Climate and Security Revisited
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NO. 34 AUGUST 2018 Introduction Climate and Security Revisited Germany’s Priorities for the 2019/2020 UN Security Council Period Susanne Dröge Germany will hold a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2019 and 2020, and has announced that climate fragility will be one of its priorities. However, the Council members’ interest in climate change and willingness to debate improving preparation for its security implications are very mixed. In continuing the follow-up to the Swedish-led debate of July 2018, Germany will face three challenges. First, adding value for all parties involved, the vulnerable developing countries as well as the permanent five countries in the Security Council. Second, matching ambitions with resources; in particular, Germany’s credibility as a climate policy leader needs to be maintained and engagement needs to be pushed at the highest level possible. Third, managing expectations on possible Security Council progress on this non- traditional security issue in the next two years. Diplomatic efforts should improve information flows for countries suffering from climate change impacts, intensify connections across forums inside and outside the UN, and lay out what can actually be achieved through the Security Council. Political attention for security implications searchers conducted increasing numbers of climate change peaked for the first time of case studies and data-based evaluations, in 2007. Extreme weather impacts on food collated by the Intergovernmental Panel on and water supply, land losses due to sea Climate Change (IPCC). Accordingly, more level rise, and systemic issues such as detailed information is available today changing precipitation patterns and melt- when policymakers want to address specific ing polar icecaps are the most prominent security risks associated with climate- phenomena. Their potential to create multi- related events. plier effects in conflict-prone regions was Second, political attention has grown identified already early in the debate. steadily, starting with a UK-led initiative Two areas have developed dynamically and the first debate in the UN Security over the past decade. First, knowledge and Council (UNSC) in 2007. When it previously data about climate change impacts on the held a seat on the UNSC, Germany staged a natural environment and populations in debate in 2011 on climate-related security several world regions has increased. Re- risks which concluded with a presidential
statement. The statement underlines that about adaptation and determination of
“adverse effects of climate change may, in losses and damages. They regarded miti-
the long run, aggravate certain existing gation as the top priority because it would
threats to international peace and security”. have avoided the need to adapt.
Another debate followed in 2013, in an It has become clear, however, that these
Arria-formula meeting of UNSC members efforts did not suffice. Climate change is
where the need for rapid preventive action happening fast with considerable impacts
was stressed. Arria meetings are convened already felt today, mostly but not exclusively
at the initiative of a UNSC member, but in developing countries.
are not an official Security Council activity A number of developing countries, the
and thus enable frank and confidential small island developing states (SIDS), are
exchanges. forced to take the consequences of climate
The G7 foreign ministers in 2013 estab- impacts very seriously as they face threats
lished a Working Group on Climate Change to their territories, but lack the financial
and Fragility. Under the German G7 presi- and institutional capacities to safeguard
dency 2015 a report was commissioned and their interests. Since 2007 the SIDS have
a platform launched to address implications been demanding a forum for regular ex-
of particular climate-fragility risks like for changes about threats from climate change.
example local resource competition, liveli- They regard the UNSC as a suitable place,
hood insecurity and migration, extreme where the developed countries, which con-
weather, and transboundary water manage- tributed most to climate change, could take
ment. During 2017 and 2018, the Nether- responsibility for its effects.
lands and Sweden followed up with UNSC The appetite of UNSC members to ad-
debates on climate and security. dress non-traditional security risks is mixed,
In parallel, calls became louder to reform however. At the latest debate in July 2018,
UN structures in order to advise policymakers led by Sweden, three groups emerged.
on non-traditional security risks such as France, the United Kingdom, Côte-d’Ivoire,
climate change impacts. This history sets Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Nether-
the stage for the coming two years of Ger- lands, Poland, and Sweden, support estab-
man engagement. lishing climate change as a matter of UNSC
involvement. China, the United States,
Kuwait, Peru, and Sudan were interested;
Climate change in the UN Russia and Bolivia were outspokenly
system – UNFCC and UNSC critical.
The key players, however, are the five
With the Paris Agreement effective from permanent members (P5: United States,
2020, the international climate regime Russia, China, United Kingdom, France). As
comprises rules on climate protection, they hold the power of veto, non-traditional
adaptation to climate change, and irre- security threats cannot be addressed in this
versible losses and damage, and also in- forum without their support. Germany will
cludes financial assistance, capacity- join the UNSC, together with Belgium, the
building and technology transfer. It took Dominican Republic, Indonesia and South
many years to get this far. The Framework Africa, in 2019, when the terms of Bolivia,
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands and
began in 1994 with a clear focus on green- Sweden will end.
house gas mitigation, based on an assump-
tion that the atmosphere will not have
deteriorated to a point of unmanageable What is in the cards?
irreversibility by the end of the century.
Policymakers in the 1990s also wanted to The UNSC addresses acute security crises
escape the fatalism inherent to thinking with the authority to intervene using mili-
SWP Comment 34
August 2018
2tary force. Preventive action is not included Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, there
in its mandate. Yet, the links between cli- is even a link to terrorist groups. The lake’s
mate and security are increasingly obvious dramatic decline means that agriculture
and identifiable. References to these and to and fishing can no longer guarantee in-
the need for risk assessments have entered come, which in turn makes it easier for
some recent resolutions, the Lake Chad militias and terrorist groups to recruit
resolution (2017) and Darfur (renewed 2018) young men.
being prominent examples. The reactions of natural systems to a
Climate change research and impacts warming climate develop over long periods,
forecasts show that the extent and fre- making it hard to identify and prepare for
quency of extreme weather will increase immediate threats. A study that looked into
and the global mean temperature will rise. the 2007–2010 drought in the Fertile Cres-
The intensity of extreme events will vary, cent with a focus on Syria illustrates how
but will affect all UNSC member countries the consequences of rising temperatures
through first-, second- and third-order become visible. The authors found that the
events. severe drought cannot be explained by
First-order events are measurable GHG natural variability alone; local changes in
impacts, for example on temperatures; precipitation are linked to a warming east-
water systems like glacial reservoirs in the ern Mediterranean. This long-term trend
Himalayas, Alps and Andes; sea level rise in more than doubles the likelihood of
all oceans, tornadoes and hurricanes hitting droughts in the region. In Syria, this gen-
coast lines in Europe, the United States, erated severe stress for farmers and live-
China, and many other Asian countries; fre- stock herders who suffered great losses.
quency of flooding and drought; or changes Many moved to the urban centres, adding
in land quality and availability. The most to inflows of Iraqi refugees and contrib-
extreme effect is the total loss of territory, uting to a 50 percent expansion of the
which some low-lying island states antici- urban population in only eight years. These
pate in the event of unabated climate social strains and a lack of local resources
change (slow onset events). Second-order contributed to political unrest.
events affect security of supply, like loss
of agricultural productivity and disruption
of water resources (with catastrophic pro- How to handle the risks?
portions reached in the Lake Chad Basin).
Such events are projected to occur more The effects of climate change events can be
often. Migration is a third-order effect. If managed. But to do so, policymakers have
sources of income and sustenance dis- to take decisions in anticipation of future
appear, temporary migration can turn into incidents and different degrees of uncer-
permanent displacement within and across tainty about scale. Both features demand a
national borders. functioning governance system with strong
Thus, human security can be at risk on and effective institutions. In many coun-
all three levels, with the actual magnitude tries, such governance is rare or lacking.
depending on a whole range of other Accordingly, international and regional
factors. cooperation often is the only channel for
Ethnic, territorial, political or socio- mobilizing resources for populations in
economic conflict are the main drivers fragile environments suffering climate
of outbreaks of violence on the national, risks. This is where the adaptation agenda
regional and local levels. Changes in the under the Paris Agreement has already en-
natural environment influence these hanced international cooperation. Yet for
drivers, for instance opportunities to gen- international actors, ex post humanitarian
erate income. In the case of Lake Chad, aid is easier to legitimize than ex ante
once the largest lake in Africa, shared by interventions.
SWP Comment 34
August 2018
3Prevention short-term intervention with military
means resolve long-term structural risks
First and foremost, foreign policy and devel- in vulnerable situations. Thus it is under-
opment cooperation provide measures to standable that many countries are also
help vulnerable countries to avoid food and skeptical about granting the UNSC a climate
water scarcity, to reconstruct after extreme mandate.
natural events, and to enhance their resili- Stronger and more visible connectivity
ence to a greater frequency and severity of with the climate agenda between UN insti-
extreme weather. tutions that function at the preventive end
The UN system covers all relevant aspects could divert some of the demands placed
of prevention, but governance needs to on the UNSC. Nevertheless, there is also
be improved. New initiatives are emerging, reason enough to establish more systematic
based on the Sustainable Development preparedness for future risks. Attempts to
Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement. A implement better and more innovative fore-
UNDP report on climate resilience projects sight exist for instance for strategic develop-
in Arab states shows how various SDGs (like ment assistance planning at the UN level.
poverty reduction, zero hunger, gender
equality, clean water and sanitation, and
peace, justice and strong institutions) can Risk cultures and framing of
be supported through climate action and climate security
thus contribute to overall resilience, in par-
ticular against water stress. Together with The US Department of Defense (DoD)
the United Nations Environment Pro- frames climate change impacts as a matter
gramme (UNEP), the World Food Programme of national security and has stepped up its
and other regional institutions, UNDP plans activities. US military operations inside and
to launch an SDG-Climate Nexus Facility in outside the United States experience directly
2018, in a move to support bottom-up local how climate change could play out, for
actions by enabling investment, with example by aggravating security of supply
shared benefits across the SDGs. More such at US bases hit by extreme weather or by
approaches need to be pushed by key UN melting permafrost in the Arctic region.
members. While they are unlikely to defuse Based on a 2015 DoD report on climate-
the underlying security threats in regions related risks, the Pentagon announced it
with simmering tensions, for instance in would integrate climate impacts into its
Somalia or Yemen, they stand a good chance planning cycles and conduct vulnerability
of avoiding additional threats from climate assessments. Senior defence officials in the
impacts. current administration have continued this
pragmatic approach. The National Defense
Preparation Authorization Act (NDAA) adopted by Con-
gress in 2017 and signed by President
Rather than prevention, “preparedness” for Trump includes spending to prepare the
climate-related risks has become the UNSC’s military for climate-related impacts. Trump
buzzword in the debate over its role. signed the 2019 NDAA in August 2018,
Security circles in general, and the Secu- continuing this approach with a stronger
rity Council members China, Russia and the focus on installations in the Arctic.
United States in particular, however, are In Europe, preparedness and planning
cautious in relation to non-traditional risks for climate-related risks differs consider-
and demands to prepare for them. There is ably. The 2008 Solana/Ferrero-Waldner
good reason for this. The securitization of report showed little military-related inter-
indirect drivers of conflict does not auto- est, but rather the perception that risks
matically lead to solutions that are in the would increase in non-European region and
interest of all parties involved, nor does affect the EU’s foreign relations and devel-
SWP Comment 34
August 2018
4opment policy. The European Council ac- Africa. Seeking dialogue also with the criti-
cordingly prioritized cooperation with third cal countries like Russia and Bolivia is nec-
countries and regions regarding the inter- essary.
national security implications of climate Third, Germany initiated a Group of
change. Friends on Climate and Security on 1 August
Ten years later, the EU approach is little 2018, co-chaired with Nauru and consisting
changed. The climate diplomacy agenda of twenty-seven UN member states, the
of the EU Foreign Affairs Council takes a majority of which are vulnerable islands
holistic approach, integrating climate into and other developing countries. The group
the European External Action Service is an important diplomatic means of inten-
(EEAS) mandate. In June 2018 at a high- sifying and focusing the debate in New
level event in Brussels, EU High Repre- York. It can help to sound out ideas on how
sentative Federica Mogherini laid out three to bring climate-related issues to the UNSC,
EU policy priorities: climate protection as to involve critical members and to deepen
the best way to prevent conflicts, climate and broaden the understanding of the
diplomacy to address the risks together climate-fragility risks.
with partners, and investment in technol-
ogies like satellite systems to inform coun-
tries on weather impacts. The top concern Next steps
for the EU is displacement of people by
natural disasters. Improving credibility
That reluctance to frame climate risks as
a matter for national security policy is also Giving direction and shaping an agenda
shared by the German government, and in New York will have to go hand in hand
hinders direct connection to US interests. with other German climate policy activities.
The 2016 white paper on German security Germany is expected to perform as an
policy recognizes climate change as a phe- integral facilitator in the UN system and in
nomenon, but fails to deliver any deeper other forums like the G7. France will host
analyses or a statement on the role of Ger- the G7 summit in 2019 and is a reliable
many’s future defence policy. Although partner for pushing climate issues in this
the report focuses on early warning of up- setting, as well as in New York.
coming crises, it limits itself to referring the Moreover, expectations on national
issue of climate fragility to international development policy, the UNDP agenda, and
forums and organizations like the G7, the matters such as UNEP’s intensified work on
UN and the EU, or to development policy. transboundary water crises will need to be
matched by German and EU commitment.
In particular, the Green Climate Fund –
Germany in the UNSC which is struggling to operationalize its
project funding – plays a part in this
Its non-permanent seat on the UNSC in context.
2019 and 2020 gives the German govern- The outcomes of the UNFCCC climate
ment the opportunity to follow up on this conference COP24 (Conference of the Par-
priority and to further promote the cred- ties) in Poland in December 2018 will
ibility of the process. For this, first, the cli- set the tone for 2019, and for 2020, the
mate risks debates and initiatives that have year the Paris Agreement comes into effect.
developed in the UNSC-context since 2011 For the SIDS and other vulnerable poor
need to be consolidated. Second, any sug- countries the UN-processes are closely inter-
gestion on handling country-specific climate twined and consistency is imperative. The
fragility in the UNSC needs to be matched less is achieved at COP24, the more efforts
with the diverging interests of the P5 in have to be undertaken to convince develop-
conflict-prone regions, for instance in ing countries and civil society stakeholders
SWP Comment 34
August 2018
5that engagement for their cause can also first being due in 2023 – will also reveal
function through other forums – the UNSC how the big emitters, to which the P5
being one of them. belong, follow up on their own promises
Constructive contributions to a strong to limit global warming.
rulebook for implementing the Paris Agree- Last but not least, the climate diplomacy
ment from 2020 – the key deliverable of capacities at the EU level, including the
COP24 – are as important as domestic Foreign Affairs Council, the European Par-
action for Germany’s reputation. A signifi- liament, and the EEAS, need to be activated
cant political push for domestic climate at an early stage to support the German
policy would thus be helpful to underpin agenda at the UNSC and other UN institu-
credibility. tions during 2019 and 2020.
Improving knowledge Managing expectations
Better preparedness for climate risks will The UN system as such is suffering pressure
function only with better information flows from sharp financial cuts and long-standing
and risk analyses. There is still a need to demands for reform. The appetite for new
improve the knowledge base on climate institutional arrangements is weak. Pushing
impacts from different sources and in par- for Security Council resolutions or state-
ticular regions, and to bring that knowledge ments on climate risks is not a safe bet, and
to those who are affected. The special the ambition of such attempts is amplified
report of the IPCC on a 1.5 degrees climate by a weak UN system. Still, drawing atten-
change target, expected for release in tion to climate impacts will maintain the
October, will highlight the latest scientific pressure on the critical UNSC members,
insights and will set a mark also for the where Germany is one of the few countries
climate and security debate. Exchanges on with the standing to make a difference.
early warning for policymakers seeking to Whether the outcome of Germany’s two-
prevent crises, and meta-studies on risk con- year stint matches the ambition will de-
stellations in specific regions can further pend on the overall political situation at
improve understanding of where massive the UNSC when an open debate is held as
conflicts are to be expected. Germany much as on the diplomatic resources in-
should disseminate and promote such ex- vested upfront.
pertise to inform debates. With a view to Diplomats will need to prepare for flex-
the UNSC, this should be included in the ibility. Working with the United States
Groups of Friends agenda and in Arria exemplifies the issues: While the ongoing
formular meetings. US withdrawal from multilateralism under-
mines the UN system, Germany could
Cross-cutting approaches leverage US national security interests con-
cerning climate risks to engage with US
The German agenda could also serve to representatives in the UNSC. Similarly, for-
more closely connect the debates on pre- mulating common interests of the P5 in the
ventive policies in the UN, such as humani- Arctic region could be a door-opener, but
tarian aid and the implementation of the also delicate as long as Arctic neighbour
sustainable development goals (SDGs) with Russia is critical of talking about climate
experiences of institutions inside and out- security at all.
side the UN that deal with crises aggravated Germany will need a mix of sound alli-
by climate change. Effective SDG imple- ance-building with countries in the UNSC
mentation in particular is a building block (like the United States and China, Peru and
for improving resilience in fragile states. South Africa), sufficient diplomatic re-
Regular reviews of climate action imple- sources to follow up across UN institutions
mentation in the Paris Agreement – the that are already addressing the risks for
SWP Comment 34
August 2018
6fragile states, flexibility of concepts, and
high-level domestic and European govern-
ment engagement. The German govern-
ment can build on the recent efforts and
experiences of the Netherlands and Sweden,
which promoted the debates and tested
approaches during the past two years, and
showed how to enhance foreign policy
infrastructures to achieve impact. Not least,
Germany can build on its strong reputation
as a reliable international partner across © Stiftung Wissenschaft
different forums, including G7 and G20, in und Politik, 2018
times of weakened multilateralism. All rights reserved
This Comment reflects
the author’s views.
The online version of
this publication contains
functioning links to other
SWP texts and other relevant
sources.
SWP Comments are subject
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing.
For further information on
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/
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SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute for
International and
Security Affairs
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0
Fax +49 30 880 07-100
www.swp-berlin.org
swp@swp-berlin.org
ISSN 1861-1761
Dr. Susanne Dröge is a Senior Fellow in the Global Issues Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 34
August 2018
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