Liste der Veröffentlichungen des Think Tank des EP
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Liste der Veröffentlichungen des Think Tank des EP
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank
Suchkriterien für die Erstellung der Liste :
Sortierung Nach Datum ordnen
Schlagwortliste "Beziehungen der Union"
272 Ergebnisse
Erstellungsdatum : 16-06-2022Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing
Art der Veröffentlichung
Auf einen Blick
Kalenderdatum 06-05-2022
Verfasser
POPESCU Irina
Politikbereich
Fischerei
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | Drittland | Erhaltung der Fischbestände | Fischereiordnung | gemeinsame Fischereipolitik |
unerlaubter Handel
Zusammenfassung The IUU Regulation (1005/2008) is the core of the EU’s legal framework for action against global IUU fishing. Its
primary objective is to prevent, deter and eliminate the trade of IUU-caught products into the EU. One of its key
components is a multiple-step procedure for dealing with non-EU countries considered uncooperative in the fight
against IUU fishing. Sixth edition. This infographic further updates an earlier one, the previous edition of which was in
March 2021. For more information on IUU fishing and the EU's IUU Regulation 1005/2008, see EPRS briefing: PE
614.598.
Auf einen Blick EN
Human development in Putin's Russia: What the data tell us
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
21-04-2022
Verfasser
PICHON Eric | RUSSELL Martin
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Gemeinwohl | Krim-Frage | menschliche Entwicklung
| wirtschaftliche Entwicklung
Zusammenfassung While the UN Human Development Index, which assesses progress in the standard of living, health and education,
ranks Russia among the 'very high human development' countries, other data suggest a more nuanced reality. Russia
has gone from Soviet-era egalitarianism to extremes of wealth and poverty. Economic growth during the first decade
under Vladimir Putin's leadership slightly reduced the gap between rich and poor, but inequality is still higher than in
most developed countries. Factors such as corruption and low taxes for the rich exacerbate the income gap. Free
public healthcare and a relatively inclusive education system apparently mitigate inequality. However, many hospitals
are ill-equipped, and universities struggle to compare with foreign counterparts. Since 2014 and the invasion of
Crimea, Russians' living conditions have deteriorated. Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and the imposition of
Western sanctions is already placing a burden on the poorest members of Russian society, as prices increase and
staple goods begin to run out. The social contract between Russians and Putin, often considered as one in which
citizens ceded certain freedoms and civil liberties in exchange for stability and prosperity, is now under strain. This
briefing is partly based on and updates previous EPRS publications on socioeconomic inequality and on the education
system.
Briefing EN
Situation in Lebanon: Severe and prolonged economic depression
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
13-04-2022
Verfasser
IMMENKAMP Beatrix | JONGBERG Kirsten
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | Finanzlage | Libanon | Rezession | soziale Auswirkungen | sozioökonomische Verhältnisse |
Wirtschaftslage
Zusammenfassung The Lebanese government's decision to impose new taxes in October 2019 sparked nation-wide protests by a
population exhausted by poor public services, worried about increasing national debt and frustrated by widespread
corruption. Since then, Lebanese politics have been marked by political deadlock that has prevented successive
governments from implementing urgent reforms. The devastating explosion in the port of Beirut on 4 August 2020 only
exacerbated the situation. By the time Prime Minister Najib Mikati presented his new government on 10 September
2021, the country had sunk deeply into a financial and economic crisis. Lebanon's severe and prolonged economic
depression is, according to the World Bank, 'likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top 3, most severe crisis episodes
globally since the mid-nineteenth century'. Poverty in Lebanon has spread dramatically over the past year and now
affects about 74 % of the population. Lebanon is host to approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 90 % of whom live
in extreme poverty. There are also over 210 000 other refugees. The Lebanese pound has lost 90 % of its value in the
past two years, most people have only two hours of electricity per day, and the healthcare sector is at breaking point.
The middle class has been decimated, with many leaving the country or planning to do so. There is concern that
parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2022 may be postponed, further prolonging the political deadlock that is
preventing the implementation of critical reforms. The war in Ukraine is meanwhile expected to have a serious impact
on Lebanon, which imports around 90 % of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia. The EU has supported Lebanon with
€2.77 billion over the past decade, to help the country However, in July 2021, the Council adopted a framework for
targeted restrictive measures, offering the possibility to impose sanctions on persons and entities responsible for
undermining democracy or the rule of law in Lebanon. The European Parliament has called Lebanon's present
situation a 'man-made disaster caused by a handful of men across the political class'.
Briefing EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 1EU-Ukraine trade and investment relations and the impact of Russia’s war
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
06-04-2022
Verfasser
IGLER WOLFGANG | KRAMER Lorenz
Politikbereich
Internationaler Handel
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | die Ukraine | Handelsbeziehungen | Krieg | Kriegsschaden | Lieferkette | soziale
Auswirkungen | wirtschaftliche Auswirkung
Zusammenfassung The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is the main tool for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together: it promotes
deeper political ties, stronger economic links and the respect for common values. The Agreement was negotiated
between 2007 and 2011, signed in 2014, and entered into force on 1 September 2017 after unanimous ratification by
EU Member States. The Association Agreement includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)
between the EU and Ukraine that has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2016. By 2020, the EU had become
Ukraine’s most important export market and principal source of imports, dwarfing Ukraine’s second partner – China –
and placing Russia a distant third. Since the Russian Federation launched its military invasion of Ukraine on 24
February 2022, EU-Ukraine trade and investment relations have started to experience constraints, with some
European (car) manufacturers reporting disturbances and temporarily halting production due to a lack of Ukrainian
components. Ukraine’s future trade prospects will depend not only on its trade partners, but also on rebuilding the
physical damage the country has suffered, and on the status of its ports
Briefing EN
EU-China ties and Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
31-03-2022
Verfasser
CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | bilaterale Beziehungen | China | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Gipfeltreffen | Krieg
| Think Tank
Zusammenfassung EU officials say that the 23rd summit between the European Union and China on Friday 1 April will focus on Russia’s
war on Ukraine, the engagement of the international community to support Ukraine, the dramatic humanitarian crisis
created by the conflict, its destabilising nature for the international order and its inherent global impact. The meeting, to
be conducted by video-conference, is also expected to discuss bilateral issues and areas of shared interest, such as
climate change, biodiversity and health, as well as ways to ensure a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship.
The EU is also likely to urge China to end its trade ban on imports from Lithuania, which followed the country’s
decision to open a de facto Taiwan embassy in its capital. In recent years, China has become more of a rival for the
EU than a declared strategic partner. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many
international think tanks on EU-China relations, the country’s attitude to the war on Ukraine and its policies on other
issues. Analyses on the war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are
Thinking’ series.
Briefing EN
China-Russia relations: A quantum leap?
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
31-03-2022
Verfasser
JOCHHEIM Ulrich
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | China | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik |
internationale Beziehungen | militärischer Eingriff
Zusammenfassung Hours before the Beijing Winter Olympics officially opened on 4 February 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping had a
long meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, the Chinese leader
for the first time voiced his country's outright opposition to NATO enlargement and support for Russia's 'proposals to
create long-term legally binding security guarantees' in Europe. This stance might be seen as the culmination of a
relationship, formed in 1992, between the newly proclaimed Russian Federation and a China that had just started
emerging from the stupor following the Tiananmen Square massacre. This relationship has seen major shifts since
1992. At the outset, China's population was greater than Russia's and both countries had a very similar level of GDP.
Nowadays, thanks to China's exceptional growth performance, its economy is more than eight times bigger than
Russia's. Similarly, trade with Russia is not of major importance to China in terms of value. However, the high share of
raw materials (including food) in Russian exports and the transfer of Russian military technology are of strategic
importance to China in these relations. Since 2012, the relationship has evolved into an informal alliance in the face of
what both countries consider a rising threat from the West to their regimes. At present, China's response to Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine seems to be more favourable to Russia than it was in 2014 when Russia annexed
Crimea. China has been critical of NATO's enlargement to central and eastern Europe, and less insistent about respect
for the territorial integrity of nations – something that it has traditionally upheld in light of the 'open Taiwan question'.
On 30 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in China to discuss the
bilateral relationship. Experts posit that China is likely to support the kind of solution to the Ukraine war that would be
the least likely to challenge the power monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party.
Briefing EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 2Values on the retreat? The role of values in the EU’s external policies
Art der Veröffentlichung
Studie
Kalenderdatum 31-03-2022
Verfasser
DAMEN Mario
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Demokratie | Entwicklung und humanitäre Hilfe | Globale Ordnungspolitik |
Internationaler Handel | Menschenrechte | Sicherheit und Verteidigung | Völkerrecht
Schlagwortliste Außenpolitik | Beziehungen der Union | EU-Politik | Wertschöpfungskette
Zusammenfassung There is a general perception in Western countries that the role of values as a foreign policy driver is currently on the
decline. This study in the series ‘global trends in external policies’ seeks to contribute to the debate by investigating
what is meant by ‘values’, whether their importance is on the wane and, if so, how this manifests itself, and how the
European Union (EU) can respond to these trends. The broad concept of values has therefore been split into five
categories. Socio-cultural values are implicit drivers of foreign policy. In the case of the EU, these are characterised by
diversity. ‘Political values’ is used as a term to describe the fundamental principles of political and public action,
defining the relationship between the state and its citizens. For the EU, these are often referred to as the triad of
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Economic values characterise the nature of the prevailing economic
system in a country. The EU advocates a social market economy. The term ‘Earth values’ refers to the inclusion of
environmental considerations in external policies. The EU has become a leader in promoting sustainability. Resulting
from the preceding four are ‘international order values’, which characterise the overall international outlook of actors.
The EU’s international order value is ‘principled pragmatism’. This study compares the EU’s values with those of four
reference countries: the US, Turkey, Russia and China. The US in the West comes closest to many of the EU’s values,
but does not overlap completely. Turkey and Russia are in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and increasingly disagree
with the EU on values. Chinese values overlap least with the EU’s values. The study confirms a decline in the influence
of the political values preferred by the EU. This decline appears to correspond to a clear West-East spectrum.
However, the study also notes an opposite trend of increasing influence of Earth values. For these, a Eurocentric
spectrum appears more adequate. For economic values, the definition of trends depends on benchmarks and
methodology. The international order notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ has been extended to ‘EU strategic autonomy’.
Values are often considered as part of EU strategic autonomy and some policies, such as EU accession or trade
policy, incorporate them. A values-based approach to external policies should differentiate according to the partner
country and the value category concerned. Whereas cooperation on political values does not appear to be fruitful with
certain countries, continued efforts on economic or Earth values may still be possible. The study explores what such a
differentiated approach could mean for the four reference countries in the near future. Such an approach should also
take into account the differing perceptions of partner countries. Although positive avenues of cooperation on, for
example, Earth values are still possible, geopolitical tensions, partly rooted in differing values, are overshadowing this
path.
Studie EN
The Economic Reconstruction of Belarus: Next Steps after a Democratic Transition
Art der Veröffentlichung
Studie
Kalenderdatum
28-03-2022
Externe Autor
Christopher A. HARTWELL; Kateryna BORNUKOVA; Dzmitry KRUK; Benedikt ZOLLER-RYDZEK
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Demokratie
Schlagwortliste
Belarus | Beziehungen der Union | bilaterale Beziehungen | die Russische Föderation | konjunkturelle Erholung |
Umstellungsbeihilfe | wirtschaftliche Umstrukturierung | wirtschaftliche Verflechtung
Zusammenfassung The economic performance of Belarus has been unimpressive ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, due mainly to the
country’s lack of serious structural reforms. This study examines the consequences of this benign neglect should a
democratic transition occur and attempts to understand the assistance that may be required to help Belarus
successfully transform. Unlike the transformations which began in Central Europe during 1989, though, Belarus’
potential transition is complicated by immense Russian pressure. Hence, the provision of much needed assistance will
be highly dependent upon Russia’s stance towards a democratic transfer of power. This study examines its possible
responses to understand how the EU can best be involved in the long-delayed Belarusian transformation and also how
much assistance may be required.
Studie EN
Outlook for the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
22-03-2022
Verfasser
ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf
Politikbereich
Energie | Europäisches Semester | Sicherheit und Verteidigung | Öffentliche Gesundheit
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | Coronavirus-Erkrankung | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Epidemie | EU-
Energiepolitik | Europäische Zusammenarbeit | Europäischer Rat | Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik |
Gipfeltreffen | militärischer Eingriff | wirtschaftliche Unabhängigkeit
Zusammenfassung On 24-25 March 2022, EU Heads of State or Government will meet for the third time in five weeks. In the presence of
the United States President, Joe Biden, they will discuss developments in and support for Ukraine, in the context of the
unprovoked Russian invasion of the country. Building on their Versailles Declaration of 10-11 March, EU leaders will
take further steps aimed at strengthening European sovereignty in the field of security, defence and energy security.
As regards security and defence, the European Council will endorse the EU Strategic Compass, call for its
implementation, and give further guidelines for the deepening of European defence cooperation. With respect to
energy, EU leaders will consider means to counter the current spike in energy prices, consider gas storage capacities
and planning in view of the next winter and resume discussions on phasing out EU dependence on Russian fossil
fuels. Furthermore, the European Council will take stock of coordination efforts in response to the Covid-19 pandemic,
appraise the European Semester, and review initiatives designed to build a more robust economic base and reduce
the EU's strategic dependence in the most sensitive areas. Under external relations, items on the agenda will include
the preparation of the forthcoming EU-China Summit and the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European
Council will be followed by a Euro Summit meeting on 25 March.
Briefing EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 3Outcome of the informal European Council in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
15-03-2022
Verfasser
ANGHEL Suzana Elena
Politikbereich
Energie | Sicherheit und Verteidigung | Wirtschaft und Währung
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Europäischer Rat | Gemeinsame Außen- und
Sicherheitspolitik | militärischer Eingriff | Unabhängigkeit in der Energieversorgung | Verteidigungspolitik |
wirtschaftliche Verflechtung
Zusammenfassung At the informal European Council of 10-11 March 2022, EU leaders adopted the Versailles declaration condemning the
‘unprovoked and unjustified’ Russian military aggression against Ukraine. They set strategic guidelines for security and
defence, energy and economic and financial affairs.
Briefing EN
Proposed anti-coercion instrument
Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing
Kalenderdatum 10-03-2022
Verfasser SZCZEPANSKI Marcin
Politikbereich Internationaler Handel
Schlagwortliste Beziehungen der Union | EU-Politik | Handelspolitik | internationale Beziehungen | Wirtschaftslage | Wirtschaftspolitik
Zusammenfassung It is widely held that geopolitical tensions in the world are on the rise. One of the clear indicators of this phenomenon is
the increasing use of economic tools for the pursuit of strategic and geopolitical aims. This can take the form of
coercion exerted by one country on another through trade or investment restrictions to interfere with their sovereign
choices. In response to the EU and its Member States becoming the target of deliberate economic coercion in recent
years, on 8 December 2021 the Commission published a proposal for the adoption of an anti-coercion instrument (ACI)
that would allow the EU to better respond to such challenges on a global scale. While the new framework is primarily
designed to deter economic coercive action through dialogue and engagement, it also allows – as a last resort – to
retaliate with countermeasures comprising a wide range of trade, investment and funding restrictions. While there is
broad support for creating a legislative tool to address the growing problem of economic coercion, opinions are divided
as regards the severity of countermeasures and the manner of establishing when they should kick in. Within the
European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on International Trade (INTA). A draft report is
expected to be published in April. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages
throughout the legislative procedure.
Briefing EN
'Foreign agents' and 'undesirables': Russian civil society in danger of extinction?
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
08-03-2022
Verfasser
RUSSELL Martin
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste
Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör | Beziehungen der Union | die Russische Föderation | Menschenrechte |
Menschenrechtsbewegung | Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts
Zusammenfassung After a period of relative freedom in the 1990s allowed the emergence of civic activism in Russia, repression has now
come full circle. Under Vladimir Putin's power vertical, space for independent voices has narrowed. Like the political
opposition and the media, civil society is now increasingly subordinate to the state. Repressive legislation has
gradually circumscribed the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As part of a more general drive to
exclude external influences after a wave of post-election protests in 2011, in 2012 Russia adopted a Foreign Agent
Law, whose scope since then has been progressively expanded to include media and individual activists as well as
NGOs. A second Undesirable Organisations Law from 2015 excludes numerous international NGOs from the country.
While the Foreign Agent Law does not actually ban Russian NGOs from receiving foreign support, it makes it much
harder for them to operate and has forced many to close down. The number of organisations concerned is relatively
small, but it includes many of the country's most prominent activists. Vaguely worded legislation puts large swathes of
civil society at risk of falling foul of the law, a significant deterrent to activism. Repressive legislation has created a
divide between officially tolerated 'social' NGOs, whose activities and values are more closely aligned with the
Kremlin's agenda, and 'political' NGOs. Conditions for the latter have become increasingly hostile, leaving little room
for political activism.
Briefing EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 4Canada's Parliament and other political institutions
Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing
Kalenderdatum 24-02-2022
Verfasser PARRY Matthew
Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste Beziehungen der Union | Hoheitsrecht | Kanada | nationales Parlament | Regierungssystem | Selbstbestimmung
Zusammenfassung The contemporary federal state of Canada was formed in 1867, when the Province of Canada merged through
confederation with two other British colonies in North America, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Canada's 1867
constitution sets out the rules by which the country is governed and divides government responsibilities into three
separate branches: parliament, executive and judiciary. In addition to being a federation, Canada is also a
representative democracy and a constitutional monarchy. Queen Elizabeth, who resides in the United Kingdom (UK),
is Canada's head of state. Canada's system of government is modelled on the UK's Westminster system. Canada's
federal parliament, made up of the Queen and the two houses of Parliament, is both the legislature and the source of
executive power: in the tradition of 'responsible government', government ministers are responsible and accountable to
parliament, and must answer to it for their actions. There are three levels of government within Canada: federal,
provincial and territorial, and the local levels. Under Canada's federal system, the powers of government are divided
between the federal level and the 10 provincial governments, with federal responsibility for the three territories de facto
devolved to them. The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court in the judicial system. Canada's political system
as a federal constitutional monarchy and its Westminster-style democracy resembles that of Australia. Accordingly, this
briefing is similar in structure to the February 2020 EPRS briefing 'Australia's Parliament and other political institutions'.
Briefing EN
Understanding the EU's approach to a new partnership with Africa
Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing
Kalenderdatum 11-02-2022
Verfasser PICHON Eric
Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Entwicklung und humanitäre Hilfe
Schlagwortliste Afrikanische Union | Beziehungen der Union | Internationale Partnerschaft der EU | internationale Zusammenarbeit
Zusammenfassung Africa has been put at the core of the Commission's geopolitical work programme and of the French Presidency of the
Council of the EU. In February 2022, a summit between EU and African Heads of State and Government will discuss
ways to build a new and comprehensive partnership, based on five pillars put forward by the EU: green transition and
energy access, digital transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace and governance, and migration and mobility.
Although the proposal mainly builds on existing frameworks, its high profile and clear commitment to the African Union
(AU) make it an important milestone in an effort for a deeper relationship and strengthened partnership in multilateral
fora, initiated several years ago. In order to preserve its own economic and security interests in the face of increased
geopolitical competition, the EU intends to continue to be an important player on the African continent. The EU and the
AU have converging interests in a number of areas, such as the fight against climate change and the promotion of a
sustainable, job-creating African economy. However, they still have to find common ground on migration, security
management, and fundamental values. The comprehensiveness of the proposed strategy is challenged by the gaps
and overlaps of the current variable-geometry partnerships. The coronavirus outbreak delayed the adoption of a
common strategy. At the same time, it clearly highlighted the need to strengthen the links between the two continents
in order to tackle the most urgent global issues. Measures to fight the current pandemic and to prevent future ones
have reframed the priorities and will give new impetus to partnerships in areas such as health, the fight against climate
change, and promoting the digital transformation. This briefing updates 'Towards a new EU strategy with Africa',
published in June 2020.
Briefing EN
Australia's strategic view of the Indo Pacific
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
08-02-2022
Verfasser
PARRY Matthew
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste
ASEAN | Australien | Beziehungen der Union | Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik | Internationale
Partnerschaft der EU | internationales Abkommen
Zusammenfassung Australia, which is bordered to its west by the Indian Ocean and to the east by the Pacific Ocean, and lies in close
proximity to members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its north, can be described as a
central Indo-Pacific state. Since 2012, the idea of the Indo-Pacific has become a point of reference for Australian
governments to define the country's foreign and security policy interests. Throughout the post-war period, Australia has
sought to meet its conventional security needs primarily by way of its mutual defence pact with the United States (US),
the 1951 Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), as well as the 'Five Eyes' signals
intelligence sharing agreement with the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and New Zealand. In turn, the latter is
underpinned by the 1946 United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (UKUSA). In terms of its trade
interests, however, Australia has looked increasingly to markets in Asia and proportionally less to traditional Western
allies. As China has risen and grown more assertive, setting up a strategic rivalry with the US and its regional partners,
Australia has begun to find it harder to insulate its commercial interests from regional geopolitical tensions. The
recently forged 'AUKUS' security and technology partnership with the US and the UK reflects both the pace of
geopolitical change in the Indo-Pacific and the enduring centrality of the US to Australia's defence strategy. Having
initially determined that the lack of a domestic civil nuclear industry precluded the use of superior nuclear propulsion
technology in Australia's submarine fleet, the current government has re-assessed its security strategy and re-
calibrated its defence procurement arrangements, with potentially far-reaching diplomatic implications.
Briefing EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 5US-Russia relations: Geopolitical, security, economic and human dimensions
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
08-02-2022
Verfasser
RUSSELL Martin
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | die Russische Föderation | die Vereinigte Staaten | Gemeinsame Außen- und
Sicherheitspolitik
Zusammenfassung After a period of détente, tensions are rising between the two former Cold War enemies again. Fundamental
differences were already apparent during the Yeltsin years and have increasingly strained relations since 2000, under
Vladimir Putin. There are few issues that Washington and Moscow agree on, but none is more divisive than Ukraine.
Russia is determined to prevent further NATO expansion into post-Soviet eastern Europe, which it still sees as a buffer
zone vital to its security and as a sphere of influence. Since late 2021, there are signs that Russia is planning renewed
aggression against Kyiv; the US has promised a robust response if that happens. Both sides are likely to avoid direct
conflict at all costs. Russia is not the military superpower that the Soviet Union was, but it is still a formidable
adversary. Most of the bilateral arms control agreements that helped to maintain the fragile military balance have now
gone, but talks launched at the first Biden-Putin summit in June 2021 aim at maintaining strategic stability. Economics
play a much lesser role in US-Russia relations than geopolitics. Trade and investment between the two countries are
limited, and since 2014, they have been constrained by sanctions. Washington's economic superiority gives it a certain
amount of leverage over Moscow; however, the Russian economy has proved more resilient to US restrictions than
might have been expected. People-to-people contacts could help mitigate geopolitical tensions, but there is little
interaction. Few Russians travel, study or work in the US, and the same applies vice-versa. Surveys show that
diplomatic tensions are reflected in the generally negative views that Americans and Russians have of each other's
countries. This is an update of a Briefing published in October 2018.
Briefing EN
Research for PECH committee: Workshop on impacts of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement
on fisheries and aquaculture in the EU - Part II: Trade aspects
Art der Veröffentlichung Studie
Kalenderdatum 27-01-2022
Externe Autor Wageningen Economic Research: Heleen BARTELINGS, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, International Policy Zuzana
SMEETS KŘĺSTKOVÁ, Ph.D., Senior Researcher, International Policy, Assistant Professor, Czech University of Life
Sciences in Prague
Politikbereich Bewertung von Rechtsvorschriften und politischen Maßnahmen in der Praxis | Fischerei
Schlagwortliste Aquakultur | Beziehungen der Union | das Vereinigte Königreich | Fischereipolitik | Wirkungsstudie |
Wirtschaftsprognose
Zusammenfassung This study is the second research paper in a series of three, commissioned for a PECH Committee Workshop. It
applied the MAGNET model to quantify the impact of the EU-UK TCA on fish related sectors. The results show
negative impacts on trade, production and consumption of fisheries and aquaculture products for both parties. For the
EU, the biggest losses are found in the fish processing sector. The overall impact is driven by increased trade costs
whereas the impact of a reduced total allowable catches is rather limited.
Studie EN
Outlook for the meeting of EU leaders on 16 December 2021
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum 10-12-2021
Verfasser
DRACHENBERG Ralf
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Coronavirus | Demokratie | Energie | Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts |
Sicherheit und Verteidigung | Wirtschaft und Währung
Schlagwortliste Beziehungen der Union | Coronavirus-Erkrankung | Energiepreis | Epidemie | Europäischer Rat | gemeinsame
Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik | Tagesordnung | Wanderung
Zusammenfassung The last regular European Council meeting of 2021, on 16 December, will discuss a broad range of topics, notably the
coronavirus pandemic, crisis management and resilience, energy prices, security and defence, migration, and external
relations. In the context of the worsening epidemiological situation and the emergence of the Omicron variant, EU
leaders will address progress in vaccination across the EU and the impact of new restrictions on the single market.
They will also discuss international solidarity and ways of ensuring global vaccine coverage. Their debate on security
and defence will probably focus on two intertwined outstanding issues, the Strategic Compass and the forthcoming
cooperation declaration with NATO. On migration, EU leaders are expected to review the follow-up to their previous
commitments and address the migration situation in the English Channel. In the external relations field, they will most
likely discuss the situation in Ukraine and at the Belarus border, the developments in Ethiopia as well as preparations
for the EU-African Union summit. As the European Council meeting will take place back to back with the Eastern
Partnership Summit, EU leaders could take stock of the outcome of the latter. The Euro Summit directly after the
European Council meeting will focus on the Covid recovery and review progress on the Banking and Capital Markets
Unions
Briefing EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 6Japan's global vision: Tokyo's evolving foresight practices, Indo-Pacific strategy and EU-partnership
Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing
Kalenderdatum 08-12-2021
Verfasser NOONAN EAMONN
Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Vorausplanung
Schlagwortliste Beziehungen der Union | Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik | Internationale Partnerschaft der EU | Japan
Zusammenfassung Since 1970, Japan has developed a world-leading capacity for foresight. At the outset, the focus was on technology
and socio-economic development. Broader geopolitical and security aspects have become more pronounced in the
past decade. Concerns about global political changes have given rise to an enhanced strategic partnership between
Japan and the European Union. Common challenges include shifts in global economic power, the emergence of
China, and uncertainties around the United States' international engagement. While Japan and the European Union
have differing security policy perspectives and capabilities, joint efforts can have a positive impact in areas such as
infrastructure, digital connectivity, overseas development assistance and energy sustainability. A shared vision on
common challenges and responses is at the heart of the partnership between the European Union and Japan. Joint
strategic foresight activities, building on existing foresight capabilities on each side, could be considered as a means of
updating and strengthening this shared vision.
Briefing EN
Towards a joint Western alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative?
Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing
Kalenderdatum 01-12-2021
Verfasser GRIEGER Gisela
Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Globale Ordnungspolitik
Schlagwortliste Beziehungen der Union | China | internationale Beziehungen | Systemverbund
Zusammenfassung Since the People's Republic of China (PRC) launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, President Xi Jinping's
signature foreign policy project has drawn widespread criticism, including for challenging the traditional model of
multilateral infrastructure financing. Western-led bilateral and plurilateral infrastructure and connectivity initiatives
designed as alternatives have remained fragmented and have been dwarfed in scope and scale by a geographically
and thematically rapidly expanding BRI, which has thrived on an attractive brand and a streamlined authoritarian one-
stop-shop project management system. In contrast to Japan, it has taken the EU and the US years to respond with
separate regional strategies reflecting their distinct geopolitical outlook and economic relations with the PRC. The
manifold implications of the PRC's use of physical and digital infrastructure projects as a foreign policy tool to expand
its sphere of influence both across the world and within international organisations have been widely under-estimated.
At their 2021 G7 Summit, however, leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US agreed
on a global 'values-driven, high-standard and transparent infrastructure partnership', known as the 'Build Back Better
World' (B3W) initiative, which echoes US President Joe Biden's 2020 'Build Back Better' campaign trail slogan. It is the
first collective attempt of major democracies to craft a sustainable and targeted alternative to the BRI and to address
the challenges it poses to the rules-based international order. It seeks to help fill, by 2035, an infrastructure gap in low
and medium-income countries estimated at US$40+ trillion, by leveraging public development finance to mobilise
untapped private-sector funds. Trends in the flows of global private infrastructure investment suggest that the initiative
will face opportunities and challenges. The European Parliament's 2021 resolution on connectivity and EU-Asia
relations calls for an EU global connectivity strategy as an extension of the 2018 Europe-Asia connectivity strategy, in
order to strengthen the EU's role as a geopolitical and geo-economic actor with a single narrative, and to broaden
partnerships with democracies across the world that share the EU's fundamental values.
Briefing EN
Promoting gender equality through parliamentary diplomacy
Art der Veröffentlichung
Studie
Kalenderdatum
15-11-2021
Externe Autor
Davor JANCIC; Małgorzata DRUCIAREK, Aleksandra NIZYNSKA; Veronika KUBEKOVÁ, Roland BLOMEYER
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Demokratie | Gleichstellungsfragen, Gleichheit und Vielfalt
Schlagwortliste
Beziehungen der Union | EU-Aktion | EU-Politik | Europäisches Parlament | Gleichbehandlung | Gleichheit von Mann
und Frau | internationale Beziehungen | Lage der Frauen | parlamentarische Diplomatie | Rechte der Frau
Zusammenfassung The purpose of this study is to support the European Parliament (EP), in particular its standing delegations, in
implementing the commitment made in the EP resolution of 23 October 2020 on gender equality in EU foreign and
security policy. Based on desk research as well as quantitative and qualitative empirical analysis, the study describes
the existing EP practices of gender equality promotion, analyses whether the current practices deliver on the
commitment, and presents what can be learned both from the bottlenecks identified in the EP’s existing institutional
arrangements and from the practices of other national parliaments and international parliamentary institutions. The
study concludes that while the EP is highly advanced when it comes to gender mainstreaming in external relations,
there are a number of aspects that need improvement or fine-tuning. To facilitate the implementation of the
overarching EP gender action plan, the study provides a set of policy recommendations aimed at increasing the
effectiveness of gender equality promotion through parliamentary diplomacy. The recommendations comprise
proposals to strengthen the institutional framework, clarify the roles of gender focal points, increase access to gender-
specific information and training, maximise the use of interparliamentary meetings and DEG activities for gender
mainstreaming abroad, streamline the links with civil society and other external stakeholders, and improve the gender
dimension of oversight over EP external relations.
Studie EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 7Outlook for the European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum 15-10-2021
Verfasser
DRACHENBERG Ralf | TORPEY REBECCA MARY
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Binnenmarkt und Zollunion | Energie | Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts
| Öffentliche Gesundheit
Schlagwortliste Beziehungen der Union | Coronavirus-Erkrankung | digitaler Wandel | Energiepreis | Epidemie | EU-Migrationspolitik |
Europäischer Rat | Gipfeltreffen
Zusammenfassung The regular European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021 will discuss the coronavirus pandemic, digital policy,
migration, energy prices and external relations. Regarding the coronavirus pandemic, EU Heads of State or
Government will focus on EU coordination, resilience and readiness in terms of health crises and the EU's future
preparedness for the short and medium terms. The discussions at the meeting on both digital policy and on migration
are expected to be stock-taking exercises, assessing the implementation of previous European Council decisions and
possibly adding further specifications to them. If the update of the Schengen Borders Code were to be addressed in
the context of migration, this could generate a strong debate, since despite overall support for strong external EU
borders, Member States have diverging views on how border protection should be assured. EU leaders could also
debate energy prices at length, as the issue has become high profile in many Member States. Regarding external
relations, discussions in the European Council will focus on preparations for forthcoming international events, notably
the ASEM and the Eastern Partnership summits, and the COP26 climate conference. In addition, the Presidents of the
European Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, may brief EU Heads of
State or Government on the recent EU-Ukraine Summit, held on 12 October 2021.
Briefing EN
EU-China relations in challenging times
Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing
Kalenderdatum 14-10-2021
Verfasser JOCHHEIM Ulrich
Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste Beziehungen der Union | China | Coronavirus-Erkrankung | Desinformation | EU-Investition | EU-Strategie |
handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit | umweltpolitische Zusammenarbeit | wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit
Zusammenfassung Following the 1975 establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the European Economic Community (EEC)
focused its strategic approach – in line with its competences at the time – on support for China's economic opening,
launched in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping. While this approach resulted in a swiftly expanding trade and investment
relationship, results in other areas are rather mixed. By most accounts, the strategy also failed to contribute to making
significant progress on the rule of law in China and there were no visible results of the EU's human rights engagement.
Given that, at the beginning of Deng's reforms, China was very poor, the EEC/European Union (EU) de facto agreed to
an arrangement for special and differential treatment, linked to China's status as a developing country. However, with
China having become an upper-middle income country and the bilateral trade relationship still characterised by
considerable asymmetries, the existing lack of reciprocity in market access and of a level playing field in general have
attracted increasing attention. At the same time, China has been regressing in terms of human rights. Furthermore, the
country has become much more assertive in the regional context, is fast improving its (offensive) military capabilities
and has started to engage in global disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks. As a consequence, the EU has
changed its strategic approach considerably, as exemplified by the 2019 Joint Communication, which proposed
different legal instruments to ensure a level playing field in trade, and to fend off Chinese attempts to gain access to
critical infrastructures. Relations with the European Parliament have deteriorated, pushing Parliament to put the
comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) – which had been agreed on 30 December 2020 – on ice.
Briefing EN
The future of EU-US relations
Art der Veröffentlichung
Auf einen Blick
Kalenderdatum 30-09-2021
Verfasser
PARRY Matthew
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Schlagwortliste
Außenpolitik | Beziehungen der Union | die Vereinigte Staaten | Gipfeltreffen | internationale Zusammenarbeit |
internationaler Handel | transatlantische Beziehungen
Zusammenfassung In December 2020, the European Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) published an
ambitious agenda for transatlantic cooperation with the incoming US administration of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris.
This was followed by an EU-US Summit on 15 June 2021, which saw the launch of new formats for EU-US
collaboration. Yet unexpected foreign policy developments since then have raised questions about the partnership's
future. Parliament is expected to debate and vote on a report on the topic during the October I plenary session.
Auf einen Blick EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 8Plenary round-up – September 2021
Art der Veröffentlichung
Auf einen Blick
Kalenderdatum 17-09-2021
Verfasser
FERGUSON CLARE | SOCHACKA KATARZYNA
Politikbereich
Demokratie in der EU, institutionelle und parlamentarische Rechte
Schlagwortliste
Arbeitserlaubnis | Austritt aus der EU | Beziehungen der Union | das Vereinigte Königreich | die Russische Föderation |
Krankheitsvorbeugung | Mangel an Arbeitskräften | sexuelle Diskriminierung | Volksgesundheit | Vorschlag (EU)
Zusammenfassung During the September 2021 plenary session in Strasbourg, Parliament held a number of debates, including on
legislative proposals for health and disease prevention, and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve; as well as on natural
disasters in Europe; the Pegasus spyware scandal; media freedom; and on further deterioration of the rule of law in
Poland. Members debated Commission and Council statements on the July 2021 'Fit for 55' package of legislative
proposals, in the light of the latest IPCC report. Council presented its position on the draft general EU budget for 2022,
ahead of the Parliament voting its position during the October II session. Parliament also debated statements from the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep
Borell, on the situation in Afghanistan and in Lebanon. A number of other resolutions and legislative acts were
adopted, inter alia on: the instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA III); a new EU-China strategy; fair working
conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers; and on guidelines for Member States' employment
policies.
Auf einen Blick EN
'Global Britain' and 'Europe of Defence': Prospects, challenges and opportunities
Art der Veröffentlichung
Briefing
Kalenderdatum
06-09-2021
Verfasser
LATICI Tania
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Schlagwortliste
Austritt aus der EU | Außenpolitik | Beziehungen der Union | das Vereinigte Königreich | gemeinsame Sicherheits- und
Verteidigungspolitik | Verteidigungspolitik
Zusammenfassung Since the referendum to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) has been rethinking its role
in world affairs. Under the 'Global Britain' banner, the UK sees itself as a force for multilateralism, a strong military
power with global presence and reach, and a strong pillar of the transatlantic alliance. Reflection on the implications of
'Global Britain' for the UK's future foreign, security and defence policy has resulted in two strategic documents, the
Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, which outline policy priorities and the government's strategic
vision. Although the EU as such is to a large extent absent from these strategic documents, there are implications to
be considered, particularly as the EU has taken significant steps towards defence and military integration and as it is
continuing to deepen its relationship with NATO. Although foreign, security and defence policy were excluded from the
formal negotiations on a new EU-UK partnership, at the British government's request, it appears that the EU and UK
foreign policy positions, strategic considerations, and security interests remain largely aligned. Various experts
therefore argue that it is worth considering options for flexible engagements and for cultivating a new relationship
through other common multilateral, bilateral and international forums.
Briefing EN
EU climate change diplomacy in a post-Covid-19 world
Art der Veröffentlichung
Studie
Kalenderdatum
12-07-2021
Externe Autor
Dennis TÄNZLER; Daria IVLEVA; Tobias HAUSOTTER
Politikbereich
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Coronavirus | Umwelt
Schlagwortliste
Anpassung an den Klimawandel | Beziehungen der Union | Coronavirus-Erkrankung | dauerhafte Entwicklung |
Epidemie | Europäisches Parlament | Klimaveränderung | nachhaltiges Finanzwesen | parlamentarische Diplomatie |
Verringerung der Emissionen von Treibhausgasen
Zusammenfassung Since the European Parliament issued its resolution on climate diplomacy in June 2018, several important trends have
been shaping this area of the EU’s external action, enabling progress and posing new challenges. The EU started its
comprehensive low-emission transformation with the Green Deal, established a progressive policy framework for
sustainable finance and had to cope with the impacts of the pandemic in a way that is compatible with its
transformative ambition. At the same time, its role on the international stage has evolved substantially, and
sustainability has been playing an ever-stronger role across its external relations. Against the backdrop of these
developments, this study assesses the progress of climate diplomacy since 2018, with a focus on climate security,
trade, development cooperation, sustainable capital flows, gender equality and science, research and innovation.
Based on this assessment, it outlines the tasks for a European climate diplomacy of the future and highlights the role
of the European Parliament in shaping this policy field.
Studie EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 9Plenary round-up – June II 2021
Art der Veröffentlichung
Auf einen Blick
Kalenderdatum 25-06-2021
Verfasser
FERGUSON CLARE | SOCHACKA KATARZYNA
Politikbereich
Demokratie in der EU, institutionelle und parlamentarische Rechte
Schlagwortliste
Bericht | Beziehungen der Union | die Schweiz | EU-Migrationspolitik | Europäische Staatsanwaltschaft | Europäischer
Bürgerbeauftragter | Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen | Klimaschutzpolitik | Mehrjähriger Finanzrahmen |
Parlamentssitzung | Rechtsstaat | öffentliche Anleihe
Zusammenfassung During the June II 2021 plenary session in Brussels, Parliament continued to debate and adopt programmes financed
under the multiannual financial framework for 2021 2027, specifically this session in the areas of regional development,
with the Common Provisions Regulation, European Territorial Cooperation Regulation, European Regional
Development Fund and Cohesion Fund all finalised. Important debates on Council and European Commission
statements were held, in particular on the preparation of the European Council meeting on 24 25 June 2021 and the
relaunch of the Malta Declaration on external aspects of migration, on the urgent need to complete nominations for the
full functioning of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, and on the future of EU-Swiss relations. Members also
debated and adopted, inter alia, the proposed European Climate Law, the Public Sector Loan Facility, and discussed
the Commission's 2020 rule of law report. António Guterres, the recently re-elected Secretary-General of the United
Nations, addressed Parliament in a formal sitting.
Auf einen Blick EN
Artificial Intelligence diplomacy | Artificial Intelligence governance as a new European Union external
policy tool
Art der Veröffentlichung Studie
Kalenderdatum 21-06-2021
Externe Autor Ulrike FRANKE
Politikbereich Forschungspolitik | Vorausplanung
Schlagwortliste Auswirkungen der Informationstechnologie | autoritäres Regime | Beziehungen der Union | China | Desinformation | die
Vereinigte Staaten | Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik | Geopolitik | Informatikanwendung | Informationskrieg
| Kernwaffe | künstliche Intelligenz
Zusammenfassung Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a tool of power politics, and an element of state diplomacy. The European Union,
however, approaches AI primarily from an economic, social, and regulatory angle. This paper discusses the way that
AI impacts the European Union’s geopolitical power, and its relationship with other countries. It presents possible
scenarios for how AI may change the international balance of power and recommends ways for the EU and its
members to respond.
Studie EN
Plenary round-up – May 2021
Art der Veröffentlichung
Auf einen Blick
Kalenderdatum 21-05-2021
Verfasser
FERGUSON CLARE | SOCHACKA KATARZYNA
Politikbereich
Coronavirus | Demokratie in der EU, institutionelle und parlamentarische Rechte
Schlagwortliste
Aufschlüsselung der EU-Finanzierung | Beziehungen der Union | Datenschutz | EU-Energiepolitik | EU-Politik |
Europäisches Parlament | Fonds (EU) | Impfstoff | Parlamentssitzung | TRIPS
Zusammenfassung A number of important debates were held during the May 2021 plenary session, in particular on Parliament's rights to
information regarding the ongoing assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans, on a revised industrial
strategy for Europe and on recent migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Members also held a debate on possible
waiving of the WTO TRIPS agreement on Covid 19 vaccines to help developing countries fight the pandemic; on
business taxation; and on Roma equality in the EU. Two joint debates took place, on hydrogen and energy strategies,
and on data protection adequacy. Members debated a statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, on the EU position on the Israel-Palestine conflict. A
number of programmes under the multiannual financial framework were approved, and debates and votes were also
held, inter alia, on the impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations in developing countries, on the digital
single market, consumer use of artificial intelligence and on company liability for environmental damage.
Auf einen Blick EN
16-06-2022 Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2022 - EP 10You can also read
