Is Tunisia Really Democratising? - Introduction - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
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NO. 13 MARCH 2019 Introduction Is Tunisia Really Democratising? Progress, Resistance, and an Uncertain Outlook Max Gallien and Isabelle Werenfels January 2019 marked the eighth anniversary of the end of the Ben Ali dictatorship – the celebrations however were marred by massive social protests. Opinions both in Tunisia and abroad differ about the state of Tunisia’s political development as it gears up for its second parliamentary and presidential elections since the adoption of the new constitution in 2014. While some consider its democratisation to be virtually complete, others fear a relapse into autocracy. Despite its considerable democratic achievements, Tunisia is in danger of developing into a hybrid system: part democratic, part authoritarian. This is not only due to the difficult economic and regional con- text. Critically, the political, economic and administrative networks of the old system, as well as persistent authoritarian practices and “old” rhetoric in politics and society, complicate the deepening of its fragile democracy. Tunisia’s international partners should make it their explicit objective to weaken these counter-currents. Eight years after the end of the dictatorship, erning coalition into a serious crisis. The Tunisia is the only country that has democ- main point of contention was the growing ratised following the so-called Arab Spring. conflict in 2018 between President Béji Caid The Tunisian transition is even more re- Essebsi and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed markable as the regional security context (then a member of Nidaa Tounes). Essebsi and the profound economic crisis since pushed for Chahed, whom he had originally 2011 have been anything but conducive to nominated, to be replaced. For the sake of democratisation. continuity and stability, however, Ennahdha However, on the anniversary of the insisted that the prime minister remain in revolution in January 2019, the headlines office. In late January 2019, Chahed then in Tunisian and international media were founded his own political party, Tahya dominated not by democratic achieve- Tounes, to occupy the social and political ments, but by massive social protests, a centre. It seems likely that Chahed will run general strike and power struggles within for the presidential elections in November the political elite. After almost four years, 2019. The 92-year-old incumbent, Essebsi, conflicts between its two largest parties, may run again as well. Another candidate the secular Nidaa Tounes and the moderate from the currently strongest party, Ennah- Islamist Ennahdha, have thrown the gov- dha, remains a possibility. If, as expected,
Ennahdha again performs strongly in the constitution. It explicitly limits the role of
October 2019 parliamentary elections, the military; guarantees equality between
the party may get to play the role of king men and women; emphasises the independ-
maker. ence of the judiciary; and creates the basis
This politicking takes place against the for decentralising political responsibility.
background of an extremely tense economic Tunisia’s constitution establishes a system
situation. Tunisia relies on international in which executive power is shared be-
credit to avert national bankruptcy. Donors, tween the prime minister elected by parlia-
above all the International Monetary Fund, ment and the directly elected president.
are demanding austerity measures and This is meant to prevent a regular occur-
structural reforms. At the same time, the rence in the region: the concentration of
unions’ powerful umbrella organisation, political power in a single person. Last but
the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail not least, the constitution lays the foun-
(UGTT), has mobilised massively against dation for the separation of politics and
austerity measures. Chahed and the UGTT religion.
reached an agreement on wage increases in Alongside its content, the very drafting
early February, but the stalemate between of the constitution was an important
the government and the UGTT, which achievement in Tunisia’s post-revolutionary
lasted for months and was accompanied development, earning some of its protago-
by strikes, has aggravated the economic nists the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize. In 2013,
situation and further boosted the wide- civil society actors negotiated a compromise
spread socio-economic and political pro- which was supported by almost the entire
tests. It is likely that the struggle between political spectrum, breaking a deadlock
the government and UGTT for economic concerning the constitutional process fol-
reform and austerity measures will con- lowing the assassination of two leftist
tinue into the electoral campaigns. politicians.
To interpret these dynamics mainly as Since the adoption of its constitution,
a result of novel democratic freedoms and Tunisia has held parliamentary and presi-
political competition, however, would be dential elections in 2014 and local elections
short-sighted. They are also an expression in 2018. The organisation of the elections
of the difficulty of consolidating democrati- was conducted by the Independent Electoral
sation in Tunisia. Anti-democratic elite net- Commission (Instance Supérieure Indépendante
works in politics, business and administra- pour les Elections, ISIE) to international
tion, entrenched authoritarian practices acclaim, as both the parties involved and
and an “old” rhetoric are still part of the international election observers recognised
country’s political repertoire. Together, the elections as free and fair. Throughout
these have been driving factors in ensuring these processes, Islamist as well as secular
that it has not yet been possible to anchor parties showed that they can adhere to the
the considerable post-2011 political achieve- democratic rules of the game.
ments in such a way as to make them irre- These positive developments have
versible. demonstrated the relevance of an active
and rapidly developing civil society. Newly
won civil rights allowed so-called “watch-
The Achievements dog” organisations, such as AlBawsala,
I-Watch or Nawaat, to help shape Tunisia’s
In principle, conditions for the consolida- development as critical observers and
tion of Tunisian democracy would appear opinion leaders – not least through cam-
excellent. Tunisia’s constitution, adopted paigns on social media. It is particularly
in 2014, is rightly regarded as a milestone noteworthy that Tunisian civil society has
in North Africa’s political history, and the the only officially recognised (albeit in
region’s most progressive and democratic March 2019 again contested) organisation
SWP Comment 13
March 2019
2in North Africa, Shams, which is committed forces have improved in recent years, mainly
to the rights of the LGBTI community and as a result of extensive support from inter-
calls for LGBTI people to be decriminalised. national partners. Nevertheless, fundamen-
Civil society was also instrumental in tal internal reforms, especially of the police,
passing a 2017 law that protects whistle- have been delayed. The sector continues to
blowers who uncover corruption, and the a large extent to operate in a non-transpar-
establishment and support of the so-called ent, fragmented manner and with insuffi-
Truth and Dignity Commission (Instance de cient accountability or parliamentary super-
Vérité et Dignité, IVD) to investigate human vision. The role of new, increasingly politi-
rights abuses in the country’s authoritarian cally active, trade unions within the security
past. Its mandate expired in December 2018. sector, especially the police, is particularly
However, it is precisely with respect to worrying, as they have repeatedly and bla-
the extremely sensitive issue of Tunisia’s tantly blackmailed the legislative and judi-
authoritarian legacy that the limits and cial branches (see p. 4). The frequent declar-
deficiencies of the new Tunisian political ation of a state of emergency and the pro-
structure have become apparent. A tug-of- liferation of anti-terror laws in cases where
war has developed between reform- and there is no obvious link to terrorism pre-
status-quo-orientated political actors vent greater transparency in the security
around the IVD, its competences, its work- apparatus and can undermine civil and
ing methods and the potential extension of human rights, including freedom of expres-
its mandate – with the latter too frequently sion. In 2018, the blogger and parliamen-
retaining the upper hand. tarian Yassine Ayari was sentenced to
prison for a Facebook entry, under the pre-
text of undermining army cohesion.
The Limits of Democratisation The economy. Thus far, the reform of the
corrupt economic structures of the old
Difficulties in consolidating Tunisia’s system has also fallen short. Investigations
democratisation are most visible in the were largely limited to the family of former
judiciary, the security sector and the fight President Ben Ali and to a few politically
against corruption. opportune and high-profile cases. Inde-
The judiciary. Almost five years after the pendent state institutions that combat
adoption of the new constitution, Tunisia corruption, such as the Instance Nationale de
still has no constitutional court – so far, la Lutte contre la Corruption, remain without
only one of the twelve stipulated judges sufficient political support. The manage-
has been confirmed by parliament. This has ment of the extensive economic assets con-
serious consequences: the constitutionality fiscated from the former dictator and his
of several laws passed in recent years has family has also proven difficult. Legal am-
been controversial, as were the respective biguities, overlapping competences and a
powers of the president and prime minister. lack of resources and political will have led
Repeatedly, the country has found itself on to corruption and mismanagement of these
the verge of a constitutional crisis. Beyond assets, alongside the rehabilitation of promi-
the Constitutional Court, further reforms nent figures from the so-called Ben Ali clan.
of the judiciary are needed to ensure its in- A law passed in 2017 was particularly
dependence and transparency – the broad controversial in this context, as it issued a
jurisdiction and application of military general amnesty to senior officials accused
authority, for example, remains highly of corruption under the Ben Ali regime. An
problematic. earlier draft of this law, which would have
The security sector. Even more worrying is extended the amnesty to the entire private
the situation in the security sector, particu- sector, had failed as a result of massive pro-
larly within the Ministry of the Interior. tests from civil society. Nevertheless, it
The overall capacities of Tunisia’s security must be noted that initiatives to unbundle
SWP Comment 13
March 2019
3the political from the economic sphere in Old Networks in the Economy
Tunisia have not yet been successful. Thus, Many Tunisians had hoped that democrati-
a central mechanism through which the sation would bring not only new political
Ben Ali regime was able to accumulate institutions, but also a more inclusive,
power and profit has still not been elimi- fairer and less corrupt economic order.
nated. So far, these hopes have largely been dis-
appointed. The family clan of former
President Ben Ali, who had established a
Counter-Currents to patronage economy through corruption
Democratisation and intimidation, has largely left the coun-
try. However, other politically and inter-
The facts set out above – that the judiciary nationally well-connected economic elites
cannot (yet) fully exercise its independent remain active. Their political interest lies
role, that no fundamental reforms have above all in defending privileges they have
taken place in the security sector, and that gained under the old regime. Moreover,
corrupt economic elites of the old system they aim to avert reforms that could in-
remain largely unchallenged – are due to crease transparency and competition and
a number of counter-currents to democrati- thus lead to the emergence of new eco-
sation that frequently infiltrate or block nomic competitors. For decades, their influ-
necessary reforms. ence has contributed to low tax revenues,
a growing informal sector, and a non-trans-
Networks parent system of regulation that has placed
a massive burden on the Tunisian economy.
Old networks within the security sector, the This form of strategic opacity is also one
economic elites and the administration are reason why parts of the economic elite, and
considerable disruptors for Tunisia’s democ- in particular the service elite, are opposed
ratisation. They have acquired a quasi-veto to the comprehensive free trade agreement
power over various reform processes. An with the EU that the government is currently
example of this are the police unions: in negotiating. Furthermore, these networks
2012, they temporarily prevented the dis- are also trying to prevent processes under
missal of a Director General in the Ministry which economic elites could be held account-
of the Interior, who was later convicted for able over their links to Ben Ali’s regime –
the killing of demonstrators by the security here too they have been extremely successful.
forces in 2011. Since 2015, security sector This is not least due to the considerable
unions have also been trying to force the influence that these business networks are
legislature to adopt a particular law by pro- able to exert on public opinion. Although
testing and threatening to stop providing freedom of the press is anchored in the new
security. Among other things, this law constitution, the high concentration of
would ensure impunity for actors in the media ownership in the hands of a few,
security sector even when they use lethal sometimes politically ambitious, actors has
force to protect property. prevented a diverse, professional and in-
These various networks are not aiming dependent press landscape from develop-
to restore the status quo ante. Rather, their ing. Consequently, the press and the clas-
primary motivation lies in safeguarding sical audio-visual media (radio, TV) do not
their own spoils and interests. These are reflect the great diversity of the actual
more difficult to achieve in a consolidated political landscape. In addition, there have
democratic system with appropriate levels been concerted and politically motivated
of transparency and accountability. media campaigns, for example against the
IVD or against Ennahdha, which has few sup-
porters in the described economic net-
works.
SWP Comment 13
March 2019
4Last but not least, these networks have became secretary-general of Nidaa instead.
also benefited from the return of important In February 2019, however, he was sentenced
cadres from Ben Ali’s quasi-unified party in absentia to five years in prison for cor-
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique ruption.
(RCD), which was dissolved in 2011, to high Within many other parties, internal pro-
positions in politics and administration. In cedures are often only borderline democratic
fact, more than a fifth of the 43 ministers and disproportionately benefit well-en-
and under-secretaries of state of the Chahed trenched individuals within the party. Fre-
government of 2017–18 had already served quently, personalities trump content.
as ministers and/or RCD cadres during the The emphasis on charismatic leaders,
Ben Ali period. known in the Maghreb as “zaïmisme”,
It is important to highlight that the means that important decisions are often
various networks with connections to the not negotiated in government and parlia-
old system do not form a common front. ment, but agreed upon informally. This
Rather, they are very diverse cliques whose happened repeatedly between President
interests overlap when it comes to fending Essebsi and the Ennahdha’s president Rachid
off regulations and legislation for more Ghannouchi, who in Tunisian jargon are
transparency, accountability and investiga- revealingly known as “sheikhs”.
tions into their role under authoritarian- Another practice that is particularly
ism. problematic for Tunisia’s democratisation
is the parties’ widespread lack of financial
Practices transparency. According to a January 2019
statement by I-Watch, 96 percent of the over
Among the counter-currents that impede 200 Tunisian parties have so far refused to
the consolidation of Tunisia’s democratisa- submit financial reports or statements. A
tion are long-standing authoritarian reflexes draft law on reforming party financing has
and practices displayed by a wide range of been awaiting adoption since late 2017.
actors beginning with the head of state and The fact that this law has not yet been
reaching far beyond the political sphere passed is in part due to the quest for ‘con-
into society. sensus at all costs’ – often perceived as the
President Essebsi has repeatedly exceeded unofficial political doctrine of the Essebsi-
the powers and jurisdiction of his office. Ghannouchi’s partnership from 2014 to
For instance, when Prime Minister Chahed 2018. Thus, in the interest of maintaining
organised a partial cabinet reshuffle at the consensus, Ennahdha has always been in-
end of 2018, Essebsi initially refused his centivised to tilt towards Nidaa’s prefer-
approval on the grounds that he had not ences. This explains why Ennahdha agreed
been consulted. The new constitution, how- to the law on amnesty for administrative
ever, does not provide for such consultation cadres and the anti-terrorism law, even
with regard to non-strategic ministries, as though both were highly controversial
was the case here. Within this pattern fits among the party’s base. Paradoxically, the
Essebsi’s repeated advocacy for moving consensus principle has thereby also hin-
to a straightforward presidential system. dered the deepening of democracy. Ennah-
Moreover, Essebsi frequently demon- dha here acts on fears of renewed exclusion
strates little respect for democratic pro- – during the Ben Ali period, the party was
cedures within parties. A co-founder of banned, and its members were persecuted.
Nidaa who left the party to become presi- This concern increased with the military
dent, Essebsi has been trying for several coup against the Muslim Brotherhood in
years to make his son chairman of Nidaa Egypt in 2013, and is likely to ensure that
Tounes, against considerable resistance with- Ennahdha continues to seek consensus.
in the party. After Nidaa’s merger with the Authoritarian reflexes are also at work
smaller UPL in 2018, the latter’s head outside politics, as the power structures of
SWP Comment 13
March 2019
5the old regime were not limited to the for- external actors, this systematically gener-
mal political sphere. Highly hierarchical ates a discourse that blurs the boundaries
structures continue to exist within the ad- between democratic and undemocratic
ministrative apparatus, but also in schools action. Worse yet, it creates an atmosphere
and universities. Here, too, overreach and that justifies radical political measures. This
the creation of informal power structures kind of rhetoric is particularly worth noting
by well-networked individuals are also com- as it is closely connected to Tunisia’s politi-
mon in the absence of functioning institu- cal history: the coup that brought Ben Ali
tional supervisory bodies. to power in 1987 was also often justified as
All these practices reduce transparency, preventing a competing coup attempt by
strengthen clientelist and personalised net- Islamists.
works, and make it more difficult to anchor Old rhetorical patterns can also be found
the new democratic ‘rules of the game’ in in the image that Tunisia seeks to convey
society. to an international audience in recent years.
In Ben Ali’s day, Tunisian officials tried to
Rhetoric sell the ‘Singapore model’, i.e. to present
Tunisia as an authoritarian, but well-func-
Another important factor that counteracts tioning, well-governed and economically
‘deep’ democratisation in Tunisia is the successful country. In the immediate years
rhetoric frequently used by Tunisian politi- after 2011, the discourse was dominated
cians at home and abroad to fend off key by the ‘model democracy’ that had slipped
structural reforms. into an economic crisis due to the mistakes
When communicating with the popula- of the Ben Ali regime and the turbulence
tion, many Tunisian decision-makers tend of the revolution. For some years now, how-
to systematically and disproportionately ever, the discourse has changed again.
shift political responsibility and power on- Actors who once held high positions in the
to foreign actors. The United Arab Emirates, Ben Ali era and have returned to hold offi-
France, the European Union, so-called “Is- cial posts are not the only ones to present
lamic State” or the USA are thus commonly 2011 as a contretemps of history, claiming
presented as the actors that are actually that the upheaval caused the country’s
‘pulling the strings’ in domestic political economic, security and governance prob-
disputes. Often occult networks are also lems. In romantic depictions of the Ben Ali
evoked, made up of local actors that are years, democratic successes since 2011 are
‘lacking patriotism’. This not only fuels the rarely mentioned; instead, the country is
widespread tendency towards conspiracy presented as needing to get back on the
theories in both the media and the general track from which it deviated in 2011. It is
population, but also allows political elites worth noting that some of these discourses
to discredit foreign media that report are also adopted by foreign partners whose
critically, as well as independent Tunisian focus has shifted from democratising to
media professionals and non-governmental stabilising Tunisia.
organisations that ‘sully Tunisia’s image’. What unites old rhetorical patterns at
This kind of rhetoric obscures the role of home and abroad is that they treat Tuni-
democratically elected institutions in the sia’s political development and its economy
practice of politics and suggests that these and security situation as separate issues.
institutions are of little political relevance. Economic and security challenges are attri-
Furthermore, it has been striking how buted to external actors and presented as a
frequently leading Tunisian politicians and burden on the political reform process. This
Tunisian media since 2018 have referred is then used to justify the delay and post-
to regular political processes that go against ponement of reforms, often with reference
their interests ‘coup attempts’. Accompa- to failed democratisation processes in
nied by repeated talk of thwarted coups by Algeria or Libya. This rhetorical separation
SWP Comment 13
March 2019
6deliberately conceals the links and net- compared with the early Ben Ali period.
worked relationships between business, The formal political framework is different
security and politics – the very space in – Tunisia’s strong civil society, which has
which the power base of anti-democratic been operating in great freedom for more
networks is located. than eight years now, has no historical
The cumulative effect of this rhetoric, equivalent. In early 2019, the AlBawsala
authoritarian practices and obvious machi- organisation was able to sue the president
nations by anti-democratic networks is an for abuse of power and a breach of the con-
increase of the social, economic and politi- stitution – without fear of the consequences.
cal costs of transition. One of its results The outcome of these legal proceedings is
is the population’s declining confidence still open.
in the capacity of democratic processes to As a result, in early 2019 there is little
create order and social justice. For example, reason to believe that the old system will
only 33.7 percent of registered voters took be re-established. But neither is the consoli-
part in the first free local elections in Tuni- dation of democracy realistic unless the
sia’s history in the spring of 2018. A survey described counter-currents abate – which
conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in does not appear to be happening. For the
2016 showed significantly lower confidence foreseeable future, this raises the prospect
in parliament than in the army or police – of a hybrid system in which democratic
this is unlikely to have changed much since elements and processes are muddled with
then. Parliament is not only under-equipped authoritarian reflexes and sometimes anti-
and over-burdened with the large number democratic measures.
of new laws generated by the transition,
but power struggles within the governing
coalition also have a negative impact on Recommendations for
the speed and quality of parliamentary External Actors
processes and debates.
Against this backdrop, Tunisia’s German
and European partners and the international
Simply Déjà-Vu? donor community have an interest in curb-
ing the counter-currents described above.
Tunisia’s history shows that democratisa- To prevent Tunisia from getting mired in
tion is by no means sure to deepen and a hybrid system, the following measures are
succeed automatically. In the late 1980s, therefore desirable:
shortly after Ben Ali took power, there was ∎ Continue to set political priorities, even
already a brief period of optimism among if the discourse increasingly focuses on
international observers. They particularly the economic and security situation. This
praised elections involving several parties, should include the independence of the
formal commitments to human rights and judiciary and administrative reforms.
social justice, and the use of the consensus ∎ Help defend the freedom to operate for
principle. “The honesty and devotion of watchdog organisations, journalists and
Bourguiba’s successor have brightened the civil-society associations.
mood in Tunisia,” wrote American political ∎ Promote diversity within civil society and
scientist Mark Tessler in 1990, stating that above all in the press, and counter pub-
the country had “made significant progress lic-opinion monopolies by supporting plat-
in its quest for democracy”. forms for critical and minority voices.
Progress was soon followed by regression ∎ In both political and economic coopera-
and the Ben Ali dictatorship. Nevertheless, tion, insist on official channels, rule-
history is unlikely to repeat itself here. The based work, and transparency.
current struggle between democratically- ∎ Critically examine the role of individual
minded and status-quo actors cannot be actors, organisations or state bodies (in-
SWP Comment 13
March 2019
7cluding partners of German foundations)
in Tunisia’s political development and
openly address problematic networks,
practices and rhetoric.
∎ Appeal to political leaders’ sense of
responsibility and ask for reliable evi-
dence when they make serious accusa-
tions, for example of attempted coups.
Conversely, it would be advisable for Tuni-
© Stiftung Wissenschaft sia’s international partners to avoid the fol-
und Politik, 2019 lowing in the interests of greater democra-
All rights reserved tisation:
∎ Rely on non-transparent networks, in-
This Comment reflects
cluding for economic or political cooper-
the authors’ views.
ation, even if they promise short-term
The online version of advantages.
this publication contains ∎ Describe and treat Tunisia’s democrati-
functioning links to other sation as successfully completed.
SWP texts and other relevant
∎ Adopt the prevailing rhetoric uncritically.
sources.
∎ Make unrealistic comparisons for drama
SWP Comments are subject or embellishment – comparisons to
to internal peer review, fact- Libya and Syria, or to European model
checking and copy-editing. democracies are not an appropriate yard-
For further information on stick.
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp- Democratic transitions take time. It was un-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ realistic to expect that Tunisia could be a
quality-management-for- consolidated democracy eight years after
swp-publications/ the revolution. In this respect, the outcome
of this assessment – that the country is
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
tending towards a hybrid system – is not
Politik necessarily a bad one. The crucial point
German Institute for here is that such a hybrid system would
International and probably not be able to carry out the key
Security Affairs reforms which both the international com-
munity and the Tunisian population ex-
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin pect. Reforming the state apparatus and
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 highly corrupt economic structures is im-
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 perative to ensure sustainable social and
www.swp-berlin.org political stability in Tunisia. Preventing
swp@swp-berlin.org
hybrid political structures from becoming
ISSN 1861-1761
entrenched is therefore of critical im-
doi: 10.18449/2019C13 portance.
Translation by Tom Genrich
(English version of
SWP-Aktuell 7/2019)
Max Gallien is a Visiting Fellow and Dr Isabelle Werenfels is a Senior Fellow
in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 13
March 2019
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