Ecology Meets WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA - Atlantic Council
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Ecology
Meets
Geopolitics
WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA
by Peter Engelke and David Michel
The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to
develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address
the most important security challenges facing the United
States and the world. The Center honors General Brent
Ecology
Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of
nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support
for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners,
and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation
of leaders.
Meets
Geopolitics
Cover image: Riccardo Pravettoni/GRID Arendal WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA
This report is written and published in accordance with
the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence.
The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and
recommendations. The Atlantic Council, its partners,
and funders do not determine, nor do they necessarily
endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s particular
conclusions.
© 2019 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All
rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means
without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council,
except in the case of brief quotations in news articles,
critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to:
Atlantic Council
1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-583-1 by Peter Engelke and David Michel
March 2019
Contents Foreword
1 Foreword
L
2 Executive Summary
9 Section I: Introduction ife is difficult, if not impossible, without consistent access to clean water.
Yet unfortunately, too many societies around the world face life without it, a
13 Section II: Himalayan Asia’s Water Tower
bleak reality that for many threatens to become worse during this century.
24 Section III: Water and Geopolitics Swiftly rising global demand for water, increasingly tight supplies of it, and
the stresses presented by a rapidly changing planet all are combining to
35 Section IV: Water and Security push societies into new and uncomfortable territory. The risk is that water
insecurity will lead to violent conflict within societies or across international boundaries.
40 Section V: Three Big Questions (and Some Recommendations)
The nightmare scenario, indeed the one we all fear, is that such conflict will involve the
56 SPECIAL SECTION 1 world’s major powers.
Himalayan Asia’s Water Dynamics in Depth There are few regions in the world where water insecurity US Water Partnership, the authors of this study embarked
57 By sector has as much consequence as it does in Himalayan Asia, a on an intensive exploration of the water security challenges
62 By region term delineating the vast swath of the continent dominated in Asia. Their research, which involved travel to the region,
by Asia’s high mountain ranges and the rivers that flow from expert interviews, and desk study, focuses on the intersec-
them. Those mountains, including the Himalayas, produce tion between Himalayan Asia’s changing ecology and the
74 SPECIAL SECTION 2
much of the fresh water that nourishes billions of people dynamic competition for geopolitical leadership among its
Hot Spots and Blind Spots across East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. Rapid major powers.
75 The Hydraulic Mission population and economic growth in those regions are plac- The Scowcroft Center’s mission is to develop non-partisan
ing enormous stresses upon fresh water sources. Himalayan strategies to address the most important security challenges
77 The Indus River
Asia’s rivers in turn are experiencing complex hydrologi- facing the United States and the world. These strategies are
80 The Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) River cal changes arising from both direct and indirect human informed by the Center’s strategic foresight and risks analysis
83 The Mekong (Lancang) River intervention. Geopolitical competition, including among capability, which enables it to produce world-class, forward-
85 The Rogun Dam distrusting nuclear-armed rivals, provides an unsettling back- looking analyses of global and regional trends. This study is
drop to Himalayan Asia’s water challenges. fully in keeping with the Center’s mission.
This study is the culmination of nearly two years’ work I hope that you find this report to be as rewarding a read
88 Authors’ Bios conducted by the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for as I did, that it will help you better understand this complex
Strategy and Security. Through a generous grant from the topic, and that it will ultimately inspire you to help lead the
89 Acknowledgments and Disclaimer Smith Richardson Foundation, and in cooperation with the way in finding solutions to this critical challenge.
90 Endnotes
Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky
Former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001–2009);
Board Director and Member of the Executive Committee, Atlantic Council;
Vice Chairman of the National Executive Committee, US Water Partnership
IV ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 1
Executive Summary
H
imalayan Asia is a shorthand term referring to the Asian countries that
depend on river water from the high mountain ranges of the Tibetan
Plateau. As the rivers produced by the Himalayas and other mountain
ranges on the Plateau are under increasingly serious pressure, water inse-
curity threatens much of the continent’s peace and security. Himalayan
Asia’s transboundary water dynamics threaten to erode interstate coop-
eration, including among the continent’s major powers, risk worsening geopolitical Mountains in the Tian Shan
range, Kyrgyzstan. The Tian
competition, and heighten the odds of domestic and interstate conflict. Yet there are viable Shan range is one of several
high-altitude mountain ranges
pathways for avoiding such outcomes, the most important of which treat water as a shared within Asia’s water tower.
resource to be managed cooperatively.
Himalayan Asia: Water Overview There are four regions in Himalayan Asia: East Asia, Central On the supply side, the region’s high mountains are growing challenge, as are changing sedimentation patterns.
At the center of Himalayan Asia are the Hindu Kush- Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Because China controls warming faster than the global average, producing greater South Asia is beset by intense bilateral rivalries between
Himalayas, Pamir, Karakoram, and Tian Shan mountain the Tibetan Plateau, it contains the headwaters of trans- variability in water supply. On the demand side, Central its major powers (India and Pakistan on the one hand, China
ranges. Often collectively referred to as Asia’s ‘water tower,’ boundary rivers that stretch across all four regions. These Asia’s ecology has been under threat for decades, extending and India on the other) as well as between the major and
these mountain ranges contain the world’s largest amount rivers include the Indus, Brahmaputra (known as the Yarlung back to the Soviet Union’s decimation of the Aral Sea. minor powers. Unresolved border disputes, longstanding
of ice and snow outside of the two poles, and in turn are the Tsangpo in China), Mekong (Lancang in China), Salween (Nu The Central Asian republics live within a competitive historic grievances, and geopolitical competition have led to
source of Asia’s most important rivers, including the Mekong, in China), Irtysh, and Ili rivers. energy-versus-water tradeoff that the Soviets created. the securitization of water.
Indus, Amu Darya, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Yellow, Within East Asia, China has a limited water supply, a Diplomatic agreements have not proven strong enough to Southeast Asia is defined as all countries within the two
Yangtze, and Salween rivers. Billions of people living in China, gargantuan water demand, and a severe internal water imbal- overcome divergent national interests. There is little inter- major transboundary river basins, the Salween and Mekong
India, Pakistan, and other Asian states depend on them for ance between its drier, thirsty north and wetter south. On est in tackling the Aral Sea’s fundamental problem, which is basins, which are the most important sources of surface
their fresh water. the demand side, China’s booming economy and expanding that the level of cotton production robs the lake of the water fresh water in Southeast Asia (aside from the Irrawaddy
Most of the water tower’s major rivers traverse multiple population have placed its surface and groundwater sources necessary to sustain itself. River, which lies almost entirely in Myanmar).
countries, several across contested national boundaries. The under extreme pressure. On the supply side, China has been South Asia faces severe water-related challenges includ- Southeast Asia’s water politics is about electricity versus
rivers face stresses arising from both water demand and one of the world’s foremost devotees of gargantuan water ing declining per capita water resources, large and growing food. The Mekong and Salween rivers are among the world’s
supply. On the demand side, Asian water use is increasing, projects. Water quality is a serious problem within China. populations, a dependence on irrigated agriculture, low most biologically productive. At the same time, both rivers
owing to rising population, greater agricultural production, China, Russia, and Mongolia share the Amur River basin, water use efficiencies, and poor water management. are attractive for hydroelectric development, and several
increasing urbanization, rising industrial production, intensive with much of the river’s main channel forming the boundary South Asia’s transboundary water resources consist of two governments are eyeing them for hydroelectric dam con-
dam-building, and much more. Many of the rivers face mul- between Russia and China, a rarity for China in that it is not major river systems, the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna and struction. The primary controversies involve dams that are
tiple such factors. The water tower and its rivers also face an in a commanding upstream position. China supports more Indus systems, plus large aquifers. These water resources planned or under construction from Laos and Myanmar
uncertain supply-side threat arising from climate change. A hydroelectric dams and other infrastructure along the Amur’s are under increasing stress. Together, the six countries in southward. The most controversial of these are in Laos.
THOMAS DEPPENBUSCH/FLICKR
warmer climate is melting the water tower’s 54,000-plus gla- main channel, which Russia has resisted to date. South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, Multilateral instruments to manage transboundary river
ciers that are the source of its rivers. A warmer climate also Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Bhutan) have a population of 1.8 billion people, many of conflicts have proven largely ineffective. The Mekong River
will shift precipitation patterns. These changes, plus higher Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, has a limited and whom are poor, making food security a massive challenge. Commission (MRC) has been unable to contain divergent
temperatures, will have significant impacts on agriculture, variable water supply. The Syr Darya, Amu Darya, Irtysh, and Agriculture faces competition from the energy sector and national interests. In keeping with its reluctance to enter
settlements, fisheries, energy production, and more across Ili rivers run through semi-arid landscapes before draining cities. Water pollution is a major problem. Coastal flood- multilateral forums not of its own making, China has refused
Himalayan Asia. into several internal lakes. ing and saltwater intrusion into groundwater sources is a to both become a member of the MRC and negotiate jointly
2 ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 3
with Myanmar and Thailand concerning the Salween River. In plans to dam the Brahmaputra’s tributary rivers in Arunachal Broadly speaking, there are two sets of fears when it Technology alone will not save the
2016, in what was widely interpreted as an attempt by China Pradesh, a contested territory. India and China have no comes to water and its relationship to security: the water day, but new technologies will be
to increase its influence across Southeast Asia, it created the formal mechanisms for resolving their disagreements over wars hypothesis and the spillover hypothesis. The water wars
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, a regional organi- the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo. hypothesis claims that as states exist in a zero-sum competi-
critical to help solve Himalayan Asia’s
zation designed to expand cooperation in the region. Hydro-diplomacy is central to the bilateral relationship tion for scarce water resources, they are willing to go to war water challenges.
between India and Pakistan. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) to prevent others from taking their share of transboundary
has survived the many down periods in Indian-Pakistani water resources. The water war narrative makes for compel-
Water and Geopolitics relations intact. But the IWT falls well short of being compre- ling reading, but there is no evidence of interstate water wars
in Himalayan Asia hensive and malleable enough to deal with novel challenges during our own time or in the past, whether in Himalayan
Water contributes to Himalayan Asia’s complex geopolitics such as climate-driven changes in Indus water levels. The Asia or anywhere else.
while being subject to the continent’s many geopolitical divi- deep wells of distrust and suspicion within both countries The spillover hypothesis refers to the risk that increasing risks—can help manage domestic resources and mitigate
sions. Hydrologically, China is upstream of nearly everyone about the other’s motivations and behaviors continue to water scarcity and/or variability will undermine domestic one’s own risk exposure to transboundary stresses. And
else, giving it a commanding position. Other countries also strain relations over the Indus. stability, in turn spilling over into the international arena. better management of domestic resources can help lessen
enjoy upstream positions (India, for example, is upstream of In Central Asia, rivers are part of a complex geopolitical The logical pathway is: rising water scarcity and variability the potential impacts of vulnerabilities to international risks
Pakistan and Bangladesh). This hydrological asymmetry is landscape consisting of suspicion-fueled rivalries and major in water supply, combined with poor water governance, while mitigating the domestic stresses that might generate
matched by geopolitical asymmetry, with China possessing power competition for influence. The central disputes involve creates domestic water insecurity, which causes a series of spillover instability.
outsized power. the region’s most important rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu destabilizing effects including rising food insecurity, migra- Improved data and monitoring can improve tracking and
China’s predominant diplomatic inclination is to refuse par- Darya, pitting the three downstream republics (Kazakhstan, tion, and rising subnational tensions among different groups understanding of hydrological conditions. Although water
ticipation in multilateral forums surrounding transboundary Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) against their upstream neigh- up to and including violence among those groups; ultimately, data is often treated as a state secret, that condition is
water use, instead preferring bilateral economic diplomacy, bors (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Of Asia’s major powers, these effects begin to spill over into the international sphere swiftly being eroded given technological changes in remote
much through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Unfortunately, Russia and China are currently the most active in influencing through various pathways, including out-migration. Under sensing and other areas. More broadly, civil society can help
the BRI’s overall lack of transparency makes it difficult to Central Asian affairs. the worst-case scenarios, water insecurity contributes to the develop more effective subnational, national, and trans-
divine the role that water investments play in China’s plans. Himalayan Asia’s many water disputes are made worse by breakdown of vulnerable societies, resulting in civil conflict boundary water management.
China and India compete indirectly for influence among low trust among riparian states. China, India, and Pakistan all and its transmutation to surrounding states. At the international level, Himalayan Asia’s transboundary
their South and Southeast Asian neighbors, with transbound- lay claim to overlapping pieces of territory running along the As domestic water disputes and conflicts are already water management regimes need strengthening. Instead
ary waters occasionally part of the mix. They share one mountainous regions that the three countries share, and that common in Himalayan Asia, one can forecast scenarios in of trying to create new comprehensive basin-level treaties
critical river, the Brahmaputra River (the Yarlung Tsangpo form important portions of their transboundary watersheds. which water insecurity at the domestic level bleeds into the from scratch, a better strategy might be to build from the
in China). India’s existential fear is that China will someday These claims are part of emotionally fraught and historically international one through blame-shifting processes (where bottom up. Such efforts might focus on negotiating parts
divert the river northward. China also views India’s inten- laden disputes. Overlaid against these worries are perceived politicians blame outsiders, including foreign governments, of the larger basin puzzle, for example through negotiating
tions through a national security lens, seeing threats in Indian threats to their national sovereignty and territorial control. It for water stresses) and grievance politics that brings water a resolution to a controversial dam. Success would serve as
is easier politically to define water problems as coming from issues together with territorial control, ethnic and religious a trust-building exercise that then would enable additional
outside national boundaries. Invoking the external threat is identity, and historical animosity. negotiations. Expanding hydro-diplomatic engagement
a tried-and-true method for politicians to deflect away from through better use of ‘Track 1.5,’ ‘Track 2,’ and ‘Track 3’
domestic criticism, particularly in those parts of Himalayan approaches has proven effective in building knowledge and
Asia where such messaging finds ready audiences. These Three Big Questions (and Some trust within the Brahmaputra basin.
motives are buttressed by utilitarian mindsets that predis- Recommendations)
pose national governments toward unilateral river use and
away from joint river management.
1 What are the risks of conflict over transboundary
waters in Asia?
2 Will technology save the day?
Technology alone will not save the day, but new tech-
nologies will be critical to help solve Himalayan Asia’s water
Whereas interstate warfare over water is unlikely in the short challenges.
Water and Security in Himalayan Asia run, there is more risk of violent conflict over the longer run, Desalination is a proven technology that can increase the
Across much of Himalayan Asia, water has become part of a given the intense supply-versus-demand squeeze underway. supply of fresh water in coastal regions.
geopolitical chess match, viewed as an asset to be protected Experts believe there is considerable risk of domestic conflict Although some countries such as Israel have overcome
against encroachment by one’s international rivals and/or as over water and fear that it will bleed outward into the inter- water scarcity through desalination, replicating its experience
a lever for influencing rival states. Securitization leads states national arena, in the form of out-migration, blame-shifting will be difficult, if not impossible, elsewhere. Despite decreas-
ANDREW AND ANNEMARIE/FLICKR
to adopt inflexible, hardline positions vis-à-vis their neigh- of neighbors, and more. Absent hydro-diplomatic break- ing costs, desalinated water remains expensive, making it
bors while discouraging them from looking inward at their throughs, there is a high risk that transboundary water will useful for municipal drinking water and commercial and
The Yarlung Tsangpo River own vulnerabilities. Securitization can play into the hands of become an even greater source of tension and competition industrial purposes in coastal areas, but not for agriculture.
flows through China. In politicians who use their domestic constituencies’ fears and among geopolitical rivals in Himalayan Asia. Desalination should be one piece of a comprehensive solu-
downstream India and
Bangladesh, the river is
grievances against constructive solutions, via pointing to Better governance at both the international and domes- tion set for Asia’s water challenges.
known as the Brahmaputra. their rivals’ water-threatening behavior, which is frequently tic levels is essential. Sharing data and coordinating policy There are promising agricultural technologies in existence,
more imagined than real. with a neighbor—for example on flood warnings and climate in development, or on the horizon. As Asian agriculture is
4 ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 5
the most heavily irrigated in the world, making it more water
efficient is imperative. Only a small fraction of all irrigated
land in Asia is fitted with drip irrigation technologies, as
3 What should the United States do?
The United States is the external superpower in the
Asian geopolitical context. If the United States plays to
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
to regularly update its Global Water Security assessment
(ODNI cannot do so on its own, it must be directed to
smallholding farmers have proven reluctant to adopt and its many strengths, it can maintain and even augment its conduct such assessments). Doing so would send the clear-
maintain them. Many water experts are excited by advances leverage within Himalayan Asia. With an eye toward the big est signal to United States’ partners and allies, and to US
in remote sensing technologies, which have enormous picture, this report offers some recommendations: government departments and agencies, that water security
power to assist in agricultural production, including the more is treated as a strategic priority at the highest level of the
efficient use of water, down to the farm level and in real A. Define water’s place within the context of US strategic US government. Water security is a non-partisan issue, and
time. Agricultural biotechnology also stands at the cusp of interests in Asia easily could become a standard component of future strate-
breakthrough innovation. Advances in genomics and genetic The first step is to create a coherent US government strat- gic documents, including the NSS, across administrations.
engineering are allowing scientists to understand plant egy toward Asia incorporating water as a pivotal element.
genetic patterns to improve crop performance yield. There For the United States, an important part of the strategic B. Craft a compelling vision around water in Asia
is considerable optimism that seeds that perform well under challenge is preventing water from contributing to both An important task will be to craft a compelling vision for
water scarcity or higher temperatures will be developed over state fragility (the spillover hypothesis) and international how the United States can assist Himalayan Asian states
the coming decades. conflict (the water wars hypothesis). Both of those out- in solving their water challenges. A compelling vision
Regarding the water-energy nexus, decoupling energy comes would undermine every other US strategic objective about water, including how the United States can help solve
A Cambodian farmer
production from water use is critical. Scaling renewable in Asia. water-related challenges in Himalayan Asia, would pro- ploughs his field after
energy sources should be a centerpiece of Asian coun- The US government should deepen its understanding of vide an opening for the United States to reassert its global flooding subsides.
tries’ energy strategies. Economic and financial trends are the linkages between water and its strategic objectives, in water leadership. A starting point would be to create or
increasingly important in driving the shift to renewables. Himalayan Asia and elsewhere in the world, and articulate commission a high-level report specifying exactly how
China is driving much of the downward pressure on renew- those linkages in its top-level documents. A clear objective the US government and its partners should organize Scientific Affairs, empowered with a long-range mission
able energy prices. There is also considerable risk that should be the inclusion of water security into the National its efforts around water to achieve its strategic goals and equipped with interagency coordinating powers. Peer
long-run returns on big hydroelectric dam investments will Security Strategy (NSS) and other strategy documents in Asia. That document should: describe how increased positions, focused on global water security, ought to be
not pay off. From the climate side, for example, the risk is at the highest levels of governance (e.g., the Quadrennial water security contributes to societal resilience; emphasize established within the US Department of Defense and
greater uncertainty on river water levels. Defense Review). A related objective would be to direct that water is critical to sustainable development, inclusive National Security Council.
prosperity, and cooperation in Himalayan Asia; stress that
the United States can help Himalayan Asian states achieve C. Work with key allies and partners around the vision
water security through innovation, improved governance, To make the connection between water and US national
and enhanced cooperation; and articulate how the US security, including the risks to US strategic goals in Asia,
Moving goods on the Mekong
River in Vietnam. The Mekong government should organize itself to best fulfill America’s the vision will need to be translated into thoughtful, well-
serves as a fishery, transportation strategic goals. articulated, well-planned, and fully fundable plans that can
artery, irrigation source, and
power generator all at once. With regard to how the US government organizes itself be implemented with allies and partners on the ground.
to fulfill its goals, if the United States is to be taken seri- Ideally, the US government would develop long-range
THIS PAGE: DOCUMENTATION CENTER OF CAMBODIA (DC-CAM)/MAKARA OUCH/FLICKR
ously as an honest broker in Himalayan Asia, it needs to plans that would focus on a mix of policies and processes
show that it can do the hard work of regional engage- designed to increase societal resilience to water-related
ment, with a commitment to transparent multilateral shocks. Capacity building, development of best-practice
diplomacy and building long-term regional dialogues policies and infrastructural investment strategies, and
and processes. In the water context, the US foreign ser- diplomatic engagement on transboundary water resources
vices do not have such a mission. That is one reason why would all be included. One key is to expand the definition of
water experts believe that water needs a more permanent who qualifies as a partner. Subnational actors ranging from
and visible presence within the US government’s foreign civil society groups to businesses to provincial governments
and security policy firmament. For several years, the US to local farmers all are key to water-related outcomes.
OPPOSITE PAGE: DANIEL MENNERICH/FLICKR;
Agency for International Development (USAID) has had While the US government’s foreign affairs departments and
a global water coordinator and Office of Water, reflective agencies engage subnational actors, the engagement is ad
of the dominance of federal spending on water supply, hoc. To improve, the US government should create a fully
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) programs. By contrast, funded and staffed office for subnational engagement in
funding for the government’s hydro-diplomatic activities is the State Department to track interactions with subnational
woeful. To partially correct this imbalance, a fully funded actors, devise strategies for engagement, and coordinate
and staffed water office and global water coordinator the government’s diplomatic outreach.
position should be created within the State Department’s Another practical step would be to empower the US
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and government’s scientific agencies to: fully engage at the
ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 7
international level; ensure the international availability Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD, an intergovern-
and distribution of their data; and develop partnerships mental organization based in Kathmandu).
with national and international agencies, the private
sector, and civil society in the development of open D. Protect Himalayan Asia’s water tower
source data tools that are tailored to end users includ- The United States should support the protection of
ing non-profits, agricultural extension services, disaster
management agencies, and individuals (e.g., farmers).
Himalayan Asia’s water tower—the HKH ranges, their eco-
systems, and the rivers spawned by them. The water tower SECTION I
Introduction
The US government’s scientific organizations such as the is the single indispensable feature of Asian geography, one
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), that serves the collective interests of billions of people.
US Geological Survey (USGS), and National Oceanic and The Arctic Council is the appropriate model. The Arctic
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) gather among the Council is an intergovernmental forum whose eight
best and most comprehensive water data in the world. So member states work cooperatively on common environ-
too do many of its private-sector firms. The challenge is mental and scientific challenges facing the Arctic region.
to find ways to have that data be used on the ground by Two of these member states are Russia and the United
people who make decisions about water use in Asia. States, which despite being geopolitical adversaries have
A related and important step would be to create an early managed to cooperate on the Arctic.
warning system focused on predictions of water-related The United States government should pick up this mantle
fragility. The US government should, in coordination with and support processes leading to the creation of an inter-
academic analysts and international scientific organiza- governmental forum for the environmental and scientific
tions, develop an early warning of potential water conflict stewardship of Himalayan Asia’s water tower. Those pro-
hotspots in Asia and elsewhere in the world. The models cesses should mirror the processes that led to the creation
here include the Famine Early Warning Systems Network of the Arctic Council in 1996. A similar permanent, legally
(FEWSNET), a famine prediction service created in 1985 established and recognized intergovernmental forum, like
by USAID, and SERVIR-Himalaya, a Hindu Kush-Himalaya the Arctic Council, could be created for Asia’s water tower. If
(HKH) satellite monitoring service created by the NASA the US government were to lead such an effort, its best play
and USAID in cooperation with International Centre for is to utilize its diplomatic strengths to bring other nation-
states, multilateral organizations, and civil society into a
consensus-building coalition for the creation of precursor
institutions and processes. Those institutions and processes
should follow the Arctic Council’s template.
Given that the United States is not a riparian state, the
US government should support those multilateral, civil
society, and scientific organizations that wish to lead this
endeavor. The purpose of such a forum would be to facili-
tate collective knowledge building and policy development
among the HKH states. In advancing an HKH forum, the
United States should seek diplomatic support from other
Arctic Council states that also are active in advancing
hydro-diplomatic relations around the world, includ-
ing Sweden and Norway, plus Arctic Council observers
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
One additional and simple recommendation is to create a
special representative for Himalayan affairs (or similar title)
to coordinate the US government’s efforts and facilitate the
creation of an Arctic Council-like forum for the HKH region.
WENZEL PROKOSCH/GRID ARENDAL
This position should be placed within the Bureau of Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, in
keeping with the Arctic Council’s institutional home at the
Asia’s water tower contains the
highest glacier and mountain in the State Department, and in keeping with the goal to estab-
world: the Khumbu Glacier leading to lish an HKH body focused on environmental protection and
the slopes of Mount Everest, Nepal.
scientific research.
8 ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 9
H
imalayan Asia is a shorthand term referring to the Asian countries that and China in South Asia), and by unsettled territorial disputes physical goods necessary for every human activity. Although
in some the continent’s most important water-producing two-thirds of the Earth is covered in water, the vast major-
depend on river water from the high mountain ranges of the Tibetan
regions (especially in contested mountainous territories ity—97.5 percent—is salt water. And only a small fraction of
Plateau. As the rivers produced by the Himalayas and other mountain between China, India, and Pakistan). All of these features of the remaining 2.5 percent of all water is available for human
ranges on the Plateau are under increasingly serious pressure, water inse- Asian geopolitics frequently lead to high levels of mistrust use in the form of surface water and groundwater (much of
that both complicate the task of creating robust transbound- the world’s fresh water is at the Earth’s two poles). Therefore,
curity threatens much of the continent’s peace and security. Himalayan ary water management regimes while, conversely and at the any systemic changes to hydrological cycles threaten to
Asia’s transboundary water dynamics threaten to erode interstate same time, raising the odds that transboundary waters will upend complex and often delicate relationships between
cooperation, including among the continent’s major powers, risk worsening geopoliti- become sources of competition or even conflict among the human and natural systems. This describes reality across
major powers. most of Asia, where the combination of human interference
cal competition, and heighten the odds of domestic and interstate conflict. Yet there are The bottom line is that water is the world’s single in these systems plus climate-driven temperature and atmo-
viable pathways for avoiding such an outcome, the most important of which treat water most precious natural resource, one of a tiny handful of spheric changes are altering the timing and amounts of water
that are available to societies, and to the fresh water ecosys-
as a shared resource to be managed cooperatively among a variety of actors, public and
tems that undergird much human activity, such as fisheries.
private, national and subnational. Without such leadership and engagement, there is signif- The Hindu Kush Himalayan mountain ranges produce many
Water insecurity is increasingly acknowledged as a threat
icant risk of water insecurity becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy, wherein states securitize of the rivers spawned by Asia's water tower. to peace and prosperity. For years, the World Economic
water and therefore define it in zero-sum geopolitical terms. That scenario has few, if any,
positive outcomes. AL
TA
The Hindu Kush Himalayan region Tarba
Y
M
O
UN
At the center of Himalayan Asia are the Hindu Kush- and significant improvements in water use efficiencies, gatay
Range TA
Hangay
n Mou
IN ntai
ns
Himalayas, Pamir, Karakoram, and Tian Shan mountain the demand for water in Asia will continue rising through K A Z A K H S T E P P E S
ranges. Often collectively referred to as Asia’s ‘water tower,’ mid-century. BETPAQDALA w Mo
untains Junggar Basin
Alata
these mountain ranges contain the world’s largest amount Second, water governance in Himalayan Asia leaves much DESERT Boroho
ro Moun
QIZILQUM DESERT tains
MONGOLIAN PLATEAU
of ice and snow outside of the two poles, and in turn are to be desired. While this is painting with a broad brush— Karatau Range
T I A N S H A N
GO
the source of Asia’s most important rivers, including the several Asian states, including Singapore, Japan, and South C H I N A BI
DE
SE
Mekong, Indus, Amu Darya, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Korea, are generally regarded as highly competent at water Ferga
na Valley
TARIM BASIN
Hex
RT
i Co
Yellow, Yangtze, and Salween rivers. Collectively, these governance—most of the countries within Himalayan Asia’s AMUDARYA
TARIM tains
rrid
or
GARAGUM DESERT TAKLIMAKAN Moun QUIL
rivers extend across four Asian regions: Central Asia, South major river basins generally face numerous, often severe, PAMIRS DESERT Altun Qai IAN
YELLOW RIVER
dam MO
Basin UN
TAI
Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Billions of people living water governance challenges. The transboundary gover- NS
Westerlies
KUNLUN MOUNTAINS
in China, India, Pakistan, and a dozen or more other Asian nance of water resources is in even worse shape. Himalayan KA
RA
Loess Plateau
HINDU KUSH KO
states depend on them for their fresh water, either entirely Asia’s transboundary rivers are poorly governed at bilateral Paropamisus Range
KABUL
RA
M Ya
ISLAMABAD g tze
n
or in large part (groundwater also is an important source of and multilateral levels, with few robust treaties and institu- Salt
Range Vale of
A F G H A N I S TA N P A K I S TA N P L A T E A U O F T I B E T
Sulaiman R
Kashmir
fresh water in certain regions). Himalayan Asia contains by tions governing how transboundary rivers and their basins
H
far the most critical sources of surface fresh water in all of are used. Its transboundary aquifers are not governed by Margo
Desert I C H I N A
Rigestan M
ange
Asia, and arguably the entire world. international agreement in any way, shape, or form. INDUS A L
In dus
Central YANGTSE
Bruhui
N EPAL A Y A
Within Himalayan Asia, there are three principal reasons Finally, Himalayan Asia’s geopolitical dynamics intersect Range Siwa S Tsangpo
NEW DELHI lik H BRAHMAPUTRA Gorge
why the linkage between ecology and geopolitics is becom- with its water dynamics, creating a potentially dangerous ills
KATHMANDU
Dalou
THAR DESERT BHUTAN Mountains
n
ra
ing increasingly important. The first is a rising gap between nexus of challenges that must be managed through skillful ak Kirthar aputr a
Ce n t r a l M Range Arvalli Ga
ng Br a hm
ills
GA
water supply and its growing demand. On the supply side, diplomacy. Its geopolitical dynamics have a high potential to Range GANGES NG es
aH
Khasi Hills YUNGUI PLATEAU
ES P
Nag
Indus LAIN
surface and groundwater sources are stressed across the both fuel water insecurity across the continent and in turn Elevation Delta
I rrawaddy
DHAKA
continent. Climate change will reduce water supply in some be fueled by that insecurity, given the clash between water Metres
Chi
e Chota Nä Ganges
ang Plateaugpur
ya R
n Hil
Delta
critical sub-regions of the continent and increase the variabil- supply and demand plus poor water governance across 6 000 Kathiawar Vindh R ang
e
Sundarbans
RICCARDO PRAVETTONI/GRID ARENDAL
3 000 Satpura
ls
Peninsula SHAN PLATEAU
ity in that supply nearly everywhere. Moreover, water supplies much of the continent. Himalayan Asia is beset by a series
1 000
0
BANGLADESH IRRAWADDY MEKONG
are frequently heavily polluted. On the demand side, rising of rivalries among its major continental powers, as well as I N D I A NAYPYIDAW
Hindu Kush Himalayas EASTERN Arakan Yoma SALWEEN
populations, especially in three major powers (China, India, among and between these powers and the continent’s less Major river basin GHATS
AN
DECCAN
Sa
MYANMAR
N
VIENTIANE
lween
AM
and Pakistan), plus rapid economic growth have translated powerful states. Those rivalries are fueled by historic griev- PLATEAU
Khorat
WES
IT
ER
soon Plateau
into rising demand for water for irrigation, industry, energy ances (e.g., the India-Pakistan dispute), by rapidly rising Indian mon
TER
AN
INDOCHINA
GE
Irrawaddy
Me
production, and municipal uses. This demand has led to powers that are upending continental diplomacy (China is
NG
Delta PENINSULA
kon g
HA
overuse of the continent’s surface water sources (rivers and the most important of these), by competition for influence
TS
Central
Highlands
lakes, primarily) and its groundwater. Absent widespread (e.g., China and Russia competing in Central Asia, and India
Laccadive Islands Myeik Arch. PHNOM PENH
Andaman Islands
10 ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA The boundaries and names shown and the designations
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA Mekong
11
acceptance by ICIMOD, CICERO or GRID-Arendal. Delta
Forum’s global risks reports have ranked water-related northern India. One of the authors had the good fortune to
crises to be among the most probable and consequential visit the Ladakh region as part of a Himalayan research trip
coming risks. Similarly, a 2012 US Intelligence Community for this report. While there, he interviewed several groups of
Assessment of Global Water Security, a first for America’s villagers for their thoughts on local water challenges.
intelligence services, hypothesized that water problems This report is organized into the following sections. Section
will contribute to destabilizing key states around the world.
“When combined with poverty, social tensions, environmen-
II examines the water tower’s evolving hydrology and its
downstream effects, within the context of Asia’s changing SECTION II
Himalayan
tal degradation, ineffectual leadership and weak political water dynamics. Section III provides an analysis of water and
institutions,” it argued, water insecurity will “contribute to geopolitics, through an examination of how transboundary
social disruptions that can result in state failure.” Such intel- water resources intersect with the geopolitical interests and
ligence community assessments also anticipate that some perspectives of major and minor powers in Asia. Section IV
states might leverage transboundary water resources to gain segues into a related conversation about the relationships
Asia’s Water
advantage over their neighbours. Multiple other institu- between water and security. Finally, Section V asks three big
tions are focusing on this nexus of issues surrounding water questions about water and Himalayan Asia’s future, provid-
insecurity, peace, and conflict, including the World Bank and ing recommendations for reducing the risk of water conflicts
United Nations (UN). and improving the odds of cooperation over transboundary
water resources. One of these questions is about the United
Tower
Report method and plan States, its strategy, interests, and policies.
THE FINDINGS IN THIS DOCUMENT RESULTED FROM A COMBINA- Two Special Sections, placed at the end of this report,
tion of desk research, interviews, and field study. Although explore several important topics for those readers inter-
the authors consulted hundreds of published documents, ested in more depth. Special Section I explores Asia’s water
their insights were sharpened the most by input from dozens dynamics in greater detail, addressing water stresses across
of experts, interviewed in person and by phone over the major sectors (agriculture, cities, and energy) and regions
NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY
course of 2017 and 2018. All interviews were conducted off (South, Southeast, Central, and East Asia). Special Section
the record. The authors solicited the opinions of experts II highlights several of Asia’s “hot spots and blind spots,”
located in Asia, Europe, and North America, drawn from including: Asia’s hydraulic mission; the Indus River; the
the public, private, and non-profit sectors, academia, and Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsanpo River; the Mekong/Lancang
journalism. In addition, source material for this report also River; and the planned Rogun Dam. Each case illustrates one
came from villagers living in Jammu and Kashmir state in far or more important themes outlined in this report.
NASA satellite image showing
contrast between heavy snow
and ice covering the Hindu
Kush Himalayan ranges and
downstream regions in South
Asia, February 2005.
12 ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA
H
Glacial river in the
imalayan Asia’s water tower is the most important source of fresh water in Sagarmatha National
Park, Nepal.
Asia, with its major and minor rivers providing water to billions of people
north to south and east to west. The tower refers to the high-altitude
regions that sit at the center of the continent and collectively act as a kind
of water-generating engine for Asia. Because the tower’s high mountain
ranges contain vast quantities of ice and snow, they produce a long list of
rivers, including the Mekong, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Indus, Salween, Amu Darya, Syr Darya,
Ili, Irrawaddy, Yellow, and Yangtze rivers. Collectively, those rivers flow into every region
of the continent except for West Asia (the region extending from Iran westward) and the
Caucasus. Moreover, because these mountain ranges straddle China, India, Pakistan, and
other countries with contested borders and regions, the water tower is itself a key part of
Asia’s geopolitical competition.
This section summarizes the central features of Himalayan not only as snow melt but crucially as rain too. This feature
Asia’s water tower and the importance of the rivers that flow is less important for the monsoon-dominated rivers like the
out of it. It also sketches the dynamics of water use across Mekong, where the greatest amount of rain falls well down-
the continent, with attention paid to the transboundary sur- stream of the mountains. (The HKH ranges play a role in the
face waters produced by the water tower. monsoons: the high mountains create a ‘rain shadow,’ mean-
Although there is no precise definition of the mountain ing that they block the monsoons’ path into China, confining
ranges within the water tower, for purposes of this report it rains to South and Southeastern Asia.)
includes the Hindu Kush Himalayas (HKH), Pamir, Karakoram, Collectively, the water tower’s rivers range across thou-
and Tien Shan ranges. The HKH ranges contain the tall- sands of kilometers of Asian territory and dozens if not
est mountains on Earth, including Mt. Everest, and are the hundreds of individual ecosystems. While generalizing about There is also a ‘Northeast’ monsoon season for South While power dynamics among riparian countries are not
most heavily glaciated. There are more than 54,000 glaciers the rivers is therefore a difficult proposition, they do share and Southeast Asia, running from October to December geographically determined (meaning that upstream coun-
in the HKH ranges alone, giving them the third greatest some commonalities. Given the height of the water tower’s (Northeast refers to the origins of prevailing winds). For tries automatically have power over downstream countries),
concentration of ice on Earth after the two poles. Many of mountain ranges, nearly all the rivers experience a significant the HKH ranges, the Northeast monsoon brings much less at the same time it is true that upstream countries are in
Asia’s greatest rivers originate in the HKH mountain ranges, drop in altitude from origin to termination, which in turn precipitation, but it is the major source of rainfall for penin- a more advantageous position. Whether that geographic
including the Mekong, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Indus, Salween, means that they are ideal for construction of hydroelectric sular India. To complicate matters, these seasonal fluxes can position translates into geopolitical power depends on
Amu Darya, Irrawaddy, Yellow, Tarim, and Yangtze rivers. The dams. Indeed, partly for this reason (hydroelectric dams also be out of sync with water demand, whether for agriculture, several other factors, including relative economic, diplo-
Tien Shan mountains lie to the north of the HKH ranges and are built in flatter landscapes), there are more dams already hydroelectric power generation, or other uses, depending on matic, and military power. China, it bears repeating, is the
are the source of the Syr Darya and Ili rivers. The only rivers built in Himalayan Asia, or in planning stages, than in any river basin and region-specific seasonal weather patterns. upstream riparian for most of the water tower’s rivers. It is
included in this study that do not originate in what might other continent. With a few exceptions, the water tower’s rivers are the closest thing to an Asian hydro-hegemon because of
be called the water tower proper are the Irtysh and Amur Furthermore, as none of the major rivers run through transboundary rivers rather than national ones. Unlike the this geographic position plus its considerable power across
rivers. The Irtysh originates in the Altai mountains in western temperate regions from start to finish, they are vulnerable Mississippi River Basin, which lies almost entirely in one numerous other dimensions.
Mongolia, and is shared by Mongolia, China, Kazakhstan, and to high fluctuations in river flow. Part of this variability is country, most of the water tower’s rivers straddle multiple Finally, all of the water tower’s major rivers face a diffi-
Russia. The Amur River’s tributaries originate in Siberia and seasonal, with very wet seasons followed by very dry ones. countries. Moreover, several of these rivers run across jittery cult combination of stresses arising from both the demand
eastern Mongolia. The Amur is included in this study because Spring and summer mountain snow melt gives the rivers national boundaries, as in the cases of the Brahmaputra/ and supply sides of the hydrological equation. On the
the river forms much of the border between two of Asia’s their water through the dry seasons. For the rivers that run Yarlung Tsangpo (China, India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh), demand side, the rivers face increasing stresses owing to
major powers, China and Russia. through South and Southeast Asia, monsoons add to this the Indus (China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), the rising population, greater agricultural production, increas-
The water tower’s mountains themselves also are a signifi- seasonal variability. The major monsoon season is the June Mekong (China, Lao PDR, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, ing urbanization, more intensive industrial production, more
PETER PROKOSCH/GRID ARENDAL
cant feature of regional rainfall patterns. As a high altitude to September/October summer monsoon. (The season and Vietnam), the Amur (China, Russia, and Mongolia), dam-building, worsening pollution, and much more. Many
wall stretching thousands of kilometers east to west, they has a slightly different onset and departure for South and or the Amu Darya and Syr Darya (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, of the rivers face combinations of several of these factors. A
impact wind and moisture circulation patterns across much Southeast Asia.) Since summer is the monsoon season, when Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), and the 2012 study in the journal Applied Geography, for example,
of Asia. By far, most of the rainfall in the Indus River basin precipitation is extreme, snowmelt is less important to river Salween/Nu (China, Myanmar, and Thailand). The few purely assessed ten rivers arising in the water tower and concluded
and in the Central Asian rivers falls in the high upper basins flow in these months. For river levels in South and Southeast ‘national’ rivers that arise within the water tower include the that all of them face a range of intense demand-side chal-
in the mountains, while the downstream areas are more Asia, meltwater is most important in the so-called ‘shoulder’ Yangtze and Yellow rivers (China) and the Irrawaddy River lenges. The ten rivers ran through regions characterized
arid. The mountains therefore effectively ‘generate’ water seasons in spring and fall, before and after the monsoon. (Myanmar). by high population densities, swift urbanization, ongoing
14 ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 15Hydropower in the Hindu Kush Himalayan region CHINA
agricultural intensification, high poverty, rapid industrializa- ASIA’S WATER TOWER Amu Darya 694 000
Food, Cities, and
tion, or combinations of these factors. Dense settlement Tarim 341 190
patterns and high populations characterized all the basins.
Energy
These authors are hardly the first to point out such chal- Yellow river
lenges, with most serious analyses pointing to similar AFGHANISTAN 461
demand-side concerns across much of the continent. These
stresses are examined in greater detail in the sub-sections
below.
As demand-side pressures are increasing, the water tower
R ising demand for water in Himalayan Asia comes from
three broad sources: agriculture (food production
plus non-food cash crops), cities (industrial, commercial,
PAKISTAN
42 000
7 477
and its rivers also face an uncertain and difficult supply-side and household uses), and energy production. Owing to
Brahmaputra Yangtse
threat arising from climate change. By now it is well estab- population and economic growth across the water tower’s Indus 30 000
lished that the disruptions created by a changing climate countries, each of these sources has been increasing its NEPAL 1 615
INDIA
83 290 BHUTAN
will upend hydrological patterns throughout Himalayan claim to surface and groundwater resources. Agriculture is 148 000 968
Asia and the rest of the world. The questions are how those the largest water user and figures to remain so for a very 49 382
patterns will change, when they will change, and with what long time to come, but it is hardly the only sector with rising Ganges BANGLADESH 230
consequences. demand for water. Rapid urbanization and population growth Irrawaddy
For the regions served by the Himalayan Asia water tower, in general have meant the swift growth of hundreds of cities MYANMAR
100 000
a changing climate introduces several significant chal- across the continent. That in turn has driven rapid growth of 3 140
lenges. The first and most obvious involves glacial melt, municipal demand for water (from industries, households,
Hindu Kush Himalaya
given the tens of thousands of glaciers in the mountain businesses, and other entities) and in the production of Salween
ranges. Temperatures have been rising faster in the water wastewater. There has been a related and massive growth in
Main river basins
tower’s higher elevations than the global average, causing energy demand as well, reflecting strong economic growth Mekong
glaciers to shrink across all of the ranges, with few excep- and urbanization in many countries.
Hydropower
tions. Glacial melt is critical for maintaining river flows in Briefly, experts divide the concept of water use into con-
Megawatts per country
the spring and summer months when river water is most sumption and withdrawal. Consumption refers to water that
Installed capacity
needed for crops. Although all of the water tower’s rivers is taken from a source (river, lake, groundwater, etc.) but
depend to some extent on glacial melt, several are more not returned. Withdrawal refers to water that is taken but Potential
dependent than others. Among the rivers originating in the returned. Globally, agriculture is far and away the largest con-
Source: Lutz et al., 2015, Comprenhensive Review of Climate Change and the Impacts on 200 km
water tower, the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra are more sumer of water because irrigation water is either absorbed Cryosphere, Hydrological Regimes and Glacier Lakes, Future Water, Statkraft and Icimod;
International hydropower association, 2018, Hydropower status report, IHA. GRID-ARENDAL / LÓPEZ, 2018
dependent on glacial melt than the Mekong and Salween, by plant tissue or evaporated into the atmosphere. Water
which are more heavily dependent on monsoon rains. withdrawal is frequently not a neutral exchange because the
Besides accelerating glacial melt, a warmer climate also will water taken from a source is often returned to it in a more
shift precipitation patterns, with timing and amounts of pre- degraded state.
cipitation expected to change at high and low elevations. A Asian agriculture is the biggest user of water in the world. China is particularly important for China’s food produc-
major problem here is that climate models are inconsistent In 2010, the United Nation’s (UN) Food and Agriculture tion, although the region is a relatively dry area that
in their predictions, which in turn means that scientists are Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that Asia’s agricultural sector requires significant groundwater extraction to support food
reluctant to forecast either greater or lesser precipitation for Asia’s large population is the primary reason for its mas- withdrew 81 percent of all water on the continent and about production.
specific river basins. Greater variability of rainfall is, however, sive agricultural water demand. Feeding 4.4 billion people 75 percent of all water withdrawn for agriculture globally. Climate change likely will have negative impacts on
expected everywhere. requires an enormous amount of water, in particular given India (first), China (second), and Pakistan (fourth) are in the the water cycle and therefore on agriculture. Yield losses
Altogether, climate change will have significant conse- rising incomes across much of the continent (wealthier top five most prolific agricultural water users in the world. from higher temperatures and reduced soil moisture, more
quences for those Asian countries that are dependent on people tend to consume both more calories and meat than Asia has by far the most irrigated land in the world, at frequent and intense flood and drought cycles, increased
the water tower. Greater variability in river flows and in do poorer people, both of which require more water per 41 percent of the continent’s cultivated area, with China and pest infestations, and loss of farmland in low-lying coastal
NIEVES LÓPEZ ISQUIERDO/GRID ARENDAL
precipitation patterns, plus higher temperatures, will have person). The challenges involved in feeding China and India’s India the world’s two largest irrigators by a long measure. regions top the list of concerns. Although Asian farmers
significant impacts on agriculture, settlements, fisheries, growing and increasingly urbanized populations are primary Several of the world’s most intensely irrigated regions are plant many different types of crops, a few staples dominate.
energy production, and more. Climate change will result concerns. Together, the two countries have 2.7 billion people in Asia. The largest of these is the Indo-Gangetic Plain that These include the water-intensive cereals of rice, wheat,
in greater glacial melt and changing seasonal snowfall and and counting, with both enjoying high economic growth runs across Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Bangladesh. The and maize and a few water-intensive cash crops such as
rain patterns at high and low altitudes (all of which will rates. Food security therefore is a dual-sided proposition, Plain is a vast region that is nourished by the water tower’s cotton, which is particularly important in Pakistan and
change river flows), will alter ecosystems at all elevations, involving on the one hand the production of enough food for rivers and groundwater. More than a billion people live on Central Asia. Finally, Asian agriculture continues to depend
and will likely have negative and potentially devastating increasingly wealthy urbanites and on the other finding ways the Indo-Gangetic Plain, many of whom are smallholder on smallholder farmers, especially in South and Southeast
impacts across human systems (agriculture, settlements, to ensure that poorer populations, which still number in the farmers. Asia also contains intensely irrigated regions in Asia, meaning that climate disruptions will fall hardest upon
and infrastructure). billions, have sufficient access to food. Northern China, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Northern farmers with the fewest resources to withstand the impact.
16 ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA ECOLOGY MEET GEOPOLITICS WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 17You can also read
