Endgame Belarus? Union State Integration under Pressure Jakob Hedenskog
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Endgame Belarus? Union State Integration under Pressure Jakob Hedenskog FOI-R--5181--SE October 2021
Jakob Hedenskog Endgame Belarus? Union State Integration under Pressure
FOI-R--5181--SE
Title Endgame Belarus? – Union State Integration under Pressure
Titel Slutspel Belarus? – Unionsstatsintegration under press
Report no FOI-R--5181--SE
Month Oct
Year 2021
Pages 54
ISSN 1650-1942
Client Ministry of Defence
Forskningsområde Säkerhetspolitik
FoT-område Inget FoT-område
Project no A12111
Approved by Johannes Malminen
Ansvarig avdelning Försvarsanalys
Cover: TT Bildbyrå Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Aleksandr
Lukashenko take part in a hockey game at Shayba Arena in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia
February 15, 2019. Sergei Chirikov/Pool via REUTERS
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This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works
(1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that
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2 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
Sammanfattning
Den utdragna processen att upprätta en Unionsstat mellan Ryssland och Belarus
har tagit flera steg framåt efter krisen i Belarus 2020. Den auktoritära belarusiska
regimen under Aleksandr Lukasjenkos ledning använde sig av kraftfulla repressiva
medel för att slå ned gatuprotesterna efter det manipulerade presidentvalet den 9
augusti 2020. Västmakterna införde sanktioner mot Belarus, vilket tvingade
Lukasjenko att söka närmare band med Ryssland och dess president, Vladimir
Putin. I september 2021, i Moskva, tog de två ledarna ännu ett steg för att integrera
sina länders ekonomier när de enades om 28 så kallade unionsstatsprogram.
Samtidigt startade ländernas väpnade styrkor den aktiva fasen av den
gemensamma strategiska övningen ”Väst” (Zapad) 2021, en av de största militära
övningarna i Europa under de senaste 40 åren.
Denna rapport ger en analys av de två ländernas intressen av politisk, ekonomisk
och militär integration före och efter den belarusiska krisen. Rapporten ger också
scenarier för den framtida utvecklingen av integrationsprocessen fram till 2025.
Nyckelord: Belarus, Ryssland, Unionsstat, politisk integration, ekonomisk
integration, militär integration, Lukasjenko, Putin
3 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
Summary
The lengthy process of establishing a Union State of Russia and Belarus took
serious steps forward after the Belarusian Crisis in 2020. Following the fraudulent
presidential elections on 9 August, the authoritarian Belarusian regime under
Aleksandr Lukashenko used forceful repressive measures to quell the street
protests. The West implemented sanctions against Belarus, which forced
Lukashenko to seek closer ties with Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin. In
September 2021, in Moscow, the two leaders took yet another step towards
integrating their countries’ economies when they agreed on 28 so-called Union
State Programmes. Simultaneously, the countries’ armed forces started the active
phase of the joint strategic exercise “West” (Zapad) 2021, one of the largest
military exercises in Europe in the last 40 years.
This report provides an analysis of the two countries’ interests in political, eco-
nomic and military integration before and after the Belarusian Crisis. It also
presents scenarios for the future development of the integration process until 2025.
Keywords: Belarus, Russia, Union State, political integration, economic
integration, military integration, Lukashenko, Putin
4 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
Foreword
The year 2020 represented a watershed for Belarus, both domestically and exter-
nally. President Aleksandr Lukashenko managed to weather the domestic storm of
public protests that followed the fraudulent presidential elections on 9 August. But
in doing so, the fate of his regime has become increasingly beholden to Russia.
Consequently, the stalled integration process of the Union State of Russia and
Belarus has come alive in the past year.
In this timely report, conducted on behalf of the Swedish Ministry of Defence,
Jakob Hedenskog analyses how the Belarusian crisis of 2020 has affected the
political, economic and military integration of the Union State, and what the future
may hold for the integration process. In this endeavour, he proceeds in three steps:
first, he documents the interests of Belarus and Russia in the integration project
before the Belarusian crisis started on 9 August 2020. Next, he details how the
turbulence of the crisis affected the integration process of the two countries.
Finally, he outlines three possible scenarios for Belarus-Russia relations and pros-
pects for integration in the period up to 2025
The author is indebted to Tobias Ljungvall, of the Swedish initiative for democracy
and human rights (Östgruppen för demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter), for his
thorough review of the draft report, and to Christian Ifvarsson, the manager of
FOI’s Russia and Eurasia Studies Programme, who chaired the review seminar on
31 August 2021. Thanks are also due to Pär Gustafsson, Jonas Kjellén, Gudrun
Persson, Susanne Oxenstierna, Carolina Vendil Pallin, and Fredrik Westerlund, all
colleagues at FOI’s Russia and Eurasia Studies Programme, who attended and/or
gave comments to improve the draft report. Finally, we are grateful to Richard
Langlais for language editing and Marianna Serveta for layout.
Johan Engvall
Deputy Head of the FOI Russia and Eurasia Studies Programme
Stockholm, September
5 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
Content
1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 7
1.1 The scope of this study ................................................................ 8
2 The Union State up to 2020: Interests in favour of integration . 11
2.1 Political integration..................................................................... 12
2.2 Economic integration ................................................................. 16
2.3 Military integration...................................................................... 18
3 Changes after the Belarusian Crisis of 2020 ............................... 25
3.1 Political integration..................................................................... 25
3.2 Economic integration ................................................................. 31
3.3 Military integration...................................................................... 33
4 Scenarios for developments up to 2025 ....................................... 36
4.1 Delay of the game...................................................................... 36
4.2 Interference ................................................................................ 37
4.3 Sudden death............................................................................. 39
5 Concluding remarks ....................................................................... 42
References .............................................................................................. 43
Appendix ................................................................................................. 54
6 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
1 Introduction
The integration process of the Union State of Russia and Belarus (hereafter Union
State) took some important further steps in September 2021. First, on 9 September,
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, and Belarus’s, Aleksandr Lukashenko, met in
Moscow and discussed the implementation of the schedule for integration that is
part of the 28 so-called Union State programmes. This was the fifth meeting of the
two presidents during 2021 and the sixth since the Belarusian Crisis erupted, after
the fraudulent presidential election in Belarus on 9 August 2020. All of their
meetings have been held in Russia.
The following day, on 10 September, the prime ministers of Russia and Belarus,
Mikhail Mishustin and Roman Golovchenko, respectively, signed a Union State
Council of Ministers’ resolution to implement the provisions of the Union State
Treaty in 2021–2023. This document contains the 28 Union States programmes,
which include harmonisation in industry, energy, finances and the agro-industrial
sectors, as well as tax and customs regulations and the monetary policy in general.1
Later in 2021, it will be officially confirmed by the Supreme Council, the highest
policymaking body of the Union State, consisting of the heads of states, heads of
governments and heads of the different houses of the parliaments of the two
member states. The full implementation of the document, however, will probably
take a few more years, at best.
Russia and Belarus have been engaged in this Union State integration process for
more than 20 years. For a long time, the process stalled because of Lukashenko’s
objection to further integration with Russia, as he feared it would eventually
threaten his own power base. Since 2015, Russia has increased the efforts for
implementation of the original Union State agreement signed by the presidents of
Russia and Belarus on 8 December 1999. These efforts received new impetus after
the eruption of protests against the Belarusian regime in August 2020, which left
Lukashenko sanctioned by the Western powers – especially the European Union
(EU) and the United States – and forced him to seek closer support from Russia.
The timing of the latest events was delicate, being just prior to the State Duma
elections in Russia on 19 September and the approaching 30th anniversary of the
collapse of the Soviet Union, in December. Even more precisely, the meetings
commenced simultaneously to the start of the active phase of the Russian-
Belarusian joint strategic exercise, Zapad-2021, held in both Russia and Belarus
on 10–16 September 2021. 2 In the five Belarusian exercise areas, some 2,500
Russian paratroopers, armoured contingents of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army,
supported by Russian jets and anti-aircraft units, joined 10,300 troops from Belarus
and a tiny contingent of 50 men from Kazakhstan in a war game envisaging an
1
Russian Government (2021).
2
Żochowski (2021b).
7 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
attack on the Union State by a hostile outside force of the fictitious “Polar Repub-
lic”.3 In their meeting of 9 September, the two presidents had raised military and
security issues, in conjunction with the plans to create a “common defence space”
of Belarus and Russia.4 The military integration of the Union State has been the
most dynamic area of integration, especially after the Belarusian Crisis, in 2020.
1.1 The scope of this study
The aim of this study is to analyse in what way the political, economic and military
integration of the Union State was affected by the Belarusian Crisis of 2020 and
what can be expected of the future integration process until 2025. The topic is of
high relevance for all neighbours of Belarus and Russia, including all countries in
the Baltic Sea area, among them Sweden.
The study’s research questions are as follows:
1. What are the interests of Belarus and Russia in the Union State
integration process?
2. How did the Belarusian Crisis affect the integration process?
3. What are the possible scenarios towards 2025?
These three research questions are each discussed in the report’s three main
chapters. Chapter 2 analyses primarily Belarus’s, but to some extent also Russia’s,
interests in the integration before the Belarusian Crisis started on 9 August 2020.
Chapter 3 focuses on how the turbulence of the Crisis affected the integration
process of the two countries. Chapter 4 provides three scenarios on the future
bilateral relations of Belarus and Russia and the prospects for integration in the
period up to 2025. The concluding remarks in Chapter 5 discuss the probability of
the scenarios and the further development of Belarus’s relations with Russia and
the integration process. The report is updated to the events of 15 September 2021.
The purpose of the scenarios in Chapter 4 is to provide room for manoeuvre for
considering what developments are possible in the future – not necessarily to
establish the most likely outcome. The three scenarios, named with terms from
Lukashenko’s favourite sport, ice hockey, are:
1. Delay of the game: Lukashenko remains in power; continued slow
integration of Belarus and Russia.
2. Interference: Lukashenko is removed, but under forms controllable for
Russia; integration is speeded up.
3. Sudden death: Lukashenko is removed, but under circumstances not
fully controlled by Russia; the Russian leadership decides to use armed
3
Interfax-AVN (2021a, 2021b).
4
TASS (2021a).
8 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
intervention in order to save its influence and the integration process
with Belarus.
Here, some explanations and limitations are needed. First, not coincidentally, the
scenarios are all tightly connected to the future of Lukashenko himself. This comes
naturally, since, in Belarus, the Union State integration process – and even the
whole relationship between Belarus and Russia per se – are very much under the
personal domain of Lukashenko. It is difficult to see how the Union State integ-
ration process could continue in exactly the same way, given a situation where
Lukashenko did not remain in power. Second, the scenarios focus only on the
Union State integration process, the internal situation in Belarus and Russia’s
ability to respond to certain developments in its neighbouring country, not on the
geopolitical situation or Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West in general.
Third, because of that, the third scenario (“Sudden death”) will limit itself in a
potential Russian armed intervention at the level of either armed conflict or local
war, according to the 2014 Russian military doctrine’s stipulations of the four
types of military conflicts. 5 In an armed conflict or a local war, Russia would
preferably (although probably not exclusively) use police or paramilitary forces,
such as the Special Purpose Mobile Unit (OMON) within the National Guard, to
quell a potential uprising, or “colour revolution”, in Belarus. Any scenario
including other types of military conflicts stipulated in the military doctrine, i.e.,
regional war and large-scale war, would involve neighbouring states, some of
which are members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such
scenarios are unlikely in this case and would necessarily have consequences, far
beyond the scope of this study, on the two countries’ bilateral relations.
This report’s sources are a further limitation. The report uses primary open
sources, such as doctrines, policy papers and official speeches and statements,
from Belarus and Russia, as well as secondary sources (media, research reports)
of Belarusian, Russian and Western origin. During the study, however, some of
the sources, such as the Belarusian tut.by and the Russian The Insider, became
victims of the on-going repression in the two countries, and were banned.
Furthermore, the report makes only limited use of opinion polls. This is due to the
constant lack of relevant and reliable polls in Belarus after 2016, when the
Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), the last
truly independent pollster, was banned and forced to leave the country. The
repressive nature of Belarusian laws and the potential risks faced by researchers,
especially after 9 August 2020, make face-to-face interviews in Belarus impos-
sible. Polls originated from the West and conducted over the internet are some-
times widely cited in Western research. The low number and flawed represen-
tability of their respondents, however, render them of only quite marginal value.
Various sources claim that only 75–82 percent of the population of Belarus have
5
Russian Security Council (2014); Hedenskog, Persson, and Vendil Pallin (2016).
9 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
access to the internet.6 Since Belarusian internet users are primarily young people
based in larger cities and towns, it is difficult to draw conclusions from these polls
on the national level on, for instance, changes in political attitudes and awakening
of national self-awareness after the Belarusian Crisis.
Figure 1.1 Map of Belarus (Per Wikström, FOI)
Finally, a note on language. This report uses Russian language name forms for
persons and places in Belarus. Although both Belarusian and Russian – two East
Slavic languages – are official state languages in Belarus, Russian is by far the
most widely used. Herein, however, some names of sources produced by authors
who prefer using Belarusian name forms are left in their original form. A list of
Belarusian and Russian names of persons and places referred to, along with their
most commonly used English forms, can be found in the appendix at the end of
this report.
6
Astapenia (2020; 2021).
10 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
2 The Union State up to 2020:
Interests in favour of integration
Upon coming to power in 1994, Lukashenko almost immediately announced that
both economic and political-military integration with Russia would be the strategic
priorities for Belarusian foreign policy. During the 1990s, he signed a number of
treaties and agreements with then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, culminating in
the conclusion of the 8 December 1999 Treaty on Establishing a Union State. This
document included an ambitious integration agenda, including the creation of a
shared constitution, parliament, defence and foreign policy, currency, customs,
taxes, etc.7
This Union State treaty has bound Belarus and Russia since 1999. Yet, despite
advanced economic and military integration, both have irreconcilable views of this
community of interests. Lukashenko has always pushed back against Russian
attempts at political integration.8 In fact, the Union State largely remains symbolic,
since Belarus and Russia disagree on its institutional outlook and functioning.
Citing Article 3 of the 1999 Treaty, Belarus claims that the Union State is a union
of equals (“based on the principles of sovereign equality of the participating
States”), and sees this principle as determining further unification. 9 From the
beginning, Lukashenko’s claim for parity was hard for the Russian leadership to
swallow, since it would amount to granting the Belarusian president a veto right
over the Union State’s decisions, and thus potentially over Russian’s foreign
policy priorities, too.10 In addition, the mere difference in size and power makes
this principle difficult to maintain in praxis. Russia’s population is about 15 times
and its economy about 29 times bigger than that of Belarus.
Furthermore, Lukashenko’s original motives for integration were probably based
on the calculation that he would survive the old and unhealthy Yeltsin and succeed
him as Russia’s president or president of the Union State. This calculation changed
in early 2000, after Putin’s coming to power, as it was also clear that he did not
show any respect for the agreement’s principle of equality. In 2002, Putin even
presented his vision for the future Union State integration process, where Belarus’s
seven regions (see Figure 1.1) would be incorporated into the Russian Federation
separately, i.e., a complete destruction of the Belarus as a geopolitical entity.11
After that, Lukashenko’s interest in the Union State faded substantially.
7
Hedenskog (2020); Soyuz.by (1999).
8
Boulègue (2020), p. 4.
9
Soyuz.by (1999).
10
Marin (2020), p. 4.
11
Lenta.ru (2002)
11 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
Despite the stalled process, Russia continued to officially prioritise the Union State
project. Since 2000, all of Russia’s foreign policy concepts have mentioned the
relations with Belarus and the Union State integration as being the first among
Russia’s foreign policy regional priorities. The latest concept, from 2016, declares
that “Russia is committed to expanding strategic cooperation with the Republic of
Belarus within the Union State with a view to promoting integration in all areas”.12
The primary interest in integration between Belarus and Russia are more or less
the same. They will here be separated as political, economic and military integ-
ration. Since at least 2014, Russia has also put more emphasis on cultural issues
and the inclusion of Belarus in the “Russian world” (russkiy mir), a concept based
on a common Russian culture, history and “Russianness”, which the Kremlin is
promoting in the former Soviet countries. This has met some resistance from the
Belarusian authorities. Since they are political instruments, this is dealt with below
in the section on political integration.
2.1 Political integration
For both Belarus and Russia, especially under the current presidents, political
stability and regime survival have always been the highest priority. For Russia, the
Union State Treaty of 1999 was a sign that the dissolution process, starting with
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, had ended. The signing of the Treaty
also paralleled the second Chechen War, launched by Putin – then Prime Minister
– in August 1999, in order to fully pacify and reincorporate Chechnya in the
Russian Federation and stop further disintegration attempts within Russia.
One of Russia’s foreign policy goals is to establish an exclusive sphere of interest
in its post-Soviet neighbourhood. 13 To some extent, Belarus goes beyond this
foreign policy goal, since Russia is striving to achieve an even closer relationship
with it within the framework of the common Union State. This interest also has an
internal dimension for Russia, since the Kremlin fears that a popular regime
changed in its allied neighbour country could also inspire such events in Russia.
For instance, the poisoning of the Russian opposition leader, Aleksey Navalny, on
20 August 2020, coincided with the protests in Belarus, which Navalny himself
had mentioned as an inspiration for his own movement.14 Furthermore, the violent
crushing of the mass protests in Russia in early 2021, provoked by Navalny’s arrest
and sentencing to 3½ years in a penal colony (which the court later changed to 2
years and 8 months in prison), after returning from hospital in Germany, where he
had been cured from the poisoning, echoed the response by the Belarusian
authorities a few months before.
12
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016).
13
Hedenskog and Persson (2019), p. 83.
14
Sierakowski (2021).
12 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
The Union State integration process has been based on a strategic deal between
Belarus and Russia, building on the exchange of Russian economic assistance, the
so-called integration subsidies, for Belarus’s geopolitical loyalty. In contrast to its
neighbouring states, such as Ukraine, Belarus renounced its aspirations to integrate
with Western institutions, such as the EU and NATO, and agreed to integrate with
Russia. Consequently, Belarus became a member of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and other
organisations dominated by Russia. In addition, Belarus provided Russia with
security on its Western border with Poland and the Baltic states, which had joined
NATO in 1999 and 2004, respectively. In return, Moscow supplied energy at pre-
ferential prices and provided privileged access of Belarusian goods to the Russian
market.
This strategic deal worked until 2014, although cracks in the façade had already
appeared in 2008, when Belarus refused to recognise the “independencies” of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, after the Russo-Georgian war. After Russia’s illegal
annexation of Crimea, the Belarusian leadership began to feel uneasy about
Belarus’s own security and territorial integrity. Minsk also experienced dissatis-
faction with the prospect of being in the middle of Moscow’s increasing confron-
tation with the West, following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Lukashenko adopted a neutral stance on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. He
refused to endorse the annexation of Crimea de jure, although he recognised it as
being part of Russia de facto.15 He publicly called on Russia to respect the terri-
torial integrity of Ukraine and even ridiculed Russia’s justification of the
annexation, when he argued that Mongolia could just as easily lay claim to parts
of Russian territory. 16 As Russia started to initiate a separatist war in parts of
Donbas, eastern Ukraine, in April 2014, Lukashenko continued his neutral stance,
saying that Belarus would never allow Belarusian territory to be used to attack
another state. He established Minsk as a site for negotiations over the conflict by
hosting the first talks on the Minsk process in September 2014. Furthermore,
Lukashenko did not concede any legitimacy to Russia’s “Novorossiya Project” in
Ukraine, nor to any attempt to impose the “Russian World” on Belarus.
Even if the Kremlin continued to press Belarus to integrate with Russia, the
Belarusian leadership struggled to preserve its sovereignty and strategic autonomy
in foreign and security policy. Despite its membership in the CSTO and EAEU
and its integration in the Union state, Belarus still preserved a considerable degree
of strategic autonomy from Russia, which allowed it to block any of the Kremlin’s
initiatives that were inconsistent with Belarus’s national interests.
The Belarusian leadership’s stated neutrality and their attempts to improve
relations with the West angered Russia and led Moscow to press Minsk through
15
Marin (2020), p. 8.
16
Global Security (n.d.).
13 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
one-sided measures. In 2017, for instance, units of the Russian Federal Security
Service (FSB) and Federal Customs Service established a border security zone
along the Russia-Belarus border, officially as a response to the decision by the
Belarus authorities to liberalise visa policy for more than 40 countries, among them
the members of EU. Such a border security zone had existed before 1996, when it
was abolished as part of the Union State integration process.17
Furthermore, the coronavirus pandemic created additional difficulties in the bila-
teral relations between Russia and Belarus. In March 2020, Russia temporarily
closed its border with Belarus, without consulting the latter, citing Belarus’s non-
compliance with the World Health Organization’s (WHO) coronavirus guide-
lines. 18 President Lukashenko accused Russia of creating the potential for bad
effects on the Belarusian economy caused by the border closing.19 Russian media
channels and official representatives made aggressive statements against Belarus’s
corona strategy and President Lukashenko’s relaxed attitude to it.20 In May 2020,
Belarusian authorities expelled a Russian TV journalist from Belarus territory
because of a reportage on the handling of the coronavirus in Belarus.21 Given this
development, Lukashenko’s decision to stage the 9 May Victory Parade in Minsk,
in contrast to the Russian president’s refusal to do so in Moscow, was probably
motivated, at least to some extent, by his desire to show greater strength than the
Russian president in the face of the pandemic.
When discussing the political integration of Russia and Belarus before 2020, it is
important to establish that the Kremlin never posed strong political and elite
linkages to Belarus. Belarusian pro-Kremlin political parties were relatively small
in terms of influence and impact – not least because they faced severe counter-
measures from the Belarusian leadership, and Russia had few “agents of influence”
in Belarus. Neither did Russia “infiltrate” Belarusian state structures of political
life to the extent that is often portrayed in the West. 22 As already mentioned,
relations with Russia are very much the Belarusian president’s domain and he has
not allowed Russia to build strong links with potential alternative sources of power
in Belarus.
Nevertheless, cooperation between Russian and Belarusian security and military
services was part of the Union State integration. Before 2020, however, there
seemed to have been a generational split in Belarus between older and younger
generations within the military and security establishments, where the latter distan-
ced themselves from the Russian military mind-set and were critical of the Russian
aggression against Ukraine. The Belarusian authorities attempted to limit ties with
17
Davies (2017).
18
Naviny.by (2020).
19
Laruelle and McCann (2020).
20
Belta (2020b).
21
RBC (2020).
22
Boulègue (2020), p. 3.
14 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
Russian military academies and exchange programmes. Among the Belarusian
services, the State Security Service, still known by its Soviet abbreviation, KGB
(Komitet Gosudarsvennoy Bezopasnosti), worked closely at first with the Russian
Federal Security Service (FSB), but when relations deteriorated in the 2000s, the
Russian foreign security service (SVR) stepped in. Lukashenko purged Russian
linkages in the Belarusian KGB during the 2000s and removed pro-Russian
elements. Russian espionage operations against Belarus predominantly aimed to
obtain information that could help limit the influence of other actors in Belarus
who opposed Lukashenko or closeness with Russia. The Russian FSB did not ope-
rate in tandem with the Belarusian KGB but worked independently within Belarus,
although they supposedly did inform the local authorities when operations were
underway.23
Political measures such as disinformation and propaganda have been influential
means for Russia to use when pressuring Belarus. Both in Russia and Belarus,
there are rather favourable breeding grounds for Soviet nostalgia, cooperation, and
integration based on the common Soviet or Russian heritage. Russian or Russian-
language Belarusian TV channels and Russian social media dominate the media
space in Belarus. On one of Belarus’s state TV channels, ONT (Obshche-
natsionalnoe Televidenie), only about 10 per cent of the content was Belarusian-
made.24 Russian TV also benefits from higher levels of trust than Belarusian media
sources. Furthermore, Russian-based social media networks such as VK (earlier
VKontakte) and Odnoklassniki are popular and used to disseminate pro-Kremlin,
anti-Western propaganda in Belarus. Likewise, Yandex and Telegram are com-
monly relied on for daily news consumption.25
To deter Russian interference in Belarusian media space, in 2019 the Belarusian
government introduced a Concept of Information Security, with the aim of
protecting Belarus “from manipulation of mass consciousness, discrediting ideas
and values, erosion of national sovereignty, [and] instability of the information
structure”. 26 Although not the first initiative to limit Russian mass media in
Belarus, the document was the first of its kind to acknowledge officially the need
to restrict Russian intervention in Belarusian media space.
Russia was also counting on a number of so-called GONGOs – government-
organised NGOs (non-governmental organisations) – and influence groups to
permeate Belarusian society with the aim of fostering a Russia-friendly agenda
and worldview. Prominent organisations also include the Federal Agency for the
Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs; Compatriots Living Abroad; and
International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), in charge of
supporting compatriot politics; and Young Russia, in charge of promoting the
23
Batashvili (ed) (2020), p., 54.
24
Batashvili (ed) (2020), p. 55.
25
Boulègue (2020), p. 4.
26
Rudnik (2019).
15 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
“Russian world”, promoted as an alternative to Western values. The Russian
Orthodox Church, through the Belarusian Orthodox Church’s canonical ties to the
Moscow Patriarchate, is another important tool and instrument of Russian soft
power. In addition, despite the historical absence of Cossack groups in the country,
a pro-Russian Cossack movement and so-called military-patriotic clubs have also
been multiplying in Belarus, in an attempt to promote “Russian world” values
through sport and paramilitary activities.27
Although sometimes Belarus was considered to be “the most Soviet of the Soviet
Union republics”, the concept of “Russian world” met resistance in Belarus. The
Belarusian authorities’ answer for containing the increased Russian influence in
the cultural and information spheres was called ‘soft Belarusization’. Erupting in
the Belarusian society in the 2010s and accelerating after the Russian annexation
of Crimea, it included the gradual, purposeful expansion of the use of the
Belarusian language, support for the development and dissemination of Belarusian
culture and the preservation and promotion of Belarusian cultural history and
heritage. Russian authorities interpreted this national awakening as a Russophobe-
type nationalism and, therefore, as an illegitimate and dangerous trend.28 Russian
propaganda services, such as Regnum News Agency, regularly published chauvi-
nistic materials containing hate speech, questioning Belarusian sovereignty and
territorial integrity and spreading degrading statements about Belarusian people,
language and culture.29
These developments even led Lukashenko to name Russia explicitly as a country
meddling in the 2020 Belarusian election campaign. He specifically referred to
“fakes” and the deliberate disinformation activities of Russia. He also accused the
presidential hopeful, Viktor Babariko, the former chairperson of Belgazprombank,
who was arrested ahead of the elections, for being a “puppet” financed by
Gazprom, Russia’s giant state monopoly. 30 This was the first election when
Lukashenko accused Russia of interference; previously, all accusations were
directed against Western states.
2.2 Economic integration
Both Belarus and Russia have an interest in economic integration, but from
different angles. The Russian leadership unhesitatingly uses its economic might in
the energy, agricultural and industrial sectors. The limited integration of the
Belarusian economy into the world market gives Russia a preferable position.
Since Gazprom in 2011 took over the Belarus gas pipeline operator, Beltransgaz,
which controls the Belarusian gas transmission system, Moscow has shown an
27
Boulègue (2020), p. 5; Persson (2014), p. 27
28
Marin (2020), p. 22; Rudnik (2019).
29
Yeliseyeu and Laputska (2016).
30
Batashvili (ed) (2020), pp. 53-54.
16 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
appetite for similar takeovers of other Belarusian state enterprises. For Belarus,
integration subsidies – Russian oil and gas at discounted prices – as well as
preferable access to the Russian market for Belarusian products, have always been
the primary interest in integration in the economic sphere, but only to the extent
that integration does not threaten Belarus economic sovereignty.
Because of its economic structure, Belarus is highly dependent on Russia for both
its exports and imports. Its manufactured products, based on Soviet technology,
can almost only be sold to Russia, because their quality is hardly sufficient for the
West.31 Therefore, Moscow is Minsk’s main trading partner, representing 41.5 per
cent of its exports and 50.4 per cent its imports in 2020. Belarus mainly imported
subsidised crude oil and natural gas, metals and cars from Russia. Exports were
mainly milk and dairy products, meat products, lorries and tractors.32 The numbers
for the second countries on the lists of exports and imports (as of 2019), Ukraine
and China, respectively, were 12.6 and 9.6 per cent.33
Russia is also the main creditor of Belarus, with some 45 per cent of the country’s
foreign lending, as well as being the country’s largest source of foreign direct
investments (FDI). Furthermore, from 2015, Belarus transformed into a hub for
re-export to Russia of those European and Western products covered by the
Kremlin countersanctions on Ukraine.34
Belarus energy dependency is a critical vulnerability, since it imports virtually all
its energy from Russia and has no viable alternative sources. Moscow supplies
discounted energy to Belarus and can easily suspend supplies, since it controls the
Belarus gas transit system.35 In addition, about 20 per cent of Belarusian state reve-
nues and two-thirds of its exports to the West are derived from imported Russian
oil refined in the two Belarusian refineries of Naftan and Mozyr, and other petro-
leum products, as well as fertilisers. Russian oil is significantly more affordable
for Belarus as imports from other countries require sea transport to, and then train
transport from, either Ukrainian or Lithuanian ports, to the Belarusian refineries.
Since 2015, Russia has restricted its support of Belarus and applied economic
pressure by reducing oil supplies, increasing oil and gas prices, and restricting
access for Belarusian agricultural and industrial goods to the Russian market.36
Russia gradually started raising its oil price for Belarus while implementing the
so-called “tax manoeuvre” – a domestic fiscal change program aimed at replacing
export duties with a mineral extraction tax. Belarus had previously been importing
Russian crude on a duty-free basis, so the tax manoeuvre brought additional pain
to an already-stressed Belarusian economy. Heretofore, Minsk sharply resisted this
31
Åslund et al. (2021), p. 6.
32
Belta (2021e).
33
National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus (2020), pp. 68-69.
34
Boulègue (2020), p. 6.
35
Boulègue (2020), p. 6-7.
36
Sivitsky (2019).
17 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
new pricing mechanism, which led to disruptions in Russian oil supplies to
Belarusian refineries in the first quarter of 2020. In response to the embargo on
deliveries from Russia’s traditional suppliers of oil, Belarus started to search for
alternative sources, such as Norway and Azerbaijan, at a much higher price than
Belarus’s traditional Russian suppliers.37
For a long time, Lukashenko blamed Russia for failing to deliver on integration
subsidies, since Moscow kept adjourning the establishment of a single market on
energy. He demanded that Russian gas and oil be sold to Belarus at Russian
domestic prices (plus transport costs from the border). Russia replied that this
could be envisaged only once political integration was fulfilled and the joint
managing bodies of the Union State were entitled to make and implement such a
decision.38 In December 2018, when Lukashenko requested that the Belarusian oil-
processing industry be compensated for the losses entailed by the “tax mano-
euvre”, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev replied by issuing an ultimatum:
Belarus should first implement past agreements regarding the Union State
integration in order to be eligible to receive compensation and further economic
support. Medvedev outlined two possible futures for the further Union State
integration; there could be either a continuation of the status quo with inert
integration, implying the necessary “marketisation” of Russia’s relations with
Belarus, or the presentation of deeper integration under the auspices of unified
supranational bodies as the only option for guaranteeing that Belarus received
further economic benefits.
Negotiations, including at ministerial and presidential levels, intensified in 2019
when the 20th anniversary of the Union State Treaty, on 8 December, was marked
as a target date for signing of an official document. In November 2019, the two
sides launched so-called “road maps” covering technical and regulatory aspects of
deeper cooperation and harmonisation for each of 30 spheres, ranging from sani-
tary rules in the agro-industrial field to tariffs for mobile-phone roaming. In the
early days of December 2019, however, it appeared that no consensus was going
to be found on the road maps for energy and taxes. Belarus refused even to discuss
the so-called “31st road map”, which allegedly provided for the establishment of
political supranational bodies.39 The exact content of the road maps, however, was
classified and never officially published.
2.3 Military integration
It is impossible to analyse the development of the military Union State integration
apart from the geostrategic situation and the general Belarus-Russia foreign policy
relationship. The geostrategic position of Belarus, which functions as a buffer zone
37
Mammadov (2020).
38
Marin (2020), p. 4.
39
Marin (2020), p. 6.
18 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
for the defence of Moscow, and as a potential staging area for Russia’s attack
against the West, has always been Lukashenko’s main bargaining card in his talks
with the Russian leadership. Particularly, the so-called Suwałki Corridor – the
short (65-kilometer) stretch of the Polish-Lithuanian border, between Kaliningrad
oblast and Belarus – is viewed in the West as potentially one of the most vulnerable
areas on NATO’s eastern flank. In case of hostilities, Russian forces could rapidly
cut off the Baltic States and block Poland’s eastern border, at the same time
establishing naval superiority in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, secured by naval
forces located in Kronstadt, close to St. Petersburg and Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad
oblast. Yet this scenario would be feasible only if Belarus allowed Russian forces
to traverse its territory from east to west (see Figure 2.1). Speaking on this subject
before 9 August 2020, Lukashenko repeatedly made clear that Belarus would only
allow Russian forces to move through the territory if NATO committed aggression
against Russia.40
Figure 2.1 Map of Belarus and surrounding countries (Per Wikström, FOI)
40
Sukhankin (2021).
19 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
Well aware of this geostrategic importance of Belarus for Russia, Lukashenko
used it in two directions, both for and against the Kremlin. If Russia wanted this
buffer zone to be credible in deterring potential opponents from the West, it also
needed to assist with financial support and military arms for the Belarusian Armed
Forces.41 In a 2019 interview with Ekho Moskvy, the Belarusian leader even stated
that “if Russia attempts to violate our sovereignty – you know how the world
community will react. They will turn up involved in a war. The West and NATO
will react because they consider it as a threat to them, as well”.42
The military sphere has always been the most integrated sphere of the Union State.
While the political and economic spheres of integration have seen numerous
tensions and periodic rifts, especially in the field of energy, the military integration
has continued with less interference from the Belarusian government.43 In fact,
Belarus’s strategic alignment with Russia predates the establishment of the Union
State. Since the early 1990s, Belarus and Russia have been sharing the view that
bilateral cooperation is necessary in order to deter the common NATO enemy.
In 1995, the parties signed an agreement on advancing military-technological
cooperation. The countries’ military industries are tightly connected and have been
so since Soviet times. Belarus produces several of the high-tech components
(optics, electronics, and telecommunications) used for manufacturing, repairing,
or upgrading, Soviet- and Russian-made military equipment, including tanks,
aircraft and radars. Russia’s military-industrial complex and Armed Forces are still
dependent on Belarus for chassis for mobile missile complexes, such as the RT-
2PM2 Topol-M and 9K720 Iskander, and the surface-to-air missile systems, S-300
and S-400, as well as the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) BM-27 Uragan.
This also makes the dual-use factories that produce these chassis – the Minsk
Automobile Plant (MAZ) and the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) – and other
state-owned dual-use companies particularly vulnerable to Russia’s appetites (see
more on this below).44
The 1999 Union State Treaty underlines the necessity of close cooperation in the
military field, but does not mention integration as such. The treaty lists primarily
the following spheres as belonging to the joint competencies of the Union State
and its members (Article 18): joint defence policy, coordination of actions in the
field of military construction, development of the armed forces of the state parties,
joint use of military infrastructure, and the adoption of other measures in support
41
Vanaga (2017), p. 57.
42
Ekho Moskvy (2019).
43
Wilk (2021), p. 10.
44
Marin (2020), pp. 19-20.
20 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
of the defence capabilities of the Union State.45 Since 2001, the defence establish-
ments of Belarus and Russia have been operating under a Joint Military Doctrine.
The latest update of this classified document is from 2018.46
Since 2014, in a similar way to their economic integration, Russia has also stepped
up its pressure on Belarus in the military sphere, which led to disagreements. In
October 2015, Belarus unilaterally terminated a two-year-old agreement to open a
Russian military airbase in Bobruysk, in eastern Belarus, which would station Su-
27 fighter jets manned by Russian pilots. In 2016, Russia had to withdraw 4 Su-
27SM it had parked at the Belarusian airbase in Baranovichi for three years.47 The
lessons from the annexation of Crimea pointed to the risks in having a Russian
military base on its territory. A Russian military base in Belarus would also
undermine the promises Lukashenko had given the neighbouring states that
Belarus would not provide territory to Russia to commit aggression against
Ukraine and other neighbours. 48
Belarus’s stated neutrality in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, led
Moscow, in 2016, to establish the 144th Guards Motorised Infantry Division, with
a headquarters in Yelnya (Smolensk oblast). This includes, among other units, two
Motor Rifle Regiments in Klintsy (Bryansk oblast), close to the Belarusian border.
The Kremlin gave no clear explanation for this move, except for the need to
respond to the NATO decision to deploy four multinational battalion tactical
groups in the Baltic states and Poland.49 Despite all its lamentation over NATO’s
expansion, however, Russia for many years refused to export modern weapon
systems, including air defence systems and aircraft, to Belarus, which rendered the
Belarusian air-defence system porous and its ground forces useless without air
support.50 With this policy, which may seem peculiar given its influence on two
countries supposed to be military allies, Moscow kept Minsk in a situation of a
military capability gap towards Russia and dependent on Moscow.
To date, the Union State includes two joint military components, the Regional
Group of Forces (RGF) and the Unified Regional Air-Defence System (URADS).
Both components are usually trained during the Zapad joint strategic exercises and
during Union Shield (Shchit Soyuza) joint operational exercises, both held once
within every four-year period, together with the Russian Armed Forces. The RGF
was originally formed in 1998, as a regional component of the CSTO, and today
consists of all ground forces and special operations units of the Belarusian Armed
Forces as well as the 1st Guards Tank Army of Russia’s Western Military District
(MD). Decisions regarding the functioning and command of the RGF belong to
45
Soyuz.by (1999)
46
Marin (2020), pp. 2, 7-8.
47
Bellingcat (2016)
48
Hedenskog (2020); Sivitsky (2021a).
49
Sivitsky (2019).
50
Bohdan (2016).
21 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
the exclusive competence of the Union State (Article 17 of the 1999 Treaty),
meaning they require a consensus between the leadership of the two countries.51
The RGF is a virtual creation, however, because Article 2 of the Treaty placed it
under a joint governing body only in wartime “for both sides”.52 However, what is
considered wartime for one party may not be the same for the other party.
The clearest example illustrating the Belarusian Armed Forces’ ongoing strategic
dependence on Russia, is the agreement on the Unified Regional Air Defence
System (URADS), which was signed in 2009 and came into force in 2012. It
includes all air forces and air-defence forces of the Belarusian Army as well as
units from the sixth Air Forces and Air Defence Forces Army, also located in
Russia’s Western MD. To some extent, at least in retrospective, the creation of the
URADS could be understood as a compensation for Minsk’s refusing to host a
permanent military base and especially given that Belarus’s air defence capability
already exclusively relied on Russia. 53 In contrast to the RGF, which is to be
organised and deployed only during the so-called “threating period”, the URADS
exists and functions on an ongoing basis in peacetime. In the immediate period
before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as during wartime, the URADS becomes
a composite part of the RGF.54
At least before 2021, the only permanent form of Russian permanent military
presence inside Belarus has been two Soviet-era military-technical facilities,
owned by the Belarusian government but rented by Russia. These are the 474th
Independent Radio-Technical Unit, a Volga-type early-warning radar station in
Gantsevichi, near Baranovichi (Brest oblast), and the 43rd Communications Centre
of the Russian Navy, in Vileyka (Minsk oblast) (see Figure 2.1). Together they
comprise some 950 military personnel, although they neither possess combat
capabilities, nor considered military bases. When signing these agreements, in
1995, Moscow partially agreed to write off Belarus’s debts for energy resources
and was obliged to share with Minsk intelligence data about the regional space and
missile-operating environment. 55 The agreements came into force in 1996 and
lasted for 25 years (until 7 June 2021), when they were supposed to be
automatically renewed for another 25 years.56 However, no official confirmation
of the extension had been noted by September 2021.
The 474th Independent Radio-Technical Unit, with its Volga-type early-warning
radar, operated by the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces, was launched in 2001
and came into full service in 2003. It was still of strategic importance at the
beginning of the century, but now plays a complementary role in the new Russian
51
Soyuz.by (1999).
52
Marin (2020), p. 15.
53
Boulègue (2020), p. 8.
54
Sivitsky (2020).
55
Sivitsky (2020).
56
RIA Novosti (2021b).
22 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
early warning system, which is based on new radars from the Voronezh family.
The Western direction is served by two such stations, one in the Leningrad oblast
and one in Kaliningrad oblast. 57 The keeping of the Gantsevichi Volga radar
station is therefore more of political than military importance for Russia.
The 43rd Naval Communications Centre, in Vileyka, staffed by 350 officers and
ensigns, mainly from the Russian Navy, is purposed for the frequencies of an ultra-
long character that the General Staff of the Russian Navy uses, namely to contact
nuclear submarines active in combat duty in the South Atlantic, Indian and Pacific
Oceans.58 This installation remains one of the most important elements of Russia’s
military infrastructure beyond its borders.
When it comes to military education, at least before the Belarusian Crisis in 2020,
the Belarusian authorities tried to improve their own national universities and
specialised institutions so that fewer Belarusian officers would have to go to
Russia for training, and thereby fall under the spell of the “Russian world” ideo-
logy. Like Kazakhstan, for instance, Belarus established its own General Staff
School. However, due to the small size of the Belarusian Armed Forces and the
limited defence budget, Minsk could not rely completely on its own institutions,
but had to send some 70–100 young specialists each year to Russian military
educations facilities.59
The Armed Forces of Belarus are fully dependent on Russia, in terms of warfare,
for their supplies of weapons and military equipment, and, also to a large extent,
for supply of spare parts for post-Soviet equipment, which remains the basis of
their arsenal. Despite Russia’s declared intention of achieving full interoperability
of both armies before 2020, it did not seem to treat technical modernisation of the
Belarusian Armed Forces as a priority of military integration.60
According to the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) and CSTO agree-
ments on military-technical cooperation, which both Belarus and Russia are parties
to, the members are entitled to trade armament and defence equipment for the same
price they charge their own armed forces. For most post-Soviet countries, it means
purchasing Russian military equipment at discount price, in barter schemes, or
with fewer bureaucratic hurdles.61 Belarus, however, did not seem to benefit from
any significant discount to its bill when acquiring the 12 Su-30SM aircraft that it
bought from Russia in 2016 to replace its Soviet-era MiG-29s.62 The Belarusian
Armed Forces still heavily depend on Russian and Soviet military hardware as
well as procurement from Russia’s military industry – a dependence welcomed by
57
Wilk (2021), p. 22.
58
Batashvili (ed) (2020), p. 56.
59
Marin (2020), p. 14.
60
Wilk (2021), p. 38-39.
61
Marin (2020), p. 10.
62
Bohdan (2017).
23 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
Russia. In addition, Belarusian producers deprived themselves of an opportunity
to acquire advanced technologies from outside Russia.
Despite some problems, the Belarusian leadership has always seen loyalty to
Moscow in military matters as a guarantee of good relations and financial support,
at least in the field of security. Belarus has acted as a supplicant towards Russia,
offering its own military resources and territory for the purpose of military activity.
In return, it has expected support in maintaining and equipping the Belarusian
Armed Forces. The Belarusian army is bound to cooperate closely with the Russian
army at every level of operation. The Belarusian Land Forces and the Special
Operation Forces have been delegated to the Regional Group of Forces, while the
Air Force is a component of the United Regional Air Defence System. The main
task of the Belarusian troops, therefore, is to secure the transfer and deployment
of the Russian Armed Forces group (both the land and air components) on its
territory.63 The aim of military integration within the Union State, for Russia, is
likely to adjust the military potential of the Belarusian Armed Forces to the
standards and operational needs of the Russian Armed Forces in their Western
strategic direction.
***
Summing up the process of Union State integration before the Belarusian Crisis of
2020, Russia had striven for the maximum degree of integration at the lowest
possible cost (economically and militarily). In fact, one can say that Russia treated
Belarus more as an unreliable partner, rather than an ally, or a Union State partner.
Belarus, for its part, wanted as little as possible from the Union State integration
in terms of political integration, but accepted some economic and military integ-
ration in order to milk as many benefits (such as subsidies and by being a military
“free rider”) as possible.
The pre-2020 calculation of preserving regime stability for the Belarusian leader-
ship was through preservation of sovereignty, including some form of independent
room for manoeuvre in foreign policy affairs. As will be seen in the following
chapter, after the Belarusian Crisis of 2020, this task has become much more
precarious for the Belarusian leadership.
63
Wilk (2021), pp. 6, 52-54.
24 (54)FOI-R--5181--SE
3 Changes after the Belarusian
Crisis of 2020
After the Belarusian Crisis, with the increased dependency on Russia and the
regime under sanctions from the West, the goal of regime stability has become
much harder to achieve. Even if Lukashenko managed to strengthen his position
by quelling the immediate threat from the protests and preventing a schism in the
Belarusian elite, these efforts were achieved only when using massive repression
of the Belarusian population. By mid-November 2020, when the protests finally
subdued, the authorities reported about 25,000 arrests since early August.64 This
number was, by far, more than during previous protest waves, such as the ones
following the 2006 and 2010 presidential elections, or the protests provoked by the
“social parasite tax” decree in 2017.65 By May 2021, the Polish-based oppositionist
TV station, Belsat, published a list of at least 15 people who had died in custody
or as a result of their participation in the protests of 2020.66
This situation does not make the regime feel safe. Even before the Crisis, Belarus
was one of the countries that spent more money on internal security and defending
the legal order than on an external military threat; according to official data for
2019 and 2020, about 1.1 billion USD was spent on internal security and about
550 million USD on defence.67 This is a clear indication of the regime’s threat
perception.
3.1 Political integration
Despite this priority of internal security, when the post-election protests started, in
August 2020, it turned out that Lukashenko did not have enough forces to control
the protest throughout the entire country, especially since many units had been
brought to Minsk from other regions beforehand. After the initial days of heavy
arrests, the regime had to temporarily change tactics; the militia discontinued
attacking the protesters, and law enforcement had to adopt a passive stance. What
was worse for Lukashenko, Moscow remained silent. For several days in August,
the regime literally stood on the edge of the abyss. Two phone calls, between
Lukashenko and Putin on 15 and 16 August 2020, were crucial for the situation.
Following the calls, the Russian leadership declared its full support for the
Belarusian regime; this include the possibility of sending the forces of the Russian
Ministry of Internal Affairs to Belarus. Lukashenko was alarmed by the escalation
of the protests, while Putin was concerned about the crisis in the neighbouring
64
Human Rights Watch (2020).
65
Hedenskog (2017).
66
Belsat (2021a).
67
Wilk (2021), p. 13.
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