Cross-border climate change impacts: implications for the European Union
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Regional Environmental Change (2019) 19:763–776
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1436-1
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Cross-border climate change impacts: implications
for the European Union
Magnus Benzie 1 & Timothy R. Carter 2 & Henrik Carlsen 1 & Richard Taylor 3
Received: 4 December 2017 / Accepted: 29 October 2018 / Published online: 3 January 2019
# Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019
Abstract
The European Union (EU) is increasingly connected to the rest of the world via flows of people, capital, goods and resources,
exposing it to the potential impacts of climate change occurring outside its borders, in addition to impacts occurring on and
between EU countries themselves. However, there is currently no peer-reviewed literature that describes the way in which cross-
border impacts might affect the EU as a whole, or what the pattern of exposure to cross-border impacts might look like from a
European perspective. This paper describes the pathways via which the EU may be impacted and analyses indicator data to
identify some of the potential key issues for EU adaptation. We find that many EU countries are more exposed than the global
average to climate-related risks in the context of transboundary water dependency, trade openness, openness to asylum and
globalisation. We introduce a typology of cross-border climate change impacts to guide future assessments and adaptation
planning in the European Union: EU internal aspects resulting from climate risks shared between neighbouring member states
and within the single market; EU external aspects resulting from climate impacts beyond the EU’s borders; and EU impacts on
the rest of the world, recognising that the EU and its member states will themselves transmit impacts to others depending on the
success of their own adaptation efforts. Cross-border climate impacts raise a number of challenges for EU adaptation—such as
applying existing cohesion and external action mechanisms to build resilience to cross-border climate change impacts, or
monitoring member states to track changes in exposure to Binternal^ cross-border climate risks; and to research—such as making
better use of economic, trade and other supply chain modelling and data analysis to assess climate-related risks, as well as other
methods and approaches that have not been applied widely in adaptation studies to date. Overcoming these challenges will help to
advance society’s understanding of and preparedness for cross-border climate change impacts.
Keywords Climate change impacts . Adaptation strategies . Risk exposure . Cross-border . Spillover . Globalisation . European
Union . Cascading effects
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article
(https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1436-1) contains supplementary
material, which is available to authorized users.
* Magnus Benzie 1
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), P.O. Box 24218, SE-104
magnus.benzie@sei.org 51 Stockholm, Sweden
2
Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), Latokartanonkaari 11, Box
Timothy R. Carter 140, FI-00790 Helsinki, Finland
tim.carter@ymparisto.fi 3
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) Oxford Centre, 29 Grove
Henrik Carlsen Street, OX2 7JT Oxford, UK
henrik.carlsen@sei.org
Richard Taylor
richard.taylor@sei.org
764 M. Benzie et al.
Introduction We consider the EU an appropriate level of analysis be-
cause it has clear competences in defining, designing and co-
Background and objectives ordinating policy for member states on topics that are relevant
to the topic of cross-border impacts, such as trade, finance,
In the modern world, Europe is connected to and highly migration and environmental protection. Cross-border coop-
dependent upon many other parts of the globe. With a pop- eration is a central tenet of the founding treaties of the
ulation of over 508 million people in 2015 (6.9% of the European Union. Since 2013 the EU has also had its own
global total) and a GDP of almost €14 trillion (23.8% of adaptation strategy,2 which should presumably take account
the global total) in 2014 (Eurostat data1), the European of all climate risks to which the EU is exposed.
Union (EU) is the leading global exporter and importer of We define the cross-border impacts of climate change as
goods and commercial services by value, a net importer of the consequences for a country—or other planning entity,
energy resources and other raw materials and a major ex- such as a regional organisation (such as the EU)—of climate
porter and importer of food, drink and agricultural products change impacts occurring at a different location beyond that
(e.g. see Fig. A and Table A, Supplementary Material). The country’s border (or the region’s borders). The mechanisms
EU is also: the world’s leading supplier and recipient of via which climate impacts cross borders can be various; they
foreign direct investment; the major source region and des- include physical flows such as impacts on the quality or avail-
tination for international tourism; the world’s largest pro- ability of traded commodities, as well as information flows,
vider of official development assistance (ODA); and a net such as price effects. We further explore and define types of
recipient of international migration. cross-border impacts below.
Climate change is projected by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change to amplify existing risks and cre- Current knowledge about cross-border impacts
ate new risks for natural and human systems worldwide— in the EU
some limited to particular sectors or regions, others having
cascading effects and many with high confidence attached Research on cross-border impacts of climate change is still in
(IPCC 2014). Slow onset changes are expected to alter the its infancy. The issue is referred to in the IPCC AR5 as Bcross
viability of trading partners, influencing ecosystem func- regional phenomena^, requiring Bknowledge of critical but
tions, food security, human security and human mobility geographically remote associations and of dynamic cross-
and health, as well as increasing the propensity for extreme boundary flows^ (Hewitson et al. 2014). Aspects brought to-
events to disrupt livelihoods and economic activity across gether under that heading (but also treated separately in other
all sectors (IPCC 2014). AR5 chapters—see Oppenheimer et al. 2014) include impacts
These two facts—the deep integration of Europe with the of climate change on international trade, on financial flows
rest of the world and the high confidence that climate change and on human migration and transboundary ecosystems
will negatively impact countries directly or through cascading (Hewitson et al. 2014).
effects—raise the prospect of cross-border climate change im- A growing body of evidence seeks to describe cross-
pacts as a potentially significant challenge for the EU. border impacts at a global or general scale. For example,
However, there is very little research into the implications of vulnerabilities to the regional impacts of climate change on
cross-border impacts within Europe (i.e. between European manufactured and agricultural commodities that are traded
countries) or from a European perspective, and to our knowl- on the global market are examined by Lewis and Witham
edge no peer-reviewed literature that assesses the EU’s expo- (2012a, b). Coastal regions and ports have been a focus of
sure to such impacts (i.e. as a regional organisation, as op- some studies that recognise their importance for interna-
posed to literature on the exposure of individual member tional trade, infrastructure and supply chains (e.g. Becker
states to international effects in general). This paper seeks to et al. 2018; Nicholls and Kebede 2012; Wellesley et al.
open this topic to greater scrutiny. 2017), whilst the sub-national jurisdictional implications
The paper has three objectives: first, to indicate the path- of cross-border impacts at the local and state level have also
ways and pattern of the EU’s exposure to cross-border im- been highlighted, though not in a European context (e.g.
pacts; second, to suggest a typology of cross-border impacts Singh-Peterson et al. 2013 for Australia; Gotangco et al.
from an EU perspective in order to guide future assessments; 2017 for Metro Manila, Philippines). Other initiatives have
and third, to suggest future policy and research challenges that sought to analyse the potential for climate risks to propagate
need to be addressed in order to support adaptation to cross- via global networks, especially via global food networks
border impacts in and by the EU. (e.g. Bren d’Amour et al. 2016; Suweis et al. 2015; Liu
et al. 2014; Costinot et al. 2016) or global economic
1 2
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/what_enCross-border climate change impacts: implications for the European Union 765
cascade effects across sectors (e.g. Wenz and Leverman More recently, an economic modelling assessment of
2016). Whilst all of these studies add highly valuable in- cross-border impacts on the EU was conducted as part
sight into the nature of the risk, few studies have yet been of the GAP PESETA project (Ciscar et al. 2018, p. 64).
completed to support assessment and decision-making for According to this analysis, which used a computable
adaptation to cross-border impacts (Liverman 2016). As general equilibrium model called CAGE to assess how
yet, there is no peer-reviewed literature on the implications changes outside the EU would economically impact the
of cross-border climate impacts specifically for the EU as a EU, the effects are likely to be small. The key climate
whole. Instead, the current knowledge base on the implica- impact categories identified by the analysis were hypo-
tions of cross-border impacts for the EU is made up of a thetical agriculture and labour productivity shocks; a
number of national-level assessments, which provide in- hypothetical agriculture shock might lead to welfare
sights that could be scaled up to infer implications at the losses of about $5 billion, whereas losses from de-
EU level, and a small number of European-level policy creased labour productivity outside the EU could be
reports. around $3 billion. Additionally, indirect losses from cli-
National assessments of cross-border climate change mate impacts on coastal infrastructure outside the EU
impacts have been undertaken in a number of EU coun- might lead to between $0.5 billion and $2 billion worth
tries, including Finland (Kankaanpää and Carter 2007; of losses inside the EU, depending on the scenario of
Hildén et al. 2016), the United Kingdom (Foresight sea level rise used. The most significant sources of
2011; PwC 2013; Challinor et al. 2016) and the cross-border impacts for the EU were identified as
Netherlands (Vonk et al. 2015), as well as non-EU China and Brazil. There are certain limitations of stud-
Switzerland (INFRAS 2007), with other assessments ies that employ equilibrium modelling techniques to this
currently underway, for example in Germany. These question, including their poor treatment of shocks and
tend to employ a broadly international focus, with less higher-end climate change impacts (see Watkiss et al.
attention paid to European issues per se. Key issues 2015; Lamperti et al. 2016), which might also explain
identified in these assessments include climate impacts the low-cost estimates in the results. However, studies
on trade and businesses resulting from price volatility such as this provide insights that are otherwise not
and supply chain disruption, and political and security available on the economic cross-border impacts of cli-
implications of increased disasters and negative climate mate change.
impacts in partner countries, requiring more or new A third source of information on cross-border impacts for
forms of intervention through development assistance, the EU is offered by the European Environment Agency3 re-
diplomacy and foreign policy. One national study, for port on climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe
the UK, concluded that cross-border impacts could be 2016 (Lung et al. 2017). This is the first time the EEA report,
Ban order of magnitude larger than domestic threats and which is published every 4 years, has placed such emphasis on
opportunities for some thematic areas, in particular busi- cross-border dimensions (largely drawing on grey literature
ness (trade and investment) and food (supply chains)^ and the national studies described above). It concludes that
(PwC 2013, p. 2). European vulnerability to cross-border impacts is expected
Specific European level assessments include a report to increase in the coming decades. Based on current evidence,
commissioned by the European Commission Directorate- the EEA identify the following priority vulnerabilities for
General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) in 2012 to Europe from climate change outside Europe (based on
assess the Bspillover effects^ in the EU of the adverse section 6.4 of the EEA report, Lung et al. 2017):
effects of climate change in the rest of the world, which
concentrated on impacts in the EU’s neighbourhood & Economic effects through climate-caused global price
countries (Amec 2013). This report identified some of volatilities;
the priority impacts for the EU and in many cases spec- & Disruption to transport networks such as ports;
ified which member states were likely to be most af- & Changes in the Arctic environment, including new ship-
fected. The report concluded that policy responses at the ping routes;
EU and member state level had in general not directly & Vulnerability hot spots in Mediterranean countries suscep-
taken spillover effects into account. It also stated that tible to agricultural commodity trade shocks;
regardless of the success of domestic adaptation efforts
within Europe, the EU would remain vulnerable to cli-
mate change impacts in neighbouring countries and that the
challenge was therefore for the EU to use the tools at its dis- 3
EEA member countries include all EU 28 member states as well as 5 non-EU
posal to support adaptation and improve the security of indus- members. EEA reports are therefore considered of high relevance to EU policy
trial links and supply chains in its neighbourhood. making, despite the difference in membership.766 M. Benzie et al.
& Vulnerability hot spots in small, open and highly devel- research. The BConclusions^ section provides some conclu-
oped European economies sensitive to non-agricultural sions of our analysis.
commodity trade shocks;
& Increased Bstrategic importance^ of North Africa (partic-
ularly the Sahel and Maghreb) and Middle East in terms of
climate-induced human migration flows and geopolitical Method
and security considerations.
In order to identify the pathways and pattern of the EU’s
A separate chapter of the EEA report (Castellari et al. 2017) exposure to cross-border effects, we have performed a new
identifies six Bmacro-regions^4 inside Europe, which are analysis of data used in computing the Transnational Climate
Btransnational region(s) crossing administrative boundaries Impacts Index (TCI Index), which was developed to raise
with common biogeographical characteristics, thus exhibiting awareness of the implications of cross-border impacts for
particular climate change impacts and vulnerabilities^. The global adaptation governance. Many existing global vulnera-
report does not specify how climate change impacts might bility indices aim to show end-point vulnerability to the po-
cross administrative boundaries, noting the lack of robust, tential direct impacts of climate change inside a country or
integrated impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessments region of interest, which implies a consideration of exposure,
across geographical and governance scales (EEA 2017, p. sensitivity and adaptive capacity (IPCC 2007). In contrast, the
322). TCI Index focuses on exposure alone (in order to avoid the
Nevertheless, Castellari et al. (2017) raise the important additional layers of complexity inherent with assessments of
issue of climate change impacts crossing internal European response capacity), with that exposure being to potential im-
borders. This point is also reflected in some of the national- pacts of climate change on a country’s assets and interests that
level assessments: for example Vonk et al. (2015) highlight occur as a result of climate change impacts outside the country
intra-European power supply and ICT infrastructure as two (Benzie et al. 2016, p. 7). The index is based on empirical data
key issues for the Netherlands, whilst Hilden et al. (2018) find and therefore measures current exposure; no attempt is made
that projected increases in hydropower potential under chang- to project exposure into the future. Thus, country profiles rep-
ing climate in Sweden and Norway would have transnational resent a snapshot, and would be expected to change over time.
effects on profitability, pricing and share of renewables in the Mainstream climate change vulnerability indices, such as
Nordic power market. However, there is no analysis of how the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index5 (ND-GAIN), score
these impacts might play out at the EU scale. most industrialised countries as having low vulnerability to
A review of the literature on this topic also reveals the lack potential climate impacts, giving the impression that adapta-
of shared or consistent terminology that is used to describe tion challenges will be low and manageable. The TCI Index
what is variously referred to as Binternational threats and considers the characteristics of countries that are likely to ex-
opportunities^ (PwC 2013), Bworldwide effects^ (Vonk et al. pose them to climate-related changes in international flows of
2015), Binternational influences^ (INFRAS 2007), Bcross- resources, finance, people and goods.
border effects^ (Hildén et al. 2016) or elsewhere as Bindirect^ The TCI Index uses a framework of climate risk pathways
(Benzie et al. 2013) or Btransnational^ climate change impacts as the starting point for its analysis: biophysical, trade, finance
(Benzie et al. 2016)—for a review of terminology, see Benzie and people, plus global context (see Box 1). For each pathway,
et al. (2017). Thus, one helpful way forward to support EU- the authors of the index identified hypotheses that describe the
level assessment would presumably be to develop a consistent characteristics that would expose countries to cross-border
typology and language with which to describe this dimension impacts. A total of 13 indicators was selected from this list
of climate risk. following a focused expert consultation process. This list was
In the BMethod^ section, we introduce the method that we further refined to a total of nine indicators after accounting for
have employed to map EU member states’ exposure to cross- data availability and quality. The assumptions, characteristics,
border impacts, as well as a framing based on impact path- data sources and selection rationale for each indicator, along
ways that has been used to guide our analysis. The BResults^ with more detail on the methodology used to the develop the
section presents our results, suggesting the pattern of exposure index framework, are provided in Benzie et al. (2016).
in EU countries. The BDiscussion^ section discusses these Indicator results, maps and code used in the analysis are open-
results, offering a typology of impacts from an EU perspective ly accessible online.6 An analysis of the global index results is
and identifying challenges that arise for both policy and provided by Hedlund et al. (2018).
5
http://index.gain.org/
6
Results data and maps are available from the Stockholm Environment
4
These are the European Arctic, Baltic Sea, Pyrenees mountain region, Alps Institute website https://www.sei-international.org/publications?pid=2972;
mountain region, Carpathian mountain region and Mediterranean region. code is accessible via GitHub https://github.com/sei-international/TCICross-border climate change impacts: implications for the European Union 767
Box 1: Pathways of impacts
The concept of climate risk pathways through which impacts can be transferred was first mooted in work at the Stockholm Environment Institute (Benzie
et al. 2013, 2016; Benzie 2014), who defined four pathways that operate within a global context of stability and security (“SEI” in Table 1). These
pathways categorise the different “flows” that connect countries, which are themselves vulnerable to climate change impacts. Flows can be physical,
such as material goods, or informational, such as price signals. They are as follows:
• The biophysical pathway, cross-border ecosystems (e.g. floods or droughts upstream in a river basin)
• The trade pathway, via international markets
• The finance pathway, the flow of public and private capital
• The people pathway, the movement of people across borders.
Similar definitions were adopted for work in Finland (“FIN” below; Hildén et al. 2016), but with two additions: infrastructural, describing impacts
transmitted via cross-border infrastructure and geopolitical pathways, describing climate-related changes to international relations and strategy, and by
the European Environment Agency (“EEA” below; Lung et al. 2017), who dropped the biophysical pathway and subdivided the trade pathway into
two (for agricultural and non-agricultural commodities). The Finnish study also identifies a cognitive pathway, which describes the understanding by
key actors of how climate impacts occurring in one region may be of importance in another. The overall impact of a remote climate event may hence be
ameliorated or magnified (or not) depending on how it is perceived and acted upon at different steps along the chain of cause and effect. Here, we
interpret this as a cross-cutting filter that modifies impacts occurring through each of the other pathways (Table 1).
A similar approach to the pathway-based studies listed above is adopted by Moser and Hart (2015). They refer to “societal teleconnections”: trade and
economic exchange, insurance and reinsurance, energy systems, food systems, human health, population migration, communication, and strategic
alliances and military interactions.
Pathways of climate risk may operate over different scales. Benzie et al. (2016) distinguish between transboundary impacts across borders and
teleconnected impacts via more remote links and international networks.
The nine indicators, including the climate risk pathways change impact exposure profile for the EU. A simple average
under which they are categorised (in brackets), are7 (1) does not account for the relative influence of large EU mem-
transboundary water dependency (biophysical), (2) bilateral bers (e.g. Germany) over smaller ones (e.g. Luxembourg or
climate-weighted foreign direct investment (finance), (3) re- Malta) in determining the EU profile. However, this approach
mittance flows (finance), (4) openness to asylum (people), (5) provides a rough indication of the exposure that is typical of
migration from climate-vulnerable countries (people), (6) EU member states. Results are summarised in the BResults^
trade openness (trade), (7) cereal import dependency (trade), section (see also Supplementary Material).
(8) embedded water risk (trade) and (9) KOF (Swiss
Economic Institute) Globalisation Index (global context).
The indicators fall into two groups: those that measure a
country’s openness and reliance on international flows in gen- Results
eral (nos. 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9) and those that measure the risk or
opportunity associated with specific countries that it is linked In this section we present results of our analysis of TCI indi-
to (nos. 2, 5, 8). Data were gathered for 203 countries. cator data for EU countries and the EU28 as a bloc. Whilst
Countries were ranked for each indicator and a global map recognising that mainstream climate change indices such as
produced to summarise results. The pattern of exposure glob- ND-GAIN are not directly comparable to the TCI Index in
ally differs between each indicator, offering complementary absolute terms, the patterns of relative vulnerability/exposure
insights into the potential distribution of climate risk from a can be compared (Fig. 1). Whereas none of the top 30 coun-
cross-border perspective. The nine indicators have also been tries in the NG-GAIN are in the EU, 30% of the top 30 coun-
combined into a simple composite index, for which data are tries on the TCI Index are small European nations, including
available for 152 of the 203 countries (due to incomplete the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal,
global coverage on a number of datasets used in the analysis). Montenegro,8 Malta, Austria and Lithuania. This makes
In this paper we have extracted indicator data for all EU Europe the most heavily represented global region in the
member states from the TCI Index database to produce two TCI Index top 30, reflecting the high dependency of small
layers of analysis. First, individual country scores for EU na- industrialised countries on neighbours and global systems
tions have been compared to non-EU countries in order to (see Supplementary Materials, Table B for an overview of
consider EU exposure relative to the rest of the world. the top 30 countries in the ND-GAIN and TCI indices).
Second, we have calculated an average across each indicator Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of countries’ scores using both
score for the EU28 in order to create a cross-border climate ND-GAIN and the TCI Index. It indicates that the spread of
results in the TCI Index amongst EU countries (y axis) is
almost as broad as across the rest of the world, even though
7
See Table 3 in the Supplementary Materials for a description of each
8
indicator. Not currently an EU member state.768 M. Benzie et al.
0.21 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.4 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.51
0.39 0.45 0.5 0.54 0.62 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.66 0.82
Fig. 1 Comparison between ND-GAIN (Notre Dame Global Adaptation 0.62 in ND-GAIN and 0.4–0.82 in the TCI Index. Each index is mapped
Initiative; left) and TCI (Transnational Climate Impacts) Index (right) for globally, but here we zoom in on Europe only. Scores for European
European countries; ND-GAIN assesses vulnerability to Bdirect^ climate countries are therefore relative to the global results. Darker colours indi-
impacts within a country’s borders, and the TCI Index assesses exposure cate higher vulnerability/exposure. As such, mapped patterns can be com-
to transnational climate impacts originating outside a country’s borders. pared, but numerical scores are not comparable between the two maps.
The results show that European countries are relatively more exposed, The legend shows the deciles (10% ranges) that are used to determine the
globally, in the TCI Index than they are vulnerable to direct impacts in shading for each score (1–10) in each index globally (data sources: http://
ND-GAIN. The two indices are not strictly comparable: they are based on index.gain.org/ and Benzie et al. 2016)
different methods and the range of scores varies globally between 0.21–
they are tightly bunched at the low end of the ND-GAIN (x well as of the potential implications for the stability and resil-
axis). ience of the European single market.
In order to further understand the EU’s exposure to cross- By calculating an average of the country-level scores for
border impacts relative to the rest of the world, we analysed each indicator in the TCI Index, we present an indicative pro-
the top scoring countries on each indicator and distinguished file of the EU’s exposure to cross-border impacts in Fig. 3.
between EU and non-EU countries (see Figs. B to G in Whilst the EU is not a country, its collective interactions with
Supplementary Material). The EU28 average is higher than the rest of the world, as represented by the EU28 average,
the average score for the rest of the world on a number of provides a reasonable overview of the types and scale of EU
indicators, including transboundary water dependency, trade exposure along each of the nine indicators. The EU28 scores
openness, openness to asylum and globalisation. For others, low on bilateral climate-weighted foreign direct investment
such as indicators of exposure via the finance pathway, EU (FDI), because significant proportions of FDI from EU mem-
countries are less exposed than the global average, according ber states are invested in relatively low-risk countries, includ-
to the TCI Index data. Of particular note is the extremely high ing much of it within the EU itself. The EU28 also have low
dependence of the EU’s smallest countries on trade, raising the dependency on remittances, making an overall low exposure
prospect of significant trade-related climate risks that will re- via finance pathway indicators, in comparison to the rest of the
quire further, more detailed analysis at the country level, as world. Certain aspects of the EU28 increase the bloc’s
Table 1 Pathways of cross-border impact
Pathway (SEI) Pathway (EEA) Pathway (FIN) Example climate impacts on
Finance Finance Financial Cognitive filter • Economy (extreme events)
Climate impacts perception/adaptation • Remittances
People Human mobility Human mobility • Climate-related migration
• Tourist flows
Trade Trade (non-agricultural commodities) Trade • Raw materials
• Manufacturing
Trade (agricultural commodities) • Food price volatility
• Reliability of supply
Infrastructure Infrastructural • Transport links
• Reliability of energy supply
Biophysical Biophysical • River basin management
• Invasive species
Global context Geopolitical risks Geopolitical • Arctic resources
• Access to waterCross-border climate change impacts: implications for the European Union 769
7.5
NLD
LUX BEL
7
6.5 PRT
MLT
SVK AUT LVA
TCI Index
6 DEU LTU
SVN
CYP
IRL HUN EST
5.5 DNK GRC
ITA
GBR HRV BGR
FRA ROU
5 ESP
SWE
CZE ISL
FIN
4.5 POL
9
4
JOR BHR 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
LBN
8 ND-GAIN
KWT
ARE
NLD SDN
LUX BEL MRT
MYS
7 EGY
DJI COG
TJK SWZ TGO
PRT GMB KEN
MLT SAU ZAF MDV
LVA ARM THA PAN FJI
SVK AUT AZE SGP NAM LSO NER LBR
OMNMUS JAMSLV
DEU CHE LTU
TCD
6 SVN TUN KGZ VUT UGA
HUN CYP ISR MKD MDA KOR BHS
CPV NIC ATG IND GHA MOZ SLB GNB
IRL EST GEO LKACRI SYR ZWE
TCI Index
DNK GRC HND IRQ YEM BDI
ITA BLR BLZ VCT DOM PAK
GBR HRV BGR ROU IRN SRB MAR SEN KHM BEN
FRA NZL LCA UZB VNM
NOR CHL BOL GUY NPL CIV SLE
5 AUS UKR MEX ECU ALBGTM KNA RWA GIN
SWE CAN PRY LBY HTI MLI
CZE TUR CHN PHL DMA
POL
FIN ESP ISL JPN
KAZ DZA PER MNG BGD NGA BFA
BIH VEN TTO MWI PLW COD
USA COL CUB TON CMR ZMB TZA
4 ARG URY AGO
BRA SUR LAO
ETH
IDN
RUS Non-EU
3
MDG EU
2
top 30 %
1
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
ND-GAIN
Fig. 2 Scatter plot graph showing ND-GAIN (Notre Dame Global Kingdom, HRV Croatia, ROU Romania, ITA Italy, DNK Denmark,
Adaptation Initiative) vs TCI (Transnational Climate Impacts) Index GRC Greece, EST Estonia, IRL Republic of Ireland, CYP Cyprus,
results per country (EU countries are shown in red; the rest of the world HUN Hungary, SVN Slovenia, DEU Germany, AUT Austria, LTU
is shown in green). The section containing EU countries is shown Lithuania, SVK Slovakia, LVA Latvia, MLT Malta, PRT Portugal, BEL
zoomed-in (top right). POL Poland, FIN Finland, CZE Czech Republic, Belgium, LUX Luxemburg, NLD the Netherlands
ESP Spain, FRA France, SWE Sweden, BGR Bulgaria, GBR United
Fig. 3 EU profile (shaded Transboundary
grey)—exposure to cross-border water dependency
10
climate change impacts using data KOF Globalizaon Bilateral climate-
from the TCI Index (Benzie et al. Index 8 weighted FDI
2016). An average of the EU28
member states has been calculat- 6
ed for each of the nine indicators
(radial axes, labelled): a score of 1 4
signals low exposure (bottom Embedded water 2 Remiance flows
10% of all countries worldwide; a risk
score of 10 signals high exposure 0
(top 10% worldwide)). KOF is the
Swiss Economic Institute; FDI is
Foreign Direct Investment
Openness to
Cereal import
asylum
dependency
Migraon from
climate vulnerable
Trade openness countries770 M. Benzie et al.
exposure to potential changes in the flow of people across The EU should be concerned with this dimension because it
national borders, although the migration links between EU could threaten cohesion and solidarity within the union itself,
countries and the most vulnerable parts of the world are less and thereby raises the prospect of EU intervention and coor-
than for many developing countries. In contrast, aspects of the dination in adapting to internal aspects.
EU28 trade profile and their extremely high overall level of
engagement in the global economy mean that events outside
the EU could have profound impacts on welfare inside the BEU external^
EU28 as a result of cross-border impacts.
Despite the usefulness of the TCI Index in developing an These are climate change impacts beyond the EU’s borders
initial idea of the pattern of EU exposure in relation to the that create risks for the EU as a bloc,9 as well as its member
rest of the world, a more bespoke and detailed indicator- states individually. This includes spillover effects from im-
based assessment of European exposure would be helpful pacts in the countries of the European neighbourhood,10 as
for informing future adaptation planning at the EU scale. It well as those further afield that are linked to the EU via the
is worth noting that the Index was developed with a global climate risk pathways, as described above. Likewise, adapta-
scope and indicators were selected that had general rele- tion actions beyond the EU—in addition to climate change
vance and for which data were available globally (see impacts themselves—will have cross-border ramifications,
Benzie et al. 2016, pp. 7–12). In any case, caution should and therefore require adaptation within the EU itself.
be exercised in interpreting indicator-based approaches, Member states should care about the external aspect because
given that they rely on subjective choices of the attributes it will influence domestic resilience and require adaptation at
to be displayed, may be strongly influenced by the methods the national level. In addition, the EU has a remit to govern
used to combine indicators and are constrained by the qual- various external functions, including, crucially, trade and the
ity and coverage of data used in their construction (Hedlund growing importance of coordinated EU action on security,
et al. 2018). defence, diplomacy, climate change and the significant role
played by the EU in development cooperation, both in the
European neighbourhood and beyond.
Discussion
Cross-border impacts from an EU perspective BEU impacts on the Rest of the World^
Considering the characteristics of EU economies that are These are climate change impacts within the EU that will
likely to increase exposure to cross-border climate change affect countries outside the EU because of the links and de-
impacts described above, we identify three distinct types of pendencies that exist between the EU and its global partners.
impacts relevant to the EU. This typology covers impacts Likewise, adaptation measures taken by and within the EU
that may be positive or negative, from both a EU and non- will have consequences on the rest of the world, whether de-
EU perspective. liberate (e.g. changes to development aid), indirect (e.g.
resulting from changes to the Common Agriculture Policy)
BEU internal^ or unknown (e.g. due to changes in insurance markets).
Negative EU impacts on the Rest of the World (EUROW) im-
These are climate change impacts in one EU member state that pacts could be considered Bmal-adaptations^, at least from the
spill over internal EU borders to create risks for other EU perspective of affected places outside the EU (see Atteridge
member states. Given the important role of internal EU trade, and Remling 2018). Positive EUROW impacts could be con-
high levels of social, economic and infrastructure integration sidered additional contributions of EU adaptation to the global
and the number of climate-sensitive transboundary ecosys- public good. Both should be assessed as part of national and
tems and physiographic features within the EU, we expect EU adaptation strategies to better account for cross-border
EU internal impacts to comprise a significant proportion of effects. Ignoring EUROW impacts could negatively impact
cross-border risks under future climate conditions. Similarly, the EU’s diplomatic standing, where direct harm is caused to
the implementation of adaptation actions in one EU country others, but it could also ultimately rebound to negatively
will affect flows between member states, potentially in ways 9
For example, financial risks threaten the stability of the Eurozone countries,
that require adaptation elsewhere and coordination inside the and the BRefugee Crisis^ in Europe had political ramifications for the EU as a
union and by the EU itself (e.g. transboundary river basins in whole (e.g. threatening core pillars of the EU such as the freedom of move-
ment and the integrity of specific agreements, such as Schengen), in addition to
Europe). Member states should be concerned about internal
posing challenges to individual member states.
aspects because they will potentially add to the climate risk 10
Those countries to the east and south of the EU; for a full list, see https://ec.
burden they face and require specific adaptation responses. europa.eu/culture/policy/international-cooperation/neighbourhood_enCross-border climate change impacts: implications for the European Union 771
impact the EU, given the interdependencies that are described theme at the heart of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is
above. that Bdisasters know no borders^, making it a potentially use-
ful and highly relevant instrument with which to build EU-
wide resilience to climate change-related as well as other ex-
Challenges for EU adaptation treme events. A mid-term evaluation of the Mechanism is
currently ongoing, opening up the opportunity for it to be
The EU Adaptation Strategy recognises the importance of modified and applied to address climate-relevant emergencies
cross-border climate change impacts. This includes recogni- inside and beyond the EU’s borders.
tion of both EU internal and external aspects (EC 2013, p. 5). Similarly, EU Cohesion Fund and Structural Funds have
Cooperation to address internal impacts has occurred with- attempted to mainstream climate change adaptation over re-
in the EU in the water management sector, for example via cent years. They dedicate significant EU investments to pro-
International River Basin Management Plans under the Water jects and programmes that hold potential to address cross-
Framework Directive.11 This is also starting to occur for coast- border climate change impacts via regional approaches, espe-
al area management (EEA 2017, p. 55). However, for other cially in parts of the EU that exhibit high vulnerability to
sectors and issues, the level of awareness about cross-border climate change impacts.
Bshared climate risks^ and adaptation needs is low. Specific EU external related impacts are set to be addressed more
knowledge gaps relating to the internal aspects of cross-border comprehensively in the next iteration of the EU Adaptation
climate change impacts include the following: Strategy. Cross-border issues were highlighted as one of the
thematic areas that is being evaluated by the European
& Food security risks stemming from poor harvests within Commission (EC) to inform this new strategy, partly because
the EU single market; it represents a clear area where the EC can Badd value^ to
& Cascading risks from climate change impacts on critical member state approaches to adaptation. However, the EU
infrastructure in the EU; Adaptation Strategy is only a Communication—it is not legis-
& Financial risks stemming from exposure of individual lation; the EU is limited in the extent to which it can oblige
member states via their investments in other EU markets, member states to adapt, or to influence or steer adaptation im-
for example as a result of failed adaptation in some of the plementation at member state level. A focus for the EU in
EU’s most vulnerable countries; addressing cross-border impacts is therefore to mainstream
& The social and political opportunities and risks associated such considerations in existing (Bnon-adaptation^) instruments.
with increased human mobility between member states as The EU could also seek to enhance its role internationally
a result of adverse climate change impacts within the EU; in facilitating effective adaptation amongst the EU’s global
& The cross-border impacts of climate change on partners. Potential priority cross-border impacts for consider-
transboundary ecosystems and other Bmacro-regions^ that ation include migration and security, particularly in relation to
are currently under-studied (e.g. not covered in EEA heightened risk of instability in Europe’s neighbourhood,
reports). trade, Common Agricultural Policy reform and climate resil-
ience in financial markets.
The EU may look at options for improved monitoring and Existing mechanisms can be used to achieve adaptation to
evaluation of member state adaptation planning and imple- external aspects of cross-border climate impacts. For example
mentation, in order to enhance overall EU climate resilience the EU Disaster Risk Reduction programmes can also be used
by reducing risks from EU-internal cross-border impacts. to prevent and adapt to cross-border impacts, including those
Existing mechanisms can be used to achieve adaptation to from climate change. The EU has already invested over €325
internal dimensions of cross-border climate impact. For exam- million in DRR globally via the Disaster Preparedness ECHO
ple, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism gives a strong com- programme (DIPECHO).
petence to the European Commission to address events that An overarching mechanism with which the EU can seek to
can have effects across borders. It includes a national obliga- reduce the risks of external cross-border climate change im-
tion to undertake national risk assessments that consider the pacts is the 2016 EU Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common
potential for cross-border effects. The mechanism applies to Actions (EU 2016). A key message in the Strategy is that BThe
all 28 EU member states as well as a number of affiliated non- external cannot be separated from the internal^; BFragility
EU countries, but it can be—and has been—called upon to beyond our borders threatens our vital interests^ (EU 2016).
respond to crises by any country in the world.12 A central Given this and the explicit recognition of climate change as
11
one of the global challenges facing the EU, cross-border im-
See DG ENV website on WFD: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/
pacts could be said to be at the heart of EU foreign policy.
participation/map_mc/map.htm
12
DG ECHO website: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/ The Global Strategy recognises the EU’s significant diplo-
mechanism_en matic reach and numerous networks of influence as key772 M. Benzie et al.
instruments of EU security strategy. It includes the goals of Cross-spatial analysis of climate change impacts raises
BPre-emptive Peace^, the use of a Bmultidimensional many of the same methodological challenges as cross-
approach^ to conflict prevention and resolution—employing sectoral analysis (as well as new ones), especially the chal-
all available policies and instruments, and a willingness to lenge of dealing with Bcomplex interdependencies^ (see
invest in stabilisation in regions beyond the EU, including Harrison et al. 2016). There is the same scope for uncertainties
by making better use of development cooperation and more to be magnified when combining assessments from different
coherent external policies overall. places and/or sectors. There is also a similar challenge in how
The notion of pre-emptive peace, which is discussed spe- to account for these uncertainties in ways that remain trans-
cifically in the context of climate change (e.g. EU 2016, p. parent and meaningful to the stakeholders who will ultimately
29), implies an enhanced role for EU-funded or facilitated use the results to inform decisions. Considering cross-border
climate change adaptation in other countries as a strategy for impacts under high-end scenarios that are well outside local
preventing instability that might negatively affect the domes- experience adds an extra layer of uncertainty and complexity
tic interests of the EU and its citizens. to this challenge.
The case for enhancing efforts to account for EU impacts Nevertheless, scientific challenges can be confronted, es-
on the rest of the world is less obvious because it does not pecially where interdisciplinary teams are established to seek
directly concern the effects on EU citizens or actors. new insights into the scale and nature of cross-border climate
Nevertheless, identifying EUROW impacts is important if the change impacts. Below we suggest six key challenges:
EU is to take seriously its responsibilities under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change & Balance. Researchers and funding agencies should bal-
(UNFCCC). The Paris Agreement established a global goal ance competing requirements for breadth of coverage
on adaptation (Article 7.1), which aims to strengthen resil- (e.g. full scoping of risks) versus sufficient understanding
ience and reduce vulnerability globally, and as such, the EU, (e.g. deep, complex sectoral analysis to support decision
which along with all member states is a Party to the UNFCCC, making). To these ends, and in light of likely data con-
should not implement measures that might redistribute vulner- straints, analyses should necessarily combine both quanti-
ability to other world regions. EU submissions to the tative and qualitative approaches.
UNFCCC, including its Nationally Determined Contribution & Exposure and vulnerability mapping. There is a lot of
(NDC) and Adaptation Communication,13 should specifically room for improving the scope of indicator-based assess-
seek to identify the contributions of EU adaptation to global ment of exposure or vulnerability to cross-border risks
resilience, as well as any potential negative impacts of EU inside the EU. The TCI Index represents a crude first
action on climate vulnerability in other countries (see Benzie attempt in this direction, but remains the only example
et al. 2018). The EU could consider the positive and negative of exposure mapping in this area. More detailed assess-
consequences of its Adaptation Strategy outside Europe as ment, using the higher quality and availability of data
part of its impact assessment.14 The basis upon which the enjoyed at EU scale (compared to globally), would be
EU might assess EUROW impacts on behalf of its member useful for assessing the distribution of exposure be-
states, though, remains unclear; such an assessment seems tween member states and perhaps even for moving to-
unlikely to occur. wards more sophisticated vulnerability mapping (for in-
stance taking into consideration relative response ca-
pacities in the context of cross-border impacts, in dif-
Challenges for research
ferent member states or sub-national regions).
Likewise, more detailed indicator-based assessment of
Analysis of cross-border climate change impacts is inherently
sectoral exposures within the EU could help to direct
complex. Assessments must take account of potential changes
further efforts, for example focusing on food security,
in at least two different locations, and often multiple locations.
commodity supply chains, financial risk exposure and
For example, in the case of assessing climate-related migra-
migration. New partnerships between the public and
tion, climate change impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation
private sectors could help to reveal key risks and oppor-
options need to be identified in source, transit and recipient
tunities for various industrial sectors.
countries. Analysis of critical supply chains presents similar
challenges.
& Economic modelling. Studies of cross-border effects of
13
FCCC/APA/2017/INF.1 (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, climate trends or weather shocks using computable gen-
Information related to possible elements of adaptation communications iden- eral equilibrium (CGE) models coupled with climate
tified by Parties)
14 impact models show considerable promise in exploring
The current impact assessment of the EU Adaptation Strategy does not
consider international issues, see http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/metadata/ how climate and sea level rise may affect prices, com-
publications/eu-strategy-on-adaptation-to-climate-change-impact-assessment petitive advantage and trade (see, for example SchenkerCross-border climate change impacts: implications for the European Union 773
2013; Bosello et al. 2007). However, there are important potential future impacts of climate change. Given the
limitations of CGE analyses, including simplifying as- many uncertainties about the future, it becomes impor-
sumptions about the rationality of consumers and pro- tant to specify alternative future conditions, not only of
ducers and an absence of market imperfections (Arent climate itself but also of the socioeconomic conditions
et al. 2014), the simplistic way in which they represent providing the context for cross-border impacts (e.g.
climate damages and their limited capacity to model the changes in population, supply and demand, critical in-
effect of production and trade shocks (Watkiss et al. frastructure). One concrete step forward for the EU
2015; Benzie and John 2015). There are increasing calls could be to develop a scenario matrix for the EU based
to undertake integrated assessment of global impact and on the global RCP/SSP scenario framework (van
adaptation costs, which have also questioned the utility Vuuren et al. 2014). This would comprise shared socio-
and credibility of climate change damage estimates (see economic pathways (SSPs) coupled with climate pro-
the review by Diaz and Moore 2017). However, alter- jections based on representative concentration path-
native global and regional economic modelling ap- ways (RCPs). For specific DGs or even sub-regions of
proaches have yet to be applied to the estimation of the EU, similar but bespoke scenario exercises might
indirect economic effects of climate change, including also be appropriate.
cross-regional impacts (Arent et al. 2014).
& Other modelling methods. There are many other model-
ling methods that can be applied to different aspects of Conclusions
this topic. For example, network analysis has been ap-
plied in recent studies of cross-border impacts on food This article has suggested that since the EU and its constituent
systems (Brooks et al. 2013; Puma et al. 2015; Gephart nation states are linked via flows of resources, goods, capital
et al. 2016; Bren d’Amour et al. 2016). However, it is and people to each other and to all other regions of the world,
potentially applicable in any studies of non-linear sys- they are likely to be exposed to cross-border climate change
tem dynamics that characterise many of the more com- impacts. We have described the climate risk pathways via
plex risks, including those operating over remote, which the EU is likely to be impacted and provided an initial
teleconnected dimensions. Use of behavioural models overview of the pattern of EU exposure. We have compared
(Brown et al. 2017), such as agent-based models, which individual EU member states to non-EU countries in order to
are similar to network analysis but concentrate on the identify transboundary water dependency, trade openness,
different behaviours and responses of individuals or openness to asylum and high levels of globalisation as some
classes of actors within a network, is also a promising of the key European characteristics that could affect future
avenue for research on this topic (Lamperti et al. 2016). climate risk.
Future EU assessments should consider embracing We put forward a typology of cross-border impacts that can
these and similar scientific methods to better understand help to guide and structure future research and planning ef-
exposure to cross-border impacts both within and be- forts. EU internal aspects reveal a clear Bvalue adding^ role for
yond the EU. the EU in adaptation by coordinating member state adaptation
& Supply chain analysis. Standard trade statistics conven- where cross-border flows are involved. The EU is unique as a
tionally present a barrier to better analysis because they functioning regional bloc with the policy and governance in-
record the last port of call for imports rather than the struments at its disposal to build regional resilience to cross-
source location and subsequent movements of products border climate change impacts.
along the supply chain, all of which may be subject to The EU external dimension calls for a strategic approach to
climate change impacts. Increased transparency of data risk management beyond the EU’s borders, employing several
along supply chains and their exposure to climate risks of the existing external functions of the EU. The EU is likely
(e.g. Godar et al. 2015) and alternative modelling tech- to be exposed to cross-border impacts as a result of: its trade
niques (e.g. input-output methods applied by West et al. ties and dependence on imported resources (including food)
2016) are therefore needed to assess cross-border climate and components via international supply chains; economic
change impacts via the trade pathway. ties with other countries and with the global economic system
& Scenario methods. Many existing studies that are used as a whole; and its strategic, geo-political and security inter-
to demonstrate the cross-border impacts of dependence with other countries. Given its proximity to re-
climate impacts rely on observed or gions and countries that are less likely than the EU to be able
historical evidence showing impacts from the past to adapt to adverse climate impacts, there is a real possibility
(e.g. of weather-related food price shocks). However, of significant spillover effects. These concerns appear to have
a primary concern of many decision makers relates to gained traction in recent years amongst policy makers in774 M. Benzie et al.
various branches of the EU. Future iterations of the EU with Bio Intelligence Service, Cambridge Econometrics and Milieu
Limited. Report to European Commission DG CLIMA
Adaptation Strategy should attempt to clarify the risks to ac-
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Acknowledgements The authors wish to acknowledge the substantial Econ 37:549–571. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-006-9048-5
contributions made by Oskar Wallgren for original conceptual develop- Bren d’Amour C, Wenz L, Kalkuhl M, Christoph Steckel J, Creutzig F
ment; Georgia Savvidou, Frida Lager, Fanny Groundstroem and Nina (2016) Teleconnected food supply shocks. Environ Res Lett 11:
Pirttioja for contributing to the review material and preparing summary 035007. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/3/035007
figures and tables; and Åsa Persson for the critical review and Brooks DH, Ferrarini B, Go EC (2013) Bilateral trade and food security. J
contributions. Intl Econ Commer Policy 04:1350015. https://doi.org/10.1142/
S1793993313500154
Funding Financial support from the European Commission Seventh Brown C, Alexander P, Holzhauer S, Rounsevell MDA (2017)
Framework Programme project IMPRESSIONS (Impacts and Risks Behavioral models of climate change adaptation and mitigation in
From Higher-End Scenarios—Grant Agreement No. 603416) and valu- land-based sectors. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim Chang 8:e448.
able contributions and feedback from project partners were provided. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.448
Additional funding was provided by Formas, The Swedish Research Castellari S, Lung T, Hildén M et al (2017) Vulnerability to climate
Council for Sustainable Development, Sida, who provide core support change in European macro-regions. In: Climate change, impacts
to the Stockholm Environment Institute and the PLUMES (Pathways and vulnerability in Europe 2016. European Environment Agency,
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project of the Academy of Finland (decision 277276). 305
Challinor AJ, Adger WN, Baylis M et al (2016) UK climate change risk
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdic- assessment evidence report: chapter 7, international dimensions.
tional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Report prepared for the Adaptation Sub-Committee of the
Committee on Climate Change, London
Ciscar JC, Ibarreta D, Soria A, Dosio A, Toreti A, Ceglar A, Fumagalli D,
Dentener F, Lecerf R, Zucchini A, Panarello L, Niemeyer S, Pérez-
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