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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and
Options
Updated July 29, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32048
SUMMARY
RL32048
Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and
July 29, 2021
Options Kenneth Katzman
U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Specialist in Middle
occasionally flaring into direct conflict while at other times witnessing negotiations or tacit Eastern Affairs
cooperation on selected issues. U.S. officials have consistently identified the regime’s support for
militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and limiting the
expansion of Iran’s nuclear program has been a key U.S. policy goal for nearly two decades.
The Obama Administration engaged Iran directly and obtained a July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement (Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) that exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran’s nuclear program. The accord did
not contain binding curbs on Iran’s missile program or its regional interventions, or any requirements that the Iranian
government improve its human rights practices. The Trump Administration criticized the JCPOA’s perceived shortcomings
and, returning to prior policies of seeking to weaken Iran strategically, on May 8, 2018, it ceased implementing U.S.
commitments under the JCPOA and reimposed all U.S. sanctions. The stated intent of the Trump Administration’s
“maximum pressure” policy on Iran was to compel it change its behavior, including negotiating a new nuclear agreement that
encompassed the broad range of U.S. concerns. Iran responded by exceeding nuclear limits set by the JCPOA and by
attacking Saudi Arabia as well as commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, and supporting attacks by its allies in Iraq and
Yemen on U.S., Saudi, and other targets in the region.
The Biden Administration has again shifted U.S, policy toward Iran, moving closer to that pursued during the Obama
Administration. The Biden Administration has engaged in talks with Iran to restore full implementation of the JCPOA by
both Iran and the United States, including offering the lifting of those U.S. sanctions that are “inconsistent with the JCPOA.”
Yet, the Administration has dealt with repeated Iranian challenges in the form of enriching uranium to higher levels of purity
and attacks on U.S. forces in both Iraq and Syria by Iran-backed militias. On at least two occasions, the Administration has
conducted air strikes on these militias in response to attacks on U.S forces and installations. The Administration has
continued to enforce all U.S. sanctions on Iran throughout the talks with Iran.
There Biden Administration also has sought to navigate changes in Iranian policy that are the product of shifting politics
inside Iran. Hassan Rouhani, who sought to improve Iran’s relations with the West, including the United States, won
successive presidential elections in 2013 and 2017. Reformist and moderate candidates won overwhelmingly in concurrent
municipal council elections in all the major cities. However, the killing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps –Qods
Force commander (IRGC –QF) Qasem Soleimani by a U.S. strike in January 2020 contributed to a significant victory by
hardliners in the February 21, 2020, Majles (parliamentary) elections. And, the June 18, 2021 election in Iran saw the election
of Ibrahim Raisi, a hardline disciple of the Supreme Leader. He is to be inaugurated on August 4. Hardliners also continue to
control the state institutions that maintain internal security largely through suppression and they continue to advocate that
Iran insist on significant U.S. concessions, including the lifting of all U.S. sanctions, including those specified in the JCPOA,
and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report
RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth
Katzman; and CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J.
McInnis, and Clayton Thomas.
Congressional Research ServiceIran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
Contents
Political History............................................................................................................................... 1
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition ................................................................................... 2
Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of
Guardians, and Expediency Council ...................................................................................... 4
The Supreme Leader ........................................................................................................... 4
Council of Guardians .......................................................................................................... 4
Expediency Council ............................................................................................................ 5
Domestic Security Organs .................................................................................................. 5
Elected Institutions/Recent Elections ........................................................................................ 7
The Presidency .................................................................................................................... 7
The Majles .......................................................................................................................... 7
The Assembly of Experts .................................................................................................... 8
Previous Elections ..................................................................................................................... 8
Disputed 2009 Election ....................................................................................................... 8
Rouhani’s Election Wins and Presidency ........................................................................... 9
Periodic Unrest Challenges the Regime............................................................................ 12
Human Rights Practices ................................................................................................................ 14
U.S.-Iran Relations, U.S. Policy, and Options ............................................................................... 17
Reagan Administration: Iran Placed on Terrorism List ........................................................... 18
George H. W. Bush Administration: “Goodwill Begets Goodwill” ........................................ 18
Clinton Administration: “Dual Containment” ......................................................................... 18
George W. Bush Administration: Iran Part of “Axis of Evil” ................................................. 19
Obama Administration: Pressure, Engagement, and the JCPOA ............................................ 19
Trump Administration: JCPOA Exit and “Maximum Pressure” ............................................. 21
Withdrawal from the JCPOA and Subsequent Pressure Efforts........................................ 21
Biden Administration: Resumption of Nuclear Talks ............................................................. 23
Policy Elements and Options......................................................................................................... 26
Engagement and Improved Bilateral Relations ....................................................................... 26
Military Action ........................................................................................................................ 26
Economic Sanctions ................................................................................................................ 28
Regime Change ....................................................................................................................... 29
Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts ....................................................... 31
Figures
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government.............................................................................. 38
Figure 2. Map of Iran .................................................................................................................... 39
Tables
Table 1. Major Pro-Regime Institutions and Factions ..................................................................... 5
Table 2. Human Rights Practices: General Categories .................................................................. 16
Table 3. Summary of U.S. Sanctions Against Iran ........................................................................ 28
Table 4. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding ............................................................................... 33
Congressional Research ServiceIran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 39 Congressional Research Service
Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Political History Iran is a country of nearly 80 million people, located in the heart of the Persian Gulf region. The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty, which had ruled since 1794. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajar dynasty had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajar dynasty to form Iran’s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and dynasties whose reach shrank steadily over time. After the 16th century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shia Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which ended a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests. During the Cold War, the United States viewed the Shah as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in 1949 elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as prime minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States opposed his drive to nationalize the oil industry, which had been controlled since 1913 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. His followers began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss him, and the Shah fled. The Shah was restored to power in a CIA-supported uprising that toppled Mossadeq (“Operation Ajax”) on August 19, 1953. The Shah tried to modernize Iran, but in so doing he alienated the Shia clergy and religious Iranians. He incurred broader resentment by using his SAVAK intelligence service to repress dissent. The Shah exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition to what he asserted were the Shah’s anticlerical policies and forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shia theological center. In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders that temporarily ended mutual hostile actions, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, where he continued to agitate for revolution that would establish Islamic government in Iran. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini and other anti- government forces caused the Shah’s government to collapse. Khomeini returned from France on February 1, 1979, and, on February 11, 1979, he declared an Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent, or “Supreme Leader”) was enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and amended in 1989). The constitution provided for the post of Supreme Leader of the Revolution. The regime based itself on strong opposition to Western influence, and relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned openly hostile after the November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its U.S. diplomats by pro-Khomeini radicals, which began Congressional Research Service 1
Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options the so-called hostage crisis that ended in January 1981 with the release of the hostages. Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was succeeded by Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i. The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the prime minister’s office that killed several senior elected and clerical leaders, including then-Prime Minister Javad Bahonar, elected President Ali Raja’i, and IRP head and top Khomeini disciple Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Beheshti. The regime used these events, along with the hostage crisis with the United States, to justify purging many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities that had been prominent in the years just after the revolution. Examples included the regime’s first Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan; the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party (Communist); the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI, see below); and the first elected president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr. The regime was under economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, in part due to the destruction of its oil export capacity and its need to ration goods. Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition The structure of authority in Iran defies easy categorization. Iran’s constitution—adopted in public referenda in late 1979 and again in 1989—assigns paramount decision making authority for a “Supreme Leader” (known in Iran as “Leader of the Revolution”). However, choosing the successor to the Supreme Leader is the duty of an elected body called the Assembly of Experts. A President and the Majles (unicameral parliament) are directly elected, and since 2013, there have been elections for municipal councils that select mayors and set local development priorities. Throughout Iran’s power structure, there are disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those considered more pragmatic. Nonetheless, the preponderant political power wielded by the Shia Islamic clergy and the security apparatus has contributed to the eruption of repeated periodic unrest from intellectuals, students, labor groups, the poor, women, and members of Iran’s minority groups. (Iran’s demographics are depicted in a text box below.) U.S. officials in successive Administrations have accused Iran’s regime of widespread corruption, both within the government and among its pillars of support. In a speech on Iran on July 22, 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo characterized Iran’s government as “something that resembles the mafia more than a government.”1 He detailed allegations of the abuse of privileges enjoyed by Iran’s leaders and supporting elites to enrich themselves and their supporters at the expense of the public good. The State Department’s “Outlaw Regime” report on Iran, first released in 2018 and updated in 2020, cite widespread corruption and mismanagement at the highest levels of the Iranian regime “have produced years of environmental exploitation and degradation, with tragic results for the Iranian people.”2 Biden Administration officials have criticized Iran’s human rights abuses while insisting that the issue would not, at least for now, derail U.S. efforts to reach agreement with Iran on a return to the JCPOA. 1 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. “Supporting Iranian Voices.” Reagan Library, July 22, 2018. 2 Department of State. “Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive Activities, 2020.” September 19, 2020 Congressional Research Service 2
Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
Supreme Leader:
Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i
Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from the northern city of Mashhad. Was jailed by the Shah of
Iran for supporting Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution. After the regime took power in 1979, helped organize
Revolutionary Guard and other security organs. Lost some use of right arm in purported assassination
attempt in June 1981. Was elected president in 1981 and served until 1989. Was selected Khomeini’s
successor in June 1989. Upon that selection, Khamene’i’s religious ranking was advanced in official organs to
“Grand Ayatollah” from the lower-ranking “Hojjat ol-Islam.” He lacks the undisputed authority Khomeini
had, and competes with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani of Iraq and other Shia clerics for the role of marja taqlid
(“source of inspiration”)—the leading Shia figure who holds the allegiance of millions of Shias regionwide and
worldwide. As to Khamene’i’s health situation, the government acknowledged that he underwent prostate
surgery in September 2014, but he has since appeared in public regularly. Reports in late 2020 that he has
suffered health setbacks have not been widely corroborated. Has not traveled outside Iran since becoming
Supreme Leader. Lives in the Pasteur district of Tehran. He and his wife have four sons and two daughters.
Policies
Khamene’i sets overall policy direction, particularly on regional and national security issues, but tends to
allow elected presidents to pursue policy initiatives that they assert advances Iran’s interests, for example the
JCPOA. Throughout career, has consistently taken hardline stances on regional issues, particularly toward
Israel, repeatedly calling it a “cancerous tumor” that needs to be excised from the region. In March 2014,
publicly questioned whether the Holocaust occurred. He is widely believed to fear direct military
confrontation with United States on Iranian soil. He meets with few Western officials and is avowedly
suspicious of relations with the West, particularly the United States, as potentially making Iran vulnerable to
Western cultural influence, spying, acts of sabotage and assassination, and regime destabilization efforts.
Largely bowing to public opinion, Khamene’i acquiesced to the election in 2013 of the relatively moderate
President Hassan Rouhani. In 2019, following the Trump Administration exit from the JCPOA, he directly
criticized President Hassan Rouhani for expecting the United States to uphold the JCPOA long term.
Earlier, he reputedly issued religious proclamation (2003) against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and has
publicly (2012) called doing so a “sin.” He fully backs efforts by the IRGC to support regional pro-Iranian
movements and governments. Earlier in his career, Khamene’i tended to support the business community
(bazaaris), and opposed state control of the economy, but as Supreme Leader he has promoted the need to
develop a self-sufficient economy that can withstand the effects of international sanctions (“resistance
economy”). Attributed late 2017-early 2018 unrest to meddling by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel,
but also acknowledged that protesters had legitimate grievances.
Khamene’i’s office is run by Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, with significant input from Khamene’i’s
second and increasingly influential son, Mojtaba. Khamene’i is advised formally by the Expediency Council, and
informally by Keyhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari and numerous other current and former officials, clerics,
and other notables. Mojtaba was sanctioned by the Trump Administration in November 2019.
Sources: various press. Photograph from http://www.leader.ir.
Congressional Research Service 3Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, and Expediency Council Iran’s power structure consists of unelected or indirectly elected persons and institutions. The Supreme Leader At the apex of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is the “Supreme Leader.” He is chosen by an elected body—the Assembly of Experts—which also has the constitutional power to remove him, as well as to redraft Iran’s constitution (see below). A revised constitution is to be submitted for approval in a national referendum. The Supreme Leader is required to be a senior Shia cleric. Upon Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the Assembly selected one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, as Supreme Leader.3 Although he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed political or religious authority, the powers of the office ensure that Khamene’i is Iran’s paramount leader. Under the constitution, the Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, giving him the power to appoint commanders. The Supreme Leader can remove an elected president, if the judiciary or the Majles (parliament) assert cause for removal. The Supreme Leader appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians, all members of the Expediency Council, the head of the judiciary, and five out of the nine members of the country’s highest national security body, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which includes the heads of the regime’s top military, foreign policy, and domestic security organizations. Senior IRGC leader and former Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani, who espouses more moderate views than his IRGC peers, has headed it since September 2013.4 Succession to Khamene’i There is no designated successor or immediately obvious choice to succeed Khamene’i. The Assembly of Experts could conceivably use a constitutional provision to set up a three-person leadership council as successor rather than select one new Supreme Leader. Khamene’i reportedly favors Hojjat ol-Eslam Ibrahim Raisi, whom he appointed in March 2019 as head of the judiciary, and in 2016 to head the powerful Shrine of Imam Reza (Astan-e Qods Razavi) in Mashhad, which controls vast property and many businesses in the province. Raisi has served as state prosecutor and was allegedly involved in the 1988 massacre of prisoners and other acts of repression.5 Raisi lost the May 2017 presidential election to Rouhani, but his win in the 2021 presidential election presumably has improved his chances to become Iran’s top leader. Raisi’s predecessor as judiciary chief, Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani,6 remains a succession candidate. Another widely mentioned contender is hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi. Council of Guardians The 12-member Council of Guardians (COG) consists of six Islamic jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader and six lawyers selected by the judiciary and confirmed by the Majles. Each 3 At the time of his selection as Supreme Leader, Khamene’i was generally referred to at the rank of Hojjat ol-Islam, one rank below Ayatollah, suggesting his religious elevation was political rather than through traditional mechanisms. 4 Shamkhani was sanctioned by the Administration in January 2020 as part of the Supreme Leader’s office. See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. 5 “Iran cleric linked to 1988 mass executions to lead judiciary.” Associated Press, March 7, 2019. 6 Larijani was sanctioned by the Trump Administration in 2019. Congressional Research Service 4
Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
councilor serves a six-year term, staggered such that half the body turns over every three years.
Currently headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who is over 90 years of age, the conservative-
controlled body reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law. It also vets election
candidates by evaluating their backgrounds according to constitutional requirements that each
candidate demonstrate knowledge of Islam, loyalty to the Islamic system of government, and
other criteria that are largely subjective. The COG also certifies election results. Municipal
council candidates are vetted not by the COG but by local committees established by the Majles.
Expediency Council
The Expediency Council was established in 1988 to resolve legislative disagreements between the
Majles and the COG. It has since evolved primarily into a policy advisory body for the Supreme
Leader. Its members serve five-year terms, assisted by researchers and experts who help develop
policy options. Longtime regime stalwart Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani served as the
body’s chairman until his January 2017 death. In August 2017, the Supreme Leader expanded the
council from 42 to 45 members, and former judiciary head Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi
Shahroudi became chairman. Shahroudi passed away in December 2018 and Sadeq Larijani, who
was then head of the judiciary, was appointed by the Supreme Leader as his replacement. Iran’s
president and speaker of Majles attend the body’s sessions in their official capacities.
Table 1. Major Pro-Regime Institutions and Factions
Regime/Pro-regime
The regime derives support from a network of organizations and institutions such as those discussed below.
Senior Shia The most senior Shia clerics, most of whom are in Qom, are generally “quietists”—they
Clerics/Grand assert that the senior clergy should generally refrain from involvement in politics, although
Ayatollahs they do speak out on political issues. The ranks of the most senior clergy include Grand
Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei. Secretary of State
Pompeo accused Shirazi in a July 22, 2018, speech of enriching himself through illicit trading
of sugar. Another senior cleric is the hardline Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, who
represents the “vocal” school of the senior clergy and is an assertive defender of the powers
of the Supreme Leader. He lost his Assembly of Experts seat in February 2016 elections.
Religious Iran has several major parastatal religious foundations, called “bonyads.” Examples include the
Foundations Martyr’s Foundation, the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled, the Astan Qods Razavi
(“Bonyads”) Foundation (linked to the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad), and the Fifteen Khordad
Foundation (which offers a bounty for implementing Khomeini’s order that Satanic Verses
author Salman Rushdie be killed). The bonyads, run by clerics, former IRGC officials, and
other hardliners, control vast amounts of property and valuable businesses, some of which
were built from assets left behind when the Shah and his allies fled Iran in 1979. The bonyads
are loosely regulated, politically influential, and largely exempt from taxation – an exemption
that often causes unrest and protest of privileges enjoyed by regime insiders.
Society of Longtime organization of moderate-to-hardline clerics. Its Secretary-General is Ayatollah
Militant Clerics Mohammad Ali Movahedi-Kermani. Former President Rouhani is a member.
Sources: Various press accounts and author conversations with Iran experts in and outside Washington, DC.
The IRGC is discussed extensively in CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth
Katzman. See also CRS Insight IN11093, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Named a Terrorist Organization, by Kenneth
Katzman.
Domestic Security Organs
The leaders and senior officials of a variety of overlapping domestic security organizations are
largely under the direct control of the Supreme Leader in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of
Congressional Research Service 5Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
the Armed Forces. State Department and other human rights reports on Iran repeatedly assert that
internal security personnel are not held accountable for human rights abuses. Several security
organizations and their senior leaders are sanctioned by the United States for human rights abuses
and other violations of U.S. Executive Orders.7
The domestic security organs include the following:
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is a military and
internal security force, and an instrument of Iran’s regional policy. The IRGC is
sanctioned under several U.S. Executive orders, including E.O. 13224 that
sanctions entities determined to be supporting acts of international terrorism. On
April 8, 2019, the IRGC was also designated as a foreign terrorist organization
(FTO), a designation that has not previously been applied to a military
organization of any country. In April 2019, the Supreme Leader replaced IRGC
commander-in-chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari with his deputy, Major
General Hossein Salami. The IRGC-Qods Force is the unit of the IRGC that
operates outside Iran to support pro-Iranian movements and governments.
The Basij. The IRGC‘s domestic security role is implemented primarily through
its volunteer militia force called the Basij. To suppress large and violent
antigovernment demonstrations, the Basij gets backing from the IRGC, whose
bases are located mostly in urban areas. In July 2019, Khamene’i replaced
appointed a new Basij commander, Gholamreza Soleimani, who was sanctioned
by the Administration in January 2020 and who is not related to the late IRGC-
QF commander Qasem Soleimani. The Basij is widely accused of arresting
women who violate the regime’s public dress codes and raiding Western-style
parties that serve alcohol, which is illegal in Iran.
Law Enforcement Forces. The Law Enforcement Forces is an amalgam of
regular police, gendarmerie, and riot police that serve throughout the country.
These forces generally are tasked with containing non-violent demonstrations or
unrest.
Ministry of Interior. The ministry exercises civilian supervision of Iran’s police
and domestic security forces. The IRGC and Basij do not report to the ministry.
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The MOIS conducts domestic
surveillance to identify regime opponents. It also surveils anti-regime activists
abroad through its network of agents placed in Iran’s embassies. It works closely
with IRGC-Qods Force agents outside Iran, although the two institutions
sometimes differ in their approaches, as has been reportedly the case in deciding
on which politicians to support in Iraq.8
7These persons and entities are listed in: CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
8“Leaked Iranian intelligence reports illustrate the folly of the US’s Middle East strategy.” The Strategist, November
20, 2019.
Congressional Research Service 6Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Elected Institutions/Recent Elections Several major institutional positions are directly elected by the population, but international observers question the credibility of Iran’s elections because of the role of the COG in vetting candidates and limiting the size and ideological diversity of the candidate field. Women can vote and run for most offices, but the COG has consistently interpreted the Iranian constitution as prohibiting women from running for president. Candidates must receive more than 50% of the vote to avoid a runoff that is usually held several weeks later. Another criticism of the political process is the relative absence of political parties. Establishing a party requires the permission of the Interior Ministry (per Article 10 of Iran’s constitution), but the standards to obtain approval are high. Since the regime was founded, numerous groups have filed for permission to operate as parties, but only a few—considered loyal to the regime—have been granted licenses to operate. Some have been licensed and then banned after their leaders opposed regime policies, such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front and Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, discussed in the text box below. The Presidency The top directly elected institution is the presidency. The office is formally and in practice subordinate to the Supreme Leader, and virtually every president has tried but failed to expand his authority. Presidential authority, particularly on matters of national security, is circumscribed by key clerics and the IRGC, but the president has somewhat more autonomy on economic policymaking. The president appoints and supervises the cabinet, develops the budgets of cabinet departments, and imposes and collects taxes on corporations and other bodies. The presidency also runs oversight bodies such as the Anticorruption Headquarters and the General Inspection Organization, to which government officials are required to submit annual financial disclosures, and oversees the various official pension funds and government-run social services agencies. Prior to 1989, Iran had both an elected president and a prime minister selected by the elected Majles (parliament). However, the holders of the two positions were constantly in institutional conflict and a 1989 constitutional revision eliminated the prime ministership. Khamene’i has periodically raised the possibility of eliminating the post of president and restoring the post of prime minister. The Majles Iran’s Majles, or parliament, is a 290-seat, all-elected, unicameral body. There are five reserved seats for “recognized” minority communities—Jew, Zoroastrian, and Christian (three seats). The Majles votes on each nominee to a cabinet post, and drafts and acts on legislation. Among its main duties is to consider and enact a proposed national budget (which runs from March 21 to March 20 each year, coinciding with Nowruz, the Persian New Year), and it often legislates on domestic social issues. It tends to defer to executive and security institutions on defense and foreign policy issues, frequently passing non-binding resolutions supporting regime criticism of the United States and other Iran adversaries. It is constitutionally required to ratify major international agreements, and it ratified the JCPOA in October 2015. Women regularly run and some generally are elected, and there is no quota for the number of women. Majles elections occur every four years, in the year prior to the presidential elections. Congressional Research Service 7
Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options The Assembly of Experts A major but little publicized elected institution is the 88-seat Assembly of Experts. Akin to a standing electoral college, it is empowered to choose a new Supreme Leader upon the death of the incumbent, and it formally - although not necessarily in practice - oversees the work of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly can replace him if necessary, although invoking that power would most likely occur only in the event of a severe health crisis. The Assembly is also empowered to draft amendments to the constitution. It generally meets two times a year. Elections to the Assembly are held every 8-10 years, conducted on a provincial basis. Assembly candidates must be able to interpret Islamic law. The aging chairman, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, died in 2014. His successor, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, lost his seat in the Assembly of Experts election on February 26, 2016 (held concurrently with the Majles elections), and COG Chairman Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati was appointed concurrently as the assembly chairman in May 2016. Previous Elections Following the presidency of regime stalwart Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani during 1989-1997, a reformist, Mohammad Khatemi, won landslide victories in 1997 and 2001. However, hardliners marginalized him by the end of his term in 2005. Aided by widespread voiding of reformist candidacies by the COG, conservatives won a slim majority of the 290 Majles seats in the February 20, 2004, elections. In June 2005, the COG allowed eight candidates to compete (out of more than 1,000 who filed candidacies), including Rafsanjani,9 Ali Larijani, IRGC stalwart Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With reported tacit backing from Khamene’i, Ahmadinejad advanced to a runoff against Rafsanjani and then won by a 62% to 36% vote. Splits later erupted among hardliners, and pro-Ahmadinejad and pro- Khamene’i candidates competed against each other in the March 2008 Majles elections. Disputed 2009 Election Reformists sought to unseat Ahmadinejad in the June 12, 2009, presidential election by rallying to Mir Hossein Musavi, who served as prime minister during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and, to a lesser extent, former Majles speaker Mehdi Karrubi. The Interior Ministry pronounced Ahmadinejad the winner (63% of the vote) two hours after the polls closed, prompting Musavi supporters (who was announced as receiving 35% of the vote) to protest the results as fraudulent. Some outside analysts said the results tracked pre-election polls.10 Large antigovernment demonstrations occurred June 13-19, 2009. According to opposition groups, security forces killed over 100 protesters (the Iranian government figure was 27), including a 19-year-old woman, Neda Soltani, who became an icon of the uprising, which congealed into the “Green Movement of Hope and Change.” Some protests in December 2009 overwhelmed regime security forces in some parts of Tehran, but the movement’s activity declined after the regime successfully suppressed its demonstration on the February 11, 2010, anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic. As unrest ebbed, a rift opened between Ahmadinejad and Khamene’i. In the March 2012 Majles elections, candidates supported by Khamene’i won 75% of the seats, weakening 9 Rafsanjani was constitutionally permitted to run because a third term would not have been consecutive with his previous two terms. In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates. 10 A paper published by Chatham House and the University of St. Andrews strongly questions how Ahmadinejad’s vote could have been as large as reported by official results, in light of past voting patterns throughout Iran. “Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election,” http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk. Congressional Research Service 8
Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
Ahmadinejad. Since leaving office in 2013, and despite being appointed by Khamene’i to the
Expediency Council, Ahmadinejad has emerged as a regime critic meanwhile also returning to his
prior work as a professor of civil engineering.
Reformist Leaders and Organizations
The figures discussed below are widely termed “reformists” – they seek political freedoms but do not advocate
replacement of the regime. Since the 2009 Green Movement uprising, the senior reformist leaders have apparently
have been displaced by younger, anti-regime activists skilled in the use of social media. Yet, the suppression of
reformist leaders and organizations remains a key rallying point for the broader opposition to the regime. The
persons below are a small sample of political opponents; the State Department’s 2020 “Outlaw Regime” report
says that there are more than 800 prisoners of conscience detained in Iran.
Mir Hossein Musavi is the titular leader of the Green Movement, the coalition of youth and intellectuals that led
the 2009-2010 uprising. A noncleric and former Khomeini aide, Musavi served as foreign minister in 1980 and as
Iran’s last prime minister from 1981 to 1989, at which time constitutional reforms abolished the post. An advocate
of state-controlled economy, as prime minister, Musavi often feuded with Khamene’i, who was president at that
time. He was arrested in 2011 for sedition and he and his wife, activist Zahra Rahnevard, remain under house
arrest. Khamene’i has termed Musavi and Karrubi (below) as “seditionists” and insists that they remain confined.
Mehdi Karrubi is an Iranian cleric, former Majles Speaker (1989-1992, 2000-2004), and supporter of the Green
Movement. Failed presidential campaigns in 2005 and 2009 led Karrubi to question the elections’ validity and to
support runner-up Mir Hossein Musavi’s dispute over the election in 2009. Imprisoned in the 1970s for protesting
the government of Mohammad Reza Shah, Karrubi became a leading politician of the Islamic left following the 1979
revolution. Karrubi shares Musavi’s political views on the need for state-controlled economy and civil rights for
women. In 2014, Karrubi was moved from a detention facility to house arrest. In August 2017, Karrubi challenged
the regime by going on a hunger strike to demand a formal trial and a withdrawal of security forces from his
home. Security forces left but remain outside his home to control visits. He reportedly is in poor health.
Pro-reformist Organizations
The reformists are supported by several long-standing factions that once supported the regime but fell out with
hardliners and have become vocal regime critics.
National Trust (Etemad-e-Melli). Opposition grouping formed by Karrubi after his defeat in the 2005 election. Some
of its leaders, such as Hengameh Shahidi, have been arrested and harassed by authorities.
Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF). The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping, but in 2009 lost
political ground to Green Movement groups. IIPF leaders include Mohammed Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza
Khatemi (deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 2009 election,
and several IIPF leaders detained and prosecuted in postelection dispute. The party was outlawed in 2010.
Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIR). Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support
state control of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of rules on social behavior. A
major constituency of the reformist camp. Its leader is former Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who
supported Musavi in 2009 election and has been incarcerated for most of the time since June 2009. The
organization was outlawed by the regime simultaneously with the outlawing of the IIPF, above.
Combatant Clerics Association. The group was formed in 1988 and its name is similar to the Society of Militant
Clerics, but the group is run by reformists. Leading figures include former president Mohammad Khatemi.
Rouhani’s Election Wins and Presidency
In the June 14, 2013, presidential elections, held concurrently with municipal elections, the major
candidates included the following:
Several hardliners that included Qalibaf (see above); Khamene’i foreign policy
advisor Velayati; and then-chief nuclear negotiator Seyed Jalilli.
Former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and Rafsanjani ally.
The COG denied Rafsanjani’s candidacy, which shocked many Iranians because of Rafsanjani’s
prominence, as well as that of prominent Ahmadinejad ally, Esfandiar Rahim Masha’i.
Congressional Research Service 9Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
Green Movement supporters, who were expected to boycott the vote, mobilized behind Rouhani
after regime officials stressed that they were committed to a fair election. The vote produced a
70% turnout and a first-round victory for Rouhani, garnering about 50.7% of the 36 million votes
cast. Hardliners generally garnered control of municipal councils in the major cities. Rouhani’s
first term cabinet contained a mixture of hardliners and moderates, including the moderates
Mohammad Javad Zarif, a former Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, appointed
concurrently as foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator, and Bijan Zanganeh, returning as
Oil Minister. Zanganeh replaced Rostam Qasemi, who was associated with the corporate arm of
the IRGC. The notable hardliners included Defense Minister Hosein Dehgan, an IRGC stalwart
and early organizer of the IRGC’s Lebanon contingent that eventually composed a significant
component of the IRGC-Qods Force.11 Another hardliner was Justice Minister Mostafa Pour-
Mohammadi who, as deputy intelligence minister in late 1980s, reportedly was a decisionmaker
in the 1988 mass executions of Iranian prisoners.
Majles and Assembly of Experts Elections in 2016
On February 26, 2016, Iran held concurrent elections for the Majles and for the Assembly of
Experts. The CoG approved 6,200 Majles candidates, including 586 female candidates, and
invalidated about 6,000, including all but 100 reformists. Pro-Rouhani candidates won nearly half
the seats, and the number of avowed hardliners in the body was reduced significantly.
Independents won about 50 seats. Seventeen women were elected—the largest number since the
revolution. The body reelected Ali Larijani as Speaker.
For the Assembly of Experts election, 161 candidates were approved out of 800 who applied to
run. Reformists and pro-Rouhani candidates defeated two prominent hardliners—the incumbent
Assembly Chairman Mohammad Yazdi and Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. COG
head Ayatollah Jannati retained his seat, but came in last for the 30 seats elected from Tehran
Province. He was subsequently named chairman of the body.
Presidential Election of May 19, 2017
In the May 19, 2017 election, Rouhani won re-election with about 57% of the vote. He defeated a
major figure, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ibrahim Raisi, a close ally of Khamene’i, even though other
hardliners dropped out of the race to improve Raisi’s prospects.
Municipal elections were held concurrently. After vetting by local committees established by the
Majles, about 260,000 candidates competed for about 127,000 seats nationwide. More than 6% of
the candidates were women. The alliance of reformists and moderate-conservatives won control
of the municipal councils of Iran’s largest cities, including all 21 seats on the Tehran municipal
council.
Rouhani’s second term cabinet nominations retained most of the same officials in key posts,
including Zarif as Foreign Minister. In February 2019, after being excluded from a leadership
meeting with visiting President Bashar Al Asad of Syria, Zarif announced his resignation.
Rouhani did not accept the resignation and Zarif stayed on. Key changes to the second-term
cabinet include the following:
Minister of Justice Seyed Alireza Avayee replaced Pour-Mohammadi. Formerly a
state prosecutor, Avayee oversaw trials of protesters in the 2009 uprising and is
subject to EU travel ban and asset freeze.
11 See: Katzman, Kenneth. “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.” Westview Press, 1993.
Congressional Research Service 10Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
Defense Minister Amir Hatami became the first non-IRGC Defense Minister in
more than 20 years and the first regular military (Artesh) officer in that position.
The cabinet had two female vice presidents, and one other woman as a member
of the cabinet (but not heading any ministry).
Majles Elections on February 21, 2020
The latest Majles elections were held on February 21, 2020. The 2018 U.S. exit from the Iran
nuclear deal and the outpouring of public grieving for the U.S. killing of IRGC-Qods Force
commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 appeared to shift public support toward hardliners.
During December 2019, about 15,000 candidates filed candidacies for the 290 Majles seats. The
COG disqualified nearly half, including 90 incumbents that were mostly professed moderates or
reformists. Among the reformists not allowed to run was Rouhani’s son-in-law Kambiz
Mehdizadeh.12 The turnout was about 42%, lower than in most recent Iranian elections, and
hardliners won an overwhelming 230 of the 290 seats, including sweeping Tehran’s 30 seats in
the body.13 The hardliner victory contributed to the IRGC stalwart and former Tehran mayor
Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf’s selection as Speaker when the body convened on May 28, 2020.
Presidential Election of June 2021
The most recent presidential elections, in which Rouhani was not eligible to run again, was held
on June 18, 2021. The CoG excluded from the race moderate conservative Ali Larijani, and pro-
reform First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri - the two most significant potential challengers to
Khamene’i protégé and judiciary chief Ibrahim Raisi. With those exclusions, the election
unfolded as expected, with the overwhelming vote for Raisi, a mid-ranking Shia cleric, in a low-
turnout election. He won almost 18 million of the nearly 29 million ballots cast, according to
Iran’s Interior Minister. However, many reform-minded Iranians refused to take part in an
election widely seen as a foregone conclusion; turnout was 49% - the lowest since the
establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. The small vote for the only reformist candidate
allowed to run – outgoing Central Bank governor Abdolnaser Hemmati – reflected that boycott.
President-Elect Ebrahim Raisi
Ebrahim Raisi was born in 1960 to a cleric in the home of the country’s holiest Shia Muslim shrine in Mashad and
attended seminary at the age of 15. After the revolution, he joined the judiciary as a prosecutor and was trained
by Ayatollah Khamenei. In that role, he served as one of four judges who adjudicated secret tribunals in 1988 (also
known as “death commissions”), allegedly responsible for an estimated 5,000 executions of political activists and
leftist prisoners.
Raisi has long been seen as Khamenei’s successor, and has risen through the ranks of Iran’s key institutions. In
2016, Raisi was named custodian of one of Iran’s most important and wealthiest religious foundations, the Astan-e
12 US Institute of Peace. Iran Primer. “Iran’s 2020 Parliamentary Elections.” February 3, 2020.
13 “Factbox: The outcome of Iran’s 2020 parliamentary elections.” Atlantic Council, February 26, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 11Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
Quds-e Razavi, which manages the large Shia shrine in Mashad and has assets reportedly worth $15 billion. He
then competed in the 2017 presidential elections, coming in second to Hassan Rouhani with 38% of the vote. Two
years later, Ayatollah Khamenei named Raisi as head of the judiciary, and shortly thereafter Raisi was elected as
deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the body responsible for electing the next Supreme Leader. As
judiciary chief, he has reduced death sentences and executions for drug-related offenses).
Raisi campaigned on a platform of job creation and anti-corruption, and won 62% of the vote in the 2021 election,
with turnout at just under 49% (a record low since the 1979 revolution). Roughly 3.7 million Iranians turned in
blank or protest ballots. Polling stations in Tehran had particularly low turnout (34%). Raisi will become the first
Iranian president to be sanctioned by the U.S. before entering office: President Trump sanctioned Raisi in 2019 for
human rights abuses committed against protesters during the Green Movement that followed the 2009 election.
Raisi is married and has two adult daughters.
Photograph: Maryam Kamyab/Mehr News Agency. Licensed CC BY 4.0,
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en.
Periodic Unrest Challenges the Regime14
The regime has faced periodic flare-ups of significant unrest. In December 2017, protests erupted
in more than 80 cities, mostly based on economic conditions but perhaps also reflecting
opposition to Iran’s leadership and the expenditure of resources on interventions throughout the
Middle East. The government defused the unrest by coupling acknowledgment of the legitimacy
of some demonstrator grievances with use of repressive force and a shutdown of access to social
media sites such as the messaging system called “Telegram.”15 Iranian official media reported that
25 were killed and nearly 4,000 were arrested during that unrest. In mid-2018, possibly to try to
divert blame for Iran’s economic situation, the regime established special “anti-corruption courts”
that have, in some cases, imposed the death penalty on businessmen accused of taking advantage
of reimposed sanctions for personal profit.16
During 2018-19, small protests and other acts of defiance took place, including shop closures in
the Tehran bazaar in July 2018 and protests by some women against the strict public dress code.
Workers in various industries, including trucking and teaching, conducted strikes to demand
higher wages to help cope with rising prices. In early 2019, protests took place in southwestern
Iran in response to the government’s missteps in dealing with the effects of significant flooding in
that area. The regime tasked the leadership of the relief efforts to the IRGC and IRGC-QF,
working with Iraqi Shia militias who are powerful on the Iraqi side of the border.
In November 2019, significant unrest flared again after the government announced an immediate
reduction in subsidies for the price of gasoline. Prices rose 50% for amounts up to 15 gallons per
month, and 300% (to about $1 per gallon) for amounts purchased beyond that amount. The
government explained the subsidy reduction as a consensus government decision that was
necessary in order to increase cash transfers to the poorest 75% of the population. In response to
the unrest, the government allowed peaceful protests, used repression against violent acts, and
shut down access to the internet and social media. As he has done in past periods of unrest,
Supreme Leader Khamene’i blamed the protests on agitation by foreign powers and on exiled
opposition groups. He also stated that dissatisfaction over the fuel price hikes was
14 The following information is derived from a wide range of press reporting in major newspapers and websites. Some
Iranian activist sources report wide variations in protest sizes, cities involved, numbers killed or arrested, and other
figures. CRS has no way to corroborate exact numbers cited.
15 National Council of Resistance, “Khamene’i’s Belated Confession to Injustice and Inability to Reform, a Desperate
Attempt to Escape Overthrow,” February 19, 2018.
16 Erin Cunningham. “In Iran, Graft Can Lead to the Gallows.” Washington Post, December 1, 2018.
Congressional Research Service 12Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options “understandable.” On November 20, 2019, President Rouhani stated that the unrest had been put down. Amnesty International asserted that over 300 protesters had been killed by security forces, and thousands arrested.17 The Iranian government asserted the figure was “fabricated.” U.S. officials concluded in January 2020 that security forces had killed 1,500 protesters in the unrest.18 In the aftermath of the unrest, the State Department solicited Iranians to send photos and other information to the State Department documenting the Iranian crackdown and any other instances of regime human rights abuses. Unrest re-emerged briefly in January 2020 after the government admitted – after several days of concealment – that its military forces had mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger jet in the hours after Iran launched its January 8, 2020, missile strike in Iraq that was retaliation for the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF commander Soleimani. All 176 passengers, which included 82 Iranians, were killed. There were sporadic incidents of unrest, including in the nation’s prisons, to protest the government’s handling of the COVID-19 outbreak in the winter-spring of 2020. U.S. officials asserted in 2020 that the government’s response to the outbreak lacked transparency.19 There was renewed unrest beginning July 15, 2021, which began in southwest Iran (Khuzestan Province) in response to water shortages, but has spread to several major cities as a protest against the regime’s performance, repression, and corruption.20 The Trump Administration supported each wave of protests by expressing solidarity with the protesters and, in some cases, imposing sanctions on regime officials connected with repressing the unrest. In response to the 2017 unrest, the Administration requested U.N. Security Council meetings to consider Iran’s crackdown on the unrest, although no formal U.N. action was taken, and sanctioned then-judiciary chief Sadeq Larijani. In 2020, the Administration sanctioned several Iranian security personnel responsible for killing numerous protesters that had fled to, and purportedly briefly seized control of, the small city of Mah Shahr during the November 2019 unrest. On July 28, 2021, the Biden Administration condemned “violence against peaceful protestors” in the context of the water shortage protests and expressed concern about the regime’s shutdown of some access to the Internet, a tactic intended to curb the protests. In the 116th Congress, H.Res. 752 passed the House on January 28, 2020. The resolution, among other provisions: urged the Administration to work to convene emergency sessions of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Human Rights Council to condemn the ongoing human rights violations perpetrated by the Iranian regime and establish a mechanism by which the Security Council can monitor such violations; and encouraged the Administration to provide assistance to the Iranian people to have free and uninterrupted access to the Internet, including by broadening a general license for U.S. exports to Iran of equipment that citizens can use to circumvent regime censorship of the Internet. 17 “Iran: Thousands arbitrarily detained and at risk of torture in chilling post-protest crackdown,” Amnesty International, December 16, 2019. 18 This decision was allegedly based on a Reuters report that said it had obtained information from security officials inside Iran. “US Confirms Report Citing Iran Officials as Saying 1,500 Killed in Protests.” Voice of America. December 23, 2019. 19 Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights for 2020. Iran. 20 Iran Says Police Officer Killed In Sixth Night Of Protests Over Water Shortages. RFE/RL, July 21, 2021. Congressional Research Service 13
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