navy, including the Amphibious Forces, It will probably take considerable time to probably have some work to analyze the come forward with a common understand- respective consequences of operations in ing, multinationally and multifunctionally, an irregular environment. The effect of of how to boost the civilian side. During their own formations of special operations this time, we shall see the military function, forces, surveillance and security forma- in itself quite different between nations tions and overall approach to an irregular with a degree of a mature mindset and context both on the tactical and operational adequate capabilities for fighting irregular levels have to be worked on thoroughly. warfare, developing different utilities for So far, the light blue and brown maritime the irregular context. areas are somewhat “untouched areas of Narrowing the scope to the armed interest” for modern irregular warfare. branch, there are some questions to ad- However, effects for world trade and for dress here. First, all services probably the western hemisphere if/when the world have to analyze today’s attitudes, training sea trade comes in focus will be uncompa- and tactics. The Army will be tasked for rable to the, in itself troublesome enough, the light-heavy balances, where the scope operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Irregu- for the infantry may include special units lar warfare does have an option to reach for FID (Foreign Internal Defence) pro- coastlines and coastal cities and the people viding training of the supported/occupied inhabiting them. In a historical perspective, countries’ own/new forces with inherent or the riverine contexts have forced forward separated additional armed police forces irregular warfare capabilities for some (the gendarmerie not being a part of the navies, for example the Portuguese Navy armed forces). The intelligence branch has during the Cold War era.21 to devote more attention to analyst training Thus, there is not only a tactical problem and generally to look into the capabilities for the ground forces in handling irregular of ISTAR-units in order to deliver action- warfare – it has a potential to become a able products – all under the challenges of truly joint problem. So far we have had the 21 Cann, P. John: Brown Waters of Africa: Portuguese Riverine Warfare, 1961-1974. Hailer Publishing, St Petersburg, FL, 2007 1-2009 95
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luck of only dealing with a mainly opera- competences are the answer, one needs to
tional and sequential case. Maritime and have a professional army and preferably
Navy expeditionary and logistic efforts, a Northern Ireland-situation, which the
and subsequently ground and air assets, are British Army had for a long time. Practice
two-service operations with special forces is the mother of understanding. However,
as key elements for the actual irregular a “one solution” type of COIN-tactics will
antagonists. not be sufficient. Every irregular war or
operational environment is unique and has
COIN challenges – time-consuming to be analyzed thoroughly in order to meet
and mindset-challenging training for with a suitable tactical approach. A bottom
non-conventional operations line is education and a mindset for both
As for organizing and training military soldiers and officers beyond the narrow
forces for better utility in counterinsur- conventional warfare approaches.
gency, there are problems. Not only in what If, however, the possibilities for the ground
is to be trained or how to use the troops forces’ production of both conventional
among the population. The problem also combat and counterinsurgency are arranged,
lies in the very small defence forces that it will be even more important to have an
most nations in Europe have left. How to officer training that gives several opportuni-
conduct counterinsurgency is both to be ties for serving in staffs on higher levels and
seen as a general capability and a special- commanding forces in COIN-campaigns as
ity or main task, just as different units of well as in conventional combat. The situation
infantry are specialized in mountain, arctic, is not so for Swedish officers.
urban and military police main tasks. In or- If the above is not possible, the armed
der to be able to train COIN-forces, every forces’ ability to produce forces for util-
army has to consist of at least brigade- ity in COIN will be limited. Thus, the
sized formations for warfighting and also reverse occurs. The main “security-units”
an amount of COIN-marked battalions. If for COIN have to be produced and em-
this is not the case, the conventional bri- ployed by the police force establishment,
gades also have to be COIN-trained after including an armed Gendarmerie as in
their first training period for conventional France. This would also include the bulk
warfighting. of security-intelligence resources that all
The training period has then to be long COIN-operations rely so heavily on.
enough for this double capability. Howev- The contribution from the armed forces
er, an added problem will emerge in the last will thus consist of all-round infantry units,
form of production – the amount of training Special Forces and support units. The
that undoubtedly has to be done in order to COIN-staff and headquarters have to be
also keep up both competences. If double set up by the police with support from the
1-2009 96KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT
military. This in turn will put new demands equipped for common health problems, the
on police command and control capabilities common military organization is also the
well beyond the everyday working levels. same for conventional warfighting. COIN
This version of COIN-focus, as be- and Irregular Warfare is for the military
ing mainly police operations with some branch something special and beside the
military support, is probably the very best whole structure, mindset, core tradition
as COIN and Irregular Warfare and is and aim, just as what certain unknown
positioned right in the very midst of the diseases are for a general hospital.
population. But it is also probably a long- Specialist treatment is then needed. In
term vision. Only the military structures the COIN-case, no such specialists have
have command and control capabilities been trained, units produced, or tactics
that can handle extended operations. developed within a designed operational
Regardless of the main focus, where context in western armies since World
either the police or the military constitute War II or since the Vietnam War, which
the security bulk, the sooner the people for many different reasons was lost. This
themselves can take responsibility for has often been compared with the British
their security the better. Here, the Mili- success in Malaya in 1948-60, not bearing
tary/Police-assistance and training units in mind the very different settings of the
will be required in large amounts and as scene with severe difficulties several years
we are talking coalition COIN, there have before unified intelligence machinery could
to be some sort of EU/NATO standards turn the wheel.23
for such units. If we consider the settings, tactical and
operational, military and even more com-
Negative attitudes on COIN and prehensive with or supporting the police
shallow theoretical foundations work, as Irregular Warfare and COIN
One problem with COIN and Irregular are quite a challenge within the military
Warfare is the common military mindset sphere, further aims at unconventional
and de facto the whole military organiza- warfare will be even more problematic.
tion. This problem is elaborated on by John As we have to bring forward coalition
Nagel in his very readable book Eating interoperable solutions, a common under-
Soup with a Knife.22 Just as the public standing and willingness to tread in the
health sevice is organized, trained and same direction has to be reached. One way,
22 Op. cit. footnote 3
23 Op. cit. footnote 10, p. 494-518, Victory in Malaya (from the intelligence view).
Connor, Ken: Elitstyrka SAS, Historiska Media, Lund 1998. p. 32-59 Malaya 1950-58 (from a Special
Forces view)
1-2009 97KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT for example within the EU, is to deal with derstood to exist, if not fully opened up. Irregular Warfare and COIN as if it were This clearly starts with a sound interaction not necessary to be labelled and discussed between real-life experiences on COIN and as a case at all. Again, the theoretical Irregular Warfare being documented and foundation for military theory on COIN supported by an ongoing research effort and Irregular Warfare is very shallow and in order to bring forward academically diversified. The “Panta Rei”24 landscape solid theories. The education effort is by of definitions within this area shows this far the most important strategic tool in very clearly. order to mature the conventionally focused The opposite is, nevertheless, to formu- military system for the actual operational late and adapt a multinational EU doctrine environment. or concept for Irregular Warfare/COIN. In any case, NATO has to choose to adapt the Development of unconventional ap U.S. way or to create a NATO-way, if not proaches for irregular warfare oper a Nelsonian “I really don’t see that sig- ations/campaigns; Three ways ahead nal” approach25 is chosen. The “no-case” with different potentiality of utility alternative is of course an option also. But With the above view of the future for irreg- already in the transformation way to more ular combat we shall outline some uncon- expeditionary capabilities for all members, ventional approaches to military operations the irregular context is wholly addressed for irregular warfare in comprehending the even today. The next step should then be civilian dimensions and full joint military “how” to do it, after the counter-guerrilla scope. Also, we will include a view on the boots on the ground have left the expedi- vertical force dimension, from overt via tionary keels from the sea. clandestine, to the covert aspects of force Looking at the whole international sys- utility. The last aspect can be problematic tem with states and other actors interacting to think of as “coalition-coordinated”. on each other, their toolboxes have to be If Unconventional Warfare capabilities considered. As tools exist both for diffe will be enlarged, due to a strategy built on rent functions and for different situations, such a base, what will be and can be the both dimensions have, at least, to be un- content in a coalition perspective? Also, 24 Panta Rei latin for “Everthing is floating” 25 A classic remark from one of the many battles Lord Nelson took part in. During the battle, the British higher command signalled to retreat. Lord Nelson was sure that it was possible to win, so he put his binoculars to his blind eye and said “I really don’t see that signal” and then approached the enemy. He succeeded and the enemy was beaten in the end. If this approach is a wise one for the COIN-challenge can only be assessed by tomorrow’s history research. 1-2009 98
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT what content is possible and suitable to large U.S. construction on a civilian base, work on in terms of being unconventional? a new OSS, which may probably not be a As for the original definition, the subject way that other nations will try for some of subversion and sabotage might not be time at least, or, UW-capabilities within proper within a “peace force”. SOF-structures, where embryonic re- One does not mix overt and covert activi- sources are still to be found. These are the ties. For obvious reasons, the whole point two ways ahead, but the latter may be the of a covert need is indeed that it is not to be first we will meet in the coming irregular addressed openly – not even as a definition warfare-compatible forces. regarding one’s own ambition. Rather, it Thus enlarged to the “full package coa- falls under the actual “other governmental lition force”, which as an expeditionary department” resources that will be there force can be deployed and employed in if different nations have such needs, and an irregular warfare context, at least three some will obviously have these. different approaches can be drawn up. This leads us to the need to frame the The first one is the most conventional, “unconventional warfare” content in rather but yet more developed than today’s option; a hard way compared to the original mean- conventional in the meaning that the bulk ing of the concept. We need a comprehen- consists of a coalition Combined Joint Task sive concept for covert, clandestine and Force under a UN/NATO/EU-mandate. We also, when suitable, overt (at the surface) see a more COIN-capable approach among political, paramilitary and military actions. the soldiers and also more comprehensive The whole dimension could be encom- staff work, more trained for 3-block warfare passed in one organization (although short than today; also definitely more trained or conventional warfare capabilities being for multifunctional coordination, as that is the main force contributor). the key to the population. The SOF units UW “light” is probably the best that can have adapted more core-capabilities in be accomplished when we speak of coali- unconventional warfare but are still a nar- tions, just as Intelligence “light” in a coali- row resource. The ongoing trend of mixing tion National Intelligence Cell (NIC) -struc- civilian intelligence units with SOF has de- ture, which is well-known from the events in veloped, but is still a challenge to coordinate the Balkans and Afghanistan. More valuable for the Force Commander. Covert actions collections are always directed on a nation- are not within the capabilities or mandates to-nation basis, as they always have been. for the Force Commander. Trust is a rare and expensive condition that The second is a developed Joint Force cannot be risked too easily. that strategically, operationally and tacti- Here we see two different possible ap- cally rests on a common COIN-doctrine. proaches. Either UW-support from a new The military forces have developed a prob- 1-2009 99
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT ably British-oriented core of infantry units wish of the population for the CMJU to trained and with a mindset for operations arrive. The core of the gendarmerie seizes within the people. It also rests on an EU- the order and is backed up with instant version of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps armed assets from behind. FM 3-2426 guidelines. The shaping phase is carried out first The multifunctionality rests on a com- from other governmental resources. Now, mand structure with a civilian overall it is not a U.S. but a coalition non-military Director of Operations. However, we still unconventional warfare organization, sup- see a lack of civilian units in quantity that ported by the coalition military special rapidly fill in where the military creates forces primarily dedicated to UW. Today’s pockets of security. The gendarmerie- DA-engagement and direction for the air production within the U.S. and the EU has assets has been transferred to non-special been enlarged, but the mindset still has forces such as Air Force commandos or some way to go. The Special Forces are equally well-suited Army Rangers or Ma- as mentioned above, but the FID-missions rine commandos. have been solved in a better way. Here we see a fully all-governmental Besides needing more SOF for this, we multif unctional comprehensive unit also see Army units now dedicated for it. operating exactly as addressed in 3-24, The Force Commander, and above all the with a British mindset – a lightened Army Director of Operations, has a clear capac- more “SOC”-capable unit for both DA ity for traditional Unconventional Warfare and fire direction and also for FID, the in- within his/her command. This could include, verted UW. The SOF, which mainly has a or not include, depending on the coalition direct approach focus as it does today, but members’ opinion on political benefit or, is more developed to work “combined” more likely, on risks, capabilities inside or with intelligence and law enforcement supported by covert actions. units, is the force most UW-capable and The third way is the most revolutionary the glue between the “shaping force”, the in CRO-affairs. The Coalition Joint Multi- fully civilian UW – force supporting the functional Unit (CJMU), under a Director Director of Operations. The Director of of Operations, is employed only after the Operations should have the authority to Unconventional Warfare operations, in command also covert affairs, thus leaving their full reach of an overt, clandestine and this outside the overt military force and covert shaping phase have clearly reached command chain. their end state, i.e. the full and credible The described three ways forward should 26 The U.S. Army/ Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual – FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33,5, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2007 1-2009 100
KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT
be seen as possible examples more than has to be launched in order to support the
actual alternatives. Neither one will prob- needs for new doctrines. This probably has
ably see the daylight of tomorrow outlined to be done in a multinational way and has
exactly as above. Nevertheless, in one way to be broader than a “Special Operations
or another questions on how to enhance University”.
capabilities for COIN are waiting for a Research, theories, doctrines and accept-
military answer as well for political and ing experiences are vital cornerstones. The
strategic decisions that can be compromised next step is by whom is this to be absorbed
among the western countries. Multifunc- and used in its execution? Should it be
tional solutions that bring forward military, the military still with a big-war mindset
the gendarmerie and different potent police reluctantly hiding this, or a new generation
capabilities have probably to be found in of officers and soldiers with an understand-
order to be able to deal at all with COIN- ing also of the small-war challenges and
operations. demands?
The degree of military unconventional If one does not dare to take the second ap-
warfare capabilities will also meet with proach, the roads to irregular compabilities
dicussions, not least within the military will still be as problematic as they are today.
system itself. The decision for military development lies
in the hands of the politicians.
Conclusions and remarks In some ways the future of irregular
The military problem of Irregular Warfare warfare capacities also lies in the hands
and modern counterinsurgency needs are and minds of the military system and in the
multidimensional. The root problem lies academic world connected to war studies. If
in the limited theory apparatus and the neither of these groups recognize the needs
traditional conventional military approach, or benefits of digging into the nonconven-
or non-approach, to this form of war and tional world of war and warfare, more
thus the new need for military utility. This people will die and more hearts and minds
is an approach that has constantly neglected will be lost and turned to enemies. As has
repeated experiences related to military been the case many times before, it seems
efforts in irregular environments all over wise to combine the use of both the sword
the world. and the pen in order to reach better military
Secondly, there are the comprehensive utility in actual warfare and operations.
challenges in order to either bring civilian
sectors closer to the military, or to create The author is a Captain of the Royal
some new “comprehensive units” under Swedish Navy and serving at the Swedish
civilian command. Thirdly, a new effort in National Defence College, Department of
research regarding irregular warfare theory War Studies.
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