HATE SPEECH AS A CURRENCY OF NATIONALISM: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE IN NORTH MACEDONIA - By Marko Pankovski Misha Popovikj
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
HATE SPEECH AS A CURRENCY OF NATIONALISM: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE IN NORTH MACEDONIA By Marko Pankovski Misha Popovikj
HATE SPEECH AS A CURRENCY OF NATIONALISM: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE IN NORTH MACEDONIA
1
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 2
LEGITIMAZING HATE ........................................................................... 3
CYBERHATE IN NORTH MACEDONIA ................................................... 4
CATEGORIES OF ONLINE HATE AND INFLAMMATORY SPEECH ............. 6
CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............................................ 8
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE ............................................................... 10
The Ambivalent Role of Education ............................................... 10
Media .......................................................................................... 12
Cross-border Influences ............................................................... 14
Police Work on Hate Speech ....................................................... 16
The Response of Independent Bodies ......................................... 18
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................ 19
Tackling Hate Speech and Nationalism Through Education ............ 19
The Media .................................................................................. 19
Institutional Setup and the Legislative Framework ...................... 20
| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 1 INTRODUCTION The year 2021 marks the twentieth anniversary of motes this work. In the media section, we explore the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), a peace press attempts to self-regulate and how this can deal ending hostilities between ethnic Albanian help reduce inflammatory material on online portals. combatants and the Republic of Macedonia in 2001. We briefly write about other regional news sourc- After the peace deal, a hoped-for goal was to use es outside of North Macedonia which, because of better education and recognition of group rights and language similarities, participate in the media land- representation to improve the position of the ethnic scape and contribute, intentionally or not, to inflam- Albanians in the country. matory online public debate. Lastly, we explore the Twenty years later, the improvements in intercultur- role of the police and their capacity to crack down on al life are modest. Representation has certainly im- online activities which might result in hate crimes. proved, at least in numbers. Several universities now This section concludes with a short overview of the teach in Albanian and public services are available in roles of independent anti-discrimination organiza- the language, but political divisions between ethnic tions and the country’s Ombudsman’s performance Albanians and Macedonians have not declined. This in tackling hate speech. cleavage of major political parties into two blocs – Macedonian and Albanian -- exploits a major fault line in society and fosters misunderstanding and in- tolerance. This study explores the phenomenon of national- ist hate speech in social media. The first part of the study examines how nationalist narratives construct ethnic differentiation, with a look at which strategies are employed to legitimize hate. By building narra- tives that show the majority as the oppressor and the minority as the disruptor, this creates an envi- ronment where politics exploit fear and uncertainty. This, in turn, legitimizes hate and other inflammato- ry speech. We then provide an overview of the social media space where hate speech is easily distributed. The first part concludes with a short content anal- ysis of instances of hate and inflammatory speech and tries to explain why particular categories and terms are used. The second part of the analysis explores the institu- tional response to such speech in two main areas: prevention and repression. Three sectors are given particular attention: education, the media, and the police. In the area of education, we discuss its am- bivalent role and how educational activities provide meaningful tools to improve intercultural under- standing and literacy. However, at the same time, education fails to teach history in a way that pro-
| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 2
BACKGROUND
In 2001, deep-rooted ethnic intolerance, asymmetry ures, academics, business leaders, and civil society,
in ethnic rights, and economic inequalities led to a among others. According to Rogers Brubaker, a Pro-
brief armed conflict in North Macedonia.1 The Mace- fessor of Sociology at the University of California at
donian police and army fought the ethnic Albanian Los Angeles, ethnicity is a “field of differentiated and
combatants of the National Liberation Army in sev- competitive positions or stances adopted by differ-
eral towns and villages in the northern and western ent organizations, parties, movements, or individual
parts of the country. After several months of armed political entrepreneurs, [...] each seeking to monop-
conflict and international brokerage, the OFA paved olize the legitimate representation of the group.”5
the way for peace.2 Twenty years later, despite this Communicating on national issues is an essential
reconciliation, conflicting narratives are still reflect- part of creating and perpetuating an ethnic commu-
ed in public discourse. The post-conflict period was nity. Each group seeks to position its narrative as the
neither free of hate speech nor of ethnically related sole legitimate ethnonational worldview and to bring
hate crimes. In fact, North Macedonia followed a ‘order’ to a complex world. In other words, “ethnici-
similar pattern as other post-conflict societies, such ty, race and nationhood are fundamentally ways of
as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland, in perceiving, interpreting, and representing the social
reflecting insufficiently resolved tensions between world,”6 as Brubaker writes.
ethnic communities. Hate speech hung on as a cur-
rency long after the actual conflict ended.3 The OFA In North Macedonia, the political field is formed
involved the political representatives of four major by political actors divided along ethnic lines, most
political parties, despite evidence that peace agree- notably the Macedonian and Albanian blocs. The
ments’ durability increases if a broad set of actors, Macedonian bloc is divided into two major political
including civil society and minority rights groups, parties, the Social Democrats7 and the center-right
are involved.4 The implementation of important VMRO-DPMNE.8 There are two networks of small
non-discrimination and education principles contin- satellite parties gathered around these two major
ue to face challenges and create division, frustration, players, typically representing smaller ethnic com-
and ethnic tension. munities. Within this bloc, a third actor – the populist
nationalist party Levica – has recently been gaining
Scholars of nationalism have long written about how momentum. The Albanian bloc consists of DUI, the
groups are constructed, rather than spontaneous- most significant player within the bloc, BESA, which
ly created. Negotiation and discussion about the is currently in government, and an opposing coali-
meaning of nationalism, the imagery, and values tion of Alternativa and Alliance of Albanians. Political
that underpin large groups, such as ethnicities, is parties from each of the blocs rarely cater to other
the scholarship’s central topic. The debate over the voters.
meaning of nationalism occurs between political fig-
1 For more details, please see Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/country/343
2 Ohrid Framework Agreement, Available at: https://www.osce.org/skopje/100622
3 Chapman, “The role of hate speech and hate crime in the escalation of identity conflict.” Minority Rights Group International, 2014. Available at: https://minority-
rights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/mrg-state-of-the-worlds-minorities-2014-chapter04.pdf
4 Desirée Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace,” International Interactions 38, no. 2 (April 2012): 243–66, https://
doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2012.659139.
5 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 61. To be
fair, here Brubaker discusses national minorities, however, he bases his argument around the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who writes in a general manner about groups
and group activity. Brubaker takes a more general approach in his work titled Ethnicity Without Groups.
6 Ibid
7 Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija
8 Vnatreshna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija – Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 3 This structure of the political field has incentivized two most dominant ethnic groups in North Mace- pandering for ethnic votes. This means that ethnic donia – the 64 percent of the population which are tensions are heightened and political parties be- ethnic Macedonians and the 25 percent which are come more divided, even when coalition govern- ethnic Albanians. These strategies tap onto existing ment agreements are necessary. This puts political historical and political nationalist narratives. They parties in seemingly paradoxical situations, such as serve to create two interrelated outcomes. The first accusing each other of working against national in- is to maintain fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the terests, while at the same time potentially trying to ‘other’ and thus cement inter-ethnic relations. The cooperate and form a government. The most noto- second is to provide legitimacy to acts of discrimina- rious of these examples is the so-called “Tirana Plat- tion and hate. form,” a phrase coined in 2016 by VMRO-DPMNE im- plying a common anti-Macedonian political agenda. At the same time, VMRO-DPMNE attempted to form a government with the leading DUI party. Converse- ly, faced with a disastrous election result, the leader of DUI criticized the fragmentation of Albanian votes among several parties, portraying it as a weak posi- tion against the other side, meaning Macedonians. This kind of tactic is based on differentiation and op- position strategies, creating a cleavage between the LEGITIMIZING HATE Given the atmosphere of post-conflict national- out-group dynamic is more clearly seen in content ism and the fragile reconciliation process in North that involves inter-ethnic physical incidents or con- Macedonia, hate speech is used to manipulate so- tent related to respective communities’ collective cial differences with out-group and in-group effects. rights while the in-group dynamics are clear in more Out-group effects refer to practices of targeting closed formats, events of celebration (particularly populations using dehumanizing terms, i.e., where sports celebrations), and/or before elections.11 the target communities are seen as a threat to the Those who rely on hate speech portray certain safety and values of the communities that hate events, acts, or statements as undermining the speakers tend to represent.9 In-group effects refer fabric of the polity. Two narratives emerge and are to hate speech aimed at recruiting and socializing typical for the two major ethnic groups; the first is new members and strengthening in-group memo- the dissolution of the country. In this narrative, eth- ry, with the goal of increased group solidarity.10 In nic Albanians are portrayed as disloyal citizens of North Macedonia these effects are interlinked. Both North Macedonia, working to achieve Greater Alba- in- and out-group effects are apparent in social me- nia. In doing so, they are allegedly undermining local dia posts, posts linking to web portals (news articles, laws and “spreading” into new neighborhoods, thus editorials, commentaries), and posts linking to posi- claiming new lands. The second narrative suggests tions and statements by governmental officials. The that the single source of discrimination is ethnicity 9 Udupa, Gagliardone, Deem, and Csuka, “Hate speech, information disorder, and conflict.” Social Science Research Council, February 2020. Available at: https:// s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/the-field-of-disinformation-democratic-processes-and-conflict-prevention-a-scan-of-the-literature.pdf, 3 10 Ibid, 3 11 For more details, please see the content analysis bellow.
| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 4
and that the Macedonian state bears the responsi- A 2012 study explored how two events, a multiple
bility for not protecting the minority rights of ethnic murder near the capital, Skopje, and burning the
Albanians. Both narratives avoid complexity. country’s flag in the town of Struga, were reported
The ethnic Macedonian narrative against Albanians as being ethnically motivated.12 In the first case, the
relies on a monolithic representation of them as murder of six people at Smilkovci lake near Skopje,
a group, ostensibly guided by a single interest. It the murderers’ Albanian ethnicity and Muslim reli-
does not represent ethnic Albanians as individuals, gion was used to project blame for the individual act
as people with diverging worldviews based on their onto the ethnic group as a whole. It was portrayed as
class, education, or profession. The ethnic Albanian inter-religious conflict and act of provocation, as the
narrative forgets that other forms of discrimination murder took places on Thursday before Easter.
exist, and rarely recognizes the possibility that dis- The second case focused on media reporting in the
crimination can come from ethnic Albanian political winter of 2012, when a man burnt the Macedonian
parties, through bad governance and corruption. flag at the municipal building in Struga. Despite little
These narratives construct an image of the ‘other evidence of a link, some Macedonian language me-
as a physical threat to their very existence. In doing dia scrambled to connect this to radical Islamists.
so, they compel subgroups or individuals to protect In contrast, Albanian language media employed a
themselves, oftentimes by antagonizing the other defensive narrative, writing about how, before the
group by using hate speech. Divisive narratives help flag incident, a depiction of the Prophet at a local
legitimize acts of hate and violence against the ‘oth- carnival was a sign of ongoing discrimination, link-
er.’ These narratives are often reproduced around ing it with Nazism.
specific events and sparked by media coverage.
CYBERHATE IN NORTH MACEDONIA
Narratives of conflict and opposition are widely dis- population checked social media, and 48.2percent
seminated online. This content is shared on social read news online.16 This online engagement came
media platforms by individuals (organically) or via or- with a concurrent jump in political content on the
ganized groups (i.e., Facebook pages/groups or Twit- web and provided an “enabling environment” for the
ter accounts). spread of hate speech. It also offered an incentive for
The ease of access, size of the audience, anonymity, hate speakers to shift their activity online, while ex-
and instantaneousness13 lowers the cost of engaging ploring new platforms and methods. Discussions on-
in cyberhate. The number of Internet users in North line, combined with the opportunity to engage anon-
Macedonia14 rose from 49.6 percent in 2010 to 81.4 ymously, brought more people into the information
percent in 2020.15 In 2020, 70.9 percent of the pop- space. This process had a multiplication effect and
ulation used the Internet daily, 69.6 percent of the expanded the platform for promotion of nationalism,
though some argue that it also allowed Macedonian
12 Micevski Igor & Misha Popovikj. 2013 “The Media and the Religious Narratives: The Case of Carnival of Vevcani Coverage” & “The Media and the Narratives of
Threat: The Case of the Coverage of Smilkovsko Lake Murder” in Jakimovski Ljubomir (ed) “Reporting on Interreligious and Interethnic Tensions: The Meaning Behind
the Headlines.” Institute of Communication Studies. Skopje. Available at: https://iks.edu.mk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Reporting-on-interreligious-and-in-inter-
ethnic-tensions.pdf
13 Alexander Brown, “What Is so Special about Online (as Compared to Offline) Hate Speech?,” Ethnicities 18, no. 3 (June 2018): 297–326,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796817709846.
14 Used the Internet in the last three months, when surveyed.
15 This increase is particularly large among the age group 55-74.
16 State Statistical Office, Republic of North Macedonia. Information Society. Available at: https://www.stat.gov.mk/OblastOpsto_en.aspx?id=27| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 5
society an oportunity to confront hatred. of these cases, 181 included bodily injury, 136 proper-
ty damage, 79 endangerment of safety, 44 offence/
“The online space participation in fight, 29 theft and armed robbery, 26
showed the hatred that incitements of national and religious hatred, friction,
and intolerance, and 15 cases of robbery.
people practiced at home, in
their families. It brought the In these instances, the offenders were identified 322
garbage into the spotlight. times. In 96 cases there was an investigation, in 48
cases victims refused to report.23 Criminal charges
We should not hide it under were filed in 127 cases, and misdemeanor charges
the carpet.”17 in 75.24 Ethnicity (66.1 percent) and political affilia-
tion (17.9 percent) remain the main drivers behind
hate crimes. In 202025 there were 89 cases. Six were
due to political affiliation or belief, and 76 to ethnic-
There is a lively debate on the need for, and the ex-
ity, citizenship, or language.26 In Regarding percep-
tent of, regulation regarding hate speech in North
tions, 47.4 percent perceive political affiliation as
Macedonia, and whether different approaches
grounds for hate speech, followed by 42.5 percent
should be applied offline and online. However, ex-
who believe ethnicity is a trigger for hate speech.
perts in North Macedonia, including the Council of
Sexual orientation is perceived as a reason for hate
Europe, recommend that institutions should not dif-
speech by 42.5 percent, and religious affiliation by
ferentiate between offline and online hate speech.
36.8 percent.27 Considering the dominance of na-
Hate speech18 is a driver of violence, conflict, and tionalism, a main driver of hate speech, in the online
hate crimes.19 OSCE-ODIHR defines hate crimes as sphere in North Macedonia, and the increase in hate
“criminal acts motivated by bias or prejudice towards crimes linked to ethnicity, one can conclude that
particular groups of people.” Hate crimes have to hate speech and hate crimes feed off each other.
meet two criteria, according to OSCE-ODIHR : First, One cannot be addressed without the other.
the “act constitutes an offence under criminal law,”
and second, that the act “must have been motivated
by bias.”20In 2019, North Macedonian police record-
ed a total of 23 hate crimes, a decrease compared to
2018, but still significantly higher than the two cas-
es in 2016 and five in 2015.21 Despite the relatively
low number of officially recorded cases, data from
alternative sources suggests a completely different
picture. According to the Macedonian Helsinki Com-
mittee, the total number of hate crime incidents be-
tween February 2013 – October 202022 was 758. Out
17 Quote from a research interview.
18 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/655135/IPOL_STU(2020)655135_EN.pdf
19 Hate speech and violence, Council of Europe. Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/hate-speech-and-
violence
20 https://hatecrime.osce.org/
21 OSCE/ODIHR Hate crime reporting. Available at: https://hatecrime.osce.org/north-macedonia
22 159 cases in 2019.
23 Ibid. There is no information for 198 cases.
24 Ibid, Unregistered cases = 56.
25 Decrease compared to 2019 (159 cases) and 2018 (123 cases), and increase compared to 2017 and 2016 (70 cases each).
26 MHC Database: www.zlostorstvaodomraza.com
27 Research report: The influence of stereotypes and ethnic distance as cause of discrimination, hate speech, and hate crime. OSCE Mission to Skopje, 2016. Avail-
able at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/5/295636.pdf| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 6
CATEGORIES OF ONLINE HATE
AND INFLAMMATORY SPEECH
This study compiled research on hate speech online, nationalism. The material was coded to find com-
focusing on user-generated content, primarily com- monalities and categorize the content.
ments and statuses found on various groups and Most of the content is commentary on articles on
pages on Facebook and Twitter. A total of 201 items online portals or on more formal media outlets. Hate
underwent content discourse analysis. The goal was speech is found in comments appended to content,
to find common themes in the narratives. These regardless of whether the original content is divisive
narratives assign labels for the purpose of spreading or neutral.
Categories of hate or intolerant speech
Traitors 38%
Insults at group
characteristics 26%
External threat 17%
Threats 15%
Insults on individual 2%
characteristics
Other 2%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
The most prominent motif in the content, at 38 per- ing the accused as an internal enemy of the group.
cent, is the accusation of treason. The division be- A label of “traitor” has a chilling effect and discourag-
tween patriots and traitors is a common narrative es different opinions and positions within the group.
thread in public debate in North Macedonia.28 This “Traitor” is the shorthand for the alleged internal en-
charge aims to strip an actor of legitimacy, portray- emy conspiring with external forces.
28 Bliznakovski Jovan. 2020. “Ours but Not Yours State: Symbolic Divisions between Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonian Politics” in “Us Against the Others:
Symbolic Divisions in North Macedonia.” The Center for the Research of Nationalism and Culture. Skopje. Available at: https://bit.ly/3tBES5w| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 7
About a quarter of the communication analyzed con-
sists of derogatory terms for ethnic groups. These
insults dehumanize ethnic communities and are the
most persistent kind of hate speech. Greece’s dis-
pute over the name Macedonia and Bulgaria’s de-
bate about the origins of the Macedonian language
and ethnicity have pushed the internal traitor/exter-
nal enemy narrative to the forefront of the political
debate.
The third trend to note is that of an “external threat”
present in 17 percent of the communications. This
motif amplifies security fears and categorizes peo-
ple as either protectors or enemies. This rhetoric
is used to legitimize action against less favored do-
mestic groups and serves as a way to normalize hate
crimes.
The last large category is explicit threats, including
direct threats against people and groups, most com-
monly threats to life and bodily harm.
1 Example of a poster, shared on Facebook, of the
MPs of the VMRO-DPMNE coalition voting for the
name change and former and current VMRO-DPMNE
officials calling people to take part in the referendum
Within this category of so-called traitors, two slurs
are commonly used: the first is the so-called soro-
soid, and the other is a derogatory term for male
homosexuals. Both of these terms are commonly
used as synonyms to portray people as traitors. The
term sorosoid is used for people who come from the
non-governmental sector, or who are closely aligned
with them. It derives from George Soros, considered
by conspiracy theorists to be the shadowy figure be-
hind many events in Central and Eastern Europe. It
denotes a person who uncritically promotes liberal
values and who pushes for liberal change.| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 8 Sidenote: A peculiar new trend on TikTok The TikTok social media platform became sig- This messaging perpetuates a stripped- nificantly more popular in 2020. Its content is down version of the neighborly relations based on sharing short user-made videos on di- and portrays ethnic, state-based relations as verse topics. A significant portion of the content monolithic. But more importantly it normal- is user performances - acting, dancing, imitat- izes a simplified worldview, particularly for ing, or talking about specific issues. The content younger, less sophisticated audiences. can be autonomous or posted as a reference to State authorities should pay special atten- another post. Typically, TikTok users post about tion to TikTok, considering the platform’s trending topics, often by imitating an original relatively lenient enforcement of community poster. rules. Anti-social behavior is not uncommon During the summer and fall of 2020, a new trend in TikTok’s content. highlighting the region’s conflicts emerged in the For example, in August 2020, someone post- Balkans. In these videos, a group of people walk ed a video of a fight on TikTok. It isn’t clear if along a street. A bully appears, harassing them. the fight is real or staged. In some versions, Suddenly, a friend emerges to fight off the bully. a young man is attacked in a locale labeled Different users attach different flags to the bul- with the flag of North Macedonia. In another ly and to the savior. The flags reflects the user’s version, the area is marked with an Albanian view of conflict and cooperation in the Balkans. flag.29 A viewer cannot tell if this attack is In one video, the group consists of Kosovo and between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, Macedonia, with Serbia as the bully and Albania or if the footage is repurposed from another the savior. In another combination,Albania is the fight. Regardless, the video fosters hostility. bully and Serbia is the defender. The cathartic part of the video is accompanied by dramatic music, reinforcing the messages. CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK There are important differences between discrimina- inciting discrimination, and the hate speech itself tion, hate speech, hate crimes, insults, and defama- can also be/mean/be treated as discrimination.” 30 A tion. Discrimination refers to “a less favorable treat- hate crime is a criminal offense based on prejudice ment of the individual on a prohibited basis, such toward a group or victim which must include two as racial or ethnic origin.” Hate speech is “speech elements: a criminal offense and bias as a motive. spreading hatred (that) can include advocating or An insult occurs when a person shares malicious in- 29 Civil Media. “TikTok fight for inter-ethnic and political struggle.” 2020. Available at: https://civilmedia.mk/tik-tok-tepachka-za-meguetnichka-i-politichka-presmetka/ 30 Mihajlova, Bachovska, Shekjerdziev. Freedom of expression and hate speech, OSCE Mission to Skopje, 2013. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/docu- ments/e/8/116610.pdf
| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 9
formation with the intent to humiliate another per- Article 379-d defines hate speech online:
son. Defamation is the dissemination of false facts
“Whosoever via a computer system spreads in
about an individual to a third party. These acts are a
the public racist and xenophobic written ma-
protected category under the Law on Civil Liability
terial, photo or other representation of an idea
for Insult and Defamation.31 The distinction between
or theory helping, promoting or stimulating
hate speech, insult and defamation is important.
hatred, discrimination or violence, regardless
The definition of hate speech is often misused by
against which person or group, based on sex,
those on the political stage who rely on it to advance
race, skin color, class, membership in a mar-
their agendas.
ginalized group, ethnic background, language,
Given the broad definition and varied interpretations nationality, social background, religious belief,
of hate speech, it is regulated under different stat- other types of beliefs, education, political affil-
ues and varied entities. North Macedonia follows a iation, personal or social condition, mental or
so-called European approach that tends towards ag- physical disability, age, family or marital status,
gressive regulation of hate, potentially infringing on property status, health condition, or any other
freedom of speech. ground foreseen by law or ratified internation-
The Criminal Code of the Republic of North Mace- al agreement, shall be sentenced to imprison-
donia32 defines hate speech and hate crimes in ment of one to five years.”
several articles, including Article 319: The Law on Prevention and Protection against Dis-
“Whosoever by force, maltreatment, endan- crimination33 in Article 9 states:
gering the security, mocking of national, eth- “Any activity on the basis of which a person
nic, religious and other symbols, by burning, directly or indirectly calls for, encourages,
destroying or in any other manner damag- gives directions or incites another person to
ing the flag of the Republic of Macedonia or discriminate.”
flags of other states, by damaging other peo-
ple’s objects, by desecration of monuments, and in Article 10 regulates that:
graves, or in any other discriminatory man- “Harassment shall mean unwanted treat-
ner, directly or indirectly, causes or excites ment of a person or group of persons on any
hatred, discord or intolerance on grounds of discriminatory grounds, whose purpose or
gender, race, color of the skin, membership effect is to violate the dignity or to create a
in a marginalized group, ethnic membership, threatening, hostile, humiliating or intimidat-
language, nationality, social background, reli- ing environment, approach or practice.”
gious belief, other beliefs, education, political
affiliation, personal or social status, mental The Law on Media, in Article 4, prohibits audio and
or physical impairment, age, family or marital audiovisual programs that:
status, property status, health condition, or in “Promote or spread discrimination, intoler-
any other ground foreseen by law on ratified ance or hate based on race, sex, religion or
international agreement, shall be sentenced nationality.”
to imprisonment of one to five years.”
It should be noted that the current regulation on
Audio and Audiovisual Services is limited to televi-
sion and radio; and does not regulate online con-
31 Ibid.
32 Criminal Code of the Republic of North Macedonia amended 2018, consolidated text. Available at: https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8145/file/fYROM_
CC_2009_am2018_en.pdf
33 Law on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination. Available at: https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8567/file/North_Macedonia_law_anti_dis-
crimination_2019_en.pdff| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 10
tent. In 2018, the European Union’34 addressed in North Macedonia has not yet adopted this direc-
«the ongoing convergence of television and internet tive once it does it could have an impact on hate
services» in an effort to keep up with technological speech and nationalist tropes spread via video-shar-
changes in communications. While the legal system ing platforms.
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
In North Macedonia, a three-level institutional struc- alist narratives. In North Macedonia, history is often
ture addresses nationalism and hate speech online. taught as an instrument of nation building,35 which
The first level is made up of preventive institutions can be used to perpetuate nationalism. Two main
- educational institutions, civil society organizations, themes are clear. The first is the notion of the na-
and international organizations like the OSCE and the tion’s immutability. If a nation has been situated on a
Council of Europe. These institutions work directly given territory “since time immemorial,” then it must
with schools to build programs and update curricula. stand to reason that the people of said nation are
This process involves the Ministry of Education’s pe- the sole heirs of that territory. This line of thinking
riodic revision of history textbooks, re-interpretation has produced myths about antiquity as well as the
of certain historical events, and a focus on media “right” to certain parcels of land. Almost all Balkan
literacy in courses on civic education. The second ethnic groups have staked such claims.
level consists of institutions that can act as a brake Both Macedonian and Albanian school textbooks link
on inflammatory language. including the Agency contemporary events to historic ethnicities. Stories
for Cybercrime and Digital Forensics in the Ministry in Macedonian textbooks tie present-day Macedo-
of Interior, the Commission for Prevention and Pro- nians to the Macedonians of antiquity, through the
tection Against Discrimination, and the country’s Slavic kingdoms and empires of the Middle Ages.
Ombudsman, as well as independent bodies with Similarly, Albanians link themselves to the ancient
competencies that touch upon hate speech and dis- Illyrians, and to Skanderbeg, a military leader in the
crimination. The third level is the judiciary system, Middle Ages.36
public prosecution offices, and the courts.
Ethnicity is a second theme in the country’s text-
The ambivalent role books. This theme ignores the history of interaction
of education between groups and cultures on a given territory. It
eliminates a shared history and creates the illusion
Education is the key to North Macedonia’s institution- that interaction between different ethnic groups is a
al response to countering hate speech. Students can recent phenomenon.
be taught about other ethnic and religious groups There have been attempts to improve the teaching
and learn skills to counter nationalist and hate narra- of history, but with feeble results. The latest struc-
tives. However, education is often subject to trends tural change, in 2004, introduced an inclusive pro-
and reforms on an ad hoc basis. In some classrooms, cess, with historians from different ethnic groups
teachers focus on multicultural recognition; in oth- writing new curricula. Efforts like this improved the
ers, they offer coursework that perpetuates nation- language in textbooks, but the narrative themes re-
34 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2018/1808 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination
of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual
Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018L1808&from=EN
35 Todorov Petar. 2020 “’Us’ Against ‘Them’: Historical Education for Inciting Divisions” in “Us Against the Others: Symbolic Divisions in North Macedonia”. Center
for the Research of Nationalism and Culture. Skopje. Available at: https://bit.ly/3tBES5w
36 Pichler Robert 2009.“Historiography and the Politics of Education in the Republic of Macedonia (1991 – 2008)” in Dimou Augusta (ed) ›Transition‹ and the Politics
of History Education in Southeastern Europe. V&R Unipress. Göttingen| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 11
mained largely the same.37 different ethnicities to eah other.
Change takes time. Currently, two joint commis- Teaching media literacy presents another challenge.
sions, one with Bulgaria and another with Greece, Several projects, run by civil society and internation-
are working to analyze the ways history is taught, al organizations, have developed materials and train-
with a focus on events important to all three ing on media literacy.39 Media literacy courses teach
countries. The joint commissions’ goal is to work people to be critical consumers of mass media; such
through the countries’ textbooks and eliminate in- training helps people notice bias and assess false
accuracies that generate biased views of history. or inflammatory information. Research shows that
This process, though, is so slow that it blunts the teaching about media varies widely and is largely
impact of the work. Certainly, in the short term, dependent on a teacher’s interest and resources. A
the current framing around ethnic Macedonian major impediment is the fact that the state neither
and Albanian origins will remain. invests in nor promotes these projects. Current ini-
Meanwhile, reform of elementary education should tiatives depend on limited resources and a teacher’s
bring about improvements in addressing intercul- or administrator’s individual motivation. The North
turalism and media literacy. During the last 10 years, Macedonia school system must make it a priority to
many projects attempted to introduce intercultur- mix students of different backgrounds and ethnici-
alism into schools by exposing children to materi- ties. It also needs to incorporate media literacy into
als about tolerance and interethnic understanding. primary and secondary education, as an essential
The Ministry of Education worked with the OSCE, tool for consuming information.
the Council of Europe, the First Children’s Embas-
sy Megjashi, which is a civic organization which
Media
protects the rights of children, and others to pilot The media landscape in North Macedonia is severe-
programs and train teachers on how to introduce ly polarized.40 This polarization was as its most ex-
tolerance and interculturalism to their coursework. treme during VMRO-DPMNE’s leadership between
Between 2011 and 2019 the First Children’s Embas- 2006 and 2016.41 At the time, key media outlets
sy Megjashi worked with 10 high schools to pilot a worked in favor of the ruling party, ignoring journal-
program of education for peace and conflict resolu- istic standards and ethics. With the change of gov-
tion. OSCE also works with schools, providing train- ernment, the situation began to improve, though
ing for teachers and students about tolerance and another set of media outlets worked to defend the
comity. The Council of Europe has also worked with new government.42
schools during its No Hate Speech campaign38
Online, almost anything goes. Online portals in
Teaching interculturalism is a goal. But the success North Macedonia and elsewhere work with varying
of any educational reform is limited by the struc- degrees of professional standards and account-
ture of schooling. In North Macedonia, schools are ability. An analysis of complaints sent to the Coun-
separated by ethnicity. Teachers give instruction in cil on Media Ethics (a self-regulatory body) on hate
Macedonian or Albanian, depending on the school speech shows that 83 percent comes from mate-
and its location. This makes it difficult, if not impos- rial published online. Traditional media accounted
sible, for administrators to expose students from
37 Ibid
38 Interview reference, 11.03.2021
39 Shopar Vesna, Aleksandra Temenugova & Monika Aksentievska. 2018. “Media Literacy in Macedonia: An Attempt at Implementation in Elementary Education.”
School of Journalism and Public Relations. Available at: https://www.medium.edu.mk/attach/Mediumskata-pismenost-vo-Makedonija-obid-za-impelementaci-
ja-vo-osnovnoto-obrazovanie-MKD.pdf
40 Nikodinoska Vesna. 2020. “The Political and Economic Basis of Media and Communication Models Spreading Disinformation and Hate Speech.” Seenpm, Tirana,
Peace Institute, Ljubljana and Macedonian Institute for Media, Skopje. Available at: https://mim.org.mk/attachments/article/1231/Resilience-research-publica-
tion-1-MK-ENG.pdf
41 Ibid
42 Ibid.| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 12
for the remaining 17 percent.43 According to the V-dem Institute at the University
The state media regulator, the Agency for Audio of Gothenburg, which uses data to measure de-
and Audio Visual Services, does not have jurisdic- mocracy, North Macedonia scores 1.79 out of four.
tion over online media. Professional associations, One means “all online content monitoring and reg-
such as the Association of the Journalists of Mace- ulation are done by the state” and four means that
donia and other civil society organizations work- “the state off-loads all online content monitoring
ing on media, following the recommendations of and regulation to private actors.” This score groups
the Council of Europe,44 oppose the expansion of North Macedonia with countries where the state
regulatory authority over online outlets because does some “online content monitoring and regu-
enforcement would simply be too difficult. Ma- lation, but the state also involves private actors in
lign actors can and do create new outlets once old monitoring and regulation in various ways.” In the
ones are shut down. Western Balkans, this score is higher than in Kosovo
(1.51), while the other countries have scores ranging
Currently, experts agree that the government does from 2.03 to 2.36.46 North Macedonia’s score has im-
not have sufficient staff and resources to regulate proved continuously since 2013.
online content in accordance with existing law, the
country scores 1.97, meaning a “capacity to regu-
late only some online content or some portions of
the law.”45
Bosnia and Bosnia and
Albania Kosovo Albania Kosovo
Herzegovina Herzegovina
2.33 1.21 1.14 2.36 2.97 1.51
North North
Montenegro Serbia Montenegro Serbia
Macedonia Macedonia
1.75 1.97 1.35 2.03 1.79 2.23
43 Council of Media Ethnics in Macedonia. 2020. “Statistical Report on Complaints in 2019.” Available at: https://semm.mk/komisija-za-zalbi-4/statistichki-pregle-
di/690-2019
44 Nikodinoska Vesna.
45 Ibid.
46 Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gast-
aldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Pamela Paxton, Daniel
Pemstein, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtröm, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore
Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2021. “V-Dem Codebook v11” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 13
North Macedonian media regulators built a coalition The media registry can potentially link this revenue
of public institutions and civil society organizations with adherence to ethical principles. This enforc-
to ally against hate speech.47 This network consists es professional standards and avoids regulatory
of the Agency as the Regulator, the Ministry of In- change or engaging public institutions which might
formation Society and Administration, and the Min- lack the necessary resources or integrity to avoid an
istry of Interior, as well as professional associations abuse of power.
of journalists, prosecutors, unions and civil soci- Meanwhile, consumers must pressure companies
ety. This is a significant step in creating public-pri- to advertise on the media, as listed in the registry,
vate partnerships and open space for civil society which adhere to professional standards. This would
and self-regulation to address concerns about on- incentivize the media to follow the standards set
line speech. A diversified and self-regulated fight by advertisers, while advertisers are incentivized by
against hate speech in the media is an important consumers to follow the registry.
step. There are justified reservations that more ag-
gressive regulation of content, especially online, can
lead to abuse and censorship, and any movement
Cross-border influences
to limit hate speech must be balanced against free- News and information in North Macedonia are influ-
dom of expression.48 To this end, several projects enced by content from neighboring countries. Some
have joined the fight against disinformation and of this content further aggravates hate and ethnic di-
hate speech online. The Metamorphosis Foundation visions. Regional proximity and similar linguistic char-
is an independent fact checking group and has re- acteristics contribute to this cross-border spread of
cently partnered with Facebook to improve content. information; in the Western Balkans, sharing infor-
The Helsinki Committee maintains a database on mation often means sharing nationalism and hate.
hate speech related to online content and traditional Audiences in North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herze-
media. The key player here is the Council of Media govina, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro speak and
Ethics in Macedonia, which is designed to regulate understand each other’s languages, as they are all
media. The Council rules on complaints about me- part of a group of South-Slavic languages. While
dia conduct and while it is still too early to measure the Albanian language is distinct, most ethnic Alba-
impact, more media organizations are printing and nians in North Macedonia understand South-Slavic
posting corrections when they are needed.49 languages and participate in national and regional
The most promising development is the recently information spaces.52 This linguistic infrastructure,
created registry of professional and ethical online coupled with historical interactions and shared eco-
media outlets.50 This registry provides information nomic challenges, creates a single regional political
to advertisers about which online media follow pro- dialogue, one where information lands in distinct
fessional journalistic standards like using multiple local realities. Considering the cleavages between
sources, fact-checking, portraying many sides of a national and local narratives,53 once a piece of in-
story, and not publishing hate speech. This is a posi- formation lands in a local context, it sparks divides
tive approach to encouraging professionalism in the and creates new dynamics, which are then reflected
media and preventing the publication of inflamma- back onto national news and information space.
tory content. Advertisers, who comprise the bulk of
the media’s revenue currently spend $4.7 million. 51
47 Ministry of Information Society and Administration. 2019. “Ministers Manchevski and Popovski signed the Declaration Against Hate Speech in Media. “Available
at: https://www.mioa.gov.mk/?q=mk/print/2196
48 Interview 11.03.2021.
49 Interview 11.03.2021 & Annual Report of the Council on Media Ethics for 2019. Available at https://bit.ly/3d3ILtY
50 Available at: https://promedia.mk/main?lng=mk
51 Nikodinovska Vesna
52 Vichova et al. Assessment of the Kremlin’s Malign Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Available at: https://www.kremlin-
watch.eu/userfiles/assessment.pdf, 23
53 Kalyvas, S. (2003). The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars. Perspectives on Politics, 1(3), 475-494. Retrieved February 1, 2021,
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688707| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 14 One example of this dynamic comes from the EURO cles are then shared regionally, frequently provok- 2016 qualification soccer game in Belgrade. A drone ing hate speech. Examples of this include articles flew the flag of Greater Albania over the stadium with inflammatory and provocative titles coming where Albania was playing Serbia.54 In North Mace- from Serbian tabloids. These tabloids cover events donia, this provocative move ignited nationalist talk in North Macedonia and run lurid headlines, such and hate speech between ethnic Macedonians and as “Macedonia becomes Albania 2?”57 or «He sold ethnic Albanians. everything to the [Albanians], then the Bulgarians! The cross-border spread of nationalism and hate (The Prime Minister of North Macedonia) Zoran Zaev speech online in the Western Balkans has distinct humiliated the Macedonians.”58The main difference features. Each feature contains a different center-pe- between types 1 and 2 is that here information is riphery dynamic, method of dissemination, and bias. not spread by state entities but rather through me- In order to establish an analytical framework, we dis- dia outlets, tabloids, political/entertainment shows/ tinguish three separate types of information spread. hosts, and even sports. In some cases, especially in First, the existence of a strong center-periphery dy- Serbia, these entities have close ties to state entities namic with biased content and either inflammatory or political parties. An example is a media outlet that or non-inflammatory rhetoric. Second, a balanced appears to be privately-owned but is actually con- center-periphery dynamic with biased content and trolled by state actors. either inflammatory or non-inflammatory rhetoric. The third type of cross-border information spread Third, a decentralized dynamic with biased content (type 3) has a decentralized dynamic, largely inde- and inflammatory rhetoric. pendent of centers of power (state, political par- The first set of features of cross-border spread of in- ties),with a strong bias for or against certain com- formation that ignites hate speech (type 1) includes munities. It features inflammatory rhetoric and is content from state entities, such as statements from generated by individual users online,59 on popular officials, symbolic gestures, divisive regulatory ac- social media platforms including Facebook, You- tions with a clear bias for or against specific commu- Tube, Twitter and, recently, TikTok. This information nities.55 These types of actions are intended to mo- becomes part of North Macedonia’s discourse, and bilize followers or divert attention before or during are often driving factors of hate speech. Social me- upcoming elections, political or corruption scandals, dia statements or tweets by regional celebrities also or bargaining in national or international negotia- get taken up and discussed in North Macedonia. tions.56 In this context, the inflammatory rhetoric is presented with an expected outcome, whose prima- ry objective is not necessarily sparking hate. The second set of features (type 2) has a more bal- anced center-periphery dynamic with a strong bias for or against specific communities. Type 2 includes inflammatory news content which is read widely in the region. These articles refer to ethnic and social divisions within a neighboring country. These arti- 54 “Flag-Carrying Drone Ends Serbia-Albania Match”, BIRN, October 15, 2014. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2014/10/15/flag-carrying-drone-ends-albania- serbia-match/ 55 Examples include statements by the former Foreign Minister of Serbia and current President of the Parliament, Ivica Dacic on internal matters in North Macedo- nia, like the recognition of Kosovo by North Macedonia or over the North Macedonia – Bulgaria dispute. 56 Negotiations in this sense include employing inflammatory tactics as bargaining chips in (1) internal power dynamics within the political party; (2) national pro- cesses (coalition building) or (3) international processes (posturing in a context of bilateral disputes, alliance building) 57 “Zaev falls, VMRO is back in power, but the Albanians will take everything.” Alo.rs, 06.08.2020. Accessed at: https://www.alo.rs/vesti/region/zaev-pada-vmro- se-vraca-na-vlast-ali-ce-albanci-sve-preuzeti/331907/vest 58 “He sold everything to the [Albanians], then the Bulgarians! Zaev humiliated the Macedonians – We and the Bulgarians are the same people,” Informer.rs, 03.05.2017. Accessed at: https://informer.rs/svet/balkan/328695/prodao-siptarima-onda-bugarima-zaev-zestoko-ponizio-makedonce-bugari-smo-jedan-narod 59 These also include troll farms and automation bots. Please see: Alexander the Bot: The Twitter War for the Macedonian Soul, Balkan Insight, 18.12.2019. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/18/alexander-the-bot-the-twitter-war-for-the-macedonian-soul/
| MK • Hate Speech As a Currency of Nationalism: Institutional Response In North Macedonia 15
Disinformation campaigns exacerbate internal con- and feelings and/or they reflect pre-existing narra-
flicts, influence international relations, and distort tives in North Macedonia. In this way they serve to
electoral processes.60 A common characteristic of exacerbate underlying tensions.
the three types of cross-border information spread
outlined of above is that they promote familiar ideas
Table 1: Characteristics of the cross-border spread of nationalism and hate speech in the Western Balkans:
Center-periphery
Type Bias Inflammatory Examples
dynamic
Statements from officials,
Type 1 Strong centralization Yes Yes/No symbolic gestures, divisive
regulatory actions
Media outlets, tabloids,
Balanced
political/entertainment
Type 2 center-periphery Yes Yes
shows/hosts,
dynamic
sport matches
Organic content on social
Decentralized
Type 3 Yes Yes media, statements from
dynamic
celebrities
Police work on hate speech
The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is responsible for The Office for Cybercrime and Digital Forensics has
internal affairs and investigates hate speech and a wide array of other responsibilities, as well. This
hate crimes prosecutable under the Criminal Code. broad mandate makes it difficult to allocate signifi-
Following the ratification of the Additional Protocol cant resources to combat
to the Convention on Cybercrime of the Budapest ting hate speech, since it is a unit of only eight of-
Convention, the MOI recognized the spread of rac- ficers. Another concern is that its officers are often
ist and xenophobic materials through computer asked to work on issues that do not reflect its ca-
systems as computer crime.61 One of the MOI’s key pacities. Despite the need for a comprehensive ap-
competencies is the “prevention of ignition of na- proach, often this is the only department that acts
tional, racial or confessional hate and impatience.”62 upon reported instances of hate speech online.
The Office for Cybercrime and Digital Forensics
within the MOIis a responsible for prosecuting po- Another problem is political will. Investments in
tential online crimes. However, there is no dedicat- funds and people are a prerequisite for sustain-
ed unit for tackling hate speech, and these cases able reform. Budgeting ample funds to tracking
are distributed upon availability of police officers. cybercrime would send a strong signal from the
government. While the MOI frequently advertises
60 Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter Them, Policy Department for External Relations
Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, December 2020. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653621/EXPO_
STU(2020)653621_EN.pdf
61 Limani 2019. “Hate speech in multi-ethnic communities in the Republic of Macedonia”. Ss. Clement of Ohrid University. Available at: https://fb.uklo.edu.mk/
wp-content/uploads/2019/11/DOKTORSKA-FINALE-2019.pdf
62 Law on Internal Affairs (33/15), Ministry of Interior of the Republic of North Macedonia. Available at: http://www.mvr.gov.mk/Upload/Documents/ZVR%20
nov%20precisten%2005.03.15.pdfYou can also read
