India's multi-alignment management and the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle
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India’s multi-alignment management and
the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ia/iiab036/6226154 by guest on 29 April 2021
FRANK O’DONNELL AND MIHAELA PAPA *
India co-founded the Russia–India–China (RIC) trilateral alignment in 2001.
Alignment cooperation proceeded primarily through foreign ministers’ meetings
and Track 1.5 conferences, which involve both government officials and civil
society experts. However, both Russia’s President Putin and India’s External
Affairs Minister Jaishankar have independently concluded that the Brazil–Russia–
India–China–South Africa (BRICS) alignment has been a more successful multi-
lateral grouping.1 Indeed, they have both suggested that the greatest value of RIC
lay in its serving as a precursor to BRICS, which has been rapidly developing
since its first stand-alone summit in 2009.2 Then in 2017 India additionally became
a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a larger align-
ment that also includes China and Russia.
At the first RIC summit in July 2006, no member advanced the idea of subse-
quent summits, instead noting a shared preference to continue engagement at
the foreign minister level.3 As Mikheeva argues, emerging policy differences,
including the US–India strategic partnership, Sino-Indian rivalry and Sino-
Russian tensions over access to central Asian energy resources, hindered further
* The authors would like to thank Kelly Sims Gallagher, Zihao Liu, Lisa May, Neeraj Prasad, John Zeleznak, the
editor, and two anonymous reviewers for valuable input and the grant agency for making this work possible.
This work relates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Minerva Initiative through the Department of
Navy award [N000141812744] issued by the Office of Naval Research. The United States Government has
a royalty-free licence throughout the world in all copyrightable materials contained herein. Any opinions,
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Naval Research.
1
Originally formed as a Brazil–Russia–India–China (BRIC) foreign ministers’ grouping in 2006, the BRIC
held its first stand-alone summit in 2009, and transformed into BRICS in 2010 when South Africa joined the
grouping. See Andrew F. Cooper, BRICS: a very short introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016),
pp. 18–35; Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, The India way: strategies for an uncertain world (New Delhi: HarperCollins
India, 2020), p. 84; Vladimir Putin, cited in Bobo Lo, ‘New order for old triangles? The Russia–China–India
matrix’, Russie.Nei.Visions, no. 100, April 2017, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russienei-
visions/new-order-old-triangles-russia-china-india-matrix, p. 23. (Unless otherwise noted at point of cita-
tion, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 3 March 2021.)
2
Jaishankar, The India way, p. 84; Lo, ‘New order for old triangles?’, p. 23.
3
‘China, Russia, India hold 1st trilateral summit’, Xinhua, 18 July 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/
Jul/175028.htm; ‘Press briefing by Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran after the G-8 Summit and the outreach
meeting, St Petersburg, July 17, 2006’, in Avtar Singh Bhasin, ed., India’s foreign relations—2006 documents (New
Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 2006), pp. 335–6; ‘Joint press interaction by
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov,
New Delhi, November 17, 2006’, in Bhasin, ed., India’s foreign relations, p. 1971.
International Affairs 00: 0 (2021) 000–000; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiab036
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is
an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the
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For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.comFrank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa
RIC institutionalization after mid-2006.4 In the same year, Russia organized the
first BRIC foreign ministers’ meeting. The greater interest by RIC member states
in this new grouping led to annual BRIC summits with joint statements from
2009 onwards.5 Then, in 2018, a major change in India’s RIC policy occurred
when it agreed to a Russian proposal to restart RIC summits after a twelve-
year hiatus.6 More surprisingly, New Delhi agreed to a meeting of RIC foreign
ministers convened by Russia in June 2020, despite India and China having been
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engaged in the most serious militarized border crisis in 40 years.7 During this
meeting, the three states also committed to initiating a parallel RIC defence minis-
ters’ dialogue, which constitutes the most substantive institutional deepening of
the alignment in years.8
In the light of these striking developments, this article addresses two questions.
First, what drives Indian efforts to develop the security agendas of the RIC,
BRICS and SCO, as its core Eurasian multilateral alignments which also feature
China and Russia as members? Second, how does this Indian reactivation of RIC
contribute to our understanding of the practice of India’s multi-alignment foreign
policy, as opposed to the general principles which inform it?
To answer these questions, this study first draws upon the academic literature
on regime complexity.9 We employ this literature to test whether India’s practice
of multi-alignment involves India’s forum-shopping to advance its policy agenda
across the RIC–BRICS–SCO complex and ensuring that all of these institutions
work in India’s favour. ‘Forum-shopping’ refers to
the strategic selection and use of policy venues by actors in order to advance their policy
goals ... the multiple, reiterative use of various arenas, including returning an issue to the
original arena, and thus building (or blocking) support for policy action.10
A key element of this approach is that ‘policy-makers, when encountering
obstacles in their traditional policy venue, tend to seek new venues for policy-
4
N. M. Mikheeva, ‘Russia–China–India: transformation of national interests’, in N. M. Mikheeva and V. A.
Plotnikov, eds, Contemporary Russian foreign policy in the global and European dimensions: materials of the interuniver-
sity scientific-practical conference, scientific works of the North-West Academy of Public Administration, vol. 1,
no. 1 (St Petersburg: North-West Institute of Management, 2010), pp. 259–70.
5
Rachel S. Salzman, Russia, BRICS, and the disruption of global order (Washington DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2018), pp. 26–7.
6
Press Trust of India, ‘G20 summit: India, Russia, China hold trilateral after 12 years’, Mint, 1 Dec. 2018,
https://www.livemint.com/Politics/zPdB5h9iQc4tqIxnSPol4K/G20-summit-India-Russia-China-hold-
trilateral-after-12-ye.html.
7
Government of India, MEA, ‘EAM’s opening remarks at the RIC trilateral foreign ministers’ video conference’
(New Delhi, 23 June 2020), https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/press-releases-23-06-2020-1.php; Aleksei
Zakharov, ‘After Galwan valley standoff, does the Russia–India–China trilateral still matter?’, Diplomat, 26
June 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/after-galwan-valley-standoff-does-the-russia-india-china-tri-
lateral-still-matter/.
8
Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to
media questions during a news conference following the video conference of foreign ministers of Russia,
India and China’, 23 June 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNon-
kJE02Bw/content/id/4171520.
9
Karen J. Alter and Kal Raustiala, ‘The rise of international regime complexity’, Annual Review of Law and Social
Science, vol. 14, 2018, pp. 329–49.
10
Hannah Murphy and Aynsley Kellow, ‘Forum shopping in global governance: understanding states, business
and NGOs in multiple arenas’, Global Policy 4: 2, 2013, p. 139.
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International Affairs 00: 0, 2021India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle
making that are more amenable to their preferences and goals’.11 This can include
the practice of institutional ‘interplay management’, or conscious efforts to address
and improve institutional interaction and its effects in such a way that they work
in one’s favour.12 We then trace Indian diplomatic activities within each align-
ment in pursuit of India’s counterterrorism policy agenda, as a security policy
case-study. This research draws on a range of data sources including RIC, BRICS
and SCO statements, Indian official documents and statements, and policy-maker
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media briefings, as well as relevant scholarship and commentary by experts close
to Indian policy-making.
This study is important for three main reasons. First, while both the general
and Indian literature elaborate some overarching principles that characterize the
contemporary Indian foreign policy approach of multi-alignment, the general
literature focuses largely upon distinct Russian and central Asian multi-align-
ment models. Exploring Indian multi-alignment practice, including its potential
strategy of generating institutional overlaps to enable forum-shopping, can help
determine whether India’s multi-alignment approach constitutes its own distinc-
tive model. Second, this study provides empirical insight into actors’ participation
in informal intergovernmental institutions while they have the choice of other
institutions, including those with greater degrees of formalization. Finally, under-
standing Indian foreign policy in the context of its RIC–BRICS–SCO alignments
is particularly timely from a policy perspective. Evaluating how India pursues its
interests within and across these forums can illuminate how India views the role
of these institutions in enabling its rise as an aspiring global power.
This article makes two arguments. The first is that India prefers to enhance
the convergence of alignments around its policy preferences, while avoiding
the creation of alignment structures characteristic of formal intergovernmental
organizations (FIGOs).13 This practice balances two competing Indian impera-
tives: on the one hand, to maximize its ability to advance key issues across
different groupings; and, on the other, to pursue its preference for foreign policy
hedging over becoming locked into new FIGO-type structures. Forum-shopping
helps India engage in ‘soft balancing’, which employs informal alignments, inter-
national institutions and economic measures to constrain antagonistic powers.14
Forum-shopping also facilitates hedging, reducing the impact of failure in
promoting the Indian agenda in any one institution. The second argument is that
Indian lack of success in advancing its counterterrorism agenda in the BRICS
and SCO has been an important incentive for India’s decision to reactivate the
11
Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard, ‘The development of the EU asylum policy: venue-shopping in
perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy 19: 9, 2012, p. 1397. See also Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D.
Jones, ‘Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems’, Journal of Politics 53: 4, 1991, pp. 1047–50.
12
Olav Schram Stokke and Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Introduction: institutional interaction in global environmental
change’, in Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke, eds, Managing institutional complexity: regime interplay
and global environmental change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), p. 6.
13
Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal, ‘Organization without delegation: informal intergovernmental organiza-
tions (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements’, Review of International Organizations 8: 2,
2013, pp. 194–5.
14
T. V. Paul, Restraining Great Powers: soft balancing from empires to the global era (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2018), p. 2.
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International Affairs 00: 0, 2021Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa
RIC since 2018, as another platform and opportunity through which to address
counterterrorism.
Following an examination of general and Indian scholarship on alignments and
multi-alignment, the article first details the key propositions and indicators, and
then tests them by analysing Indian security policy-making across the three align-
ments since 2001 and the counterterrorism case-study. The conclusion summa-
rizes our findings, and their theoretical and policy implications.
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Alignments in Indian foreign policy and multi-alignment in Eurasia
The term ‘alignment’ refers to the ‘expectations of states about whether they will
be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions’: it
includes alignment ‘against’ as well as ‘with’; it identifies potential opponents as well as
friends ... Expectations of support may be created by various behavioral means, such as
joint military planning or diplomatic statements and agreements of various kinds, up to
and including formal alliances.15
Erkomaishvili distinguishes alignments as outcomes, where an alignment is a form
of cooperation (similar to other forms of relationship, such as alliances) from align-
ments as processes, the maintenance of which can in itself be a legitimate state activ-
ity and benefit state interests, without this process necessarily needing to lead to
greater institutionalization.16 Recent alignment literature shows that alignments are
becoming particularly dominant in the era of rising powers, given that these coun-
tries have a strong tradition of non-alignment and tend to organize their foreign
relations around both security and non-security goals. For example, Wilkins uses
‘alignment’ as an umbrella term for a diverse set of security relationships, including
both alliances and strategic partnerships.17 Chidley defines alignment as a ‘value-
neutral concept that neither infers nor connotes any particular content to an inter-
state relationship’, including security policy content.18 This latter definition is also
common to Indian scholarship on the country’s foreign policy approaches.
Indian foreign policy approaches and alignment principles
Four Indian foreign policy approaches, and their associated alignment principles,
have emerged in the Indian scholarship and in the country’s statecraft. The first
approach is that of non-alignment. This was defined by founding Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru in terms of an intention ‘to keep away from the power politics
of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars
and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale’.19 Nayudu argues
15
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 6.
16
David Erkomaishvili, ‘Alliance index: measuring alignments in international relations’, International Studies 56:
1, 2019, pp. 28–45.
17
Thomas S. Wilkins, ‘“Alignment”, not “alliance”—the shifting paradigm of international security coopera-
tion: toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment’, Review of International Studies 38: 1, 2012, pp. 53–76.
18
Colleen Chidley, ‘Towards a framework of alignment in international relations’, Politikon 41: 1, 2014, p. 141.
19
Jawaharlal Nehru, speeches, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1967), p. 2.
4
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle
that this approach aimed to desecuritize the security-centric Cold War global
environment and generate room for political rather than military solutions to
international crises.20
The second concept is that of ‘strategic autonomy’. This approach is most associ-
ated in the Indian scholarship with the United Progressive Alliance governments,
led by the Congress Party, that held office from 2004 to 2014.21 Kalyanaraman
defines this concept as ‘the ability of a state to pursue its national interests and
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adopt its preferred foreign policy without being constrained in any manner by
other states’.22 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and others further articulated
it as seeking the external conditions most conducive to Indian economic devel-
opment while also retaining India’s foreign policy independence.23 These aims
limited India’s efforts in improving its strategic relationship with the United States.
‘Non-alignment 2.0’, the third approach, was developed in 2012 through a
substantive study by leading Indian security scholars and former policy-makers.
It shares the same goals as strategic autonomy but advocates Indian strategic
equidistance between the United States and China.24 This distinguishes it from
non-alignment and strategic autonomy, which both permit selectively tilting
towards a single power as circumstances require.25
The fourth concept is that of multi-alignment. This is most associated in the
Indian scholarship with the Bharatiya Janata Party governments led by Narendra
Modi from 2014 to the present. Notably, it is often presented as a natural evolution
of strategic autonomy in offering a clearer definition of Indian strategic interests,
identifying the United States as a more unambiguously positive partner for India,
and conversely China as an increasingly hostile actor, and motivating distinct policy
initiatives to implement these interests.26 An example is Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy,
which is intended to deepen political, economic and military engagement with
south-east and east Asian states, and is partly a response to the rise of China. This
20
Swapna Kona Nayudu, The Nehru years: Indian non-alignment as the critique, discourse and practice of security (1947–
1964), PhD diss., King’s College London, 2015, pp. 6–10, 18–19.
21
Sanjaya Baru, ‘India and the world: a geoeconomics perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly 48: 6, 9 Feb.
2013, pp. 37–41; Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Evasive balancing: India’s unviable Indo-Pacific strategy’, International
Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 75–94.
22
S. Kalyanaraman, What is ‘strategic autonomy’? How does it help India’s security? (New Delhi: Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses, 20 Jan. 2015), https://idsa.in/askanexpert/strategicautonomy_indiasecurity.
23
Government of India, ‘PM’s reply to the Lok Sabha debate on his US visit’, 3 Aug. 2006, https://archivepmo.
nic.in/drmanmohansingh/pmsinparliament.php?nodeid=13; Government of India, Department of External
Affairs, ‘Speech by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing’,
15 Jan. 2008, https://mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?1445/Speech+by+Prime+Minister+Dr+Manm
ohan+Singh+at+the+Chinese+Academy+of+Social+Sciences+Beijing; Rajiv Kumar, ‘Maintaining strategic
autonomy in an interdependent world’, Strategic Analysis 34: 4, 2010, pp. 525–6.
24
Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt Gen. (Retd) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath
Raghavan, Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan, Non-alignment 2.0: a foreign and strategic policy for India in
the twenty-first century (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012), pp. 32–3, https://www.cprindia.org/
system/tdf/policy-briefs/NonAlignment%202.pdf ?file=1&type=node&id=3572&force=1.
25
Harsh V. Pant and Julie M. Super, ‘India’s “non-alignment” conundrum’, International Affairs 91: 4, 2015, pp.
747–64; Ashley J. Tellis, Non-alignment redux: the perils of old wine in new skins (Washington DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2012), pp. 46–7.
26
Rajendra M. Abhyankar, Indian diplomacy: beyond strategic autonomy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018),
p. xxi; C. Raja Mohan, ‘India: between “strategic autonomy” and “geopolitical opportunity”’, Asia Policy,
no. 15, 2013, pp. 23–5.
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International Affairs 00: 0, 2021Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa
builds upon the previous Indian ‘Look East’ policy, initiated in the early 1990s with
a more limited focus on developing economic ties with south-east Asia.27
Developing this theme, Hall has conceptualized a contemporary tripartite
Indian model of multi-alignment, composed of general wide-ranging diplomatic
outreach, strengthening strategic partnerships with select powers and ‘normative
hedging’ (which means avoiding robust normative positions in global politics).
However, Hall argues that this third element is somewhat weakening under the
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current Modi government, which is more forthright in espousing the normative
causes of democracy promotion and reducing the impacts of climate change.28
Table 1: Indian foreign policy approaches and alignment principles
Indian foreign policy approach Alignment principles
Non-alignment Rejecting membership of either Cold War bloc
Maintaining meaningful relationships with major
powers
Flexibility to selectively tilt towards major powers
Strategic autonomy Advancing, or not jeopardizing, India’s economic
development and foreign policy independence as
ends in themselves
Flexibility to selectively tilt towards major powers
Non-alignment 2.0 Maintaining strategic equidistance between US and
China
Multi-alignment Declared, consistent strategic interests
Flexibility to selectively tilt towards major powers
Strengthening multiple overlapping and offsetting
alignments
Sources: C. Raja Mohan, ‘Foreign policy after 1990: transformation through incremental adaptation’,
in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan, eds, Oxford handbook of Indian foreign
policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 140–41; Harsh V. Pant, ‘A rising India’s search for
a foreign policy’, Orbis 53: 2, 2009, pp. 250–64; Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister’s
speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka lecture (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs, 14 Nov. 2019), https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32038/External+Affairs
+Ministers+speech+at+the+4th+Ramnath+Goenka+Lecture+2019; Indrani Bagchi, ‘LAC face-off:
solution “has to be found” in diplomacy, says foreign minister S Jaishankar’, Times of India, 3 Sept.
2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lac-face-off-solution-has-to-be-found-in-diplo-
macy-says-foreign-minister-s-jaishankar/articleshow/77917088.cms; Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar,
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt Gen. (Retd) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam
Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan, Non-alignment 2.0: a foreign and strategic policy for India in the twenty-
first century (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012), https://www.cprindia.org/system/tdf/
policy-briefs/Non-alignment%202.pdf ?file=1&type=node&id=3572&force=1, pp. 32–33.
27
Sumit Ganguly, ‘Has Modi truly changed India’s foreign policy?’, Washington Quarterly 40: 2, 2017, pp. 136–8.
28
Ian Hall, ‘Multi-alignment and Indian foreign policy under Narendra Modi’, Round Table 105: 3, 2016, pp.
271–86.
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International Affairs 00: 0, 2021India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle
These approaches are united in their preference for avoiding alliances in Indian
diplomacy.29 Since the end of the Cold War, India has demonstrated greater
interest in forming ‘strategic partnerships’ with states instead. In defining this
term, Indian experts have remarked that
these partnerships, unlike the Cold War type of alliances, do not bind nations to support each
other on all strategic issues in all situations. The partnerships are entered into in those areas of
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common interest where mutual help and collaboration can be of long-term benefit to both.30
While the terms of this cooperation model can be tailored for each bilateral
relationship, one important way in which they all differ from alliances is in
omitting mutual defence commitments.31
The idiosyncratic terms of India’s strategic partnership with each state invite
the question of what items Indian policy circles ultimately value most in these
arrangements. One indicator is provided by a comparative assessment of Indian
strategic partnerships with selected major powers, published by a panel of senior
retired policy-makers and foreign policy experts in 2011.32 Each variable—namely,
political, defence and economic cooperation—was classified according to ‘one,
how substantial the cooperation has been in the last 10 years; two, how sustained
the cooperation has been; and three, how much potential it has for future’.33 The
political criteria selected for comparative analysis were: the level of support for
India’s positions on counterterrorism, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir; its
efforts to achieve full acceptance into the global nuclear order without disarming;
and its campaign for permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC).
The corresponding economic criteria were the level of trade and investment, and
the defence criteria were the qualitative and quantitative levels of defence trade.
To conclude, Indian scholarship on its alignments tends to frame them as
content-neutral and process-based.34 However, this literature leaves unaddressed
the question of how India manages multiple alignments. This includes how it acts
across alignments to advance a certain policy issue.
General explanations of multi-alignment and the RIC triangle
The general literature on multi-alignment gained impetus with the use of the
term ‘multi-vector foreign policy’, first enunciated by Kazakhstan’s then-presi-
dent, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in 1992. This diplomatic policy was intended to
29
Harsh V. Pant and Kartik Bommakanti, ‘India’s national security: challenges and dilemmas’, International
Affairs 95: 4, 2019, pp. 846–50; Rajesh Basrur and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, ‘A time of strategic partner-
ships’, Hindu, 21 Sept. 2017, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-time-of-strategic-partnerships/
article19722970.ece.
30
Satish Kumar, S. D. Pradhan, Kanwal Sibal, Rahul Bedi and Bidisha Ganguly, India’s strategic partners: a compara-
tive assessment (New Delhi: Foundation of National Security Research, 2011), http://fnsr.org/files/Indias_Stra-
tegic.pdf, p. 1.
31
Ankit Panda, ‘Why does India have so many “strategic partners” and no allies?’, Diplomat, 23 Nov. 2013,
https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-does-india-have-so-many-strategic-partners-and-no-allies/.
32
Kumar et al., India’s strategic partners.
33
Kumar et al., India’s strategic partners, p. 1.
34
Deepshika Shahi, ‘Indian scholarship on international relations and multilateralism’, Economic and Political
Weekly 48: 5, 2013, pp. 50–58.
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International Affairs 00: 0, 2021Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa
enhance the strategic autonomy of this new post-Soviet state, geographically
located between the more powerful states of Russia and China.35 Pikalov defines
this foreign policy approach as being ‘characterized by a state’s engaging multiple
states on many issues in mutually beneficial engagements, maximizing the poten-
tial gain and minimizing the loss that a particular relationship may bring or incur,
without jeopardizing its independence and freedom of manoeuvre’.36 However,
most of the general International Relations literature on this concept focuses on
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post-Soviet states, and therefore is concerned with the specific context of a state
distancing itself from a dominant regional power which previously formed the
hegemonic core of a political union including these states. This model is not more
generally applicable.37
A similar approach was advanced from 1996 by the Russian foreign minister,
and later prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov. He intended Russian foreign policy
to accelerate a global transition from US unipolarity to multipolarity, in which
Russia would maintain ‘equal partnership(s)’ with a variety of international power
centres and ‘equidistant positioning’ from each to maintain a multipolar balance of
power.38 It was his recognition that China and India formed likely future power
centres, and his desire for their national leaderships to share this world-view, that
propelled his initial proposal for an RIC alignment in 1998. This is a different
model from that proposed for the post-Soviet states considered above, which
permits more foreign policy flexibility in selective tilting towards one or more
larger powers. Primakov argued that a Russian tilt towards China and India would
be only a medium-term means to deliver a future multipolar balance, at which
point a new doctrine of ‘equidistance’ would apply.39
This Russian approach may appear closer to the Indian multi-alignment foreign
policy. However, contemporary Indian multi-alignment practice does permit
selective tilting towards certain powers; also, Russia interprets multivectorism
principally in terms of bilateral interstate relationships, while India places much
more emphasis on building and joining multilateral institutions.40 Moreover,
when both do decide to form new multilateral alignments, India favours looser
arrangements to the treaty-based institutionalization model which Russia prefers,
as applied in, for example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
and SCO. Indeed, the SCO, as the sole treaty-based multilateral alignment in
the RIC–BRICS–SCO triangle, is also the only one which was initially founded
without Indian participation.
35
Nicola P. Contessi, ‘Foreign and security policy diversification in Eurasia: issue splitting, co-alignment, and
relational power’, Problems of Post-Communism 62: 5, 2015, p. 299.
36
Aleksandr Pikalov, ‘Uzbekistan between the great powers: a balancing act or a multi-vectorial approach?’,
Central Asian Survey 33: 3, 2014, p. 298.
37
See e.g. Elena Gnedina, ‘“Multi-vector” foreign policies in Europe: balancing, bandwagoning or bargaining?’,
Europe–Asia Studies 67: 7, 2015, pp. 1007–29; Sergey Minasyan, ‘Multi-vectorism in the foreign policy of post-
Soviet Eurasian states’, Demokratizatsiya 20: 3, 2012, p. 272.
38
Yevgeny Primakov, Russian crossroads: toward the new millennium (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004),
pp. 126–7.
39
Primakov, Russian crossroads, pp. 315–16.
40
Primakov, Russian crossroads, pp. 315–16.
8
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle
In explaining why India engages with the RIC, BRICS and SCO, some
scholars argue that these forums complement India’s bilateral relations with Russia
and China, in serving as additional useful platforms for discussion of any disagree-
ments arising, as well as potential areas of cooperation.41 Bratersky and Kutyrev
frame RIC and BRICS security cooperation in terms of attempting to develop
non-western norms of international security practice.42 Other experts claim
that India’s participation in these Eurasian alignments is a part of a ‘continued
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engagement’ approach towards Beijing, ensuring India remains in dialogue with
China even as their bilateral relationship continues to worsen. There is also the
continuing imperative to weaken the Russia–China strategic partnership through
Indian participation in Eurasian alignments.43 It is also argued that India’s partici-
pation in the RIC serves as a symbolic example of its commitment to multi-
alignment hedging approaches, as opposed to an exclusive alignment.44 Each of
these arguments has been employed to explain the reactivation of the RIC in
2018. The timing of this revival has also been justified as a response to the US
Trump administration’s aggressive security and trade unilateralism, drawing the
three states closer together in their common interest in opposing this tendency.45
However, for the most part this scholarship does not delve into the inter-
play between Indian actions to advance its interests in each of these alignments.
Crucially, it overlooks the question whether Indian dissatisfaction with its progress
in advancing its policy agenda in other alignments might lead to a new focus on
pressing those issues in the RIC alignment. Indeed, Jaishankar has recently argued
in public that ‘the world of agreements is over, it is now the world of conver-
gences’.46
Finally, this topic also addresses gaps in the general literature on regime
complexity. This literature disagrees on how the generation of overlapping forums
should be treated, as such overlap undermines particular institutions’ efforts to
regulate policy agendas while also empowering actors to cultivate agendas which
they would otherwise be unable to advance.47 Moreover, while there have been
regime complexity studies relating to defence policies, these employ case-studies
in which state members are not currently engaged in a highly militarized dispute
41
Uma Purushothaman, Why RIC is as important to India as JAI and BRICS (New Delhi: Observer Research
Foundation, 13 Dec. 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/why-ric-is-as-important-to-india-
as-jai-and-brics-46213/; Ashok Sajjanhar, The ‘Quad’ and RIC—are they compatible? (New Delhi: Observer
Research Foundation, 4 Jan. 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/quad-ric-are-they-compatible/.
42
Maxim Bratersky and Georgy Kutyrev, ‘BRICS and the evolving Russia–India–China security agenda’, Stra-
tegic Analysis 43: 6, 2019, p. 602.
43
Sankaran Kalyanaraman, External balancing in India’s China policy, IDSA issue brief (New Delhi: Institute for
Defense Studies and Analyses, 28 March 2018), https://idsa.in/system/files/issuebrief/ib-indias-china-policy-
skalyanaraman.pdf, pp. 8–9.
44
Lo, New order for old triangles?, p. 20; Sajjanhar, The ‘Quad’ and RIC.
45
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘Russia–India–China trilateral grouping: more than hype?’, Diplomat, 5 July
2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/russia-india-china-trilateral-grouping-more-than-hype/.
46
Indrani Bagchi, ‘LAC face-off: solution “has to be found” in diplomacy, says foreign minister S Jaishankar’,
Times of India, 3 Sept. 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lac-face-off-solution-has-to-be-found-
in-diplomacy-says-foreign-minister-s-jaishankar/articleshow/77917088.cms.
47
Daniel W. Drezner, ‘The power and peril of international regime complexity’, Perspectives on Politics 7: 1, 2009,
p. 66.
9
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa
with each other.48 This study thus additionally contributes to the literature in
exploring how a state uses multi-alignments to advance security policy agendas
in this context of high tensions with another member state.
Examining Indian security multi-alignment in Eurasia
To address these gaps in the literature, this study investigates India’s security
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policy agenda across the three alignments of the RIC, BRICS and SCO. It
examines India’s efforts to advance counterterrorism initiatives in these group-
ings from 2001 to 2020, as an issue case-study focusing on a core element of India’s
security policy.49 This analysis details India’s counterterrorism policy agenda and
traces the degree to which it was successfully reflected in the joint statements and
actions of each alignment during the period considered. Furthermore, it carefully
explores India’s comparative success in developing the counterterrorism agenda of
each grouping at the time of significant shifts in India’s management of its multi-
alignment approach, including the RIC reactivation from 2018 to 2020.
This study tests two hypotheses regarding its research questions. The first
question concerns the drivers of Indian efforts to develop the security agendas of
RIC, BRICS and SCO. Our hypothesis is that India prefers to enhance the convergence
of alignments around its policy preferences, while avoiding the creation of FIGO alignment
structures. FIGOs comprise ‘official interstate arrangements legalized through a
charter or international treaty, and coordinated by a permanent secretariat, staff, or
headquarters’.50 By contrast, an informal intergovernmental organization (IIGO)
is defined as ‘an explicitly shared expectation—rather than a formalized agree-
ment—about purpose, with explicitly associated state “members”, who partici-
pate in regular meetings but have no independent secretariat or other significant
institutionalization such as a headquarters and/or permanent staff ’.51 Compared
to FIGOs, IIGOs grant their member states ‘increased flexibility, speed, and lower
sovereignty costs’.52 In its emphasis on the principle of flexibility, state member-
ship of IIGOs is therefore more consistent with an overarching multi-alignment
foreign policy approach and preference for strategic partnerships over alliances.53
We argue that India aims to generate convergence of policy agendas across multiple
alignments, but in ways that avert FIGO-type formalization and instead maximize
Indian foreign policy manoeuvrability. This hypothesis would be disproven by
48
See e.g. Stephanie C. Hofmann, ‘Overlapping institutions in the realm of international security: the case of
NATO and ESDP’, Perspectives on Politics 7: 1, 2009, pp. 45–52; Brigitte Weiffen, Leslie Wehner and Detlef
Nolte, ‘Overlapping regional security institutions in South America: the case of OAS and UNASUR’, Inter-
national Area Studies Review 16: 4, 2013, pp. 370–89.
49
See e.g. ‘India says priority at UNSC will be to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation’, Hindustan Times,
18 June 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-says-priority-at-unsc-will-be-to-enhance-
counter-terrorism-cooperation/story-9Udrrn4vjtcAzv80FGYGDI.html.
50
Vabulas and Snidal, ‘Organization without delegation’, p. 197.
51
Vabulas and Snidal, ‘Organization without delegation’, p. 197.
52
Vabulas and Snidal, ‘Organization without delegation’, pp. 194–5.
53
Kenneth W. Abbott and Benjamin Faude, ‘Choosing low-cost institutions in global governance’, International
Theory (FirstView), June 2020, pp. 1–11; Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic partnerships in Asia: balancing without alliances
(New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 44–6.
10
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle
Indian leadership of or acquiescence in the formation of permanent secretariats or
other FIGO structures, while serving as a full decision-making member of these
alignments.
The second research question is how India’s reactivation of the RIC develops
our understanding of the practice of India’s multi-alignment security policy
management, as opposed to the general principles which inform it. Our hypoth-
esis is that Indian lack of success in advancing its counterterrorism agenda in the BRICS and
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SCO alignments has been an important incentive for India’s decision to reactivate RIC since
2018, which gave it another platform through which to address counterterrorism. This would
be disproven by Indian lack of interest in leadership on counterterrorism issues
within the RIC–BRICS–SCO triangle, combined with proof of Indian satisfac-
tion in advancing counterterrorism issues in BRICS and SCO.
Evaluating Indian multi-alignment management in the RIC triangle
This section will first examine India’s interests within each alignment. It will then
investigate how it has established and advanced its policy objective of elevating
counterterrorism cooperation within each, while simultaneously reframing this
issue around its preferred focus of Pakistan’s culpability for continuing to host
anti-India terrorist actors, by seeking alignment condemnation, sanctioning and
isolation of Pakistan, and encouraging support for the Indian-drafted Compre-
hensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT).54
As noted above, India co-founded the RIC trilateral forum in 2001, and its first
meeting at foreign minister level was held in September 2001. The trilateral became
more systematic from 2003 on, with meetings at foreign minister level organized
around every 12–18 months. The first summit was held in 2006. The general
driver of the RIC alignment is to improve policy coordination between the three
states, to the end of accelerating the development of multipolarity.55 India was
also a co-founder of the BRICS multilateral alignment. The first BRIC summit
took place on the sidelines of the 2008 G7 summit, and the first joint statement
was produced during the 2009 stand-alone BRIC summit.56 Reforming global
economic governance was the core theme of the BRIC/BRICS early summits.
When the SCO was established in 2001, India was not a founding member.
It was granted observer status in 2005 and was admitted along with Pakistan as
new full members in 2017.57 The SCO has principally focused upon central Asian
security and energy cooperation. However, all three alignments have gradually
expanded their policy agendas over time from their initial focal points. Figure 1
54
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, ‘How to put an end to terrorism as a card in the games nations play’, Wire, 3 Feb.
2016, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/how-to-put-an-end-to-terrorism-as-a-card-in-the-games-nations-play.
55
Nivedita Das Kundu, Russia–India–China: trilateral cooperation and prospects (Moscow: Valdai Discussion Club, 14
May 2012), https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia_india_china_trilateral_cooperation_and_prospects/.
56
BRICS Information Centre, ‘BRIC leaders meet, Toyako, Hokkaido, Japan’, 9 July 2008, http://www.brics.
utoronto.ca/docs/080709-leaders.html; ‘Joint statement of the BRIC countries’ leaders, Yekaterinburg,
Russia’, 16 June 2009, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html.
57
Government of India, MEA, Brief on SCO (New Delhi, 31 Jan. 2020), https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRela-
tion/SCO_MULTI_Brief_feb_2020.pdf.
11
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa
Figure 1: Policy issues managed within the RIC, BRICS and SCO
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Note: This diagram represents declaratory areas of cooperation, and does not record comparative
levels of institutionalized cooperation.
Sources: RIC, BRICS and SCO summit and joint ministerial statements, 2001–present.
sets out the differences and overlaps in RIC, BRICS and SCO state memberships,
and the policy issues managed in each alignment, as of November 2020.
The general Indian approach to counterterrorism in its multi-alignment diplo-
macy was enunciated by the then foreign secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, in
2016. He set out three principles, namely: ‘build[ing] effective inter-state coop-
erative mechanisms to combat it [state sponsorship of terrorism]; naming and
shaming ... carried out relentlessly in the case of perpetrators, supporters and
connivers of terrorism’; and ‘diplomacy to isolate those indulging in terrorism’.58
Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statements on BRICS tend to
emphasize the economic and financial gains from India’s participation in the align-
ment, especially up to 2011. However, in MEA statements since then, counterter-
rorism has gradually emerged as a coequal benefit of India’s BRICS engagement.59
MEA statements on the RIC also tend to list a wide range of issues discussed
at RIC meetings. However, counterterrorism is the only specific RIC policy
issue raised with the MEA by Indian members of parliament.60 The influence of
58
Jaishankar, ‘How to put an end to terrorism’.
59
Government of India, MEA, ‘Q.1760 BRICS summit’, 10 Aug. 2011, https://mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.
htm?dtl/16815/Q1760_BRICS_Summit; ‘Question No. 2671 BRICS summit’, 4 Dec. 2019, https://mea.gov.
in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/32149/UESTION_NO2671_BRICS_SUMMIT.
60
Government of India, MEA, ‘Q No. 53 Discussion on terrorism with China and Russia’, 5 Dec. 2013, https://
12
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle
parliamentarians on Indian foreign policy discourse puts persistent pressure on the
Indian government to seek stronger statements and actions from the RIC against
terrorist actors, especially those hosted in Pakistan and directed against India. This
in turn reinforces India’s prioritization of this issue at RIC interactions.61
India perceives multiple benefits arising from its participation in the SCO align-
ment. These include a greater Indian presence in institutional debates regarding
central Asian and Afghan security; enhanced diplomatic and economic engage-
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ments with the energy-rich central Asian states; an additional multilateral forum
for engaging with China and Russia on Eurasian security matters; and reducing
Chinese influence in these matters.62 However, the security-focused core of SCO
activities also provides India with an additional forum in which to win support for
its diplomatic counterterrorism approaches. This latter objective has been elevated
in Indian diplomacy since its formal admission as an SCO member in 2017.63
India’s counterterrorism diplomacy in Eurasian alignments
In tracing India’s counterterrorism efforts within the RIC, SCO and BRICS align-
ments, we see New Delhi gradually attempting to implement the same counter-
terrorism policy agenda within all three—as opposed to creating a division of
labour across these alignments, in which a unique agenda is advanced within
each grouping. In its approach to all three forums, India seeks first to introduce
counterterrorism as a general topic on the policy agenda. Then it builds upon
this foundation by ensuring that its draft CCIT is endorsed by fellow alignment
members. The proposed CCIT privileges the right of states to address terrorist
challenges within their own borders and against their own nationals or institutions
globally, as opposed to encouraging early foreign counterterrorist military inter-
ventions on their soil.64 The Indian government foregrounds Pakistan-sponsored
terrorism in its official statements on the CCIT, arguing that adoption of the
convention would prohibit terrorist actors from receiving ‘support, sustenance
and safe havens in another country’, while establishing extradition of interna-
mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/22572/Q_NO53_DISCUSSION_ON_TERRORISM_WITH_CHINA_
AND_RUSSIA.
61
Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘The parliament’, in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan, eds, The
Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 219–31; Sibaram Badatya,
‘Parliament and foreign policy decision making in India: extent, instruments and impediments’, Journal of
Governance and Public Policy 9: 2, 2019, p. 9.
62
Meena Singh Roy, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: India seeking new role in the Eurasian regional mechanism
(New Delhi: Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2014), pp. 61–9, https://idsa.in/
system/files/monograph34.pdf; Government of India, MEA, Brief on SCO.
63
Government of India, MEA, ‘Speech by external affairs minister at the meeting of Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization council of foreign ministers’, 22 May 2019, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.
htm?dtl/31331/Speech+by+External+Affairs+Minister+at+the+Meeting+of+Shanghai+Cooperation+Orga
nization+Council+of+Foreign+Ministers; Government of India, MEA, ‘English rendition of prepared text
of press statement by prime minister at SCO summit in Astana ( June 09, 2017)’, https://www.mea.gov.in/
Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28518/English_rendition_of_Prepared_text_of_Press_Statement_by_Prime_
Minister_at_SCO_Summit_in_Astana_June_09_2017.
64
UN General Assembly agenda item 148, appendix II, ‘Draft Comprehensive Convention against International
Terrorism’, 12 Aug. 2005, https://undocs.org/en/A/59/894, pp. 7–18.
13
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa
tional terrorists as a new element of any pre-existing bilateral extradition treaty.65
Indian officials simultaneously apply pressure for counterterrorism language and
activities in each alignment to focus upon the Pakistani threat. They attempt to
advance this goal with increasing specificity over consecutive summits within
each forum, while also seeking to replicate new policy accomplishments from
one grouping in the others.
A secondary objective is to embarrass and isolate China for blocking stronger
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counterterrorism actions and language directed against Pakistan, with which it has
a close security partnership.66 By being present in and emphasizing this agenda
across different alignments, India maximizes its opportunities both to introduce
multilateral counterterrorism policies focused on Pakistan and to raise the political
costs of Chinese efforts to reject them. However, Indian diplomats are challenged in
these efforts by the structural rules of all three alignments, which exclude bilateral
issues (such as India–Pakistan relations and disputes) from the agenda.
The general pattern of Indian counterterrorism approaches and progressive
agenda-building is set out in table 2, which compares milestone years in these
Indian efforts across the three alignments from 2001 to 2020. The strongest policy
achievement—and the one which Indian diplomats appear to struggle to replicate
in alignment language over multiple summits—is a joint condemnation of anti-
India terrorist groups based in Pakistan which specifically names these groups. The
italicized text in the table indicates the most successful year for India in enacting
its agenda in each alignment.
Table 2 (page 16–17) also highlights that Indian successes in enacting its
counterterrorism agenda have varied from one alignment to another over time.
We identify three distinct periods of Indian multi-alignment management on
counterterrorism between 2001 and 2020.
2001–2010: advancing the agenda in RIC and the SCO
The first period, from 2001 until around 2010, features an Indian focus on devel-
oping its agenda within the RIC alignment, while also lobbying the SCO before
and after its approval as an observer in 2005. The first RIC joint statement featuring
counterterrorism was a brief commitment to prevent the acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists in 2003.67 More substantive counter
terrorism language first emerged in the 2005 statement, which affirmed that ‘any
form of terrorism represents one of the most serious threats to international peace
65
‘Statement: Mr Rajindra Abhynakar, delegation of India’, in Jahyun Han, Rainer Hermann and Aigul Mamy-
tova, eds, Summary report: Bishkek international conference on enhancing security and stability in Central Asia: strength-
ening comprehensive efforts to counter terrorism (Vienna: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
2001), p. 177.
66
Geeta Mohan, ‘SCO not forum to target one nation: China’, India Today, 11 June 2019, https://www.india-
today.in/world/story/shanghai-cooperation-organisation-india-china-1546353-2019-06-11; Derek Grossman,
‘China will regret India’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’, Diplomat, 24 July 2017, https://
thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-will-regret-indias-entry-into-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/.
67
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Russia, India, China foreign ministers hold a working
meeting’ (Moscow, 25 Sept. 2003), https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNon-
kJE02Bw/content/id/505178.
14
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle
and security regardless of its roots and motives. The ministers agreed that the
fight against terrorism should be continued unswervingly and no double standards
should be adopted.’68 This language was flexible in that, for India, it could be read
as delegitimizing Pakistan-sponsored terrorism conducted in Kashmir and India,
presenting it as a purely criminal activity without any political justification.69 The
same statement could also be applied by Russia with regard to political violence
in Chechnya, and by China to Uighur separatists.70 Indeed, India’s key termi-
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nology—recognizing any form of terrorism as a serious threat to global security,
and opposing double standards in its prosecution—would become standardized
counterterrorism language in RIC, SCO and BRICS statements.
Before 2005, Indian statements regarding the SCO were limited to emphasizing
its valuable counterterrorism focus in describing the institution, and affirming that
Kazakhstan had lobbied for India’s admission as a member.71 Since 2005, Indian offi-
cials have been able to address SCO meetings directly. In his address that year, the
Indian external affairs minister foregrounded terrorism in describing priority issues
both for the SCO itself and for greater India–SCO cooperation. He also alluded
to the challenge of Pakistani terrorism, noting that ‘terrorism today has become
a sinister transnational activity, with terrorists taking full advantage of less than
whole-hearted cooperation among states’.72 These general diplomatic formulations
in RIC summits and Indian statements to the SCO would continue until 2008.
The year 2008 marked a milestone in several respects. The first BRIC summit
was held this year, complementing the foreign ministers’ meeting. While no joint
statements were issued from these engagements, the Indian external affairs minister
described this nascent alignment as ‘a platform ... to fight terrorism’.73 The RIC
summit of this year also evidenced greater development of its counterterrorism
agenda, formally endorsing CCIT and UNSC Resolution 1267. This resolution
imposed sanctions on Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and individuals and organizations
linked to them.74 As many of these actors were based in Pakistan, the RIC’s empha-
sis on full global compliance with this resolution served as another means for India
to expand the counterterrorism agenda while focusing it on Pakistan. Meanwhile,
annual Indian observer statements to SCO meetings still mentioned terrorism and
subtly linked it to Pakistan, but downplayed it as one among several issues for
India–SCO cooperation, rather than the foremost issue as previously.
68
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The joint communiqué of the informal meeting
between the foreign ministers of the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the Republic of
India’ (Beijing, 3 June 2005), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t198983.shtml.
69
Karthika Sasikumar, ‘State agency in the time of the global war on terror: India and the counter-terrorism
regime’, Review of International Studies 36: 3, 2010, pp. 620–21.
70
Willem van Kemenade, Détente between China and India: the delicate balance of geopolitics in Asia (The Hague:
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2008), p. 127.
71
Government of India, MEA, Q. 4582—membership of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (New Delhi, 9 May 2002),
https://mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/9382/Q_4582__Membership_Of_Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation.
72
‘Address by External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh at Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit’,
Astana, 5 July 2005, in Avtar Singh Bhasin, ed., India’s foreign relations—2005 (New Delhi: Government of
India, MEA, 2005), pp. 313–15.
73
Cited in P. S. Raghavan, BRICS: still under construction, policy brief no. 5 (New Delhi: Ananta Aspen Centre,
Oct. 2016), https://storage.ning.com/topology/rest/1.0/file/get/489114934?profile=original, p. 9.
74
UNSC Resolution 1267, 15 Oct. 1999.
15
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