Coordinating the Air: Institutions and Strategic Interactions - International Public Policy Association
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Coordinating the Air: Institutions and Strategic
Interactions.
Roberto Rodríguez R.1
Sciences Po
Introduction
Cities have become relevant actors on policymaking. Their role has changed
from being mere recipients of national policies to become active participants on
policy formulation and implementation (Le Galès & Therborn, 2010; Wolman,
2012). In environmental matters, cities are recognized to be strategic sites
that deal with diverse issues such as sustainable development, air quality and
climate change (Castán Broto, 2017; Rosol, Béal, & Mössner, 2017).
But cities are still dependent on other actors. Institutional frameworks and
other policies partially defined by other levels of government have a strong
influence on policymaking in cities (Peters & Pierre, 2012). Overall, the state
reconfiguration has brought “new” logics, leading to diverse governance
arrangements that imply an interrelation of governmental agencies, levels of
government, institutions and non governmental actors (Le Galès, 2014; Pierre,
2000). Within governance arrangements diverse actors coexist, each one with
somewhat defined attributions (Voß, 2007) in charge of implementing different
policy instruments. Such interrelation poses a problem of coordination.
Current studies on policy coordination treat it as a response to fragmented
government action due to specialization (Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 2010;
Cejudo & Michel, 2017). However, it must take into account the set of mutual
dependencies. This is not new, previous studies have dealt with the way actors
affect each other and its effects on coordination (Duran & Lazega, 2015; Duran
& Thoenig, 1996; Greenwood, 2016; Lindblom, 1965). Coordination has to be
treated then as a response to fragmentations and dependencies taking place
within diverse governance arrangements.
1
PhD Student at the Center for European Studies and Comparative Politics of Sciences
Po-Paris. roberto.rodriguez@sciencespo.fr. Preliminary Working Draft. Please do not
circulate, quote or cite without author's permission.
1This assumption leads to analyze policy coordination processes in two levels:
one institutional, that distributes attributions to fragmented actors and another
relational, in which mutual dependencies of actors lead to strategic
interactions. These two levels interplay, generating diverse outcomes.
Drawing on the case of air quality policy in Mexico City (CDMX)2, the aim of
this paper is to show how the outcomes of coordination processes are product
of such interplay. In other words, how the strategic interactions and the
institutional setting influence policy coordination processes, leading to diverse
outcomes product of those dynamics.
Relational nature of coordination: fragmentation and
mutual dependence
Policy coordination is often treated as a response to a problem of fragmented
government action caused by specialization (6, 2004; Bouckaert et al., 2010;
Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Peters, 2015). Governments segment their domains of
action to be specialized in many issues so they can be more effective when
intervening in a particular problem. This results in a set of organizations and
governments implementing policies in different policy domains that could
either be divided into substantive topics (targeted on specific areas, such as
environment, health, security, etc.), target groups, or geographical areas
(May, Sapotichne, & Workman, 2006).
However, posing coordination only as a response to fragmentations falls short
on its relational nature. Attention must be paid also to the set of mutual
dependencies that are present during the policymaking process. The focus on
dependence is not new. For instance, Lindblom (1965) viewed the problem of
coordination as one of adapting a set of mutually dependent decisions. The
mere fact that different actors work together to achieve a common objective
means that they all depend on each other actions. In order to achieve
coordination actors must also realize that their actions affect and get affected
2
CDMX was also known as Federal District (Distrito Federal or D.F.). A constitutional
reform in 1993 homologated the names D.F. and Mexico City. However it’s official
name changed as of 2016 to be known only as Mexico City. In this paper both names
are used indistinctively.
2by others. Hall et al capture that sort of view on their definition of inter-
organizational coordination, it is “defined as the extent to which organizations
attempt to ensure that their activities take into account those of other
organizations” (1977, p. 459).
The nature of public problems and decentralization lay behind the set of
fragmented organizations that must work together and become dependent on
a specific issue. Problem definition and its subsequent solution define whether
some organizations or levels of government have a role on a policy within a
specific domain (Scharpf, 1997). It affects the policy choice and in
consequence the mutually-dependent organizations that will be in charge of
executing the policy actions (Kingdon, 2014; Moore, 1976). Depending on the
problem framing, diverse laws, plans or directives may be issued to stress the
division of tasks that each actor involved has to carry out.3 More complexities
arise when the cross-sectional nature of some problems requires an integrated
solution in which different agencies at many levels are involved in order to
achieve such common goal (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Howlett, 2009; Jochim
& May, 2010; May, 2015).
Under a merely functional logic, decentralization processes delegate the
responsibility of implementing policy actions to subnational governments with
the idea that they have a better knowledge on the local conditions and may
lead to more effective interventions. This might depend on the type of state
organization (federal or unitary) and the different models of intergovernmental
relations (Agranoff & Radin, 2014; Wright, 1988) that arise depending on the
issue. Decentralization fragments and gives autonomy to subnational
governments that sometimes have to work together with other levels of
government creating mutual dependencies where ”decisions by one
government in one or more specific functional area impact other governments
and other governmental functions” (Feiock, 2013, p. 397).
3
For example, Lascoumes and Le Galès names the plans and frameworks as meta-
instruments of coordination because they define how instruments have to be
coordinated (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007).
3Decentralization processes have not being merely technical. The type and
degree of decentralization is a good example that fragmentations do not only
arise by division of labor, but also from the political environment. There can be
an implicit technical reason for the division of labor, but political factors should
also be considered. Either in federal or unitary systems subnational authorities
are strengthened with decentralization (Stren, 2012), leading to a
reconfiguration of attributions and linking relationships between the levels of
government (Skowronek, 1982). Overall it means transferring powers to
autonomous and politically diverse lower levels government, creating political
fragmentations.
Fragmentations and dependencies are an inherent condition of every aspect of
governmental action addressing a public problem. Coordination processes arise
in response to a collective action problem that tries to manage fragmented but
mutually dependent actors in charge of implementing policy. Conversely, this
means understanding coordination as the result of the interplay between two
levels: one institutional and one relational.
Policy coordination processes as an interplay between
institutions and strategic actions
The logic behind the distribution of attributions and its implications can be
found in the developments of the new institutionalism. According to Rational
Choice Institutionalism (RCI), institutions are created in response to
cooperation conflicts. They are “ex ante agreements about a structure of
cooperation” (Shepsle, 1986, p. 74) as they look to inhibit opportunistic
behavior and enable positive and stable collective action (Shepsle, 1986). In
their absence, individuals face a “social dilemma”, where “their behavior makes
all worse off” (Weingast, 2002, p. 670). Institutions anticipate to possible
behaviors by establishing a set of rules to accomplish a particular objective.
Once created, they condition action by supporting cooperation in contexts of
strategic interaction (P. A. Hall, 2016). To cope with fragmentations and induce
coordination, institutions distribute functions and responsibilities to actors.
4A RCI view of this type is useful to understand the role of institutions as
structuring elements that serve a purpose, if the problem were only
fragmentations due to specialization. RCI may fall short when addressing
fragmentations of other nature and mutual dependencies of strategic actors.
What happens at this so-called institutional level of policy coordination
processes can be better understood by the developments of Historical
Institutionalism that treat institutions as “distributional instruments laden with
power implications” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 7). As a choice, institutions
are the result of struggles among unequal actors (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002). At
the same time, what they do is to distribute power, giving disproportionate
access to decision-making processes (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996; Mahoney &
Thelen, 2010). While distributing functions, institutions also distribute power.
The distributional consequences are result of resource considerations regarding
unequal implications of its allocation. It’s about which resources are distributed
to whom and in what conditions. Whenever the distribution of attributions
changes, what we could expect is that coordination processes are molded, to
use Thelen’s words, “through periodic political realignment and renegotiation”
(2004, p. 30).
This kind of approach moves away from a functionalist view of institutions and
expands the reach of the institutional level. It is helpful to understand the
distribution of attributions as result of diverse fragmentations. Dependencies,
on the other hand, are a matter of a second, relational level. For their analysis,
the sociology of organized action proves useful.
The institutional configuration defines the players and the rules of the game by
distributing attributions and faculties among actors (Scharpf, 1997), opening
opportunities to exert power (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Moreover, policy
coordination processes imply a dependence between multiple actors within and
among organizations and institutional levels that are interconnected through
power relations (Pinson, 2015). This relational power is generated by the
strategic behaviors of actors that interact on a resource exchange basis
(Bergeron, 2018). They negotiate using their incertitude areas often generated
5by the institutional framework itself (Crozier, 2010). In this matter,
dependence is a basis for power (Fligstein, 1987).
Resource exchange processes (or negotiation) define the kind of cooperation
achieved. In that sense, power relations would be stable to the extent they are
reciprocal and “link long-term interdependent actors in the achievement of a
common objective” (Bergeron, 2018, p. 68). Therefore, “the need for
coordination is in function of the degree of the existing interdependence
modalities between the parts of an inter organizational or intra organizational
system” (Duran & Lazega, 2015, p. 295). This means that to the extent that
mutual dependencies are traduced into interdependencies, coordination on a
relational basis may be achieved (Duran & Thoenig, 1996).
Mutual dependence as treated here is an inherent condition of any relationship
involving two or more actors regarding their role in policy implementation. It
means that their actions and decisions influence each other (Bergeron, 2018).
Interdependence, on the other hand, has a normative nature, and refers to an
end state where such mutual dependencies are acknowledged. It is when there
is a mutual recognition of the roles played by each and anyone of the actors
involved on the implementation of a determined policy (Duran & Lazega,
2015).
As the institutional approach suggest, actors are influenced by institutional
arrangements (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). At the same time this institutional
control rests contingent on the structure of the existent interdependence
relationships within a social group (Ferguson on Bergeron, 2018). Collective
action is thus structured within “systems of action” that define the rules of the
game. They organize and regulate the dependencies between the participants
and the exchange processes; at the same time, such rules interplay with the
strategic interactions and processes of exchange and power between actors
(Crozier & Friedberg, 1977).
Policy coordination processes are shaped by the interplay between an
institutional level that is in charge of distributing attributions and a relational
level, where mutually dependent actors develop strategic behaviors. This takes
6place when policy instruments are implemented under loosely coupled
governance arrangements.
Policy instruments and governance arrangements, where
does the city stand?
Policy instruments are how “government makes the link between wish and
fulfillment” (Hood, 1983, p. 8). They are the tools used to implement policy
decisions and the channels through which public policies intend to achieve
behavior changes on target populations. Such link between decision and action
and the effects produced by the choice and use of instruments are problematic
and have significant effects when implemented (Hood, 1983; Lascoumes & Le
Galès, 2007).
Focusing on the way instruments are put in action remits to the study of
instrumentation involving both “the reasons that drive towards retaining one
instrument rather than another [as well as] envisaging the effects produced by
these choices” (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007, p. 4). Studying instrumentation
is then to problematize policy instruments themselves, to give a dynamic
perspective on these technical devices and their dynamics surrounding them .
Policy coordination will then be a product of such instrumentation embedded in
governance arrangements, leading to different effects independent of their
intended goals (Kassim & Le Galès, 2010).
Within a specific urban context, in a determined policy space, there are
different sets of administrative and political fragmentations. Three dimensions
of governance can be accounted for: internal or local governance, vertical or
multi-level governance and horizontal or metropolitan governance.
In urban (or local) governance the role of local government is still preeminent
but also takes into account the strategic capacity and the negotiation dynamics
with other non-governmental actors, such as civil society, private
representatives, enterprises, NGOs, etc. (Le Galès, 1995). Governance plays
different in different contexts and there is no single, universal mode (Pierre,
2011); they reflect norms, ideas and practices of a particular context and they
7are in function of different modes of democracy, the role of government in
both, economic development and in the relations with the civil society (Pierre,
1999).
In addition to local governance, different issues and problems are addressed
across a specific configuration of the powers, attributions and the decisional
logics within federal or unitary systems. Intergovernmental relations affect the
nature of policymaking and implementation depending on the degree of
involvement of each level of government in terms of their defined powers and
attributions (Agranoff, 2011). Relationships of this kind have complex patterns
of dependence due to issues such as overlapping jurisdictions and are defined
as multi-level or intergovernmental governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2003;
Vlahos, 2013).
The third dimension has to do with the horizontal relationships between local
governments. Metropolitan governance amongst neighboring local
governments emerge from this logic; they stress the need for taking into
account the connections between policies and how their implementation is
either tied through the provision of services or the dependencies between local
governments (Hendrick & Shi, 2015; Lefèvre, 1998).
Policies can be implemented through the whole governmental span of action:
within and among each one of the levels of government. The presence or
absence of some actors creates diverse governance arrangements that shape
policy processes. Not all the actors are necessarily present in every policy
action. As previously argued their presence or absence depends on the
problem framing and on whether the policy requires the involvement of other
levels of government or non-governmental actors.
Cities are embedded in a wide range of governance arrangements each one of
which defines itself as a particular political space –as defined by Stone Sweet,
Fligstein and Sandholtz (2001) 4 , that operates around a certain policy.
4
According to them actors, organizations and levels of government interact under
specific political spaces, where they “make, apply, interpret, and enforce rules” (2001).
These spaces have formalized but changing structures that define the roles of actors in
8Specifically, governance arrangements are particular institutional designs in
which the attributions of mutually dependent actors are (unevenly) distributed
under a specific policy domain. This means that such a structure defines the
“players” as well as what they are allowed to do. These types of institutional
designs change over time, redefining the players as well as constantly
redistributing their attributions. Moreover, within this arrangements mutually
dependent actors develop strategic interactions.
Analyzing policy coordination
Coordination processes are embedded in governance arrangements, therefore
affected by the interplay between institutional and relational considerations.
Governments try to deal with these complexities by deploying any sort of
mechanisms embodied in the form of hierarchies, markets or networks
(Bouckaert et al., 2010; Capano, Howlett, & Ramesh, 2015; Howlett, 2009;
Thompson, Frances, Levacic, & Mitchell, 1991).5 They are put in place with the
aim to coordinate the multiple policy instruments that happen to be
implemented by several actors. However, coordination can be achieved without
specific mechanisms deployed (Chisholm, 1989).
Coordination capacities don’t necessarily arise only by rules, authority,
hierarchy or either power, but from a plurality of devices that take into account
power and negotiation, market relationships, hierarchies and logics of trust and
reciprocity (Friedberg, 1997; Kaufmann & Sager, 2019; Pinson, 2015; Sager,
2005). This is more evident in a context where the state is no longer the
hegemonic actor (Le Galès, 1998, 2014; Pierre, 2000). All the actors require
negotiation capacities in a new public action reality, characterized by
the political process and thus influence a determined outcome (Stone Sweet et al.,
2001).
5
Markets involve voluntary exchange of goods and services between two parties. It is
by nature decentralized and motivated by self-interest (Williamson, 1973, 1979,
1996). Hierarchies involve organizations and stratification of authority with defined
spheres of competence in order to achieve high levels of efficiency while accomplishing
a common objective. Finally, networks presuppose cooperation and trust out of their
members. Individuals engage themselves in “reciprocal, preferential, mutually
supportive actions” (Powell, 1990). Respectively, each one of the three models has
commonly established control mechanisms: prices, authority and trust (Bradach &
Eccles, 1989).
9transversal problems, among a wide variety of mutually dependent actors with
sometimes contradictory interests; and embedded in a turbulent environment
(Duran & Lazega, 2015; Duran & Thoenig, 1996; Jessop, 1995, 2016).
Addressing coordination as a response to fragmentation/dependence through
governance arrangements requires a comprehensive analysis of 1) institutions
as distributive elements that structure behavior, distribute power and provide
policy choices (Pierre, 1999, 2011; Scharpf, 1997) and 2) the relational aspect
of the interactions in the instrumentation process.
The two-level interplay can bring out different outcomes. For example,
sometimes actors exert their attributions and responsibilities if they have the
correct incentives. Sometimes they use their attributions as a resource for
negotiation and force others to cooperate. Sometimes they just decide to
cooperate because they involve themselves in cooperation-based networks.
A way to grasp the effects of such interplay is by looking for institutional
changes affecting governance arrangements. Such configurations are
structurally contingent, thus shaped by time and space-specific institutional
factors (Hyden, Court, & Mease, 2004). Changes in governance arrangements
could be either abrupt or incremental, resulting of day-by-day interactions
between institutions, actors, and organizations throughout time (Thelen,
2004). In fact the arrangements have been transformed gradually through
political realignments and the incorporation of new groups whose role was
unanticipated (Le Galès, 2014; Pierre, 2000).
Tracing institutional change will reveal how the balance of power of governance
arrangements has been affected either by abrupt changes or through periodic
readjustments and negotiations (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2004). The
shifts in governance arrangements change the distribution of power of the
actors in a determined policy domain and influence at the institutional level the
way in which coordination processes are shaped. Moreover, when looking at
such configurations, one must account for the combined effects of institutions
in place, among with other processes (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002) that in this
case are molded by the interactions of mutually dependent, strategic actors
10and organizations. The combined effect of such interplay determines the
outcomes of such coordination.
To show the interplay between the institutional and the relational levels and its
effects on policy coordination, the research is carried out through a longitudinal
study. Drawing on the case of the environmental contingencies program
(implemented to deal with pollution peaks), the study traces the institutional
changes and the development of the relational dynamics of the governance
arrangements and their effects on coordination processes of policy instruments
of air quality policy in Mexico City.
The chosen time period is from 1986 to 2018. The starting point was chosen
on the basis that in the late 80s the pollution levels in Mexico City Metropolitan
Area (ZMVM) turned into an environmental crisis, encouraging the deployment
of plans and instruments to cope with it. The first systematic instrument to
measure pollution was formally established in 1986. Data collection includes
the review of laws, norms, regulations, plans, previous research, and 24 semi-
structured in-person interviews with civil servants from the federal and local
governments of Mexico City and the State of Mexico (EDOMEX) and members
of NGOs.
Following the instruments: Tracking the interplay between
institutions and strategic actions
Air quality policy in Mexico is mostly dedicated to contain and prevent pollution
peaks. The preferred method to coordinate is through ad hoc commissions that
have gone over diverse design transformations linked to institutional changes.
The main focus on the instrumentation is posed on the interactions within and
around such commissions, mostly regarding crisis avoidance and management.
Mobile sources (vehicles) are the main contributors for such outbreaks. When
those crises occur, an “environmental contingency program” is put in place. It
is a protocol where different measures are activated in order to diminish the
pollution levels and to go back to standards set up by the Secretary of Health
and Assitance (SSA). Activating the program means that atmospheric pollution
11has reached dangerous levels for health and immediate measures are taken.
Depending of the levels, the program can reach different phases, each one
with differentiated measures. They comprise the shut down of industrial
activity, driving restrictions and if the levels become even more dangerous, the
population is advised to stay indoors and avoid any kind of outside activity
(CDMX, 2019c).
Four main instruments are involved in the environmental contingency
program: regulations, pollution index, driving restrictions and vehicle
inspections. They are fundamental for either preventing or managing the
pollution crisis.
Regulations set standards on diverse issues that have an effect on air quality.
They elaboration is attributed to the federal government and are commonly
known as the Mexican Official Norms (NOM). Different types of NOMs are
developed depending on their focus. For instance, some are devoted to
regulate the auto industry regarding engine’s emissions, jointly elaborated by
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) and the
Secretary of Economy (SE). Other NOM regulate health standards and
determine the permissible thresholds of pollution-damaging levels (elaborated
by SSA). Some other NOMs are issued for the standards and procedures that
must be observed in vehicle inspection centers. All these norms are elaborated
by federal organizations and in their elaboration or updating process they are
supposed to follow consultation forums with the actors involved on the sector.
The pollution index is commonly known as the Metropolitan Index for Air
Quality (IMECA). It is an informational instrument devoted to disseminate to
the general public the data of the pollution levels and its possible health
damages. It was elaborated in 1982 and finally made public in 1986.6 IMECA
reports on a daily basis the information gathered by the monitoring stations on
6
The index has a predecessor, the IMEXCA that was first developed in 1977 by the
General Direction of Environmental Sanitation of SSA. It was inspired on U.S.
regulations (Lezama, 2010a)
125 pollutants.7 It is represented in a 0 to 500 scale, in which 100 is assigned to
the limit of health-damaging emissions. Less than 100 points is considered low
risk and when it goes over 100, it implies health hazards (SEMARNAT, n.d.).
The bigger the number, the higher the risks for human health caused by
pollution (Ezcurra, 1991). At first the federal government calculated it; later it
became a local norm. As of 2006 IMECA changed to become the Air Quality
Index (ICA) and is calculated by the Secretary of Environment of Mexico City
(SEDEMA) linked to SSA-NOM.
Vehicle inspections ensure that vehicles stick to the emission criteria set by the
SSA and SE issued NOMs. CDMX, it’s neighboring state, the State of Mexico
(EDOMEX) and the Secretary of Communications and Transports (SCT) (in
charge of freight transport) implement them through the “verifications
program”. Driving restrictions are known as the “No driving day” program (Hoy
no circula- HNC).8 Since 1996 the verification program was coupled to HNC.
Depending on some characteristics such as the model year, the type of fuel
and the emission levels, vehicles could obtain exemptions on HNC
(Gakenheimer et al., 2002).9 They are able to circulate 7 days a week even
when contingency phase 1 is activated.
The way through which these instruments relate to the pollution crisis is the
following. Contingencies are activated (jointly by SEMARNAT, CDMX and
EDOMEX) when IMECA surpasses certain thresholds. IMECA methodology is a
local norm, which is paired to the federal NOMs released by SSA that
determine the highest permissible emission levels. When contingencies are
activated many actions are taken to reduce atmospheric pollution. One of them
7
The criteria pollutants are: sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), ozone (O3) and Particles under 10 micrometers (PM10).
8
According the last digit of the license plate, vehicles are issued a sticker in one of five
colors, each one representing the five weekdays. Vehicles that have the color
corresponding a weekday cannot circulate.
9
The exemptions worked under a system of hologram-stickers. The most polluting
vehicles got the “hologram 2” which meant that they would have driving restrictions
twice a week. “Hologram 1” meant driving restrictions once every week. “Hologram 0”
exempted vehicles from restrictions. Later, on 2001, the “hologram 00” was
introduced. That meant that they would have all the advantages of hologram 0 plus
skipping the verification process for two years.
13is when CDMX and EDOMEX governments enforce stricter driving restrictions
(HNC) that would vary depending on the vehicles’ emissions. The auto industry
is compelled to stick to NOMs that regulate their vehicle emission technology
(SEMARNAT and Secretary of Economy (formerly SECOFI) jointly elaborate
such regulations). The way to determine whether a vehicle has permission to
circulate daily and in contingency episodes is by making regular inspections
through the verifications program, which is implemented by CDMX, EDOMEX
and SCT (for the freight transport). Vehicle inspections ensure that their
emissions stick to standards set by SEMARNAT regulations. Depending on the
emission range of a vehicle it can obtain a free pass to drive the whole week
(exempt HNC) and sometimes even during environmental contingencies.
The city’s takeover, getting the president’s attention
In the late 1980’s air pollution levels in Mexico City were so high that birds
were falling dead from the sky ("Miles de aves murieron por la infición", 1987).
It was not until that period when instruments to control pollution episodes
were deployed more intensively and when CDMX got a more active role. It was
a problem in the city but not yet the city’s problem.
Strong activism of civil society gave saliency to the air pollution problem at the
end of the 80’s. A growing number of organizations criticized the role of the
government handling environmental issues (Gilbreath, 2003). They were able
to get media attention and to seize the spirit of solidarity among Mexico City’s
inhabitants after the 1985 earthquake (Lezama, 2010b; Quadri de la Torre,
1991).10
Indeed, by 1986 CDMX was the most polluted city in the planet. Monitoring
stations recorded 47 registries with more than 400 IMECA points.11 By then
most plans and actions for controlling pollution had a limited impact but they
10
At the beginning of 1985, a group of one hundred artists and intellectuals (that
would later be known as “the group of the 100”) published a manuscript calling for
governmental action to reduce the high levels of air pollution and its consequences for
health and the environment (Aridjis, 1985). They had media connections and also
some ties with the political class, giving them considerable media attention (Aridjis &
Ferber, 2019; Quadri de la Torre, 1991).
11
The standards set on the criteria were lower than those proposed by the World
Health Organization and the United States.
14set the basis for the development of the verifications program and HNC that
would be picked up in further measures (Garza & Aragón, 1995). The plan
“100 Necessary Actions” established stricter limits for vehicle’s emissions and a
mandatory inspection twice a year in DF and EDOMEX (Garza & Aragón, 1995).
The crisis pushed CONADE 12 to implement a “contingency plan” in May of
1986 13 and two other programs. The first was “A day without a car” as a
temporary measure for the winter of 1989-1990 (Miller, 1991) that then
turned into a permanent program in February 1990 with the name “no-driving
day” (Hoy No Circula- HNC). The other action was a mandatory vehicle
emissions inspection for all the vehicles of the ZMVM twice a year, the “Vehicle
Verification Program” (VVP).
Till that moment, most of the attributions to control air pollution were under
the federal government. The institutional framework evolved without giving a
more prominent role to the city or the subnational governments. The
institutional construction of the air quality policy began in the early 70s with
the “Federal Law to Prevent and Control Environmental Pollution” (LFPCCA)
(Lezama, 2010b). The problem was framed on the consequences that
atmospheric pollution has on health, with a highly centralized logic. The issue
was under control of the federal Secretary for Health and Assistance (SSA).14
At the sub national level, D.F. and other States had a marginal role only as
15
“auxiliary authorities” to the SSA. Later on, the creation of the
Undersecretary of Ecology in 1983 within the nascent Secretary for Urban
12
The National Commission of Ecology (CONADE) was created in 1985 to foster inter-
sectorial coordination (Agreement to create CONADE, 1985). It played an important
technical role for the actions included in the Presidential Decree of February 14th 1986.
13
From May 1986 to November 1989, phase 1 contingency was activated at 200
IMECA points and phase 2 when it reached 300 .
14
The Under-Secretary of Environmental Improvement (SSMA), created in 1972 was in
charge of environmental policy. The law comprised also the involvement of other
sectors to control water, soil and pollution derived by industrial activities, so the
Secretary of Hydraulic Resources (SRH), the Secretary of Agriculture and Livestock
(SAGAR) and the Secretary of Industry and Commerce (SIC) were also involved.
15
They had only one attribution that was shared with the Secretary of Communications
and Transportation (SCT): the emission control of mobile sources. The LFPCCA was
substituted by the Federal Law of for the Protection of the Environment (LFPA) in 1982
but without any change in terms of attributions or a more decentralized logic (LFPA,
1982).
15Development and Ecology (SEDUE) reframed the issue from one entirely
focused on health to one more related to population growth and the complex
set of urban practices (INECC, 2009). However, not even that led to a deeper
involvement of D.F.. This was because of two reasons.
First, there was a strong control of the executive in all policy areas under the
16
hegemonic party regime (Casar, 1996). The central management of
environmental functions was apparently opposed to the decentralization wave
that was hitting the country in the early 80s.17 However, the decentralization
reforms showed a very limited impact on local governments and policymaking
remained highly concentrated in the center. Such logic was evident in the
National Ecology Program 1984-1988 (PNE) or the Presidential Decree of
February 14th of 198618 where environmental policy is seen as an exclusive
attribution of the federal government (Decree, 1986).
In addition, between 1917 (when the actual constitution was enacted) and
1996 Mexico City was conceived as an administrative entity under direct
control of the executive. As consequence, there was not a clear differentiation
between national and local policies in D.F., creating some sort of a paradox: all
the city’s problems were treated as national ones, giving D.F. a
disproportionate political importance; conversely, there were not significant
urban policies devoted to deal with specific problems in D.F. because it was not
seen as a city but as another administrative sector (Loaeza, 1995). That put
D.F. in an ambiguous position as reflected by the 1988 the Law for Ecologic
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA).19 It indicated that all the
16
Under the PRI regime, the party managed to permeate the political institutions and
define its behavior. It created an “indivisible and unitary government” in the three
branches (executive, legislative and judiciary) as well as among the levels of
government –federal, state and local (Casar, 1996).
17
In 1983 came a major constitutional reform to article 115 whose purpose was the
empowerment of state and local governments. It sought to strengthen administrative,
economic and political autonomy of states and municipalities by redistributing faculties
and attributions among the three levels of government (Beltrán & Portilla, 2010).
18
It delineated a series of specific actions that had to be carried out to fight
environmental pollution under presidential instruction. The decree was issued in
response of the high levels of pollution reached at that moment.
19
Substituted the 1982 LFPA.
16matters of the law should be tackled jointly between the three levels of
government within their respective jurisdictions (LGEEPA, 1988). On the one
hand gave D.F. the same attributions granted to the states and municipalities
(which were formally autonomous) and on the other hand it was subordinated
to SEDUE (LGEEPA 1988).
It was in the aftermath of the air pollution crisis when the city’s administration
took over the air quality policy. Civil society contributed to the saliency of the
issue but what really made the city’s government to attract it was the social
discomfort after the 1988 elections. Under fraud allegations20, the hegemonic
party, PRI almost lost the presidency. That created a political turmoil in the
city, involving a more active participation of the civil society forcing the
authorities to take immediate action in many policy matters (Gilbreath, 2003;
Loaeza, 1995). If the president wanted to remain powerful, he had to be more
aware of the society claims, especially in highly politicized issues; and
atmospheric pollution was one of them.
Besides contingencies, air pollution crisis demanded immediate action so the
president ordered the elaboration of the Integral Program Against Atmospheric
Pollution in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (PICCA). It was the first real
effort of inter-sectorial, multi-level policy coordination (Lezama, 2000). 21
However, D.F.’s principal limitation to implement PICCA was the tasks
allocated to other actors –the members of the cabinet and EDOMEX. As before,
the tasks were dispersed through many actors that didn’t share the same
levels of commitment or don’t have incentives to develop their tasks (Mumme,
Bath, & Assetto, 1988).
As former head of SEDUE, air quality was important for DDF’s head, Manuel
Camacho Solís (1988-1993). Moreover, he had political aspirations (Miller,
20
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was very close to defeat Carlos Salinas (candidate from PRI
and president from 1988 to 1994). Cárdenas alleged electoral fraud and because of the
high number of supporters, such accusations caused social discomfort in many sectors
of the society.
21
This plan was followed the Programs to Improve Air Quality (PROAIRES). To-date, 3
PROAIRES have been issued: PROAIRE 1 (1995-2000), PROAIRE 2 (2002-2010) and
PROAIRE 3 (2011-2020)
171991) and as one of the PRI’s frontrunners for the next presidential elections
(Interview 46). The saliency of the topic and putting himself at the lead of it
would help him to gain adepts for his nomination. That brought him to attract
the issue and to put the city on a leading position.
In PICCA, most of the actions to reduce pollution were related to fuel quality,
which was a monopoly of the state (Secretary of Energy, Minning and
Government-controlled Industry (SEMIP) and the Mexican Oil Company -
PEMEX), and the car industry, regulated by the Secretary of Commerce and
Industrial Development (SECOFI) (DDF, 1990). To lower the pollution levels in
the city the Department of the Federal District (DDF)22 was dependent on other
secretaries23 that weren’t acting as PICCA presupposed because LGEEPA and
PICCA itself distributed attributions without any kind of formal incentives for
their compliance. In addition, other members of the cabinet would also have
their own agendas and aspirations.24
At the end, the actions by other secretaries (SECOFI, SEMIP and PEMEX)
resulted indeed determinant on improving air quality (Molina & Molina,
2002b).25 Sectorial actors were not self-motivated to carry out such tasks and
laws were not binding, but they acted under the president’s commands. Under
the hyper-presidential regime 26 , if anybody at the top of the government
22
DDF was the administrative entity in charge of D.F. The head of DDF was officially
named Chief of DDF and commonly called “Regent”. The position was cabinet-level.
This position disappeared in 1997, with the first election of the Head of Government
23
Miller gives a good example of the dependencies involved on fighting pollution:
“[W]hile the Mayor has the power to license and regulate the operation of vehicles that
circulate in the city, he lacks the authority to regulate vehicle design. Thus, if the
Mayor decided to combat air pollution by requiring catalytic converters in all new
automobiles, he would need the support of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry,
who works with automobile manufacturers, to establish design and production goals.
He would also need the assistance of the Secretary of Energy… to assure that PEMEX
would be able to produce or purchase an adequate supply of the unleaded gasoline
required for use with catalytic converters. Finally, the Mayor would need the
cooperation of SEDUE, which sets emissions standards” (1991, pp. 188–189).
24
It was a common practice that the President’s appointee to succeed him came out of
his cabinet members.
25
The “18 de marzo” oil refinery in 1991 helped to lower the emissions of some criteria
pollutants such as SO2 and lead (Molina & Molina, 2002b).
26
In such a system, there was a strong control from the executive regarding all
matters of political life. There was almost absolute concentration of power on the
presidential institution (Carpizo, 2002; Serrano Migallón, 2006; Ugalde, 2000)
18wanted something to be done and compel the others to do their part, she or he
would have to reach the president and convince him to throw instructions.
What D.F. needed was to gain positions and control on several issues. Regent
Camacho was perfectly aware of that and went to the president to get his
support and to tell the others to line up together (Interview 34). 27 An
immediate response for that was the creation by presidential instruction of a
coordinating body on air quality policy: the Commission for Pollution
Prevention and Control in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (the Commission)
in 1992 (Agreement to create the Commission, 1992). D.F., EDOMEX and
SEDUE were the key members, although other secretaries were also part of it
(Secretary of the Treasury (SHCP), SEMIP, SCT, SSA, PEMEX) (Agreement to
create the Commission, 1992). The Commission’s rules defined a rotating two-
year presidency among SEDUE, D.F. and EDOMEX. D.F. was the first one to be
in charge. Its original purpose was to coordinate the implementation of PICCA
and manage an environmental trust fund created later in 1992 (but activated
in 1995) (CAMe, 2016; Molina & Molina, 2002b). For the time being, their
actions were not related to immediate crisis management but to lower the
pollution levels through PICCA.
For D.F. the main goal inside the commission was still to reach president’s
attention and get him to throw instructions. That was precisely how lead was
removed from gasoline. Setting the fuel formula standards was under PEMEX
control so removing lead fell entirely under its functions. However, PEMEX
claimed that it was not possible, or that doing it would be very costly, not only
the process itself, but also the adjustments industry may have to do to stick
with the new regulations (Interview 46). Facing that reluctance, what DF
Mayor did, according to a civil servant that worked on DDF, was to take it to
27
He was a close friend to the president so he had a straight communication line with
him.
19the president (Interview 46). Finally, lead was removed (Garza, 1996) as an
instruction from president Salinas to PEMEX.28
Another move of this kind was attracting the control of the Automatic
Monitoring Network (RAMA) of emissions (Interviews 34 and 46). RAMA
gathers information on the daily levels of the criteria pollutants. They are
contrasted with SSA issued official norms (NOM) and its registers are the input
to calculate IMECA, which was in turn the source for determining whenever a
pollution episode should be determined as a crisis. RAMA was transferred from
SEDUE to DF in 1993 and since then it remains in control of SEDEMA.
By getting other actors to comply with their tasks and taking over diverse
issues the city gained power positions. It made the other two main actors –
SEDUE and EDOMEX –to get joint agreements on some other aspects, such as
funding allocation and the negotiation of IMECA levels that would define the
pollution crisis episodes.
Under D.F.’s chair, the Commission signed a contract for the operation of the
Environmental Trust Fund (Fideicomiso Ambiental- F1490) in 1994 to support
the commission’s through projects (Roccatti, 2007).29 An executive committee
formed by the Secretary of Treasury (SHCP), SEMARNAP, DDF and EDOMEX
managed it. There is no record that that any amount of funds has been denied
to the commission (Molina & Molina, 2002b) because SEDUE, D.F. and
EDOMEX distributed them evenly to bring projects back to their jurisdictions
(even if they were not of metropolitan scope) and agreed on funding allocation
jointly with an equally satisfying outcome for everyone (Interviews 8 and 13).
The trust fund application rules were able to create interdependencies because
they balanced the actors’ attributions and their relational interaction.
Regarding contingencies, IMECA activation thresholds have varied over time
product of the negotiations between DF, EDOMEX and the Federal Government.
For over 9 years (1989-1998) phase 1 was in the range of 250-349 IMECA
28
This in part was exacerbated because the sons of the U.S. ambassador at that time
were intoxicated with lead. Fuel specifications were negotiated starting 1992 and –no
matter the real motivations –lead was removed from gasoline on 1994.
29
Its funding came from a surcharge of $0.02 pesos per gas liter sold.
20points of ozone, in contrast to the lower previous range of 200-299 in 1986-
1989. Phase two was from 350 to 449, in contrast to the also lower levels of
300-399 between 1986-1989 (CDMX, 2019b). On the ongoing years, IMECA
ranges for ozone and PM10 (since 1998) were consistently lowered (CDMX,
2019b).The 89-98 levels were far from ideal because lowering them was a
lose-lose situation for all and they have to coordinate to avoid being in that
position.
Tightening the standards would mean more contingencies, therefore more
driving restrictions and less industrial activity, rising generalized social unrest
and ultimately affecting their constituencies. The blame would be on all the
actors. The best solution for everyone was not to have contingencies.30 Their
rationale was that they couldn’t lower the thresholds at once to appropriate
levels because they would create a seism in the city’s industrial and social
activity. From 1998 onwards they decided to lower systematically the levels.
Particularly from the period 2006-2011, the negotiating parts decided to set
tighter standards for activating contingencies
Doing that affected everyone. The Law established that D.F. and EDOMEX were
in charge of regulation and enforcement of pollution coming from mobile
sources31 so it would imply taking out many cars out from circulation. HNC has
never being a popular measure (Davis, 2008) and stricter verification controls
would mean that many vehicles wouldn’t be allowed to circulate. There would
30
A high level civil servant who worked on the General Direction of Ecology of D.F. put
it on that sense: “These thresholds have always a negotiation margin because they are
based on standards or norms that have a scientific base, but that are the ultimate goal
or at least a mid-term aspiration. Certain protection margins are set and what really
happened is that such levels didn’t’ move or moved just a little bit. That’s why
contingencies stopped… The pollution levels were so high that the city couldn’t be
paralyzed all the time. Therefore the contingency [IMECA] levels were fixated relatively
high. The problem is that they stood that way, nobody adjusted them.” (Interview 34).
31
Pollution sources are divided in mobile and fixed. They can be of federal jurisdiction
or local jurisdiction. Fixed sources of federal jurisdiction are the following industries:
chemical, oil, paint, inks, automobile, cellulose and paper, metallurgy, glass, electric
energy generation, asbestos, cement, dangerous waste management. The mobile
sources of federal jurisdiction are the freight transports that have license plates issued
by the SCT. Local jurisdiction fixed sources of pollution are industrial, commercial, and
service establishments not comprised as federal jurisdiction sources. Mobile sources
are motorized vehicles with license plates issued by local authorities.
21also have to put stricter controls to poorly tuned public transport (Garza,
1996). In addition, local and federally regulated industry may have to shut
down their operations, meaning less productivity.
The agreement on IMECA levels was an equilibrated situation between all the
actors. It’s not that nobody wanted to do anything; it’s just that
interdependencies were created because everybody had something to lose if
the standards were increased more rapidly than they did. DF would have a
political cost if the situation remained like that.
Power reconfiguration and realignments
Two major structural changes ended up reconfiguring the role of the main
governmental actors on air quality policy in Mexico City: the 1996
constitutional reform granting the direct election of the Head of Government of
D.F. and the end of the hegemonic party regime. The former inserted D.F. as a
more active political actor in policymaking. The new elected mayor would count
with the legitimacy of the popular vote and considerable autonomy to conduct
most city policies. From that moment onwards, the city was no longer an
administrative sector but a real political actor gaining independence from the
other branches of government. Moreover, since the first elections and until
2018 the Mayor, the President and EDOMEX Governor were from different
political parties. Without any “political alignment”, confrontations were
persistent, yielding important effects on the instrumentation. Mexico City was
granted with full autonomy by a constitutional reform in January 2016.
Among with these reforms, the decline of the hegemonic party regime was
fundamental for the city’s empowerment. After the 1988 incidents, PRI still
managed to retain the presidency in 1994. However, the existence of diverse
political parties, combined with major institutional changes on the electoral
system diminished its political presence since the end of the 80’s (Whitehead,
1996) fostering free and more competitive elections in the country (Merino,
2003). The final outcome was a politically fragmented context in which none of
the actors, including the president, held disproportionate power over another.
22Effects on the domain were immediate. By 1996 the Commission was turned
into the Metropolitan Environmental Commission (CAM), implying diverse
modifications in its composition and the interactions within (Convenio de
Coordinación, 1996). One change was regarding the rotatory presidency that
would be only between D.F. and EDOMEX, and the Federal Government was
stepping back. A second change was that in the new CAM only D.F., EDOMEX,
SSA and the Secretary for Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries
32
(SEMARNAP) were consistently present, taking away the mandatory
participation of other sectors (PEMEX, Secretary of Energy(SENER)33, SECOFI).
CAM was weakened because the mutually dependent sectors (PEMEX, SECOFI,
SENER) had no longer to report what they were doing (Interviews 34 and 39).
They were not co-responsible on policy implementation. Moreover CAM lacked
the authority to push the involved parties to cooperate. It didn’t count with the
direct involvement of the president nor with a powerful position of the federal
environmental sector.34
In addition, the political and administrative autonomy of DF and EDMOEX
prevented any kind of formal subordination of D.F. or EDOMEX to the Federal
Government. They were administrative and politically more autonomous than
before. CAM didn’t have any kind of budget nor a formal administrative
structure to operate and depended on the financial and human resources of the
government holding the chair. 35 Staff members of the CAM were the same civil
servants performing local public administration tasks, therefore acting
“according to the logic of their own organizations or government levels”
(Lezama, 2006, p. 524).
32
Was created in 1994 and replaced SEDUE as the Secretary in charge of
environmental policy.
33
Formerly SEMIP.
34
The Secretary in charge of the environmental policy (SEDUE, SEMARNAP and now
SEMARNAT) has always been one of the less favored in budgetary terms, leaving it in a
powerless position in comparison to other offices such as Energy, PEMEX or SHCP
(Romero-Lankao, 2000).
35
For some time, EDOMEX had a small administrative structure devoted specifically for
metropolitan environmental coordination.
23All this moved to develop strategic interactions affecting the work of CAM.
SHCP shut down in 1998 the fuel surcharge, cutting incoming money for F1490
(Roccatti, 2007).36 By doing that, it removed a source of interdependencies
and CAM members lost interest to meet.37. It served well for the coordination
process and even had a positive impact reducing pollution levels (Molina &
Molina, 2002a; Roccatti, 2007), but with SHCP holding it, the other actors had
no say on the funding sources. The air quality problem has always been seen
by the society as local issue of CDMX so the complaints were always with the
city government. With some other party ruling the city, the Federal
Government didn’t have to carry such a burden.
Such a scenario also encouraged the development of coalitions to overcome
sectorial differences. In 1997 the National Institute of Ecology (INE) tried to
impose tighter emission limits to the automobile industry and adopt emission
standards known as “EPA 94”.38 INE was pushing to set the standard for ‘99
models onwards but the industry, with SECOFI “sitting on their side”, replied
that the sooner they could do it would be with models 2001 (Interview 39).
Negotiations were facing an impasse until D.F. came into play. INE and D.F.
made an agreement so D.F. would exempt for two years the verification of
models ’99 that comply with EPA 94 regulations (Interview 39). At that time,
vehicles had to get inspected every 6 months so it was a good incentive for
buyers to look out for the 2-year exemption. As Gakenheimer et al note, that
move “was a driving force to get automobile manufacturers to put Tier 1 [EPA
‘94] technology into vehicles designed for the Mexican market a few years
earlier than they wanted to” (2002, p. 262). By 1999 all new vehicles fulfilled
EPA 94 standards.
36
Even if SHCP cut the funding source, some projects were financed by F1490 after
1997. The fact that it was a trust fund meant that the money hasn’t to be spent
entirely during a budgetary year and could remain indefinitely.
37
“CAM diminished its intensity after the political changes. With [the relationship] PRI-
PRD, didn’t’ met that much, there wasn’t even a trust fund because they removed the
fuel surcharge.” (Interview 8).
38
At that time INE was the organization in charge of issuing environmental norms.
24Cars with the new technology were awarded a "double zero" sticker, creating a
new category for the verifications program. The norm specially created for the
auto industry to stick to new regulations would also affect HNC after being
coupled with verifications in 1996. Four instruments were now interconnected
under the contingencies program: norms (NOM), inspections (Verifications),
restrictions (HNC) and IMECA.
Coordinating the comfort zone
After 1996 most actions regarding air quality policy were taken trying to avoid
another environmental crisis (Interviews 39 and 16). Their occurrence was
always a lose-lose situation for all the actors because it had a strong
significance on the people’s mind. It meant that pollution levels were high and
that was health damaging. Additionally, contingencies signified driving and
industry restrictions that made almost everyone feel angry. After removing the
F1490, CAM meetings were mostly between EDOMEX and CDMX and to deal
with pollution peaks and the instruments around them. This situation lead
sometimes to coordination and sometimes to break ups and to a blame game.
Pollution peaks lowered in the years to come. From 1988 to 1999
contingencies were activated 45 times in contrast to only 4 episodes on 2000-
2012 (CDMX, 2019a). Air quality was in fact improving (Molina & Molina,
39
2002b) and NOMs were modified only marginally. IMECA levels for
contingencies were tied to the standards set by the NOMs, so updating them to
international standards will imply more contingencies with negative impacts on
public perception (Interview 39). NOMs are an exclusive attribution of the
federal government. Local governments and other actors have to be invited to
participate in the elaboration and modification process (Federal Law of
Metrology and Standardization, 2014) but their involvement is marginal and
some NGOs have the impression that it’s more for legitimation purposes
39
Removing lead from gasoline, tighter standards to the car industry, the introduction
of catalytic converters on vehicles and taking out from CDMX an oil refinery
contributed to improve air quality (Molina & Molina, 2002b).
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