Culture, Capital, and the Political Economy Gender Gap: Evidence from Meghalaya's Matrilineal Tribes
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Culture, Capital, and the Political Economy Gender Gap:
Evidence from Meghalaya’s Matrilineal Tribes
Rachel Brulé, Boston University
Nikhar Gaikwad, Columbia University
What explains the gender gap in political engagement and economic policy preferences? Many scholars point to material
resources, while others credit cultural determinants. We identify and test an important link between these factors: cultural
lineage norms that structure entitlements to resources. Studying the relationship between culture and resources is chal-
lenging in societies where both disadvantage women. We analyze a unique setting: northeast India, where matrilineal tribes
live alongside patrilineal communities. Patriarchal cultures and political institutions are shared, but lineage norms are
distinct: patrilineal groups distribute inherited wealth through men, while matrilineal tribes do so via women. We conduct
survey and behavioral experiments with representative samples of both communities, alongside extensive qualitative re-
search, and find that the gender gap reverses across patrilineal and matrilineal groups. Our results indicate that lineage
norms—which determine who gets to make decisions about wealth and how—are key determinants of the political economy
gender gap.
A round the world, women are significantly under-
represented in politics, from participation to elected
positions (Teele 2018; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman
1997). A gender gap is also evident in policy preferences, with
women and men expressing systematically different priorities
Gottlieb 2021) and grasping fundamental dynamics of repre-
sentation (Bhavnani 2009).
Figure 1 documents the gender gap in political partici-
pation and economic policy preferences in countries around
the world, including the world’s largest democracy, India.1
about how states should raise and invest resources (Clayton We term this divergence in the political behavior and policy
et al. 2019). Women are more likely than men to favor re- preferences of women and men the “political economy gen-
distribution, social security, and insurance, for example, and der gap.” Our focus departs from classical tests of the gender
less likely to be critical of taxation than men (Iversen and Ro- gap in preferences, measured as voters’ broad ideological sup-
senbluth 2006). Because participation is a conduit for policy port for parties on a left-right spectrum (Inglehart and Norris
change, women’s programmatic preferences are less likely to 2000; Lipset 1960; Shorrocks 2018). Instead, we consider a
translate into government action when their political engage- distinct set of preferences about state intervention to redis-
ment is limited (Sapiro 1981). Explaining why women’s and tribute wealth. This follows recent work documenting how
men’s participation and policy preferences diverge is thus women across developed and developing countries prefer the
crucial for remedying gender-related inequities (Robinson and state to invest more in redistribution than men do (Bleck and
Rachel Brulé (rebrule@bu.edu) is an assistant professor at Boston University, Boston, MA 02215. Nikhar Gaikwad (nikhar.gaikwad@columbia.edu) is an
assistant professor at Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.
This study was conducted in compliance with relevant laws and was approved under 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) by Yale University’s Human Subjects
Committee (IRB protocol 1401013238), as well as under category 2 by New York University Abu Dhabi’s Institutional Review Board. Support for this
research was provided by New York University Abu Dhabi and Yale University. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results
in the article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available
at https://doi.org/10.1086/711176.
1. Men are more likely to vote, express political interest, claim political knowledge, attend political meetings, and discuss elections. Women are more
supportive of government policies to reduce income inequality, provide care for those in need, and subsidize the poor. Women typically prioritize taxation
and intervention to ensure well-being, whereas men prefer a smaller, less redistributive welfare state.
The Journal of Politics, volume 83, number 3. Published online May 17, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1086/711176
q 2021 by the Southern Political Science Association. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
(CC BY-NC 4.0), which permits non-commercial reuse of the work with attribution.
For commercial use, contact journalpermissions@press.uchicago.edu. 0022-3816/2021/8303-00XX$10.00 000
000 / Meghalaya’s Matrilineal Tribes Rachel Brulé and Nikhar Gaikwad
Figure 1. Political economy gender gap around the world. Additional details presented in appendix A1.
Michelitch 2018; Folbre 2009; Gottlieb, Grossman, and Rob- enables gendered political cooperation that differs from widely
inson 2018). observed behavior in patrilineal cultures.
What explains the political economy gender gap? Most We leverage local variation in gendered inheritance norms
work emphasizes one of two factors. One side argues that across neighboring matrilineal and patrilineal societies in the
patriarchal cultural norms dampen women’s political partic- northeastern Indian state of Meghalaya. Matrilineal groups
ipation and promote their support for a larger, more caring represent roughly 13% of the world’s population (Robinson
welfare state (Franceschet, Piscopo, and Thomas 2015). A and Gottlieb 2021; cf. Murdock 1967). We study an “eco-
second set of arguments focuses on material determinants. nomic” variant of matriliny, present in Meghalaya’s Garo,
Men’s greater stocks of wealth—in the form of assets, prop- Khasi, and Jaintiya tribes. Property passes directly from mother
erty, and income—yield more resources and incentives to in- to daughter, and both genders participate in managing fam-
vest in political participation, particularly to limit taxation and ily wealth (Ryndem 2017). Living alongside the matrilineal
redistribution (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Verba et al. 1997). groups in our study are communities with patrilineal norms
We argue, by contrast, that analyzing the gender gap regarding inheritance and economic decision-making. Prop-
by separating culture and resources, or studying culture as erty travels from father to son, and economic resources are
mainly driven by economic factors (Alesina, Giuliano, and owned and controlled exclusively by men. This setting allows
Nunn 2013), misses a central point. Cultural norms them- us to examine the extent to which cultural norms about wealth
selves influence which gender owns and manages wealth in distribution affect gender-specific political attitudes and be-
societies. In particular, cultural prescriptions about kinship haviors, while holding constant many institutional features
privilege different genders via lineage traditions—that is, that may also influence the gender gap (Gneezy, Leonard, and
whether group membership and ancestral wealth are trans- List 2009). In particular, both groups are subject to similar
mitted through men, in patrilineal societies, or women, in formal political institutions, as well as patriarchal traditions
matrilineal groups (Levi-Strauss 2008). We consider lineage privileging men with positions of social authority in the public
a cultural norm because it characterizes a set of beliefs—of domain (Nongbri 2010).
who “belongs” to a given society and what they are owed— We provide the first rigorous paired comparison of ad-
based on rational, commonly known individual expectations joining matrilineal and patrilineal communities to examine
about how others in a given society will act under various how differences in lineage norms predict variation in polit-
contingencies (Greif 1994, 915). Here, we focus on the impact ical participation and policy preferences. For our analysis, we
of lineage on the likelihood that a particular gender will inherit conducted a large face-to-face survey of representative sam-
and control wealth. Our contention is that the institutional ples of men and women in both matrilineal and patrilineal
ordering of wealth via female-based kinship—matriliny— communities. An innovative series of survey and behavioralVolume 83 Number 3 July 2021 / 000
experiments probed respondents’ patterns of political partic- Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Khan 2017; Prillaman 2021) by
ipation and policy preferences about taxation, redistribution, mapping how cultural mandates for distributing wealth affect
and intrahousehold bargaining. We also collected extensive the negotiation of power in the polity.
ethnographic data via field research to adjudicate the poten-
tial mechanisms that may drive our results. THEORY OF LINEAGE NORMS AND THE GENDER GAP
We first test our hypothesis that political engagement The literature offers two main explanations for the political
should vary on the basis of the private stock of resources a economy gender gap. A first set of theories argues that gen-
given gender is able to devote to this time-intensive behavior dered cultural roles drive this divergence. Culture is manifest
with social and material costs. We expect that men’s repre- in norms about what constitutes appropriate behavior for
sentational advantage in patrilineal cultures stems from their individuals, with socially enforced sanctions for noncompli-
differential ownership of inherited property, congruent with ance. In “classic patriarchy,” control over the relations of pro-
Schlozman, Burns, and Verba’s (1994) findings in the United duction—economic, social, and political—is held by the senior
States. In contrast, we expect that women’s sustained inter- male in the private sphere of the household and by states that
generational entitlements to property inheritance in matri- reproduce similar gendered relations of dominance in public
lineal societies give females a clear advantage in allocating (Braunstein and Folbre 2001; Kandiyoti 1988; Sapiro 1981).
personal resources to political engagement. We find that the Crucially, patriarchal behavioral prescriptions discourage
gender gap in participation flips in matrilineal relative to pat- women from advancing their preferences through political
rilineal groups. Traditional wealth owners—patrilineal men participation (Bleck and Michelitch 2018; Khan 2017). In
and matrilineal women—are more politically engaged than addition, the assignment of domestic support roles to women
culturally excluded genders (patrilineal women and matri- in patriarchal cultures is often credited with explaining their
lineal men, respectively). relatively greater support for “nanny” (welfare) state policies
The reversal of gendered entitlements to resources in matri- (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Lundberg and Pollak 1993). Mean-
lineal societies is radical because it occurs within larger pa- while, men’s patriarchal role as providers of financial security
triarchal systems where men hold social and political enti- for the family undermines male support for state policies that
tlements. As a result, lineage norms not only enable women’s restrict their personal agency over wealth.
political engagement but also alter incentives for gender- A second set of theories attributes gendered patterns of
based coordination within families. Where men and women political empowerment to differential access to capital. Be-
each hold some entitlements, there are incentives for gen- cause political participation is costly—requiring contributions
ders to negotiate across household domains in order to realize of time and resources—gender-based differences in income,
their own priorities. This creates a private channel for indi- property, and wealth drive disparities in political engagement
viduals to accomplish personal goals, lowering the value they (Verba et al. 1997). Intrahousehold “control over major fi-
place on state action and leading economic policy preferences nancial decisions” also influences policy preferences (Burns,
to converge across genders. By contrast, when men hold all Schlozman, and Verba 1997, 373). Gendered disparities in the
entitlements, there are fewer incentives for intrahousehold ability to distribute household wealth help explain why men
coordination over allocating resources. This drives a wedge tend to be more sensitive to financial costs imposed by taxa-
between women’s (higher) and men’s (lower) value for public tion and are more willing to participate politically to preclude
action, leading preferences to bifurcate across genders. Using redistribution in both industrialized and developing coun-
experiments embedded in our survey, we find that preferences tries (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Robinson and Gottlieb
regarding the size of the welfare state diverge in patrilineal 2021). For excluded genders, limited access to material re-
cultures. Men—who exclusively own and manage wealth— sources disrupts the link between taxation and the economic
are more likely to oppose costly redistribution. Women, ex- burden of the welfare state (Burns et al. 1997). Financial ex-
cluded from wealth ownership and management, remain cost clusion also creates demand for public goods, which women
insensitive. In matrilineal cultures, however, where women historically leveraged to secure a “maternalist” welfare state
and men jointly manage wealth, preferences converge and the (Skocpol 1992).
gender gap closes. We posit that these prior approaches miss a critical point:
We illuminate how one set of cultural norms relevant across culture and capital jointly shape the political economy gender
the developed and developing world—lineage—structure at- gap. Cultural norms can bias representation by systematically
titudes and behavior through their influence on intrahouse- tilting the scales of gender-based access to wealth. To build our
hold decision-making. This extends work on the importance argument, we apply a key insight from anthropology: line-
of the private roots of political action (Brulé 2020a, 2020b; age norms governing wealth ownership and control generate000 / Meghalaya’s Matrilineal Tribes Rachel Brulé and Nikhar Gaikwad
gender-specific economic advantages (Levi-Strauss 2008; We see several implications of how resources may alter
Schneider and Gough 1962). Cultural prescriptions affect political behavior. Members of groups with cultural entitle-
each gender’s ability to accumulate and deploy wealth across ments to wealth should be more able and willing than those
generations. If lineage norms create important resource in- without such entitlements to engage in core political activities
equalities across genders, and if these inequities influence po- like voting. Greater stocks of resources may also affect polit-
litical behavior and policy preferences, as we hypothesize, then ical attitudes involving trust and accountability. In Levi and
cultural norms regarding the intergenerational transfer of Stoker’s (2000, 476) words, political trust “involves an indi-
wealth are important explanations for gendered disparities in vidual making herself vulnerable to another individual, group,
representation. or institution that has the capacity to do her harm or to be-
It is typically quite difficult to observe variation in how tray her.” Those with greater financial resources that can be
culture structures wealth because most societies are patriar- deployed as means of self-protection should be better poised
chies where norms concentrate political and social power in to undertake the risks necessary to build trust in local legis-
men’s hands, and patrilineal structures privilege men as cus- lators and political parties and demand accountability from
todians of intergenerational wealth. Men accrue relatively more representatives. As matrilineal and patrilineal groups pre-
social and political advantages than women, and consistently sent mirror images of gendered entitlements to resources,
benefit from greater economic opportunities to inherit wealth we expect to see a reversal in gender-based patterns of polit-
(Braunstein and Folbre 2001). However, we leverage a rele- ical engagement and willingness to bear participation’s costs
vant disjuncture within patriarchy based on variation in gen- across these groups.2
dered property rights. As feminist theorists explain, in “classic Second, differences in the gendered distribution of re-
patriarchy,” social norms about the broader institutional rules source entitlements alter incentives for coordinating financial
of the game governing human interaction are grounded in the decision-making in the household. This affects whether eco-
patrilineal transfer of wealth and title within patrilocal fami- nomic policy preferences converge or diverge across genders.
lies (Braunstein and Folbre 2001; Kandiyoti 1988). Yet, within In patrilineal cultures, men can direct their authority over all
patriarchal systems, economic variants of matriliny prescribe (political, social, and economic) entitlements toward achiev-
alternate norms dictating the intergenerational transmission ing their individual goals via private channels without de-
of wealth from mothers to daughters (Schneider and Gough pending on government support. Thus, men’s value for state
1962). Social and political hierarchies remain consistent— action to redistribute resources diminishes as the cost of public
senior males continue to be the relevant representatives of intervention rises. Women’s exclusion from all entitlements
households in society and the state—but this rests on the “pri- limits incentives for men to coordinate economic decision-
vate” organization of property rights as matrilineal, trans- making with women in the household. This means that
ferred within matrilocal households. women lack private channels by which to achieve goals, and
Figure 2 illustrates our theory regarding the importance they accordingly place a high value on state intervention to ob-
of culturally sanctioned inequities in resources for structur- tain resources, independent of its cost. The gender-imbalanced
ing the political economy gender gap. Within patriarchal sys- allocation of entitlements in patrilineal societies creates di-
tems, patriliny accords men control over political, social, and vergent values for public action that drive a wedge between
economic entitlements. Matriliny bifurcates entitlements across men’s and women’s policy preferences.
genders, with men retaining positions of political and social By contrast, in matrilineal cultures, while men maintain
control and women holding authority over economic resources. political and social entitlements, it is women who hold wealth
We expect to observe the gender gap shift across patrilineal entitlements. This creates substantial incentives for men and
and matrilineal cultures in two ways. women to coordinate intrahousehold decision-making across
First, norms governing inheritance should differentially domains, creating a private channel for all family members to
enable the gender that traditionally owns resources (patrilineal negotiate over, demand, and access resources—from house-
men and matrilineal women) to participate in grassroots pol- hold goods to education opportunities. By balancing entitle-
itics. Following Burns et al. (1997), we consider political par- ments across genders, matriliny incentivizes intrahousehold
ticipation broadly, as behavior intended to influence govern- coordination over the deployment of resources and influence
ment action. Participation is a costly individual investment in for both genders. We posit that this private channel presents an
altering slow-moving political institutions, making it more
likely among those who can afford to be patient and wait for 2. In contrast, since men control political entitlements in both pat-
investments to mature, that is, those possessing larger and rilineal and matrilineal groups, formal positions of power such as political
more secure stocks of culturally determined resources. office are predicted to remain a male domain across cultures.Volume 83 Number 3 July 2021 / 000
Figure 2. Cultural resource entitlements, participation, and political economy preferences
important alternative to relying on resources via public redis- consistent patterns of women’s inheritance and matrilocal
tribution, making both men and women in matrilineal socie- residence (Lowes 2018; Robinson and Gottlieb 2021). Me-
ties sensitive to the pecuniary burden of the welfare state and ghalaya’s groups are closer to the high end of the spectrum,
therefore more reluctant to support public action as its cost rises. with inheritance firmly passing via women and matrilocal
residence strongly enforced. Yet, men possess an equal role in
MATRILINEAL CONTEXT AND STUDY SETTING coordinating resource management (Nongbri 2010). Megha-
A growing literature examines the consequences of matriliny laya thus represents a strong (but not extreme) case for testing
for individual and group behavior in distributive politics. the impact of matriliny’s economic prescriptions on political
Robinson and Gottlieb (2021, 90) define “matrilinearity as economy outcomes, relative to matrilineal cultures in Africa
a long-term program that consistently gives women greater (Muriaas et al. 2019; Robinson and Gottlieb 2021).
access to resources.” To specify a broader framework for how Matrilineal norms about political roles also merit consid-
lineage institutions differentially affect political economy out- eration. Women’s political authority appears greater in Africa
comes, we map variation in the contemporary distribution of than Meghalaya. For example, women play a central role in
resources to matrilineal women. The Akan of Ghana typify selecting the paramount chief for the Chewa of Malawi, Mo-
the low end of the spectrum: the mother’s line determines zambique, and Zambia (Muriaas et al. 2019). In Meghalaya,
descent, but men primarily own property (traveling from a women are excluded from formal positions of political power
mother’s brother to her son), and marital households are or- (Nongbri 2010). The primary advantage that matrilineal cul-
ganized around men’s prior home (La Ferrara and Milazzo ture in Meghalaya presents women pertains to economic en-
2017). The Mosuo of Yunan, China, are at the high end. titlements, as distinct from political authority.
Women exclusively inherit land, households center around
mothers (matrilocal to natolocal), and “walking marriages” Meghalaya context
limit a father’s presence to reproduction (Nongbri 2010, 161). Our study is situated in Meghalaya’s state capital, Shillong,
Many matrilineal groups on the African continent are where the “largest part of the population is found,” with res-
clustered toward the lower end of this spectrum, with in- idents numbering just over 350,000 (Ryndem 2017, 53; see000 / Meghalaya’s Matrilineal Tribes Rachel Brulé and Nikhar Gaikwad
also Government of India 2011). Shillong is home to a large exempt from India’s constitutional mandate to implement
set of neighboring matrilineal and patrilineal groups. Matri- quotas for women’s representation, enabling persistent fe-
lineal tribes, in particular the Khasis, Jaintias, and Garos, male exclusion in local and national politics.3 For example, in
make up approximately 91% of Meghalaya’s tribal population. Meghalaya’s last three Vidhan Sabha (State Legislative As-
The remaining 9% comprise patrilineal tribes (Government sembly) elections, between 2008 and 2018, women occupied
of India 2011). Mizos and Hmars are the most numerous a marginal 1.6%–6.7% of seats (Bhogale et al. 2019). This pat-
patrilineal tribal groups and have resided in Meghalaya since tern fits with our theoretical analysis of matriliny, wherein
the state’s inception (Haokip 2013). Fourteen percent of Me- men retain formal positions of power such as political office
ghalaya’s population is nontribal. Originating mainly from because of broader patriarchal structures that persist in soci-
other northeastern states, with the remainder from mainland ety. Despite exclusion from positions of authority, however,
India, they today reside primarily in Shillong. matrilineal women are active political participants: attending
meetings, voicing concerns, and organizing to resolve socio-
Matriliny norms economic problems.
According to Ryndem (2017, 53), the Khasis “universally
and traditionally follow” matrilineal principles, including so-
Basis of comparison
In Shillong, matrilineal and patrilineal communities live in
cial organization around descent from a common ancestress
(Iawbei), who is the founding mother of the clan (kur). Within close proximity, share analogous political institutions, sub-
each clan, the most important unit is the immediate family, scribe to broader patriarchal structures, avail of common wel-
organized around the mother (iing). Ryndem explains that fare state policies, and face comparable local economic mi-
“the iing is premised on the principle of the ritual unity of lieus.4 The primary difference follows cultural norms about
the sibling group and rests on the cooperation between [two lineage, which determine wealth ownership and control (Gneezy
parties:] the [sister] (ka Khadduh) who inherits the property et al. 2009). We leverage this variation to study whether cul-
turally sanctioned wealth inequities drive the political econ-
and the elder brother who exercise(s) control and authority
omy gender gap.
over the affairs of the iing. . . . Khasi matriliny not only lays
special emphasis on the solidarity of the matrilineal descent RESEARCH DESIGN
group, but also ensures that brothers have a permanent place Qualitative research
in the natal iing” (53–54). It follows that “democratic prin- We employed a multimethods research design in this study,
ciples are the pillars of the Khasi way of life” (57). relying on both qualitative and experimental methods. For
The equality of decision-making power that results in our qualitative data collection, we conducted 10 focus groups
Meghalaya’s matrilineal groups cannot be overstated. Nong- and 100 structured ethnographic interviews with individuals
kinrih (2002) explains that this begins with the equitable belonging to matrilineal tribes in Shillong over the course
“division of authority between the head of the iing (mother) of nine field research trips between 2014 and 2015. Appen-
and her eldest brother” for managing resources. Further- dix A3 discusses our qualitative research methodology.5 Be-
more, when important decisions arise, both sit with adult low, we present a mix of representative quotations and de-
family members to “take collective decisions on various” is- scriptive statistics to explain both the patterns and anomalies
sues about “managing the property” (163). Such equality trans- that emerged from our qualitative interviews. We bring in
lates directly into the daily process of intrahousehold decision- this evidence to interpret the mechanisms driving our ex-
making. According to Mawrie (1981, 66–67): “Neither the perimental results.
husband nor the wife has a position lower than the other in
their relationship. A woman has her own status as a mother, 3. The Indian Constitution, Part IX, mandate for Panchayats with
and a man his status as a father and it is their business to women’s quotas does not apply to Meghalaya because of its predominantly
manage and run their own household according to their wis- tribal heritage (Articles 243 D, M, T, and ZC, http://bit.ly/2sOTaW4).
4. Yet might matriliny in Meghalaya simply act as a proxy for other
dom, mutual understanding, and cooperation.”
historical economic determinants of the gender gap? Appendix A2 (apps. A1–
A24 are available online) presents detailed information on matriliny and its
Patriarchy in politics regional origins. There is no evidence that matriliny was adopted in response
Political office remains a strictly male domain in matrilineal to economic imperatives (Bareh 1967).
tribes, as in patrilineal groups (Nongbri 2010). Across Me- 5. The focus groups helped us construct our sample frame and com-
parison sets and design both the qualitative interview questionnaire and
ghalaya, “male domination can be seen . . . in matters of state survey instrument. Our ethnographic interviews were designed to shed light
and village administration . . . [which] has been an exclu- on the mechanisms behind our experimental results and help explain patterns
sive[ly] male prerogative” (Syiem 1998, 46–53). The state is in the preferences and behavior of men and women in matrilineal groups.Volume 83 Number 3 July 2021 / 000
Matriliny practices assigned to treatment versus control groups in our survey
To begin, we sought to understand contemporary matriliny experiments have statistically indistinguishable observable
practices in Meghalaya. Our interviews corroborated the con- characteristics (apps. A7–A10).
sistency and persistence of lineage systems. On the content
of inheritance practices, for example, one Khasi woman ex- Empirical specification
plained: “Our society follows the matrilineal society. The in- We first estimate the effects of cultural norms about resource
heritance is traced through the maternal side.” This means entitlements on attitudinal and behavioral political outcomes
that daughters receive “the greater share of property, [in- and then move to study the influence of our experimental
cluding] immovable property” (respondent 53, August 11, treatments on economic policy preferences. For the later
2014). When we probed how household decision-making oc- analysis, we use an ordinary least squares model of the form
curs, a common refrain emerged: “We usually sit and decide DVi p a 1 b # T i 1 g # X i 1 εi , where DVi is the out-
things together as a family. We all have equal rights in decision come of interest, a is a constant representing mean values
making in every aspect of the family like household budget, for the control group, Ti is a binary indicator of randomly
education, child bearing, and politics” (respondent 30, July 14, assigned individual treatment status, and Xi refers to a vector
2014). Our interviews also confirmed the rigidity of political of demographic controls: age, education level, wealth index,
institutions. According to one Khasi woman, “elder male mem- and religion. For all specifications, we estimate robust stan-
bers” are the only “one[s] who . . . manage the locality” (re- dard errors. Results both without controls and with an ex-
spondent 72, August 12, 2015). tended set of social controls are qualitatively similar (see the
appendixes). When estimating the gender gap for nonexper-
imental questions, we use t-tests to check whether differences
Survey and sampling strategy in means across genders in each cultural group are significant.
The centerpiece of our empirical approach was a large face-to-
face survey that we conducted on a representative sample
of Shillong’s population between February and July 2015. RESULTS
Our team interviewed 3,410 voting-age citizens who had lived Political participation and engagement
in Shillong for at least 10 years.6 To create a representative We begin by analyzing the well-documented gender gap in
sample, our team first gathered data for every household political engagement. To test whether lineage norms explain
via face-to-face visits with local community organizers. We gender differences across our matrilineal and patrilineal sam-
generated a full census of all citizens residing in 25 randomly ples, we probed respondents about political behavior. First, we
selected wards in Shillong. Stratified random sampling was asked about their voting activity: “Did you vote in Meghalaya’s
used to select participants from the resulting census roll. To most recent MLA [Member of Legislative Assembly] election?
strengthen comparisons, we obtained balanced samples of Yes or No.” As figure 3 shows, the results effectively flip across
men and women, from matrilineal and patrilineal groups, patrilineal and matrilineal societies.7 In the patrilineal group,
who were rich and poor (app. A4). Appendix A5 illustrates men are 11 percentage points more likely than women to re-
the geographical proximity of our sample’s kinship groups. port voting (p p :000). Matrilineal women, by contrast, are
In our sample, genders are similar across cultures on most 9 percentage points more likely than men to vote (p p :000).8
demographic characteristics (app. A6). The main differences This result is striking. In Meghalaya’s matrilineal tribes, cul-
across groups are the result of cultural traditions about wealth tural norms specify that men should run for, and hold, office.
ownership that we explicitly study here, such as differential However, matrilineal women are much more likely to go to
land- and asset-ownership rates. We also find differences in the polls and decide their representatives.
educational attainment, for which we control. Notably, those We next consider two indicators of individual willing-
ness to bear risks associated with political participation: trust
and accountability. To evaluate commitment to make long-
6. We matched enumerators and respondents on gender and ethnicity
term materially and socially costly investments in politics,
to encourage trust and reduce social desirability bias. The survey was
offered in Khasi, Mizo, English, and Hindi. Enumerators used handheld
tablet devices that automated the randomization process in our experi-
ments. To ensure our study neither interfered with nor disrupted local 7. Appendix A11 provides additional details; app. A12 presents inter-
customs, we recruited all members of our research team from local tribal actions of gender with kinship groups.
groups, and we obtained permission from every block council head before 8. The gender gap reversal across cultural groups is significant (b p
our survey. 0:20, p p :000); see app. A11a.000 / Meghalaya’s Matrilineal Tribes Rachel Brulé and Nikhar Gaikwad
Figure 3. Political participation: percentage responses among men and women, respectively, and the difference in responses between genders. ***p ! .01.
we queried whether respondents trusted their (a) local legis- recounted: “Women of our locality are active in politics. Dur-
lators and (b) political parties “to do the right thing for people ing election[s] we can see that they will leave everything and
in Shillong.” Matrilineal women are 8 percentage points more run for campaigning, [to] accompany the candidate during
likely to trust local legislators (p p :000) and 13 percentage house-to-house visits and attend public meetings” (respon-
points more likely to trust political parties (p p :000) than dent 38, June 20, 2014). Another noted: “I see in my own
matrilineal men. But among patrilineal respondents, a tradi- family, especially my mother was very active and used to take
tional gender gap emerges. Men are more likely than women part in many political activities along with friends; other[s]
to trust local legislators, by 9 percentage points (p p :000), take part as voters” (respondent 15, May 15, 2014). Men agree,
and political parties, by 7 percentage points (p p :007). observing that women “actively participate, their numbers are
Culturally sanctioned wealth ownership norms also in- more than the men, they are in rallies, meetings, canvass,
crease individual ability to make materially costly efforts to etcetera” (respondent 34, June 16, 2014). Across our qualitative
ensure political accountability. Incentives to do so may be interviews, political interest and activity were consistently
higher if inherited wealth increases the stakes of politics. higher among women than men: 84% of women versus 74% of
We asked respondents whether it was possible for them to men report regular participation in elections by voting and
hold local politicians accountable for the functions they are other forms of political activities; the remainder (16% of
supposed to perform. Akin to prior results, the gender gap women and 26% of men) said that they were not interested
reverses: 63% of matrilineal women report being able to hold or did not have time to engage in electoral activities. Both
politicians accountable, but rates are significantly lower (51%) genders were more likely to follow politics at the state and
for matrilineal men (b p 20:12, p p :000). Patrilineal men local (rather than national) level: 63% of women and 52% of
are qualitatively similar to matrilineal women: 66% of men men (vs. 6% and 5% interested in national-level elections),
feel it is possible to hold officials accountable. But fewer pat- respectively. As one respondent explained, at this level of
rilineal women agree: 39% (b p 0:27, p p :000).9 politics, officials “can protect our people and can bring about
We turn to our qualitative research to investigate how and development to the state” (respondent 6, August 8, 2015).
why matrilineal women evidence higher rates of political en- Again, women’s interest was consistently higher than that
gagement than men. On how women participate, one woman of men.
What explains matrilineal women’s higher political en-
gagement? Women are frequently described as more com-
9. The gender gap difference across both cultures is significant (b p mitted and entitled to bear the costs of participation on behalf
0:39, p p :000); see app. A11d. of society: “All the women in the family [are more politicallyVolume 83 Number 3 July 2021 / 000
engaged than men] because they feel that they are the cus- welfare state.10 We expect treated individuals will be less likely
todians of society” (respondent 50, August 2, 2014; emphasis to support welfare state policies, as they anticipate relinquish-
added). For men’s engagement, self-interest appeared to be a ing wealth they control.
persistent motivation. According to one man: “Most of the Table 1 reports the treatment effect on average support
men, as I have seen . . . are very active especially during levels for public welfare schemes. A decisive gender gap
election because they keep some expectations from the can- emerges in patrilineal policy preferences for redistribution,
didate that if he wins he can refer a job or help with other resonating with contemporary global patterns (recall fig. 1).
benefits” (respondent 21, June 16, 2014). Another man di- Men, who exclusively control wealth, react negatively to the
rectly compared women’s and men’s motivation: “Nowadays, introduction of a personal cost to support public welfare. The
I could see that women are very active in politics, as cam- treatment decreases patrilineal men’s support for state-provided
paigners, polling agents, and some of them are die hard sup- services by 3 percentage points (p p :016).11 However, for
porters. [However,] most of [the] men who involve in politics patrilineal women, who do not control wealth, support is
[do so] just for their own benefit, that is, to get money, free al- resistant to this cost; the impact of the treatment is statistically
cohol, and free food” (respondent 22, Shillong, June 16, 2014; insignificant. We obtain similar results when we exclude con-
emphasis added). trols, include a larger battery of social and political controls,
To dig deeper, we asked respondents to describe the fac- and run ordered logit specifications (apps. A13 and A14).
tors that led them to support a particular political candidate In contrast, the gender gap closes entirely in our matrilineal
over others. Among the open-ended answers, the most con- sample. The treatment significantly deters both men and women,
sistent response was candidate policy platforms, which 47% of who jointly control wealth, from supporting state-provided
women and 39% of men prioritized. Yet the second-most- services. Support for welfare state policies drops by 4 per-
popular preference diverged starkly by gender: 31% of men centage points, for both men (p p :027) and women (p p
focus on candidate character and personality versus 6% of :001).12
women. Whereas such traits reflect qualities a person nur- Cultural norms incentivizing gender-egalitarian wealth
tures independently of society, women’s second-highest pri- management practices are a crucial piece of the explana-
ority is firmly grounded in social outcomes: capability to get tion about converging preferences in the matrilineal group.
things done (33% of women and 24% of men). If we consider
political trust as a commodity requiring costly social invest-
ments, following Levi and Stoker (2000), there is an unsur-
prising gender divergence around women’s third-to-top pref- 10. Experimental treatment is in brackets: “In Meghalaya, many peo-
ple lack access to essential services like water and electricity. Do you sup-
erence—candidate trustworthiness and honesty—prioritized
port an increase in the funding of government programs that provide essen-
by 22% of women versus 10% of men. Again, matrilineal tial services for the poor [even if this means that the government must raise
women exhibit more commitment to, and trust in, politics as money from people like you]?” Response options: yes or no (coded as 1 or 0,
a costly social process. respectively).
11. It is striking that across control groups, average levels of support for
Overall, we find a reversal of the gender gap in political
welfare state policies are high, a pattern that helps explain the magnitudes
participation across cultures. Men are more politically en- of the treatment effects in this experiment. Interestingly, matrilineal women
gaged, have more trust in political representatives, and believe and men have virtually indistinguishable levels of support for redistribution
that they are better able to hold political officials account- even before the treatment’s emphasis of personal costs. By contrast, and in line
able relative to women in patrilineal communities, where men with our theoretical argument, patrilineal men evidence lower support for
welfare state policies compared to patrilineal women in the control condition
traditionally own wealth. However, women are more engaged,
and further reduce their support once the personal cost of redistribution is
trusting, and confident in their agency to hold officials ac- highlighted.
countable than men in matrilineal communities. Here women, 12. Notably, the gender gap in treatment effects is significantly different
as socially sanctioned wealth owners, are more concerned across cultural groups (b p 21:98, p p :035); app. A14 presents regression
analysis of the treatment’s marginal effects within and across groups. To put
about socially beneficial political participation and able to
the magnitude of these effects in context, a drop in support for the welfare
bear its “costs.” state by 4 percentage points represents a halving of women’s differential
prioritization of government resources to reduce poverty across Africa, where
Preferences about taxation and redistribution the gender gap ranges from 7.4 to 10.7 percentage points (Clayton et al. 2019;
Next, we employ a vignette experiment to test whether differ- Gottlieb et al. 2018). In addition, Margalit (2013, 84–87) conducts a similar
experiment in the United States and finds a smaller coefficient—a 1 per-
ences in lineage norms help explain the gender gap in eco- centage point change in support for welfare policies—upon inclusion of
nomic policy preferences regarding the welfare state. The treat- personal cost (“even if this might raise your taxes”) for the group (Democrats)
ment introduces a personal cost to individual support for the that has comparably high baseline levels of support (just over 80%).000 / Meghalaya’s Matrilineal Tribes Rachel Brulé and Nikhar Gaikwad
Table 1. Effect of Personal Cost Treatment said the government and citizens have a joint responsibility
on Policy Preferences to reduce poverty. Notably, the importance of self-reliance
and private familial-style coordination is consistently reit-
Patrilineal Matrilineal erated, alongside support for state action. For one man: “Yes,
the government . . . has a big role to reduce and to eradicate
Men: poverty, as it is like the mother of all the citizens, and she
Explicit cost to policy 2.03** 2.04** must find all means and methods or ways to lift up herself
(.01) (.02) and its citizens above the poverty line.” Yet for him, “it is [also]
the responsibility of the citizen to fight against poverty. It
Constant (control) .94 .99
is the responsibility of the people as only through the will of
N 868 854
the citizen itself they can eradicate poverty” (respondent 56,
Women:
August 12, 2014). Female responses indicate a similar wres-
Explicit cost to policy 2.00 2.04*** tling with personal and state agency. For one woman: “Yes, it
(.01) (.01) is the responsibility of the government along with the partic-
Constant (control) 1.02 .97 ipations of the citizen to work together to reduce poverty. The
N 838 850 government should generate more schemes to improve the
Demographic controls Yes Yes living condition of the peoples.” Throughout, she is adamant
that reducing poverty requires citizen action “because without
Note. Demographic controls include age, educational level, wealth index, the hard work of the citizen itself the government cannot do
and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses. anything” (respondent 52, August 11, 2014).
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
Linking participation to preferences
*** p ! .01.
We now analyze the intersection of political participation
and preferences about public goods, building on the prior two
Because shared priorities drive resource allocation in mat- analyses. In particular, we expect that cultural norms about
rilineal households, both genders are equally sensitive to wealth ownership and control will predict which gender is
the cost of redistribution. Our interviews reaffirm shared most likely to participate via a costly action: communicat-
gendered concerns about the welfare state’s cost. For ex- ing preferences about redistribution policies to relevant actors.
ample, when asked whether the government should raise We expect that cultural norms about wealth control will ex-
money from the rich to help poor citizens, one Khasi woman plain the content of the preferences that individuals express:
exemplifies responses: “I don’t agree with this because most genders with culturally sanctioned control should be sensi-
of the rich people became rich because of their hard work” tive to the cost of public goods. To test this hypothesis, we
(respondent 36, June 17, 2014). Another woman reiterated: implemented a behavioral experiment to probe each respon-
“The government cannot raise money from the rich. This is dent’s willingness to take action to advocate preferences about
because the rich earn because of their hard work so it is not the welfare state. The behavioral component involved volun-
fair for the government to raise money from the rich” (re- tarily filling out and mailing a prestamped postcard.13
spondent 97, August 28, 2015). Matrilineal men concur: “No, Table 2 presents the results of this behavioral study. We
it’s not [required for the rich to reduce poverty]. But some report the treatment’s impact on individual support or op-
who are good they [may] help the poor by giving household position for the policy expressed in the received postcards.14
goods and some by monetary [contributions]” (respondent 28, In patrilineal groups, evidence of the conventional gender
June 16, 2014). gap emerges again. Introducing an explicit cost makes men,
We also asked respondents whether reducing poverty
should be the responsibility of the government, citizens, or
both and coded the open-ended answers provided. A remark- 13. The postcard text follows, with the experimental treatment in brack-
able congruity emerges across matrilineal genders: 47% of ets (complete instructions are in app. A15): “Dear Sir/Madam, I support □ /
both women and men consider the government as having the I oppose □, raising the level of funding for government programmes that help
main responsibility to curb poverty. Another 35% of women the poor and the unemployed with training, employment and social services
[even if this means that the government must raise money from people like
and 37% of men said that the government does not hold pri-
me].”
mary responsibility, but it should help citizens to pull them- 14. Twelve percent of respondents (410 of 3,410) completed and mailed
selves out of poverty. Finally, 16% of women and 13% of men back postcards.Volume 83 Number 3 July 2021 / 000
Table 2. Effect of Postcard Treatment on Policy Preferences MECHANISMS
Do cultural norms dictating the gender-specific ownership
Patrilineal Matrilineal of wealth generate incentives for both genders to coordinate
household economic decision-making when entitlements are
Men: distributed relatively equitably across genders? We begin by
Explicit cost to policy 2.12** 2.11
testing experimentally two key empirical implications of our
(.06) (.12)
theoretical mechanism.
Constant (control) 1.04 1.06
N 101 50
Women: Household decision-making authority
Explicit cost to policy 2.03 2.14*** First, our theory predicts that for patriarchal cultures with
(.02) (.04) patrilineal norms that magnify male dominance, the domi-
Constant (control) 1.03 .90 nant gender will consistently claim exclusive “final” decision-
N 112 147 making authority. In contrast, if lineage norms favor women,
Demographic controls Yes Yes
improving gender equality, we expect that final control over
decisions will be less rigid, and responsive to the preferences
Note. Demographic controls include age, educational level, wealth index,
and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses. of whomever generates more household wealth. To probe this
* p ! .10. claim, we designed an experimental question to understand
** p ! .05. the effect of gender-specific wealth control norms on indi-
*** p ! .01.
vidual authority to allocate household resources.18 The treat-
ment shifts the economic arrangement from a common sce-
the exclusive owners and controllers of wealth, 12 percentage nario, in which men are the sole income earners, to one in
points more likely to express opposition to welfare policies which women fill this role. We hypothesize that cultures with
(p p :042). In contrast, policy cost does not have a statisti- gender-inegalitarian norms regarding wealth management will
cally significant effect on the communicated policy preferences be unresponsive to the treatment, whereas those with gender-
of patrilineal women, the group excluded from owning wealth. egalitarian norms will adjust support for women’s decision-
But results differ among matrilineal groups.15 Women—as making power in response to their economic contribution.
traditional wealth owners—are 14 percentage points more Table 3 presents the results of our analysis (app. A20
likely to “participate” to express opposition to welfare state excludes controls). In matrilineal cultures, when women be-
policies when informed about their cost (p p :001). The treat- come the dominant income earners both genders are signifi-
ment effect on the expressed preferences of those traditionally cantly less likely to see the husband as the final decision maker
excluded from owning wealth (here, men) is statistically in- for household wealth allocation. But this effect diverges in
significant.16 These results support our contention that cul- patrilineal groups, where only women think decision-making
tural entitlements to wealth help explain participation to ex- should shift with income.19 These findings support our
press policy preferences and preclude costly redistribution.17
controls (apps. A16 and A18). Additionally, we use a Heckman selection
15. Note that matrilineal women are significantly more likely to mail model to account for individual propensity to send postcards in estimating the
postcards than matrilineal men, while the rates of mailing postcards between treatment effect. To do so, we first predict the probability of inclusion in our
patrilineal women and men are not statistically different. Overall support for sample—i.e., sending a postcard—on the basis of one’s distance from the
the welfare state is very high across all groups. Table 2 indicates that support nearest post office. While this factor is a good predictor of sending postcards,
levels are similar for patrilineal men and women. Matrilineal men and women it should be less likely to influence individuals’ preferences. Our results remain
appear to have differing baseline levels, but our restricted sample size limits robust to this adjustment (app. A19).
inferential leverage for this comparison. 18. Respondents received the following question (experimental treat-
16. The gender gap in revealed preferences differs significantly across ment in brackets): “Imagine a typical husband and wife in your community.
groups (b p 23:01, p p :059). See app. A16 for analyses of the treatment’s [The wife stays at home while the husband earns money/The husband stays at
marginal effects within and across cultural groups. home while the wife earns money]. Let’s assume the two of them disagree over
17. Note that comparing results only among postcard senders will a costly household purchase. Should the man be the person to make the final
produce biased estimates if the treatment systematically alters respondents’ decision?” No (0) or yes (1).
willingness to mail the postcards. This does not appear to be a concern, 19. Both patrilineal men and women express high levels of support for
however. We find that individual propensity to submit postcards is inde- men making decisions at baseline, underlining the prevalence of “classic
pendent of treatment status (app. A17). Our results are robust to including a patriarchy.” Few matrilineal women, and a majority of matrilineal men
control for what is most likely to physically constrain behavior (distance from (for whom income is the only source of financial autonomy), express such
the nearest post office), as well as to excluding or including our standard support at baseline.000 / Meghalaya’s Matrilineal Tribes Rachel Brulé and Nikhar Gaikwad
Table 3. Gendered Wealth Treatment Effect social hierarchy make those financial resources less valuable
on Decision-Making Preferences to lower-status individuals, relative to policies that directly
transfer resources from the state to all individuals in a house-
Patrilineal Matrilineal
hold. If our theoretical mechanisms hold, then the treatment
should nudge individuals to choose the financially more lu-
Men:
crative option—regardless of who receives resources—when
Wife is the main earner .01 2.17***
norms are gender egalitarian. Where both genders have a
(.02) (.02)
Constant (control) .67 .99 voice in wealth management, their ability to benefit from the
N 577 564 state’s financial resources should not vary with the distribu-
Women: tion mechanism. By contrast, where wealth control norms are
Wife is the main earner 2.03* 2.09*** gender inegalitarian, the dominant gender should benefit dis-
(.02) (.02) proportionately from the receipt of goods given to household
Constant (control) .62 .36 heads. Here, the treatment should increase support for the
N 560 567
more lucrative distribution channel—via the household head—
Demographic controls Yes Yes
only for those who anticipate benefits: men. In patrilineal
Note. Demographic controls include age, educational level, wealth index, groups, we thus expect gender-divergent preferences for dis-
and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses. tribution channels.
* p ! .10. Table 4 displays the effect of the treatment: making trans-
** p ! .05. fers from the state to the household head more remunerative
*** p ! .01.
than direct transfers from the state to each individual (see also
app. A21). For matrilineal groups, the treatment induces pref-
erence convergence around maximizing household wealth. The
hypothesis about the substantive difference in financial
treatment makes women and men significantly more likely to
decision-making authority across cultures. In cultures in which
prefer direct cash transfers to the household head. In patri-
lineage norms exacerbate inequality, members of the gender
lineal cultures, the treatment causes only men, the group with
culturally empowered to make decisions (patrilineal men)
culturally sanctioned authority to control wealth, to choose
retain their sense of authority even when they are not the
the most financially lucrative option of direct cash transfers.
household’s main economic contributor. Where egalitarian
Lacking direct control over wealth, patrilineal women con-
wealth control norms hold, in matrilineal groups, authority
tinue to support state distribution to individuals even when
over final household decision-making is more responsive to
individual economic contributions in a gender-blind fashion.
Table 4. Public Goods Distribution Channel Treatment
Decision-making and policy preferences Effect on Preferences
Second, we conduct an experimental test to investigate whether
Patrilineal Matrilineal
altering the mechanism for distributing public goods—either
by engaging or circumnavigating the household head—changes
Men:
the value individuals place on redistribution.20 The treat-
Costly government distribution 2.07* 2.08**
ment examines the impact of distributing cash directly to the
(.04) (.04)
household head versus 30% less cash via government pro- Constant (control) .54 .48
grams. In our comparison (control) group, individuals receive N 578 568
an equal amount of financial resources via each distribution Women:
mechanism. This measures whether policies that give finan- Costly government distribution 2.06 2.16***
cial resources only to the individual at the top of a household’s (.04) (.04)
Constant (control) .81 .24
N 556 560
Demographic controls Yes Yes
20. Respondents received the following question, with the experimental
treatment in brackets: “Which policy would you prefer? (1) The government Note. Demographic controls include age, educational level, wealth index,
will give Rs. 1,000 per month in cash to household heads of poor families to and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
improve their welfare. (2) The government will spend [Rs. 1,000/Rs. 700] per * p ! .10.
month on programs to improve the welfare of poor families.” Choice of pol- ** p ! .05.
icy 1 vs. 2 was coded 0 or 1, respectively. *** p ! .01.You can also read
