Force Design 2030 Annual Update - May 2022 - Marines.mil
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Force Design 2030
Annual Update
May 2022INTRODUCTION
This report describes progress to date on the United does not have the luxury of focusing on a single threat,
States Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 (FD 2030) to the exclusion of all others, and basing our design
modernization effort. on such a narrow point of view. We are building a
force capable of executing our concepts, not a force
Force Design began in response to known and
exclusively tailored to them. The Marine Corps remains
anticipated changes in the operating environment,
an expeditionary crisis response force. As I wrote in
many of which were described in the 2018 National
my CPG, a force composed of highly capable tactical
Defense Strategy, and affirmed by my predecessor,
units that can perform combined arms operations at
the 37th Commandant. In his 2019 posture statement
all echelons, enabled by organic air and logistics, is a
to Congress, he described the need to change how
force that can execute the complex missions defined
the Marine Corps is organized, trained, equipped, and
by our emerging concepts in any potential theater. This
employed in light of the evolving security environment.
remains our overall aim point for Force Design. This
The changes driving FD 2030, however, originated
report reflects our efforts to modernize, as measured
long before. They are rooted in the 31st Commandant’s
against our directed benchmark, but this modernized
Hunter Warrior (1997) and Urban Warrior (1998 – 1999)
force must and will fulfill our crisis response mandate
experiments and the 33rd Commandant’s Concept for
as well.
Distributed Operations (July 2005). Each of these
helped shape the direction I gave in my Commandant’s To reflect FD 2030 progress in previous years, we
Planning Guidance (CPG) of July 2019, when I identified published updates in March 2020 and April 2021.
Force Design as my top priority. Building on my CPG, I This year’s report explains the current state of our
expanded on the need for change in the articles “The modernization effort by reviewing the progress we have
Case for Change: Meeting the Principal Challenges made toward our goals in the past year, providing my
Facing the Corps” (Marine Corps Gazette, June 2020) direction to the Marine Corps on steps requiring action
and “Preparing for the Future: Marine Corps Support now, and identifying issues needing further analysis to
to Joint Operations in Contested Littorals” (Military support future decisions.
Review Online, April 2021), among others. Today, world
This report also summarizes the foundation for Force
events emphasize our need to rapidly adapt in order
Design, our Campaign of Learning. The outcomes of
to help the joint force deter, and if necessary, defeat,
its wargames, analyses, experiments, and exercises
a peer competitor.
underpin our investment and divestment decisions,
The newly released 2022 National Defense Strategy and fully comport with the analytic guidance issued
establishes the importance of the coming “decisive by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We also take the
decade,” and the need for new approaches to the opportunity this year to highlight how our thinking has
strategic challenges in our future. The tenets of the evolved after two and a half years.
strategy—integrated deterrence, campaigning, and
build enduring advantages—call for fresh thinking The report then describes the implications of the above
with respect to military capabilities. Due to our close for our objective force and the resulting investment and
collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense divestment priorities. As I have stated, I am confident
(OSD), Force Design is a modernization effort that, in we can achieve the majority of our modernization goals
many ways, anticipated the demands of the strategy. without asking for an increase in our budget topline
It has been, and will continue to be, characterized if we are able to redirect divested dollars toward our
by thoughtful balance in addressing the need for priority modernization investments. With the support
rapid change, while understanding and managing the of Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
associated risks. and the Department of the Navy, we have made good
on this assumption over the past several years and we
The pacing threat for our Force Design, as directed by the will need similar support again this year. Similarly, FD
current and two previous presidential administrations, 2030 assumes adequate support for its key components
is the Armed Forces of the People’s Republic of China such as logistics modernization, amphibious shipping,
(PRC). We are modernizing the Marine Corps using operational lift, and littoral mobility.
the PRC as a benchmark. However, the Marine Corps
Force Design 2030 Annual Update 1
May 2022YEAR IN REVIEW
Since our last update in April 2021, Force Design trained 5th Marine Regiment to contribute to sea denial
moved forward with the publication of several new in a maritime littoral environment. This exercise also
concepts, refinement of our organizations, force-on- explored streamlined methods of command and control
force experimentation, and the testing and fielding of to complete a digital kill chain from the joint force to
new systems. This section outlines major highlights in Marine units on the ground. On the eastern seaboard
these areas and summarizes progress on actions from from the Florida Keys to the Carolinas, and in Europe, II
last year’s report. MEF partnered with both 4th and 6th Fleet to examine
innovative naval force reconnaissance and counter-
The security environment is characterized by proliferation
reconnaissance constructs, tactics, techniques, and
of sophisticated sensors and precision weapons coupled
procedures.
with growing strategic competition. Potential adversaries
employ systems and tactics to hold the fleet and joint The recent activation of the 3d Marine Littoral Regiment
force at arm’s length, allowing them to employ a strategy (MLR) in Hawaii highlights the pace of progress since
that uses contested areas as a shield behind which they April of last year. The live force experiments and limited
can apply a range of coercive measures against our allies demonstrations with this new unit will help us refine its
and partners. Written in response to this environment, design and inform further organizational change. The
the newly published A Concept for Stand-in Forces activation of 3d MLR leverages the return on investment
describes the ways Marines will intentionally disrupt from our divest-to-modernize approach to Force Design,
the plans of these potential adversaries and defines recapitalizing resources to field new formations and
Stand-in Forces (SIF) as small but lethal forces, designed capabilities.
to operate across the competition continuum within
Other live force experimentation has focused on infantry
a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime
battalion modernization and 21st century combined
defense-in-depth. They operate with low signature,
arms. Analysis of multiple events across three infantry
are mobile, and are relatively simple to maintain and
battalions from each MEF is providing for a holistic
sustain. The enduring function for SIF is to help the fleet
assessment of the strengths and limitations of the
and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-
proposed design. New capabilities now organic to
reconnaissance (RXR) battle at every point on the
modernized battalions include loitering munitions, new
competition continuum. Our recent publication of A
and enhanced small unmanned aerial systems, tools
Functional Concept for Maritime Reconnaissance and
to help the battalion manage its signature, and the
Counter-Reconnaissance describes how the Marine
addition of electronic warfare and signals intelligence
Corps intends to develop needed capabilities in this
capabilities. Outcomes from ongoing infantry battalion
area. Future publication of A Functional Concept for
experimentation will drive recommendations for
MAGTF Air and Missile Defense will similarly describe
refinements to the design and implementation of the
the intended development of air and missile defense.
Service’s transition to infantry formations more capable
In the past 12 months, all three Marine Expeditionary of distributed operations.
Forces (MEF) conducted exercises purposefully designed
Leveraging expertise across the total force, we
to refine force employment using emerging concepts
established the Marine Innovation Unit (MIU), a Marine
like SIF and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
Corps Reserve formation whose work will complement
(EABO) along with newly fielded capabilities. Feedback
that of our Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL)
from the MEFs is a critical element in our historical
by accelerating advanced technology development for
combat development process and is integral to
the Marine Corps. Reserve Marines in grades sergeant
our Force Design approach today. These exercises
through colonel will be assigned to this unit on the basis
had the collateral effect of improving naval integration
of their expertise in areas like artificial intelligence, data
as the MEFs operated alongside their shipmates in
science, human systems, advanced manufacturing,
the numbered fleets. In Japan, for example, III MEF
quantum computing, autonomy/robotics, space,
exercised with 7th Fleet and our Japanese allies to
supply chain management, cyber, synthetic biology,
develop command arrangements needed for Stand-
energy and materials sciences, and other technology
in Forces operating in a coalition. In California and
fields. This initiative allows us to tap the diverse talent
adjacent waters, I MEF, with assistance from 3d Fleet,
2 Force Design 2030 Annual Update
May 2022pool in Marine Forces Reserve and this new unit, in and counter-reconnaissance, and development
collaboration with MCWL, will integrate research from of a program to assess and analyze the full cost of
multiple advanced disciplines into Force Design and modernization based on planned investments. We
related efforts. moved aggressively on other directed actions with
complex interdependencies, such as 2d Marine Division’s
This year we fielded systems and introduced prototypes
acceleration of experimentation with maritime, multi-
across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). For
domain reconnaissance constructs and activities; an
example, in August during LARGE SCALE EXERCISE-21
examination of operational logistics that leverages a
in Hawaii, we partnered with the Navy to successfully
new Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) Logistics Command;
demonstrate our new Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship
and, generation of new personnel models to mature
Interdiction System (NMESIS), launching two Naval
the force. The progress we are making through each
Strike Missiles from a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
of these longer-term actions is incorporated into our
(JLTV)-based, Remotely Operated Ground Unit for
Campaign of Learning, in support of which we published
Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE-Fires) carrier, striking a
a classified Service Level Experimentation Campaign
moving maritime target at over the horizon range. In
Plan; an unclassified version will be released in the
cooperation with the Strategic Capabilities Office and
second quarter of CY 22. Most importantly, the progress
the Navy, we also conducted a ground launch of a
we’ve made has resulted in new capabilities that are
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile mounted on a remotely
already in-demand by combatant commanders. One
operated mobile launcher.
such example is the creation of Task Force 61/2 (TF
We also successfully tested a prototype expeditionary 61/2) by the Commander of 6th Fleet.
air and missile defense system, the Medium Range
Intercept Capability (MRIC), at New Mexico’s White
Sands Missile Range. Other prototyping efforts
accelerated requirements processes and informed
solution development in key areas, to include automated
recognition of naval targets using small unmanned aerial
systems. While the complete inventory is too large to
list here, these examples illustrate how our Marines are
advancing our capabilities with new systems.
We examined multiple aspects of the MAGTF and
emerging concepts through extensive wargaming.
Outcomes from logistics-focused games drove elements
of our design and Campaign of Learning. Our capstone
Service game, EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR 21, informed
the Distributed Maritime Logistics Operations concept
currently in development in partnership with the Navy,
and shaped our logistics experimentation campaign
plan. Both the ENIGMA and EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR
22 Part I wargames tested concepts for operations in the
information environment and ‘gray zone’ competition
below the level of traditional armed conflict. These
wargames inform the soon-to-be-published Marine
Corps Doctrinal Publication 8, Information, and underpin
critical thinking in support of refining MLR design and
Infantry Battalion Experimentation.
We completed directed actions and discrete tasks from
last year’s Force Design Annual Update, to include
publication of A Concept for Stand-in Forces, publication
of functional concepts for both MAGTF Integrated Air
and Missile Defense and multi-domain reconnaissance
Force Design 2030 Annual Update 3
May 2022KEY FINDINGS FROM THE CAMPAIGN OF LEARNING
INCLUDING DIRECTED ACTIONS • Force Design communications were weighted
AND IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES too heavily toward the MLR. Feedback from
FMF exercises has shown that, in most cases,
REQUIRING FURTHER ANALYSIS task-organized MAGTFs perform Stand-in Force
This section describes the steps we are taking to missions. The MLR is a component of that larger
deepen the Campaign of Learning, which is the analytic effort.
foundation for Force Design. It also provides an overview
• Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
of the adjustments we are making after more than two
missions at scale, such as those envisioned
and half years of learning. It then articulates the learning
against the pacing threat, are MAGTF missions.
points derived since the last report that apply across
The MEF is a reservoir of capabilities we will
Force Design as a whole. This section concludes with
use to task-organize for these missions. Our
outcomes learned in major functional areas and the
exercises and the forward deployed use of our
directed actions and issues requiring further analysis
concepts repeatedly emphasize this point.
that resulted from them. The Deputy Commandant,
Combat Development and Integration (DC, CD&I), will • As we activate 3d MLR and conduct further
continue to track and report progress of these actions experimentation, our initial observations linked
and issues. to A Concept for Stand-in Forces, especially for
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance,
This past year we invested in the Campaign of indicate we focused the MLR too much on
Learning itself by taking a more structured approach lethality and not enough on sensing, the ability
to collaborating with partners and by applying to make sense, maneuverability, and deception.
sophisticated modeling and simulation methods While our initial assumptions about the value of
and tools. This is reflected through the refinement and the MLR to the FMF and fleets were anchored
analysis of mission engineering threads we developed on the enhanced lethality it could provide via
in partnership with the Navy. This work included support long-range fires, further analysis demonstrates
from Naval Information Warfare Center (NIWC) Pacific the even greater value of resilient sensing and
and NIWC Atlantic and others, and deepened the enabling of kill chains.
analytic underpinning of our investment decisions.
Achieving a significant milestone in June, we broke • The size and composition of the infantry
ground on the Marine Corps Wargaming and Analysis battalion remains the subject of continuous
Center at Quantico, VA. Once complete, the Center experimentation via three battalions—one each
will provide next-generation technologies to help us from our three Active Component divisions.
better visualize the threat environment and maintain Our initial planning concluded a reduction
competitive advantages over adversaries. from an existing personnel strength of 896 to
approximately 735 was suitable and sustainable.
Outcomes from our Campaign of Learning over the past Over the previous 24 months, force-on-force
two and a half years caused us to make adjustments experimentation has demonstrated that infantry
in our initial Force Design, particularly in the following battalions of 800 to 835 personnel are optimal.
areas: We will continue to refine the structure of the
• Our FD 2030 communication has not been infantry battalion through decisions informed
effective with all stakeholders. While we are by our experimentation.
modernizing the Marine Corps using the pacing • As a result of continued experimentation and the
threat as our benchmark, we have consistently refinement of our objective force, cannon battery
said that a modernized Marine Corps must still capacity will be sustained at seven batteries,
be capable of performing global crisis response which is an increase in two batteries over initial
operations. Regardless, we must do better in plans. Along with the seven High Mobility
explaining to all stakeholders the analytic rigor Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) batteries, these
underpinning our Force Design choices, and 14 combined batteries are sufficient to satisfy
how a modernized Marine Corps will perform traditional requirements of a MEF engaged in
our traditional roles and functions in the future. sustained operations ashore.
4 Force Design 2030 Annual Update
May 2022• We originally planned to divest three MV-22 • Through the lens of all-domain operations,
medium tiltrotor squadrons (VMMs) from the reconnaissance is a function focused on
Active Component, which would have resulted sensing to initiate decisive action. It is entirely
in a total of 14 squadrons of 12 aircraft each. consistent with our maneuver warfare philosophy
However, detailed analysis demonstrated that of generating tempo via the ability to rapidly
16 squadrons of 10 aircraft each better satisfies make sense of the operating environment, make
joint force requirements and better supports decisions more quickly than an adversary, and
Service needs to organize, train, and equip. maintain initiative. Counter-reconnaissance is a
In particular, this force structure simplifies the function focused on denying the enemy’s ability
formation of a Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (MEU) to sense and initiate action, disrupting their plans
aviation combat element (ACE). This change is and kill chains. This is consistent with maneuver
reflected in the directed actions in the aviation warfare as it seeks to disrupt enemy decision
section of this report. cycles and induce friction.
• In the preceding two and half years, we learned • To persist inside an adversary’s weapons
a considerable amount about how to conduct engagement zone, our Stand-in Forces must
organizational design. As a learning organization, be set and sustained by logistics capabilities
we also perform internal reviews focused on designed for distributed operations over long
process improvement. This year we will refine the distances in a contested environment.
Force Design process to make it more efficient • Certain capabilities must be organic to our
and to ensure we are prepared to take advantage Stand-in Forces, such as organic sensors and
of major investments, such as our Wargaming long-range precision fires to close kill webs
Center. Continual improvement in our ability when external capabilities are not present or
to perform organizational design will make the available.
Marine Corps more agile.
• Stand-in and crisis response forces need organic
The following learning points apply to Force Design air and surface operational and tactical mobility
as a whole: to provide joint force commanders a capability
• The value proposition of our newest concepts that operates with minimal dependence on
shifted as we learned more over the past two and theater lift assets.
a half years, from an initial focus on generating • Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
organic lethal capabilities through anti-ship provided by task organized Stand-in Forces
missiles and the aviation combat element of the support naval and joint targeting and fires across
MAGTF, to a more balanced focus that includes domains. Stand-in Forces’ capabilities increase
persisting forward in a contested area to win the survivability and effectiveness of the naval
the RXR battle and complete joint kill webs. To and joint force.
be clear, this includes the ability to generate • As a complement to maneuver, deception is a
lethal effects, an essential part of what Marine core capability necessary to enhance survivability
forces must and will provide, but lethal effects when operating forward regardless of assigned
are not the only value Marine forces offer the mission. This will require materiel and non-
joint force. materiel solutions, to include a focus on refined
• Our force-on-force experimentation, specifically tactics and associated training.
the MAGTF Warfighting Exercise (MWX) and
We have high confidence in our newest concepts, which
Infantry Battalion Experimentation (IBX),
continue to be tested through wargames, live force
demonstrate that the command and control
experiments, and exercises with the Navy and our joint
warfighting function is the first among equals,
partners. They support the conclusions that follow
and getting it right is a prerequisite for the
and inform the next steps in our iterative campaign
warfighting function integration necessary for
of learning. High confidence does not imply that
all-domain actions.
refinement is not required.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update 5
May 2022CONCEPTS & WARGAMING 2. Publish version two of TM EABO by 1 January
2023. MCWL will publish an article on the
We laid the conceptual foundation for our initial
subject no later than FY23Q1 to create a
modernization by publishing both The Tentative Manual
shared understanding of the revision and
for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (TM EABO)
any substantive changes.
and A Concept for Stand-in Forces in 2021. Now, we
will broaden our view and consider how forces outside 3. Update the Service Level Experimentation
of a contested area contribute, especially in conflict Campaign Plan and publish an unclassified
against the pacing threat, and how a modernized Marine version no later than 30 June 2022.
Corps responds to crisis. The Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU) is central to crisis response. It represents 4. MCWL will publish unclassified executive
a combat credible and operationally suitable force summaries of all Service-level war game
effective for competition, countering gray zone activities, reports related to FD 2030 no later than 1
setting conditions for the joint force, and reinforcing November 2022 and make these available
our networks of allies and partners. Further, it packs an on the FD 2030 website. Going forward,
all-domain “punch” in conflict. Additionally, the MEU MCWL will publish unclassified versions of
is an essential complement to our Stand-in Forces. all Service-level war game reports within 90
Future MEUs must have the right mix of capabilities, days of event completion.
which requires laying an updated conceptual foundation
for employment in the future operating environment, Issues Requiring Further Analysis
informed by analysis and experimentation. A. MEU Modernization. Continue to explore
concepts for modernizing the MEU.
The modernization of our conceptual foundation
also includes updating our approach to all types of B. Logistics. In accordance with recommenda-
amphibious operations. Existing naval and joint doctrine tions originating from the ongoing MWX, the
provide useful definitions but must be adjusted to Service must develop concepts for resilient
account for changes in the operating environment and logistics webs in a contested environment
connect to the ideas expressed in our newest naval with multiple options for support, to include
concepts like Distributed Maritime Operations, Littoral distribution networks, and multi-domain
Operations in a Contested Environment, and A Concept delivery methods.
for Stand-in Forces. We also must clearly describe how
modern amphibious operations increase the options
available to the naval and joint force in competition
COMMAND AND CONTROL,
and conflict. INTELLIGENCE, AND OPERATIONS IN
THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Underscoring the iterative nature of Force Design, our Campaign of Learning activities, such as our ENIGMA
Campaign of Learning necessitates that we update The and EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR 22 wargames, revealed
Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base gaps that inhibit the FMF’s ability to conduct steady-
Operations. state RXR campaigning to enable MAGTF, naval, and
joint awareness, threat characterization, and posture.
Directed Actions These shortfalls are currently addressed via ad hoc
1. Develop a “Concept for 21st Century relationships and networks, but such informal solutions
Amphibious Operations” to describe the result in episodic, inconsistent engagement and
manner in which Fleet Marine Forces conduct actions. Therefore, our command arrangements require
the full range of military operations no later examination to ensure that our Stand-in Forces remain
than 1 January 2023. The Marine Corps in a readiness posture that does not require changes in
Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) will publish command and control or structure to rapidly transition
an article on the subject no later than Fiscal from competition to conflict.
Year (FY) 23 Quarter (Q) 1 to create a shared
understanding. We believe that in a conflict with a peer adversary, first
moves may be in space and cyber, so we must enable
our Stand-in Forces, MEUs, and MEFs to integrate
with, and have access to, those capabilities now. We
6 Force Design 2030 Annual Update
May 2022can streamline and simplify much of the coordination Issues Requiring Further Analysis
burden at the headquarters level if we re-organize and C. Reserve Augmentation. Conduct a study of
re-focus some of our structure, which we will do in the total force integration (Active Component/
future with the creation of the Marine Corps Information Reserve Component) approaches and
Command (MCIC). alternatives to determine Reserve
augmentation requirements for a deployable,
Our Campaign of Learning confirms what we have
3-star JTF HQ in II MEF.
long known intuitively: access and placement matter.
Assigning liaison officers within naval, joint, combined, D. Reconnaissance and Counter-Reconnaissance
and interagency organizations—those with authorities (RXR). Identify critical dependencies, including,
and permissions—will allow us to gain kill web tempo but not limited to: command arrangements,
and agility. staff functions, and certifications that will
enable the Service to conduct reconnaissance
Finally, we have learned from our experiments and and counter-reconnaissance operations, and
exercises that we need to adjust how we perform activities and investments with the fleet, joint
command and control (C2) across the MAGTF to achieve force, interagency, and allies and partners
integration with naval and joint forces. Our aviation C2 below the threshold of armed conflict.
organizations and tactical employment concepts are
well-defined and recognized by the joint force. We E. Reconnaissance and Counter-Reconnaissance
are considering new C2-specific formations using our Liaison Officers (RXR LNO). Recommend
approach to aviation C2 as a model. Accordingly, we placement of organic Marine Corps enablers
will leverage Marine aviation C2 in our Campaign of and liaison officers needed to enable enduring
Learning to further inform and develop command and reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
control across the MAGTF; related C2 directed actions and rapid integration of Marine capabilities
and issues requiring further analysis are captured in the into theater crisis response.
aviation section of this report. F. Multi-Domain C2 Command or Brigade.
Conduct a more thorough analysis of
Directed Actions this recommendation, create a notional
5. Develop a concept of employment for table of organization (T/O) and table of
Service assigned and Service retained forces equipment (T/E), and present findings and
to integrate and campaign within the global recommendations to DC, CD&I.
and theater response frameworks.
G. Operations in the Information Environment
6. Develop a deployable 3-star Joint Task Force (OIE) Doctrine. The Service lacks adequate
Headquarters (JTF HQ) in II MEF. OIE doctrine or training standards. This
leads to a lack of awareness, education, and
7. Develop options for the creation of a Marine experience often reflected in commanders
Corps Information Command (MCIC). and staffs grappling with operating in a
8. Establish a restricted officer Primary Military multi-domain environment and applying
Occupational Specialty (PMOS) for a and integrating information capabilities at
Command and Control Interface Control MWX. DC, I and TECOM must build upon
Officer. the foundation created by MCDP 8 and
produce the requisite doctrinal foundation
9. Establish an Air Control Company in 3d for OIE.
Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) to support
experimentation.
10. Wargame a MEF construct supported by a
multi-domain C2 brigade.
11. Revise command and control and planning
doctrine to reflect gaps in multi-domain
operations.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update 7
May 2022MANEUVER, MOBILITY, AND FIRES mobility, and equipment that integrates with special
operations and joint forces are needed. Our Campaign
Maritime maneuver is of supreme importance. Littoral
of Learning developed some initial options that will
mobility remains a significant gap, a conclusion repeatedly
serve as the foundation for further experimentation
validated across Campaign of Learning activities. Our
so that we can determine the right mix of capabilities
Stand-in Forces require organic operational mobility,
needed at the various echelons in each MEF, as well
such as the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), plus a mix
as the Reserve Component.
of crewed and uncrewed vessels to support multi-domain
reconnaissance and scouting, counter-reconnaissance The LAR transition will directly affect our Ground
and screening operations, small unit maneuver, and Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS). Choices
lethality in support of sea denial and sea control. Littoral made in the maritime mobility discussion above will
mobility requires further analysis to develop a better also affect the GCTVS, as will its integration with our
understanding of the specific capabilities needed by uncrewed systems roadmap. We must continually refine
maneuver elements of the MAGTF, to sustain Stand-in this strategy to ensure it is operationally suitable and
Forces by connecting with the Navy’s Combat Logistics logistically supportable.
Force, provide small craft for local littoral mobility,
and more. This will require a mix of vessels that are Last year’s report reflected our prioritization of fire
complementary to, but different from amphibious support, to include long-range precision fires and organic
warships. We must conduct a thorough analysis to precision fires for our infantry battalions. These systems
understand and resource all aspects necessary to realize are beginning to enter the inventory, and experiments
these capabilities, to include manpower and training, and exercises with them are revealing their strengths
as we consider resourcing these as requirements. and limitations. To ensure our updated approach to fires
leaves no unnecessary gaps, we will conduct a holistic
FD 2030 envisions the activation of MLRs in III MEF study of MAGTF fires to enable sound prioritization for
only. While we do not currently plan to create MLRs in future resource decisions and science & technology
I and II MEF or Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), (S&T) efforts.
every MEF and MARFORRES will modernize through
our Force Design process, to include developing the
Directed Actions
ability to conduct tasks associated with sea denial.
12. Provide and sustain bridging solutions for
The activation of 3d MLR and associated experimentation littoral mobility for MLR experimentation
plan will help us answer a series of questions within Force and training until the LAW is fielded.
Design. These questions include whether a modernized
13. Experiment with alternatives to the core
infantry battalion is the correct base unit for the MLR,
element of the MLR to determine if the Littoral
or whether the base unit should be a reconnaissance
Combat Team should be a modernized
or artillery battalion; the correct amount and type of
infantry battalion, as currently planned,
organic sensors needed in the MLR; and the essential
or another formation such as an artillery
tasks for this formation and how those will drive future
battalion or reconnaissance battalion.
training and force generation. At present, 3d MLR will
maintain an infantry battalion as its base unit to facilitate 14. Refine the MLR Mission Essential Task List
experimentation. We also expect MLR experimentation no later than 1 September 2022.
to heavily inform the LAW program specifically and
operational mobility in general, and help us determine 15. Experiment with a maritime reconnaissance/
the correct echelon of command in the MEF for the counter-reconnaissance capability in 1st
Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV). LAR Battalion, guided by the November
2021 Ground Board proposal, to inform the
Our light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalions must development of a larger capability for the
transition from their current ground vehicle-centric Stand-in Forces.
approach to an all-domain mobile reconnaissance
approach. Sole reliance on armored ground vehicles 16. Initiate the transition of LAR battalions to
for reconnaissance is too limiting, especially in complex mobile reconnaissance battalions aligned
littoral environments. Attributes such as reconnaissance, with the November 2021 brief to the Marine
surveillance, targeting beyond the line of sight, littoral Corps Ground Board. Start with 2D LAR and
8 Force Design 2030 Annual Update
May 2022build off their efforts with TF 61/2. Mobile Experimentation and training over the past year
reconnaissance battalions do not have to demonstrates what some in the Service have known
be mirror-imaged. since the days of the Hunter Warrior Experiments of the
late 1990s—distributable light infantry with access to
17. Publish an updated and refined GCTVS that
organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
reflects evolving reconnaissance/counter-
(ISR) and strike create advantage and extend the area
reconnaissance approaches, particularly
of influence of every small unit.
the LAR to mobile reconnaissance battalion
transition and the Uncrewed Roadmap. Our continued experimentation demonstrates that
Review and validate all assumptions regarding infantry and LAR battalions that field teams or small
programmed or potential future capabilities, units with the organic ability to sense, decide, and
such as the Amphibious Combat Vehicle shoot have a competitive warfighting advantage on
(ACV)-30 and Advanced Reconnaissance a modern battlefield. If those small units also possess
Vehicle (ARV). an organic long-range precision fires capability (light
miniature attack munitions (LMAMs), etc.), then this
18. Produce a detailed plan to ensure appropriate
shortens the kill chain dramatically and enables that
sensors are organic to our operating forces.
unit to out cycle the enemy. These observations are also
Refine associated acquisition objectives and
being demonstrated on global battlefields for all to see.
fielding plans, as necessary.
Ensuring our small units, especially our infantry squads,
19. Refine Stand-in Force requirements for
are led by the most well-trained and capable infantry
maritime mobility.
Marines has been a goal of every Commandant. Our
20. Conduct a holistic MAGTF fires study to force-on-force experiments support this goal, which is
identify any gaps in all-weather fire support informing individual and collective training adjustments.
coverage. The study will recommend ways to Additionally, our experiments have revalidated that unit
mitigate gaps and will recommend priorities cohesion creates advantage.
for resourcing solutions and related S&T
efforts. Fielding Multi-purpose Anti-armor Anti-personnel
Weapon Systems (MAAWS) and loitering munitions
Issues Requiring Further Analysis within our small units provide the close-combat lethality
H. Sea Denial. Based on MLR experimentation, enhancements long-envisioned by infantry Marines.
identify the appropriate composition of sea While our company commanders will retain access to
denial capabilities in I MEF and II MEF, and 60mm mortars for use depending on their estimate
support decisions on the activation of MLRs of the situation, force-on-force training repeatedly
in III MEF. demonstrates the range, precision, and lethality of
the new systems outperform 60mm mortars.
I. LRUSV. Based on MLR experimentation,
determine the right echelon of command
(MLR, Division, or MEF) for the LRUSV and Directed Actions
where it is best postured (Hawaii, Guam, 21. Experiment with the hunter-killer platoon
Okinawa, or other). concept as part of the continuing IBX
campaign and provide findings and
recommendations at the Executive Off-Site
INFANTRY BATTALIONS (EOS).
Infantry will continue to locate, close with, and destroy
22. Experiment with a swarming unmanned
adversaries through fire and maneuver, but the range
aircraft system (UAS) capability in I MEF and
of options for how to locate, how to close, and how to
provide findings and recommendations at
destroy is expanding. These new means give infantry
the EOS.
increased lethality and greater range of purpose.
Today, the ability of infantry to operate distributed, Issues Requiring Further Analysis
with reduced logistical footprint and low signature, J. Snipers. Our initial re-organization of the
while employing a wide range of direct and indirect infantry battalion disaggregated the sniper
fires, invests this arm with new-found relevance. platoon and added one sniper team per
Force Design 2030 Annual Update 9
May 2022company. Our force-on-force exercises have (MCLE), especially for distribution across large theaters
identified other options to organize this of operation. We also believe we can achieve improved
capability. Continue to evaluate the merits of outcomes in aviation by incorporating Reserve
each possible construct and provide a formal Component squadrons into Active Component air
recommendation no later than 1 September groups, and will conduct limited experiments to test
2022. this premise.
K. 81MM Mortars. At present, 81s are to be Our Campaign of Learning also indicates that our
dispersed across the battalion with two tubes future uncrewed aviation capabilities must expand
per company. The battalion commander and increase dramatically. While we stand up MAGTF
can decide whether aggregation is required Unmanned Aerial System, Expeditionary Aircraft
depending on the mission and threat. Some (MUX) and Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE)
suggest that 81s should be aggregated back unmanned aerial vehicle (MUX/MALE) capability in our
into a platoon within H&S Company. Continue Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons 1, 2, and
to evaluate the merits of each construct and 3, our next set of uncrewed capabilities will focus on
provide a formal recommendation no later logistics, manned/unmanned teaming, and higher end
than 1 September 2022. tactical systems. This approach will be informed by the
significant experimentation and prototyping that has
AVIATION already begun, and as reflected in our recently drafted
Uncrewed Roadmap.
Our aviation combat element remains central to all
we do, both as a Stand-in Force and in response to
crisis. To that end, we have restructured our MV-22 Directed Actions
squadrons to provide adequate capacity for Service 23. Incorporate the aviation-specific components
commitments, equipped to seamlessly serve as a MEU of the Service’s Uncrewed Roadmap into the
ACE. We will return to a 16 MV-22 squadron construct Aviation Plan.
with 10 aircraft per squadron. Within the ACE, the 24. Reorganize our tiltrotor capacity by
Marine Air Control Group (MACG) remains the most transitioning from 14 squadrons of 12 aircraft
capable command and control formation across the each to 16 squadrons of 10 aircraft each.
MAGTF. Experiments and exercises across all three
MEFs indicate there are important efficiencies and 25. Perform Active Component/Reserve
synergies to be gained by combining the functions of Component integration proof of concept
the tactical air operations center and direct air support in 2d MAW by incorporating VMM-774 into
center into a single Multifunctional Aviation Operations an Active Component Marine Aircraft Group
Center. Also, the capabilities provided by the Common in FY 23.
Aviation Command and Control System, especially 26. Publish unclassified aviation threat and
its ability to communicate with joint systems, such as future operating environment assessments in
Link 16, have been used to integrate all elements of order to create a shared understanding with
the MAGTF into the joint fight. We must benchmark external stakeholders and assist decision-
the functions provided by the MACG to inform and making.
improve an increasingly complex solution to support the
MEF. A first step is to resource the technical expertise 27. Conduct a formal review of the Marine
to manage network architectures across the MEF with Aircraft Wing T/O and Marine Aircraft Group
the stand up of a new PMOS for an Interface Control HQs staffing and training as a battle staff,
Officer. We will also create an Air Control Company in and adjust training accordingly.
3d Marine Aircraft Wing to provide an organization we Issues Requiring Further Analysis
can use to examine how to apply aviation C2 across L. Aviation Logistics. Analyze naval aviation
the MAGTF. supply and distribution mechanisms for
Our Campaign of Learning indicates we need to potential incorporation into our ground
understand more clearly how aviation logistics should logistics solutions.
integrate with our Marine Corps logistics enterprise
10 Force Design 2030 Annual Update
May 2022LOGISTICS Issues Requiring Further Analysis
M. Command Relationships. CD&I will
The challenge of providing distribution and sustainment
evaluate the merits of a potential command
in the context of our emerging concepts makes logistics
relationship adjustment for CG, Marine Corps
the pacing function for both modernization and
Logistics Command (LOGCOM) and make a
operational planning. Logistics will be contested—in
formal recommendation to the Commandant
some respects, it is being contested now—by peer
of the Marine Corps (CMC) no later than 1
and near-peer competitors, along the entire length of
July 2022.
the supply chain. Thus, over the past two years, our
Campaign of Learning closely examined our logistics N. Command Relationships. CD&I will examine
enterprise. To modernize the force, the MCLE must adapt command relationships for material readiness
to balance priorities and resources to set and sustain battalions to determine how to embed
the MAGTF, while delivering adequate readiness levels. LOGCOM capabilities in those battalions
Logistics modernization requires a critical assessment to best support the MEFs.
of material readiness and the MCLE’s force posture,
O. Logistics Modernization. We will continue to
sustainment models, and C2 arrangements.
execute the logistics portion of the Service
We need systemic change in logistics. Planning teams Level Experimentation Campaign Plan to
have developed potential solutions that support our determine if the proposed Marine Logistics
emerging concepts, but much more work remains. Group (MLG) re-organization is sufficient
Some recommendations are decision ready, while others to meet operational requirements. These
require further analysis and experimentation that is efforts will include experimentation to refine
central to the Service Level Experimentation Campaign multifunctional combat logistics battalions
Plan. and MLG functional battalions, and to
provide implementation recommendations
Directed Actions for the FMF Logistics Command, advanced
28. Implement a Service-Level Centralized base concept, pioneer battalion, and
Inventory Management Policy to better expeditionary medical modernization
leverage demand planning and predictive proposals. Provide an in-stride update
forecasting, to create flexibility, and to on FY22 logistics combat element (LCE)
provide greater material readiness outcomes. experimentation plan findings at the General
Officer Symposium (GOS).
29. Develop and implement a revised Service-
wide equipping strategy, which divests P. Positioning. The characteristics of the future
excess inventory and properly sizes the operating environment, combined with
Service against future force demands. imperative to maintain a globally employable
force at the speed required to maintain the
30. Establish 18 multifunctional combat logistics initiative, requires a holistic examination
battalions, two distribution support battalions, of our afloat and ashore prepositioning
and two material readiness battalions. The construct. Conduct the necessary planning to
multifunctional combat logistics battalions develop, resource, and implement a Service-
will serve as the base logistics combat directed Global Positioning Network (GPN)
elements for the MLRs, MEUs, and other as an integrated afloat/ashore capability
crisis response forces. The multifunctional enabling day-to-day campaigning, rapid
combat logistics battalions may be task response to crisis and contingency, and
organized with additional capabilities, based deterrence.
on unforeseen operational demands.
31. Publish a Marine Corps Installation Support
Plan (ISP) incorporating, as appropriate,
regional installation support plans produced
over the past 12 months, no later than 1
October 2022. This document is intended
to be the installations’ equivalent of the
Marine Corps Aviation Plan.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update 11
May 2022TRAINING & EDUCATION Directed Actions
32. Implement Project Tripoli and provide initial
Some of our best insights were provided by the FMF as
assessments to include identification of
they teamed with their shipmates in the numbered fleets
any challenges to the CMC no later than 1
to experiment, train together, and even employ select
September 2022.
concepts and capabilities in deployed environments.
Realistic training is driving change across the FMF 33. Expand OIE and multi-domain operations
and improving Navy-Marine integration. Marines are instruction in formal professional military
attending Navy training schools to be certified to education.
perform naval tasks such as fire support at sea. Navy
34. Publish an unclassified MWX report
units are experimenting with Marine methods, such as
on observations, conclusions, and
the use of low bandwidth/low signature command and
recommendations from the previous 24
control. Fleet units are participating in naval exercises
months of force-on-force experiments no
that train Marine Corps units to contribute to sea denial
later than 1 August 2022.
during pre-deployment rehearsals focused on multiple
theaters. Navy units are integrating Marine aviation and 35. Revise MCWP 3-01, Offensive and Defensive
ground units into undersea warfare exercises. We are Tactics, in accordance with the previous 24
also learning how Stand-in Forces’ ability to counter months of lessons learned from MAGTF-
high value adversary aviation assets with the right mix Training Command and publish no later
of integrated air and missile defenses and sensor cueing than 1 January 2023.
is essential to supporting naval maneuver. Numbered
fleets recognize, value, and are engaged in exercises 36. Publish a doctrinal publication on small
and activities tied to Marine Corps modernization. For unmanned aerial systems (SUAS) no later
example, Exercise STEEL KNIGHT, taking place later than 1 April 2023.
this year, will include coordinated operations between 37. Publish a doctrinal publication on OIE no
Marines in the littorals and a Carrier Strike Group at sea. later than 1 April 2023.
Fleet Sailors and FMF Marines are teaming together to
develop solutions for operational and tactical problems. 38. Create the simulation support necessary
for staffs to practice operations in a multi-
Our Campaign of Learning helped us recognize that domain environment.
our current range and training infrastructure does not 39. Rewrite MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations,
adequately support the combined-arms integration of to update foundational guidance on Marine
the new systems we are fielding, such as expeditionary Corps actions and activities, and publish no
long-range precision fires, loitering munitions, later than 1 April 2023. MCDP 1-0 will provide
unmanned systems, and electronic warfare capabilities, actionable direction on how an updated
among others. It also revealed challenges we face with tactical system, operating across all domains,
environmental and other local governmental policies and enables effective, global operations across
restrictions both in CONUS and overseas. To address the competition continuum. It will serve as
this, we initiated “Project Tripoli,” which will create a the link that ties Marine Corps warfighting
comprehensive venue to train in all domains using state philosophy to methods and approaches
of the art and emerging systems and capabilities. It necessary for success in changing warfare
will build readiness across all echelons of command conditions and will orient institutional,
and throughout the MAGTF and provide venues for training, and education support structure on
experimentation with new technologies and concepts. the people and systems necessary to support
This live virtual and constructive training environment and evolve the all-domain, tactical system.
(LVCTE) will provide the architecture to integrate and
render real-time data from instrumented ranges, force- 40. Review the period of instruction at
on-force training aids and devices, simulators, and Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and
simulations across a deliberately provisioned training Staff College, and the School of Advanced
network that enables connectivity and interaction across Warfighting, as well as MAGTF Staff Training
globally disparate training sites. Program instruction, and identify ways to
incorporate all domain operations in both
education and planning.
12 Force Design 2030 Annual Update
May 2022Issues Requiring Further Analysis 42. Achieve greater average time in Service
Q. Tactical Logistics. Identify ways to increase and thickening of the E-4 to E-7 ranks to
Service-led training opportunities that support a more mature force, while not
employ all functions of tactical level logistics, disadvantaging or disincentivizing the most
and connect to operational logistics. talented Marines—who must be allowed
to move as rapidly as their talents dictate.
R. Combined Arms Integration. Analyze the
Driven by the changes from Force Design,
training and education requirements needed
certain communities will require more senior
to perform the combined arms integration of
ranks in certain formations. This will allow us
newly and soon to be fielded systems across
to mature the force and meet the aspirations
all domains, to include environmental and
of Force Design.
electromagnetic spectrum considerations.
43. Develop a total force “hire to retire” system
S. Training Ranges. Analyze the range, training
of modern tools. We will pursue digital
area, and airspace requirements needed to
modernization of our existing manpower
perform distributed operations as described
management systems to achieve greater
in our emerging concepts such as A Concept
transparency, fidelity, and analysis of
for Stand-in Forces and The Tentative
manpower data. This will allow us to
Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base
better match Marines’ talents with Service
Operations.
requirements.
TALENT MANAGEMENT 44. Provide the CMC with options to reduce first
Capitalizing on a decade’s worth of studies, books, term attrition no later than 1 August 2022.
reports, and academic articles on military personnel Issues Requiring Further Analysis
reform, we published Talent Management 2030, a T. Career Paths. Analyze multiple paths to
report that directs the redesign of our seven-decade successful careers for our Marines that will
old personnel management system to meet the needs balance retention goals with the needs
of a modern Marine Corps based on our Force Design of the Marine Corps and aspirations of
2030 vision. We established a Talent Management Force Design 2030. Provide findings and
Strategy Group to further refine and implement the ideas recommendations to the CMC no later than
contained in Talent Management 2030. We conducted 1 January 2023.
a Talent Management Integrated Planning Team to
orient all elements of HQMC to the problem set and U. Quality Spread. Conduct a thorough review
to organize for the work ahead. While some of the of the quality-spread (1/3s model) used at
ideas contained in Talent Management 2030 will be The Basic School for Military Occupational
implemented over a period of years, many initiatives Specialty (MOS) selection. Present findings
and investments are ready now and will be aggressively and recommendations for retention,
pursued. Input from, and outreach to, the fleet will be modification, or replacement at the GOS
vital to modernizing our systems, as will synchronizing in late 2022.
the efforts of our recruiting, training and education,
and manpower enterprises.
Directed Actions
41. Provide the CMC with a plan to rebalance
recruiting and retention no later than 1 July
2022. To change the “recruit and replace”
paradigm, we will implement measures to
professionalize our career retention force and
further incentivize retaining our most talented
Marines. This will allow us “retain and invest”
in our most valued asset—Marines.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update 13
May 2022IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OBJECTIVE FORCE
As we describe above, our Campaign of Learning Key aspects of I MEF
identified two broad sets of capabilities required of the • Retains its capability as a MAGTF warfighting
Marine Corps. First, it confirmed the enduring need for headquarters.
a force that can respond to both crisis and contingency, • Capable of providing a persistent Southeast Asia
addressing a wide range of combatant commander MAGTF, with a sea denial capability, operating
missions worldwide. To that end, our deployed MEUs out of Darwin, Australia, with a rotational force
and CONUS-based forces will remain ready for tasking campaigning in support of INDOPACOM
to address the full spectrum of missions. objectives.
Secondly, the Campaign of Learning highlighted the • Provides MEUs as ready, mobile forces with
rapidly growing requirement for Stand-in Forces focused associated ARGs.
on the pacing threat and optimized for campaigning.
Stand-in Forces will operate forward, alongside allies II MEF: As a key part of our Service retained forces,
and partner, providing persistent RXR, lethal effects, develops a 3-star, JTF-capable headquarters, purpose
mobility, and command and control in a distributed built for global crisis response operations. This force
maritime environment. will be persistently active across national, joint, and
III MEF: Optimized as Stand-in Forces in the first island allied networks, with an established globally integrated
chain, with an enduring function to help the fleet, joint, response capability.
and combined force win the maritime reconnaissance and
counter-reconnaissance battle. Underpinned by maritime Key aspects of II MEF
mobility, III MEF secures key maritime terrain, gains and • Provides a 3-star, JTF-capable headquarters
maintains maritime domain awareness, and maintains built for global crisis response operations.
U.S. security guarantees through a persistent, forward-
• Capable of providing MAGTFs with sea denial
deployed posture that helps defend U.S. interests and
capability.
support allies and partners. These partnerships are vital
in presenting a united front to deter malign actors. In • Provides MEUs as ready, mobile forces with
the event of escalation, this force fights to support sea associated ARGs.
denial and to enable naval and joint force access and Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES): MARFORRES
targeting to counter Chinese aggression. is deliberately aligned with II MEF as part of the Service
Key aspects of III MEF retained global crisis and contingency response force
• In general, III MEF is deployed forward in support outside of INDOPACOM. MARFORRES will remain
of Indo-Pacific Command’s (INDOPACOM) focused on providing specialized and general purpose
campaigning objectives. forces in support of combatant commander requirements.
• Employs Stand-in Forces capabilities, as they
become available. Key aspects of MARFORRES
• Aligned with II MEF and capable of augmenting
• Provides the 31st MEU as a ready, mobile force a 3-star, JTF-capable headquarters.
with its associated Amphibious Ready Group
(ARG). • Provides access to advanced disciplines through
MIU.
I MEF: As our largest Marine Expeditionary Force, it • Provides surge support, as required.
provides significant capability postured to support the
Indo-Pacific while preserving capability and capacity to
respond to the full range of crisis response missions the
President may direct. I MEF retains this capacity and
crisis response capabilities to enable us to refine our
organizational design as we continue to learn about
the future operating environment and evolving threats.
14 Force Design 2030 Annual Update
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