ECB asset purchases Heading towards a German wall - DNB
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CREDIT RESEARCH 27 June 2017 ECB asset purchases Heading towards a German wall Bloomberg DNBM We believe the ECB is set to further taper purchases Credit research under its Asset Purchase Programme (APP), starting in Ole Einar Stokstad Martin Børter +47 24 16 90 48 +47 24 16 90 46 2018. However, DNB Markets expects the programme Shawn Courcelles Mikael Løkken Gjerding +47 24 16 91 28 +47 24 16 90 47 to be increased in length, to mid-2019. On our Rolv Kristian Heitmann Fredrik Hössjer +47 24 16 90 49 +46 8 597 912 16 estimates, the ECB will probably run out of eligible Thomas Larsen Knut Olav Rønningen +47 24 16 90 44 +47 24 16 90 45 German debt assets prior to this, and will have to Kristina Solbakken Lund Magnus Vie Sundal +47 24 16 90 51 +47 24 16 91 23 amend its guidelines in order to continue the asset Erik Öberg Fixed income sales Oslo +46 8 473 48 49 +47 24 16 90 30 purchases. Fixed income sales Stockholm +46 8 473 48 60 For full contact list, see last page We expect the ECB to extend its asset purchases. Despite having purchased nearly EUR2trn worth of debt securities, we believe that fragile European economic growth will lead the ECB to continue its Asset Purchase Programme until mid-2019, but at a reduced pace, starting in 2018. From current levels of EUR60bn/month, we believe purchases will be reduced, to EUR40bn/month in H1 2018, EUR20bn/month in H2 2018, and EUR10bn/month in H1 2019. By mid-2019, aggregated purchases will have amounted to nearly EUR2.8trn. Bund scarcity likely to become an issue. Approximately 82% of purchases have thus far been allocated to the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), under which the central bank buys debt securities issued by central, regional, and local governments, as well as domestic, international, and supranational agencies. A large allocation to German bonds, combined with shrinking German government debt limits the volume of eligible debt securities available for purchase. Although the ECB currently has some headroom, we believe this could become a problem under current ECB guidelines. Close to the limit. We estimate that the ECB already owns 20–23% of eligible German debt securities. By mid-2019, we estimate that the ECB will own 28.7–33.6% of PSPP-eligible German debt. According to the central bank’s guidelines, maximum ownership for such debt is 33%, but in cases where this would give the ECB a blocking minority position, ownership is limited to 25%. With about half of German sovereign bonds containing such clauses, we estimate the real ownership limit to be closer to 30%. In our various scenarios we find that the ECB could reach this limit as soon as H1 2018, but most likely towards the end of 2018. Where there’s a will, there’s a way. Guidelines can be changed, as the ECB has already proven, when deciding to remove the lower yield and maturity criteria in December 2016, or including regional and local government debt, in December 2015. Consequently, we believe the central bank will find a way to run supportive policies if it wishes to do so. We believe a first step will be to re-allocate purchases to countries such as Italy and France, or the other programmes under the APP, such as to covered bonds or corporate bonds. Finally, it could also consider removing the 25/33% limit it currently applies, although we find this more problematic, as it would give the central bank a blocking minority position in certain bond issues. ANALYSTS Magnus Vie Sundal Credit strategist magnus.vie.sundal@dnb.no +47 24 16 91 23 Please see last page for disclaimer and information regarding distribution
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Background and programme overview Since Mario Draghi made his famous statement that the “ECB is ready to do whatever it takes ECB’s supportive monetary policy did 1 to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough” in 2012, there has been little doubt not come as a surprise, and we do not that the European Central Bank would run a supportive monetary policy in the years ahead. expect the central bank to stop the With a backdrop of three quantitative easing programmes and “Operation Twist” conducted by programme anytime soon the Federal Reserve, the introduction of ECB’s ABS Purchase Programme (ABSPP) and Covered Bond Purchases Programme 3 (CBPP3) did not surprise markets, nor did the 2 expansion through the announcement of the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), four months later. These programmes – the ABSPP, CBPP3 and PSPP – are the pillars of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP), together with the Corporate Sector Purchase 3 Programme (CSPP), introduced in April 2016. As the CSPP commenced in June 2016, total purchases under the APP were increased, from EUR60bn to EUR80bn, but later scaled down to EUR60bn/month, from April 2017. We still believe the programme may continue for another two years, as described on the following pages, but that monthly purchases will be scaled down further, starting in early 2018. For a full timeline, see the appendix. In terms of reception in the market, the introduction of the APP became a “buy the rumour sell the fact” kind of event. Especially with the commencement of purchases under PSPP (March 2015) and later expansion (June 2016), we saw interest rates and credit spreads tightening substantially prior to the introductions. However, following commencement of purchases, interest rates rose substantially. Figure 1: Sovereign bond yields (note: Portugal on rha) (bp) Figure 2: CDS spreads (bp) Source: Bloomberg, DNB Markets Credit Research Source: Bloomberg, DNB Markets Credit Research Certain restrictions apply to purchases under the PSPP. Under the programme, the ECB The PSPP includes purchases of purchases central (and in December 2015 expanded to also include regional and local) - Sovereign, regional, and local government debt issued by the Eurozone member countries, as well as debt issued by certain government, as well as agency national, international, and supranational institutions and agencies. International and debt supranational institutions and agencies may comprise up to 10% of purchases. All debt - International and supranational should carry an investment grade rating. agency debt (10%) After the initial yield floor equal to the ECB deposit rate (-0.4%) was removed in January - Only investment grade securities 2017, any yield is permitted in the programme, but the bonds should have a remaining - All yields permitted maturity between one and 31 years. Finally, the central bank is limited to holding not more - Tenor of 1–31 years than 33% of any bond issue for governments and 50% for supranationals. However, the 33% - Maximum ownership of 33% in limit is lowered to 25% for bonds in which 33% would not give the ECB a blocking minority for bond issues, 50% for supranational the purpose of collective action clauses. agencies 1 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html 2 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html 3 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160421_1.en.html 2
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 European growth fragile, QE to be extended While the outlook for the Eurozone is improving, the upswing remains fragile. Although PMIs The current European upswing remains are looking strong, and unemployment continues to fall (albeit at still elevated levels), inflation fragile. Consequently, we expect the remains stubbornly low. Moreover, we are seeing a slowdown in the Chinese economy, as ECB to extend the Asset Purchase authorities shift focus from hefty growth to increased financial stability. This could further Programme contribute to a negative growth impulse to European economies, as we have seen indications that China tends to be a leading factor in European performance in recent years. Combined with slack in the labour market, we believe inflation will remain low, and that the ECB will 4 continue its quantitative easing for a prolonged period of time . Figure 3: Eurozone PMI development (pts) Figure 4: Eurozone economic surprise index (pts) 65 100 60 80 60 55 40 50 20 45 0 40 -20 -40 35 -60 30 -80 Jul-98 Jul-99 Jul-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 Jul-03 Jul-04 Jul-05 Jul-06 Jul-07 Jul-08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jul-16 -100 -120 Composite Manufacturing Service Jun-12 Jun-13 Jun-14 Jun-15 Jun-16 Jun-17 Source: Markit, Thomson Datastream Source: Citigroup, Bloomberg Figure 5: Eurozone inflation (YOY, %) Figure 6: DNB Markets’ macro-score, YOY change, China and Eurozone (nine months lagged) (pts) 4.5 2.5 4.0 2.0 3.5 1.5 3.0 1.0 2.5 0.5 2.0 0.0 1.5 -0.5 1.0 -1.0 0.5 -1.5 0.0 -2.0 -0.5 -1.0 -2.5 Jun-16 Jun-09 Jan-10 Jan-17 Mar-11 Dec-05 Sep-07 Apr-08 Nov-08 Aug-10 Oct-11 Dec-12 Sep-14 Apr-15 Nov-15 Aug-17 May-12 Jul-06 Feb-07 Jul-13 Feb-14 Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Mar-04 Mar-05 Mar-06 Mar-07 Mar-08 Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 Mar-14 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 Eurozone inflation Eurozone core inflation China Eurozone (9 month lag) Source: Bloomberg Source: DNB Markets On our current estimates, we believe the ECB will continue to purchase assets worth On our estimates, we expect the EUR60bn/month for the remainder of 2017, as previously guided by the central bank. following purchase pace: However, we do believe the debate on tapering will come up in the early autumn, and that Rest of 2017: EUR60bn/month purchases will be reduced as we enter 2018. Thereafter we expect purchases to amount to H1 2018: EUR40bn/month EUR40bn/month in H1 2018, EUR20bn/month in H2 2018, before slowing down to H2 2018: EUR20bn/month EUR10bn/month in the first half of 2019. H1 2019: EUR10bn/month According to these estimates, the purchases will lead to the APP balance peaking at EUR2.8trn in mid-2019 (figure 7). Assuming that the average proportions seen over the past 12 months continue going forward, purchases under the PSPP will amount to EUR2.30trn, up EUR714bn from today’s EUR1.59trn. 4 For a full overview of our macroeconomic forecasts, see: http://bit.ly/2ucwI4H 3
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Figure 7: ECB's Asset Purchase Programme – cumulative Figure 8: ECB's Public Sector Purchase Programme - purchases w/DNB Markets estimate (EURbn) development over time w/DNB Markets estimate (EURbn) 3,000 Current 3,000 Current 2,500 2,500 2,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,000 1,000 500 500 - - Germany France Italy PSPP CBPP3 CSPP ABSPP Spain Netherlands Belgium Austria Other countries Supranationals Source: ECB (underlying data), DNB Markets Credit Research (further calculations) Source: ECB (underlying data), DNB Markets Credit Research (further calculations) Figure 9: Monthly APP purchases and estimates (EURbn) Figure 10: APP purchases by programme (%) 90 100% 80 90% 70 80% 60 70% 50 60% 50% 40 40% 30 30% 20 20% 10 10% - 0% Oct-14 Oct-15 Oct-16 Oct-17 Oct-18 Jul-18 Apr-15 Apr-16 Apr-17 Apr-18 Apr-19 Jan-19 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16 Jan-17 Jul-17 Jan-18 Monthly APP purchases Estimates - PSPP Estimates - CBPP3 Estimates - CSPP Estimates - ABSPP PSPP CBPP3 CSPP ABSPP Source: ECB (underlying data), DNB Markets Credit Research (further calculations) Source: ECB (underlying data), DNB Markets Credit Research (further calculations) The ECB has already bought itself more time As shown in figure 7 above, the vast amounts of assets purchased under APP belong to the Most asset purchases under the APP PSPP, most of which are sovereign bonds. The bonds are to be purchased according to the take place through the PSPP. Due to country split in ECB’s capital key, as shown in figure 11. The combination of a large capital weighing of purchases, with Germany key and relatively modest levels of sovereign debt led investors last year to question whether having a large capital key, approximately the ECB would find enough PSPP-eligible German sovereign bonds. The situation got worse one-quarter of all purchases are related owing to ECB’s former guideline of not purchasing bonds whose yield was below the ECB to German debt deposit rate of minus 0.4%. With the low yields seen in recent years, particularly in the summer of 2016, this prevented the ECB from purchasing substantial amounts of debt. Notably, in July 2016, all German sovereign debt with tenors of eight years and lower was excluded due to this requirement. Following a revision of the rules in December 2016, the ECB is now free to purchase the Guidelines for purchases were revised in sovereign bonds, regardless of yield levels. Moreover, the lower eligibility limit for the tenor of late 2016, now permitting the a bond was reduced from two years to one year. Consequently, the ECB gave itself programme to purchase bonds, substantially more headroom in terms of eligible debt to purchase. At the same time, it was regardless of yield announced at the December meeting that overall volume purchased under the APP would be reduced, from EUR80bn/month to EUR60bn/month, starting in April 2017. 4
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Figure 11: Relative capital key and actual PSPP purchases Figure 12: Germany: Sovereign yield curves (%, y-axis; (excluding supranationals), % years, x-axis) 30% 1.5 25% 1.0 20% 0.5 15% 10% 0.0 5% -0.5 0% -1.0 -1.5 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 Relative capital key Actual purchases (excl. Supranationals) 20-Jun-17 08-Jul-16 Former yield limit (ECB dep rate) Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Source: Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Looking to the average tenor of monthly purchases, we see clearly that the ECB made these amendments to be able to purchase shorter-dated German debt. As evidenced in figure 13, the average tenor of monthly purchases of German bonds dropped dramatically at the beginning of 2017, and is substantially below that seen for other European countries. Interesting to note is that while this shift in purchases should logically lead to a steeper curve than before, the German curve has moved more or less in sync with other European countries. Figure 13: Average tenor of asset purchases, by country Figure 14: Curve steepness, selected sovereigns (%) (years) 16 3.0% 14 2.5% 12 2.0% 10 8 1.5% 6 1.0% 4 2 0.5% - 0.0% Mar-16 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Mar-15 Mar-17 Sep-14 Nov-14 Sep-15 Nov-15 Sep-16 Nov-16 May-14 May-15 May-16 May-17 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jul-16 Total Germany France Italy 10y-2y, Germany 10y-2y, France 10y-2y, Italy Spain Netherlands Belgium Austria Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Source: Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Still some headroom, but a shift in purchases may become necessary With the prospect of postponed asset purchases from ECB, we believe the question regarding whether there will be enough eligible bonds available for the PSPP is relevant, especially with focus on Germany. The first hurdle to answer this question is to find the nominal values of ECB’s asset purchases to date. The purchased amounts are reported on a market value basis, which needs to be discounted by average prices in order to find underlying nominal amounts. Looking at historical sovereign bond prices (using Bloomberg’s sovereign indices), we find that volume-weighted bond prices have been hovering around 120–125 over the past two years. Nevertheless, as most bond issues have traded at slightly lower prices (the average is moved by certain long-dated bonds), we use a discount in our base case estimates. Clearly, this is also one of the biggest uncertainty factors in the calculation, with 5
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 each price figure miss equalling approximately EUR10bn in underlying nominal bond values. However, please see page 9 for a sensitivity analysis on the topic. Figure 15: Volume-weighted Figure 16: ECB PSPP holdings - Figure 17: ECB PSPP cumulative sovereign bond prices Market values and nominal values purchases - Nominal values, by (EURbn) country (EURbn) 140 2,500 3,000 Current 135 2,500 2,000 130 2,000 1,500 125 1,500 120 1,000 1,000 115 500 500 110 - Dec-14 Sep-15 Dec-15 Sep-16 Dec-16 Jun-15 Jun-16 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 - Oct-14 Nov-16 Dec-18 Feb-18 Aug-15 Apr-17 Sep-17 Jan-16 Jun-16 May-19 Mar-15 Jul-18 Germany France Italy Spain Market value, actual Germany France Netherlands Belgium Market value, estimate Italy Spain Austria Nominal, actual Netherlands Belgium Nominal, estimate Austria Other countries Source: Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets calculations) (further calculations) (further calculations) Comparing nominal outstanding eligible volumes to actual purchases by the end of May, we The ECB has purchased approximately find that the central bank has purchased approximately 23% of Germany’s PSPP eligible debt 23% of German PSPP eligible bonds, securities, dropping to 20% if including eligible bonds with remaining time to maturity below representing EUR380bn in market value, one year. The purchased bonds represent EUR380bn in market value, and EUR329bn and EUR329bn in nominal terms 5 nominal terms . Compared to the other countries, Germany has a larger proportion of eligible regional and local government debt, as well as agency debt securities, giving the ECB some headroom on purchases. Also of interest, we find that the ECB now owns more than 30% of the outstanding eligible debt securities issued by the selected international and supranational agencies. The figure drops to 28% of outstanding volumes when taking into account short- term securities maturing within one year. We regard this substantial ownership as one of the reasons why the ECB has raised the maximum ownership in these agency debt securities from 33% to 50% of outstanding volume in any single issue. Figure 18: PSPP eligible debt securities (EURbn, lhs), and proportion already purchased (%, rhs) 2,000 40% 1,800 35% 1,600 30% 1,400 1,200 25% 1,000 20% 800 15% 600 10% 400 200 5% - 0% Central government Regional and local governments National agencies Additional debt w/maturity < 1y Supranationals Proportion of eligible debt purchased already (0-31y), rhs Proportion of eligible debt purchased already (1-31y), rhs Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) 5 As of end of May 2017. Nominal values estimated by DNB Markets Credit Research 6
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Looking ahead, we find that the ECB may experience bund scarcity towards the end of the Substantial amounts yet to be programme, by our estimation in mid-2019. At that time, we believe the ECB will have purchased. purchased German debt for a market value of EUR549bn, representing a nominal value of Our estimates (market values): EUR479bn. Assuming zero debt growth, the country currently has eligible sovereign debt in Purchased already: EUR380bn the 1–31 year maturity interval amounting to EUR948bn, with additional regional and local Yet to purchase: EUR149bn government debt of EUR257bn and agency debt of EUR217bn. Assuming that debt securities Total: EUR549bn 6 with less than 1 year to maturity are refinanced with longer-dated paper , the total outstanding volumes increase from EUR1.42trn to EUR1.67trn. Consequently, nominal purchases of EUR479bn represent 28.7% of outstanding debt if short-term debt is included and 33.6% otherwise. Hence, in the former case, the ECB stays within the 33% limit. However, 33% is the maximum limit, applied to bonds where such ownership would not give We believe the volume-weighted the central bank a blocking minority position for collective action clauses. In such cases, maximum ownership limit is close to maximum ownership is limited to 25%. Looking to German bonds, we find that eligible agency 30% debt and debt issued by regional and local governments seldom contains such clauses. However, approximately half of German sovereign debt is covered by these, giving a weighted limit of approximately 30%. Hence, our current estimates imply a potential breach prior to the end of the programme. Figure 19: PSPP eligible debt securities and ECB ownership 2,000 50% 1,800 45% 1,600 40% 1,400 35% 1,200 1,000 30% 800 25% 600 20% 400 15% 200 0 10% Italy France Germany Spain Netherlands Belgium Austria Other Supranationals Central Regional/Local Agency Supranationals Additional debt w/maturity < 1y Purchased Additional purchases 2017-2019 Proportion today (rhs) Proportion, mid-2019 (rhs) Proportion, mid-2019 (short-term debt stays short-term, rhs) Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Substantial uncertainty exists The estimates are surrounded by several uncertainty factors including, with the largest being future debt growth and bond prices at which the ECB carries out its PSPP operations. Debt growth negative, but still not a big problem Looking at German sovereign debt, we find that its level, in nominal terms, has remained German debt growth is currently in stable and even falling, for several years. Please note that not all the debt in figure 20 is negative territory eligible for the PSPP. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the outstanding volume of German debt could decline over the next two years with recent YOY growth rates being negative for central, state, and local levels. 6 Analysing the German PSPP eligible debt securities with less than one year to maturity, we find that the majority of volume was originally issued as longer-term bonds, rather than short-term treasury bills. Consequently, we believe, in a zero debt growth scenario, that these volumes will be refinanced at longer-term maturities, making them eligible for purchases again. Some of this volume may already been purchased by the ECB following the removal of the lower yield criteria, in effect from 1 January 2017. For an overview of original maturities of these short-term debt securities, please see the appendix. 7
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Figure 20: Germany - Government debt (EURm) Figure 21: Germany - Government debt (EURbn), YoY growth (%) 2,000 14% 1,800 12% 1,600 10% 1,400 8% 1,200 6% 1,000 4% 800 2% 600 0% 400 -2% 200 -4% 0 -6% Dec-08 Dec-10 Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-09 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16 Dec-06 Dec-10 Dec-14 Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 Dec-15 Dec-16 Central State Local Central State Local Source: Bundesbank, DNB Markets Credit Research Source: Bundesbank, DNB Markets Credit Research While debt growth is not critical, it can affect the calculation by a few percentage points. As Debt growth estimates affect the picture evidenced in figure 22 (annual debt growth on the x axis), an annual reduction in debt of 2% somewhat, but not significantly over the next two years would lead to the ECB owning approximately 34.8% of PSPP-eligible German debt by mid-2019. In the opposite direction, a debt growth of 2% would reduce the ownership share to approximately 32.5%. With a more realistic limit, at 30%, the ECB would have to have purchased close to the maximum of the debt with less than one year to maturity on refinancing, and close to maximum of the debt entering the zero to one year time to maturity bracket, in order to avoid a breach of internal guidelines. Figure 22: ECB ownership of German PSPP-eligible debt under various debt growth scenarios 34.8% 35% 33.6% 33% 32.5% 31% 29.7% 28.7% 29% 27.7% 27% 25% -2% -1% Base case (flat) 1% 2% Purchases, % of outstanding [ 1-31y ] Purchases, % of outstanding [ 0-31y ] Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Price uncertainty affects the picture somewhat The prices at which the bonds have been, and will be, purchased is important to answer the question about whether there are enough available bonds or not. This is also a big factor of uncertainty. To obtain a proxy for historical market prices for purchases, we have used volume-weighted prices from Bloomberg’s sovereign bond indices. These have further been revised down somewhat, as some long-dated issues move the average substantially. Moreover, we have adjusted regional and local government bond prices, as well as agency bonds, to reflect a slightly lower price level than that seen for German sovereign bonds, partly due to trading at higher yields with less need for issuance at prices above par. Still, we do not know at which prices the bonds have been purchased and show three different cases in the figures below: A high case with prices close similar to the averages seen in Bloomberg’s 8
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 indices, a base case with some adjustments, and a low price case with prices closer to Under the various bond price scenarios, median than average levels. Under the various assumptions, we find that asset purchases in ownership of German PSPP-eligible mid-2019e vary by about EUR52bn, with EUR500bn of nominal bond volumes purchased in debt varies from 31.5% to 35.1%, or the low price case (remember: fixed volume at market prices) and EUR448bn purchased in 26.8% to 29.9% in the case where short- the high price case. Assuming zero debt growth, the low, base, and high price cases imply term debt is included ownership of 29.9%, 28.7%, and 26.8% of German PSPP eligible debt when counting in debt with less than one year to maturity and 35.1%, 33.6%, and 31.5% ownership otherwise. Figure 23: Nominal volume purchased in the various cases Figure 24: Nominal volumes purchased compared to (EURbn) current outstanding volumes (EURbn) 600 1,800 1,600 500 1,400 400 1,200 1,000 300 800 200 600 400 100 200 - - Sep-15 Dec-15 Sep-16 Dec-16 Sep-17 Dec-17 Jun-17 Sep-18 Dec-18 Jun-15 Jun-16 Jun-18 Jun-19 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 Mar-18 Mar-19 Jun-18 Jun-15 Jun-16 Jun-17 Jun-19 Dec-18 Sep-15 Dec-15 Sep-16 Dec-16 Sep-17 Dec-17 Sep-18 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 Mar-18 Mar-19 Outstanding, 0-31y Outstanding, 1-31y Low price case Low price case Base case High price case Base case High price case Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Matching the three price scenarios with the three debt scenarios, we find that asset purchases exceed the 33% limit by mid-2019 in all cases of our “low price” scenarios and two out of three base case scenarios. However, this is in the case that current short-term debt is not refinanced with longer-dated PSPP eligible securities. In this case, and under the expectations that ECB owns close to the maximum limit of securities entering the [0–1y time to maturity] interval, there is enough eligible debt for the programme to not re-allocate purchases, given that maximum ownership is at 33%. In our base case for prices and with the above-mentioned assumptions, it is also enough eligible debt, when assuming an ownership limit of 30%. However, this implies perfect planning from the ECB and that the necessary bonds are easily available, which we believe will not always be the case. Figure 25: Low case debt growth (-2% Figure 26: Base case debt growth (0% Figure 27: High case debt growth p.a.), % of German PSPP-eligible debt p.a.), % of German PSPP-eligible debt (+2% p.a.), % of German PSPP- held in mid-2019 held in mid-2019 eligible debt held in mid-2019 40% 40% 40% 35% 35% 35% 30% 30% 30% 25% 25% 25% 20% 20% 20% 15% 15% 15% 10% 10% 10% 5% 5% 5% 0% 0% 0% Low prices Base case High prices Low prices Base case High prices Low prices Base case High prices Purchases, % of outstanding [ 1-31y ] Purchases, % of outstanding [ 1-31y ] Purchases, % of outstanding [ 1-31y ] Purchases, % of outstanding [ 0-31y ] Purchases, % of outstanding [ 0-31y ] Purchases, % of outstanding [ 0-31y ] Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets Source: ECB, Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) (further calculations) (further calculations) 9
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Worst case: Early 2018 In a worst case scenario, with a the “low price” scenario, assumption of limited refinancing of short-to-long-dated bonds, and an average upper ownership limit closer to 30%, the ECB may reach its ownership limit as early as H1 2018 (figure 28). Moreover, should the central bank decide to continue purchases at current pace (EUR60bn/month), this limit could be reached as early as Q1 2018 (figure 29). In our base case, and not assuming the ECB has maximized ownership of bonds with less than one year to maturity, we believe the ECB could reach 30% ownership closer to Q4 2018. Figure 28: ECB ownership of German PSPP eligible debt in Figure 29: ECB ownership of German PSPP eligible debt in various price scenarios (%) under current DNB Markets various price scenarios (%) under unchanged purchases of estimates of reduced asset purchases EUR60bn/month 40% 50% 35% 45% 40% 30% 35% 25% 30% 20% 25% 15% 20% 15% 10% 10% 5% 5% 0% 0% Jun-18 Jun-15 Jun-16 Jun-17 Jun-19 Jun-16 Jun-15 Sep-15 Dec-15 Sep-16 Dec-16 Sep-17 Dec-17 Sep-18 Dec-18 Jun-17 Jun-18 Jun-19 Sep-15 Dec-15 Sep-16 Dec-16 Sep-17 Dec-17 Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 Mar-18 Mar-19 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 Mar-18 Mar-19 Low [1-31y] Base [1-31y] High [1-31y] Low [1-31y] Base [1-31y] High [1-31y] Low [0-31y] Base [0-31y] High [0-31y] Low [0-31y] Base [0-31y] High [0-31y] Source: ECB, Bloomberg, DNB Markets Source: ECB, Bloomberg, DNB Markets We believe the ECB will find a way Despite worries that there will not be enough German PSPP eligible assets, we believe the The ECB has several options, but given ECB will find a way to run loose monetary policy if deemed necessary. Given that, on our the remaining time of the programme at estimates, the central bank would reach the limit towards the end of 2018, the programme is the end of 2018, we believe re-allocating near its end (remember, we estimate purchases of only EUR10bn/month in 2019). purchases to other parts of the Consequently, we believe it would be unproblematic for the central bank to re-allocate some APP/PSPP is the most realistic one. of the purchases to other countries within the PSPP, especially Italy, France, and to a certain This could mean upholding the pressure extent, Belgium. Moreover, we believe some volumes could be allocated to other parts of the on spreads within EUR covered or other APP, namely CBPP3 and CSPP. Such a move could keep up the pressure on spreads in corporate bonds, or shifting purchases EUR-covered bond and corporate sectors. Purchases within these sectors have averaged to Italian or French sovereign bonds EUR11bn in total over the past 12 months, and by 2019, we estimate that total purchases under the APP would be only EUR10bn/month. Another option could be, given the short time remaining and low monthly volume, that the central bank would amend its 25/33% ownership rule. In our view, this would be more problematic, as it would entail the central bank gaining a blocking minority share for collective action clauses. Thus, the cost is relatively large compared to the small effects of re-allocating purchases to other parts of the APP or PSPP. Finally, in the case of longer-term asset purchases, in the cases of extended low inflation or further recessions, recent years have shown that there are many ways to run accommodative policies, such as Bank of Japan’s purchases of equity ETFs. However, on our estimates for future purchases, this seems like a less realistic option. Moreover with recent sentiment shifting to focus on also the negative sides of quantitative easing, prolonged asset purchases would probably have a hard time gaining political support. 10
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Appendix: APP timeline Figure 30: APP timeline w/ DNB Markets estimates Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 2014 Jul Aug 10 September 2014: ABSPP and CBPP3 announced Sep 20 October 2014: CBPP 3 purchases commence Oct Nov 21 November 2014: ABSPP purchases commence Dec Jan Feb 22 January 2015: Expanded APP - PSPP introduced Mar Apr 9 March 2015: Purchases under PSPP starts, total APP at EUR60bn/month May Jun 2015 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov 3 December 2015: PSPP expanded to also cover regional and local government issuers Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr 21 April 2016: ECB announces CSPP. Total APP increased to EUR80bn/month May 2016 Jun 8 June 2016: Purchases under CSPP starts Jul Aug Sep Oct 8 December 2016: Decision to reduce purchases to EUR60bn/month starting in April 2017. Nov Programme extended to at least December 2017 Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr April 2017: Monthly purchases reduced to EUR60bn May Jun 2017 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr 1H 2018: Worst case: ECB runs out of PSPP eligible German bonds May Jun 2018 Jul Aug Sep Oct 2H 2018: Base case: ECB runs out of PSPP eligible German bonds Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar 2019 Apr May Mid-2019: Expected end of APP Jun Source: DNB Markets 11
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Figure 31: German sovereign debt with less than 1 year to maturity - Original tenors (EURbn) 60 53 50 50 39 40 30 20 15 10 5 - 1y 2y 5y 7y 10y Source: Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Figure 32: German regional and local debt with less than 1 year to maturity - Original tenors (EURbn) 18 16.3 16 14 12 9.8 10 8 6.9 7.1 6 4.2 4 2 1.3 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 - 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y 11y 15y 16y 20y Source: Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) Figure 33: German agency debt with less than 1 year to maturity - Original tenors (EURbn) 16 14.2 14 12 10.9 10 8 6.8 6.1 6 4 3.0 1.8 2 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.2 - 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y 11y 20y Source: Bloomberg (underlying data), DNB Markets (further calculations) 12
DNB Markets | ECB asset purchases 27 June 2017 Contacts Credit research Ole Einar Stokstad Mikael Løkken Gjerding Knut Olav Rønningen Head of Credit Research, Financials High-Yield Oil/Offshore/Shipping High-Yield Corporates +47 24 16 90 48 +47 24 16 90 47 +47 24 16 90 45 ole.einar.stokstad@dnb.no mikael.lokken.gjerding@dnb.no knut.olav.ronningen@dnb.no Rolv Kristian Heitmann Thomas Larsen Kristina Solbakken Lund Financials & Utilities High-Yield Oil/Offshore/Shipping Investment Grade & High-Yield Corp. +47 24 16 90 49 +47 24 16 90 44 +47 24 16 90 51 rolv.kristian.heitmann@dnb.no thomas.larsen@dnb.no ksl@dnb.no Magnus Vie Sundal Martin Børter Erik Öberg Credit Strategist High-Yield Oil/Offshore/Shipping Investment Grade & High-Yield Corp. +47 24 16 91 23 +47 24 16 90 46 +46 8 473 48 49 magnus.vie.sundal@dnb.no martin.borter@dnb.no erik.oberg@dnb.se Shawn Courcelles Fredrik Hössjer Investment grade High-Yield Oil/Offshore/Shipping High-Yield Corporates High-yield +47 24 16 91 28 +46 8 597 912 16 Shawn.courcelles@dnb.no fredrik.hossjer@dnb.no Fixed income sales Fixed income origination Oslo Oslo Jan Krogh-Vennemo jan.vennemo@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 15 Peter Behncke peter.behncke@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 62 Khagani Agaev khagani.agaev@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 61 Jarl H. Brevik jarl.brevik@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 52 Elisabeth Agre elisabeth.agre@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 13 Jørgen B. Engh jorgen.engh@dnb.no +47 23 26 84 85 Joakim Ben Riala joakim.ben.riala@dnb.no +47 24 16 94 16 Knut Eivind Haaland knut.eivind.haaland@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 61 Alain Britt-Côté alain.britt-cote@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 09 Haakon Magne Ore haakon.magne.ore@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 49 Fredrik T. Eliassen fredrik.thorso.elisassen@dnb.no +47 24 16 91 03 Kristian Ottosen kristian.ottosen@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 56 Nils-Jørgen Fimland nils-jorgen.fimland@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 23 Preben Stray preben.stray@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 63 Morten Fornes morten.fornes@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 18 Henning Sørlie henning.sorlie@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 57 Hedda Giæver hedda.giaever@dnb.no +47 24 16 91 05 Frode Sævig frode.savig@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 55 Rune B. Liholt rune.liholt@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 25 Hans-Christian Vatne h.vatne@dnb.no +47 976 56 353 De Cong Lu de.cong.lu@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 12 Morten Madsen morten.madsen@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 22 Christian Malde christian.malde@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 26 London Trond S. Marthinsen trond.marthinsen@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 19 Padraig Harrington padraig.harrington@dnb.no +44 20 7621 6021 Dag Bernt Nilsen dag.nilsen@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 11 Stuart Fidler stuart.fidler@dnb.no +44 20 7621 6129 Erich Normann erich.normann@dnb.no +47 24 16 91 13 JoJo Thirasilpa jojo.thirasilpa@dnb.no +44 20 7621 6056 Jannis Rikvold jannis.rikvold@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 16 Petter M. Rishovd petter.rishovd@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 21 Hanna Tronrud hanna.tronrud@dnb.no +47 24 16 90 14 New York / Houston Robert Christensen robert.christensen@dnb.no +1 212 551 9831 Daniel Hochstadt daniel.hochstadt@dnb.no +1 212 681 3990 Oslo – Fixed Income and Real Estate Frank Rognes frank.rognes@dnb.no +47 24 16 91 15 Bård Løkken bard.lokken@dnb.no +47 73 87 49 85 Singapore Harald Taarud harald.taarud@dnb.no +47 61 24 79 57 Joachim Skorge joachim.skorge@dnb.no +65 6212 06 70 Mattis Hystad mattis.hystad@dnb.no +65 6212 06 97 New York Lars Nyhus lars.nyhus@dnb.no +1 212 681 3911 Stockholm Ole Martin Bosåen ole.martin.bosaen@dnb.no +1 212 681 3918 Karl Johan Kulling karljohan.kulling@dnb.se +46 8 473 48 67 John Parker john.parker@dnb.no +1 212 551 9852 Johan Edin johan.edin@dnb.se +46 76 466 69 21 Brian Mcevilly brian.mcevilly@dnb.no +1 212 551 9897 Henrik Kansmark henrik.kansmark@dnb.se +46 76 466 69 22 Vincenzo Zarrillo vincenzo.zarrillo@dnb.no +1 212 551 9855 Kristofer Pousette kristofer.pousette@dnb.se +46 8 473 48 77 Fixed income syndicate desk Singapore Oslo Chee Keen Ng chee.keen.ng@dnbbank.com +65 6220 2122 Pål Vammervold pal.vammervold@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 68 Eleana Mei Ling Chan eleana.chan@dnbbank.com +65 6220 7717 Pål Hegseth pal.hegseth@dnb.no +47 24 16 93 54 Jerome Teo jerome.teo@dnbbank.com +65 6223 1720 Stockholm Viktor Jansson viktor.jansson@dnb.se +46 8 473 48 71 Nina Ahlstrand nina.ahlstrand@dnb.se + 46 8 473 48 78 Daniel Andersson daniel.andersson@dnb.se +46 8 473 48 75 Fredrik Boklund fredrik.boklund@dnb.se + 46 8 597 91 215 Jamil Ekring jamil.ekring@dnb.se +46 8 473 48 21 Robert Fredholm robert.fredholm@dnb.se +46 8 473 48 59 Arin Kamangar arin.kamangar@dnb.se +46 8 473 48 34 Pontus Kylander pontus.kylander@dnb.se +46 8 473 48 73 Camilla Ohlsson camilla.ohlsson@dnb.se + 46 8 597 912 17 Ulf Pettersson ulf.pettersson@dnb.no +46 8 473 48 38 13
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