Insuring the Risks of Brother-Sister Corporations: Think Captive
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Insuring the Risks of Brother-Sister Corporations: Think Captive Reprinted from the Journal of Taxation of Financial Institutions By Irving Salem and Jocelyn Noll Irving Salem is a partner and Jocelyn Noll is an associate at the law firm of Latham & Watkins, New York. This article first appeared in the May/June 2002 issue of the Journal of Taxation of Financial Institutions. Reprinted with permission.
Insuring the Risks of Brother-Sister Corporations: Think Captive Recent developments — including the demise of the economic family test and the emphasis on the number of risks transferred — should embolden taxpayers to explore brother-sister captive insurance arrangements. IRVING SALEM and JOCELYN NOLL S ince 9/11, insurance coverage ple denying a deduction in both Federal Claims, in allowing a has been harder to obtain parent-subsidiary and brother-sis- deduction, provides this pro-tax- and is far more expensive. ter arrangements and even where payer analysis of the risk shifting Fortuitously, both the courts and the captive had substantial occurring with respect to brother- the IRS have opened a door pre- amounts of outside business; how- sister corporations: viously considered problematic — ever, the pendulum has swung.1 Indeed, the Seventh and Ninth As explained in Humana, the brother-sister companies that are Circuits, in the Sears and Amerco wholly owned subsidiaries have members of the same affiliate cases, have expressed doubts as to no ownership interest in the group can deduct premiums paid parent’s captive insurer and to an insurer which is a sibling the importance of the risk shifting hence would not suffer any addi- (even though the insurance com- and distribution requirements. 2 tional loss if payments by the pany insures no unrelated par- In devaluing the significance of the captive insurer of future claims ties). Accordingly, it behooves risk shifting/distribution analysis, against the subsidiaries exceed- affiliated groups to think captive both the Seventh and the Ninth ed the amount of premiums the Circuits suggest an alternative captive insurer received. For insurance while seeking adequate approach which seems to shift the example, because a $1,000 claim and affordable insurance coverage. burden to the IRS: against a Kidde subsidiary paid This article will analyze the devel- by [the captive insurer] KIC opments and the open questions. However, we also agree with the would not result in a corre- Seventh Circuit that discussions sponding decrease in that sub- of this area might seem less sidiary’s net worth, the risk as BACKGROUND abstruse if we asked ourselves a to that claim was shifted from One of the most contentious areas somewhat different question: the subsidiary, through Nation- in the tax law has been the debate Suppose we ask not ‘What is al, to KIC.4 over the definition of insurance insurance?’ but ‘Is there ade- and the ability of a corporate tax- quate reason to recharacterize The court then provided a pro-tax- this transaction?’, given the payer risk distribution analysis: payer to deduct premiums paid to norm that tax law respects both another member of its affiliated the form of the transaction and Similarly, when viewed from group. The IRS and some courts the form of the corporate struc- the perspective of that sub- were very rigid at first, for exam- ture. (Emphasis supplied)3 sidiary, risk distribution also took place in that KIC distrib- The most recent judicial decision uted the risk faced by that sub- Irving Salem is a partner and Jocelyn Noll is an addressing the brother-sister issue sidiary in a pool with the risks associate at Latham & Watkins, New York. is Kidde Industries. The Court of of other entities in which the May/June 2002 Vol 15 / No 5 INSURING BROTHER-SISTER CORPORATIONS
subsidiary did not have an own- IRS Concedes Pending Brother-Sister would retain a note and value of ership interest.5 Cases in FSAs. Somewhat surpris- $1.00 per share, bids were sought ingly, in 2000, the IRS signaled a from unrelated third-party insurers. As described below, some recent change in attitude by releasing an However, they were expensive and developments confirm the trend FSA which agreed to a 100% con- a mutual insurer was formed to and make a captive arrangement cession with respect to the brother- insure the RIC against credit well worth considering. sister captive structure in the trans- default risks. action at issue, explaining: In a recent follow-up PLR he IRS seems to have agreed (200121019 8 ), the IRS again T with the brother-sister cases it has lost, and concluded that [B]oth the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit [in Humana] and the United responded favorably even though the 33 RICs consolidated into States Court of Federal Claims “no less than V Funds.” The PLR premiums paid to a bona fide notes the initial ruling was based insurance subsidiary insuring the [in Kidde] have held that pay- ments to a captive insurer by its in part on the analysis in Rev. Rul. risks of brother-sister members sibling subsidiary were 78-33 (1978-2 CB 107) which of the same affiliated group are deductible as insurance premi- involved 30 unrelated corpora- likely to be deductible. ums...The court in Humana tions. In affirming the prior PLR, explained that brother-sister the diversity of the risks, not the transactions should be consid- RECENT IRS POSITION number of insureds, was empha- ered insurance for Federal FURTHER OPENS BROTHER- sized: “[W]e note that the pro- income tax purposes, unless SISTER CAPTIVE DOOR either the captive entity or the posed transaction will not reduce transaction is a sham.7 the number of independent risks In a flurry of recent activity, the IRS Mutual accepts... .” As indicated seems to have agreed with the broth- PLR 20012109 Emphasizes Number below, the emphasis on the num- er-sister cases it has lost, and con- of Risks, Demphasizes Number of ber of independent risks has cluded that premiums paid to a bona become a consistent theme. Insureds. In a prior PLR (9624028, fide insurance subsidiary insuring June 14, 1996), the IRS ruled the risks of brother-sister members favorably on a captive utilized by Rev. Rul. 2001-31 Eliminates Eco- of the same affiliated group — 33 unrelated regulated investment nomic Family Test. Revenue Ruling regardless of the existence of out- companies (RICs). Each RIC was a 2001-31 9 provides that the IRS side business6 — are likely to be money market fund which held “will no longer invoke the econom- deductible. Chronologically, here- securities used by numerous issuers. ic family theory” enunciated in Rev. in follow the recent developments: Seeking coverage to insure the RICs Rul. 77-316,10 citing the failure of 1 ruling in part 88 TC 197 (1987), the tax- insurance subsidiary was a sham and there- The IRS initially took the position that captive insurance arrangements were not payer began winning cases. In Humana, the fore reversing the Tax Court’s finding of insurance for tax purposes because the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and risk shifting). insuring corporation(s) and the captive sub- held that, in respect to the sibling insureds, Some courts have allowed both the par- sidiary represented one “economic family,” both risk shifting and risk distribution were ent and subsidiary insureds to deduct pre- and consequently there was no risk shift- present because payment of a claim by the miums paid to a captive insurance sub- ing or risk distribution. Rev. Rul. 77-316, captive insurer did not affect the balance sidiary when the captive received what the 1977-2 C.B. 53. Although no court fully sheet of sibling insureds and the losses were court considered to be a significant amount accepted the economic theory, several spread among the several separate corpo- of premiums from unrelated insureds, courts denied deductions for premiums paid rations within the affiliated group. As despite a contrary ruling by the IRS in Rev. by affiliated corporations to captive insur- there was no evidence that the captive was Rul. 88-72, 1988-2 C.B. 31. See Ocean ance subsidiaries. See Clougherty Packing a sham or that the transactions lacked busi- Drilling and Exploration Co., 988 F.2d Co., 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’g ness purpose, the Sixth Circuit allowed the 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aff’g 24 Cl. Ct. 714 84 TC 948 (1985); Beech Aircraft Corp., sibling insureds to deduct premiums paid (1991) (44-46% from unrelated insureds); 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986), aff’g 1984- to the captive insurer. Subsequent decisions Sears, Roebuck and Co., 972 F.2d 858 (7th 2 USTC 9803 (D. Kan. 1984); Stearns- followed the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and Cir. 1992), aff’g 96 TC 63 (1991) (99.75% Roger Corp., 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. allowed deductions for premiums paid from unrelated insureds); Amerco, Inc., 979 1985), aff’g 577 F.Supp. 833 (D. Col. pursuant to brother-sister arrangements. F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992), aff’g 96 TC 18 1984); Carnation Co., 640 F.2d 1010 (9th See Kidde Industries, Inc., 40 Fed. Cl. 42 (1991) (52-74% from unrelated insureds); Cir. 1981), aff’g 71 TC 400 (1978); Mobil (1997); Hospital Corp. of America, TCM The Harper Group, 979 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. Oil Corp., 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985). 1997-482; Malone & Hyde, Inc., TCM 1992), aff’g 96 TC 45(1991) (29-32% from However, beginning with Humana, 1993-585, overruled by 62 F.3d 835 (6th unrelated insureds). Inc., 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989), over- Cir. 1995) (holding that the wholly owned For a more comprehensive discussion of May/June 2002 Vol 15 / No 5 JOURNAL OF TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
the courts (specifically in Humana, will continue to view such factors with unrelated insurers. The TAM Clougherty, and Kidde) fully to as guaranty and indemnity agree- said there was sufficient risk shift- accept the theory. The ruling, how- ments, capitalization of subs, ing and risk distribution, conclud- ever, cautioned that the IRS may actuarially determined reserves, ing that the insurer qualified as an and whether premiums are priced continue to challenge certain cap- insurance company under subchap- at arm’s length to gauge whether tive insurance transactions based on premiums paid to a sub are the facts and circumstances, citing deductible. n 2000, the IRS signaled a the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mal- one. At a tax conference shortly after the publication of Rev. Rul. ‘It’s a sliding scale,’ Martin said of the analysis. ‘The closer it I change in attitude by releasing an FSA which agreed 2001-31, the tax press reported the resembles a commercial, arm’s- to a 100% concession with following comments of Robert A. length insurance transaction, the respect to the brother-sister Martin, an IRS official in the Office better you’ll be,’ he added.11 captive structure in the of the Associate Chief Counsel transaction at issue. (Financial Institution & Products) While unstated, presumably anoth- with a high degree of involvement er of the factors the IRS will con- in the new ruling: tinue to focus on will be whether ter L. Factors which the TAM the balance sheet of the insured found important in analyzing the Martin, who drafted the latest rul- entity is affected by the captive issue were: ing, explained that the IRS had insurer’s payment of a claim.12 successfully invoked the eco- Thus, the IRS is likely to apply a nomic family theory in cases balance sheet test to disallow a 1. There were no parental or involving wholly owned insur- deduction for premiums paid by a related party guarantees ance subsidiaries without unre- parent to a captive insurance sub- propping up Insurer; lated insurance contracts. How- sidiary, particularly where there is 2. Insurer was adequately ever, the Service was not little or no outside business. capitalized; successful in applying the theory to cases in which the sub insured 3. Insurer’s premium to surplus TAM 200149003 Blesses Brother-Sister ratio was strong; unrelated parties or in “brother- sister” captive situations. Arrangement. In TAM 200149013,13 4. Insurer was formed in part a domestic insurance company (the “Insurer”) provided workers’ com- because of significant disrup- According to Martin, the IRS will focus on this fact-based approach pensation coverage only to its sib- tions in the market price of for transactions resembling the ling operating subsidiaries. A por- workers’ compensation last two situations. The Service tion of the insurance was reinsured insurance; this history, see Emanuel Burstein, “What all of the risk, but the upper and low- insurer should accept risks from unrelat- is Insurance?” The Insurance Tax Review er bounds are set so that almost all ed corporations, either directly or through 25 (January 1997); Joe Taylor, “Myster- of the time the insured firm pays the reinsurance arrangements. ies of the Term ‘Insurance’ Continue Fol- full costs of the losses it generates. 7 lowing Sixth Circuit Reversal of Tax Court FSA 200029010 (July 21, 2000). Both experience rating and retro- in Malone & Hyde,” The Insurance Tax spective rating attempt to charge the Similar FSAs are FSA 200125009 (June 22, Review 1723 (November 1995). firm the full cost of its own risks over 2001); FSA 200125005 (June 22, 2001); 2 Amerco, 979 F.2d at 168. The Seventh the long run, a run as short as one FSA 200043012 (October 27, 2000); FSA Circuit in Sears was emphatic in its deval- year with retrospective rating. 200105014 (October 26, 2000). uation of the significance of risk shifting (Emphasis supplied) 8 May 25, 2001. and risk distribution: 9 Sears, 972 F.2d at 862. 2001-26 I.R.B. 1348. 3 10 Much insurance sold to corporations Internal citations in all quotations gen- 1977-2 C.B. 53. is experience-rated. An insurer sets erally omitted. 11 4 The Insurance Tax Review 9 (July a price based on that firm’s recent 40 Fed. Cl. 42, 46. and predicted losses, plus a loading 2001). 5 Id. 12 and administrative charge. Some- The “balance sheet” approach was 6 times the policy is retrospectively However, courts may be more inclined originally put forth by the Ninth Circuit in rated, meaning that the final price to rule that premiums paid to a captive Clougherty, in connection with the court’s is set after the casualties have insurance subsidiary are deductible if the analysis of the IRS’s economic family the- occurred. Retrospective policies captive writes a significant amount of ory. See note 1, supra. have minimum and maximum pre- unrelated business (see note 1, supra). 13 miums, so the buyer does not bear Accordingly, if practicable, the captive December 7, 2001. May/June 2002 Vol 15 / No 5 INSURING BROTHER-SISTER CORPORATIONS
5. Insurer was a fully regulated 2 The dilution of the insurance and b works with a joint pro- domestic insurance company coverage allowed by the cessing faculty (sic) on the same under the laws of State of C; contract if subsequent property). (Emphasis supplied) 6. Insurer issued a separate insurance were issued to policy to each sibling, and another insured, Thus, the large number of inde- maintained separate records; 3 The retroactive change made pendent risks is highlighted in dis- and to the policies; and cussing all three judicial decisions 7. Insurer hired a number of 4 The investment of 97.5% of analyzed in the FSA, and the num- employees in the year in issue, the premium by the insurer in ber of corporate siblings is only and hired more after that. affiliates of the insured. mentioned with respect to one of the decisions. Perhaps most critically, while the The FSA, however, could be viewed numbers of siblings and insured as supportive of many brother-sis- workers were undisclosed, the ter arrangements. While reviewing SOME OPEN ISSUES TAM noted the Insurer distributed the brother-sister judicial deci- a “large number of homogeneous, sions, the FSA emphasizes the num- Is One Subsidiary Enough? Probably. independent risks among its ber of properties insured, rather There is no conclusive authority insureds.” than the number of insureds: dealing with the minimum number of subsidiaries that would meet the Similarly in the present case, we risk distribution test under the n PLR (200121019 the IRS again brother-sister analysis. Based on I responded favorably even though the 33 RICs consolidated into an expect that with only the work- ing operations of Operating Subsidiary 1 and 2, Insurance Humana, and the IRS’s acceptance of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, it Subsidiary was unable to achieve seems clear that even a relatively unspecified number of funds. adequate risk distribution small number of insureds, each of which, as discussed previously, whom insure a significant number incorporates the concept of the FSA 200202002 Expresses Doubt in of risks, can achieve risk distribu- law of large numbers. The inher- Dubious Brother-Sister Arrangement; ent risk distribution in the pre- tion. Although there were from 22 Quantum of Risks Again Emphasized. sent case is much more limited to 48 brother-sister corporations Lastly, FSA 200202002, 14 again than the three brother-sister involved in Humana, the Sixth Cir- emphasizing a facts and circum- captive insurance cases that the cuit’s language could be read broad- stances approach, expressed seri- Government has lost. In ly as blessing a much smaller group: ous reservations over a brother-sis- Humana, supra, during the years ter captive arrangement. Only two under consideration the tax- [W]e see no reason why there subsidiaries were involved and payer operated an average of 77 would not be risk distribution in hospitals with 12,558 patient the instant case where the captive only a few properties (two plants, beds for which it needed liabil- insures several separate corpo- one of which was operated joint- ity coverage. In HCA v. Com- rations within an affiliated group ly). The FSA, after reviewing the missioner, the taxpayer operat- and losses can be spread among case law on brother-sister insur- ed an average of 160 hospitals the several distinct corporate ance, expressed concern over: with an average of 26,574 entities.15 (Emphasis supplied). patient beds for which it need- 1 The few entities and few ed similar coverage. In Kidde In Malone, the Tax Court accept- properties insured (one Industries, Inc., supra, the tax- ed risk distribution with respect to insured accounted for 86- payer was a broad based decen- eight brother-sister corporations, tralized conglomerate with 15 88% of the captive insurer’s suggesting that the above-quoted separate operating divisions and premium income, and that language from the Sixth Circuit 100 wholly owned operating same insured’s single process- subsidiaries for which it needed did not foreclose “the ability of a ing facility accounted for the workers’ compensation, auto- few insureds with many different “vast majority” of the risks mobile and general (including insurable risks to demonstrate transferred), products) liability coverage. In that they also had achieved risk contrast, the present case distribution” (emphasis supplied): involves risks of two insureds 14 January 11, 2002. and two working operations We conclude that petitioner has 15 Humana, 881 F.2d at 257. (one of which consists of the a demonstrated the presence of May/June 2002 Vol 15 / No 5 JOURNAL OF TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
risk distribution in this case. The IRS had a chance to reject stated that, “[g]enerally, the more Although at most only eight the single insured case, but blinked. policies that the primary insurer subsidiaries, as compared with There was apparently only one writes, the more predicable its between 22 and 48 subsidiaries subsidiary insured in FSA underwriting results will be.”25 In in Humana, participated in the 200125009, in which the IRS con- order to get a better understanding reinsurance agreement, worker’s ceded the deduction of premiums of the parameters of “large num- compensation, automobile lia- paid by a subsidiary (“a domestic bility, and general liability corporation”) to its sibling sub- claims involve diverse risks and n Malone , the factors the potentially represent thousands of individual loss events. 16 sidiary insurance company. The analysis by the IRS did not, how- I Sixth Circuit pointed to in determining that the transaction (Emphasis supplied) ever, address the issue of risk dis- tribution beyond stating that risk was a sham were that the Conversely, based on FSA distribution is a requisite element insurer subsidiary was thinly 200202002, risk distribution will of insurance; moreover, FSAs have capitalized, it was propped up be a problematic issue when there no precedential value. with parent guaranties and a are only two subsidiary insureds, A classic single sibling case hold harmless agreement with would involve an insured like the unrelated primary insurer, and each of whom are insuring a “Hertz.” Assuming that thousands and it was loosely regulated by small number of risks located in of automobiles rented throughout the jurisdiction in which it was the same area.17 the country by Hertz were owned incorporated. An intriguing question is by a single entity, such entity whether a captive subsidiary insur- should be able to deduct premiums er which insures only a single sub- bers,” one is required to understand paid to a bona fide sibling captive. sidiary that has a large number of some statistical nightmares (for However, whereas reliance on the independent risks can achieve risk number of risks, not entities or example, “The Central Limit The- distribution. The Tax Court has insureds, seems eminently sound, orem”), an adventure beyond the addressed this issue, in dicta, in it may take some time to fully clar- scope of this article. Gulf Oil,18 in which the court ify the issue since language (one said “risk transfer and risk distri- might suggest is merely “loose”) Be Careful to Do What You Said You bution occur only when there are referring to the number of either Were Going to Do. Both the courts sufficient unrelated risks in the entities or insureds can be found and the IRS have identified factors pool for the law of large numbers in the case law,21 IRS publica- that may indicate that the transac- to operate,” and that “a single tions,22 a Joint Staff document,23 tion is a sham and thus not true insured can have sufficient unre- and certain non-tax descriptions of insurance. In Malone, the factors the lated risks to achieve adequate insurance.24 Sixth Circuit pointed to in deter- risk distribution.”19This language Assuming one entity is accept- mining that the transaction was a was quoted by the Tax Court in able, that still leaves open the ques- sham were that the insurer sub- Malone, in support of its conclu- tion of how many risks must the sidiary was thinly capitalized, it was sion that risk distribution was entity insure in order to meet the propped up with parent guaranties present.20 law of large numbers. It has been and a hold harmless agreement with 16 of other entities”) (Emphasis supplied); 41-85), 60 (September 20, 1985) (risk dis- TCM 1993-585 at 93-3084. 17 Humana, 881 F.2d at 257 (risk distribu- tribution occurs when there is a “group of Query, if the two plants in FSA tion was present where “the captive insures a large number of individual insureds who 200202002 were split among 30 corpora- several separate corporations and losses can share a similar type of risk of loss”). tions, would the result be different. A be spread among the several distinct cor- (Emphasis supplied) very close question. porate entities”). (Emphasis supplied) 24 18 See R. Riegel & J. Miller, Insurance 89 TC 1010 (1987), reversed in part 22 FSA 199915004 (April 16, 1999) Principles and Practices (6th ed. 1976) on other grounds, 914 F.2d 396 (3rd Cir. (risk distribution is accomplished “where (referring to insurance as an arrangement 1990). 19 the risk is distributed among insureds oth- Id. at 1025-26. in which risks of individuals are combined er than the entity that incurred the loss.”) 20 in a group). TCM 1993-585, at 93-3084. (Emphasis supplied) 25 21 23 R. Michael Cass et al., Reinsurance Kidde, 40 Fed. Cl. at 46 (risk distri- Staff of the Joint Committee on Tax- bution took place because the subsidiary’s ation, Tax Reform Proposals: Taxation of Practices 35 (2nd ed. vol. 1, 1997). 26 risk was placed in a pool “with the risks Insurance Products and Companies (JCS- 62 F.3d at 840. May/June 2002 Vol 15 / No 5 INSURING BROTHER-SISTER CORPORATIONS
the unrelated primary insurer, and it a managing director of Marsh Inc. there has been risk distribution was loosely regulated by the juris- as saying: “The entire market that and risk shifting...[if the parent diction in which it was incorporat- provided workers’ compensation corporation] changes its corpo- ed.26 The IRS has cited these factors catastrophe insurance has dried rate structure and that change and identified several more, in FSA up.” Another article, also in the involves risk shifting and risk 200043012: Wall Street Journal, on February distribution, and that change is 26, 2002, “Property-Casualty for a legitimate business purpose In addition to the factors set Insurers’ 4th-Period Charges To and is not a sham to avoid the forth in Malone, other factors Boost Claims Reserves Don’t Faze payment of taxes, then it is irrel- considered in determining evant whether the changed cor- Investors,” further confirms the whether a captive insurance porate structure has the side need to consider alternative ways transaction is a sham include: effect of also permitting [the par- whether the parties that insured of obtaining necessary insurance coverage: “You pick up the paper ent’s] affiliates to...deduct pay- with the captive truly faced haz- every day and everyone is talking ments to a captive insurance ards; whether premiums charged about 30% rate increases, 100% company under the control of by the captive were based on rate increases.” the...parent as insurance pre- miums. (Emphasis supplied)30 The facts and circumstances enerally, meeting the business G purpose requirement should be a non-issue today. test is a sort of Gregory28-type analysis — did the taxpayer in fact Thus, provided that the require- ments discussed in the preceding do what he said he did, namely, was the risk of loss in fact trans- subsection are met, courts should commercial rates; whether the ferred to a separate and distinct respect the form of a brother-sis- validity of claims was estab- entity which functioned like a nor- ter captive insurance arrangement. lished before payments were mal insurance company, and was made on them; and whether the there a business purpose for the captive’s business operations CONCLUSION arrangement? If this test is met, and assets were kept separate presumably the transaction will Current developments — includ- from its parent’s. also meet the test suggested by the ing the demise of the economic Seventh and Ninth Circuits (that family test and the emphasis on the Additionally, favorable IRS opin- is, “no adequate reason to rechar- number of risks transferred — ions normally mention that busi- acterize this transaction”). ness reasons prompted the use of should embolden taxpayers to a captive. 27 Generally, meeting explore brother-sister captive Will Courts Respect the Form of the insurance arrangements. While the business purpose requirement Brother-Sister Transaction? A con- should be a non-issue today. For the IRS will scrutinize the facts and cern that prompted the Tax Court example, an article in the Wall circumstances, large affiliated in Humana to extend the analysis Street Journal of January 9, 2002, and the holdings of the parent-sub- groups with numerous subsidiaries “Workers’ Compensation Insur- sidiary cases to the brother-sister and risks should be able to deduct ance Now Harder to Get,” quotes arrangement at issue was that a premiums paid to a bona fide failure to do so “would exalt form insurance subsidiary even though over substance and permit a tax- it is a sibling and insures no out- 27 For two recent articles that plumb the side risks. Further, the number of payer to circumvent our holdings depths of “business purpose,” see Stephen by simple corporate structural subsidiaries, while still an open Bowen, “Whither Business Purpose?” Tax- es 275 (March 2002); David Garlock, “Is changes.”29 In overturning the Tax question, need not be very signif- There Any Substance to the Sham Trans- Court, the Sixth Circuit rejected icant — indeed, could be a single action Doctrine?” Tax Management Mem- this rationale: corporation — if one or more sib- orandum 83 (2002). lings has a large number of inde- 28 Such an argument provides no Gregory, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). pendent risks (e.g., workers’ com- legal justification for denying the 29 pensation) which are effectively 88 TC at 213. deduction in the brother-sister 30 881 F.2d at 255-56. context. The legal test is whether being pooled. ■ May/June 2002 Vol 15 / No 5 JOURNAL OF TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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