IMFGperspectives Evictions in Toronto: Governance Challenges and the Need for Intergovernmental Cooperation
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IMFG
perspectives
No. 32 / 2021
Evictions in Toronto:
Governance Challenges
and the Need for
Intergovernmental
Cooperation
Julie Mah
About IMFG The Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance (IMFG) is an academic research hub and non-partisan think tank based in the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto. IMFG focuses on the fiscal health and governance challenges facing large cities and city-regions. Its objective is to spark and inform public debate, and to engage the academic and policy communities around important issues of municipal finance and governance. The Institute conducts original research on issues facing cities in Canada and around the world; promotes high-level discussion among Canada’s government, academic, corporate, and community leaders through conferences and roundtables; and supports graduate and post-graduate students to build Canada’s cadre of municipal finance and governance experts. It is the only institute in Canada that focuses solely on municipal finance issues in large cities and city-regions. IMFG is funded by the City of Toronto, the Regional Municipality of York, the Regional Municipality of Halton, Avana Capital Corporation, and Maytree. Author Julie Mah received a PhD in urban planning from the University of Toronto. She was the 2020–2021 IMFG Post- Doctoral Fellow and is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Florida. Her research focuses on affordable housing issues, evictions, gentrification and displacement, and equitable development approaches. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Enid Slack, Tomas Hachard, Nevena Dragicevic, and Philippa Campsie for their helpful feedback and edits. Special thanks to Lee Webb for his expert advice and careful reading of the paper. All errors are the author’s responsibility. Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance (IMFG) Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy University of Toronto 1 Devonshire Place Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3K7 email: info.imfg@utoronto.ca http://www.munkschool.utoronto.ca/imfg Series editors: Philippa Campsie and Tomas Hachard © Copyright held by author, 2021 ISBN 978-0-7727-2456-2 ISSN 1927-1921
Executive Summary The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the importance of increased cooperation among different levels of government and of governance structures that enhance intergovernmental coordination so that residents’ needs are effectively addressed. This paper uses residential evictions in Toronto as an example to show why municipalities need to have a seat at the provincial table. The paper explains how provincial policy helps shape the rental housing landscape. Municipalities, in turn, feel the impacts of tenancy laws and provincial policy decisions on evictions and bear the costs in the form of added demand for social services. In particular, although the residential eviction process is controlled by the Province, the City of Toronto experiences the effect of this governance arrangement in the form of a growing homeless population, an increased burden on the shelter system, rising housing instability, and disproportionate eviction impacts on low-income and racialized communities that have also been hardest hit by the pandemic. Municipalities can use their jurisdiction over the development approvals and permitting system to address specific local housing challenges and mitigate some of the effects of the evictions problem, but Canadian cities lack the authority to address the underlying structural issues. While municipalities have the power to develop and implement eviction prevention programs, they are relatively powerless to solve systemic drivers of evictions. That power lies at the provincial level. This gap impedes a municipality’s ability to meet eviction prevention goals. Since municipalities deal with the financial and social impacts of provincial policy decisions, they should be meaningfully included and engaged in the decision-making process. Formalizing bilateral provincial-municipal relations to enable regular meetings and collaborative governance would help address this gap.
IMFG Perspectives
Evictions in Eviction can be simply defined as “a landlord-initiated
move that expels people from their homes.”2 This involuntary
Toronto:
displacement may occur formally and follow a legally
prescribed process, or informally, when a landlord changes the
locks, threatens a tenant with a formal eviction filing, pays
Governance a tenant to leave, or just tells a tenant to leave.3 The process
of eviction also goes beyond the moment in time at which a
Challenges and household is physically removed from its housing. It should
be conceptualized as an “ongoing set of relations between
the Need for
landlord and tenant.”4 As Dan Immergluck et al. argue:
Intergovernmental
Eviction is a complex phenomenon. It is more
than a singular event or even a discrete series of
events that always leads to the forced removal of a
Cooperation tenant. Informal evictions often involve landlords
threatening a tenant with a formal eviction filing or
the nonrenewal of a lease. Eviction filings can be the
Introduction beginning of a forced removal process, but they are
also frequently a tool used to enforce the collection
In Ontario, the uneven economic effects of the COVID-19
of rent and fees, including late payment fees.5
crisis combined with increases in precarious employment
have produced the prospect of an eviction crisis within a
public health crisis. Even before the pandemic, evictions In Ontario, eviction policy is largely the jurisdiction
were considered a problem in Toronto, especially given their of the Province and also the source of intergovernmental
disparate impact on racialized communities.1 COVID-19 tensions between the Province and the City of Toronto.
has laid bare the severity of this problem, as it has done with Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, for instance, Toronto
many other social and urban problems. City Council urged the province to take more action
–1–Evictions in Toronto: Governance Challenges and the Need for Intergovernmental Cooperation
against residential evictions.6 In 2020, the City also made power to do so lies at the provincial level. Therefore, the
a submission to the Province’s Standing Committee growing eviction crisis is not the result of a messy “who does
regarding Bill 184, later enacted as the Protecting Tenants what” issue but illustrates the lack of provincial-municipal
and Strengthening Community Housing Act, 2020. The cooperation and its consequences. Since municipalities have
bill included amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act to deal with the financial and social impacts of provincial
(RTA). The City recommended removing certain changes policy decisions, they should be meaningfully included and
that, it argued, would expedite evictions by removing a engaged in the decision-making process.
hearing requirement in the case of a breach in an agreement. This paper is organized into four main sections. The first
The City’s input was not reflected in the final draft of the presents findings from a literature review on the impacts of
legislation, and in the face of intense community activism, evictions and the structural explanations and systemic drivers
City Council voted to challenge the legislation legally. of forced displacement. The second section provides context
These events suggest a lack of cooperation and on the eviction problem in Toronto through an analysis of
coordination between the municipal and provincial levels, eviction filings. The third section explains the residential
which might be structural in nature. As Tomas Hachard has eviction process in Ontario and outlines the limit of the
pointed out, poor coordination between different orders of city’s power in eviction prevention approaches. The fourth
government is a challenge for cities. Canadian cities suffer section describes the situation in Vancouver and provides a
from an imbalance of power, given their prescribed role as comparison with Toronto’s approaches.
the “ ‘little siblings’ in Canadian federalism, often ignored or The impacts of evictions and the role of
overruled by the other orders of government.”7 Despite the legislation
growing economic and cultural importance of cities, their
Evictions may cause material hardship and mental and
powers and jurisdictions still follow an outdated system,
physical health challenges 10; housing instability and
established when urbanization was not as widespread as it is
homelessness11; job
today.
loss12; and community
In general, a more destabilization.13
productive provincial- The growing eviction crisis is not the result of Tenant households
municipal relationship that experience an
would involve more a messy “who does what” issue but illustrates
eviction have a tarnished
meaningful input from the lack of provincial-municipal cooperation rental record, which
municipalities, as they decreases their ability
are better positioned and its consequences. to rent a suitable unit
to understand how in the future.14 These
policies affect local households can then be
populations. This is an important point made in the City forced to settle for any unit they are approved for, even if it is
of Toronto’s COVID-19: Impacts and Opportunities report. located in a more disadvantaged neighbourhood.15
One recommendation called for a “whole of governments” Residential instability can lead to instability in other
approach to improving prosperity, which involves deepened areas, such as education, work, family, and community life.16
and sustained intergovernmental partnerships at the A study of low-income urban mothers found that eviction
provincial and federal levels. As noted by the report’s authors: leads to financial hardship and health problems for mothers
“The pandemic highlighted that public policy at the national and their children,17 and that forced displacement can have
and provincial levels should be informed by first-hand deleterious effects on children’s educational success, especially
experiences in municipalities.”8 if they have to switch schools.18 Eviction is also connected to
This paper began as a project to disentangle the employment insecurity. For example, Matthew Desmond and
provincial-municipal relationship in residential evictions, and Carl Gershenson found that eviction was a strong predictor of
to clarify the legislative and regulatory frameworks governing job loss, in that low-income renters who experienced a forced
the process. The review showed that the residential eviction move were substantially more likely to lose their jobs as well.19
process lies firmly within provincial jurisdiction. Moreover, Crucially, the incidence of eviction tends to be
provincial policy helps shape the rental housing landscape. experienced unequally along racial, class, and gender lines,
Municipalities, however, feel the impacts of tenancy laws and as numerous studies illustrate that lower-income, racialized,
provincial policy decisions regarding evictions and bear the and female-led households with children experience
costs in the form of added demand for social services. disproportionately high rates of eviction.20 Eviction rates are
Municipalities have the power to develop and implement also higher in Black neighbourhoods.21 These occurrences
eviction prevention programs, but are relatively powerless to highlight important racial and gender disparities in the
solve structural problems, such as vacancy decontrol.9 The eviction process.22
–2–IMFG Perspectives
There are individual and structural explanations for “incentivized landlords to remove existing tenants and raise
the eviction problem. Individual factors include mental rents on the vacated suites.”32
health challenges, unexpected expenses, and low incomes In a 2020 study on landlord-tenant legislative
that contribute to rental arrears.23 Systemic and structural approaches in the United States, Breanca Merritt and
reasons vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on Morgan Farnworth examine the extent to which different
the landlord-tenant policy frameworks and the state of the state tenancy laws may be connected to evictions at the local
affordable housing supply. level. Unsurprisingly, they found that neighbourhoods in
In Toronto, the combination of gentrification, rising states with tenant-friendly policy regimes experienced lower
rents, stagnating income, precarious employment, and a eviction and eviction filing rates compared with those in
severe lack of affordable rental housing are structural factors states with more landlord-friendly policies. However, when
contributing to the evictions problem.24 An increased looking at eviction outcomes in communities of colour,
presence in the rental housing market of financialized25 the authors found that majority-Black neighbourhoods
landlords beholden to investors is also a factor.26 These had significantly higher eviction rates than majority-
landlords are under pressure to return as high a profit as White neighbourhoods, even in states with more tenant
possible from their investments. Evictions are just one way protections. In other words, there are serious racial
they achieve that goal. And although some evictions initiated disparities in eviction in any landlord-tenant policy regime.
by these landlords may be justifiable, others are the result of In light of the looming eviction crisis in the wake of the
extractive business practices to increase rental revenues by global pandemic, they argue that their research “places an
evicting existing tenants, upgrading buildings, and replacing impetus on policymakers to address the disproportionate
the tenants with more affluent households able to pay higher impact of evictions in communities of color.”33
rents.27 Findings from recent research illustrate the differences
The Toronto context
between “mom-and-pop” small landlords and larger
landlords, in that corporate landlords are more likely to file Merritt and Farnworth’s exhortation to American
evictions than smaller landlords.28 policymakers should also be heeded in Toronto, as a spatial
analysis of eviction
Another important
filings in the city
structural factor is the
In Toronto, the combination of gentrification, between 2012 and
role of legislation in
2016 (see Figure 1)
shaping rental housing rising rents, stagnating income, precarious clearly shows higher
markets and creating the
concentrations
conditions for evictions employment, and a severe lack of affordable in racialized
to occur. Tenant-
friendly legislative rental housing are structural factors underprivileged
neighbourhoods.
frameworks are assumed contributing to the evictions problem. Little research has
to afford more tenant
been conducted into
protection and produce
understanding the
fewer evictions, while
landlord-friendly policy approaches presumably contribute prevalence and extent of the eviction problem in Toronto,
to more evictions. For example, in a study of eviction filings with the exception of recent work by Scott Leon and James
in the Atlanta metropolitan area, Immergluck et al. highlight Iveniuk (2020) and by Philip Zigman and Martine August
the influence of state law on “how and when landlords file, (2021).34
and the extent to which landlords view filing eviction as a last The City of Toronto lacks easy and real-time access
resort or as a common and almost automatic response to even to data on eviction applications and landlord applications
an occasional delinquency.”29 Moreover, Chester Hartman and for above-guideline increases, both of which are gathered
David Robinson note that policy tools such as rent control and maintained at the provincial level. Without this
can be extremely helpful in eviction prevention, because timely information, the City cannot gain a complete
affordability is maintained through controlling the amount understanding of the problem, nor can it determine where
rents can be increased each year, although this effectiveness evictions may be occurring, which impedes its ability to
can be undermined by provisions for vacancy decontrol.30 make evidence-based policy decisions.
It is an important distinction, because if landlords are This issue highlights the need for increased
allowed to set rents for vacant units at whatever price the coordination between the City and Province. The City has
market will bear, this “creates an enormous incentive to push requested that the Province provide open data on eviction
sitting tenants out, often by use (and more often abuse) of the applications and other types of applications submitted
law, such as owner move-in clauses.”31 In Ontario, the 1997 by landlords to the Landlord and Tenant Board.35 The
Tenant Protection Act brought in vacancy decontrol, which Executive Director of the City’s Housing Secretariat
–3–Evictions in Toronto: Governance Challenges and the Need for Intergovernmental Cooperation
Figure 1: City of Toronto Eviction Application Location Quotients (L1, L2, L4), 2012–2016
Source: Landlord and Tenant Board data, map compiled by the author.
also recommended that the City request a “Data Sharing mostly in the postwar inner suburbs in the city’s northwestern
Agreement between the City of Toronto and the Landlord and northeastern areas that are home to a large percentage
and Tenant Board to facilitate regular information sharing of new immigrants and visible minorities.39 The racialized
on evictions, above guideline increases and other tenancy- impacts of evictions are also echoed in Leon and Iveniuk’s
related data.”36 Enabling better access to this real-time data is 2020 study, which found that Black renter households may
a concrete example of how improved coordination between be at higher risk of eviction in Toronto.40
the municipal and provincial levels is necessary to inform In his 2010 analysis of income polarization in
effective decision-making, program development, and Toronto, Hulchanski noted that low-income households
monitoring. have transitioned out of the central city over the past few
Based on eviction filings data from the Landlord and decades to the periphery, where there is poorer access to
Tenant Board, I calculated location quotients (LQs) to public transit and services. During that same period, inner-
uncover spatial concentrations of eviction filings over city neighbourhoods became the home of more affluent
time. Figure 1 identifies the census tracts with higher households, so it is unsurprising that eviction filings would be
concentrations of eviction filings, which are shown in darker less concentrated in the central area, as many disadvantaged
blue. An LQ of less than 1 indicates that the tract has a households have already been filtered out.
smaller share of eviction filings than the city as a whole. The map also shows that eviction filings are
An LQ greater than 1 means that the census tract has a disproportionately concentrated in most of the 31
higher-than-average spatial concentration of eviction filings Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (NIAs) – high-need,
compared with the city as a whole. So, for example, an LQ of underserved areas designated by the City of Toronto to
2.0 indicates that eviction filings are twice as concentrated in prioritize investment in social services and infrastructure. In
that tract relative to the city overall. fact, a deeper look at the top 10 census tracts with the highest
Although an eviction filing does not necessarily mean concentrations of eviction filings in the city between 2012
that an eviction has occurred, considering that formal and 2016 indicates that seven of these 10 tracts are located
evictions represent a significant undercount of involuntary within an NIA.
displacement,37 this data may still be a good indicator of Though the map of eviction filing LQs (Figure 1)
landlord behaviour and intent.38 is historical, the trend of high concentrations in the
As shown in Figure 1, the clustering patterns of eviction northwestern and northeastern areas of the city holds true
filings align with David Hulchanski’s “City #3,” which over a period of five years. These patterns are concerning in
generally refers to the low-income areas of Toronto located light of the COVID-19 pandemic, as they are also the areas
–4–IMFG Perspectives
Figure 2: Toronto COVID-19 Cases per 100,000 People, as of December 10, 2020
Source: Data from the Ontario Ministry of Health, integrated Public Health Information System (iPHIS); Toronto Public Health, Coronavirus Rapid
Entry System (CORES), map compiled by the author.
that have borne the brunt of COVID infections. As Figure constituting more than one-third of rental arrears in
2 shows, NIAs – home to a large percentage of non-white Canada’s CMAs.
households – have experienced a higher incidence of COVID This large number of Toronto region households
cases per 100,000 people. In short, racialized communities experiencing arrears is concerning. Many of these
are being disproportionately affected by COVID-19 in terms households may be facing eviction because of their
of infections and economic impacts and are at heightened risk inability to catch up on missed rental payments. This
of eviction since the lifting of the eviction moratorium at the situation is exacerbated by the lockdown orders that came
end of July 2020.41 into effect in the City of Toronto and Peel Region in
A simple mapping of eviction filings during the early late November 2020, which severely impacted economic
months of the pandemic (see Figure 3) from April to opportunities for those with precarious jobs.
November 2020 clearly shows that filings are occurring in the The residential eviction process and municipal
NIAs but also in the downtown areas. The map suggests some constraints in preventing evictions
clustering in areas with historically higher eviction LQs – for Figure 4 illustrates the legislative and bureaucratic
example, South Parkdale, the Moss Park area, Upper Jarvis frameworks governing the residential eviction process
Street near St. Jamestown, and the Weston neighbourhood. in Ontario and the different eviction prevention
There were more than 19,000 eviction filings across Ontario, mechanisms employed by the City of Toronto. The
and more than 5,000 eviction filings (L1, L2, L4)42 in eviction process is governed by provincial legislation,
Toronto between April and November 2020. namely the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA), 2006.
Further, to provide a snapshot of the potential evictions This piece of legislation outlines the relationship
problem resulting from the pandemic, the Canada Mortgage between landlords and tenants in terms of rights and
and Housing Corporation’s (CMHC) October 2020 Rental responsibilities, and sets out the composition and
Market Survey included data on the level of rental arrears functioning of the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB),
nationwide. Ontario had the highest arrears rate in the which adjudicates eviction cases (and other tenancy-
country with tenants in slightly more than 10 percent of related disputes).
purpose-built rental units experiencing arrears. In the Toronto Residential intensification has been occurring in the
Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), more than 34,000 city’s downtown areas and other urban growth areas as
households (or 10.7 percent of units) were in arrears, which designated by the Province’s Growth Plan. This increased
represented almost $55 million in missed rental payments, density has been described as the “condofication”
–5–Evictions in Toronto: Governance Challenges and the Need for Intergovernmental Cooperation
Figure 3: Toronto Pandemic Eviction Filings (L1, L2, L4), April to November 2020
Eviction Filings (Aug. 1 to Nov. 1, 2020)
Eviction Filings (April 1-July 31, 2020)
Source: Landlord and Tenant Board data, map compiled by the author.
of Toronto; it has resulted in the demolition of existing assistance with “relocation beyond the amounts required by
affordable units and created upward pressure on rents.43 provincial legislation”; the right to return to a replacement
The city can use its jurisdiction over development controls unit; and an extended notice period.46
to assist with eviction prevention and mitigate some of the Other City programs, such as Eviction Prevention in
negative impacts of redevelopment. For example, to prevent the Community (EPIC), have helped forestall eviction and
evictions, the City has invested in a number of programs ensured some tenants retain their housing.47 However, the
(as shown in Figure 4)44 and has increased support for these majority of eviction filings are for non-payment of rent. In
programs to respond to COVID-19’s financial impacts on the a legislative context in which rent control applies only to
city’s precariously employed tenant households, who now find sitting tenants48 and not to new tenants, landlords also have
themselves at increased risk of eviction given the lockdowns an incentive to push existing tenants out so that they can raise
and resulting job losses or reductions in work hours. rents on these units.49 To bypass rent limits, landlords can
In particular, Toronto’s rental housing demolition and apply for above-guideline increases (AGIs) if they experienced
conversion bylaw and Official Plan policies help protect an extraordinary increase in property taxes, or incurred
against demovictions (whereby all tenants from a building eligible capital costs or operating costs related to security.
are evicted so that it can be demolished) by requiring a Financialized and corporate landlords are responsible for
one-for-one replacement of affordable and mid-range rental 64 percent of all AGI applications in Toronto from 2012 to
units at similar rents. Although these policies apply only 2019, which represented 84 percent of affected units.50 In
when six or more units are proposed for demolition, the City contrast with other types of private landlords, who pursue
has managed to secure 3,571 rental replacement units since profit-making strategies, financialized landlords51 use their
200745; it is, however, unclear how many affordable and mid- size and access to capital markets to create “new ways to
range rental units in buildings with five or fewer units have extract greater profits from old apartment buildings.”52 AGIs
been lost. constitute just one revenue-generating tool they employ to
Toronto has also secured tenant relocation and assistance derive higher profits for investors.53 In their detailed analysis
plans through Section 37 of the Planning Act, which enables of AGIs in Toronto, Zigman and August54 outline how these
municipalities to allow increases in height and density for a above-guideline rent increases accrue to significant sums of
development beyond what is permitted by the zoning by-law money over time beyond what a tenant household would
in exchange for community benefits. For example, in certain have paid if there was no AGI: “Because AGIs involve an
cases, the City has required developers to provide financial additional increase of up to only a few percent per year,
–6–IMFG Perspectives
Figure 4: Diagram of Residential Eviction Process in Ontario* Tenant or landlord can request to review an
STAGE 2 STAGE 3 order. Can also appeal an order to the STAGE 5
Divisional Court.
Notice of Termination (N form) given to tenant by Court Enforcement Office
landlord: Landlord applies to Landlord Order Tenancy or Sheriff ’s Office‡
LTB Hearing
N4 – non-payment of rent } and Tenant Board (LTB) to issued terminated (Ministry of the Attorney
Provincial Day after evict tenant (L Form):
N5 – damages and interfering with others General)
legislation curative L1 – Application to evict a tenant Notice of
N6 – illegal acts or misrepresenting income in RGI unit No agreement If the tenant does not
(Residential period for non-payment of rent and to Hearing
N7 – causing serious problems reached Tenancy vacate the premises by the
Tenancies ends and no collect rent tenant owes sent to
N8 – predominantly used to evict for persistent late preserved termination date indicated
Act, 2006) resolution L2 – Application to evict tenant Tenant
payment of rent LTB Mediation in the eviction order, the
L4 – Tenant failed to meet by LTB
N12 – landlord, purchaser, or family member requires by Board landlord can file the order
unit conditions of settlement/order** mediator with the Sheriff ’s Office and
STAGE 4
N13 – landlord wants to demolish, repair, or convert unit the Sheriff will supervise
the changing of the locks
Payment Agreement (in cases Failure to meet conditions
Mediation and evict the tenant from
involving arrears) reached and filed of agreement may result in
STAGE 1 agreement the unit. A Notice to Vacate
eviction order without
reached will be issued that provides
notice†
(agreement is the time and date the
LTB may issue a consent order, in legally binding) Sheriff will arrive to enforce
which case the hearing is cancelled the eviction order.
Rental housing replacement
Eviction prevention programs and services:
Legal Assistance Actors:
Under Chapter 667 of the Toronto
• Eviction Prevention in the Community (EPIC) program: Housing
Municipal Code and Official
City of Allowance; Bridging Grant; Homelessness Prevention Fund The Tenant Duty Counsel Program (TDCP) is managed by the
Plan Policy 3.2.1.6, the City
Toronto • Rent Bank Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) to provide legal
requires one-for-one replacement
eviction • Housing Stabilization Fund (assistance for Ontario Works or Ontario services to tenants at the Landlord and Tenant Board (ACTO,
of rental housing at similar rents
prevention Disability Support Program recipients)
when six or more existing rental
• Tenant Defence Fund
2019). Tenants can also obtain help from community legal
policies and units at affordable or mid-range
programs • Tenant Hotline; Financial Trusteeship services clinics, such as Parkdale Community Legal Services, or from Pro
rents are proposed for demolition.
Bono Ontario or the OBA Tenant-Lawyer Connection Portal.
Source: Lee Webb (CERA), personal communication; McDonald, “Examining Evictions through a Life-Course Lens”; Leon and Iveniuk, Forced Out;
CERA, Eviction Prevention and Navigating the Landlord and Tenant Board for Community Workers, 2020, retrieved from https://www.equalityrights.org/s/
CERA-Guide-final-interactive.pdf; LTB forms (tribunalsontario.ca); Ecker et al., “An Evaluation of the EPIC Program.”
*This diagram illustrates the process for tenants and landlords in the private rental housing market and is for informational purposes only. There is a different process
governing evictions in the non-profit co-operative housing sector. Also, it is worth noting that social housing providers, such as Toronto Community Housing (TCH),
have additional eviction prevention policies, where evictions are sought only as a last resort.
** “L4 applications are not available until after a Mediated Agreement or Consent Order is made. So, normally they are filed in Stage 4 as shown on this diagram.
Usually, an L4 is decided by the LTB before notifying the tenant. However, the LTB will hold a hearing if it detects anything out of the ordinary with the L4
application.” (Lee Webb, Manager of Services and Education, Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation (CERA)).
† “Failure to fulfil a condition in either a Mediated Agreement or a Consent Order allows a landlord to file an L4 application. This normally results in an eviction
order without notice. However, this order is then sent to the tenant, usually in time for them to file a Motion to Set Aside an Ex Parte Order. A stay of eviction is
automatically granted when a Motion to Set Aside is filed.” (Lee Webb, CERA).
‡ “At any point prior to the execution of the eviction order, where the eviction is for rental arrears, a tenant can pay all the money owing to that date and void the
eviction. If this happens after a hearing at the LTB, the tenant needs to also file a ‘Tenant’s Motion to Void an Eviction Order for Arrears of Rent.’ This may result in
another hearing if the motion is filed after the termination date on the eviction order.” (Lee Webb, CERA)
their financial significance may be underestimated.” The the symptoms or effects of the structural problems but
“AGI-inflated rent” can create additional financial strain is powerless to address the root causes. Since residential
on tenants, especially those on a fixed income, which may tenancies fall under provincial control, the levers to effect
result in displacement as tenants can no longer afford to pay systemic change exist outside the municipality’s jurisdiction.
increasingly high rents. According to Zigman and August, Moreover, the recent changes to the Residential Tenancy
“applying for AGIs can serve a dual purpose, not only Act (RTA), as outlined in the Protecting Tenants and
securing rent increases above the guideline but also displacing Strengthening Community Housing Act, appear to illustrate
tenants unable to afford the increase, thus achieving turnover the City’s inability to shape a piece of legislation that has a
and enabling even larger rent increases.”55 direct impact on its social infrastructure and demonstrate
In response, the City can implement eviction prevention the need for a more coordinated approach to developing
programs, such as rent banks, which offer interest-free loans policy. The City of Toronto’s submission to the Standing
to help with rental arrears, but these programs cannot fully Committee on Social Policy regarding Bill 18457 contained
stem the tide, as they address only a part of the problem or recommendations to modify proposed RTA amendments, but
individual-related causes of evictions and do not address the these recommendations are not reflected in the final version.
structural causes behind evictions.56 One major divergence in the City’s and Province’s
The power to address many of the underlying structural positions on eviction prevention had to do with procedural
causes of evictions lies at the provincial level. The Province fairness; one RTA amendment allowed an eviction order to
could pass legislation to eliminate vacancy decontrol and occur without requiring a hearing for a breach of a repayment
re-examine the use of AGIs and the eligibility criteria. agreement filed with the LTB. In its submission, the City
Without provincial action, the City is forced to cope with expressed concern that this proposed amendment would
–7–Evictions in Toronto: Governance Challenges and the Need for Intergovernmental Cooperation
make it “easier to evict thousands of tenants who fell into accommodation, which was considered beyond the City’s
arrears during COVID-19.”58 The tenant does have the right jurisdiction.64
to bring a motion to the LTB (within 10 days of the eviction While the City controls the issuing of development
order) to request the eviction order be set aside and to request permits under the Zoning and Development Bylaw and
a hearing, although the closure of LTB service counters due building permits under the Building Bylaw, there are “legal
to lockdown measures made this more difficult. A recent limits on the types of conditions that can be placed on both
report by the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) a Development Permit and a Building Permit.”65 Conditions
that was endorsed by a number of community legal clinics for a development permit “must relate to the form and use
highlighted slow processing times for the Motion to Set Aside of the development” and conditions for a building permit
an Ex Parte Order (Form S2).59 “must relate to the construction and code compliance of
Considering the important role that provincial legislation the building.”66 Considering that tenant relocation cannot
plays in shaping and contributing to the incidence of arguably be related to building construction, the TRPP
evictions, and the fact that lower-income communities of cannot be imposed as a condition of issuing a building
colour in Toronto are experiencing disproportionately high permit.67 This story of the TRPP illustrates the limit of
rates of eviction filings, the City of Toronto needs meaningful municipal authority to achieve stated goals of effective
input into the policy development process at the provincial eviction prevention.
level. The City’s powers can address only the symptoms rather Conclusion
than the roots of the problem. The City ends up developing The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the need for increased
programs to help as many people as possible who get caught cooperation between different levels of government and
up in the raging river of evictions when a more effective for governance structures that enhance intergovernmental
solution would be to stop people from being pushed into the coordination so that residents’ needs are effectively addressed.
river in the first place. In particular, evictions
Provincial policy should demonstrate the need
be informed by on- for municipalities
the-ground municipal to have a seat at the
experiences.60 Provincial policy should be informed by on- provincial table. While
the residential eviction
The Vancouver the-ground municipal experiences.
process is controlled by
experience
the Province, the City
Renovictions and of Toronto experiences
demovictions have also the serious impacts of
become serious problems in Vancouver.61 An exploratory this governance arrangement, in terms of a growing homeless
scan of the landlord-tenant regimes in British Columbia population, an increased burden on the shelter system, rising
and municipal responses to evictions reveals that Vancouver housing instability, and disproportionate impacts on low-
has similar experiences to Toronto in terms of jurisdictional income and racialized communities.
limitations (see Table 1).
Municipalities can complement provincial legislation
Vancouver has supplemented British Columbia’s by using their jurisdiction over the development approvals
Residential Tenancy Act (RTA) provisions with a Tenant and permitting system to address specific local challenges.
Relocation and Protection Policy (TRPP), which was For example, Vancouver’s Tenant Relocation and Protection
enhanced in 2019 with increased coverage, tenant Policy requires compliance with notice requirements,
compensation, and relocation support, among other compensation, and tenant assistance before a development
requirements.62 Under this policy, the City requires owners to permit can be issued. However, as the Vancouver case
provide Tenant Relocation Plans as a condition for obtaining illustrates, there is a limit to the authority and ability of
a development permit. municipalities to address an evictions crisis, given the
This and other aspects of Vancouver’s municipal eviction narrow range of revenue tools at their disposal and lack of
prevention approach offer a strong response in comparison jurisdiction over residential tenancies.
with other Canadian cities. Like Toronto, though,
63
Strong tenant protections can help stem evictions
Vancouver has been limited in its ability to extract additional related to rent increases, renovations, conversions, and
protection for tenants in the case of renovictions. Vancouver’s demolitions. Legislative approaches to address systemic
TRPP applies only to owners who require a rezoning drivers of evictions, such as vacancy decontrol, can also aid
or development permit. It does not extend to building in preventing evictions. However, the jurisdiction to address
permits. This runs counter to the city’s original intention to the structural causes of the evictions problem lies at the
have the policy apply to all permits and all types of rental provincial level. Municipalities can mitigate some of the
–8–IMFG Perspectives
Table 1: Provincial Residential Tenancies Legislation and Intergovernmental Relations in Ontario and British Columbia
(Select Provincial Legislative Areas Related to Eviction)
BRITISH COLUMBIA ONTARIO
Vacancy control No vacancy control. No vacancy control.
Rent increases Landlords cannot increase rent beyond the No landlord can increase rent beyond the annual guidelines
maximum allowable percentage amount, (which is the percentage change from year to year in
defined as the inflation rate (or 12-month Consumer Price Index, or a maximum of 2.5 percent).
average percentage change in Consumer Price However, this does not apply to new rental properties
Index). Landlords can apply for above-guideline occupied after November 15, 2018. Landlords can
increases if they have made significant repairs apply for above-guideline increases if they incurred “an
or renovations or have incurred a financial extraordinary increase” in municipal taxes; eligible capital
loss from increases in operating expenses or expenditures; and/or operating costs related to security
unforeseen financing costs purchasing the services.
residential property. Current rent freeze effective
from March 30, 2020, to December 31, 2021.
Renoviction and Under the Residential Tenancy Act (RTA), Renters are entitled to three months’ rent or another
demoviction renters are entitled to four months’ notice and acceptable rental unit when they are evicted for the purpose
protections one month of free rent if the landlord wants to of demolition in cases where the residential complex
terminate a tenancy for demolition, renovation, contains at least five residential units and one month rent
or conversion and has all the required permits in cases where the residential complex contains fewer than
and approvals. The tenant has right of first five units. Tenants are entitled to 120 days’ notice. In the
refusal, but there are no requirements ensuring case of repairs or renovations, the tenant has right of first
that the rent will be similar post-renovation. refusal to reoccupy the rental unit after renovations are
completed at a similar rent. Additional compensation to
the tenant is to be provided if landlord acts in bad faith,
though generally in practice tenants would have to file an
application at the LTB and show at the hearing that they
were evicted in bad faith.
“Landlord own use” Landlords may terminate a tenancy if they or Landlords may terminate a tenancy if they in good faith
repossession of unit: a close family member in good faith intends to require the unit for themselves, their family, or a person
protection against reside in the unit. The tenant is entitled to one who will provide care services. Tenants are entitled to 60
abuse month’s rent payable and two months’ notice. days’ notice and one month’s rent or the offer of another
If the unit is not used for the stated purpose, acceptable rental unit. Additional compensation to the
then the tenant is entitled to additional payment tenant is to be provided if landlord acts in bad faith.
equal to one year’s rent.
Vancouver Toronto
Municipal action The City supplements British Columbia’s Rental housing replacement and conversion by-laws are
RTA provisions with a Tenant Relocation in place. Other interventions include Eviction Prevention
and Protection Policy (TRPP), which was in the Community (EPIC) program; Rent Bank; Housing
enhanced in 2019 with increased coverage, Stabilization Fund (assistance for Ontario Works or
tenant compensation, and relocation support Ontario Disability Support Program recipients); Tenant
among other requirements. Under this policy, Defence Fund; tenant hotline; and financial trusteeship
the City requires owners to provide Tenant services.
Relocation Plans as a condition for obtaining a
development permit.
Inter-governmental issues Tenant Relocation Plans apply only where owners The City’s powers to address the systemic drivers of evictions
require a rezoning or development permit. They do are limited and it can address only the symptoms, rather
not extend to building permits. The City’s original than the roots of the problem. Given that the power to
intention was to have the policy apply to all permits effect systemic change lies at the provincial level, meaningful
and all types of rental accommodation. This was inclusion of municipalities in policy development and
considered beyond the City’s jurisdiction. implementation is important.
–9–Evictions in Toronto: Governance Challenges and the Need for Intergovernmental Cooperation
effects of the evictions problem, but Canadian cities lack the at a minimum for the lockdown period initiated on November 23,
authority to fully address structural issues. This gap impedes a 2020 and lasting until the lockdown is lifted” (City of Toronto,
municipality’s ability to meet eviction prevention goals. Response to COVID-19: Persevering Through Resurgence, Report,
November 26, 2020. Retrieved from http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/
A way to address this gap has been advanced by
viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2020.HL23.1). In January 2021,
Hachard68 in that increased coordination and cooperation
the Province temporarily halted the enforcement of evictions for the
between all three levels of government (federal-provincial- duration of the stay-at-home order (see footnote 41).
municipal) is needed to address many policy challenges.
In the case of evictions in Ontario, formalizing bilateral
7
T. Hachard, It Takes Three: Making Space for Cities in Canadian
provincial-municipal relations would provide “formal avenues Federalism, IMFG Perspectives No. 31 (Toronto: Institute on
for regular meetings and collaborative governance”69 and Municipal Finance and Governance, University of Toronto, 2020),
p. 2.
would enhance timely data-sharing.
8
D. Mowat and S. Rafi, COVID-19: Impacts and Opportunities
There exists a Toronto-Ontario Cooperation and
(Toronto: City of Toronto, 2020), p. 31.
Consultation Agreement (T-OCCA), first signed in 2008
and renewed in 2019 for a four-year term. As stated in the
9
Under vacancy decontrol, rent increases may be regulated for
preamble of the agreement,70 “it is in the best interests of sitting tenants, but once a tenant vacates a unit, the landlord
the parties to exchange input on broad policy matters of can raise rents to whatever level the market will bear. Essentially
mutual interest and to identify impacts that could arise from this allows for “rent increases of any amount upon turnover.” M.
proposed changes in legislation, regulations, resolutions or August, “The financialization of Canadian multi-family rental
housing: From trailer to tower,” Journal of Urban Affairs, 42:7
bylaws.” This agreement is not widely known and appears
(2020), 975–97. The implication of vacancy decontrol is that in
to be mostly symbolic, although if the T-OCCA were
gentrifying areas, there is a strong incentive to push out existing
strengthened and put into practice, it would, in its own
tenants so that the units can be let out at a higher rental rate.
words, “result in the achievement of mutual objectives and in
more informed decision-making.”71
10
M. Hatch and J. Yun, “Losing your home is bad for your health:
Short- and medium-term health effects of eviction on young
adults,” Housing Policy Debate, forthcoming, published online
Endnotes October 20, 2020. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.
1
S. Leon and J. Iveniuk, Forced Out: Evictions, Race, and Poverty in com/doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2020.1812690?journalCode=rh
Toronto (Toronto: Wellesley Institute, 2020). pd20; M. Desmond and R. Kimbro, “Eviction’s fallout: Housing,
hardship, and health,” Social Forces 94:1 (2015), 295–324; C.
2
B. Merritt and M.D. Farnworth, “State landlord–tenant policy Hartman and D. Robinson, “Evictions: The hidden housing
and eviction rates in majority-minority neighborhoods,” Housing problem,” Housing Policy Debate 14:4 (2003), 461–501.
Policy Debate, forthcoming, published online November 17, 2020,
p. 1. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080 L. McDonald, “Examining evictions through a life-course lens,”
11
/10511482.2020.1828989 Canadian Public Policy 37 (2011), 115–33.
3
“Off-the-books evictions may account for a significant fraction
12
M. Desmond and C. Gershenson, “Housing and employment
of landlord-initiated moves.” M. Desmond, “Eviction and the insecurity among the working poor,” Social Problems 63:1 (2016),
reproduction of urban poverty,” American Journal of Sociology, 46–67.
118:1 (2012), 95. See also D. Immergluck, J. Ernsthausen, S. Earl, 13
M. Desmond, C. Gershenson, and B. Kiviat, “Forced relocation
and A. Powell, “Evictions, large owners, and serial filings: Findings and residential instability among urban renters,” Social Service
from Atlanta,” Housing Studies, 35:5 (2020), 903–24; J. Balzarini, Review 89:2 (2015), 227–62.
and M. Boyd, “Working with them: Small-scale landlord strategies 14
R. Sims, “More than gentrification: Geographies of capitalist
for avoiding evictions,” Housing Policy Debate, forthcoming, displacement in Los Angeles 1994–1999,” Urban Geography 37:1
published online September 2, 2020. Retrieved from https://www. (2016), 26–56.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2020.1800779
15
M. Desmond and T. Shollenberger, “Forced displacement from
4
P. Garboden and E. Rosen, “Serial filing: How landlords use the rental housing: Prevalence and neighborhood consequences,”
threat of eviction,” City and Community 18:2 (2019), 639.
Demography 52:1 (2015), 1751–72.
5
Immergluck et al., “Evictions, large owners, and serial filings,” 16
Desmond, Gershenson, and Kiviat, “Forced relocation and
p. 906.
residential instability.”
6
Toronto’s City Council adopted two motions in two separate 17
Desmond and Kimbro, “Eviction’s fallout.”
meetings in September and November 2020, calling on the
province to reinstate the moratorium on residential evictions that
18
Hartman and Robinson, “Evictions: The hidden housing
had been lifted at the end of July 2020. The motion adopted in problem.”
November 2020 called on the provincial government “to reinstate 19
Desmond and Gershenson, “Housing and employment
the moratorium on residential and commercial evictions applicable insecurity.”
– 10 –IMFG Perspectives
20
See, for example, Hartman and Robinson, “Evictions: The hidden 32
August, “The financialization of Canadian multi-family rental
housing problem”; Desmond, “Eviction and the reproduction of housing,” p. 5.
urban poverty”; M. Desmond and C. Gershenson, “Who gets 33
Merritt and Farnworth, “State landlord–tenant policy and
evicted? Assessing individual, neighborhood, and network factors,” eviction rates,” p. 14.
Social Science Research 62 (2017), 362–77.
Leon and Iveniuk, Forced Out; Zigman and August, Above
34
21
Desmond, Gershenson, and Kiviat, “Forced relocation and Guideline Rent Increases.
residential instability”; Merritt and Farnworth, “State landlord–
tenant policy.”
35
See City of Toronto, City of Toronto Submission on Bill 184 –
Protecting Tenants and Strengthening Community Housing Act,
22
Merritt and Farnworth, “State landlord–tenant policy.” 2020, July 28, 2020. Retrieved from http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/
23
J. Ecker, S. Holden, and K. Schwan, An Evaluation of the Eviction viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2020.PH15.10
Prevention in the Community (EPIC) Program (Toronto: Canadian 36
City of Toronto, Actions to Promote the Protection of Residential
Observatory on Homelessness Press, 2018). As Desmond and
Rental Tenancies – Update, September 10, 2020. Retrieved
Kimbro argue in “Eviction’s fallout,” given the severe rent burdens
from: https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2020/rh/bgrd/
among low-income tenants, it does not take an unexpected event,
backgroundfile-156582.pdf
such as a death, to cause a household to miss a rent payment, as
“pedestrian expenses or setbacks – for example a reduction in work
37
Desmond, Gershenson, and Kiviat, “Forced relocation and
hours, or public benefits sanction – can cause families to come up residential instability”; Hartman and Robinson, “Evictions: The
short with the rent” (p. 298). hidden housing problem.”
24
Ecker et al., An Evaluation of the EPIC Program; A. Chum, “The
38
Sims, “More than gentrification.”
impact of gentrification on residential evictions,” Urban Geography 39
D. Hulchanski, The Three Cities within Toronto: Income
36:7 (2015), 1083–98. Polarization Among Toronto’s Neighbourhoods, 1970–2005 (Toronto:
25
Financialized landlords include “real estate investment trusts Cities Centre, University of Toronto, 2010).
(REITs), private equity funds, financial asset management 40
Leon and Iveniuk, Forced Out.
firms, and other investment vehicles.” M. August and A. Walks, 41
In January 2021, the provincial government instituted a second
“Gentrification, suburban decline, and the financialization of multi-
eviction moratorium. While hearings would continue at the
family rental housing: The case of Toronto,” Geoforum 89 (2018),
Landlord and Tenant Board and eviction orders could still be
124. August (“The financialization of Canadian multi-family
issued, enforcement of these order would be paused during the
rental housing,” p. 3), defines financialization, as it relates to rental
emergency stay-at-home order.
housing, as “the moment at which ownership of a multi-family
building transfers from a non-financial operator to a financial 42
L1s, L2s, and L4s refer to specific forms that landlords use to
vehicle, such as a REIT, private equity fund, institutional investor, apply to the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) to evict a tenant.
or asset management firm. At this moment of sale, a building See Figure 4 for more details.
becomes a financial asset, ultimately owned by disparate investors.” 43
U. Lehrer and T. Wieditz, “Condominium development and
26
For more details on the rise of financialized landlords in Toronto gentrification: The relationship between policies, building activities
and Canada, see August, “The financialization of Canadian and socio-economic development in Toronto,” Canadian Journal
multi-family rental housing,” and P. Zigman and M. August, of Urban Research 18 (2019), 140–61; G. Rosen and A. Walks,
Above Guideline Rent Increases in the Age of Financialization, report “Castles in Toronto’s sky: Condo-ism as urban transformation,”
prepared for RenovictionsTO, 2021. Retrieved from https:// Journal of Urban Affairs 37:3 (2014), 289–310.
renovictionsto.com/agi-report 44
The City has a 10-year housing plan (HousingTO 2020–2030
27
August, “The financialization of Canadian multi-family rental Action Plan) to increase and preserve Toronto’s affordable housing
housing.” supply, which is effectively a longer-term strategy of eviction
28
Immergluck et al., “Evictions, large owners, and serial filings”; prevention. The diagram in Figure 4 highlights only those programs
E. Seymour and J. Akers, “ ‘Our Customer Is America’: Housing that are directly related to eviction prevention and tend to be more
insecurity and eviction in Las Vegas, Nevada’s postcrisis rental short-term, immediate policy responses.
markets,” Housing Policy Debate, forthcoming, published online 45
City of Toronto, Proposed Official Plan Amendment to the City’s
November 9, 2020. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/ Affordable and Mid-range Rent Definitions, September 8, 2020.
doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2020.1822903?journalCode=rhpd20 Retrieved from: https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2020/ph/
29
Immergluck et al., “Evictions, large owners, and serial filings,” bgrd/backgroundfile-156420.pdf
p. 906. 46
City of Toronto By-Law No. 107-2015.
30
Hartman and Robinson, “Evictions: The hidden housing 47
Ecker et al., An Evaluation of the EPIC Program.
problem.” 48
Those living in newly constructed rental units occupied after
31
Hartman and Robinson, “Evictions: The hidden housing November 15, 2018, are exempt from rent control provisions and
problem,” p. 488. there is no legal limit on rent increases for these units.
– 11 –You can also read
