H-Diplo ESSAY 420 H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin's War: "Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?" - H-Net
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H-Diplo
H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War:
“Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”
Discussion published by George Fujii on Wednesday, March 16, 2022
H-Diplo ESSAY 420
17 March 2022
Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”
https://hdiplo.org/to/E420
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii
Essay by Jonathan Haslam
Under tell-tale clouds of smoke, on 23 February 2022, Russian diplomatic personnel were visible
burning classified papers in the courtyard of their embassy in Kyiv as they prepared for for
evacuation. Meanwhile, a massive cyber-attack targeted Ukrainian government communications
systems. At 5.30am on the following day, 24 February, a pre-recorded announcement from Russia’s
President for life Vladimir Putin stated that a special military operation was under way to topple the
[1]
government of Prime Minister Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukraine. The CIA assessment was that Putin
[2]
intended a speedy, two-day Blitzkrieg. Against Putin’s every expectation, however, that war is still
in progress at the time of writing.
To wage war against a state of over 43 million people obviously requires extensive preparation. And,
since the late fifties, it has been impossible to gear up for a military offensive on any scale without
[3]
prior detection by satellites from outer space. In this instance a force of some 190,000 men was
photographed amassing along the Ukrainian border by late October 2021. It amounted to 100
Battalion Tactical Groups, most of the ground forces stationed west of the Ural Mountains separating
[4]
European Russia from Siberia. Supposedly they were there for military exercises, but the tell-tale
sign of back-up logistical units indicated that something more was intended.
The only way an element of surprise could be maintained was if it were hidden in a fog of
disinformation which the credulous could rely upon to justify inaction. Thus to ensure that nothing
leaked out, even the most senior figures under Putin, except of course those directly responsible for
the armed forces, notably Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, a long-time ally, and Chief of the General
Staff, First Deputy Minister of Defence Valery Gerasimov, and of course his own deputy chief of staff,
Dmitrii Kozak, appear to have been kept in the dark until the very last moment of action. Indications
are that the Foreign Ministry (MID) and even Foreign Intelligence (SVR) under Putin’s former
classmate Sergei Naryshkin may have had no precise idea before the fact as to the timing and
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
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perhaps even scale of the objective, not least because both institutions would have had solid ground
[5]
for opposing such a rash decision.
This enabled the Kremlin to issue false signals to the adversary, as when ambassador to the United
States Anatoly Antonov, was most unusually granted an interview on the CBS programme “Face the
Nation.” Here he had a chance to reply directly to accusations from the White House made
repeatedly from 11 January that Russia was about to invade Ukraine. Reading from a text prepared
by his home government on instruction from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Antonov, a former
Deputy Defence Minister, was emphatic “There is no invasion and there are no such plans.” He also
insisted that Russia was willing to negotiate on any issue except Crimea (which Russsia had seized in
[6]
2014 while he was at Defence (Minoborony) and for which he had received an award from Putin.
Blatantly contradicting his ambassador only a day later, Putin announced Russia’s recognition of the
two breakaway republics set up with the help of Russian forces in 2014 – “Donetsk” and
[7]
“Lugansk.” The Russian president had apparently not even shared his intentions with Foreign
Minister Lavrov and thereby Antonov, in order to make the deception more plausible.
On expert advice President Joe Biden had been warning of the imminence of war. So where did his
intelligence on the invasion come from? Not surprisingly, with a former KGB counter-intelligence
officer in charge of their country, the Russians can claim with a degree of confidence that the
Americans have no credible human intelligence in play. Instead they have to rely on Russia’s former
allies, now members of NATO. In Afghanistan, for example, the United States had to turn to Romania
for help. So whereas the Americans were very much in the picture as to the emerging mobilisation
and deployment of Russia’s invasion force against Ukraine, they had no reliable information as to
when exactly an invasion would take place and its exact purpose: a limited operation to dismember
[8]
East Ukraine or complete annihilation of Ukraine as a state.
Satellite tracking is impressive, even in the private sector. At Yelnya in the Smolensk region of
Belarus on 9 November 2021 the Americans looked down through gaps in the cloud onto elements of
the 41st combined arms army - including about 350 tanks, howitzers, missile systems - defensive and
offensive, towed artillery, and logistical support vehicles nearby the headquarters of the 144th
[9]
guards motorised rifle division with its own collection of 390 tanks and similar equipment.
At the same time, although Putin’s personal hostility towards Ukraine was well known and widely
disseminated, most notably in a paper “On the historical unity of the Russians and Ukrainians,” there
[10]
was absolutely no direct indication just how dire the consequences of this attitude could be.
Every war has its pre-history, and Putin’s sustained diatribe recorded before the invasion touches on
key points worth exploring, enriched by other information that subsequently came to light. In short,
Putin has argued that for many years Moscow asked that Ukraine give up its intention to join NATO,
that no one had listened, and that Russia had no intention of allowing it to happen. Hence, after
interminable attempts at negotiating the problem away, force was required to make it impossible.
Thus everything was presented plausibly and rationally in terms of a strategic stand-off involving
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
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2H-Diplo
NATO. Rationalist political scientists who trust international relations to work with the predictive
regularity of a machine, believers in a balance of power utterly divorced from the world of ideas, took
[11] [12]
the lead. This phenomenon has been caricatured as “Westsplaining.” And it matched the
pattern of advice ministers in Britain received, for example, from high level foreign policy and
defence officials, MI6 and Sir Stephen Lovegrove, the national security adviser, between March and
[13]
December 2021. Commentary still echoes the same notes in some quarters. EU foreign policy
chief Joseph Borrell recently confessed: “I am ready to admit that we made a number of mistakes and
that we lost the possibility of Russia’s rapprochement with the West,” he said in an interview aired on
the TF1 television channel. “There are moments that we could do better, there are things that we
proposed and then could not implement, such as, for example, the promise that Ukraine and Georgia
will become part of NATO...I think it’s a mistake to make promises that you can’t keep,” Borrell
[14]
added. The best answer to that was British Defence Minister Ben Wallace’s statement in 2021:
“Read Putin’s intentions, read his essays. He’s going to do this [attack] at some stage. We need to
help the Ukrainians defend themselves. It’s not about NATO. It’s about his territorial ambitions and
[15]
ethnic nationalism.”
Indeed, there was a rare and fascinating leak in Moscow which suggests that the main reason for the
invasion really had little to do with NATO at all. Two days after the attack, Novosti released an
indiscretion in error that was immediately withdrawn but left its footprint on the worldwide web,
revealing the pattern of Putin’s innermost thoughts. “A new world is coming into being before our
very eyes,” it began. “Russia’s military operation has opened a new epoch...Russia is recovering its
unity - the tragedy of 1991, this horrendous catastrophe in our history, its unnatural caesura, has
been overcome. Yes, at a great price; yes, through the tragic events of what amounts to a civil war,
because now for the time being brothers are shooting one another...but Ukraine as anti-Russia will no
longer exist.” Instead the Great Russians, the Byelorussians and the Little Russians (Ukrainians)
would come together as a whole. This “historic responsibility” Putin had taken upon himself “by not
leaving the Ukrainian question to future generations.” Here “the issue of national security, the
creation of an anti-Russia out of Ukraine and as an outpost for the West to pressure us is only the
[16]
second most important among them [the ‘key reasons’ for acting].”
Thus not all strategists in Moscow share the reasoning of Western rationalists. “An Offensive on Thin
Ice” appeared in Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, the weekly supplement to Nezavisimaya gazeta.
First, it questions the fundamental premiss of the invasion of Ukraine: namely that it will otherwise
join NATO and that the United States will then install its offensive missiles pointed at Russia. Second,
it argues that it would make no sense for the Americans to do any such thing, particularly in a
country whose loyalty cannot be counted on. Third, the Americans are never going to let Ukraine
have nuclear weapons and the Ukrainians are in no position to create their own. Fourth, the Donbas
and Crimea are already burden enough for the Russian economy and given the weight of Western
[17]
sanctions they will be too much for it.
The NATO Powers were in fact hopelessly blindsided, because had Putin merely intended to prevent
Ukraine from joining NATO, room - however tight - would have existed for a negotiated settlement;
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
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even under the threat of coercive diplomacy. But given that Putin’s underlying motive had more to do
with remorse at the loss of Soviet Union, it would be reasonable to suggest that no premiss for talks
ever existed.
It is not that there were no grounds for complaint on the Russian side. Every crisis has its long pre-
history. As demonstrated from the British archival records, the Americans had, indeed, assured
Mikhail Gorbachev that with German reunification they would not allow NATO to expand the
[18]
East. And with sustained lobbying concerted by Bruce Jackson of Lockheed Martin and Ron
Asmus as Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs (1997-2000), presidents Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush did accede to East European wishes for membership; thus breaking the undertaking
[19]
given at a time of Russia’s greatest vulnerability, morally and materially. But they simply felt it
did not matter.
The view taken by national security advisor Condoleezza Rice (2001-2005), for example, was that
Russia was finished as a superpower. First the USSR collapsed. Then the economic reforms of the
mid-nineties had not worked out well; indeed the economy crashed in 1998. The country was “mired
in inaction and stagnation,” she publicly pointed out; it was pock-marked by “weakness and
[20]
incoherence.” This reading, widely shared in Washington D.C., undoubtedly emboldened the
United States, which bombed Belgrade on 24 March 1999 to bring to heel the Serbian nationalists
who had taken over the rump of Yugoslavia and had massacred ethnic minorities in the process of
building a greater Serbia: “A Black Day in the History of Europe” was the epitaph penned by General
[21]
Leonid Ivashov, who epitomised the old guard of the Red Army. The Russian Foreign Ministry
[22]
under Igor Ivanov nonetheless proved crucial in brokering a peace. Yet 1999 still saw the
admission into NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In 2004 they were followed by
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; and in 2009 by Albania and
Khorvatiya, in 2017 by Chernogoriya and in 2020 Northern Macedonia. The expansion of NATO had
undoubtedly acquired a logic of its own that Russia was unable to stop. How was Putin to accomplish
this after he was elected president in 2000, when the Americans saw the Russians as weak?
At first he attempted conciliation. The ideal opportunity arose when the Twin Towers in New York
were struck by Saudi Islamists on 9 September 2001. Putin took a decisive gamble, overruled his
security advisers and publicly offered Russia’s full co-operation. Indeed, he opened the intelligence
[23]
files on Islamist activism. Somehow this grand gesture appears to have been interpreted in the
White House as a matter of necessity on his part - from the need for a powerful ally against the
common foe - rather than a welcome concession from a potential partner; as could be seen within a
matter of months.
Thus when the Bush administration launched a surprise attack against Iraq on 19 March 2003 and on
a knowingly dubious premiss - that Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons - the Russians were
[24]
not informed in advance; let alone consulted. “With respect to Russia, we do have some strains as
a result of this issue. But I think that with Russia, we’ll be able to deal with this and it won’t be any
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
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[25]
kind of even short-term damage to our relationship,” Secretary of State Colin Powell said. His
thoughtless complacency, typical of Washington, was completely misjudged.
Regime change was the dominant thread in US foreign policy from the end of the Cold War,
vindicated by this triumph. It was seen as in the national interest that other states should drop
authoritarianism for democracy and it went hand in hand with the expansion of NATO to Russian
borders. Thus what blinkered American politicians saw as an entirely altruistic strand in their foreign
relations was naturally seen by its likely victims and their allies as the vigorous pursuit of US self-
interest, backed by the unilateral use of force. And when President Bush attended a summit with
Putin in St Petersburg in the summer of 2006, “Bush drew attention to the challenges posed by
democratic freedoms, especially freedom of the press, in Russia - and then noted that things had
gotten much better in Iraq. Putin immediately responded, “Well, we really would not want the kind of
democracy they have in Iraq.’ The room filled with applause, and not everyone heard Bush’s
response: ‘Just wait, it’s coming.’ What Bush had in mind was increased stability in Iraq, but it
[26]
sounded more ominous: you’ll see, democracy will be brought to you as well...” Symptomatic was
the reception of the experienced Russianist at the embassy in Moscow sent as Resident Legal Advisor
to liaise in Moscow on anti-corruption and counter-terrorism. He was ostentatiously slighted by those
[27]
dealing directly with terrorism, socially ostracised, and subjected to intrusive surveillance.
Putin chose force to reassert Russian hegemony over the ‘near abroad’ by attacking the former Soviet
republic of Georgia in the name of local separatists in mid-August 2008. This followed NATO’s
agreement at a meeting in Bucharest, on 2-4 April, to consider Georgian membership along with that
of Ukraine. In his diatribe prior to the attack on Ukraine Putin asserted that “Many European allies of
the USA even then perfectly well understood all the risks inherent in these views, but were pressed
[28]
into accepting what the senior party wanted.” Putin also claimed that both Georgia and Ukraine
[29]
were under pressure from the United States to join the alliance. The invasion proved an ominous
sign of the new direction taken. This is the troubled background to Ukraine’s search for security
within NATO.
Inevitably with Victoria Nuland playing a leading role in the foreign policy of the subsequent
administration headed by Barack Obama (2009-17), continuity rather than change for the better was
how the Kremlin saw it; even though Secretary of State Hillary Clinton insisted in public that
Washington wished to reset relations along a more positive course. Nuland had worked as an adviser
to Richard Cheney, Vice President under Bush, who is said to be the inspiration for the invasion of
[30]
Iraq, and very much the conduit for the idea that America lead the war for democracy. And it did
not help that the figure appointed as ambassador to Moscow - unusually a neophyte in diplomacy -
Michael McFaul had just written Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can in
[31]
collaboration with the fiercely anti-Communist Hoover Institution. McFaul saw his role in Moscow
as a ‘dual-track’ engagement with both government and opposition. Unsurprisingly, when he hosted
Putin’s opposition, which he did within days of arrival in Moscow, he became a marked man. On 17
January 2012 the well briefed journalist Mikhail Leont’ev attacked him on the First Channel television
show “Odnako,” declaring him to be “not a specialist on Russia. He is a specialist on democracy
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
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[32]
promotion, pure and simple.”
But this was nothing compared with the events that took place in Kyiv, a capital city notorious for
corruption and a country whose independence seemed little more than nominal in a tug of war
between Moscow and Washington (plus the EU), where one third of the country’s population were
Russian-speaking. The president, Viktor Yanukovych, elected in 2010, found himself besieged by the
opposition for reneging on a commitment to pursue membership of the European Union after
accepting a huge loan from the Russian government. This led to massive demonstrations in Maidan
Nezalezhnosti, the main square in the capital from 21 November 2013, where Nuland, then Deputy
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, could be seen ministering to the protestors in
full view of the cameras on 11 December. The EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton did the same
in what began to appear like a competition between herself and Nuland for determining the outcome
in Kyiv. Putin sourly commented: “I can only imagine the reaction [in the European Union] would be
if in the heat of the crisis in Greece or Cyprus, our foreign minister came to an anti-European rally
[33]
and began urging people to do something.”
The situation reached crisis on 20 February 2014 after snipers opened fire killing more than fifty
demonstrators. Yanukovych was forced out two days later after a parliamentary majority voted to
remove him. The direct involvement of the Americans in what amounted to a coup d’état of an elected
president then became known to the entire world when a telephone conversation between Nuland
and the US ambassador to Ukraine mysteriously appeared in the media. Here, with the
demonstrations still in progress, she was overheard in detailed discussion with a very nervous
Geoffrey Pyatt about alternatives to replace Yanukovych, in the course of which she said “Fu*k the
EU.” On its behalf the EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton was still trying to broker a deal with
the opposition that would leave Yanukovych in the presidency. Nuland evidently felt that time had
[34]
passed. ABC News reported: “Dmitry Loskutov, an aide to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry
Rogozin, was among the first on Twitter to link to the video, which surfaced Tuesday. Along with the
video link, Loskutov tweeted, ‘Sort of controversial judgment from Assistant Secretary of State
[35]
Victoria Nuland speaking about the EU’.”
The reluctance of the new administration under Arseny Yatsenuk to investigate the massacre and a
reported telephone conversation between Catherine Ashton and the Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas
Paet in which the latter reported information deemed reliable that the snipers had been from the
[36]
opposition - also leaked, presumably by the Russians - added fuel to the fire. The truth will
probably never be known. But it did not take long for the Russians to respond.
The Kremlin was horrified. Its view of events was captured in the newspaper of the military-industrial
complex, Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, on 17 March:
Ukraine has experienced a revolution. The situation here from the first developed exactly
according to the scenario of ‘the Arab spring.’ The activities of the leaders of the West
combined with precisely coordinated events and actions of the leaders of Maidan allows one
to say with confidence that the disorders in Ukraine were prepared and initiated above all by
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
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the USA and its closest allies.
But to what end? Here Moscow had no doubts. Its purpose was to fasten the Ukrainian élite to the
West, integration with the EU and inclusion within NATO. “Ultimately,” the argument ran, and here it
hit the nail on the head, “Ukraine would evidently be used as a means of transposing the revolution to
[37]
Russia.” Echoes of McFaul could be heard clearly in the fears of contagion from uncontrolled
democracy roaming the streets.
Meanwhile, Yanukovych had telephoned Putin on the evening of 21 February to say that he was off to
Kharkov for a regional conference; he then called in again on arrival. When shown where Yanukovych
was on the map - they had fixed his coordinates at the time of each call - Putin took the view that it
would only be a matter of time before Yanukovych faced a firing squad and he urged him to accept
refuge in Russia. Putin despatched helicopters with Spetsnaz on board in anticipation. Yanukovich,
however, declared in favour of heading for Crimea. But after a few days it had become clear that
nothing was left for him in Kiyv and he accepted Putin’s offer. Meanwhile a meeting had been held
late on the night of 22 February that ran through until 7.00am the following morning. Here the
decision was taken and, with the assistance of experienced veterans, plans were laid to seize Crimea
deploying special units of the GRU (military intelligence), marine commandos and paratroops for that
purpose. The operation was under way by 27 February beginning with the taking of the seat of
government and then the two local airports on the following day. A referendum to join Russia was
hurriedly held on 16 March which, given military occupation and control over the ballot stations,
unsurprisingly claimed 95% in favour; though Putin later forgot the number and late spoke of 75%
[38]
support. The bill passed by the Duma two days later was a mere formality.
But instead of leaving it at that, Russia sought further leverage against Ukraine by despatching
forces into the Donbas region, which was on the whole ethnically Russian. In early April Moscow was
vociferous about defending ethnic Russians in the south-east of Ukraine: “Russia does not intend to
view in silence what is going on in Little Russia [the traditional Tsarist term for Ukraine],” the hard-
line newspaper Vzglyad intoned, and ominously talked of reforming Ukraine into a “federation.”
Claiming that “a single united Ukraine also no longer exists,” it added menacingly: “No one intends to
join Donetsk and Lugansk to Russia,” at least “while there is a chance of maintaining, or more
accurately, founding a Ukrainian federation.” In the meantime the people of the south-east were
[39]
looking for assistance. “There is no doubt that it will receive it.”
By inciting and arming separatists who claimed self-government for Donetsk and Luhansk, Moscow
could ensure that Ukraine would never be at peace. This in turn acted as a catalyst to hardline
Ukrainian nationalists who identified themselves with the movement of Stefan Bandera in the 1930s
and 1940s for the independence of the country and enabled Moscow to characterise the country as
dominated by Nazis. On 17 July a Russian Buk missile launcher driven into Ukraine by Russia shot
down Malaysian airliner MH-17 overflying the region, killing 298 people. Three Russians and one
Ukrainian, the former associated variously with the FSB and GRU, have recently been indicted for
[40]
multiple homicide by the Dutch authorities. On 24 August 10 armed Russian paratroops were
detained in the Donetsk region, the first of many. They were identified as serving in Russia’s 331st
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
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[41]
Regiment in the 98th Sverskii Division of airborne forces.
Attempts by Germany and France to mediate between the government in Kyiv and the rebel
strongholds resulted in the Minsk Protocols of 2014-15 (which were “reinforced” in 2017), the
legitimacy of which was never in practice recognised by either party to the arrangement as has long
[42]
been obvious from the failed cease-fire and over 20,000 dead. Throughout, American silence
spoke volumes. And it was not just Nuland’s actions in 2014 which indicated the reality of US
influence over Kyiv but also the fact that in December 2015 Vice President Biden held hostage $1
[43]
billion in aid until the government sacked Ukraine’s chief prosecutor, Viktor Shokin. Thus while
the United States did not explicitly insist on observation of the Minsk agreements, the Ukrainian
government, very much a dependent, was not likely to begin to implement them. Moreover, as one
authoritative commentator noted, the agreements “are mistakenly predicated on compromise” when
in fact there is “an unresolvable contradiction - what could be called the ‘Minsk conundrum’: is
Ukraine sovereign, as Ukrainians insist, or should its sovereignty be limited, as Russia’s leaders
[44]
demand?”
Furthermore, from 2014 the two regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, both claiming the right to
independence from Ukraine, were not recognised as such by Moscow, despite pressure from the
Duma and others over nearly eight years. This would appear to reinforce the assumption that for
Putin they were just pawns in the game rather than major pieces in play. And, having failed to
advance on that basis, he finally decided to go va banque and launch his own coup d’état in Kyiv - the
results of which are before our eyes - and turn the country into a minor dependency. One question
that remains is who will back down first; the other is, even if Putin wins a military victory, will it
prove to be pyrrhic? Will he win a war but lose his throne?
Jonathan Haslam’s latest book is The Spectre of War. International Communism and the Origins of
World War II (Princeton University Press, 2021). He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a Fellow
of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; formerly George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for
Advanced Study, Princeton; and Professor Emeritus in the History of International Relations at
Cambridge University.
Notes
[1]
“Путин объявил «спецоперацию» в Украине. Армия России подтвердила, что наносит удары по
военным объектам в Украине,” 03:26, Novaya gazeta, 24 февраля 2022.
[2]
#CNBC #CNBCTV LIVE: House Intelligence Committee holds a hearing on worldwide threats to the
U.S. — 3/8/22.
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
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[3]
The world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik, went up on 3 November 1957. But the Americans then
took the lead in innovating satellites for the purposes of photo reconnaissance. For a documented history of the
program, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/.
[4]
“Update on U.S.-Russia Policy.” Testimony of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria
Nuland to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2021, www.foreign.senate.gov.
[5]
Naryshkin looked pallid, somewhat dazed and hesitant during his own broadcast in support of the
war, https://wordpress.com/post/throughrussianeyes.com/4020. Also, “Blindsided Russia’s top officials were
caught off guard by Putin’s war in Ukraine. Many of them want to resign — but can’t.” - Meduza, 11:18 am,
March 9, 2022.
[6]
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-russian-ambassador-anatoly-antonov-face-the-nation-02-20-2022/
[7]
https://wordpress.com/post/throughrussianeyes.com/3813
[8]
“Как западная разведка врет руководству США о ‘российском вторжении’,” Vzglyad, 26 January
2022.
[9]
For the images: Seth G. Jones and Philip G. Wasielewski, “Russia’s Possible Invasion of Ukraine,”
CSIS Briefs, January 13, 2022, p. 2.
[10]
“Ob istoricheskom edinstve russkikh i ukraintsev,” Lenta.ru, 12 July 2021. Vladimir Putin, “On the
Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” 2021, Wikisource,
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Historical_Unity_of_Russians_and_Ukrainians.
[11]
For example: John Mearsheimer -
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf. For a fundamental
critique of this entire approach to international relations, see my chapter “John Mearsheimer’s ‘Elementary
Geometry of Power’: Euclidian Moment or An Intellectual Blind Alley?”, in Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and
Zara Steiner, History and Neorealism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 322-340.
[12]
Edward Lucas, now retired from The Economist, explained it at length on
https://cepa.org/its-time-to-stop-westsplaining/
[13]
Tim Shipman, “How Wallace Fought ‘Securocrats’ to Donate UK’s Tank-Busting Weapons,” Sunday
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/9948394/h-diplo-essay-420-commentary-series-putin%E2%80%99s-war-%E2%80%9
Crussia-attacks
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
9H-Diplo
Times, 13 March 2022.
[14]
Daily Sabah with AP (Istanbul), 11 March 2022.
[15]
Shipman, “How Wallace fought...”
[16]
https://wordpress.com/post/throughrussianeyes.com/4079
[17]
Александр Храмчихин, “Наступление по тонкому льду”, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,
10.03.2022 22:00:00.
[18]
This was first uncovered by Joshua Shifrinson of Boston University. It is quoted and put to good
use by Marc Trachtenberg, “The United States and the NATO Non-extension Assurances of 1990: New Light on
an Old Problem?” International Security 45:3 (2021): 162-203.
[19]
For the most recent account: Mary E. Sarotte, Not One Inch. America, Russia, and the Making of
Post Cold-War Stalemate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). Whereas Asmus later summed up his
activities in print, Jackson, whose former clients are still his current clients, maintains total discretion (email
exchange, 28 October).
[20]
Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79:1 (January/February 2000),
57 and 59.
[21]
Leonid Ivashev, “Chernyi den’ evropeiskoi istorii.” Unfortunately access to Russian government
websites is no longer possible at the time of writing; so the footnote remains incomplete.
[22]
Bridget Kendall, at that time BBC Diplomatic Correspondent, reminiscence 12 March 2022.
[23]
Personal knowledge; also, John O’Loughlin, Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Vladimir Kolossov, “‘A Risky
Westward Turn’? Putin’s 9-11 Script and Ordinary Russians,” Europe-Asia Studies 56:1 (January 2004) 3-34;
CRSR Report, Russia and the War in Iraq, April 14, 2003, RS21462; and Thomas Ambrosio, “The Russo-
American Dispute over the invasion of Iraq: International Status and the Role of Positional Goods,” Europe-Asia
Studies 57:8 (2005): 1189-1210.
[24]
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/index.htm. This also contains the original N.I.E
and the U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/9948394/h-diplo-essay-420-commentary-series-putin%E2%80%99s-war-%E2%80%9
Crussia-attacks
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
10H-Diplo
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress. For the Russian reaction: CRSR Report, “Russia and the War
in Iraq”, April 14, 2003, RS21462; and Ambrosio, “The Russo-American Dispute over the Invasion of Iraq.”
[25]
Sharon LaFraniere, “Russia’s Putin Calls the Iraq War ‘A Mistake’,” Washington Post, 18 March
2003.
[26]
Fyodor Lukyanov, “What Russia Learned from the Iraq War,” Al-Monitor, 18 March 2013.
[27]
Tom Firestone. He moved over to a private law firm, where he was involved in the case involving
the imprisonment of mega-investor William Browder’s lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, in 2008. The FSB tried to
recruit Firestone and, failing that, they had him thrown out of the country: Financial Times, 20 May 2013.
[28]
Krasnaya zvezda, 22 February 2022.
[29]
Speech to the national security council: Krasnaya zvezda, 22 February 2022.
[30]
Letter to the Financial Times from Harland Ullman, leader of the Shock and Awe Study Group of
which Cheney was an ad hoc member, 6 July 2021.
[31]
Since published by Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.
[32]
Tom Balmforth, “New U.S. Ambassador to Russia Gets Frosty Reception,” RFE/RFL, 18 January
2012.
[33]
Quoted in Andrew Gardner, “Ashton Joins Ukraine Leaders for Crisis Talks,” Politico, 29 January
2014.
[34]
Youtube, 6 February 2014. Ashton had arrived back in Kyiv on 4 February.
[35]
Broadcast 6 February 2014.
[36]
Youtube, 5 March 2014. Most of the comments in Russian praise the intelligence services for
revealing it.
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/9948394/h-diplo-essay-420-commentary-series-putin%E2%80%99s-war-%E2%80%9
Crussia-attacks
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
11H-Diplo
[37]
Konstantin Sivkov, “Украина: период полураспада,” Военно-промышленный курьер, 17 March
2014.
[38]
Documentary on Rossiya-1, “Krym. Vozrashchenie Rodinu,” 8 March 2015. The full transcript was
published in Lenta.ru on 15 March 2015.
[39]
“Право защитить своих,” Vzglyad, 9 April 2014.
[40]
https://www.government.nl/topics/mh17-incident
[41]
https://ru.krymr.com/a/sem-dokazatelstv-prisutstviya-voyennih-rossii-na-donbasse/29568097.html
[42]
https://peacemaker.un.org/ua-ceasefire-2014
[43]
Biden, 6 October 2019 at the Council of Foreign Relations,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rnIPw_Who7E.
[44]
Duncan Allan, “The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia’s War in Eastern Ukraine,” May
2020, Research Paper, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House, 2. Allan covered Ukraine for many years at the research
section of what is now called the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Essay 420- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “Russia Attacks Ukraine: A Post Mortem for Putin?”. H-
Diplo. 03-16-2022.
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/9948394/h-diplo-essay-420-commentary-series-putin%E2%80%99s-war-%E2%80%9
Crussia-attacks
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
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