Keeping Fire from Private Prometheus - Marine Corps ...
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Ideas & Issues (Training & Education)
Keeping Fire from
Private Prometheus
The future of entry level training
by CWO3 Andrew Parker & Maj Joshua Waddell
A
lexander the Great is credited
with the saying, “I am not >CWO3 Parker is a Marine Corps Infantry Weapons Officer with recent experi-
afraid of an Army of lions led ence as a Battalion Gunner in a forward deployed infantry battalion and as the
by sheep; I am afraid of an Infantry Training Battalion Gunner. Currently, he serves as the Advanced Infantry
army of sheep led by a lion.” We do not Training Battalion Gunner.
concur that this is a necessary choice. In
fact, we greatly prefer the possibility of >>Maj Waddell is a Marine Corps Infantry Officer with recent experience as a
an army of lions led by better lions. As Company Commander and Battalion Operations Officer in a forward-deployed
the Corps goes through this period of infantry battalion.
transformation, led by the 38th Com-
mandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), ELT for the Marine Corps’ infantry and in support of the CPG are ongo-
much of the discussion has rightly envisioned by the 2019 CPG. We will ing. Well-meaning phraseology abounds
centered on the ability of the Corps to limit our scope to recommendations for in variations on the themes of: “change
recruit, train, and retain the Marines the infantry, but we argue that certain the training and education continuum
necessary for this new vision. We have aspects of these recommendations could from an industrial age model, to an in-
no doubt that Marines will continue to be applied to other warfighting func- formation age one;” “improve initial
rise to the challenge as they have always tional areas as well. As many long-held proficiency and skills;” “better quality,
done. However, anticipated reductions assumptions of force design and struc- more mature, and possess more capabil-
in total end-strength and cost-savings ture of the Marine Corps are updated, ity;” and “produce multi-disciplinary,
because of legacy equipment divestiture it is only proper to apply this willingness multi domain competence across ranks
provide a unique opportunity to re-ex- for radical change to the training of and echelons.1” Assessments of the root
amine the most foundational element our most valuable resource: our Ma- problem are varied and incomplete.
of the Corps’ character: the nature of rines. The capability requirements im- Common responses include: low GT
entry level training (ELT). plicated by the CPG envision a level of scores of infantry Marines, age and ma-
Our Corps’ history is replete with tactical and technical proficiency that turity of Marines, content of training
inspiring stories of young Marines fresh is currently not produced in our ELT (“reps and sets”), length of training,
from basic training performing heroic schoolhouses, specifically with regard and designating instructor staffing of
acts on the battlefield. In many cases, to enlisted training. ELTs as special-duty assignments.
these Marines were undertrained, as was We challenge anyone claiming the We do not debate that providing
the case in Korea and Vietnam where opposite to examine the current per- more time for training will lead to in-
only basic ELT was provided prior to formance of basic infantry skills such creased proficiency. We also agree that
combat deployments. The uncom- as land navigation and patrolling in a smarter Marine will learn faster, re-
fortable truth is these Marines often newly minted privates with the aver- tain more information, and make better
achieved success through heroic actions age non-infantry officer in Phase 2 of decisions. No doubt, making the ELTs
and unnecessary loss of life vice tech- The Basic School or any graduate of the a special-duty assignment will attract
nical and tactical proficiency. Leaders British Royal Marine Commandoes. more high performers wanting to make
must acknowledge that it is not suf- We submit that there are effective mod- a career out of our Corps and will likely
ficient to throw another generation of els for rectifying this problem through be more dedicated to the assignment.
similar heroic amateurs into the caul- integrating the training of enlisted and Upon further examination, these
dron of great power conflict; the Marine officers and properly manning this com- anecdotal assessments fall apart. The
Corps needs professionals and its past bined ELT pipeline. average GT score of an active duty
time we started making them. infantry Marine ranges from 104.7
This article seeks to address the Diagnosis to 116.71, depending on MOS. These
problem of force generation through Working groups focused on ELT scores exclude reconnaissance Marines
Marine Corps Gazette • August 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 55Ideas & Issues (Training & Education)
and critical skills operators who have stitutional opportunity to further their blush, we subject these young people
average GT scores of 118 and 116, re- education beyond the basic require- to abuse at the hands of the first Ma-
spectively. Demanding a GT Score of ments for enlistment. By continuing rine leaders they meet: drill instructors
100 for infantrymen will not be the to segregate officer and enlisted train- trained in a culture that pushes them
panacea that most believe. Our aver- ing, we ensure we will not effectively to perform their duties as if they hate
age infantryman already has the GT address or reform instructor selection their recruits. We then have the gall to
score of what the Corps is considering and development, as well as training wonder where our current problem of
requiring. Our Marines are actually methodologies. This lack of parity in hazing comes from.
pretty bright; it is our training meth- training guarantees our Marines will Detractors may claim that the dis-
odologies that stifle intellect, eliminate never develop to their potential or the cipline learned at Recruit Training is
initiative, and make them appear less requirements of future force design. fundamental to the future success of
intelligent than they are. Additionally, The tragedy of the current system is it young, enlisted Marines. We are in
ELT schoolhouses were SDAs for sev- squanders the hard-won victories made violent agreement that the Corps’ tra-
eral years. Experience with the quality by our recruiters. With recent recruiting dition of discipline is fundamental to
of Marine produced then versus now shortfalls in other Services, studies have our success. However, we argue that
shows no measurable degradation in revealed the grim reality that roughly the discipline demonstrated through a
the final product of the ELT pipeline. only 25 percent of young Americans well-executed night patrol or by prepar-
The SDA alone is insufficient and failed
to attract the appropriate level of in-
structors and leadership required for
the important mission of training our Instead, these talented young Marines become ef-
Nation’s premiere warfighting force. fectively lobotomized through a process that seeks to
Further extending entry-level train-
ing to six months (as anticipated), the develop instant, unquestioning obedience to orders.
Marines (regardless of intellect) might
be better at patrolling, marksmanship,
and whichever other key skills get suf- qualify for joining the armed Services. ing defensive positions to the correct
ficient repetition. But in no way will Our Marines all possess high school standard is far more relevant than disci-
those Marines be better decision makers diplomas or GEDs in a time when our pline demonstrated in a crisp about-face.
than those we currently produce. By major cities are seeing graduation rates Instead, these talented young Marines
failing to effectively address instructor similar to the rate of 73 percent in Chi- become effectively lobotomized through
selection and development as well as cago and lower in many other small a process that seeks to develop instant,
training methodologies, we guarantee towns.2 We require our Marines to ab- unquestioning obedience to orders.
that we will continue to treat them like stain from illicit substances in a time This training mentality persists through
a recruit for six months vice a few weeks. when half of all young people claim secondary schools, and Marines arrive
We submit the root problem is that to have used over their lifetime.3 We to their units as minimally trained au-
when it comes to infantry training, the lose another potential batch of recruits tomatons who then must be re-trained
enlisted eat last. History and data shows because of an overly restrictive tattoo in the deploying unit by over-tasked
that the Marine Corps will invest heav- policy that is out of step with what is veterans and who also typically lack
ily in the training of the officer corps deemed acceptable to contemporary cul- proficiency.
while only providing the minimum in- ture. The Services also demand baseline Meanwhile, we take a young person
vestment required to prevent failure in physical ability in an era where one in who had the good fortune of being a col-
the enlisted training sites. This is also six adolescents and one in three adults lege graduate—with no regard to what
evident in the education disparities be- are obese, which when combined with degree was actually obtained—and as-
tween ranks. As part of resident PME, other physical problems, results in over sign them a completely different train-
officers are offered advanced degrees at half the eligible young adult age group ing pipeline that puts a premium on
DOD schoolhouses and other programs. being unqualified for military service.4 critical thinking and leadership almost
This is offered at the Command and This data tells us that, on the aggre- immediately. These officer candidates
Staff College, Naval War College, Na- gate, the military recruits from a pool of are then sent to the finest ELT money
tional Defense University, and among some of the most highly qualified and can buy and the end result, particularly
other similar institutions. Meanwhile, driven young people the Nation has to in the infantry, is predictable. A new
no such opportunity or requirement ex- offer. This exceptional population is infantry lieutenant arrives to his unit
ists for enlisted. Higher ranking officers then fed into a recruit training process with ten weeks of Officers’ Candidate
have the opportunity to leave the Corps that was designed to turn last century’s School, six months of basic infantry
with advanced degrees, whereas senior draftees into obedient shooters at scale. skills and leadership training at The
enlisted Marines advance through to Then, in a social experiment that would Basic School (TBS), then another four
retirement without being afford an in- make the Stanford Prison Experiment months of advanced infantry training
56 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • August 2021in combined arms skills at Infantry Of- of officers. To illustrate this fact, the The SOIs are built on an enlisted train-
ficer’s Course. In contrast to this, his below table from the 25 September 2019 ing model aimed at filling six divisions
platoon, which will likely sustain 4 out Marine Corps Training and Education with high casualty rates; a legacy sys-
of 5 combat deaths compared to other for the Future Operating Environment tem from World War II. An industrial
specialties, is manned with talented Phase 1 Report demonstrates the staff- age system, the SOIs were not designed
young Americans who have had only ing and materiel differences between to produce the thinking, independent,
43 days of actual infantry training and TBS and the Schools of Infantry (SOI): technical experts the CPG describes.
13 weeks of Napoleonic close-order drill It is worth mentioning that this table The facilities, instructor-to-student ra-
training.5 fails to capture intangibles regarding tio, teaching methods, production level
We argue that the source of the the quality disparity of personnel SE- requirements, and length of courses
are all decades behind what is needed
proficiency gap is the Marine Corps’ LECTED for duty at TBS vice those
for the information age.
system for ELT is rooted in a de-facto assigned duty at the SOIs. In summary,
tiered system that overwhelmingly and the same report also notes: This model is insufficient for pro-
unjustifiably preferences the training ducing warriors who are capable of
executing the missions our planning
guidance and warfighting concepts as-
Training Production Comparison sign to them. Without major changes to
TBS SOI-E SOI-W this process, the responsibility for the
Annual Throughput Approx. 2,000 Approx. 19,000 Approx. 20,000 most basic elements of combat training
POI Actively Managed 9 19 38
will continue to disproportionately fall
on deploying units, with no guarantee
Facilities Comparison
of deployment cycles allowing for this
TBS SOI-E SOI-W necessary training. As a force-in-read-
Berthing Facilities All built or renovated 16 of 18 barracks built 6 of 9 barracks built iness, we must ensure that our Marines
since 2015 1954 (2 built 2005) prior to 1975 (newest are ready for their assigned mission the
in 2013) day they join their unit. Crises will not
Facilities Management 28 1 1 wait, and the enemy will not oblige us
Personnel to delay until we complete a full pre-
Dining Facility Complete renovation Built 1975 with no Built 1973 with no deployment cycle before a conflict be-
2005 renovation renovation gins.
Food Service 1 per 2,500 Marines 0 for 20,000 1 for 22,000
Representative Comparative Models
Wireless Classroom Yes No No
The basic assumption behind pur-
suing a new training paradigm for our
Staffing Comparison ground combat element lays behind
TBS SOI-E SOI-W the fundamental purpose of the Ma-
Company Staffing 1 Maj & 6 Capt per Co 1 Capt per Company 1 Capt per Company rine Corps. In the 82d Congress, that
S-3 Officers 1 LtCol & 2 Captains 1 Maj 1 LtCol
purpose was defined as:
American history, recent as well as re-
S3 Ops NCO 6 (not instructors) 3 (all instructors) 3 (all instructors)
mote, has fully demonstrated the vital
S4 Maj Capt Capt need for the existence of a strong force-
Protocol 1 Maj & 1 Civ 0 0 in-readiness. Such a force, versatile, fast
Academics 15 Civ 5 Civ 7 Civ
moving, and hard-hitting, can prevent
the growth of potentially large confla-
Fitness 1 Maj, 5 Civ, 1 MSgt, & 0 to T/O 3 Personnel grations by prompt and vigorous action
26-28 NCO/Marines during their incipient stages. The nation’s
Motor Transport • 1stLt OIC • No MT Officer • No MT Officer shock troops must be the most ready when
• CWO2 Maint Officer • No Maint Officer • No Maint Officer the nation is least ready ... to provide
• 20 Mechs • 6 Mechs (1:15 veh) • 6 Mechs (1:22 veh) a balanced force-in-readiness for a na-
Communications • 1 1stLt, 4 SNCO • 1 MSgt, 1 SNCO • 1 Capt, 7 SNCO val campaign and, at the same time, a
• 51 NCO/Marines • 5 Marines • 26 NCO/Marines ground and air striking force ready to
Medical • 1 LT MO • 1 LT MO • 1 LT MO suppress or contain international distur-
• 29 Corpsmen • 21 Corpsmen • 29 Corpsmen bances short of large scale war.
(1/70 students) (1/900 students) (1/700 students) This directive assumes that the Nation
Athletic Trainers 6 (1 per 330 students) 4 (1 per 5000 students) 3 (1 per 7000 students) invests in the Marine Corps in order
to maintain a unique capability, not
Figure 1. simply one that could be considered as
Marine Corps Gazette • August 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 57Ideas & Issues (Training & Education)
interchangeable with standard Army
infantry formations. It is unreasonable
bordering on laughable to believe that
“shock troops” can be trained in 43 days
of basic infantry training.
Producing a unique capability re-
quires unique investments in training.
Fortunately, undergoing this change
should be considered similar to an “open
book test” for force planners. Long-run-
ning successful examples of the kind of
integrated and specialized training we
propose currently exist both resident to
the Marine Corps and in similar units
among our allies. Officer-enlisted in-
tegrated training can be found in the
British Royal Marines, SEAL BUDS,
Army Ranger Regiment, Marine Recon- To generate the future force required, we must radically redesign the training pipeline. (Photo
naissance, and MARSOC. by Cpl Aaron Patterson.)
The most successful naval infantry
abroad is arguably the British Royal The Marine Corps has a resident rate). MARSOC’s Individual Training
Marine Commandoes (BRMC). This model worth examining as well. The Course also only produces 115 operators
storied force currently utilizes a partially MARSOC Individual Training Course per year, supplying a total force structure
integrated training model in which of- has been successful in preparing basi- of 1,512 authorized (7.6 percent replace-
ficers and enlisted both undergo the cally trained teams of special operators ment rate).6 By contrast, the current
same basic commando training. En- despite drawing from across the force SOI pipeline generates approximately
listed ranks undergo a 4-week recruit and not just from the GCE. After the 8,100 per year against a total infantry
orientation phase followed by a 32-week competitive selection process at A&S, force structure of nearly 29,100 infantry
commando course. The training has these trainees undergo 36 weeks of Marines (28 percent replacement rate).
rigorous standards but is augmented training with phases dedicated to basic This does not consider the pending re-
by what they name “Hunter Company” skills, light infantry tactics, direct action ductions to the infantry approximating
which takes recruits that do not pass operations, special reconnaissance, and 16 percent of the structure, which would
key test gates or were injured during unconventional warfare. As with the roughly bring the required number of
training and rehabilitates them through BRMC course, officers take the same new infantry Marines produced per year
additional training, mentoring, and tests as the enlisted but are expected to to around 6,800. This also assumes our
physical therapy. The officer course is perform to a higher standard. Unlike abysmal infantry retention problem does
much longer, at 65 weeks, and includes the BRMC training pipeline, there is no not begin to improve, as we deduce it
much of the basic training in leadership need to separate officers for large por- will, with the longer contracts and im-
and officer tasks prior to beginning the tions of basic officer training. Instead, proved morale as a result of our subse-
commando phase of the course. These officers and enlisted train alongside each quent proposed solution.
portions of the officer program could be other from day one in units patterned The instructor to student ratios at
interchanged with existing infrastruc- after the special operations teams they these schoolhouses are not the magic
ture at our TBS, allowing officers to will be assigned to in the future. As ingredient they may be perceived to be
move straight into the commando phase with the BRMC, MARSOC aggres- as well. Training for the Royal Marines
along with the enlisted ranks. A key sively employs physical training staff is generally conducted between a 1:10
feature of this training is the concept of in order to prevent injury and improve to 1:16 ratio with live fire staffed at
“same test, different standards” wherein physical performance along the progres- a 1:4 ratio for day and 1:2 for night.
officers and enlisted undergo the same sion of the course. MARSOC uses a higher variance of
basic training events and evaluations, Critics will rightfully point out that instruction staffing but retains a 1:5
but officers are held to the higher stan- there are other characteristics that make ratio for high-risk training. Current SOI
dard that accompanies their responsi- these courses successful. First among instructor ratios hover near 1:15 but
bilities as leaders. This has an effect of these is the low throughput requirement. maintain similar low ratios for high-
demonstrating to the enlisted that their Roughly speaking the Royal Marines risk training such as live fire. These
officers have undergone the same trials only produce around 890 enlisted and numbers demonstrate that in terms of
as them and have been forced to lead 30 officers a year, supplying overall to- manning, the existing quantity of in-
from the front, in front of recruits who tal force structure of between 7,000 to structors in our ELT is likely sufficient.
could fill their platoons, from day one. 8,000 (roughly 12 percent replacement This demonstrates that our enlisted
58 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • August 2021training problems do not stem from a Corps slipping into irrelevance as its for top level schools. Future promotion
lack of instructor quantity. If numbers market share of mission sets is further board precepts should include briefings
are not the problem, instructor quality eroded by SOCOM and, increasingly, that identify these officers and NCOs/
and development is at least a partial the Army. It is not uncommon today SNCOs as highly competitive. In the
factor. The instructor cadre must be for Marines to be displaced from their end, the quality of personnel at ELT will
institutionally professionalized as the own ships in order to make way for drive the overall success or failure of the
requirements from ELT develop. SOCOM elements. Reinvesting in the schoolhouse and these Marines will have
basic units of employment of the force outsized impacts on the force as a whole.
Proposed Integrated Model is the foundational step to reverse this We highly recommend that this new
We argue, based on our concepts sad state of affairs. training structure is located at one
and planning guidance, future Ma- In order to generate the force required central site in order to ensure it is eco-
rines will operate semi-independently to tackle the missions forecasted in the nomical and efficient while providing
by squads, platoons, and companies 38th Commandant’s Guidance as well a standardized set of conditions for the
dispersed across vast distances. They as in our own Service concepts, we must program of instruction.
will be employed as integrated teams, radically redesign our training pipeline. Secondly, we must create an entirely
requiring advanced communications We propose two complementary lines new training course for our officer and
capabilities while actively enabling of effort in re-designing our infantry enlisted infantry. The Marine Corps
complex joint and naval operations. training pipeline. First, we must prop- already sends officers to train with the
They will have to conduct advanced erly staff a future schoolhouse with British Royal Marines through the per-
patrols, collect, and transmit informa- competitive and talented officers and sonnel exchange program. Alongside
tion from multiple sources and make NCOs. Currently, officer instructors Recon, MARSOC, and IOC person-
a host of complex decisions every day are drawn from candidates submitted nel, a working group should be con-
under the watchful eye of our potential to TBS with the highest recommenda- vened to design a 32–36 week naval
adversaries. They will conduct theater tions from battalions returning from commando course, initially overseen
security cooperation missions and op- deployment. This creates a sort of in- by the director of IOC and his staff as
erations with partner forces while being formal board process in which highly well as the Gunner for Plans, Policy,
capable of conducting limited offensive talented officers are sent to TBS and and Operations. This development
operations such as raids and the sei- later to IOC. To formalize this pro- team should be directly answerable to
zure of key terrain in the context of a cess, officer instructors should be drawn the Commandant and Commanding
larger naval campaign. They must be from the pool of Commandant’s Career General for Training and Education
able to act as a ship’s company on dis- Level Education Board candidates, spe- Command. This course should culmi-
tributed surface combatants, capable of cifically those chosen for Expedition- nate with producing small units that
boarding and seizing ships up to and ary Warfare School or other career-level are trained for distributed operations in
including hostile warships, as well as school assignment. These officers would complex terrain to include small boat
conducting shipboard security. This is return to train the next generation of raids and assault support operations.
a bold departure from our traditional Marines upon the completion of their This effort will require a brief reduc-
training goals of executing combined school assignment. A system similar tion in capacity at our schoolhouses. It
arms breaches in vast deserts as the peak to how officers are selected for assign- is fortuitous, therefore, that the Marine
evolution of our Service-level training ment to TBS today should be applied Corps forecasts a ~sixteen percent re-
exercises. Our ELT schoolhouse should to NCO/SNCO ranks, with battalions duction in infantry personnel in the
be based on these new assumed missions returning from deployment identifying coming years. Efforts should be made
and structure itself to produce naval top infantry performers and submitting to reduce throughput in line with force
infantrymen capable of fulfilling the them with the commander’s recommen- shaping measures while simultaneously
Commandant’s vision. It is insufficient dation for assignment to ELT. designing a new training pipeline for
to pursue incremental improvements As the Commandant notes in his future recruits. The key characteristics
to training at a time of transformation planning guidance: of this course should include:
in both the threat and operating envi- we need to determine the best way • Officers would enter the commando
ronment. As Henry Ford is quoted as to effect the desired change, which course upon completion of TBS. This
saying, “If I’d asked people what they includes the way we select, train and would put their total training time in
wanted, they’d have said ‘faster horses.’” evaluate instructors throughout the line with what is currently executed
The final goal of the Marine Corps continuum. for the British Royal Marines. This
should be creating a capability that is We argue this is best accomplished by also places the Officer in a dominant
relevant to these new environments and privileging the selection of leaders in position having previously completed
missions and whose utility justifies the ELT. The commander at the school a more in-depth and relevant train-
risk of their employment to the joint house should be a post-command in- ing pipeline, fostering an immediate
force’s combatant commanders. This fantry battalion commander of the coach/player relationship that can
would start to reverse the trend of the caliber reserved for current candidates span careers.
Marine Corps Gazette • August 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 59Ideas & Issues (Training & Education)
• Enlisted would complete basic re- and should be given the chance to suc- poleon Bonaparte was quoted as say-
cruit training and enter into a four- ceed. Recoverable injuries should be ing: “Give me enough ribbons to place
week pre-commando course. Prepa- treated by qualified physical trainers on the tunics of my soldiers and I can
ration courses like this have been and Marines returned to training. conquer the world.” It is common for
correlated with higher performance • In contrast to the above point, insti- military units with unique capabilities
both in the British Royal Marines as tute a system of peer-review informed to distinguish themselves with symbols
well as in SEAL BUDS training. attrition in order to divest of potential to display a camaraderie through rec-
• Officers will train alongside enlisted trainees with character flaws or lack ognition of a shared standard of profes-
for the vast majority of the course. of drive. This currently exists at TBS sionalism. This new Marine commando
All trainees will accomplish the same and IOC and should be extended to should be no different (although to start
training events and evaluations. Of- the entirety of the training population. with, we would simply be happy for a
ficers will have additional “breakout These Marines would be reassigned to combat utility uniform that has utility
sessions” to focus on combat leader- service the needs of the Corps much in combat).
ship tasks such as quick fire planning like drops from BUDS. As it currently stands, the Marine
and command and control while the • Require six-year time-in-service Corps is making the conscious choice
enlisted are provided further techni- contracts from all trainees in order to withhold the best training from the
cal training in weaponry and com- to ensure the Marine Corps reaps Marines most likely to be killed or in-
munications. sufficient return on investment from jured in coming conflicts. We recognize
we are suggesting a foundational change
not just to the infantry’s training but to
We recognize we are suggesting a foundational the overall shared identity and culture
of the Marine Corps. Unique conditions
change not just to the infantry’s training but to the exist in this moment that could enable
overall shared identity and culture of the Marine these radical changes and allow us to
become more lethal and effective than
Corps. we ever have been and to secure our
place in history as “soldiers from the sea”
for coming generations. As the article’s
title suggests, let us give our enlisted the
• Focus on producing infantry that the Marine Commandoes it trains. fire we have been withholding and see
is relevant in the context of a FMF Recruiting Command continually suc- what they can do with it. We argue it
and capable of conducing missions ceeds in its mission of six-year con- could be something transformational.
in the context of distributed naval tract assignments and we are confident
operations. that this will allow the Service to gain
• Inclusion of professional physical maximum return on investment from Notes
trainers for the development of high- each trainee. 1. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s
quality physical performance in order It is not enough that our new in- Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: July
to develop habits of action for new ductees be trained to this new standard. 2019).
Marines. Physical training should be Once the course is certified by the Com-
seen as professional development, not mandant, all commanders in the exist- 2. Thomas Spoehr and Bridget Handy, “The
punishment. ing FMF should be given a calendar year Looming National Security Crisis: Young
Americans Unable to Serve in the Military,”
• Inclusion of survival and field craft to bring their units in line with the same
The Heritage Foundation, (February 2018),
as a core component of each Marine physical fitness and training standards. available at https://www.heritage.org.
Commando. Marines should be con- Much as in the 75th Ranger Regiment,
fident in their ability to survive and this would then become an inspectable 3. Ibid.
live off the land, particularly when training standard for all ranks, certified
fighting against enemies that can by representatives of the new school- 4. Ibid.
hold our supply lines at risk. Teach house itself. Once complete, all trainees
discipline through aggressively-en- and existing structure would be awarded 5. Robert Scales, Scales on War, (Annapolis,
forced high standards for combat a shared warfighting device to signify MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016).
field craft. a shared level of warfighting capability
• Include a “Hunter Company” equiv- and mutual training standard. Those 6. Shawn Snow, “Officers Are More Success-
ful during Raider Selection, but MARSOC
alent where Marines are coached to unable to meet this standard should be Is Fielding Marinas at a Steady Rate,” Marine
rectify any mistakes or training defi- reassigned in keeping with force shap- Corps Times, (April 2019), available at https://
ciencies. As stated earlier, each Marine ing requirements. We recognize that www.marinecorpstimes.com.
that arrives to training represents the awarding a physical warfighting device
best of what the Nation has to offer to infantry is controversial, but as Na-
60 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • August 2021You can also read
