Independent Investigation Commissioner's Report - Allegations against the Chief Constable and Deputy Chief Constable of North Yorkshire Police ...
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Allegations against the Chief Constable
and Deputy Chief Constable of North
Yorkshire Police following a recruitment
campaign for police constables
Independent Investigation
Commissioner’s Report
IPCC Reference: 2010/005240
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Commissioner’s Report N Yorks recruitment
Table of contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3
Referral............................................................................................................................. 3
Background ..................................................................................................................... 4
Chronological summary of events................................................................................. 5
Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 9
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Introduction
1. This report sets out the findings from, and my views on, the independent
investigation into an allegation that Chief Constable Grahame Maxwell (CC) and
Deputy Chief Constable Adam Briggs (DCC) of North Yorkshire Police (NYP)
unacceptably circumvented the requirements of a force recruiting campaign for
constable posts for the benefit of immediate or extended family.
2. It was alleged that CC Maxwell and DCC Briggs jointly assisted a relative of the DCC
(Ms A) in circumventing the first stage of a recruitment process. It was further
alleged that Mr Maxwell assisted a member of his extended family (Mr B) to
circumvent the first stage of the recruitment process.
3. In addition the investigation examined public statements made by DCC Briggs in
media interviews and news releases about the recruitment process.
Referral
4. On 12 February 2010 an anonymous e-mail was sent to NYP’s ‘Anonymous
Messenger’ Professional Standards Department reporting concerns about the
actions of some members of staff of the Human Resources (HR) Department in the
recruitment campaign. This e-mail was read on 15 February 2010. An investigation
began into this and during the information gathering it was identified that Ms A had
completed a vetting form without having got through to a call handler on the hotline.
5. Steven Read, Head of NYP’s Professional Standards Department, was informed
about the matter involving Ms A on 26 February.
6. A meeting of NYP’s Senior Leadership Team was convened by Assistant Chief
Constable (ACC) Sue Cross on 1 March to discuss the situation. It was decided that
the CC, who was out of the force area at the time, needed to be informed. When
contacted the CC stated he was fully aware of the situation and had instructed the
call be made to Ms A.
7. The CC returned immediately to a meeting with ACC Cross. He was advised either
he could inform North Yorkshire Police Authority (NYPA) of the situation or ACC
Cross would.
8. The Chief Constable informed NYPA of the situation involving Ms A on 2 March.
Both he and the DCC were asked to give a full explanation in writing.
9. On 9 March the CC disclosed the situation involving Mr B to the NYPA. He was
asked to give an explanation in writing.
10. On 19 March NYPA referred all the matters surrounding the recruitment exercise to
the IPCC.
11. A decision was initially taken by the IPCC to manage two investigations. The first
was to be conducted by NYP’s Professional Standards Department into allegations
against two members of HR staff. This investigation would be expanded
subsequently to include allegations against a Police Constable.
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12. The second investigation would be into the allegations against the CC and DCC and
this would be conducted by Mike Cunningham, Chief Constable of Staffordshire
Police.
13. At the beginning of such an investigation there is a requirement to conduct a severity
assessment. This is to determine whether, if proven, the allegations could amount to
misconduct or gross misconduct.
14. Misconduct is defined in Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008 as a ‘breach of the
Standards of Professional Behaviour’.
15. Gross Misconduct is defined in the Regulations as ‘a breach of the Standards of
Professional Behaviour so serious that dismissal would be justified’.
16. The severity assessment is intended to inform the way in which the allegation is
dealt with and the ultimate sanction or outcome available. Such an assessment can
only be made after consultation with the ‘appropriate authority’ – in this case NYPA.
17. The severity assessment included the nature of the allegations, consideration that
the alleged conduct was on-duty behaviour, potentially impacted on public
confidence, there was alleged intent and the leadership roles of the CC and DCC.
18. CC Cunningham believed the allegations amounted to misconduct. IPCC Senior
Investigator Mike Grant, who was managing the investigation, and Commissioner
Nicholas Long, who was overseeing the investigation, disagreed. Both considered
the allegations, if proven, amounted to gross misconduct. NYPA agreed with the
IPCC.
19. As a result a decision was taken by Commissioner Nicholas Long on 6 April to
redetermine the investigation as independent.
20. The investigation was concluded in September 2010. The only significant delays
encountered were on account of the availability for interview of the principal officers.
21. The Crown Prosecution Service were engaged at an early stage in the investigation.
Background
22. NYP decided to run a recruitment campaign in early 2010 aimed at employing 60-70
police officers.
23. As the force expected significant interest in the recruitment they decided to
implement a system which had been used previously by Durham Constabulary.
24. This system entailed prospective applicants having to contact a telephone vetting
hotline which would operate between 5pm-8pm on each day of the recruitment
exercise.
25. Once connected to a call handler an applicant would be taken through a vetting
questionnaire. Those who successfully passed the vetting procedure would be given
a link to a website where they could access the application form.
26. NYP stressed in media releases that this was a first come, first served system and
every applicant had to go through the vetting procedure.
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27. The recruitment process ran from Monday 8 February 2010 to Friday 12 February
2010.
28. On Monday 8 February and Tuesday 9 February the hotline was overwhelmed by
the number of applicants. As a result the majority of callers were unable to get
through to a call handler. Some who did were cut off before completing the vetting
form.
29. A decision was quickly made to begin each call by taking the contact details of the
caller. By doing this the caller could be re-contacted should they be cut off.
30. This process only applied to those callers who actually got through to a call handler.
People who had been cut off while waiting in the queuing system were not entitled to
be called back.
31. Over the course of the recruitment period, NYP estimated 300,000 to 500,000 calls
were made to the hotline.
32. By the morning of 10 February, a new hotline number was put in place and for the
remaining three evenings the system ran smoothly.
Chronological summary of events
Ms A
33. On 8 February, Ms A became aware of North Yorkshire Police’s recruitment
campaign. It was too late in the day to contact the telephone hotline.
34. She contacted DCC Briggs to complain to him that he had not informed her about
the recruitment campaign. DCC Briggs advised her that she had to phone the hotline
to get an application form.
35. Ms A attempted to contact the hotline on Tuesday evening without success. She
contacted the DCC to advise him of this.
36. On the afternoon of 10 February, DCC Briggs, CC Grahame Maxwell and a member
of staff (Mrs C) were discussing the problems with the hotline. During this
conversation DCC Briggs said words to the effect that ‘even (Ms A) had not
managed to get through’.
37. CC Maxwell advised DCC Briggs to give Ms A’s telephone number to Mrs C so she
could contact her directly. The DCC did this and telephoned Ms A to advise her to
expect a call from Mrs C.
38. Ms A was not entitled to receive a ‘call back’ as she had failed in her attempts to get
through to the hotline.
39. That evening Mrs C was working as one of the call handlers on the recruitment
hotline. She requested her line be isolated at one point to allow her to make an
outgoing call and she then telephoned Ms A. She completed the vetting form with Ms
A and supplied the form to the HR Department.
40. Ms A telephoned the DCC to confirm she had been called.
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The Chief Constable and Mr B
41. On 8 February the CC contacted Mr B’s relative to advise her about the recruitment
campaign. The CC was aware that Mr B wanted to join NYP as a constable.
42. During the evening of 9 February Mr B’s family attempted to contact the hotline
without success. They believed they had been hung up on twice with the line clicking
and a message telling them the line had cleared. At no point did they speak with a
call handler. Mr B’s relative telephoned the CC to complain about the process.
43. On 10 February CC Maxwell advised Mrs C about the call. He advised that Mr B and
his family had had the telephone put down on them seven times when dialling the
hotline.
44. Mrs C advised CC Maxwell about the system crashing. She advised that some
callers had been inadvertently diverted to internal telephone extensions including
hers and she was passing on these callers details to the HR Department in order for
them to receive a call back.
45. CC Maxwell contacted Mr B’s relative to explain about the problems and advised her
to telephone Mrs C to provide Mr B’s contact details in order for these to be passed
to the HR Department for a call back.
46. This was done, but Mrs C advised she was compiling a list and could not promise
anything in relation to the call back. Mrs C advised that Mr B should continue to try
the hotline number.
47. At 11.29am on the Wednesday Mrs C sent an email to the HR department
containing Mr B’s contact details and indicating he was entitled to a call back. This
was not the case.
48. CC Maxwell and DCC Briggs attended the call centre on the Wednesday evening as
a media opportunity. They had photographs taken and assisted in taking incoming
calls.
49. CC Maxwell offered to make some of the call backs. He was provided with details of
two people who were genuinely entitled to call backs and partially completed vetting
forms for them.
50. He made the two genuine call backs, but in addition also called Mr B.
51. Mr Maxwell made two calls to Mr B. In the first he checked whether Mr B had
managed to get through to the hotline. Mr B replied that he had been unsuccessful
and CC Maxwell advised him to keep trying. A few minutes later CC Maxwell called
Mr B again and completed the vetting questionnaire.
52. Later that evening Mr B received a call in response to Mrs C’s e-mail to the HR
Department stating he was entitled to a call back. Mr B advised that he had already
been dealt with by the CC.
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Interviews and News Releases
53. The IPCC’s investigation also examined claims that DCC Briggs had been
responsible for misleading statements being made to the public in interviews and
news releases.
54. In an interview with BBC Radio 5 Live on 11 February 2010, the day after the phone
call to Ms A, DCC Briggs said: “Well what I’d say is, in terms of fairness, it’s a first
come first served, it can’t be fairer than that….”
55. DCC Briggs repeated the “first come first served” statement in a subsequent
interview with BBC TV news that evening.
56. In a news release issued on 12 February DCC Briggs said: “Applicants are reminded
that the hotline is only open between 5pm and 8pm and that there is no alternative
way of making an application”.
Actions following discovery of Ms A matter
57. CC Maxwell was contacted by ACC Cross on 1 March 2010 to be advised about the
information that had come to light in relation to Ms A.
58. CC Maxwell disclosed that he had authorised the call to be made. He justified this by
saying that the DCC had been under stress due to the recruitment process and he
saw it as his duty to relieve him of that stress.
59. ACC Cross advised the CC that he would have to inform the NYPA of this matter or
ACC Cross would have no option but to inform NYPA herself.
60. At no point during the meeting on 1 March did CC Maxwell mention the matter
involving Mr B.
61. On 2 March CC Maxwell advised Ms Jane Kenyon, Chair of NYPA of the matter
involving Ms A. He subsequently advised Jeremy Holderness, Chief Executive of
NYPA, and was asked to put the details of the matter in writing.
62. Again at no point during these conversations did CC Maxwell mention the matter
involving Mr B.
63. At 9am on 9 March CC Maxwell was informed that Steven Read, head of NYP’s
Professional Standards Department, would be conducting an investigation into the
recruitment process.
64. At 9:30am CC Maxwell met with Simon Dennis, the Force Solicitor. Mr Dennis noted
during this meeting that CC Maxwell disclosed the matter involving Mr B. Mr Dennis
also noted that CC Maxwell advised he had been “an arsehole”. CC Maxwell denied
having said this.
65. Mr Dennis reported the conversation to Mr Read. CC Maxwell was subsequently
asked to submit a further report to NYPA in relation to the matter involving Mr B. This
was done on 12 March 2010.
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Officers’ explanations
DCC Adam Briggs
66. DCC Briggs did not dispute the version of events outlined above.
67. DCC Briggs stated that the CC had made the decision that Ms A should be
telephoned. DCC Briggs believed the CC was entitled to make the decision and at
the time he did not regard it as inappropriate. On reflection he now regarded it as a
minor error of judgement and believed he should have advised the CC that it could
be perceived as something he should not have done.
68. DCC Briggs did not believe he misled the public in the media statements and did not
believe he had breached the Standards of Professional behaviour.
69. DCC Briggs was of the opinion that the reaction to the decisions had been
disproportionate
CC Grahame Maxwell
70. CC Maxwell did not dispute the version of events outlined above.
71. CC Maxwell admitted to two issues of ‘misjudgement’ in relation to Ms A and Mr B.
72. In relation to Ms A, CC Maxwell stated that he believed DCC Briggs was distracted
from resolving the issues around the hotline and he acted to ease the pressure on
him. He was of the opinion that it was within his remit or gift to appoint or promote
police officers to the force.
73. In relation to Mr B he stated that he genuinely believed he was entitled to a call back.
He admitted it was ‘regrettable’ that he undertook the call to Mr. B, but stated he did
not identify himself and stuck to the screening script without engaging in any other
dialogue. This is disputed by Mr B’s account, in which he states CC Maxwell
identified himself.
74. CC Maxwell did not believe he had abused his authority.
75. CC Maxwell was of the opinion that the reaction to the decisions had been
disproportionate
Decision of North Yorkshire Police Authority
76. The IPCC shared the findings from its investigation with NYPA’s Police Professional
Standards Committee, which considered the evidence and recommended CC
Maxwell should attend a hearing for gross misconduct and DCC Briggs should
attend a misconduct meeting. The IPCC agreed with those recommendations.
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Misconduct Outcomes
DCC Adam Briggs
77. DCC Briggs faced a management meeting on 7 December 2010 at which it was
found that he: ‘Accepted and acted upon the suggestion of the CC that you should
give ……(Mrs C), (Ms A’s) telephone number, whereas you knew or ought to have
known that it was an improper suggestion which you should have challenged’.
78. As a result the meeting concluded he had breached the code of conduct on two
counts. These were that he:
• Failed to challenge and report improper conduct;
• Acted in a manner likely to bring discredit upon and undermine public confidence in
the police service – Discreditable Conduct
79. The misconduct meeting concluded DCC Briggs should receive management advice
as a result of the proven breaches.
80. The misconduct meeting found that DCC Briggs did not mislead the public in his
media statements. The meeting found that he was making an ‘accurate assertion not
withstanding that (Ms A) had received a return call’.
CC Grahame Maxwell
81. On 9 May 2011 CC Maxwell admitted to gross misconduct – in that he behaved in a
manner apt to bring discredit upon, and undermine public confidence in, the police
service (discreditable conduct). A misconduct panel determined he should receive a
final written warning.
Conclusion
82. The CC and his deputy are the two most senior officers in the force and are
supposed to lead by example and set the standards for others to follow. They chose
to circumvent systems that had been put in place to benefit people they knew, while
others were expected to follow the process. CC Maxwell’s initial defence was that his
actions were ’direction and control’, essentially saying he could do what he wanted
because he was the Chief Constable. That is an unacceptable attitude from such a
senior officer. It is to be welcomed that CC Maxwell now acknowledges and has
admitted his discreditable conduct.
83. This admission vindicates the IPCC’s decision to proceed with a gross misconduct
investigation.
84. The IPCC would have been failing in its duty if it had not investigated these matters
after they were brought to our attention. The allegations could not pass without
appropriate investigation.
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85. We conducted a thorough, timely and proportionate investigation and I am proud of
the work undertaken by the IPCC investigation team, lead by IPCC Senior
Investigator Mike Grant.
86. Neither CC Maxwell nor DCC Briggs has disputed the key parts of the evidence
against them. I have known both officers in a professional capacity for some time
and had respect for them. Therefore, the outcomes bring me no personal
satisfaction. This matter has seriously undermined the reputations they had
developed and represent a significant low point in the longstanding careers of CC
Maxwell and DCC Briggs.
87. I did consider whether the CC’s hearing should be in public and in principle, I
believed it should. However, the process for directing a hearing in public requires
extensive consultation which can be time consuming. I was mindful, among other
matters, of public confidence in the force, morale within the force at a time of
unprecedented change, additional cost and the welfare of the CC Maxwell.
88. I decided accordingly that those factors outweighed what would have been a
significant delay of six months or more and I decided the hearing should proceed in
private.
89. This has been a very difficult investigation for all concerned, largely due to the senior
positions held by the subject officers. The IPCC at various stages has been accused
of disproportionality. We have been challenged by some senior policing figures and
our investigators’ abilities were questioned by the CC in an unacceptable attempt to
discredit the investigation.
90. Today is the first occasion on which details of this investigation have been made
public, and I am confident that will quash the speculation and gossip that has
surrounded this matter. From the evidence disclosed in this report I trust it will be
clear why the decision was taken to investigate.
91. My role as IPCC Commissioner is to uphold the independence of the organisation
and ensure the public interest is served. I accept that sometimes this brings with it
the risk of personal attack by those who do not agree with my decisions or believe
their positions make them in some way exempt from complaint investigations.
92. Finally, I praise the courage of senior officers and staff within North Yorkshire Police
who decided to make a stand and challenge CC Maxwell and DCC Briggs over their
actions. They recognised the seriousness of what the two officers had done and
acted in a manner that reflected the highest standards of selflessness and integrity.
The past 15 months must have been exceptionally hard for them.
Commissioner Nicholas Long
Date May 2011
A Commissioner's report is not an IPCC Investigation report. The purpose of a Commissioner's report is to share with the public the key
findings and summary of the IPCC investigation, including the Commissioner's own decision making, the outcome of any legal processes
that followed from the investigation, and the learning recommendations. The report belongs to the IPCC Commissioner who retains
oversight of the investigation. The Investigation report is provided to the family or complainant, the police force, individual officers, and
with a Coroner ahead of any Inquest. The Investigation report and related evidence is also provided to the Crown Prosecution Service
when the IPCC considers that serious consideration should be given to whether or not a person should be prosecuted for a criminal
offence. Investigation reports are published only in exceptional circumstances because of data protection or other legal restrictions.
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