JSE - GARP presentation - Stock exchange developments - Leila Fourie
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JSE – GARP presentation Stock exchange developments – Leila Fourie www.jse.co.za www.jse.co.za Copyright© JSE Limited 2009 1
Top 20 WFE exchanges Domestic market capitalisation (equities), July 2013 Taiwan SE Corp. Singapore Exchange Johannesburg SE $825,9 billion (18th largest) BME Spanish Exchanges National Stock Exchange India BM&FBOVESPA BSE India The JSE is a world class, liquid exchange. It Korea Exchange is by far the biggest on the continent and NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Shenzhen SE one of only 4 African exchanges that are Australian SE members of the WFE. It is the 4th largest SIX Swiss Exchange bond market by value traded Deutsche Börse TMX Group Shanghai SE Hong Kong Exchanges London SE Group Japan Exchange Group - Tokyo NASDAQ OMX NYSE Euronext $m 0 5 000 000 10 000 000 15 000 000 20 000 000 25 000 000 www.jse.co.za Sources: WFE 2
Finance is a Key Sector of the Domestic Economy • South Africa has a world class financial sector which accounts for around 20% of GDP and provides employment for 12% of the formal sector’s (non-agri) employed • In value terms, the stock market is greater than the country’s total economy, reflecting a high degree of financialisation • The GFC of 2008-2009 has ushered in a massive overhaul of financial regulation, affecting banks, exchanges, CCPs, CSDPs etc. www.jse.co.za Source: World Bank 3
Annual Stock Market Trends USD Indices (2000=100) Indices (2000=100) 350 600 0 300 500 30 250 400 60 200 Divergence 300 90 150 200 120 100 ZAR depreciation 50 100 150 0 0 180 Developing Countries South Africa JSE ALSI (LHS) USD/ZAR (RHS) UK Germany • South Africa’s stock market performance from 2002 up to the start of the GFC was more impressive than that of its peers and some of the more developed markets • It has also fared better post the GFC and has diverged from the currency’s performance since 2010 www.jse.co.za Sources: World Bank; I-Net 4
JSE and Exchange Rate trends Indices (Jan 2005=100) 350 50 Stocks continue to Global financial crisis diverge from economic reality; 300 bonds lose some 75 appeal as sovereign indebtedness grows and global LT rates 250 start to rise 100 200 125 150 150 Development of asset 100 price bubble Strong portfolio capital Deteriorating domestic 175 inflows, aided by US factors; imminent end and EU quantitative of QE measures easing leading to capital 50 outflows 200 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 JSE ALSI (LHS) USD/ZAR (RHS) www.jse.co.za Source: I-Net 5
Bond Market Trends Sovereign spreads over USTs • From 2001 to 2007, positive domestic (basis points) factors helped narrow the spread: GDP 1200 growth averaged 4.3% over this period; interest rates declined from mid-2003 to 900 Aug 2006, fuelling spending and growth 600 • RSA’s sovereign credit rating also improved between 2003 and 2007 300 • The GFC led to a blow-out of EMs spreads in 2009 0 • Subsequently, however, a re-assessment of “risk” led to a narrowing in spreads Developing Countries Developing Asia Latin America & Caribbean South Africa www.jse.co.za Sources: World Bank 6
Best Investment View of SA Asset Managers Effective asset allocation 100% 9.0 12.5 14.2 17.3 14.0 14.9 90% 17.2 18.0 20.12 18.77 80% 17.2 13.4 12.7 9.6 8.5 12.7 13.6 70% 17.9 17.1 15.8 60% 50% 40% 72.4 71.7 69.5 68.9 69.4 67.0 66.7 30% 61.7 59.0 60.4 20% 10% 0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Q2/2013 SA Equities SA Bonds SA Listed Property SA Real Estate SA Cash SA Other SA Commodities www.jse.co.za Source: Alexander Forbes 7
Uncertainty Heightens Volatility Net inflows/outflows (Rm) Capital flows to developing countries 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 -5000 -10000 -15000 -20000 2010 2011 2012 2013 Shares Bonds • Foreign investors’ appetite for EM bonds after the GFC has been reflected on the JSE by strong net inflows into this market. However, recently, these flows have wavered and there has been a moderate shift towards a preference for shares. • Portfolio inflows are at risk in the short-term for as long as speculation of an easing in QE continues to drive market sentiment. www.jse.co.za Sources: JSE; World Bank 8
CCP purpose - providing settlement assurance • Reduce systemic risk • Ensure efficient, fair markets • Protect investors • Ensure orderly markets • Promote transparency www.jse.co.za 10
But what is a CCP? Counterparty Counterparty A B Should one of the counterparties to the trade default the other faces losses (credit risk) Central Counterparty Counterparty Counterparty A B (CCP) A central counterparty (CCP) stands between two parties of a financial trade and absorbs the credit risk each party faces by becoming the counterparty to each trade www.jse.co.za 11
CCPs in the spotlight CCPs are seen as systemically important and if ineffective, they could be a source for contagion, financial shocks and default • 2008 Global Financial Crisis highlighted gaps in financial institutions risk management • However, it also highlighted the important role that CCPs play in reducing trading risks: Lehman Brothers’ entire derivative book that was cleared through LCH Clearnet (a CCP) was successfully unwound and any losses absorbed by the clearing house’s risk management controls • Financial regulators focus widened from banks (e.g. Basel 2/3) to include CCPs (CPSS-IOSCO, ESMA) • CPSS-IOSCO requires a CCP to have sufficient financial resources to cover credit exposures in extreme yet plausible market conditions www.jse.co.za 12
Nothing new...CCP failures prior to the 2008 crisis CCP COUNTRY DATE DESCRIPTION Caisse de Liquidation France 1974 • Steep rise in sugar prices attracted speculative investors, who were caught out by a sharp correction, leading to inability to meet margin calls • CCP failed to increase margin in response to greater market volatility • Lack of coordination between clearing house and exchange • Allocation of losses among GCMs were not transparent Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 1983 • Crash in palm oil prices led to the default of six brokers Commodity Clearing • CCP slow to respond to market conditions – 12 day delay between market crash and House broker default • Lack of management experience and coordination among market participants Hong Kong Futures Hong Kong 1987 • Trading suspended for four days in the wake of “Black Monday” Exchange • Bailed out by consortium of banks supported by government once it was clear the guarantee fund would be insufficient • Guarantee fund separate from clearing house and exchange – clearing house responsible for risk management, but was not exposed to losses • CCP did not increase margin despite sharp growth in trading volumes • No position limits and high concentration of brokers BM&F Brazil 1999 • Sudden $/Real devaluation caused two small clearing banks to default • Margin and default funds insufficient as banks were beyond BM&F operational limits, and margin stress tests were inadequate for major move • Central bank intervened and bailed out the banks Actual CCP failure Near CCP failure www.jse.co.za Source: Oliver Wyman 2011 13
South African CCP: Safcom • In South Africa, all exchange-traded derivative trades are cleared through Safcom, a wholly owned subsidiary of the JSE • Safcom thereby mitigates systemic risk in the South African exchange-traded derivatives market, as it reduces the risk of a single default impacting other counterparties and thereby contaminating the market • Imperative that Safcom’s risk management practices are of the highest standards and its financial safeguards quantified as accurately as possible • Equities are cleared by the JSE – potential exists to move to CCP model www.jse.co.za 14
Safcom growth – initial margin at an all time high Initial Margin Date 1 20,141,569,086 27-Aug-13 2 19,935,505,763 26-Aug-13 3 19,892,281,931 01-Jul-08 4 19,852,376,156 02-Jul-08 5 19,838,111,897 22-Aug-13 6 19,830,893,646 15-Jul-08 7 19,807,451,439 23-Aug-13 8 19,755,821,585 18-Jun-08 9 19,753,674,514 08-Jul-08 10 19,747,127,668 14-Jul-08 www.jse.co.za 15
Creditworthiness of the CCP: Safcom Safcom mitigates its risk through the following measures: 1. Entry requirements to becoming a clearing member (financial and capital adequacy requirements) 2. Collateral for each trade that is cleared – initial and variation margin 3. A default fund, to which all clearing members must contribute, that can be accessed to cover losses suffered as the result of one clearing member defaulting 4. Fidelity fund – for isolated and limited circumstances In addition: • Back testing • Stress testing • Default ‘fire drills’ • Safcom risk waterfall • Risk tolerance • Liquidity lines www.jse.co.za 16
Main trends - CCPs www.jse.co.za 17
1 Re-regulation and extra - territorial reach www.jse.co.za 18
Re-regulation and extra-territorial reach The G-20 reform was a catalyst for a coordinated global regulatory response US Dodd-Frank Act • SWAP dealers and participants must register • Central reporting in a depository • Central clearing of standardised OTC derivatives • Mandatory margin for cleared trades • Central trading of standardised derivatives • Restriction of activities EMIR • Operational risk monitoring measures • Central reporting • Central clearing of standardised OTC derivatives • Regulation of CCPs as ‘systemically important’ BIS / Basle III • Lower capital for centrally cleared derivatives and structured products • Capital for default fund contributions • Margin for non-centrally cleared transactions CPSS IOSCO • Global standard for CCPs and financial market infrastructures www.jse.co.za 19
2 Product expansion . . . OTC clearing www.jse.co.za 20
OTC Derivatives Clearing : Market size According to BIS, 85% of all derivative transactions are traded OTC • In June 2008, the global OTC derivatives market gross notional outstanding peak trading volumes were more than $680 trillion • OTC trading increased by 535% over 7 years to 2008 • OTC market subsequently contracted to $615 trillion to date • 2010: ZAR OTC derivatives ZAR24 trillion, ZAR800 billion traded on exchange www.jse.co.za Source: BIS, ISDA, SARB 21
3 Default funds – more science required www.jse.co.za 22
CCP risk waterfall • A CCP’s risk waterfall defines how risk mitigants will be used in the case of a default • A typical CCP (and Safcom’s) risk waterfall follows a defaulter-pays model In the case of a default, losses are funded as follows: Initial margin of the defaulting clearing member The defaulting clearing member’s contribution to the default fund CCP’s contribution to the default fund Non-defaulting member’s contribution to the default fund www.jse.co.za 23
CCP default fund quantification Possible alternatives to quantifying a default fund: • CPSS-IOSCO requires a CCP to have sufficient financial resources to cover credit exposures in extreme yet plausible market conditions • Default fund must cover losses under extreme market conditions • Therefore need measures of extreme losses, or tail-end losses • Conditional VaR (CVaR) = the expected loss given that VaR is exceeded • Extreme VaR (EVaR) = employ EVT for modelling losses within the tail end of a distribution of returns • Stress Testing = possible losses on today’s portfolio should historic stress events repeat www.jse.co.za 24
25 4 Capital adequacy requirements for CCPS? www.jse.co.za 25
Capital Capital is now a focus for CCPs • Economic capital in a CCP refers to all levels of prefunded resources to protect the market and the structure thereof • Twin Peaks regulation – trend: CCP capital adequacy to be regulated • Safcom economic capital approach: • Operational risk • Counterparty risk • Legal risk • Liquidity risk www.jse.co.za 26
4 The search for margin efficiency www.jse.co.za 27
The search for margin efficiency • Growing demand for collateral puts margin efficiencies in the limelight. • Growing number of CCPs are offering initial margin offsets between OTC and ET derivatives. • Margin Methodology: • CCPs have traditionally made use of portfolio scanning methodologies when determining initial margins for ET derivatives. • Portfolio scanning typically fails to adequately recognise the benefits of diversification. • CCPs are looking to migrate towards VaR type portfolio margining methodologies (Eurex call’s theirs Prisma). www.jse.co.za 28
Unknown unkowns • How many CCPs is right? • Capital markets are global, regulators are national – how do we reconcile these? • How do small countries manage systemic risk when much of the flows are offshore? • How to align global regulatory trends to the national agenda? • How much capital should a CCP hold? www.jse.co.za 29
Thank you www.jse.co.za 30
Contact the JSE & join us on social media Email: Leilaf@jse.co.za www.jse.co.za Copyright© JSE Limited 2011 31
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