DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC) HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ANALYSIS 2017 - Sida

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)
                 HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ANALYSIS 2017
                                                                                         February 2017

Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its
humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the
beginning of the year as to ensure predictability for humanitarian organizations and to allow
for best possible operational planning. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles,
Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective indicators and parameters of which
the most important are related to the number of affected people, vulnerability of affected people
and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to forgotten crises
in order to ensure sufficient funding to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another
part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset
emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly
allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including additional funding
to DRC.

For 2017, DRC has been allocated an initial 130 million SEK in January 2017. Close monitoring
of the situation in DRC will continue throughout the year to determine whether additional funds
should be allocated.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW
Conflict
▪ Background/Underlying cause:
DRC has been ravaged by disasters, armed conflicts and insecurity since the influx of post-
genocide Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaïre in 1994. The continued armed violence is now
fueled by ethnic and land disputes, bad governance, under-development and competition for
mineral resources. The crisis is defined as a protracted and complex emergency, with acute
and repeated shocks occurring chronically and in multiple locations, often at the same time,
and affecting populations who are remarkable for their survival skills and solidarity. Massive
and repeated rights violations and forced displacements are the crisis’ main features. Food
insecurity, malnutrition, epidemics and effects of natural disasters are other inter-related
disasters and aggravating factors. They put additional stress on the population who lives under
the poverty threshold in its large majority, despite the country’s considerable natural resources.
Children are the most impacted (protection, access to food, health and education).

Humanitarian assistance and protection in 2017 targets 6.7 million persons in the first year of
the HRP 2017-2019 budgeted US$ 748 million, (US$ 115 per beneficiary); a 8% increase
compared to 2016; 3.36% of global requirements. Insecurity, kidnapping and poor access
conditions, as well as lack of capacities and resources, are serious constraints diminishing
humanitarian actors’ coverage of needs. It results in large populations being left unassisted or
assisted too late with incomplete relief packages, while the Government neglects its
responsibility to protect and to help them rebuild their lives.

▪ Main stakeholders in the conflicts:
Armed violence and conflicts are sustained in Eastern DRC by more than 70 armed groups of
various size and nuisance capacity. Extraction and trade of natural resources remain
significant conflict drivers. The DRC armed forces (FARDC), with the support of the
MONUSCO, are conducting several operations, with uneven outcomes, to attempt eradicating
some of them, in particular the FDLR, the ADF, the FRPI. Civilians are caught in between,
regularly harrassed by weapon-bearers.

Repeated stresses on communities, especially on their livelihoods, cause interethnic tensions,
most often resulting to forced displacement. Traditional land rights are challenged by confusing

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reforms allowing massive land grab by private individuals and companies dispossessing tribes
from ancestral land. The new administrative division from 11 to 26 provinces has already
triggered violence in some areas for the control over power, resources and markets.

▪ Cross border implications:
DRC is surrounded by countries which are generating i) refugee influx (Burundi and South
Sudan), ii) commuting refugee movements (CAR) and iii) protracted refugee presence
(Rwandans since 1994). These countries are likely to export their own instability to DRC. South
Sudan and Burundi are the most worrying cases, likely to send in the coming months large
refugee caseloads throughout an ill-prepared region / DRC. Although not receiving, compared
to other countries, the largest waves of refugees from Burundi (39,499) and from South Sudan
(71,529), DRC is however challenged in assisting them. The refugee caseload has increased
by 18% in DRC during 2016 and is expected to grow further.

DRC experiences presently a powerful influx of South Sudanese refugees, likely to increase
as counter-offensive operations will escalate at the next dry season (planning figure is 105,000
persons). UN describes armed violence along ethnic lines in South Sudan as “a genocide in
the making”. Alleged infiltration and recruitment of combatants among refugees are concerns.

The crisis in Burundi is deteriorating as well (by the end of 2017, UNHCR is expecting to have
50,000 Burundian refugees in DRC). The CAR refugee caseload has been slightly receding to
103,420 persons.

The Government estimates that 245,052 Rwandese refugees from 1994 influx are still in the
East, 70% born in DRC, less and less tolerated – like Congolese Hutus – by other tribes. There
are still 539,106 Congolese refugees in neighboring countries. The forced displacement and
the refugee feature of the sub-region are indicating a high level of human insecurity, generating
migration flows reaching as far as Europe. Humanitarian assistance followed by recovery and
development at their source may contribute to curb down this migration trend.

▪ Trends:
DRC crisis is characterized by the collective inability to prevent, reduce, address and redress
consistently the impacts of many crises happening at the same time and recurrently in many
different places throughout a territory that is 5.2 times larger than Sweden and for most of it
without proper infrastructures and access to energy. As long as the drivers of the crises are
active – inter alia the lack of rule of law and order and of good governance – there is no reason
to suppose that humanitarian needs will recede in DRC in 2017 and coming years. On the
contrary, vulnerabilities tend to increase. The humanitarian community is helpless for reversing
this trend, and it is not its primary role. The current political crisis may develop into an explosive
situation, as the stage is looking increasingly set for confrontation and the democratic space is
shrinking. Massive internal and external displacements would potentially shake DRC and
neighboring countries. UNHCR works on a “DRC + 9” regional plan.

Experts interpret the current dynamics of the armed conflicts as ethnic radicalization. The
developing conflict between the Pygmies and the Luba in Tanganyika province with over
500,000 newly displaced people, as well as the recurrent massacres in North Kivu (Beni) and
the growing antagonism of Nandes against Hutus, are examples of this.

An inserructional youth movement against President Kabila regime in the three Kasaï
provinces is confronting all State’s representations, while the army and the police are trying to
suppress it in vain with a heavy hand. Mass graves are found around Tschimbulu. Over
200,000 persons are displaced.

The collapse of demand and prices on international markets for Congolese natural resources
has curbed down the Government’s income and triggered an economic crisis fueling the

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population’s resentment towards its leaders. A 30% rate of inflation is making basic
commodities even more unaffordable for the majority.

The verified number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) grew 36% to 2.2 million persons in
2016 as a consequence of armed violence, especially in the Kivus, in Ituri, in Tanganyika and
now in the Kasaïs.

Chronic malnutrition affects 43% of under five year old children. One child out of 10 in DRC
does not reach the age of 5 as a result of neglect, diseases and malnutrition. Areas without
humanitarian presence are more vulnerable to malnutrition and food insecurity.

Cholera progressed from Maniema along the river Congo to Kinshasa, and is endemic in
several areas. Large vaccination campaigns for measles, polyomelitis and yellow fever are
rolled out. Malaria is diagnosed in 50% of all MSF’s consultations throughout DRC. DRC is
prone to hemorragic fevers.

Natural Disaster
▪ Nature of disasters:
Floods have affected Boma (Bas Congo) and Kinshasa province mainly during last rainy
season (Nov. to March). The response is delivered with some sort of support from the State or
not by local humanitarian actors, like DRC Red Cross and Caritas-Congo. The country is
exposed as well to landslides and earthquakes (Bukavu), to volcanic eruptions (Goma),
bushfires, pests and locusts. These risks are recurrent. Different pests are destroying crops,
like maize which production is expected to drop by 80% at next harvest, caused by catterpillars.

▪ Resilience and coping mechanisms:
Self reliance and solidarity within the community are the main source of relief and the most
common coping strategies when disasters strike. Women are the first responders and care-
givers, adding orphans and extended-family sibblings to the household. Vulnerabilities
increase when households sell their assets and workforce, crowd their neighbors’ house,
decide to move to urban settings or migrate. Negative coping strategies are separation,
criminality, enrolment in armed groups, survival sex, early marriage, child labour.

The Government has a virtual disaster plan, supported by UNDP and the Red Cross. Results
do not yet materialize from timid efforts to shift development aid towards disaster risk reduction
and recovery goals due to the lack of funding flexibility, strategic vision and leadership within
aid community in DRC.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population
Humanitarian needs related to armed conflicts and forced displacements are 60% located in
Eastern DRC. However, new areas are being affected by insecurity and conflicts generating
new humanitarian needs where the humanitarian presence and resources are so far absent or
insufficient. The Humanitarian Fund and the CERF have allocated emergency funding recently
to these new crises (Tanganyika and Kasaïs).

The humanitarian context in DRC is qualified ‘a crisis of protection’, with massive violations of
human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and forced displacements. Civilians
are intentionally and disproportionally targeted by armed actors, refugees may be recruited in
militias, schools occupied by soldiers, health centers looted, prisoners arbitrary executed or
tortured, civilians forced to slave labor, hostages taken and people detained arbitrary or
prevented to move freely, women and girls raped/sexually abused, war remnants left
unidentified in public areas, harvests and livelihoods destroyed, ex-combatants neglected in
miserable camps, etc. Partners’ vulnerability analysis identifies the specific risks that girls,
women and old people are exposed to. IDPs and refugees are mainly hosted in families and

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communities. Only 20% of them are in sites. Most of these sites are improvised and left
informal without civil administration. Host-communities are the first responders to IDPs’ needs.
The Government is more and more willing to regroup refugees in camps in order to control
them, while UNHCR wishes to shift from costly Care and Maintenance schemes to ‘Alternative
to Camps’ strategies empowering refugees’ self-reliance.

DRC’s 14th Food Security and Nutrition national survey (IPC) identified 5.9 million people
beyond emergency thresholds (in phase 4 (red) and 3 (orange)) due to 4 types of situation: a.
conflicts, b. floods/droughts/pests, c. influx/movements of populations, d. poor diet. It is a 9%
improvement compared to the previous cycle, well visible on IPC’s maps circulated by WFP
and the FAO.

Unicef warns that Global Acute Malnutrition continues to affect 4.2 million children and Severe
Acute Malnutrition 2 million over the whole country. Maps of epidemics follow the rivers,
borders and large cities.

1.2 Critical assumptions, risks and threats
DRC stands between Syria and Iraq on INFORM’s risk assessment scale, scoring 7/10.
As same causes often result to same effects, a continuation of the humanitarian crisis is
expected. Humanitarians are only mandated, skilled and resourced for working on its most
acute symptoms, not its root-causes. Those require political will, expertise for conflict
resolution and longer-term recovery strategies. The potential for further unrest due to the
electoral political crisis is concerning. Security forces are relocated to large cities were
demonstrations are expected, leaving fragile areas or areas in conflicts without the required
capacities for security.

The ongoing political crisis already develops in wide-scale violence and unrest in different parts
of the country. This may spreads further to the point that the delayed electoral process
becomes stalled.

By December 2017, all Rwandese in DRC will lose their refugee status (cessation clause). It
is unlikely that the estimated 245,000 refugees present in DRC are repatriated to Rwanda by
next December. DRC is not in favor neither of offering them local integration as a durable
solution, (while Congolese “Rwandophones”, often IDPs, are barely tolerated). This is a
concerning cause of further escalation of armed conflicts.

The weak health system and failed immunization programmes are risks for continued and new
epidemics.

South Sudan and Burundi will generate additional refugee influx, while resources are over-
stretched.

Major donors, like USAid and ECHO, are likely to face a significant decrease of their
contributions.
The Government asserts its sovereignty and tends to restrict access and administrative
facilities to humanitarian actors who are also losing communities’ acceptance. Kidnappings
are threatening access.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Humanitarian Response Plan
For the first time, the humanitarian community elaborated a multi-year response strategy for
DRC (HRP 2017-2019). Hopefully, this will enable the humanitarian system to explore
solutions that only a longer activity timeline allows. The strategy is built on the present
humanitarian needs overview (HNO) for the response planned in 2017 and on the projection
of predictable developments in 2018 and 2019, based on observed crisis patterns and

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demographic data, to be updated in future HNOs and financial requirement budgets. It should
include the reinforcement of emergency response systems so that acute crises situations are
addressed timely. It should advocate towards other actors to address transition situations
beyond the reach of humanitarian action. It is expected, in the spirit of the “Grand Bargain for
Efficiency” that donors provide partners with three year funding and that aid shifts from
development to reducing needs and vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, the HRP could not be
connected to the UNDAF, as was the initial ambition, due to the current political tensions
delaying that planning cycle.

Donors demanded a specific objective for the quality of the assistance in accordance to
standards (Sphere), humanitarian norms (CHS) and principles (IHL), gender and protection
mainstreaming, including accountability to affected populations and their participation in the
design/implementation of interventions.

A 10 year review of humanitarian action and a review of the humanitarian architecture in DRC
that are both underway will motivate necessary adjustments to the strategy and the system.
The narrative is shifting from ‘chronic and protracted crisis’ to ‘successive acute crises with
severe protection violations’. It better depicts the reality of this “L2 crisis” and will hopefully
contribute to refocus lost attention and resources that humanitarian needs DRC desserve.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES
2.1 National and local capacities and constraints
▪ Government:
DRC Government has materialized insufficient efforts to reduce and prevent chronic risks and
vulnerabilities. The absence of state authority, bad governance, lack of safety nets, lack of
access to functioning social services, to energy, to credit and to markets, and dilapidated
infrastructures increase the population’s vulnerability and level of exposure to recurrent
shocks. It aggravates the magnitude of disaster affecting DRC. Since 1992, the country has
been unable to break this cycle and has needed international assistance. The Government’s
coordination role is undermined by shifting political priorities and agendas. Humanitarian actors
often substitute local authorities’ responsibility. They cannot sustain their inputs to the extent
that durable solutions are found and consolidated. It leaves the work unfinished, and often to
be repeated soon after, to the point that the relevance of humanitarian strategies can be
questioned. The Government is tolerating humanitarian action which alleviates sufferings it
cannot or does want to address itself. However, the Government committed to link relief and
development, support durable solutions and mainstream gender at the WHS.

Despite efforts from OCHA and the INGO Forum, administrative bottle-necks are delaying and
putting unnecessary costs on humanitarian actors’ operational budgets. Obtaining visas is
challenging.

▪ Civil Society:
DRC counts thousands of associations and local NGOs, as the absence of the State invites to
step in and initiate some sort of local solutions to missing social protection. The quality is
uneven. Several ones have become efficient humanitarian partners, fostered by DRC’s
Humanitarian Fund and preferred by UNHCR as service providers to refugees. Churches, and
to a much lesser extent the national Red Cross society, are first responders, and often the only
source of relief and recovery for victims of conflicts and disasters. It is generally observed that
their survival and recovery rely in fact primarily on the capacities of resilient host- and affected
communities themselves. It deepens the general status of poverty.

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2.2 International operational capacities and constraints
▪ Leadership and Coordination:
The humanitarian coordination is influenced by the context of an integrated UN peacekeeping
mission mandated for combat. The Humanitarian Coordinator is often drawn to other duties.
OCHA plays its central role of coordination. It is challenged by the recent budget cuts, although
it needs to keep capacities in multiple locations. Provincial inter-agency fora are the main
coordination set-up in the field, in loose liaison with Governorates. Eight clusters are still active
since 2006 reform, while the under-resourced Early Recovery cluster was mainstreamed in
other clusters a few years ago. Co-facilitation of clusters by NGOs lacks resources. Some
clusters are challenged by lack of capacities or leadership (Health, Nutrition) or resources
(Education) or conflicting mandates (UNHCR-led Protection). UNHCR maintains a parallel
multisectoral coordination set up for refugee assistance. Protection and assistance to IDPs,
supposedly under the responsibility of authorities, is not coherently prioritized by the
humanitarian system.

▪ Humanitarian Agencies:
Although experienced and robust, the humanitarian system does not cope with so many crises
and operational challenges. Its inability to break at last the cycle of disaster creates frustration
and loss of acceptance. The humanitarian community is not deployed along a need-based
analysis, but where resource mobilization and access are less challenging. One observes a
concentration of capacities and resources in North Kivu (cumulating high administrative costs)
with duplication risks. Elsewhere, the limited presence is leaving major sectoral and
geographical gaps. Too many actors, confident in the support of their back-donors, overlook
to refer or to connect to the HRP, even to participate to coordination.

The “epidemic” of kidnappings which became a lucrative industry for armed groups and gangs,
is diminishing access and coverage. Several partners of Sida, although with robust security
routines, have had local and international staff abducted in 2016 (ICRC, NRC, Oxfam,
Solidarités, IRC, MSF, Save the Children, WorldVision …). As long as some abductees’
families are paying the ransoms, despite organizations are advising not to, kidnappers are
incited to go on.

The humanitarian community, through UNHCR-UNDP and ProCap, is challenging the
Government and stabilization / transition / development actors to identify and address the root-
causes of displacements and protracted situations, so that durable solutions are actively
sought and supported when possible through existing and new programmes. The International
Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) and the World Bank’s recovery
programme should adopt and resource the proposed durable solutions strategy.

The Protection cluster, UNHCR, the ICRC, MONUSCO and the Joint UN Office for Human
Rights are each monitoring human rights and IHL violations, in quite un-coordinated
approaches, as they have different mandates and operational modes and do not manage to
capture more than a fraction of what is happening; follow up and mitigation do not match needs.

Human Rights Watch and Global Witness, as well as the former Head of the Joint UN Office
for Human Rights, have been expelled from the country by the authorities, because their
denunciation was pinpointing severe patterns of abuses, in around 60% of cases perpetrated
by state actors themselves. Several top military and police leaders are under international
sanctions for human rights abuses.

▪ Implementing partners:
There are over 208 operational humanitarian organizations in DRC. The Humanitarian Fund
has a roster of 170 eligible partners, screened for their capacities and for their efficiency
records. The UNHCR prefers implementing its assistance to refugees through low-cost service
providers which it selects among local, national and regional organizations.

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2.3 International and Regional assistance
▪ Donors:
The HRPs 2015 and 2016 were both 65% financed, a fair performance.

The Humanitarian Fund recedes from 22% of the funding provided to the Humanitarian Action
Plan in 2009 to 6.5% in 2015, with 6 donors left out of 11 initial ones, UK and Sweden providing
71% of the funding, with both a seat in the advisory board. It managed 137 projects in 2016
and addresses all major new or deteriorating emergencies. The CERF is mobilized regularly
as well: US$ 12.6 million in 2016, US$ 14.8 in 2015. The same 7 larger donors are providing
partners with 90% of the humanitarian funding in DRC – Sweden ranking 5th – USAid, ECHO,
DfID, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Canada, Belgium. These donors commit evenly their support
to humanitarian action through years and met their own limits. The first two are prioritizing
emergency response and count for 50% of all contributions. Their new aid policies of US and
UK will impact severely future funding status of humanitarian action in DRC. Sweden is the
most vocal advocate for stronger linkages between humanitarian and development actors. The
GHD’s chairmanship (France and UK) was renewed in January with ECHO and the
Humanitarian Fund.

The regional HIPs of ECHO 2016 and 2017 show a sharp decline from 60M€ to 32 M€. USAid
plans 2017 with US$ 160 million, as in 2016 so far. Donors do not all demand their partners to
adhere to the HRP. The Netherlands declares its fatigue to fund humanitarian action in DRC
and will stop its support in 2017, unless it is directly linked to mitigating the migration/refugee
crisis affecting Europe.

▪ Regional Organizations:
The African Union facilitated a controversial and non-inclusive dialogue among political actors
with the aim to prevent electoral violence and to maintain the President in power despite the
Constitution. It is uncertain whether this term extension and open-end delay of the elections
will spare DRC from the predicted chaos.

3. SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN
3.1. The role of Sida
The embassy attends regularly the following fora: humanitarian country team, humanitarian
advocacy group, inter-cluster coordination, good humanitarian donorship coordination,
advisory board and allocation review committee meetings of the Humanitarian Fund, board
meetings of UNHAS, the gender humanitarian working group, the SGBV protection working
group, and the working groups for IDPs. The embassy participates to joint field visits as much
as they occur. The ambition is to have a field visit with each funded-partner at least once a
year and to diversify the field visit destinations on a need-basis. Given the context of violence
and gender inequities, the dialogue of the embassy prioritizes the Swedish feminist foreign
policy and its current global chairmanship for the Call to Action on Protection from Gender-
based Violence in Emergencies. The main agenda points for dialogue prioritized by Sweden
in DRC are i) the mainsteaming of protection and gender in humanitarian action, in compliance
with existing norms, ii) the reduction of chronic vulnerabilities, risks and humanitarian needs
through stronger links between relief, recovery and development, the efficiency of the
humanitarian system, and iv) the mainstreaming of environmental issues in humanitarian
action.

▪ Earlier assistance and results:
Sida has had a similar humanitarian portfolio in nature and volume for almost a decade. It
typically reserves around 30% of its resources to the Humanitarian Fund which Sweden has
created with the UK in 2006. In 2016, the total humanitarian funding to Sida’s partners amounts
to 207.3 MSEK, topped up by the development cooperation country allocation with 39.2 MSEK

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in support to the Humanitarian Fund’s resilience-oriented standard allocations. The Swedish
MFA provided 15 MSEK to OCHA’s office as well. This brings the total support of Sweden to
humanitarian partners in DRC in 2016 to 261.5 MSEK.

In terms of results met with Sweden’s resources, OCHA delivered response and contingency
plans, facilitated coordination among scores of partners and advocated as it should for arising
needs. UNHAS has transported 13,599 passengers, half of them humanitarians. The
Humanitarian Fund reached out 1.95 million beneficiaries in 2015 through 84 projects,
including 30 targeting community-resilience to shocks. The ICRC reported assistance to over
one million beneficiaries. UNHCR covers directly the needs of around 190,000 refugees from
CAR, Burundi and South Sudan. Unicef’s RRMP conducted 197 multisectoral assessments
and reached out 392,131 beneficiaries through 84 interventions in WASH, NFI/Shelter, Health
or Education. ACF saved 2,397 under 5 year old children from severe acute malnutrition.
Oxfam supported 16 communities in highly volatile environments to develop and implement
their own protection plans and facilitated the national coordination of 80 INGOs. NRC provided
emergency education, food security and legal counselling services to at least 5,217 persons
and could provide specific sex and age disaggregated data for all its beneficiaries in each
sector. The Swedish Red Cross supported DRC RC’s social mobilization for polio and yellow
fever vaccination campaigns and ICRC’s first aid in conflicts new integrated project. MSF
publishes a weekly national epidemiologic surveillance bulletin and reported 1,593,760
consultations and 116,299 hospitalizations, 499,400 malaria cases treated, 2,788 SGBV cases
treated, 41,288 deliveries and 16,535 surgical operations. Save the Children reached out 7,038
children for their protection, education and health needs.

▪    Lessons learnt:
     ▪ Synergies with longer-term development assistance:
Most crises in DRC are preventable and would be avoided if the State and its partners could
ensure security, access, better governance and functioning/performing public services and
commodities. However vulnerabilities tend to increase, year after year, as communities’ coping
mechanisms and resilience although very enduring become over-stretched. Humanitarian
action is neither supposed nor equipped for providing affected communities with durable
solutions that are addressing the underlying causes of chronic crises. At the end of the
response cycle, recovering communities are deserted, as, sadly, no development process
takes over in continuity to the relief phase. They often relapse after a while into the same
exposure to risks. Mobilizing resources beyond humanitarian donors for addressing drivers
and root-causes of crises is challenging. Although reducing acute vulnerabilities is an evident
prerequisite to any development process, it is not yet prioritized strategically and resourced.
The absence of the State or its divisive / confusing roll in fora where these priorities are dealt
with discourages the partners’ sustained engagement. Development donors are lacking
efficient coordination and are risk averse in conflict areas. It hampers their evidence-based
strategic planning. Despite a consensus on the need to link humanitarian action, stabilization
and development aid, by sharing analysis, synchronizing programmes and finding flexible and
creative financing solutions, there is just but too little progress so far.

3.2. Response Priorities 2017
▪ Humanitarian Focus:
Firstly, the Embassy/Sida’s intention is to sustain in 2017 its active dialogue and advocacy in
different fora in DRC (see detailed agenda points in § 3.1.). Secondly, Sweden will strive to
remain an inspiring model of a Good Humanitarian Donor for its networking and participation
in coordination processes, its volume of multiannual funding, its predictability and flexibility
towards partners, its active follow up and monitoring of partners’ performances and results, its
informed and evidence-based analysis for decision-making, and by continuing empowering
innovative initiatives (environment, cash). Starting with a tentative allocation of 130 MSEK in
humanitarian funding as an initial country appropriation for 2017, it is likely to be extended

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through strategic partners’ upcoming Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) applications for
emergency response and further contributions resulting from Sida’s Mid-Year Review and End
of the Year Allocation, matching hopefully 2016 outcomes. Thirdly, the Embassy/Sida will
elaborate its Resilience Analysis and Plan during the first quarter of 2017, as requested by the
Africa department. An independent consultation will draw conclusions on the relevance of
continuing or not supporting the Humanitarian Fund with Sida’s development cooperation
resources in 2017-2018 in view of stimulating communities’ resilience through the Fund’s
standard allocations. Sida will assess ACF’s development application for addressing the root-
causes of malnutrition in a location where Swedish humanitarian funding has supported ACF’s
emergency response for the last three years. Sida’s main humanitarian focus in DRC in 2017
should target life-saving interventions and prioritize protection, set benchmarks for improving
the quality of the assistance in line with the Core Humanitarian Standards and reinforce
emergency response systems’ efficiency with a three year perspective. At the same time, it will
explore how to mend further its own humanitarian and development aid together so that
humanitarian interventions can be phased out as early as possible.
3.3. Partners
The current portfolio is prioritizing protection to a great extent (ICRC, UNHCR, Save the
Children, NRC, Oxfam) and emergency assistance (Humanitarian Fund, Unicef’s RRMP, ACF
and MSF), but as well support functions (OCHA, UNHAS) for coordination and air services.

Sida’s partners are kept few, exclusively selected among Sida’s framework partners, so that
they can be followed up at field and HQ level. The ambition is to support partners in the sectors
and the locations where their expertise matches with needs and adds value.

MSF will refuse in 2017 Sida’s funding in opposition to Sweden’s and EU’s migration policies.

As a start, the Humanitarian Fund should receive at least 40% (50 MSEK) of the Swedish
humanitarian country allocation: a timid step towards the ambitious commitments at the WHS
(promising 15% funding to the HRPs through the Humanitarian Funds). The Humanitarian
Fund is considered strategic based on the following: i) predictable emergency response
capacity, ii) evidence-based coverage of prioritized needs, iii) support to core strategic
objectives of the HRP including its ambition to stimulate resilience of chronically affected
communities, iv) mainstreaming of humanitarian norms in the response (Sphere, CHS, IHL),
vi) large reach out of eligible organizations (170), including many national and local NGOs that
have no partnership agreements with Sweden.

Sida’s partners with RRM prepositioned funding that are present in DRC are the following:
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Oxfam-
International, Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Save the Children (SC), Swedish Red Cross (SRC),
Diakonia and PMU (through SMR). OCHA, WFP, Unicef and UNHCR have stand-by
agreements with MSB for secondments and technical assistance.

It is proposed that 3 year funding commitments are done by Sida to the following strategic
partners that are almost guaranteed to be supported for the coming years based on predictable
needs and due to the value these actors are adding to the humanitarian system and its
response in their respective mandates and sectors: DRC Humanitarian Fund, ICRC, UNHCR,
OCHA, UNICEF and UNHAS. The same should avail for our INGO partners depending on their
respective agreement cycle with Sida.

Covering rapidly IDPs’ protection and essential needs is a priority. Supporting both UNICEF
and IOM in developing and sustaining this essential emergency response system, by
integrating cash transfers schemes to it, would be strategic. DfID is on the same line.

Oxfam and NRC are adding value for protection and resilience. ACF’s Programme Urgence
Nutrition Congo (PUNC) should be supported to address severe acute malnutrition. Save the

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Children is one of the few actors prioritizing education to refugees and IDPs. The Swedish Red
Cross should be supported for the ICRC First Aid in Conflict integrated programme.

Sida should explore how to encourage stronger synergies between all its partners’
interventions.

3.4 Strategic Funding in protracted crises
Funding from Swedish development cooperation for DRC is provided to the Humanitarian Fund
in support to the Fund’s standard allocations for early recovery and community-resilience, to
Unicef towards internal displacement returnees (PEAR+), to WFP and FAO in areas with high
risks of intercommunity violence (“Strengthening Smallholder Farmers’ Value Chains”, P4P)
and to ACF for addressing root-causes of malnutrition in Kasaï Central. This enables an orderly
phasing out of humanitarian action.

The development cooperation strategy of Sweden for DRC 2015-2019 (1,250 MSEK) provides
significant linkage opportunities with humanitarian action and substantial resources in the
strategic areas of 1. Democracy, Human Rights, Justice, Gender, Civil Society; 2. Productive
Employment for Youth and Women; 3. Maternal and Child Health, Reproductive Health and
Rights; and 4. Peace and Security.

Swedish humanitarian funding is dedicated to emergency response, but our partners are
encouraged to deliver outputs with durable effects and to adopt participative and inclusive
response strategies. In 2017, the embassy will look closer how to increase bridging Sida’s
humanitarian interventions with Sida’s development resources in order to enable a responsible
phasing out of humanitarian action.

                     Sida’s humanitarian assistance to DRC in 2017
                                     Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated
 Recommended partner                 or multi sectorial programming ),                     Proposed amount
 for Sida support                    financing modality (e.g. inkind or                    (MSEK)
                                     cash-based)
 CHF*                                Multisectoral & coordination                                                  50
 ICRC                                Protection of civilians                                                       15
 UNHCR                               Multisectoral assistance to refugees                                          10
 OCHA**                              Coordination                                                                   7
 Action Contre la Faim               Nutrition                                                                      9
 Save the Children                   Education, child protection                                                    7
 Oxfam                               Protection, coordination                                                       6
 Norwegian Refugee
                                     Protection, education, food security                                          11
 Council
 Swedish Red Cross                   DRR, first aid in conflicts                                                    5
 IOM                                 Pretection of IDPs                                                            10

                                                                                           TOTAL: 130 MSEK

*Supported as well by Sida’s development cooperation country allocation 2015-2016 with 63.7 MSEK (39.2 MSEK in 2016) for
stimulating community-resilience, potentially renewed in 2017-2018 (with 40 MSEK).
**Supported as well by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with 15 MSEK.

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