Ideals of the Good Life: A Longitudinal/Cross-Sectional Study of Evaluative Reasoning in Children and Adults
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Ideals of the Good Life:
A Longitudinal/Cross-Sectional Study of Evaluative Reasoning
in Children and Adults
by
Cheryl Armon
A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Harvard
Graduate School of Education of Harvard University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education
April, 1984
Acknowledgements
My first thoughts of appreciation go to Albert Erdynast who, methodology, as well as in countless personal ways, include my
through his perceptiveness (and not a little strength of will) close friend Anat Abrahami, without whose intelligence,
persuaded me to take a new intellectual path. Second, I wish to persistence, and confidence, the scoring manual for this work and,
thank my teacher, advisor, and mentor, Lawrence Kohlberg. For perhaps, the opus itself, could never have become what it is;
six years, my aim has been to internalize his clarity of thought and Edward DeV os whose strengths in both statistics and patience
rigorous methodology as the standards for my own work. allowed me to ask the right questions and bear up under the
Simultaneously questioning and encouraging my interests, he has answers; Richard Mattingly, my life's mate, who has not only
supported me through a difficult yet satisfying intellectual stage of suffered through those months of "thesis-writing syndrome" with
my life (and there is no regression!). incredible compassion, but also assisted with the statistical analyses
and graphics; my friend of twenty-five years, Ilena Dunlap, whose
Two other individuals have significantly influenced my knowledge of grammar and style has been helpful, but whose
thinking. Tom Robischon, who first dangled the philosophical expressions of confidence and encouragement have been of more
carrot, and Israel Scheffler, who helped me to grasp it. lasting value. Finally, I thank my daughter Aura who, after
surviving the insanity of the last year, may never go to college.
Others who have helped me with problems of theory and
© 1984 Cheryl Armon. ALL RIGHTS RESERVEDTable of Contents
List of Tables......................................................i
List of Figures....................................................ii
Abstract..........................................................iii
Introduction........................................................1
Section I: Philosophy of the Good Life..................................8
Chapter 1: Philosophical Framework for a Study of the Good Life....9
Chapter 2: Philosophical Concepts and Terms.......................17
Chapter 3: Aristotle's Conception of the Good Life................22
Chapter 4: Epicurus' Conception of the Good Life..................34
Chapter 5: Spinoza's Conception of the Good Life..................39
Chapter 6: J. S. Mill's Conception of the Good Life...............45
Chapter 7: Dewey's Conception of the Good Life....................51
Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusions of Section I................58
Section II: Psychology of the Good Life.................................72
Chapter 9: Structural-Development Model and Literature Review.....75
Chapter 10: Neo-Structural and Non-Structural Literature Review....91
Chapter 11: Discussion and Conclusions of Section II..............128
Section III: Empirical Study of Ideals of the Good Life...............141
Chapter 12: Methods and Reliability...............................142
Chapter 13: Clinical Analysis: Good Life Stages..................151
Chapter 14: Clinical Analysis: Philosophical Orientations........168
Chapter 15: Relation of Good Life Stages to Moral Judgment and
Social Perspective-Taking Stages......................174
Chapter 16: Results................................................187
Chapter 17: Discussion and Conclusions of Section III..............211
Chapter 18: Discussion, Limitations, and Future Research...........224
Reference List..........................................................238
Appendix A: The Good Life Scoring Manual
Appendix B: The Good Life Interview
Appendix C: The Standard Form M oral Judgment Interview
Appendix D: Longitudinal Case Examples
i
List of Tables
1. Categories of Value...............................................19
2. Aristotlelian Virtues.............................................26
3. Primary Goods.....................................................68
4. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment Development......................81
5. Social Perspective-Taking Stages..................................89
6. Being Values.....................................................114
7. Rokeach's Terminal and Instrumental Values.......................123
8. Comparison of Developmental Sequences............................128
9. Correlations of Issues and EM S Scores Between 1977 and 1981......148
10. Distribution of Philosophical Orientations in the W hole
Sample and the Adult Group.......................................149
11. Value Elements...................................................171
12. Correlation Matrices of EM S and Issue Scores in 1977 and 1981....189
13. Frequency of Good Life and Moral Judgment Stages.................190
14. Raw Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Scores....................191
15. Comparative Relation of EM S to MMS Scores........................192
16. Distribution of Philosophical Orientation with Conventional and
Post-Conventional Good Life and Moral Judgment Levels............201
17. Distribution of Moral Types with Good Life and Moral Judgment
Levels...........................................................202
18. Association Between Philosophical Orientations and Moral Types...203
19. Philosophical Classification of Developmental Constructs.........230
ii
List of Figures
1. Natural and Non-Natural Goods.....................................14
2. Summary of Differences in Philosophical Views of the Good.........69
3. The Developmental Relationship Between Cognitive, Social
Perspective-Taking, and Good Life, Moral, and Faith Stages......86
4. Joint Distribution of EM S and MMS in 1977........................193
5. Joint Distribution of EM S and MMS in 1981........................193
6. Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Attainment with Age in 1977...195
7. Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Attainment with Age in 1981...195
8. Relation of Age to Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Change.....1983 9. Relation Between Education and Stage Attainment in Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Scores in 1981..........................205 10. Relation Between Difference in Education and Stage Change in Good Life and Moral Judgment.....................................206 11. Good Life Stage Attainment, Age, and Gender in 1981..............207 12. Moral Judgment Stage Attainment, Age, and Gender in 1981.........208
Abstract
This four-year, longitudinal/cross-sectional study investigates the plausibility of a structural model of evaluative reasoning about ideals
of the good life and justice reasoning with subjects ranging in age from 5 to 72. The construct of evaluative reasoning, which includes both
moral and non-moral components, is specified both psychologically and philosophically and distinguished from other developmental
constructs such as justice reasoning. It is claimed that the model is normative. Support is found for this claim in an analysis of five schools
of thought from traditional ethical theory that results in a minimal conception of the good life upon which the differing ethical theories might
agree.
A scoring manual for evaluative reasoning in the domains of good life, good work, good friendship, and the good person is presented
with high reliability and internal validity. It is shown that, with the findings to date, the stage sequence constructed meets the general
Piagetian criteria for a structural stage model. It is also shown that much of the meaningful content of evaluative reasoning can be classified
according to categories derived from traditional ethics and metaethics.
Particular analyses are focused on adult structural development. It is shown that a significant percentage of individuals over 20 years
old continue their development in both evaluative and justice reasoning and that the post-conventional stages that are postulated in both
models are restricted to members of this age group. It is also shown that advanced education beyond the baccalaureate level is a significant
factor in the development of post-conventional reasoning.
It has been a central tenet of structural-developmental ideals that are structurally represented in the sequential stage
psychology to focus on the consistent and universal, rather than the model.
anomalous and unique aspects of human development (Piaget,
1968; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981). W ith this guiding principle, research The psychological approach to ethics has been to describe the
has consisted of investigations of those human activities that share phenomena and/or the development of human valuing. This
a universal function, for example, logical thinking (Piaget, 1954) approach interprets observable behavior and reasoning involved in
and certain forms of moral, social, and epistemological reasoning the processes and consequences of ethical reasoning. The aim is to
(Kohlberg, 1981; Selman, 1980; Broughton, 1978). Following this explain, rather than to prescribe, the development and expression
paradigm, it is the purpose of this study to show that aspects of both of values or moral principles. In the present work, psychology is
moral and non-moral evaluative reasoning, conceived of here under coupled with philosophy to form a philosophically supported
the general construct "ideals of the good life," also conform to a psychological theory.
universal human function and, as such, are appropriate for
structural-developmental investigation and analysis. There are two main reasons for the necessity of philosophy in
a study of evaluative reasoning about the good life. The first and
Drawing from both developmental psychology and ethical most obvious reason is that ideas concerning value or the good are
philosophy, this work defines a structural, hierarchical model of ethical in nature. To say something is good is to make an ethical
evaluative reasoning about the good life. Its general conclusions claim and ethics is a philosophical domain. In this study, ethical
are that, although such reasoning varies across persons, it does not theory provides not only a systematic analysis of morality and
vary randomly. On the contrary, evidence will be presented here value, but also a philosophical conception of the person and of "the
to show that value reasoning has underlying structural components good life."
that fall into a sequential pattern of developmental stages, the
highest of which, it will be claimed, meets philosophical criteria of For example, the present conception of stages of evaluative
adequacy. Thus, parallel to Kohlberg's (1981; 1973a) model of reasoning is dependent on a philosophical conception of the person
justice reasoning, the normative aspect of this constructed model of as a rational human being capable of making and acting upon
evaluative reasoning about the good life relies on a philosophically autonomous life choices (Rawls, 1971). In accordance with Rawls,
justified articulation of the highest stage. it is assumed that, to one degree or another, persons formulate
rational life plans that are organized by their conceptions of the
In addition to categorizing structures into developmental good. These conceptions are comprised of ideals and virtues, the
stages, it will be shown that the content of ethical reasoning can be fulfillment of which leads to happiness. In order for one to have a
categorized in a meaningful way, that is supported both empirically rational life plan based on the good, the organization of the plan
and theoretically. These categories represent "philosophical must form a structure that is generally consistent across domains of
orientations," defined not in terms of the underlying structure of experience; that is, each individual must construct a consistent
value reasoning, but in terms of the actual ultimate values that philosophy of what is good. Generally, the structure of the good is
cohere an individual's philosophy of the good life. Thus, in viewed as an organization of values and ideals that provide
conjunction with a theory of structural development, a content individuals with both motivation and meaningfulness in life.
analysis model will also be presented. Specifically, the structure of the good provides a consistent set of
criteria that the individual uses in making evaluative decisions and
The term "ideals of the good life" may bring to mind many judgments. It is this very philosophical conception that guides the
different concepts. It represents the general construct of the present present study of ideals of the good life and that has a significant
study and is constructed from both traditional ethics and structural- impact on both its psychological theory and its methodology.
developmental psychology.
The second reason for the necessity of philosophy is that the
The operational definition of the good life that will be used in present developmental model is a normative one; that is, it is
this study is, first, the combined set of human ideals that persons claimed that the highest stage is most adequate. Such a claim
affirm in normative evaluative judgments about the good life, in requires a philosophical as well as a psychological conception of
general, and about good work, good friendship or relationship, and adequacy.
the good person, in particular. Second, it is the sets of reasons
individuals give in support of these judgments. Although the fundamental scheme of this study is
psychological and, thus, primarily descriptive, part of any
Thus, operationally, ideals of the good life consist of two developmental analysis includes an explanation of where
major components. The first is a description of what traits of development leads. Typically, such psychological analyses blur the
character, objects, actions, or experiences are truly good. The boundaries between descriptive and prescriptive work.
second concerns the justification of this description. It is these2
Particularly noteworthy for a study that includes a normative of ideals of the good life. This chapter also includes a discussion
model is the issue of whether the developmental model is the result of Kohlberg's model of justice reasoning development and Selman's
of a collection of observations that fall into arbitrarily ordered (1980) model of social perspective-taking development--two
categories. If so, criticisms concerning the leap from the empirical models of central import to the present work. In Chapter 10 a
"is" (non-ethical premises) to the philosophical "ought" (ethical description of ten other psychological studies that relate to the
conclusions) are warranted. G.E. Moore (1903) first referred to present investigation of the good life will be presented. These
this leap as the "naturalistic fallacy," an idea of increasing import studies present theoretical models and empirical findings that
in structural-developmental psychology. A way to respond to this inform a developmental model of evaluative reasoning about the
problem is to incorporate in an empirical study of human valuing good life. They also provide empirical information for the
the support of philosophical justification. (For a discussion of the construction of philosophical orientations.
"naturalistic fallacy" in psychological research, see Kohlberg,
1969; in philosophy, Frankena, 1973.) The discussion in Chapter 11 will closely examine these
studies correspondences not only with one another, but also with
To address these concerns, an attempt first will be made here the structural-developmental paradigm in general. Under close
to highlight rather than obscure both prescriptive and descriptive scrutiny, discrepancies will be examined and implications from
elements, and to keep them distinct. Second, to the extent that this these studies about a developmental model of evaluative reasoning
work will commend any particular form of thought, it will rely on will be discussed.
normative ethics rather than empirical psychology for justification.
In Section III, a cross-sectional/longitudinal study of
The psychological theory and methodology employed in this evaluative reasoning about ideals of the good life conducted by the
study relies on the structural-developmental research paradigm. A author will be presented. Chapter 12 contains the methods of the
Piagetian/Kohlbergian structural analysis (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, study, in general, and of the structural analysis, in particular. In
& Lieberman, 1983; Colby & Kohlberg, in press; Kohlberg, addition, it will be shown that the validity and reliability of the
Levine, & Hewer, 1983) will be performed on both cross-sectional good life assessment methodology is supported. Chapter 13
and longitudinal data, consisting of responses to open-ended contains the first set of the study's results. There the stages
interview questions, such as "W hat is the good life?" and "W hat is themselves will be described in detail. Chapter 14 will describe the
a good person?", from individuals comprising a wide age-range. empirical construction of the philosophical orientations. In Chapter
15, the theoretical relationships between good life stages and both
The first model integrating developmental psychology and moral judgment and social perspective-taking stages will be
formal philosophy was advanced by Piaget (1954). This model discussed. The statistical results of the study will be presented in
concerns the study of logical reasoning. Kohlberg (1958) Chapter 16, including the empirical relationships between good life
constructed such a model for the study of reasoning about justice, stages and a number of other variables, such as age, education,
or right action (1981; Colby & Kohlberg, in press). Reasoning gender, and moral judgment development. In Chapter 17, a
about the good, however, has not yet received this form of research discussion of the empirical results will be presented.
attention. The present work relies heavily on Kohlberg's model of
the development of justice reasoning, but attempts to expand the Finally, in Chapter 18, both the psychological and
domain of morality that is investigated developmentally beyond philosophical considerations raised throughout this work will be
"justice," to include the moral good as manifested in ethical ideals discussed in terms of their relationship to one another. Implications
of the good life. and limitations the study will be discussed as well as plans for
future research.
In Chapter 1, the philosophical framework for this study will
be presented. Philosophical issues concerning a study of evaluative Section I
reasoning will also be discussed. Philosophies of the Good Life
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the philosophical terms and You pretend that you are not calculated for philosophy?
concepts to be used throughout this work. Then, Chapters 3 W hy then do you live, if you have no desire to live
through 7 present five normative ethical views of the good life. properly? (Diogenes Laertius [1925])
Although each view is put forth through the writings of a particular
philosopher, each is meant to be representative of a different school Chapter One
of thought on the nature of human ends. Each view purports to Philosophical Framework for a Study of Ideals of the Good Life
describe somewhat different objective values for human beings.
This review is not meant to be exhaustive of either a particular Traditionally the philosophic approach to ethics, including
scholar's ethical system nor of all the possible schools of thought in both "the good" and "the right," has been a systematic attempt to
traditional ethics. It merely describes exemplary models of ethical answer value- related questions of seemingly universal interest. In
systems concerning the good life. ethics, some typical questions are: what is the good life? what is
worth wanting and working for? what is the right thing to do?
Chapter 8 compares and contrasts these five views. There it what is a good person? The moral philosopher concerned with
will be described how these views, taken as a whole, provide what is good or right is often working out a systematic explanation
support for a normative model of ethical reasoning. In addition, it and justification of the primacy of certain values or principles over
will be show how the differences between the views inform the others.
construction of philosophical orientations.
Moral philosophy, or ethics, is commonly divided into two
Section II initiates the psychological section of this thesis. In major classes. The first contains theories of the right, or of
Chapter 9, the integrative model of psychology and philosophy is obligation; the second contains theories of the good. For the
described and the structural-developmental paradigm to be used in purposes of the present work, both the philosophical and the
this study will be presented. This description will draw primarily psychological focus is on reasoning about the good. Philosophical
from the work of Piaget (1970, 1960) and Kohlberg (1981, Colby, theories of the good are rarely constructed independent of a theory
et. al, 1983, Colby & Kohlberg, in press) in defining the general of right action; however, the reverse is not the case. There are a
characteristics and specific criteria for a developmental stage model number of moral theories of right action that are constructed3
independently of any particular conception of the good. (See, for kind of life that persons ought to seek. The theoretical construct of
example, Kant, 1785; Rawls, 1971.) the present study follows this concept. A common approach to
defining the good life in these ancient works was to work out an
This author accepts the views of Kant and Rawls that theories analysis and description of human nature and then to construct a
of the right are not dependent on any particular conception of the model of human life that would fulfill this nature, one to which
good. It is merely proposed here that a consistent, generalizable some or all persons were capable of conforming. Concurrent with
theory of the good is also plausible. this task was the attempt to construct a justification as to why these
persons should conform to a particular ideal as opposed to some
There has been some controversy as to whether ideals of the other or none at all. In other words, Greek philosophers attempted
good life fall within a category of phenomena designated as to show that value statements in their model, such as "X makes a
generalizable or universal, and thus be appropriate for good person" or "X is good," are in some sense true.
developmental research. The major theme of this controversy has
been philosophical in nature and concerns the distinction between The plausibility of, or the procedures for, the justification of
the good and the right. For example, Rawls (1971) views good value statements has remained central to ethics. The problem can
lives as pluralistic, focusing on the primacy of universal justice be stated thus: if normative value statements are to be meaningful,
principles for the distribution of the conditions for the attainment they must be shown to be objective. Only if there can be truth in
of a good life. Similarly, Kohlberg (1981) has focused his judgments that assert that certain traits, actions, or objects are good
discussion of the good or ideal life on its metaethical or religious for all persons can value judgments have objectivity (Adler, 1981).
components, such as the meanings of life and morality that are
supportive of right action, rather than on any normative or A review of the various philosophical approaches to the
prescriptive concepts of good. Boyd (1980) summarizes both of problems of justifying ethical or value statements is not required
these views: here (see Brandt, 1959, for a review). It is sufficient to state that,
philosophically, the present work assumes that there are methods
Conceptions of the good and ideals of human perfection that can be used to show some ethical statements to be valid or true.
are by no means unimportant for Rawls and Kohlberg. Relying on the constructivist approach (Rawls, 1971; Piaget, 1970)
But they do not constitute the essence of morality nor it will be held here that methods of ethical justification must be
adequately circumscribe the proper entry point into moral constructed solely for that purpose because conceptions of ethics
questions. For both pursuit of the good and human or of value constitute a special case in human experience. Once
perfection is subordinated as a concern to adjudicating constructed procedures are applied, some ethical statements will
differences among individuals on how the good and hold up while others can be shown to be indefensible.
human perfection are to be defined, furthered, and
distributed. One cannot understand this entry point unless One point about the justification of value statements consonant
one under- stands that they assume that individuals do and with any philosophical view is that we cannot justify normative
will differ in this fundamental way. This presumption of statements about the good solely by the fact that we desire
human conflict rests on a more fundamental belief that the something. Socrates refers to this problem when he repeatedly
good, even for one individual, is not one but pluralistic. reminds us that our regarding something as good because we desire
Choice of the good is seen as fundamentally subjective it does not make it good. The fact that we happen to desire
and pluralistic, and the moral point of view is seen as something may make it appear good at the time, he tells us, but it
objectivity seeking, interpersonal, and adjudicatory. does not make it truly good. But it is argued here that this need not
mean that we can never make normative statements about the
From such a perspective, ideals of the good life, however rich good.
and distinctive, can be reduced to the subjective preferences of
particular persons. This then can lead to the notion that these ideals Addressing a similar concern to Socrates', Aristotle (Ethics)
are, or can be, co-equally valid or, at least, that there is no distinguishes two broad categories of the good. The first contains
justifiable way of advocating one preference over another. The non-natural values. These are values that are identical with the
thrust of Rawls' and Kohlberg's argument, however, does not particular desires that individuals acquire and act upon over the
concern the relativity and subjectivity of the good, per se, but rather course of an individual life. These values are relativistic goods that
the insistence on the philosophical distinction between the good vary from person to person.
and the right, and the subordination of the former to the latter. In
the main, their views are constructed as arguments against the The second category, in contrast, contains values that are
utilitarian idea that principles of right action are to be derived from inherent in the human condition. They are rooted in human
a theory of the good. Their concern is for the autonomy of potentialities or capacities. These values are "natural values" and,
morality, considered as the domain of right action or justice. in contemporary literature, are sometimes referred to as human
"needs" (see Adler, 1981; Maslow, 1964).
The present study affirms these theorists' views concerning the
relation of the good to right action. It does not, however, conform In the present study, this distinction between natural and non-
to the psychological implication that all reasoning about the good natural goods is used. The natural goods are defined here as those
differs in some fundamental way from reasoning about the right. values that are considered common to all persons, not necessarily
Here certain aspects of evaluative reasoning are seen as consistent defined as "needs" but, rather, as objective values. The non-natural
systems that have both moral and non-moral dimensions, but that goods are considered here to be those subjective values that differ
exclude morally right action. not only across persons but also within persons across time and
context. As mentioned earlier, a developmental investigation relies
The issues of pluralism and the subjectivity of the good bring on the identification of generalizable phenomena. Thus, to study
to this study a concern about the justification of value judgments. the development of reasoning about the good, some conception of
This is because if value statements cannot, in some sense, be shown natural or objective values is required.
to be objective, then the notion of a generalizable conception of the
good life must have to be abandoned. The natural values can be divided into internal and external
values.1 Internal values are values of human rationality and choice.
In ancient Greek ethics, the good life was thought to be the Their attainment is through activities in which persons voluntarily4
engage. Such values can include those things we desire to do (for man. Under the doctrine of hedonism, the means to pleasure (even
example, acting virtuously) or those we desire to be (for example, if those means are perfecting) are of secondary consideration; it is
autonomous or wise). Internal values are internal in the sense that the pleasure consequences of an object, motive, or activity that is
they have their existence in the person rather than being dependent to be the basis for the identification of any good.
on an external source.
W ithin hedonism, as within perfectionism, there are divisions.
In contrast, external values are partly or completely external to Classical hedonism focuses on the good as it relates to the pleasure-
the person. They never depend solely on what one chooses to do. consequences to the individual self. In contrast, social hedonism
They are circumstantial values in the sense that the fulfillment of emphasizes the aggregate of pleasure of all persons concerned.
them depends either partly or wholly on circumstances beyond
one's control. Figure 1 is a graphic representation of these The presentation of the ethical philosophies in Chapters 3
categories. through 7 has the general purpose of providing the philosophical
support for the developmental model of reasoning about the good
Figure 1 life. Indeed, these theories provide two forms of support. The first
Natural and Non-Natural Values form of support lies in the inherent similarities among otherwise
varying theoretical views. The existence of these similarities, it
VALUES will be argued, supports a minimal conception of the good life as
being comprised of agreed-upon objective values. This minimal
NATURAL VALUES NON-NATURAL VALUES conception will be shown to provide philosophical support for the
normative nature of the good life stages. The second form of
Objective; Universal Subjective; Relativistic support is found in the way in which the variance of these theories
External Internal Internal External can be categorized in terms of end-values. These categories are
Prosperity Chance Prosperity Chance then used to categorize subjects' non-structural responses, forming
the construct, philosophical orientations.
Rational; Voluntary;
To do, To be In summary, ethics provides the philosophical framework for
the present study. Ethical theory is not only capable of informing
W ith these distinctions made, the fuller, philosophical a psychological model of evaluative reasoning, it is both an
construct of the good life can be defined. Here, the use of the term essential and interdependent aspect of it.
good life will be understood philosophically to be limited to those
objects, actions, traits, or experiences considered to be really Chapter Two
valuable, that is, objectively valuable. It is the fulfillment of the Philosophical Concepts and Terms
objective values, those values that are good for all human beings
(Adler, 1981). Philosophical terms such as ethics and metaethics are rarely
used with strictly identical meanings in the works of various
However, being a good person (an internal, natural value), for authors. The terms being somewhat arbitrary, this chapter briefly
example, does not by itself suffice for the achievement of a good delineates some general historic trends in their usage and clarifies
human life. Some of the natural values that a person needs are how the terms will be used in this study.
external values of chance. Even the attainment of certain interior
perfections is partly dependent upon favorable external In short, "normative and prescriptive ethics or statements" will
circumstances. Hence, the modified Aristotelian model that here refer to theoretical systems or concepts that attempt to answer
distinguishes between objective and relativistic, and internal and questions about how we ought to live and what we ought to be. In
external goods is accepted as part of a working model. In accepting contrast, "metaethics" will refer to the analysis of moral concepts
this model, however, Aristotle's methods of justification need not or terms such as the good or "the right" and to the justification and
be used. As mentioned earlier, for justification this work only meaning of normative moral arguments. The goal of metaethics is
assumes the view of the constructivists, namely that there are not to commend or to prescribe what we ought to do, but to analyze
correct ways or procedures for answering ethical questions even if and describe underlying meanings within normative and
it is not yet known exactly what they are. The approach used in this prescriptive ethical theory, argument, and language.
study combines ethical philosophy, structural-developmental
psychological theory, and empirical findings to support its claims. In the history of philosophy, theories such as those of Plato or
Aristotle were ethical systems. These philosophers sought to
W ith the philosophical construct of the good life, comprised as provide general guidance concerning what we ought to do, what we
it is of the totality of the objective goods as espoused above, the ought to seek, and how to treat others. Their task primarily
question remains concerning what those goods may be. Five consisted of systematically setting forth first principles (criterion
philosophical views on what the good life consists of are presented principles to which all other rules and principles should conform)
in Chapters 3 through 7. and in showing how it is possible to justify such principles with
metaethics. Such expositions would include both a conception of
The views that are to be presented can be classified as either the good life for man and the philosopher's theoretical conceptions
hedonistic or perfectionistic. Theories that fall roughly under the of the limits of justification (Nowell-Smith, 1954).
heading of "perfectionism" generally hold that the valuable activity
of life is the development (perfecting) of the capacities inherent in In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, some
a living being. Perfection-our own or others'--is the ultimate value philosophers strongly questioned the normative or prescriptive
of life. But even among perfectionists, there is disagreement as to element of ethical works. They argued that a philosopher had no
which capacities to perfect. Three different forms of perfectionism special insight about either the good life or the right way to act.
will be presented here: functionalism, unitarianism, and These authors saw the philosopher's work as the analysis of the
progressivism. meaning of ethical concepts, statements, and arguments. The
common objective of their approach was not practice but
In contrast to perfectionism, the hedonistic view defines the knowledge. Of course, traditional philosophers also analyzed
good as that which is, or brings, pleasure--an intrinsic value to ethical concepts, but what distinguished the analytical philosopher5
was the regard for analysis as the sole philosophical task. Thus, usage employed here. Thus defined, right is an irreducible notion
through the work of analytic philosophers, metaethics became a (Ross, 1930; Hare, 1952).
distinct school of thought (see, for example, C.I. Lewis, 1946;
G. E. Moore, 1903; Nowell-Smith, 1954; R. B. Perry, 1926) In contrast to the meaning given to "right", "moral good" refers
primarily to actions only when such actions proceed from an
Previous and parallel to the development of such metaethical ethical, or morally good, motive. Right and morally good cannot
theories, however, the traditional, normative form of ethical mean the same thing. This follows from the Kantian principle that
theories continued to be advanced and has increased in the "I ought" implies "I can". One can act from a certain motive only
philosophical literature in the last two decades (see, for example, if he or she has that motive; no one can choose, at least at a
Rawls, 1971, 1980; Nagel, 1970; Nozick, 1974; MacIntyre, 1981). moment's notice, to be possessed of a particular motive. Thus it
Current ethical theories, much like traditional ones, include cannot be a duty or an obligation, which "ought" implies, to act
metaethical considerations for the purpose of clarifying or from (or to have) a morally good motive (Ross, 1930).
underpinning various aspects of a particular ethical view.
Aside from actions that proceed from morally good motives,
The form of ethical theory that includes both metaethical and moral good typically refers directly to the motives themselves, or
normative ethical considerations will be followed in the present to persons, intentions, or traits of character. In these cases, as in
work. Although the focus of this study will be on normative ethical the case of morally good action as proceeding from a morally good
reasoning, a full understanding of a particular theory of the good motive, moral good is synonymous with moral worth--it is
life depends, in part, on the knowledge of how concepts such as something that can only reside in the person. Judgments
"good", "right", and "value" are to be understood. concerning the moral worth of persons are referred to as aretaic
judgments.
In addition, "normative" is to be distinguished from
"prescriptive." A normative judgment or theory will refer to values "Moral good" can also refer to the consequences of an action,
that are commended or advocated, but are not considered as even when the intention of or motive for that action was morally
morally obligatory (Ross, 1930). Prescriptive judgments will refer bad. Consider Kant's example of the storekeeper who decides that
to moral judgments of right action that carry with them a formal, a policy of honesty brings in the highest profit. To distinguish
moral obligation or "duty", that is, a commitment to an action that these two usages of the term "moral good", references to traits,
is in accordance with them (Hare, 1952). intentions, motives, and the like that reside within the person will
be referred to in terms of moral worth or aretaic judgments. In
Right, Moral Good, Moral W orth, and Non-Moral Good contrast, those references to the moral good, such as welfare
consequences, that result from some particular state of affairs, with
Like the terms "ethics" and "metaethics", the precise meanings its cause external to persons, will be referred to as "total moral
of "right", "moral good", "moral worth", and "non-moral good" are good", or "morally good consequences."
obscure. Therefore, what is of central importance here is not how
these terms are used by various scholars, but rather how they will There are also judgments of non-moral good, often called
be used here. The definitions that follow rely primarily on the judgments of non-moral value. Here such judgments refer not to
works of Frankena (1973), W . D. Ross (1930), and C.A. Campbell motives, traits of character, or persons, but to the total non-moral
(1935), and are generally consistent with the works of Rawls (1971; goodness of particular events or actions or to all sorts of other
1980), R. B. Perry (1926), and C.I. Lewis (1946). These things such as paintings, tools, lifestyles, or furniture. Such things
definitions are summarized in Table 1. may be thought of as good either because they themselves possess
good or value, or because they contain some form of good-making
Table 1 characteristics (Frankena, 1973).
Categories of Value
Moral Moral Moral Non-Moral Non-Moral Chapter Three
Right Good W orth Good Good Function Perfectionism
(aretaic) (intrinsic) (extrinsic) Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)
actions; welfare motives ends means W hat is by nature proper to each thing will be at once the
obliga- (e.g., con- (e.g., con (e.g., (e.g., painting, best and most pleasant for it. A life guided by intelligence
tions, sequences scientious) autonomy cars) is the best and most pleasant for man, inasmuch as
duties to others) knowledge) intelligence, above all else, is man. Consequently, this
kind of life is the happiest (1178 a5).
First, the word "good" itself has no special moral or ethical
connotation. It is used here with its most general meaning as an In the Ethics, 2 Aristotle offers a detailed description of the
adjective of commendation, implying the existence a high, or at good life--a system of activity lived by the good person in a just
least satisfactory, degree of characteristic qualities which are either society. Rejecting a transcendent or divine source, Aristotle claims
admirable in themselves or useful for some purpose. the good is to be found within the peculiar activity of human
beings. Constructing a single-principle teleological theory, he
The word "right", however, will be used here only in its moral identifies "the good" as a functional perfectionism; his goal is to
sense. Consistent with the definition of "prescriptive" above, right define human beings' unique and supreme functions and then to
will refer only to (a) human actions, and (b) only to those human identify the reasons and methods for the perfection of those
actions that are considered morally obligatory, that is, considered functions.
a duty. "Obligation," or "duty," in this sense is not synonymous
with compulsion; rather, it expresses the same meaning as "ought For Aristotle, the ultimate end of human happiness is
to be done." eudaimonia. Although a common translation of eudaimonia is
"happiness," it seems better served by the term "well-being" (Ross,
By defining "right" in terms of human actions and obligation, 1923; Ring, 1980). Eudaimonia is realized in activity; happiness
other uses of right, such as "the right book" are excluded from the tends to connote a passive state.6
Eudaimonia is a quality in activity that persons are to seek over Like theoretical and practical wisdom, the moral virtues are
the course of a complete life. It is through activities of human characteristics that must not only follow the dictates of reason, but
goodness that we can achieve it. also must be solely within our own power and voluntary:
For something to be an instance of human goodness, Aristotle In the case of the virtues, an act is not performed justly or
claims, it must be self-sufficient. Only something that can be with self-control if the act itself is of a certain kind, but
attained within the person, independent of external circumstances, only if, in addition, the agent has certain characteristics as
is worthy of being chosen. This is the Aristotelian conception of he performs it: first of all, he must know what he is doing;
natural goods that was discussed in Chapter 1. As ends in secondly, he must choose to act the way he does and must
themselves, such goods are the activities of well-being. choose it for its own sake; and in the third place, the act
must spring from a firm and unchangeable character
In his discussion of what these activities must be, Aristotle (1105a30).
identifies the functions peculiar to persons. The outcome of his
analysis is the identification of the exercise of reason as not only Virtuous action is not good unless it proceeds from a good motive,
the peculiar function of humans, but also the humans' highest which for Aristotle is the deliberate desire to perform our function
faculty (1097a13-1098a20). Eudaimonia must be the force of this well as human beings. This conception of virtuous action as
faculty and it must be an activity and not a mere potentiality proceeding from a good motive is consistent with the discussion of
(1098a6). "moral worth" in Chapter 2. Table 2 lists the moral virtues
identified by Aristotle. He also provides specific, corresponding
Other forms of life that do not hold reason as their primary actions for the expression of these virtues. These actions, however,
value are rejected as a result of Aristotle's search for the ideal. He are not central to this discussion. It is difficult to describe and
rejects the life of pleasure because pleasure is not unique to human understand the specific actions that Aristotle defines as those
beings--a life of pleasure, he argues, can be experienced by other proceeding from a virtuous character without reference to the
animals. He also rejects the life of honor as the ideal because such particular culture and society, in addition to the specific social
a life depends more on the intentions, motives, and activities of roles, within which they are to take place (cf. MacIntyre, 1981).
others and is thus not under the one's sole rule. Finally, he rejects Therefore, for the purposes of the present analysis, it will suffice to
the pursuit of wealth as an ideal aim because it is not only have an understanding of the human characteristics, traits, or
dependent on others, it is also a means to something, rather than an motives that precede virtuous acts, and a general sense of how such
end in itself. Throughout the Ethics, and particularly in the Book aspects are to be put into practice.
X, Aristotle tries to show that the life of theoretical contemplation,
supported by the activities of practical reason, is the highest end. Table 2 3
Aristotlelian Virtues
Reason is most active in two broad arenas: theoretical and
practical science. Although theoretical science is, for Aristotle, the Excess MEAN Defect
highest form of knowledge, it is practical science that deals with the Cowardice COURAGE [unnamed]
use of reason for the organization of life itself. The practical Rashness COURAGE Cowardice
sciences of ethics and politics have as their end neither study nor Profligacy TEMPERANCE Insensibility
reason per se, but rather the very activity of living a good life Prodigality LIBERALITY Illiberality
(Ostwald, 1979). Illiberality LIBERALITY Prodigality
Vulgarity MAGNIFICENCE Meanness
Practical and theoretical wisdom, as intellectual virtues, are Vanity SELF RESPECT Humility
thus central to the good life. Practical wisdom, in this context, is Ambitiousness [unnamed] Unambitiousness
the power of good deliberation--not about how particular things are Irascibility GENTLENESS Unirascibility
made but about things "good for oneself." In other words, it Boastfulness TRUTHFULNESS Self-depreciation
describes how a whole state of being that would satisfy human Buffoonery W ITTINESS Boorishness
beings is to be brought into existence. In ethics and politics, it is Obsequiousness FRIENDLINESS Sulkiness
the true aim of practical reason to identify "...not in a partial sense,
for example, what contributes to health or strength, but what sort of States of Feeling
thing contributes to the good life in general" (1139b28). The aim
of practical reason in ethics is to act in a certain way. It is not Bashfulness MODESTY Shamelessness
abstract knowledge, but action, and it is action in accordance with Envy RIGHTEOUS
moral virtue. INDIGNATION Malevolence
On the other hand, theoretical wisdom is directed to the loftiest Although Aristotle's conception of moral virtue as actions or
objects. Theoretical wisdom is the contemplation of non- traits that proceed from good motives is consistent with the
contingent truths from intuitive reason, such as the truths of framework of the present study, Table 2 shows that he makes less
mathematics and geometry, and of the truths of natural science. distinction between moral and non-moral virtues (cf. Chapter 2).
The aim of theoretical wisdom is study or contemplation. W here in the present work moral virtues consist only in those
activities or traits that effect the welfare of others, Aristotle
In praising a man's character, Aristotle does not refer to his includes such traits as modesty and wittiness that would be
theoretical or practical wisdom alone; he also refers to his moral considered as character traits but not moral ones. The difference
virtues. It is important to note that in Greek literature, the word between these two conceptions of moral virtues can be best
virtue (arete) denotes a functional excellence rather than the more understood by recalling the Greek conception of virtue, which is to
modern, puritanical notion (Ostwald, 1979). Moreover, Aristotle's be understood as excellence in human function. This idea is far
use of moral concepts when discussing the virtues has a rather more broad or general than the limited conception of moral virtues
broad semantic range. Moral virtues are a set of qualities that will described in Chapter Two.
make persons fulfill their unique function as persons --properly and
well. Aristotlelian theory is in particular accord with modern ethical
theorists (for example, Rawls, 1971, 1980; Ross, 1930), however,7
when it identifies self-respect as the central virtue of the good life. doing, recognizes the essential social nature of man: "No one would
The person with true self-respect is he whose "deserts and claims choose to live without friends even if he had all other goods"
are alike great" (Ross, 1923, p. 208). For Aristotle, this virtue (1155a5).
presupposes all the others and enhances them. Self-respect is a
result of acting knowingly in accordance with excellence in all the Aristotle identifies both the need of all persons for friendship,
activities of life. as well as a range of types of friendship, but the ideal friendship
holds a special place in his ethics, and, like the good person, is an
As can be seen in Table 2, Aristotle determines the proper end in itself.
experience of the virtues through the mean (1107a-1109b). Unlike
the intellectual virtues, which can never be excessive, the degree of Aristotle's focus on morally good motives is particularly clear
activity within moral virtues involves a calculation of a median in his discussion of friendship. There are three motives from which
between excess and deficiency for each individual (1114b26). He we feel affection, he tells us: the good, the pleasant, and the useful
goes to great lengths, however, to show that the mean cannot be (1155b180). To be friends, each partner must wish for the good of
defined in fixed terms, but must be a result of the deliberation of the other on the basis of one of these motives, and must be aware
each individual considering his own particular capacities and of the other's will. Each of these three motives are the foundation
desires (1106b15-1107a). The theory of the mean, a most original of three distinct types of friendship.
contribution to ethics, allows for individual differences of human
will and choice, particularly the variability in moral or virtuous The first type of friendship is grounded in utility--"the partners
behavior. In Aristotle's view, this variability is a natural limitation do not feel affection for one another per se, but in terms of the good
in ethics: accruing to each from the other" (1156a10). Because this form of
friendship is not directly dependent on what sort of person one is,
Precision cannot be expected in the treatment of all but rather on what each person brings to the other, Aristotle
subjects alike...Problems of what is noble and just, which believes that such friendships are easily dissolved since
politics examines, present so much variety and irregularity "...usefulness is not something permanent, but differs at different
that some people believe that they exist only by times" (1156a22). Moreover, since we regard a thing as useful
convention and not by nature. The problem of the good, when it serves as a means to something else, we cannot say it is
too, presents a similar kind of irregularity, because in worthy in itself of affection.
many cases, good things bring harmful results. There are
instances of men ruined by wealth, and others by courage. The second type of friendship is one based on pleasure: a
Therefore, in a discussion of such subjects...we must be union in which individuals care for one another because of the
satisfied to indicate the truth with a rough and general pleasure each affords the other. This form of friendship is superior
sketch...(1094b15). to one based on utility; it bears a closer resemblance to ideal
friendship. Both partners have the same thing to offer one another
But, even with these limitations, we must continue to cultivate and and find joy in the same objects. There is also a greater element of
rely upon our ability to construct as well as follow the rules of kindness and generosity. Moreover, for Aristotle, pleasure can be
"right reason." The obedience to such rules, within the context of a good in itself. Although pleasure is good, this friendship cannot
risks or unknowns, is at the foundation of moral virtue. be intrinsically good because it is not based on each partner's
intrinsic good or character.
It has been established that well-being is activity in accordance
with virtue. Aristotle goes further to claim that the activity "should The third and highest form of friendship is based on mutual
conform with the highest virtue and that is the virtue of the best part respect and attraction to the goodness of one another's character; in
of us" (1177a12). Since reason is the highest aspect of human essence, each person is cared for as an end in himself. Moreover,
beings, it is clear that man's highest activity in accordance with the characteristics of an ideal friendship are viewed as ultimate
virtue is the exercise of intelligence in theoretical wisdom. ends in themselves. In this friendship, usefulness, pleasure, and
goodness are combined.
Although theoretical reason is both a human being's highest
capacity and the aspect of his existence that most closely resembles Although affection is part of the ideal friendship, it is not
the divine, Aristotle acknowledges that the capacity is yet a small sufficient in itself. Aristotle rejects affection as the foundation of
part of the total human self. He advocates that we continually ideal friendship because it is possible to feel affection for inanimate
strive toward perfect realization of this divine capacity, while objects and animals. Thus, it is not an emotion specific to the
simultaneously acknowledging that to achieve this end fully would functions of persons. The ideal friendship involves a higher form
be no longer the living of a human life (1177b30). In his view, it of reciprocal affection that springs from a characteristic rather than
is only through daily practice of both the intellectual and the moral an emotion (1157b30-35). All activities that take place between
virtues over the course of a complete lifetime that one can achieve friends of this sort are activities in accordance with virtue, and,
eudaimonia. therefore, the characteristics of the ideal friendship are the same as
those of the good man.
Aristotle also acknowledges still further basic requirements for
achieving eudaimonia. For example, material wealth, which A thoroughgoing sense of reciprocity and mutuality appear to
provides physical comfort and security, is necessary to free the be central to Aristotle's idea of true friendship. Similarity,
individual to pursue the good life. however, is to be distinguished from mutuality. Mutuality, says
Aristotle, requires much time and many shared experiences for its
Aristotle on Friendship development. Indeed, becoming familiar enough with the other
person is among the most difficult activities of true friendship
As critics have noted (for example, Ross, 1923), much of (1158a15).
Aristotle's Ethics appears egoistic or individualistic in that the
importance of others in the good life is rarely mentioned. Through There are two major aspects through which mutuality is
careful attention to Aristotle's discussion of friendship, however, manifested: trust and mutual moral support. Importantly, trust
this criticism can be attenuated. In fact, Aristotle considers allows for the opportunity to share more intimate words and
friendship to be a most important form of human activity and, in so thoughts. This is not only the proper form of closeness between8
human beings (1170b10-12), but it is also a source of comfort since be the good, primary and congenital, and it is from this
a true friend " ...knows our character and the things which give us that we make our departure for choice and avoidance, and
pleasure and pain" (1171b0-5). it is to this that we go back again insofar as we judge
every good by the standard of feeling (pathos)
Mutual moral support means that each friend comes to the aid (D.L. X129).
of the other's character: "They neither go wrong themselves nor let
their friends do so" (1159b3). Together, good friends wish for Epicurus maintained a practical hedonism throughout his
what is good and just, which is in their common interest. In philosophy of the good life. His thinking turned away from the
essence, they have identical aims. Each makes it easier, more previously held ideal of persons as organic members of a social
pleasant, and more possible for the other to live a life in accordance order and focused on the private individual. Several hundred years
with virtue. A good friend will always support the good action of after the fall of Greek civilization, much of philosophy assumed a
the other as he would his own; and he would wish him, as he would practical orientation. For Epicurus, if there were any good
himself, the greatest good as a human being. attainable, it must be found by each person within himself. He
rejected both Greek skepticism and idealism. Relying on the
It is here that Aristotle likens ideal friendship to self-love. A incontestability of immediate experience, he claimed that sense data
good man loves those things in his friend that he also loves in represent the only truth.
himself (1166a). In this way, Aristotle breaks the antithesis
between egoism and altruism in that whatever good one does for For Epicurus, the ideal life is "ataraksia". A condition free
others also increases own's own good. from all pains and anxieties, ataraksia (like Aristotle's eudaimonia)
is self-sufficient. It is not dependent on the outside world for its
Aristotle counsels that we must be content to find only a few creation or maintenance; it is a condition in which..."the soul has
friends of this kind. Such friendships are infrequent not only escaped the tempest" (D. L. X128). To attain this state is to fulfill
because they are difficult to develop, but also because the persons one's telos; it is the best condition attainable within the limits of
with whom one could have such a friendship are rare. If it is human corporal nature (D.L. X146-148). Epicurus likens the
achieved, however, it is lasting, for it combines all requisite condition of ataraksia to one of pleasure, and, for him, the feelings
qualities for the highest human relation. of pleasure and pain that accompany sense experience determine
the ultimate good and evil. Indeed, all statements about good and
In summary, Aristotle offers us a vision of the good life that evil are only meaningful in relation to these feelings: "Feeling is as
involves the theoretical and practical sciences. The aim of the immediate a test of goodness or badness as sensation is a test of
former is theoretical wisdom--not the search for truth, but the truth" (D. L. X130).
contemplation of truths already attained. It is the exercise of the
best of us on the best of all objects, those that are eternal and Contrary to modern popular opinion, Epicurus does not
unchanging, sufficient unto themselves. advocate the pursuance of sensuous and luxuriant pleasures. To
him, the greatest pleasure is found in a certain peaceful state of
In the practical sciences, however, person is seen as agent. complete equilibrium of which the gods were exemplars. It is the
Here, the end is neither the contemplation nor the creation of absence of disturbance, rather the presence of sensory stimulation
something that will exist independent of the creator. Instead, the that results in ataraksia: "...when we feel no pain, then we no
aim is the living of a certain kind of life. longer stand in need of pleasure" (D. L. X130).
W e gather from Aristotle a multiplicity of virtuous activities, There are two major obstacles that Epicurus identifies as
both individual and social, that will make up this life. All variance, impeding the individual's progress to the good life. The first
however, can be contained under the principle of human concerns unfounded fears of the supernatural and of death. The
excellence, built up from his conception of human nature as both second concerns false opinions as to what pleasures we ought to
rational and social. Conceptions of pleasure or satisfaction do not pursue. These obstacles are not insurmountable, he argues, and can
conflict with Aristotle's good life. In his view, one enjoys or is be eliminated through the study of natural philosophy (science) and
satisfied most by those activities in which one achieves excellence the exercise of practical reason.
(cf. Rawls, 1971). To live the good life is to be good at being
human, and in that activity, rationality reigns supreme. Theoretical Epicurus asserts that men's unfounded fears of the gods and of
wisdom or contemplation and practical wisdom or action in death destroy their peace of mind. Although he does not deny the
accordance with virtue all require the cultivation and active existence of the gods, he claims they are to be neither feared nor
expression of rationality, preceding from deliberate, autonomous loved. Their purpose is to serve as ideal models of peacefulness
choice. Living in accordance with rational principles--things that and carefree pleasure. The unnecessary fantasies that men entertain
are distinctly human--is our aim. concerning the powers of the gods upset the plans of life, trouble
If some of the more obvious idiosyncracies are set aside, one's future, and put repose and happiness beyond one's reach.
Aristotle's general conception of the good life remains attractive Only ignorance causes us to imagine that events are brought on by
and popular today (see Adler, 1981). Ideals that rest on the idea of supernatural interference--true reason and science tell us a different
fulfilling one's function as a human being, particularly the story.
development of rational capacities and of the awareness of
voluntary choice, are central to many modern philosophical He posits that the fears associated with death can be attributed
conceptions of the good life, as well as psychological conceptions to fantasy. Through the study of natural philosophy, death is
of mental health. recognized to be merely the limit or cessation of experience, and,
therefore, irrelevant to the quality of experience. Epicurus stresses
Chapter Four that clear, practical ideas should affect the control of life, much like
Classical Hedonism the affect of medicine upon the health of the body.
Epicurus (341-270 B.C. In the choices between pleasures, practical wisdom pays
consequences their due regard, often accepting pains that lead to
...we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of greater pleasures while rejecting pleasures that lead to pain.
living happily, for it is this which we have recognized to Epicurus counts Aristotle's traditional virtues, such as temperance,You can also read
