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Monday,
December 15, 2003
Part II
Department of
Transportation
Research and Special Programs
Administration
49 CFR Part 192
Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity
Management in High Consequence Areas
(Gas Transmission Pipelines); Final Rule
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION search. Once you access this address, detail the history of the proposed rule
type in the last four digits of the docket and how the proposal addressed
Research and Special Programs number shown at the beginning of this statutory mandates, National
Administration notice (7666), and click on search. You Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
will then be able to read and download recommendations, and safety
49 CFR Part 192 comments and other documents related conclusions drawn from accident
[Docket No. RSPA–00–7666; Amendment
to this final rule. analyses. RSPA/OPS had finalized the
192–95] FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: definition of HCAs for gas transmission
Mike Israni by phone at (202) 366–4571, pipelines in a prior rulemaking on
RIN 2137–AD54 by fax at (202) 366–4566, or by e-mail August 6, 2002 (67 FR 50824).
Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity at mike.israni@rspa.dot.gov, regarding The American Gas Association (AGA),
the subject matter of this final rule. the American Public Gas Association
Management in High Consequence
General information about the RSPA/ (APGA), the Interstate Natural Gas
Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines)
OPS programs may be obtained by Association of America (INGAA), and
AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), accessing RSPA’s Internet page at the New York Gas Group (NYGAS) filed
Research and Special Programs http://RSPA.dot.gov. a petition for reconsideration of the
Administration (RSPA), DOT. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: RSPA/ HCA final rule. Issues raised in the
ACTION: Final rule. OPS believes it can ensure the integrity petition are discussed in the section
of gas transmission pipelines by titled, Petition for Reconsideration of
SUMMARY: This final rule requires requiring each operator to: (a) Develop the final rule on the definition of High
operators to develop integrity and implement a comprehensive Consequence Areas. RSPA/OPS
management programs for gas integrity management program for addressed certain aspects of the petition
transmission pipelines located where a pipeline segments where a failure in the published notice of proposed
leak or rupture could do the most harm, would have the greatest impact on the rulemaking on gas transmission pipeline
i.e., could impact high consequence public or property; (b) identify and integrity management program
areas (HCAs). The rule requires gas characterize applicable threats to requirements (68 FR 4278; January 28,
transmission pipeline operators to pipeline segments that could impact a 2003). The remaining issues were
perform ongoing assessments of high consequence area; (c) conduct a addressed in two notices published on
pipeline integrity, to improve data baseline assessment and periodic July 17, 2003—Response to Petition for
collection, integration, and analysis, to reassessments of these pipeline Reconsideration (68 FR 42456) and
repair and remediate the pipeline as segments; (d) mitigate significant defects Issuance of Advisory Bulletin (68 FR
necessary, and to implement preventive discovered from the assessment; and (e) 42458).
and mitigative actions. RSPA/OPS has continually monitor the effectiveness of
also modified the definition of HCAs in its integrity program and modify the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
response to a petition for program as needed to improve its 2002
reconsideration from industry effectiveness. This final rule does not On November 15, 2002, Congress
associations. This final rule apply to gas gathering or to gas passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement
comprehensively addresses statutory distribution pipelines. Act of 2002, which was signed into law
mandates, safety recommendations, and This final rule satisfies Congressional on December 17, 2002, and codified at
conclusions from accident analyses, all mandates that require RSPA/OPS to 49 U.S.C. 60109. This law requires
of which indicate that coordinated risk prescribe standards that establish RSPA/OPS to ‘‘issue regulations
control measures are needed to improve criteria for identifying each gas pipeline prescribing standards to direct an
pipeline safety. facility located in a high-density operator’s conduct of a risk analysis and
DATES: This final rule takes effect population area and to prescribe adoption and implementation of an
January 14, 2004. The incorporation by standards requiring the periodic integrity management program’’ no later
reference of certain publications in this inspection of pipelines located in these than 12 months after December 17,
rule is approved by the Director of the areas, including the circumstances 2002. The statute sets forth minimum
Federal Register as of January 14, 2004. under which an inspection can be requirements for integrity management
Privacy Act Information: You may conducted using an instrumented programs for gas pipelines located in
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act internal inspection device (smart pig) or HCAs. These requirements have been
Statement in the Federal Register an equally effective alternative incorporated into this final rule.
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume inspection method. The final rule also Statutory requirements for an integrity
65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78) or you incorporates the required elements for program include conducting baseline
may visit the Dockets Management gas integrity management programs and reassessment testing of each
System (DMS) Web site at http:// mandated in the Pipeline Safety covered transmission pipeline segment
dms.dot.gov. You may search the Improvement Act of 2002, which was at specified intervals, conducting an
electronic form of all comments signed into law on December 17, 2002, integrated data analysis on a continuing
received into any of our dockets by the and codified at 49 U.S.C. 60109. basis, taking actions to address integrity
name of the individual submitting the Background concerns, addressing issues raised by
comment (or signing the comment, if RSPA/OPS and by state and local
submitted on behalf of an association, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking authorities under an interstate agent
business, labor union, etc.). On January 28, 2003, RSPA/OPS agreement, conducting testing in an
General Information: You may contact published a Notice of Proposed environmentally appropriate manner,
the Dockets Facility by phone at (202) Rulemaking (68 FR 4278) that proposed providing notification of changes to a
366–9329 for copies of this final rule or pipeline integrity management program, and permitting a State
other material in the docket. All requirements for gas transmission interstate agent access to the risk
materials in this docket may be accessed pipelines. In the preamble to that analysis and integrity management
electronically at http://dms.dot.gov/ Notice, RSPA/OPS explained in great program.
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Petition for Reconsideration of the Final NPRM, and advice from the Technical integrity management rule and the
Rule on the Definition of High Pipeline Safety Standards Committee recommend changes.
Consequence Areas (TPSSC or Committee), the statutory gas On April 25, 2003, RSPA/OPS held
pipeline advisory committee, indicated another public meeting to discuss
RSPA/OPS issued a final rule defining
the need for greater clarification of how possible courses of action on issues that
HCAs for gas transmission pipelines on
operators are to implement the had been raised during the previous
August 6, 2002 (67 FR 50824). On
‘‘identified sites’’ aspect of the HCA meetings. Participants included State
September 5, 2002, the American Gas
definition. The advisory bulletin pipeline safety representatives, industry
Association (AGA), the American Public
published on July 17, 2003 (68 FR representatives, and the general public.
Gas Association (APGA), the Interstate The comments at the public meetings
Natural Gas Association of America 42456) provides guidance to gas
transmission operators on the steps closely tracked the comments received
(INGAA), and the New York Gas Group to the docket and the discussions by the
(NYGAS) filed a petition for the RSPA/OPS expects them to take to
determine ‘‘identified sites’’ along their TPSSC at its May 2003 meeting. These
reconsideration of the final rule defining issues and the advisory committee’s
HCAs for gas transmission pipelines. pipelines. ‘‘Identified sites’’ include
buildings housing people who are recommendations are discussed in the
This petition is in the docket. The section titled, Gas Advisory Committee
petition raised the following issues: confined and of limited mobility who
would be difficult to evacuate, and Considerations. The 12 issues addressed
(1) The splitting of the gas integrity in the comments to the docket are
rule into two rulemakings—the outside areas and buildings where
people gather. The guidance allows discussed below in Comments to NPRM.
definition and the integrity
requirements—causes confusion, operators to identify these sites for Gas Advisory Committee Considerations
particularly, since the Potential Impact purposes of planning integrity
management programs. RSPA has The Technical Pipeline Safety
Zone concept was not included in the Standards Committee is the Federal
definition. agreed that the intent of the regulation
will be satisfied if an operator follows advisory committee charged with
(2) The high consequence area responsibility for advising on the
definition should clarify that it applies the guidance. The guidance has been
incorporated into this final rule. technical feasibility, reasonableness,
to gas transmission pipelines that have cost-effectiveness, and practicability of
the potential to impact high population Public Meetings Following the NPRM proposed gas pipeline safety standards.
density areas and does not apply to The 15-member Committee is comprised
distribution pipelines. On January 28, 2003 (68 FR 4278),
RSPA/OPS proposed integrity of individuals from industry,
(3) The ‘‘identified site’’ component of government, and the general public.
the definition (buildings and outside management program requirements for
On May 28–30, 2003, the TPSSC met
areas) is overly broad. The definition gas transmission pipelines in HCAs. The
to review the proposed gas pipeline
should instead use the current language comment period for this proposal was
integrity management rule and the
in § 192.5 for Class 3 outside areas. scheduled to close on March 31, 2003,
associated cost-benefit analysis. The
When this petition was received, but RSPA/OPS extended this comment
Committee voted unanimously to accept
RSPA/OPS was in the final stages of period to April 30, 2003. Because the
the proposed integrity management rule
developing the NPRM on pipeline proposal was complex, a series of public
as technically reasonable, feasible, and
integrity management for gas meetings were held to educate the
practicable, subject to the recommended
transmission pipelines in HCAs. In industry and public about the proposed
changes identified during committee
addition to the proposed substantive requirements and to listen to comments
discussion. The Committee decided that
requirements, the NPRM proposed an and concerns.
before it could vote to accept the cost-
expanded definition of HCAs and On February 20–21, 2003, RSPA/OPS benefit analysis, RSPA/OPS must revise
proposed to include a definition of a participated in a public workshop it in compliance with the
Potential Impact Zone, the area likely to sponsored by the INGAA and AGA in recommendations at the May 28–30
be affected by a failure. In the NPRM, Houston, and on February 26, 2003, in meeting. RSPA/OPS sent a revised cost-
RSPA/OPS discussed the issues raised an audio conference jointly sponsored benefit analysis to the committee. On
in the petition for reconsideration and by AGA, APGA, and other pipeline July 31, 2003, the Committee voted to
its belief that the proposal, and the final trade associations, to give an overview accept the revised cost-benefit analysis.
rule to follow, would address the more of the proposed rule and clarify certain The transcripts from both meetings are
significant of the issues (68 FR 4278, proposed requirements. On March 19, in the docket.
4295–4296; January 28, 2003). RSPA/ 2003, RSPA/OPS held a public meeting
OPS requested comments on several in Washington, DC, to address issues Discussion on the HCA Definition and
aspects of the final definition, raised at the INGAA/AGA workshop Proposed Rule
particularly with respect to the and to better explain the proposed rule. The TPSSC made the following
‘‘identified sites’’ component. In two Participants included representatives recommendations during the May 28–30
notices published on July 17, 2003— from the National Association of meeting with respect to the HCA
Response to Petition for Reconsideration Pipeline Safety Representatives definition and the language in the
(68 FR 42458) and Issuance of Advisory (NAPSR), INGAA, AGA, APGA, and proposed integrity management program
Bulletin (68 FR 42456)—RSPA/OPS other Federal government agencies. rule. RSPA/OPS discusses how it
addressed the remainder of issues raised Summaries of these meetings are in the addressed each recommendation in the
by the petitioners, and provided docket. final rule.
guidance to operators of gas On March 25, 2003, RSPA/OPS The Committee discussed how to best
transmission pipelines on how to briefed the TPSSC members about identify those segments of a pipeline
identify HCAs. issues raised in the public meetings and that present the greatest potential
Comments received in response to the heard additional briefings on integrity hazard to people so that operators could
NPRM on integrity management management issues, including the HCA focus integrity management efforts on
programs, comments at the public definition. On May 28–29, 2003, the those segments. The Committee
meetings following issuance of the TPSSC met to vote on the proposed gas considered the bifurcated approach
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INGAA had presented in its comments. 12-month period (the days and weeks RSPA revised the final rule to require
The Committee discussed whether rural need not be consecutive). additional preventive and mitigative
buildings, such as rural churches, RSPA accepted this recommendation measures for plastic transmission
should be designated as Moderate Risk and modified the ‘‘identified site’’ pipelines.
Areas. Much of the meeting was spent component of the HCA area definition. The Committee discussed the
on the industry’s petition for This revision is consistent with the assessment methods and intervals that
reconsideration. The Committee held an Class 3 definition of outside area in should be required for low-stress
extensive discussion on the ‘‘identified § 192.5. pipelines and then voted for RSPA/OPS
sites’’ component of the HCA definition, The Committee discussed whether the to:
focusing on places where people criterion for determining the population Use the approach suggested by AGA
congregate and on buildings containing density component of a high as described on pages 6 and 7 of its
persons of limited mobility. The TPSSC consequence area should be 10 or 20 April 30, 2003 letter, ‘‘Amendment to
made the following recommendations buildings intended for human Low-Stress Pipeline Requirements.’’
with respect to the definition of and occupancy within the impact circle. The RSPA adopted this recommendation
identification of HCAs: Committee recommended that RSPA/ and created a new section in the gas rule
Allow a bifurcated option for building OPS: (§ 192.941) on low-stress reassessment
count as part of the definition of HCAs. Use 20 buildings intended for human for pipelines operating below 30% of
RSPA adopted this recommendation occupancy occurring within a Potential specified minimum yield strength
into the final rule and modified Impact Circle as a criterion for (SMYS). This recommendation provides
§ 192.903 to allow two methods of determining high consequence areas. for additional analysis focused on third-
identifying HCAs. This is discussed RSPA adopted this recommendation party damage and increases the
below in section 3 of Comments to and modified the definition of HCA. frequency of leak surveys as an
NPRM. The TPSSC discussed whether an alternative form of reassessment. This is
Address rural buildings in the same additional safety margin should be discussed below in section 7 of
manner as any HCA. applied to the Potential Impact Circle Comments to NPRM.
The TPSSC discussed whether a
RSPA has adopted this radius calculated using the C–FER
requirement to pressure test a pipeline
recommendation by modifying the model and recommended that:
to verify its integrity against material
‘‘identified sites’’ component of the To define an HCA use the C–FER
and construction defects be limited to
HCA definition as it relates to outside radius without additional safety margin
pipeline segments for which
areas where people gather. The to define the Potential Impact Circle,
information suggests a potential
definition now differentiates between and extend by one additional radius on
vulnerability. The Committee
outside areas, open structures, and rural either side of the segment that could
recommended that RSPA/OPS:
buildings, which provide more potentially impact an HCA. Incorporate into the rule the concepts
protection. This is discussed below in RSPA adopted this recommendation of B31.8S pertaining to material and
Comments to NPRM. and modified the definition of HCA to construction defects and increased
In the HCA definition, substitute incorporate this additional length of operating pressure.
‘‘public safety officials, emergency pipeline. RSPA has incorporated ASME/ANSI
response officials, or local emergency The TPSSC discussed whether the B31.8S–2001, Managing System
planning committees’’ for ‘‘local rule should allow an operator to use Integrity of Gas Pipelines, into the
officials.’’ data regarding the number of buildings regulation.
RSPA accepted this recommendation within 660 feet of the pipeline (available The TPSSC discussed the proposed
and modified the ‘‘identified sites’’ now to operators because of the existing direct assessment requirements and
component of the high consequence definition of Class Locations at § 192.5) ways to ensure that the method provides
area definition to incorporate this to extrapolate the building density in an understanding of pipeline integrity
change. Potential Impact Circles larger than 660 comparable to that provided by other
Define an identified site as any of the feet, and what the interim period should assessment methods. In particular the
following within a Potential Impact be for operator to collect the additional discussion focused on whether it should
Circle: data on buildings beyond 660 feet. The be allowed as a primary assessment
1. A facility housing persons of Committee voted that the rule should: method only to address certain threats,
limited mobility that is known to public Allow a three-year period for and whether the assessment intervals
safety officials, emergency response operators to use existing house count should be the same as those allowed for
officials, or local emergency planning data out to 660 feet to infer the number the other assessment methods. The
committee, and which meets one of the of houses in impact circles exceeding TPSSC recommended that the rule:
following three criteria: (a) Is visibly 660 feet in radius. Allow direct assessment as a primary
marked, (b) is licensed or registered by RSPA accepted this recommendation assessment method contingent only on
a Federal, state, or local agency, or (c) and intends to allow operators three applicability to the threats and have
is listed on a map maintained by or years to collect actual data and to revise assessment intervals the same as those
available from a Federal, State, or local the HCA to reflect this data. for other methods, subject to
agency, or The Committee discussed what clarification on how confirmatory direct
2. An outdoor area where people assessment requirements should be assessment fits into the process and
congregate that is known to public applicable to plastic transmission relates to the NACE Recommended
safety officials, emergency response pipelines and recommended that the Practice.
officials or local emergency planning rule should: RSPA/OPS has accepted this
committee and which is occupied by 20 Allow operators to conduct a recommendation and revised the final
or more people on at least 50 days per reliability analysis as a baseline rule to allow direct assessment as a
year, or assessment for plastic pipeline, and primary assessment method for certain
3. A building occupied by 20 or more require appropriate preventive and threats and to have the same assessment
people 5 days per week, 10 weeks in any mitigative measures. intervals as the other assessment
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methods. This is discussed below in The TPSSC discussed at what billion savings represents a benefit of
section 4 of Comments to NPRM. frequency and by what means operators the rule, since the requirements of the
The Committee discussed some of the should report performance measures. law would have to be implemented in
proposed requirements for remediation The recommendation was to: the absence of regulatory action. RSPA/
of anomalies found during an Require operators to submit OPS informed the Committee that:
assessment, including whether repair performance measures electronically • Changes in the definition of HCAs
criteria for dents located on the bottom (instead of merely maintaining the focuses pipeline operator resources on
of the pipeline should be different from information) on a semi-annual areas of high consequence. Class 3 areas
those for top dents and whether the frequency. that are sparsely populated have been
presence of stress risers or metal loss RSPA revised § 192.945 to incorporate deleted.
should affect this decision. The this recommendation. • Confirmatory direct assessment
Committee voted that RSPA/OPS: The Committee discussed the (CDA) is allowed to perform
Modify the proposal to require proposed rule’s treatment of earlier assessments at the seven-year intervals
remediation of dents without stress integrity assessments to allow only specified in the Act. This method is not
risers in one year to allow treating assessments conducted after December among those listed in the law.
bottom-side dents as monitored 17, 1997, to be used as a baseline • The rule explicitly recognizes the
conditions if the operator runs the assessment. The TPSSC recommend that scientific conclusion that low-pressure
necessary tools to perform strain the rule: pipelines are more likely to leak than to
Allow, without a time limit, an rupture. Outside force damage is
calculations, meets B31.8 strain criteria,
assessment conducted prior to the rule therefore a relatively more important
and [ensures] that the dent involves no
as a baseline assessment as long as the threat for low-pressure pipelines. The
corrosion or stress riser.
prior assessment substantially meets the rule provides for assessments and
RSPA accepted this recommendation
requirements of the rule, and provide actions that emphasize damage
and revised § 192.933 to address
that the reassessment for such a protection, leak surveys, and electrical
remediation requirements.
segment not be required until December surveys to better address the relevant
A member of the Committee noted
17, 2009 to the extent allowed by law. integrity threats.
that the proposed waiver language did For the reasons discussed below in The direct safety benefits of the rule
not exactly track the language in the section 4 of Program Requirements, will be realized in reduced
statue. The Committee recommended RSPA/OPS is allowing as a baseline consequences of accidents, including
that RSPA/OPS: assessment any prior assessment deaths, serious injuries, and property
Revise the proposed waiver language conducted in accordance with the damage. RSPA/OPS has estimated the
to be consistent with the language in the requirements of the subpart on integrity value of this benefit at $800 million over
statute. management. RSPA/OPS has further 20 years. There are a number of other
RSPA/OPS revised the waiver revised the rule to specify that the potential benefits of the rule as
language in § 192.943 to track the reassessment on a covered segment for described to the TPSSC:
language in the statute. This is which a prior assessment is credited as • Improved ability to site new
discussed below in section 5 of a baseline be completed by December pipelines in certain high-volume
Comments to NPRM. 17, 2009. markets because of the improvements in
The TPSSC discussed how to cost- public confidence. RSPA/OPS informed
effectively protect against delayed Discussion on Cost-Benefit Analysis the Committee that this benefit is
failures from third-party damage and The TPSSC met via conference difficult to quantify, and would be
whether additional third-party damage telephone call on July 31, 2003, to qualitatively described in the final
prevention methods should be used discuss the draft cost-benefit analysis regulatory analysis.
instead of assessments for third-party prepared in support of the final rule. • Averting accidents with larger
damage. The Committee recommended RSPA/OPS presented a summary of the consequences than any experienced to
that RSPA/OPS: benefits and costs of the rule. Because date. The quantitative estimate of this
Use the language proposed by INGAA, of the integrity requirements in the safety benefit is based on the historical
in its April 17, 2003, letter (as modified Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of accident record. Population growth
by Committee comments) as the basis 2002 (49 U.S.C. 60109), this rule does along some transmission pipelines puts
for requiring additional preventive and not impose integrity management more people at risk and exposes the
mitigative measures to address third- requirements from a baseline condition pipelines to increased chances of third-
party damage. in which no such requirements exist. party damage. Therefore, it is possible
RSPA accepted this recommendation The law required pipeline companies to that accidents larger than any in the
and revised the third-party damage develop and follow integrity historical record could occur. This rule
requirements. management programs. This rule takes will act to significantly reduce the
The Committee discussed how to advantage of the implementation likelihood of such accidents, because it
clarify the requirements for an operator flexibility allowed in the law to focus is focused on precisely the high
to look beyond the HCA segment to integrity management efforts on the population areas in which they could
address segments outside the HCA that highest risk areas. occur. RSPA/OPS informed the
are likely to have similar integrity RSPA/OPS estimates that Committee that this benefit would be
concerns. After discussion the implementing the requirements in the analyzed further and quantified in the
Committee voted that the rule should: law, without any additional flexibility, final regulatory analysis.
Require that operators use the risk would cost approximately $11 billion • The final rule exceeds the
assessment process as described in over 20 years. Using the same basic requirements of the law in ways that
ASME B31.8S as the basis for deciding assumptions, implementing the will avert accidents. This includes the
when actions need to be taken for provisions of this rule is estimated to requirement that consensus standards
pipeline segments not in HCAs. cost $4.7 billion over 20 years, which is be used, and that a threat-by-threat
RSPA incorporated this $6.2 billion less than implementation of analysis be performed to ascertain
recommendation into the final rule. the law without a regulation. The $6.2 needed protections.
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• Avoiding the economic impact of Comments to NPRM Washington Utilities and Transportation
unexpected supply interruptions. The Commission.
We received over 700 comments from Three (3) advocacy groups: Citizens
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
90 different sources in response to the for Safe Pipelines, Cook Inlet Keeper,
(FERC) has estimated the impact of the
NPRM. Some commenters submitted and Washington State Citizens Advisory
2000 Carlsbad, New Mexico accident on
several comments, each comment Committee on Pipeline Safety.
California spot gas prices. RSPA/OPS
addressing a different topic in the Three (3) consensus standards
has used this estimate to calculate that
proposed rule. The commenters were as organizations: Gas Piping Technology
the increase in gas prices resulted in an
follows: Committee (GPTC), NACE International,
economic impact to California of
approximately $17.25 million per day. Seven (7) Trade associations with and Standards-Developing
members affected by this rulemaking: Organizations Coordinating Council
• The rule will provide a better American Gas Association (AGA), (SDOCC).
technical justification for increasing American Public Gas Association One (1) Federal agency: National
operating pressure in pipelines to (APGA), Association of Texas Intrastate Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
alleviate future supply crises. Natural Gas Pipelines, Energy One (1 ) city/county: Washington City
• The rule will provide a better Association of Pennsylvania, Interstate and County Pipeline Safety Consortium.
technical justification to support Natural Gas Association of America Two (2) consultant/contractors:
waivers from existing requirements that (INGAA), Inline Inspection Association Accufacts, and Oleska & Associates.
mandate replacement of pipeline when (IIA), and Northeast Gas Association Three (3) businesses: Advanced
population increases cause a change in (NEGA). Technology Corporation, Controlotron,
class location. Experience may lead to 50 U.S. pipeline operators: AGL and Kaempen Pipe Corporation.
future changes in the existing Resources, Air Products and Chemicals, One (1) private citizen: Carol M.
requirements. For now, estimation of Inc., Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Parker.
the value of this benefit will be based on Corporation, Atmos Energy Corp., General Comments
the use of waivers to eliminate pipe Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Most commenters supported the need
replacement after a class location ChevronTexaco, CMS Panhandle for integrity management program
change where there is adequate safety Eastern Pipe Line Company, CMS Sea requirements, and provided comments
justification. Robin Pipeline Company, CMS to the proposed rule that focused on
The TPSSC suggested that a reduction Trunkline Gas Company, Consolidated specific details and language. Most
in the time required to return pipelines Edison Company of New York, commenters asserted that the proposed
to service after accidents or regulatory Consumers Energy, Dominion Delivery, rule was too complicated and, to ensure
shutdowns is another benefit of the rule. Duke Energy Gas Transmission safety and ease of compliance, should
The premise is that implementation of Corporation, El Paso Pipeline Group, be simplified and clarified.
the rule will provide better information Enbridge Energy Company, Enron Some of the broader comments
about the pipeline. When pipelines are Transportation Services, Equitable Gas included one from a private citizen,
ordered shutdown, much of the time is Company and Equitrans LP, Houston Carol Parker, who asserted that the new
used to gather additional information Pipe Line Company, Intermountain Gas pipeline safety law was written to
about the pipeline’s integrity to support Company, Kansas Gas Service, Kern ensure ‘‘adequate protection against
a return to service. Implementation of River Gas Transmission Company, risks to life and property posed by
this rule will make more information Laclede Gas Company, Metropolitan pipeline transportation’’ and that RSPA
readily available and will lead to less Utilities District, MidAmerican Energy should use this new law as a guide to
shutdown time. We expect shutdown Company, National Fuel Gas Supply ensure adequate protection. Similarly,
times to be reduced by 50%. Corporation, New Jersey Natural Gas the Washington State Advisory
Company, Nicor Gas, NiSource Committee commented that the new
The TPSSC agreed that the cost Corporate Services, North Shore Gas
estimates presented by RSPA/OPS were rule should not sacrifice rule credibility
Company, Northern Natural Gas and enforceability for timeliness, and
reasonable. The committee commented Company, Oklahoma Natural Gas,
that it is reasonable to assume that the recommended that RSPA slow down the
ONEOK, Paiute Pipeline Company, process to ensure proper rule
benefits from implementing the law and PECO Energy, Peoples Gas Light and
the final rule would be similar, but that development. The NTSB stated that it
Coke Company, PG&E Corporation, generally supported the elements of the
they are also very uncertain. Piedmont Natural Gas, PSNC Energy, proposed rule including the baseline
The TPSSC commented that the Public Service Electric and Gas assessments, threat risk assessments,
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of Company, Puget Sound Energy, Questar determination of assessment methods,
2002 imposes restrictions on what can Regulated Services, Sempra Energy and remediation and reassessment
be done within this rule. The Committee Utilities, South Carolina Pipeline provisions. More specific comments are
concluded that RSPA/OPS had Corporation, Southwest Gas discussed under the applicable topic.
reasonably exercised the authority it Corporation, TXU Gas Company, We have organized the comments into
was afforded under the Act. The Vectren Utility Holdings, Inc. Williams the following twelve groups, and will
Committee also recommended that Gas Pipeline, Williston Basin Interstate summarize both the comments and our
provisions in the Act that impose the Pipeline Company, and Xcel Energy. responses on an individual basis.
most hardships—requirements to One (1) Canadian pipeline operator: 1. Need for Clarity and Specificity
perform assessments at seven-year TransCanada Pipelines Limited. 2. Applicability (Coverage) of the Rule
intervals and to perform reassessments Five (5) state agencies: Florida 3. High Consequence Areas
before baseline assessments—be 4. Program Requirements and
Department of Environmental Implementation, including Integrity
revisited in discussions with Congress. Protection, Iowa Utilities Board New Assessment Time Frames, Assessment
The TPSSC unanimously approved York State Department of Public Methods and Criteria
the draft cost-benefit analysis, subject to Service, State of Connecticut 5. Review, Notification and Enforcement
the comments noted above. Department of Public Utility Control, Processes
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6. Consensus Standard on Pipeline Integrity divisions in the final rule is very Southwest Gas that RSPA/OPS should
7. Low-Stress Pipelines limited. RSPA/OPS believes that the exclude plastic pipelines from the
8. Remedial Actions structure of the final rule makes it much integrity management regulation or, as
9. Additional Preventive and Mitigative easier to follow and understand, and an alternative, exclude these pipelines
Measures, including, Leak Detection
Devices and Automatic Shut-off and will better support compliance by from the assessment requirements
Remote Control Valves operators. because the assessment methods are not
10. Methods to Measure Program The rule has also been revised to applicable to plastic. In addition, the
Effectiveness improve its clarity and specificity. For handout noted that the proposed
11. Information for Local Officials and the example, we deleted terms such as additional preventive and mitigative
Public ‘‘state-of-the-art.’’ And we specify which measures for corrosion are not
12. Cost-Benefit Analysis ‘‘comprehensive additional preventive applicable to plastic pipe because it is
1. Need for Clarity and Specificity measures’’ an operator must implement. not subject to corrosion. The handout
We eliminated the section containing suggested that third-party excavation
Several commenters, including the the phrase ‘‘expected future corrosion damage is the primary threat to plastic
Public Service Electric and Gas conditions’’ in favor of referencing an pipe.
Company (PSE&G), maintained that the applicable consensus standard. At the Both Cook Inlet Keeper and the
formatting of the proposed rule makes it time we proposed the rule, relevant Washington Utilities and Transportation
difficult to follow, which could lead to industry consensus standards were Commission (WUTC) commended
a lower level of understanding and less under development. These standards OPS’s goal to promote safety throughout
compliance. PSE&G suggested that the have since been finalized and we have pipeline systems. They recommended
final rule be simplified and reformatted, incorporated them into the rule. that the proposed rule require that
with clearly numbered sections and an This rule uses, as did the lessons learned from assessments on
index. Piedmont Natural Gas corresponding rule for hazardous liquid pipeline segments in HCAs be applied
recommended the use of several pipelines, a mix of performance-based to all segments of pipeline and all
sections to present the regulations and prescriptive requirements. As operators. Although INGAA agreed with
because the proposed cross-references described in the final rule on integrity the concept of applying lessons learned
and formatting make the proposed rule management programs for hazardous to pipeline segments outside the scope
difficult to read and understand. liquid pipelines (65 FR 73832), RSPA/ of the proposal, it recommended
Some commenters, including Peoples OPS believes that performance-based modifying the requirement to clarify
Energy, suggested that we better define regulation will result in effective how data and information developed
terms that are subjective and possibly integrity management programs that are from covered segments will be applied
vague. Some of those terms included: sufficiently flexible to reflect pipeline- to non-covered segments. INGAA
state-of-the-art, comprehensive specific conditions and risks. Pipeline suggested an approach for applying this
additional preventive measures, conditions vary. It is impractical to concept using the framework of
expected future corrosion conditions, specify requirements that will address standard ASME/ANSI B31.8S. Several
critical stage, and additional extensive all circumstances. In some cases, they industry commenters agreed with
inspection and maintenance programs. would impose unnecessary burdens. In INGAA, but numerous commenters
Numerous other commenters, others, they might not achieve the asserted that expanding the
including Northeast Gas Association, desired level of safety. Including requirements of the rule to entire
Puget Sound Energy, and the Iowa performance-based requirements is the pipelines is inappropriate. NiSource
Utilities Board, suggested rewriting the best means to ensure that each pipeline contended that an expansion conflicts
rule as a separate subpart of part 192 in develops and implements effective with the intent of Congress to focus
a clearer, more simplified form. integrity management programs that resources on high risk areas. NiSource
Response: RSPA/OPS agrees that the address the risks of each pipeline also suggested that the final rule should
proposed rule was complicated and segment. incorporate ASME/ANSI B31.8S as it
often difficult to follow. There are a relates to collection, review, and
large number of interrelated 2. Applicability (Coverage) of the Rule— integration of data to update risk
requirements. Including all of those § 192.901 (Formerly § 192.763(a)(b)) assessments.
requirements under a single section of The proposed integrity management Response: The final rule prescribes
part 192, as was done in the proposed program requirements were intended to minimum requirements for integrity
rule, required use of many sub- apply to all gas transmission pipelines. management programs on any gas
paragraphs and divisions. RSPA/OPS Other gas pipelines were not included transmission pipeline subject to Part
has adopted the suggestion that the final in the scope of the proposed rule. 192. The requirements do not apply to
rule be rewritten as a separate subpart NTSB commented that gathering gas gathering or distribution pipelines.
of part 192. pipelines in populated areas should be Although some requirements are of
The final rule has been recast as new included. The New York State broad applicability, they apply mainly
Subpart O, Pipeline Integrity Department of Public Service to segments of gas transmission
Management, of part 192, in which we maintained that only those gathering pipelines in HCAs. RSPA/OPS agrees
have consolidated all of the pipelines in HCAs and operating above with Cook Inlet Keeper and WUTC that
requirements applicable to gas 20% of SMYS should be included. lessons learned in developing and
transmission pipeline integrity At the public meetings and advisory applying the integrity management
management programs. The definition committee meeting, participants noted program in HCAs should be applied to
of HCAs, previously § 192.761, has been that the NPRM and pipeline safety other portions of the pipeline. It would
relocated to the new subpart (with statute did not address plastic gas not be prudent to fail to address known
changes as described below). This transmission pipelines. At the advisory problems that could challenge the
revised structure allows each of the committee meeting, a representative of integrity of a pipeline simply because
major elements of the rule to be APGA prepared a handout on plastic they did not occur in HCA pipeline
described in a separate, numbered transmission pipelines. The handout segments. The rule requires that all
section. The use of subparagraphs and included recommendations from operators evaluate and remediate non-
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covered segments of their pipelines that A government/industry Plastic Pipe these areas are currently defined in the
have similar characteristics to covered Database Committee (PPDC) has been gas pipeline safety regulations. The
sections on which corrosion is found formed to develop and maintain a definition also included ‘‘identified
(§ 192.917(e)(5) and § 192.927(c)(3)(iii)). voluntary plastic pipe data collection sites’’ and a list of methods for
The rule further requires that operators process to support the analysis of the identifying them. These sites included
who qualify for the performance-based frequency and causes of in-service facilities with people who are confined,
option have a procedure for applying plastic pipe material failures. The PPDC of limited mobility or would be difficult
lessons learned from assessment of monitors failure experience to to evacuate, and outside areas and
covered pipe segments to pipe segments characterize any failure trends in older buildings where there is evidence that at
not covered. (§ 192.913(b)(1)(iv).) plastic pipe materials. Thorough least 20 or more people congregate on at
The rule does not require integrity analysis of data on plastic pipelines least 50 days in any 12-month period.
assessment, but it does require having similar fabrication, construction, In the NPRM for integrity
evaluation of risk associated with non- and operational characteristics will alert management program, RSPA/OPS
covered segments and appropriate operators of these pipelines to integrity proposed to add another area to the
actions to address those risks. Such a threats other than third-party damage. definition—a circle of Threshold Radius
requirement would divert resources 1,000 feet or larger that has a cluster of
3. High Consequence Areas—§ 192.903 20 or more buildings intended for
away from pipeline segments that pose (Formerly § 192.761)
the most risk (i.e., those located in human occupancy.
HCAs) to those which pose lesser risks. The definition of HCAs for gas In their petition for reconsideration of
ASME/ANSI B31.8S, the consensus transmission pipelines was set forth in the HCA definition, the petitioners
standard on Managing System Integrity a final rule on August 6, 2002. The argued that RSPA should clarify the
definition included Class 3 and 4 definition, particularly with regard to
of Gas Pipelines, provides a method by
locations, and ‘‘identified sites’’, i.e., ‘‘identified sites,’’ because the definition
which operators can perform these
buildings housing people who have is so broad and vague as to make
evaluations.
limited mobility or are difficult to compliance impractical. Comments at
Although it is necessary to apply evacuate and outside areas where there the post-NPRM public meetings also
lessons learned on covered segments to is sufficient evidence of people suggested that the definition needed to
non-covered segments of pipeline, it is congregating. The rule listed ways for an be clarified.
equally appropriate that knowledge operator to identify these sites, Many commenters noted the
gained in segments of pipeline that including visible marking, licensure or complexity of the proposed expanded
cannot affect HCAs be used in the registration by a Federal, State, or local definition and asked that it be
evaluation of covered segments. The agency, knowledge of public safety simplified. Baltimore Gas and Electric
rule requires this as part of an operator’s officials, or a list or map maintained by (BG&E) asserted that the number of
data gathering and integration activities or available from a Federal, State, or variables and data requirements related
(§ 192.917(b)). The operators must, at a local agency. to the definition make it unworkable.
minimum, evaluate the set of data The definition generated numerous BG&E explained that distribution
specified in ASME/ANSI B31.8S. comments. And, as discussed elsewhere system operators maintain data on
When RSPA/OPS proposed the in this document, industry trade population and buildings near their
integrity management program associations filed a petition for pipelines, but would have difficulty
requirements for gas transmission reconsideration of the definition. At the identifying facilities with persons who
pipelines, it had not considered plastic public meetings following the issuance are confined or of limited mobility and
transmission pipelines. The statute does of the integrity management NPRM, areas where people congregate. The
not allow an exemption for such meeting participants commented in company recommended that the
pipelines. However, based on the great detail about problems with the definition only reference verifiable
information developed after issuance of definition. At the TPSSC meeting, criteria in determining areas to be
the NPRM, we recognize that these members discussed the definition and covered under the integrity management
pipelines typically operate at very low issues raised in the petition for requirements. Northeast Gas Association
pressures and are not subject to reconsideration. requested clarification on whether the
corrosion. Internal inspection tools are Comments on the proposed definition proposed expanded definition only
not useful for evaluating the condition of HCAs for gas transmission pipelines applied to large diameter, high pressure
of these pipelines. Corrosion protection addressed the complexity of the pipe.
measures are not required because definition and difficulty in identifying Dominion supported the use of
plastic does not corrode. Therefore, in HCAs; additional areas to be included; current Class designations to define
the final rule we have recognized that the role of public officials in ‘‘identified HCAs because it believes smaller
these pipelines cannot be assessed by sites;’’ numbers of people congregating pipeline companies do not have access
the methods allowed for metallic in outside areas and in ‘‘identified site’’ to sophisticated geographic information
transmission pipelines. An operator of a buildings; C–FER model; Threshold systems (GIS). The State of New York
plastic transmission pipeline will have Radius; system considerations; and also supported the use of the current
to conduct, on a continual basis, a threat calculation of Moderate Risk Areas, Class designations, supplemented by the
analysis to evaluate the threats unique Potential Impact Circle (PIC), Potential use of the C–FER model to identify
to the integrity of plastic pipe. If the Impact Radius (PIR), and Potential HCAs outside of Class 3 and 4 areas.
analysis shows that the pipeline is Impact Zone (PIZ). The comments on INGAA argued that the proposed
susceptible to failure from a cause other each of these topics are discussed addition to the HCA definition added
than third-party damage, the operator below. complexity and additional practices that
must conduct a baseline assessment by would not improve pipeline safety.
a method demonstrated to characterize The Definition’s Complexity and INGAA proposed a bifurcated option,
the risks, and must apply additional Difficulty in Identifying HCAs which would allow the operator some
preventive and mitigative measures as The high consequence area definition flexibility in determining its cumulative
necessary. included Class 3 and 4 areas because HCA sites. Under this proposal, an
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operator could choose from two information for the large-diameter, high- Response: RSPA/OPS has not
approaches to determine HCAs. Both pressure pipelines for which Potential included these additional areas in the
approaches would require that an Impact Circle(s) will exceed 660 feet. final rule. We addressed comments such
operator identify potential HCAs for RSPA/OPS expects that many, as this in the rulemaking on high
certain ‘‘identified sites’’ located within perhaps most, operators will follow the consequences areas. Other than the
a Potential Impact Circle. In addition to Potential Impact Circle option for issues that had been raised in the
the ‘‘identified sites,’’ the operator defining HCAs. Under this approach, an petition for reconsideration, and the
would either identify the remaining operator would calculate the heat areas in the NPRM for integrity
HCAs by selecting all Class 3 and 4 affected zones along its pipeline that management program requirements we
areas or by determining all Potential would result from a pipeline rupture. proposed to add, or requested comment,
Impact Circles containing 20 or more An operator would determine the radius we did not open the final definition up
buildings intended for human of the Potential Impact Circle for the for changes. When we issued the final
occupancy. Potential Impact Circles pipeline, identify segments of pipeline rule defining these areas, we agreed that
would be based on the C–FER model. within a Potential Impact Radius of impacts to critical infrastructure could
When the size of the pipeline requires ‘‘identified sites,’’ and identify segments have detrimental impact but that such
that the radius is greater than 660 feet, of pipeline having 20 or more impacts would not likely include death
INGAA’s proposal would allow residences within a Potential Impact or serious injury. A major purpose of the
prorating the number of buildings in the Circle. Such segments would be HCAs, integrity management rule is to focus
circle based on an increased circle size. and the length of pipeline included in the highest level of operator attention on
INGAA’s proposed proration scheme the HCA would be the pipe within the those portions of its pipeline that can
would allow operators additional time HCA plus the length of pipe extending have the most severe safety
to collect the expanded population one Potential Impact Radius in both consequences, i.e., can cause death and
data—until as late as 2007. directions beyond the HCA. injury.
AGA supported this approach because For transmission pipelines operating However, to protect vital
it is simpler, allows operators to use at low pressures, like much of the infrastructure, the rule provides for
existing data from house count surveys, pipeline operated by distribution applying lessons learned through
and provides safety benefits to companies, the radius of the Potential integrity management to areas outside
unsheltered areas. At least 30 other Impact Circle calculated with the C–FER HCAs. The ASME/ANSI B31.8S process
commenters endorsed this alternative model will be small. For example, the provides that operators use their risk
approach. radius for a 6-inch diameter pipeline assessments to guide them in applying
Response: RSPA/OPS has adopted a operating at 150 psi would be 50 feet. these lessons. Proper risk assessments
bifurcated definition, as suggested by It is unlikely that 20 buildings intended will identify portions of pipeline that
INGAA. It gives an operator two options for human occupancy could be found in have a higher likelihood of failure.
to define HCAs. In both options circles of such small radius. It is also Similarly, as we explained when we
‘‘identified sites’’ are treated the same. less likely that ‘‘identified sites’’ will be finalized the definition of HCAs (67 FR
However, an operator will now be found within the circles as the radius 50824), we did not include
allowed to identify the HCAs associated decreases. As a result, using the environmentally sensitive areas in the
with high population density either by Potential Impact Circle option will tend definition. The impact of gas pipeline
including all Class 3 and 4 areas or by to exclude much low-pressure pipeline accidents on such areas is expected to
counting the residences within a from the assessment requirements of be significantly less than a similar
potential impact circle to determine this rule. Because accidents along these accident involving a hazardous liquid
whether the threshold number is pipelines in developed areas can affect pipeline because of the different nature
present. Changes made to the people and property, the rule requires of gas and hazardous liquids.
‘‘identified sites’’ definition are an operator of a low-stress pipeline in
described further below. We agree that these developed area to take additional Public Officials and Identified Sites
this approach is less complex, allows preventive and mitigative actions. For the ‘‘identified sites’’ component
flexibility to operators (particularly of the high consequence area definition,
Additional Areas
local distribution companies who may the definition listed various means by
wish to designate all Class 3 and 4 Several commenters suggested adding which an operator could identify these
areas), and better focuses on areas where other sites as HCAs. The Florida State areas. The list included a site being
people could be most affected by Clearinghouse, the Washington City and visibly marked, being licensed or
pipeline ruptures, fires, and explosions. County Safety Consortium, and the New registered by a Federal, State, or local
RSPA/OPS has decided to allow York State Department of Public Service agency, being known to public safety
operators to prorate the number of all asserted that certain critical officials or being on a list or map
buildings in Potential Impact Circles infrastructure facilities be included as maintained by or available from a
larger than 660 feet in radius for a HCAs. These included, but were not Federal, State, or local agency. In the
period of three years. We believe that limited to, interstate interchanges, preamble to the NPRM, RSPA/OPS
the recommended five-year period for bridges, tunnels, certain railway invited comment on whether we should
proration is too long, but acknowledge facilities, electric transmission use the term public safety officials and/
that collecting all of the additional data substations, drinking water plants, and or emergency response officials instead
in one year would be an unreasonable sewer facilities. They asserted that of public officials (68 FR 4278, 4295).
resource burden. Operators now have impacts to these types of facilities could In the petition for reconsideration of
data on the number of buildings located detrimentally impact a wide range of the high consequence area definition,
within 660 feet from their pipelines people. The Washington City and petitioners objected to relying on public
because they have needed this County Safety Consortium further safety officials for identifying these sites
information for identifying Class contended that environmentally because these officials might not be able
Location areas pursuant to § 192.5. The sensitive areas, particularly those to convey accurate information.
three-year period is adequate for critical to endangered species, should be PECO, PG&E, and Peoples Energy all
operators to gather additional included as well. concurred that the phrase ‘‘public safety
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