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CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 286, June 2021 Europe and the Nuclear Ban Treaty The nuclear ban treaty’s entry into force gives its advocates in parliaments and civil society momentum to increase pressure on nuclear-armed states and their military allies. This is notably the case in Europe, where the treaty’s impact on longstanding positions could affect nuclear disarmament efforts on a global scale. By Névine Schepers On 22 January 2021, the Treaty on the Pro- hibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, or the nuclear ban treaty) entered into force. The TPNW’s main prohibitions, which only apply to its members, include a ban on the development, testing, production, pos- session, transfer, use of, or threat to use nu- clear weapons. The latter points in part to deterrence doctrines, which rely on the credible threat of nuclear retaliation – a pol- icy that the TPNW wants to delegitimize. The treaty also seeks to emphasize the in- humane nature of nuclear weapons as well as the catastrophic human and environ- mental consequences their use would have. The TPNW was born out of discontent with what most non-nuclear weapon states perceive as a slow pace of nuclear disarma- ment. Although stockpiles have signifi- Setsuko Thurlow, ICAN campaigner and Hiroshima survivor, speaks at the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in cantly declined since the height of the Oslo, Norway on 10 December, 2017. NTB Scanpix / Terje Bendiksby via Reuters Cold War, most nuclear-armed states are in the process of modernizing their nuclear programs, envisioning the retention, diver- sification, and improvement of nuclear ar- weapon states saw the need to take a step (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the senals for decades ahead. Moreover, the further and create an instrument that ex- US) or outside its framework (India, Israel, breakdown of arms control treaties and the plicitly bans nuclear weapons. North Korea, and Pakistan), nor US allies growing salience of nuclear weapons in whose security depends on extended deter- doctrines have increased the risk of nuclear As of May 2021, 86 states have signed the rence (NATO members, Japan, South Ko- weapon use. While nuclear disarmament is TPNW and 54 have ratified it. States par- rea, and Australia) have joined the treaty. one of three “pillars” of the near universal ties are mainly from Africa, South and As nuclear-armed states are unlikely to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Central America, Central Asia, South East join, ban treaty proponents are focusing alongside non-proliferation and peaceful Asia, and the Pacific. Neither nuclear- their efforts on US military allies. In this uses of nuclear energy, many non-nuclear- armed states, recognized by the NPT endeavor, proponents can capitalize on ex- © 2021 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 1
CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 286, June 2021
isting forms of popular support against nu-
The Origins of the TPNW
clear weapons, present at various levels
among left-leaning political parties, mem- The TPNW follows a tradition of humanitarian arms control and disarmament initiatives, which
bers of parliament, local governments, and place the emphasis on protecting civilians, communities, and the environment. It also focuses on
the human suffering caused by nuclear weapons, bringing to the front victims of nuclear use and
civil society.
testing. This is widely reflected in the treaty’s preamble and Article 6, which outline positive
obligations related to victim assistance and environmental remediation.
In Europe, this pressure could become more The treaty was negotiated in 2017 through a series of conferences mandated by the UN General
acute and divisive. Between nuclear-armed Assembly. 124 nations took part in the negotiations, including Switzerland, but no nuclear-armed
states, TPNW states parties, neutral and states were involved and the Netherlands was the only NATO state to take part, eventually being
non-aligned states, and NATO allies, in- the only state to vote against the treaty’s adoption. Proponents of the TPNW view the treaty as
cluding those hosting US nuclear weapons filling a “legal gap”, fully banning nuclear weapons in the same way chemical and biological
weapons are banned through the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons
on their soil, Europe’s nuclear landscape is a Convention respectively.
diverse and difficult one to navigate. The
TPNW has added fresh fuel to a fire which
burns at different degrees of intensity across
Europe, nourished by anti-nuclear activism,
humanitarian diplomatic traditions, and in-
creasing disillusion with the breakdown of tions such as the International Campaign pose a legal challenge to the NPT in the
arms control and disarmament policies. Ex- to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), long term, it poses a political one in the
amining how the TPNW will affect the na- which won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for short term. The upcoming NPT Review
ture of the debate between deterrence and its work on the TPNW, in negotiating and Conference, scheduled to take place in Au-
disarmament communities in Europe can promoting the treaty also reflects its objec- gust 2021 following several delays due to
serve as a testing ground for how the tive to place people and communities at the the pandemic, already faces a number of
TPNW will impact global disarmament ef- center of disarmament efforts rather than challenges (see CSS Analysis 261). The ex-
forts more broadly and whether it can truly focusing solely on states. tent to which TPNW supporters will seek
advance its goals. Promoting a constructive to have the treaty recognized at the Con-
dialogue that addresses the underlying dis- The treaty’s goal of a world free of nuclear ference could impact consensus building
content with disarmament policies so far as weapons is unobjectionable. However, its and hinder progress on other matters.
opponents outline a number of
By delegitimizing nuclear reasons why its methods are un- Third, several issues related to the imple-
feasible and unrealistic. First, mentation of the TPNW remain unclear,
weapons and the doctrines that while TPNW supporters be- notably the absence of an established veri-
uphold them, the TPNW sets lieve nuclear weapons generate fication regime and its withdrawal clause,
instability, critics highlight the which, given nuclear weapons’ unique po-
abolition as the standard rather security dynamics driving de- tential for destruction and role in defense
than as an aspirational goal. terrence policies and reliance on doctrines, are key concerns. Moreover,
nuclear weapons. In the last de- TPNW members need to develop the nec-
well as the security reasons behind contin- cade, the international security environ- essary institutional and technical infra-
ued extended deterrence would be a first ment has worsened, making it more diffi- structure to make the treaty not just a nor-
step in the right direction. cult to pursue a nuclear disarmament mative instrument but also an operational
agenda. A related issue, which critics espe- one. It remains to be seen how they will
A Polarizing Treaty cially in Europe point to, is the heightened address these concerns as they start to es-
From the early phases of the TPNW’s in- focus of TPNW advocates on democratic tablish rules of procedure and implementa-
ception (see textbox) to its entry into force, nuclear-weapon states and their military tion mechanisms at the first meeting of
the treaty has been polarizing in disarma- allies, rather than autocratic ones, notably states parties in January 2022, but this will
ment debates. For its proponents, the Russia and China, which are less transpar- undoubtedly be a long-term process.
TPNW moves well beyond the NPT in ent. While this could be attributed to more
highlighting the risks to international se- restricted civil society engagement in Rus- While nuclear disarmament has always
curity posed by continued nuclear weapon sia and China, Western critics of the treaty been a contentious issue, the TPNW has
possession and reliance on nuclear deter- perceive this insistence as misdirected and accentuated these differences by moving
rence. By delegitimizing nuclear weapons heedless of what they see as destabilizing away from consensus making and the sta-
and the doctrines that uphold them, the actions by both Moscow and Beijing. tus quo. Following the treaty’s adoption in
TPNW sets abolition as the standard rath- 2017, debates between disarmament and
er than as an aspirational goal, and creates a Second, opponents believe the TPNW cre- deterrence defenders have grown more vir-
legal and political norm against their pos- ates a competing instrument that is not ulent. Both sides talk past each other and
session and use. compatible with the NPT. TPNW sup- resort to “naming and shaming” tactics.
porters have refuted this claim, noting that Nuclear-weapon states initially adopted a
With this norm now enshrined in interna- both treaties have the same aim. In their hostile stance toward the treaty, with the
tional law, ban treaty supporters believe it view, the TPNW, like other subsequent in- Trump administration even pressuring sev-
can serve as a basis to stigmatize all nuclear struments to the NPT such as the Com- eral states to withdraw their ratification.
weapon-related activities, including the fi- prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty serve Since the TPNW’s entry into force, many
nancial tools that support them. The prom- to give effect to principles already outlined have simply dismissed it rather than sought
inent role played by civil society organiza- in the NPT. Even if the TPNW does not to engage with its advocates constructively.
© 2021 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 286, June 2021
could lead to a domino effect. The impact
Europe’s Nuclear Landscape
would certainly be greater if such a move
originates in a state that contributes dual-
capable aircraft to the NATO mission and
hosts nuclear weapons. Yet, any ally joining
the TPNW would still have deep ramifica-
tions for the entire alliance, its foundation,
posture, and capabilities. European govern-
ments of NATO members should seek to
engage on nuclear disarmament questions
with the public and with ban treaty propo-
nents, as all have an interest in reducing nu-
clear risks and avoiding nuclear escalation.
Differences on nuclear issues are far more
pronounced within the EU, which includes
a nuclear-weapon state (France); NATO
members among which four host US nu-
clear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Italy,
and the Netherlands); states such as Swe-
den and Finland, which are not part of
NATO but still significantly contribute to
its missions and operations; and TPNW
member states (Austria, Ireland, and Mal-
ta). The EU’s diverse nuclear landscape has
earned it the nickname of “laboratory of
consensus” in the NPT context, meaning it
is sometimes seen as representative on a
smaller scale of the main international po-
sitions during conferences and can serve as
an example for finding compromises.
However, diverging European views on
Europe and the TPNW sentiments against the presence of US nu- nuclear disarmament, further exacerbated
In Europe, states’ geographical proximity clear weapons on their territories. Yet, op- by the TPNW, have increasingly compli-
and political interconnectedness through position to being a nuclear host state does cated the formulation of joint positions on
the EU, NATO, or partnerships, make the not necessarily equate to opposition to be- disarmament. Non-proliferation and arms
debate over the TPNW difficult to ignore. ing a member of NATO. control, meanwhile, enjoy broader agree-
Nuclear weapons and the question of ment. As an entity, the EU cannot take a
whether they provide or hamper security Given NATO is at its core a nuclear alli- formal stand on the TPNW since defense
has long been a source of contention given ance and will remain so as long as nuclear and security remain competences of the
states’ wide ranging positions (see map). It weapons exist, joining the TPNW and re- member states. Yet the absence of EU con-
is therefore unsurprising that the TPNW maining a member of NATO are incom- sensus on the TPNW impacts its ability to
has underlined these differences more viv- patible, as are being part of NATO without exert influence within the NPT Review
idly. Yet, the TPNW has also galvanized subscribing to its nuclear mis-
existing anti-nuclear feelings, providing a sion. New Zealand’s decision to The TPNW has also galvanized
platform from which to exert increasing become a nuclear-free zone in
pressure. 1985 halted its military coop- existing anti-nuclear feelings,
eration with the US for 25 years providing a platform from which
NATO has so far presented a united front and serves as a reminder for
against the TPNW. Several of its European what signing the TPNW could to exert increasing pressure.
members, however, face increasing popular mean for a NATO state today.
pressure to sign the treaty. In Belgium, At this stage, it seems that the risks of Conference and its ambition of becoming a
Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Nor- withdrawing from the defense and security normative power. Disagreements over the
way, and Spain in particular, the treaty has arrangements provided by NATO largely TPNW and nuclear disarmament have be-
gained the support from some political outweigh the benefits of joining the come the main dividing line and signifi-
parties and local governments, with the is- TPNW in order to satisfy popular support. cantly affect finding a common position
sue of its signature raised in national par- and, by extent, the leverage and visibility
liaments. Many larger cities such as Berlin, There is little benefit, however, in taking an the EU has in the NPT context.
Oslo, and Paris have signed the ICAN cit- overly hostile stance against the TPNW as
ies appeal, pledging support to the TPNW. it only risks negatively affecting public Switzerland and the TPNW
In Belgium, Germany, and the Nether- opinion against NATO. If a NATO mem- Switzerland took part in the TPNW’s ne-
lands, TPNW supporters tap into existing ber does decide to join the TPNW, this gotiation and voted in favor of its adoption
© 2021 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 3CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 286, June 2021
despite a number of concerns. The Swiss ting the tone of the discussion. They can this is particularly the case for non-NATO
government, however, has not signed the focus on the treaty itself and make legal ar- states such as Switzerland, Sweden, Fin-
treaty despite facing pressure to do so from guments, which could risk sounding hol- land, and Cyprus. However, there is a risk
the Federal Assembly. A 2018 report by an low, or engage in a substantive debate about in making this already laden Review Con-
interdepartmental working ference the point of reference for assessing
group laid out several reasons Ignoring the TPNW altogether the TPNW’s value. It sets an undefined bar
for not joining the treaty at this for success, or worse, an extremely high one
time, notably the unclear rela- could be damaging to democratic given what are considered to be irreconcil-
tionship between the NPT and processes, especially if popular able differences in some positions.
the TPNW and the uncertain
impact of the treaty on disar- support continues to increase. After all, the TPNW is just a few months
mament efforts given the lack old. It still needs time to establish itself in-
of participation from nuclear-weapon security, threat perceptions, and the ways in stitutionally, devise implementation, verifi-
states and their allies. It also noted the po- which to address them. Ignoring the cation, and compliance mechanisms, and
tentially negative consequences for future TPNW altogether could be damaging to develop rules of procedure. The first meet-
military cooperation with those states. democratic processes, especially if popular ing of states parties in January 2022 will be
support continues to increase. able to set these in motion, but many
For many states including Switzerland, the mechanisms will take years to build and re-
upcoming NPT Review Conference will The Biden administration, which has yet to quire institutional experience and financial
serve as a basis to further evaluate the make an explicit comment about the means. Member states will have to clarify
TPNW and whether it is seen to strength- TPNW, could lead the way in defining al- within the framework of the treaty, rather
en or hamper disarmament efforts. Follow- lies’ approaches toward the treaty. While than through civil society experts, several
ing the conference, Switzerland will begin Donald Trump adopted a “denounce and legal questions related to implementation
its reassessment of the treaty. It will also at- condemn” strategy, President Joe Biden is as well as compatibility with existing re-
tend the TPNW’s first meeting of states likely to be more subdued, perhaps even gimes and military cooperation. However,
parties as an observer, which should help to conciliatory to an extent, given his desire to they should be able to set the tone they
clarify open questions related to the treaty’s reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. If he seek to use in conducting disarmament di-
relationships with existing instruments, its indeed is open to engagement, this could plomacy, which will provide an indication
implementation mechanism, and internal enable a dialogue on ways to promote re- for how proponents will choose to engage
rules of procedure, among others. straint and, perhaps, even start a discussion with treaty skeptics.
with NATO allies regarding the necessary
Outlook conditions to consider the removal of US
The TPNW’s status in international law nuclear weapons in Europe. This would
has given further impetus to its advocates have to occur within the framework of an
in parliaments and civil society across Eu- arms control agreement with Russia that
rope. Given the difficulty of impacting nu- would cover both strategic and non-strate- For more on perspectives on Euro-Atlantic
clear-armed states’ positions, treaty propo- gic nuclear weapons. Security, see CSS core theme page.
nents will be focusing their efforts on states
that rely on extended deterrence, particu- Given the centrality and near universality
larly in Europe, and building on existing of the NPT, the way in which the TPNW
anti-nuclear sentiments and disillusion is addressed during the NPT Review Con- Névine Schepers is Senior Researcher in the
with nuclear disarmament efforts. Since ference and whether it strengthens or im- Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the
the treaty is here to stay, the manner in pedes existing disarmament efforts is seen Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich,
which governments and elected officials as a test case for many states still on the where she focuses on nuclear arms control and
tackle the TPNW will be important in set- fence regarding the TPNW. In Europe, non-proliferation issues.
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