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CRU Policy Brief
JUNE 2020
Decentralisation amidst
hybrid governance
The case of northern Mali
Anna Schmauder
The Malian peace agreement of 2015, known as the Algiers Agreement, aimed to
improve relations between select representatives of northern Mali and central state
authorities through decentralisation. Yet, in contrast to ongoing counterterrorism
efforts, governance reform through the decentralisation process has received
little attention from either the Malian government or its international partners.
As a consequence, effective decentralisation in northern regions remains limited
at this point in time.
This policy brief contributes to the debate on decentralisation in Mali by illustrating
how decentralisation in northern Mali has become an issue of contestation
between central state authorities and armed signatories. Decentralisation remains
captured in a logic of territorial control, in which the representation of armed
signatories takes precedence before the needs and interests of marginalised tribes
and communities in northern regions. Central state authorities and signatories
have been reinforcing this logic of representation, each trying to hamper the
influence of the other over territorial control in northern regions.
1 Introduction
The Malian peace agreement of 2015, Since the 1990s rebellion, decentralisation
known as the Algiers Agreement, aimed has become a reflexive co-optation strategy
to improve relations between select in response to repeated northern uprisings.2
representatives of northern Mali and central In practice, however, efforts to decentralise
state authorities through decentralisation.1 governance quickly lost momentum once the
Yet, in contrast to ongoing counterterrorism military threat of northern Tuareg-led armed
efforts, governance reform through the groups subsided. As a consequence, effective
decentralisation process has received little decentralisation in northern regions remains
attention from either the Malian government limited at this point in time. Since 2015,
or its international partners. armed signatories to the Algiers Agreement
1 2015 Algiers Agreement, Article 6 calls for 2 Seely, J. 2001. ‘A political analysis of decentralisation:
enhanced representation of populations in coopting the Tuareg threat in Mali’. The Journal of
the national assembly. Modern African Studies, 39:3, p. 499-524.CRU Policy Brief
– specifically the former rebel coalition For historically subordinated groups,
CMA3 – have pushed for the decentralisation this provided an opportunity to contest
of governance. Yet, implementation of new societal hierarchies.6 Decentralisation
decentralised regions following the peace thereby became both a tool for increased
agreement has been slow. This is because representation of the north and a tool to
the Malian government has diverging challenge the hierarchical order of northern
priorities – pushing for the return of state societies.7
security forces and DDR4 in northern
territories instead.5 To this day, division lines of local politics
run along autochthonous (first-arrivers) and
This policy brief contributes to the debate allochthonous (late-arrivers) members of a
on decentralisation in Mali by illustrating community.8 Whereas village and fraction
how decentralisation in northern Mali chiefs are customarily representatives
has become an issue of contestation of the families of first-arrivers, so-called
between central state authorities and late-arrivers to a particular area have
armed signatories. It outlines the extent to had to fit into confined power structures.
which decentralisation in the north of the Local hierarchies are further structured
country has reproduced existing governance around historically defined categories
problems, in which the interests of both of ‘nobles’, ‘vassals’ and ‘slaves’.9 When
signatory armed groups and customary decentralisation formally concentrated
elites take precedence over those of financial power in the hands of the mayor,
marginalised communities. Since the 2012 the creation of electoral offices at municipal
crisis, governance in northern Mali has been level provided a channel for challenging the
determined more by a logic of territorial socio-economic and socio-political authority
control than by decentralised structures. of these customary elites.10 In this sense,
In that sense, armed actors define the scope the electoral competition introduced through
of administrative governance. decentralisation is intertwined with both
inter- and intra-community contestation,
as members of historically subordinated
2 Democratising fractions could formally compete for office
representation? with members of historically dominant
fractions.
Recurring uprisings in northern Mali
were centred around demands for both
increased electoral representation and
more autonomous territorial governance.
Since the 1990s, decentralisation has
6 Pezard, S. and Shurkin, M. 2015. Achieving Peace
been considered the necessary response
in Northern Mali: Past agreements, local conflicts,
to these demands – in the creation of and the prospects for a durable settlement. Santa
new territorial units and new electoral Monica, California, RAND Corporation. p. 32.
positions. Starting with the first municipal 7 Hagberg et al. 2019. ‘Intervention local, élites
elections in 1999, governance in Mali politiques et décentralisation de l’état au Mali’.
formally shifted from centrally appointed 8 Hetland, Ø. 2007. ‘The politics of decentralisation in
state representatives to locally elected Mali: the prospects for local democracy’, Forum for
civil authorities. Development Studies, 34:1, p. 142.
9 Molenaar, F., Tossel, J., Schmauder, A., Idrissa, A.
and Lyammouri, R., August 2019, The Status Quo
Defied: The legitimacy of traditional authorities in
areas of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya,
3 Coalition for Azawad Movements. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
4 Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration. 10 Lecocq, B. 2003. ‘This country is your country:
5 The Carter Center April 2020. Rapport de territory, borders and decentralisation in Tuareg
l’Observateur independent Observations sur la mise politics’. Itinerario-international journal on the history
en œuvre de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation of european expansion and global interaction, 27:1,
au Mali, issu du processus d’Alger. p. 60.
2CRU Policy Brief
As electoral office promised not only public most powerful.15 At both local level as mayors
authority but also access to state resources, and district level as members of parliament,
electoral contestation introduced through they have in many instances successfully
decentralisation effectively fuelled tensions in cemented their influence.16
tribal hierarchies, as customary elites at the
highest echelons of traditional authority were This logic of elite capture is best illustrated
challenged. Rather than institutionalising in the region of Ménaka, where the position
channels of contestation between the of member of parliament was consecutively
central state and northern peripheries, in the hands of customary elites. Oullimiden
decentralisation has instead increased local amenokal Bajan Ag Hamatou is an example
and regional contestation. of this dynamic, holding the position of both
member of parliament and customary leader
Yet the ability to capture elected office of Ménaka for more than two decades.
is closely linked to both financial status This combination of hereditary and electoral
and control of resources. This logic also capital facilitated the continuation of tribe-
holds in central Mali, where subordinated based representation in which customary
groups have a similarly poor chance of leaders are elected based on the hereditary
being elected.11 Electoral mobilisation position they hold within the most numerous
requires both social and economic capital.12 tribal communities.17
The prevailing logic of decentralisation is
more one of particular interests based on This dynamic illustrates how decentralisation
the logic of kinship and tribal fractions, than processes are ill-equipped to deal with
of representation of community interests.13 situations of hybrid governance in which
The institutional position of member of non-state actors play key governance roles.
parliament reproduces the political and As a result, customary actors are able to
social inequalities that exist among tribal capture newly created electoral positions to
fractions. maintain and stabilise their existing positions
of power.
As a consequence, customary elites14 have
skilfully been able to capture electoral office
across the territory, where their fractions are
11 Jourde, C., Brossier, M. and Cissé, MG. 2019.
‘Predation and violence in Mali: Fulani statutory
elites and logic of domination in the Mopti region’.
Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue and economic power that comes with the title.
canadienne des études africaines, 53:3, p. 431-445. Lecocq, B. 2003. ‘This country is your country:
12 Vliet, M. 2014. ‘Weak legislatures, failing MPs, and territory, borders and decentralisation in Tuareg
the collapse of democracy in Mali’. African Affairs, politics’. Itinerario-international journal on the history
113, p. 45-66. NIMD 2019. Etude Nationale sur le of european expansion and global interaction, 27:1,
coût financier des campagnes electorales et des p. 60.
mandats electifs au Mali. 15 De Bruijn, M. and Pelckmans, L. 2005. ‘Facing
13 Vliet, M. 2014, op. cit. dilemmas: training Fulbe slaves in modern Mali’.
14 As administrators of territory since pre-colonial Canadian Journal of African Studies / La Revue
times, customary elites have remained powerful canadienne des études africaines, 39:1, p. 69-95.
in the face of absent state capacity, especially 16 Nonetheless, the 2013 deputy elections in the
in northern Mali. Customary governance actors district of Kidal can be considered proof that this
play key roles in local conflict resolution and power also has its limits.
land management. See Molenaar, F. et. al. 2019. 17 Similarly in Mopti, the electoral arena has
The Status Quo Defied: The legitimacy of traditional consolidated the status of dominant Fulani elites.
authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, See Jourde, C., Brossier, M. and Cissé, M.G. 2019.
Niger and Libya, The Hague: Clingendael Institute. ‘Predation and violence in Mali: Fulani statutory
p. 96. The title of the highest echelon of customary elites and logic of domination in the Mopti region’.
authority – amenokal – signifies him as ‘owner Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue
of the land’, highlighting the combined political canadienne des études africaines, 53:3, p. 431-445.
3CRU Policy Brief
3 Decentralisation and Central state authorities lacking willingness
redistricting to engage with these issues have left
the decentralisation process stalled,
even in areas where it has already
Next to the logic of territorial representation, been implemented. In January 2016,
an essential part of Malian decentralisation decentralisation increased the number of
lies in the re-ordering of territory into newly regions in Mali to ten, transforming the
defined boundaries – called ‘redistricting’. previous northern districts of Ménaka and
In northern Mali, this essentially means Taoudéni into distinct regions and thereby
transforming existing districts into increasing the number of elected positions
regions and the consequent changing of for northern communities.19 Four years
municipalities into districts. This territorial after its implementation, operationalisation
aspect of decentralisation is further fuelling of these new regions had not yet been
tensions – with regard to potential access completed on all administrative levels, and
to central state resources in Bamako, and decentralisation in northern Mali is therefore
to existing resources and infrastructure in a effectively lacking a proper foundation.
given territory. As a result, central state authorities did not
take the new regions into account in the
The 2019 regional consultation processes legislative elections of March and April 2020.
on decentralisation in Mali’s northern
regions has illustrated this pattern. As voting This move has been interpreted by some
for members of parliament takes place at as a disregard of existing decentralisation.
district level, the greater the number of As one interviewee argued, the decision
districts the better the representation of has further alienated civilians, who have a
a given population in Bamako, and hence hard time comprehending such disregard of
the higher the likelihood of having access legally recognised regions.20 In this sense,
to central state resources. In the process while recognition of existing decentralised
of redistricting in Kidal, communities that structures would have effectively increased
were consulted proposed the creation of institutional representation of candidates
up to 19 districts in the existing region, affiliated with the former rebel alliance
with each powerful fraction attempting to CMA, its blatant disregard risks adding to
establish their own district. Districting has an already pervasive sense of inequality in
become synonymous with holding power northern regions.
and resources.
As seen in Ménaka, territorial redistricting 4 Armed actors and changing
exacerbates grievances around access to power relations
essential resources. In a region characterised
by repeated episodes of severe drought,
decentralisation in northern Mali has, in In the absence of reliable state apparatus
some instances, increased grievances capable of governing its entire territory,
around access to water, education Malian central state authorities have relied
and justice. For example, in early 2018 on a dual governance strategy in which
historically marginalised communities in officially implemented decentralisation
Ménaka protested against the proposed is accompanied by strategic alliances
redistricting.18 with regional elites – both customary and
armed. Rather than co-optation attempts
19 République du Mali. 2012. Loi N°2012-018 portant
création des Cercles et Arrondissements des
18 Yattara, Inamoud – unpublished transcript. Régions de Tombouctou, Taoudénit, Gao, Ménaka
Note Techniques: Analyse de la déclaration des et Kidal.
Communautés lésées du cercle de Ménaka relative 20 Interview AMM Representative, Bamako, Mali,
au découpage communal (Région de Ménaka). February 2020.
4CRU Policy Brief
through decentralisation, state–society inclusive representation of constituencies.
relations in northern Mali have instead been Through their reliance on local elites to
shaped by a strategy of counterbalance counterbalance Ifoghas Tuareg, central state
relying on establishing regional proxies as authorities ultimately profit from the elite
an antithetical element to restive Ifoghas capture of democratic positions.
Tuareg tribes.21 In this sense, central state
authorities’ governance relied more on a few Since the 2015 peace agreement, interim
selected individuals and groups, rather than authorities installed in northern regions, in
any attempt to ‘represent the full spectrum coordination between the signatory armed
of society’ through the formal decentralised groups and central state authorities, have
governance channels.22 contributed to a further blend of authority.
While these interim authorities at regional
In Ménaka, Bamako’s reliance extended to and district levels have been installed by
both the aforementioned customary elites the state, they represent key personnel of
cementing their influence in electoral office the signatory armed movements, making
and the armed groups comprising the pro- a separation of power de facto impossible.
government Platform, including the Imghad The position of interim authorities is thus
Self-Defence Group GATIA and its ally MSA, an additional example in which armed
led by Daoussahak Tuareg. This dual reliance territorial control has become congruent
on customary and armed actors favoured with administrative power. As such, interim
counterbalancing rather than integrating authorities in Ménaka – a former stronghold
and co-opting rebellious Ifoghas Tuaregs,23 of the Platform coalition – have been
putting the decentralisation process at the nominated by Platform members GATIA/
end of the queue. MSA, whereas interim authorities in Kidal
had been proposed by the ex-rebel coalition
This dual position of customary leadership CMA.
in Ménaka as proxy and de facto para-
sovereign of the region24 is best expressed The strategy of counterbalancing, however,
in the saying ‘If Bajan is strong, the state failed most recently with regard to Bamako’s
is strong.’25 In this sense, customary elites non-state armed allies of the Platform
operate on the same clientelism pattern – GATIA/MSA. As partners in French
employed by the state, with both central counterterrorism operations, they had been
state authorities and their regional proxies increasingly targeted by radical actors, which
relying on particular interests rather than on weakened the alliance and resulted in splits
within the Platform. The ex-rebel coalition
CMA stepped into this chasm of territorial
control, further expanding into northern
21 Boone, C. 2003. Political Topographies of the African
regions including Ménaka. This change in
State: Territorial authority and institutional choice.
power relations has led the aforementioned
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
The strategy of counter-balance was also deployed
customary elites – long-acting as proxy
to influence in-group dynamics of the Ifoghas. for Bamako – to adapt through renewed
22 Pezard, S. and Shurkin, M. 2015. Achieving Peace alliances with the CMA. At the November
in Northern Mali: Past agreements, local conflicts, 2019 summit of Ifoghas-dominated HCUA,
and the prospects for a durable settlement. Santa arguably the CMA’s most influential bloc,
Monica, California, RAND Corporation, p. 26. Oullimiden aménokal Bajan Ag Hamatou
23 Nonetheless, the CMA cooperated by securing officially declared his alliance to the group.26
northern Mali during the 2018 presidential elections This switch of allegiance was similarly
that led to the re-election of President Ibrahim observed across various tribal fractions,
Boubacar Keita.
formally announcing their shift to the CMA,
24 Sandor, A. 2017. Insecurity, the Breakdown of social
trust, and armed actor governance in central and
northern Mali. A Stabilizing Mali Project Report.
August, p. 23. 26 United Nations 2020. Letter dated 28 February 2020
25 Grémont, C. 2004. Les liens sociaux au Nord- from the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to
Mali: entre fleuve et dunes: récits et témoignages. Resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali addressed to the
Karthala Editions. President of the Security Council.
5CRU Policy Brief
thereby adapting to the armed group most of Ménaka as a district of Gao region, would
capable of extending at least a fragile form have increased the number of national
of protection.27 representatives of this territory by a factor of
four. Instead of one member of parliament for
In the increasingly fragmented conflict the district of Ménaka – as in previous years,
landscape of Mali, this switching of alliances amenokal Bajan Ag Hamatou was elected
is indicative of the necessity for customary with 75% – the new region of Ménaka could
central state proxies to align to new have elected four members of parliament for
power balances. it similarly underlines the each of the respective districts of the newly
continued dependency of both central state created region.
and armed actors on selected influential
customary leaders. As local strongmen, Governance dynamics in northern Mali are
their ability to mobilise large numbers of therefore characterised by the competing
the population makes them an attractive logic of both formal and informal peripheral
cooperation partner for both governments governance arrangements deployed by
and non-state armed actors.28 In this sense, the central state. As such, the formal
customary actors remain intermediaries decentralisation process has been in
between state and society,29 a function competition with a logic of armed territorial
that further allows them to cement local control, on which both the ex-rebel coalition
power hierarchies, to the disadvantage of CMA and the central state through its
subordinated groups. proxy armed Platform coalition relied.
In this sense, the predominant form of
While it is difficult to distinguish the degree governance has so far been shaped
to which territorial control will correspond by selective reliance on customary
with political power in Ménaka, the latest elites and pro-state armed groups to
legislative elections demonstrate the counterbalance the ex-rebel CMA coalition.
CMA’s ability to attain electoral dominance.30 As a consequence, decentralisation in the
This ambition has similarly translated to the northern region of Ménaka has contributed
region of Ménaka. Their capacity as veto little to democratising representation and has
players on the national level has once again instead empowered selected ethnic groups
become visible ahead of the 2020 legislative to the detriment of subordinated fractions.
elections, for which CMA advocated
the taking into account of increased
representation of northern populations by 5 Conclusion
including the region of Ménaka created
in 2016. Accounting for the new region of Five years since the signing of the 2015
Ménaka, with its distinct districts – instead Peace Agreement, governance in northern
Mali is characterised by overlapping spheres
of customary, armed and administrative
authority,31 in which the separation of power
27 Interview HCUA Representative, Bamako, Mali, eludes set categories. As authority waxes
March 2020. and wanes,32 signatory armed groups hold
28 Raleigh, C. and De Bruijne, K. 2017. ‘Where rebels administrative positions through the interim
dare to tread: A study of conflict geography and authorities, but also shape the latitude
co-option of local power in Sierra Leone’. Journal of of administrative actors through their
Conflict Resolution, 61:6, p. 1230-1260.
29 Molenaar, F. et al. 2019, The Status Quo Defied:
The legitimacy of traditional authorities in areas
of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya.
Clingendael Institute. Chapter 2; Leonardi, C. 2019. 31 Raleigh, C. and De Bruijne, K., 2017. ‘Where rebels
Making Order Out of Disorder: Customary authority dare to tread: A study of conflict geography and
in South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. co-option of local power in Sierra Leone’. Journal of
30 Thurston, A. ‘Mali: Analysing the Legislative Conflict Resolution, 61:6, p. 1230-1260.
Results from Kidal’. Sahel Blog. Available here: 32 Hagmann, T. and Péclard, D. 2010. ‘Negotiating
https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2020/05/01/mali- statehood: dynamics of power and domination in
analyzing-the-legislative-results-from-kidal/. Africa’. Development and Change, 41(4), 539-562.
6CRU Policy Brief
role as key military powers. In this sense, In addition, decentralised structures have
military force accompanies political power been a marginalised channel of contestation.
– a recognition to which even pro-state Instead, most power plays still take place
customary leaders such as the amenokal in at macro level through the problem of
Ménaka have to submit. armed territorial control and the implicit
political influence it implies. Changing power
In the aftermath of the 2015 Algiers relations in northern Mali, following the
Agreement, decentralisation has become implosion of the Platform coalition in 2019,34
conceptualised as both a tool to increase could therefore provide renewed impetus to
relations between northern Mali and central focus on institutionalised decentralisation
authorities and a means to transform armed instead of selective informal decentralised
governance into institutionally accepted arrangements.
channels of contestation. This has been
more aspiration than reality, a fact that has The current decentralisation process is
been most recently underlined in the context captured in a logic of territorial control
of legislative elections held on 29 March that remains dominated by the armed
2020, in which the failure to implement signatories, whose representation takes
decentralisation in Ménaka region led precedence before the needs and interests
to renewed contestation by the ex-rebel of marginalised tribes and communities in
coalition CMA. northern regions. Central state authorities
and signatories have been reinforcing
These ramifications of decentralisation this logic of representation, each trying
do not depend on the institutional to hamper the influence of the other over
creation of decentralised structures, but territorial control in northern regions. In
on the governance dynamics in which the present context of changed power
decentralisation takes place.33 While relations, implementing decentralisation at
decentralisation has in some cases enabled district and municipality levels in the newly
the population to challenge historical created region of Ménaka will likely lead to
hierarchies, the decentralisation process in greater representation of CMA interests in
the aftermath of the 2015 peace agreement the national assembly. But the integration
continues to play out between elites. The of former rebels follows institutionalisation,
signatory armed groups – presenting strong be it in the security sector or governance.
but marginal fractions such as those within In this regard, Mali’s international partners
CMA, and representing numerous tribes should not shy away from holding central
such as within the Platform – have installed state authorities accountable: the fact that
interim authorities, while customary elites criticism of the stalled decentralisation
proved able to secure their positions as process has come from the ex-rebel CMA
deputies through flexible alliances. bloc does not render it any less valuable.
34 The Carter Center. January 2020. Rapport de
l’Observateur independent Observations sur la mise
en œuvre de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation
au Mali, issu du processus d’Alger. Significant splits
within the armed groups composing the signatory
33 See Boone, C. 2003. Political Topographies of the Platform coalition – both within the Arab Movement
African State: Territorial authority and institutional of Azawad (MAA) and the GATIA (Tuareg Self-
choice. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Defence Group and Allies), weakened the politico-
Press. military power of the Platform coalition.
7About the Clingendael Institute
Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations –
is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs.
Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire
and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to
contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world.
www.clingendael.org/cru @clingendaelorg
cru@clingendael.org The Clingendael Institute
+31 70 324 53 84 The Clingendael Institute
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About the author
Anna Schmauder is a Junior Researcher at Clingendael’s Conflict
Research Unit. In this capacity, she focuses on hybrid governance in
peacebuilding contexts and their intersection with security dynamics
in the Sahel region.You can also read
