CHINA IN AFRICA: A STUDY OF CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (FOCAC) - DIVA
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China in Africa: A Study of Chinese Leadership in the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
Greta Simonaviciute
International Relations
Dept. of Global Political Studies Bachelor programme – IR 61-69, IR103L
15 credits thesis
Spring 2020, Date of Submission: 14/5/2020
Supervisor: John H. S. ÅbergAbstract
The leadership of powerful states in processes of institutional bargaining is significant,
though still widely ignored subject in the field of International Relations (IR). Particularly,
China’s active involvement and, in fact, leadership in the regime formation has drawn wide
attention from scholars and policy analysts alike. The discussion to follow, therefore, focuses
on the leadership role of China in the international regime process. This study uses a
qualitative content analysis method in theory-driven case study research. The suggested Oran
Young’s leadership theory which includes such basic factors as structural power, practice of
the negotiations skills and ability to generate ideas, is aimed at analyzing the complex
leadership potential of China in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) process.
Additionally, the study utilizes desktop research and therefore secondary sources, including
numerical data to support this study. The findings demonstrate that China’s leadership role in
the FOCAC process is influential and effective. Chinese practice of structural power,
negotiation skills and knowledge leadership through the FOCAC corresponds well with its
foreign policy strategy. Finally, Chinese policies in the FOCAC process show high flexibility
when it comes to the complexity of China-Africa relations and China’s ability to adapt to the
new circumstances.
The number of words: 12.969Table of Content
CHAPTER 1
1. Introduction
1.1 Research Aim and Research Question………………………………………….2
1.2 Disposition of the Study………………………………………………………...3
CHAPTER 2
2. Literature Review
2.1 Emerging Powers and Political Leadership in International Relations…………4
2.1.1 Emerging Powers in International Relations…………………………………4
2.2.1 Political Leadership in International Relations………………………………5
2.2 Grasping China’s Foreign Policy Strategies and its Global Impacts…………...6
2.3 FOCAC and the Quest for Leadership in Africa………………………………..9
CHAPTER 3
3. Theory
3.1 Theoretical Approach to the Study of Leadership…………………………….12
3.2 Relevance of the Leadership Theory………………………………………….14
CHAPTER 4
4. Research Method for Studying Leadership Role of China
4.1 Approach to the Research……………………………………………………..16
4.2 Data Sources and Collection of Data………………………………………….18
4.3 Validity and Reliability of the Method………………………………………..20
4.4 Limitations of the Method…………………………………………………….20
CHAPTER 5
5. Findings and Analytical Discussions
5.1 Structural Leadership: Practise of Bargaining Leverage……………………...23
5.2 Entrepreneurial Leadership: Practices of Negotiation Skills………………….30
5.3 Intellectual Leadership: Practise of Intellectual Innovations………………….34
5.3.1 Equality, Mutual Benefit, Mutual Respect and “All-Weather Friend” ……...35
5.3.2 Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Non-Interference…………………….38
5.3.3 Harmonious Coexistence and Mutual Non-Aggression………………………41
CHAPTER 6
6. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………43
Appendices ……………………………………………………………………………....45
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………….50Greta Simonaviciute
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China in Africa: A Study of Chinese Leadership in the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In the past few years, there has been an increasing number of academic interests in
emerging powers’ significance to the international order in correlation to their power,
strategies and evolving new roles. In particular, China’s increasing interest, participation and,
in fact, leadership in multilateral organisations, which has been a hallmark of its shift in
foreign policy since the 1990s (Jakobowski, 2018:659). China’s agenda has drawn wide
attention and even controversy on its future ambitions and the nature of China’s global
leadership (Wang, 2005). These active involvements in multilateralism symbolize the
phenomenal shift in China’s foreign policy by breaking away from its tradition of bilateral
diplomacy.
China’s journey to regional leadership in African continent may be observed since the
establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, under the period
of President Jiang Zemin (Contessi, 2009:412). The forum brings together China and 53 out of
54 African countries that have established diplomatic relations with China (appx. 2). The
Chinese involvement and its role in multilateral diplomacy are clearly seen in FOCAC.
China’s foreign policy interests in Africa have been met with both criticism and praise from
academic and policy analysts alike, across the globe. China has often been accused of luring
African countries in its debt-trap by providing them loans and then control them when they
fail to pay off their debts (Brautigam, 2009:12). While others argue that the forum is mutually
beneficial cooperation model (Anshan et al, 2012:9).
The thesis focuses on China’s emerging practise of leadership in the multilateralism
process within the field of international relations (IR). This research is a systematic and in-
depth study on the leadership role of China with a special focus on the FOCAC process as an
empirical point of departure. Particularly, it highlights how the role of a leader is conceived
and performed. Moreover, this thesis applies Oran Young’s (1991) leadership theory of
intellectual, entrepreneurial and structural leadership emphasizing the particular practise that
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China has adopted in the process of institutional bargaining, including its use of structural
power, negotiating skills and the generation of ideas governing international regimes.
As the literature review will show, some scholars applied a concept of leadership to
analyse the role of emerging and regional powers (Dent, 2008; Flemes and Wojczewski,
2011). However, in any case of collective action, political leadership in international
institution-building remains a topic that is less well understood (Young 1991; Underdal 1994;
Tallberg 2006; Deese, 2007; Morton 2017). Most of the existing research that is conducted
about political leadership has its focus on domestic politics or general governmental
organisations, rather than international organisations and diplomacy (Wang, 2005:50).
For instance, traditionally, IR theories such as rationalism focuses on multilateralism
from the perspective of structural and power-based quality of leadership, while constructivists
and poststructuralists have only recently started to approach concepts such as discursive
hegemonic strategies and the leading integrating role of power in its region (Nabers, 2008).
This phenomenon is thus important to examine to enrich study on leadership in IR,
particularly on the regional leadership issue. The following section outlines the purpose,
research question, followed by the structure of the paper of this research.
1.1 Research Aim and Research Question
The leadership of powerful states in processes of institutional bargaining is significant,
though still widely ignored topic in the field of IR (Young, 1991). The thesis, therefore, seeks
to contribute to a broader conversation and debate in the political as well as in the academic
circles on the issues surrounding the concept of leadership in the context of institutional
bargaining.
It needs to be noted that this study is aware of China’s several failures when it comes
to involvement in Africa. These include contradictions in China’s principles of non-
interference, mutual benefit or human rights discourse and others. Cases of supporting weak
regimes and dictatorships in Zimbabwe, arming revolutionary rebellious in South-West
Africa, Congo and Alegria, and cooperation with a Sudanese regime that does not consider
human rights come under wide criticism (Strauss, 2009:783; Fernando, 2014:152). However,
the purpose of this study is not to detail the ways in which China’s actions differ from those
principles. As Strauss (2009:778) noted, “post-Westphalian states all exhibit significant gaps
between what they say and what they do”. Keeping this in mind, this research aims to examine
the leadership role of China in-depth with a special focus on its grounding and framing
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principles of Chinese policies towards and actions in Africa.
Particularly, by examining how China bridges political and ideological cleavages
within the framework of FOCAC and how China tries to guide the states of the African region
towards the ‘shared goal’, this study contributes to the evolving debate in international politics
on the rise of China on the world stage in general and on the African continent in particular. In
addition, the significance of the study is to complement already existing literature and deepen
understanding of the impact of China’s emerging power, same as its negotiations of regime
formation in FOCAC, thereby providing additional literature that could be used in contrast to
other countries, same as to the wider public in general. Finally, theoretically, this study also
aims to contribute to the testing of international political leadership theory, in part to
encourage its application to the analysis of other regimes as in this case- China’s leadership
role in FOCAC process.
With that in mind, the research question which is to be answered in the line of this
study is the following: How is China performing a leadership role in FOCAC? To answer this
question, the study will assess the qualitative content analysis as a text interpretation method
in the theory-driven case study research. Additionally, this study argues that structural power
asymmetry does not necessarily condition the absolute political leadership in the international
regime process.
1.2 Disposition of the Study
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research
topic and its relevance, including the problem, purpose and research question of the thesis.
Chapter 2 conceptualizes and examines numerous existing literatures on the chosen three
themes. The themes are (i) emerging powers and political leadership in international relations,
(ii) grasping China’s foreign policy strategies and global impact, and (iii) FOCAC and the
quest for leadership in Africa. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical framework grappling this
ongoing debate, respectively. Chapter 4 presents a method used for the research. Chapter 5
constitutes the analytical section for the research which focuses on China’s abilities to lead in
Africa based on a theory-driven case study. Chapter 6 concludes the outcomes of the research.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
This chapter aims to review previous research, ideas and approaches that are relevant
to the research topic. The literature review is organised into three themes that are related to the
research question. (1) Emerging powers and leadership in international relations; (2) grasping
China’s foreign policy strategies and its global impact; and (3) FOCAC and the quest for
leadership in Africa. These themes are relevant to ideas and interpretations of the previous
research. Understanding of the previous research is necessary to understand the framework of
the thesis.
2.1 Emerging Powers and Political Leadership in International Relations
China might be considered an emerging power, regional power or even a potential
global leader (Alves and Alden, 2017). The theoretical understandings behind these concepts
are broadly contested in IR. Therefore, this section clarifies them by presenting previous
research on these concepts. This section is divided into two parts: (1) presents the concepts of
emerging powers and regional powers. (2) introduces several concepts of leadership within IR.
2.1.1 Emerging Powers in International Relations
Emerging power and regional power are contested concepts in IR. Hurrell et al. (2000:1)
describe that they are challenging to define. In addition, it is quite difficult to differentiate
between the concepts of regional and emerging power (Nolte, 2010:890).
Jordaan (2003:165) describes emerging powers as “states that are neither great nor
small in terms of international power, capacity, and influence”. This suggests that emerging
powers are countries with capabilities below those of great powers, but still far above most
secondary states. Additionally, Keohane (1969) arranges the states as to the degree of their
influence in international affairs. He refers to emerging power as “a state whose leaders
consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systematic impact in a
small group or through the international institution” (1969:295). Malamud (2011:3) interprets
Keohane’s reference to a “small group” as an emerging power’ strategy to enter the
international system. Also, he refers to the “international institution” as their strategy’s
preference. Keeping this in mind, international institutions, for emerging countries are helpful
platforms to exercise their power (Hurrell et al, 2000:6). Nolte (2010) affirms that the
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formation of a regional regime is the most effective strategy for global leadership.
Traditionally, states that are listed as regional powers are defined as powerful states
which are highly influential in regional affairs. Hence, Nolte (2010:889) notes that regional
powers have the capacity and ability to lead their neighbours. Other scholars, such as Kennedy
(1987), and Buzan and Waever (2003), conceptualise regional powers on the basis of
structural conditions. Such power is usually maintained through the possession of natural
resources. Natural resources can be used in order to get exceed ideas and assure the behaviour
of partners in a specific region (Nolte, 2010:892). Such possessions, in this view, is an
essential element to become a regional power.
Concepts of the emerging and regional power are similar, and therefore it is quite
difficult to distinguish between them. Nolte (2010:890) stresses that the difference between a
regional and an emerging power rests on leadership, which means its power resources, self-
conception, and leadership. Additionally, Fonseca et al (2016:49) note that the difference
between both concepts rests on leadership. This means the ability to dispute the polarity or
even create hegemony in a particular region. Regional leadership, “refers to political influence
in diplomatic forums, which could be exercised by emerging powers” (Nolte,2010:890).
Changes in the structure of an actor's capabilities in the distribution and
accumulation of global wealth are accepted as the fundamental elements in the rise as an
emerging power. On the other hand, emerging power is the ability to create more favourable
political decisions in multilateral spheres. Emerging power is, thus, a country that observes
such aspects and is able to convert it into political power.
2.1.2 Political Leadership in International Relations
The definition of political leadership is highly contested in IR. Yet, it is an essential
element of all spheres of politics, particularly, in understanding success or failure in the
processes of institutional bargaining (Young, 1991; Nabers, 2008). Most of the studies on
leadership exist in the domestic, rather than on the international arena of leadership (Malnes,
1995; Underdal 1994; Deese 2007).
Previous research on leadership and its importance for the regime formation was,
primarily viewed through the realist approach in the notion of hegemony. Keohane (1969:136)
stressed that hegemony played a crucial role in the regime establishment and its sustainability.
Hence, Snidal (1985:136) organized hegemony into coercive hegemony which referred to
control achieved through material power, while benevolent hegemony was applied to a group
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of great powers to provide public goods for the regime. Later, the liberal approach started to
view hegemony as the relationship between power and leadership questioning on whether the
power leads to leadership within the institution (Harrison, 2004:4).
On the other hand, the second generation of political leadership researchers argues that
political leadership in an international context is not only about power and dominance. Rather,
it is a triangular process which involves leaders, followers, and contexts (Masciulli et al,
2009:5). Additionally, Deese (2007:25) stresses that although a leader seeks to achieve a
common goal in addition to her/his own policy agenda (act selfishly), in the process of goal-
seeking, self-interest must recognise the interplay between morality and power (Deese,
2007:25). Thus, Burns (1979:18) states that potential leaders must be responsive to the values
and interests of current or future followers. Nye (2008:32) conceptualizes “soft power”, which
refers to the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion or payment. To
such a degree, Higgott (2007:95) affirms that “leadership is not the same as economic and
military preponderance. Leadership can be intellectual and inspirational as well”. Leadership,
in these views, requires more persuasion rather than payment, threat or any kind of use of
force. In short, simply forcing others to obey does not secure a leadership position.
Academics identified two methods of exercising leadership. Ikenberry and Kupchan
(1990) describe the use of material encouragements in two ways: in a negative way such as
sanctions or military strikes, and in a positive way such as rewards. The second method is
when one state actor tries to modify the basic beliefs of another state actor by using dialogue,
lobbying and other forms of diplomacy (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:285). Nabers (2012:5)
argues that political leaders often treat these approaches as complementary “political leaders
may readily assume that economic and military incentives are necessary to modify the beliefs
of leaders in other nations”. On the other hand, Nolte (2010) notes that cooperation rather than
punishment is more stable and longer lasting. In addition, Nolte (2010) also argues that it
guarantees access to resources within the region, while the process enables regional leaders to
diffuse their political ideas, shaping the behaviour of other states.
2.2 Grasping China’s Foreign Policy Strategies and Global Impact
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese major foreign policy goal has been to achieve
international recognition and expand internationally (Kent, 2013:138). According to Chinese
leaders’ the new policies, particularly, aimed to make China rich, strong, democratic and
civilised (Austin, 2013:70). Indeed, the extent of China’s shift in policy demonstrates
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president Jiang Zemin’s speech at the Royal Banquet in the United Kingdom in 1999 where he
with confidence spoke about China’s new readiness to view the UK, historically perceived as
one of its oppressors, as one of its partners in international responsibility (Kent, 2013:134).
Later on, President Xi Jinping’s gave a statement at the World Economic Forum in Davos in
2017 reaffirmed Chinese readiness to “play the role of the leader” on a global scale (Mikheev
et al. 2017:2). This demonstrates changes in China’s relations between domestic politics and
external behaviour, resulting in Chinese active participation and promotion of this national
interests.
The main global tool for promoting and exercising China’s leadership role became the
involvement in regional organisations carried mainly in the developing world (Alden et.al,
2017; Jakobowski, 2018:660; Farooq et al, 2019). Typical examples of this are seen in the
establishment of the Middle East (China-Arab States Forum), Latin America and the
Caribbean (China-CELAC Forum or CCF) and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) that have created in recent years. Goldstein (2001) argues that multilateralism
became a key element in the “diplomatic face of China’s grand strategy”. Contessi (2009:405)
affirms that “it has been identified as the instrument to steer a strategy for transcend[ing] the
traditional ways for great powers to emerge”. Multilateralism, in this view, became a Chinese
alternative strategy to achieve global power.
Contrary to popular perception, contemporary China’s role with multilateralism is
unlike its previous experience. Recent scholarship on China’s multilateralism seems to
corroborate this proposition by exemplifying previous China’s alliance with other emerging
economies, primarily the BRICS, where it united with equal partners and was somehow
balanced by other major international actors (Yu, 2017:360; Jakóbowski, 2018:659). In
Contrast, contemporary China is motivated to reshape the world order rather than be shaped
by the changing world. Hence, Contessi (2009:406) affirms that “China has gradually shifted
its role from that of norm taker, moved by mere compliance, to that of norm broker, becoming
a fully- fledged entrepreneur”.
Since the 1990s, China has participated and initiated various regional arrangements
which are signalling their importance within the international system, while at the same time
challenging Western dominance and creating alternatives for the developing countries.
Moreover, the new policy of opening helped China, in little more than three decades,
transformed itself from a closed-off Asian nation trapped in poverty to an emerging global
political and economic force (Garver, 2016:1; Alden and Alves, 2017:154). Thus, Nolte
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(2010:881) affirms that China will sooner or later outperform the United States as the largest
economy in the world.
Reflecting this unique role, China adopts several tactics and strategies in international
organisations. Thus, Alden and Alves (2017:155) note that the change in Chinese foreign
policy is “tactical and pragmatic” since it responds to the changing circumstances. A Chinese
politician Tian Jiyun in 2001 stressed that “in international relations, China adheres to non-
alignment and does not engage in the formation of military blocs, arms race and military
expansion. China upholds an independent foreign policy of peace and a defensive national
defence policy” (Kent, 2013:137). This tactic allows China to navigate “according to
circumstance or need, towards either the developing or the developed world” (Kent,
2013:137). On the other hand, Glaser and Madeiros (2012) argues that China’s strategic goals
remain essentially unchanged when it comes to regional and international order. Hence, Segal
(1999) questions whether China’s power matters at all.
Some academics have stressed the importance of moral principles in China's
international organisational behaviour (Kim, 1992; Shih, 1993). Chinese multilateral forums,
unlike North-South cooperation, have a very distinctive nature. First, Chinese-backed norms
are rooted in the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. These include mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (White Paper, 2007).
Second, these forums include high-level visits and different agenda-setting structure, new
sectoral cooperation mechanisms and financial instruments (Jakobowski, 2018:660). China’s
cooperation, in this view, is designed to benefit all members equally.
Keeping this in mind, China stresses the division between developed and developing
countries (Strauss, 2009). In particular, the continuous Western influence on the international
system (Fernando, 2014:156). Shih (1993) notes that through the involvement in multilateral
organisations, China strongly promotes self-reliance rather than self-alliance with the recipient
countries, highlighting the negative dependence on them. Thus, Kent (2013:140) affirms that
China’s active participation in international organisations is not only about system-
maintaining but also has affected “a partial return to a system-reforming approach, which in its
view redresses the imbalances and injustices of the past”. This suggests that multilateral
platforms have become China’s tool to reform such an agenda.
It is important to note here that although this paper reference China, in several
occasions, as ‘initiator’ of creating the multilateral platforms in the international system, this
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has not always been agreed by scholars. As Alden and Alves (2017:157) write, the debate over
creating regional forums between China and Arab world or between China and Latin America
took years before reaching any agreements and were accepted with some reluctance from
China. Nevertheless, while there might be some discussion on whether China or its partners
initiated the idea to create a particular forum, these multilateral initiations are potentially
supported by China’s economy, norms and its diplomacy which, arguably, gives preference to
Chinese interests in the first place (Jakobowski, 2018). This review of information suggests
that China’s leadership ambitions are beginning to grow.
2.3 FOCAC and the quest for leadership in Africa
This section presents China’s quest for leadership in Africa, including Sino-Africa past
and present relations. In addition, it demonstrates how these relations let the creation of the
FOCAC- one of the regional forum initiatives signed by China and Africa.
China’s engagement with African countries is not a new phenomenon (Brautigam,
2009). The origin of Sino-African relations traces back to the long history of interchange
which covers various aspects of politics, trade and economy (Brautigam, 2009:23). Broadly
speaking, there have been two waves of Sino-African relations: past relations and
contemporary relations. The two waves are dissimilar. While past relations were anti-colonial
liberation movements, the contemporary has turned into economic relations (Ka, 2018:2).
Thus, Motalini and Virtanen (2017:438) note that the ideological interest of the past helped to
build the current Sino-African relations with an emphasis on being mutually beneficial and
common development.
There are several reasons for China’s interest in cooperation with African countries.
First, the interest is driven by economic factors (Sun, 2014:5). Scholars agree that China,
fuelled by decades of high economic growth, is in high demand for key commodities that had
largely outstripped domestic local production (Alves, 2013:211; Garver, 2016). China, in this
view, was required to source these demands from overseas. Some may even argue that the new
demands were the main reason for the shift in Chinese foreign policy. This policy came to be
known as the ‘go global’ policy (Alves, 2013:208). The second reason is political. China
needed support from other African countries on its one-China policy which prefers China’s
sovereignty over Taiwan (Kent, 2013:141). In other words, in order to cooperate with China,
African countries must accept the One China policy as the only lawful representative of China.
In addition, African countries politically supported China to resume their seat at the United
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Nations (Sun, 2014:4). Lastly, China is interested in security issues. Due to the vast
geographical distance makes, China hardly faces a direct physical threat to its national or
periphery security (Sun, 2014:9). However, China is very concerned about its economic
activities in the African region. For instance, Chinese vessels were attacked by Somali pirates
in 2008 by causing economic damages (Sun, 2014:11).
China, pushed by economic globalisation, accelerated Sino-African relations. This can
be indicated by various exchanges of high-level visits and its officials’ statements to promote
Chinese trade (Anshan et al, 2012:15). Zhou Enlai’s visits to African countries in 1963–65
started to establish the kind of image that China presents itself today: a moral partner with a
clear differentiation from the West in its dealings with Africa, respect for sovereignty, equality
and self-reliance, support for anti-colonial struggles and no-strings developmental assistance
(Strauss, 2009:782). Similarly, chairman Jiang Zemin during his trip to Africa in 1996 stated
that “the Chinese government encourages mutual cooperation, broadening trade, increasing
African imports, and finally promoting the balanced and fast development of China-African
trade” (Anshan et al, 2012:15). Each of these visits had one goal to further develop China’s
strategic partnership with Africa.
In most of the cases, China’s cooperation proposals were welcomed in the corridors of
power in Africa (Brautigam, 2009:12). There are several reasons that make China a preferred
partner for Africa. First, Africans’ image of China is shaped by Chinese historical support to
Africa’s freedom struggles (Ka, 2018:2). Second, African countries view China’s economic
development as an example for Africa and Chinese financial support as new prospects for
Africa’s development (Motolani and Virtanen, 2017:445). Third, China’s development model
of mutual benefit and non-interference in African countries’ internal affairs favoured China’s
cooperation proposals (Ka, 2018:6). Fourth, Africans view Chinese involvement as being
efficient with “quick implementation and deliverables and in line with their priorities for the
continent” (Motolani and Virtanen, 2017:445). Lastly, the Chinese proposals have given
African governments an alternative to Western financing, thereby limiting their dependence
on the developed countries; many African countries have seized this opportunity (Brautigam,
2009:12). As a result, China now has a strong diplomatic profile, embassies, and political
offices across the African continent.
The increasing cooperation between China and African countries led to the foundation
of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in 2000. Enuka (2010:212)
notes that the FOCAC establishment “clearly demonstrated the new character of Sino-African
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relations in the new era” by becoming a forum for collective dialogue, rooted in the principles
such as long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit. In the period since FOCAC was
established, relations between China and Africa have deepened. This takes the form of
increased two-way trade, higher investments, cultural exchange and greater development
assistance for the African continent (Naidu 2008:169). Thus, Jakobowski (2017:660) affirms
that throughout the existence of FOCAC, it developed into “a far-reaching dialogue platform”
which includes various aspects such as economy, development, politics and cultural issues.
The FOCAC is based on five guiding principles and objectives that are issued in
China’s Africa Policy White Paper in 2006: (a) sincerity, friendship and equality; (b) mutual
benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity; (c) mutual support and close coordination and (d)
learning from each other and seeking common development (White Paper, 2007). These
economic and diplomatic agreements attempt to guide and shape contemporary Sino-African
relations. Moreover, the FOCAC partnership has one conditionality - supporting the ‘One
China’ principle, which implies no maintaining of official political relations or contacts with
Taiwan as a sovereign state (FOCAC, 2006a). This conditionality is openly stated in all
agreements and is clearly underlined as a prerequisite for cooperation with African countries
(White Paper, 2007).
Nevertheless, the changes in both the scale and the visibility of China’s engagements
with Africa, particularly, the Chinese government’s strategy of economic and political
cooperation have attracted wide academic attention. Brautigam (2009:78) views China’s
involvement in Africa as a well-thought-out strategy as well as manipulative cooperation for
the search of raw materials to feed the demands of the growing Chinese economy. Making
similar insinuations about China’s presence in Africa, Ka (2018:1) argues that these
relationships “helped China to penetrate economically in many parts of Africa as a friend with
total confidence and support from local politics”. Others view such cooperation as a lucrative
opportunity for both parties (Anshan et al, 2012; Fernando, 2014:147). In addition to FOCAC,
Enuka (2010:214) stresses that although this forum has encouraged mutual benefits for both
African countries and China. Yet he problematizes China's leadership role and its danger to
undermine Africa’s position in FOCAC.
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CHAPTER 3
Theory
This chapter presents an introduction to the theoretical approach that is used for this
research. The presentation focuses on the leadership theory as it was developed by the scholar
Oran Young. This chapter is divided into two sections: (1) presents the concepts of leadership
theory, including its meanings and interpretations; (2) concerns the relevance and the
limitations of the leadership theory.
3.1 Theoretical Approach to the Study of Leadership
In IR, Oran Young has provided the concept of leadership from a behavioural
perspective. Young (1991:306) emphasise that “much of the real work of regime formation in
international society occurs in the interplay of bargaining leverage, negotiating skill, and
intellectual innovation”. Thus, Young has developed three distinct types of leadership:
structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership and intellectual leadership. They relate to each
other in shaping the related institution. This proposed way of understanding leadership in
international bargaining is one way to analyse the context of China’s leadership role in the
FOCAC process from a behavioural perspective.
Structural leadership (bargaining leverage in negotiations) is exercised by the state and
its officials who possess the most power, resources and have the greatest commitment issues
under the negotiation (Deese, 2007:25-34). Meaning, in terms of power, resources and
knowledge. Young (1991:288) specifies that structural leaders are experts in the process of
translating the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage as a means of
reaching agreement on the terms of constitutional contracts in the social settings. As suggested
by Wehner (2011:142) in order to mobilize followers, structural leadership is exercised by
using “carrots and sticks”. The “carrot” seems to describe material rewards, whereas the
reference to “sticks” more closely reflects the use of threats such as sanctions. Thus Young
(1991:290) concludes that to complete a successful agreement the promise of rewards or
threats should be well thought, carefully designed and have credibility in itself for the others
to follow.
The second variety of leadership is entrepreneurial leadership (negotiating skills). It
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refers to the bridging, building and shaping of coalitions through the use of consensual
reasoning and negotiating skills (Young, 1991:293; Deese, 2007:34). In short, entrepreneurial
leader crafts structures and applied domestic skills. Wehner (2011:142) also stresses leaders'
capacity to mobilise passive actors who share a common interest but have not yet joined
together for the achievement of such common goals. In addition, according to Young an actor
with the effective negotiating skills may undertake several roles. These include: agenda-setter
who presents the ideas for consideration at the international stage, populariser highlights the
ideas, an inventor is responsible for developing policy options to overcome bargaining
impediments and broker who makes an actual deal and brokers making deals and organises the
support for salient options (Young, 1991:294). Having covered these rules, an actor will have
strong negotiating skills.
Finally, intellectual leadership (the intellectual innovations governing international
regimes) is the promotion of the ideas and language (Deese, 2007:35). According to Young
(1991:298) “intellectual leader is an individual [state] who produces intellectual capital or
generate systems of thought that shape the perspectives of those who participate in the
institutional bargaining”. In short, the intellectual leader relies on the power of ideas to shape
the intellectual capital. Young (1991:300) notes that “the intellectual leader is a thinker who
seeks to articulate the systems of thought that provide the substratum underlying the
proximate activities involved in institutional bargaining”. Although this type is an exclusively
individual aspect, states may also utilize intellectual leadership due to their established identity
(Wehner, 2011:142). In this paper, China may exercise intellectual leadership since it is seen
as having an established identity.
In the process of regime formation, all different types of leadership appear at a certain
stage in the simultaneous process. Whereas the first idea is initiated by the intellectual leader,
the entrepreneurial leader plays an essential key in diffusing that idea, followed by structural
leader’s ability to enforce a certain conclusion on the agreement. Moreover, although all three
roles are not necessarily used to lead, this paper applies all three forms of leadership to
examine the leadership role of China in the institutional bargaining process. Finally, this
theory is applied to analyse state, rather than individuals with an argument that political
individuals act in their capacity as state representatives. Thus, it is not important to strictly
distinguish between them.
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3.2 Relevance of the Leadership Theory
The key issue is to understand the complex interplay of leadership elements. Young’s
typology directly and openly touches questions of leadership in the bargaining process with
three central insights: (i) structural leadership; (ii) entrepreneurial leadership; and (iii) the
intellectual leadership. Moreover, it directly integrates many different elements such as the
role of power, material factors, the roles of ideas, the role of political will, and thus elements
of bargaining perspectives (Deese, 2007). Additionally, Young’s leadership theory is a useful
tool for understanding bargaining between states (Nabers, 2012:5). Thus Masciulli et al.
(2009:3) affirm that political leadership helps “to account for significant differences across
and within individual nation states” in relation to foreign policy and international events.
One of the purposes of applying leadership theory to this research is its ability to move
beyond the traditional argument that hegemony and structural power are essential elements for
the emergence or survival for international cooperation. Such beliefs “frequently fly in the
face of reality”, especially, among IR students (Young, 1991:306). On the other hand, Young
(1991) moves beyond this argument by noting that leadership from a hegemon is neither
necessary nor sufficient for effective international institution building. Instead, leadership
theory expands the scope of leadership by allowing to examine it from a broader perspective.
Furthermore, the process of identifying and contrasting Young’s different types of
leadership aims specifically to establish the existence of China’s leadership independent of the
outcomes it is associated with. Young (1991:286) argues that leadership roles should not be
studied with assumptions about its success because it limits “the development of propositions
dealing with the relationship between the activities of leaders on the one hand and the
outcomes of institutional bargaining on the other”. In this context, leadership theory will allow
to systemize the performance of China’s leadership role, as well as explain in detail the
eventual reasons for both: success and failure, when the role of leadership is played.
There are several limitations linked to Young’s theoretical approach to leadership.
First, it has been criticized for being restrictive since it assumes that those capabilities are used
only in the context of negotiation (Camilleri, 2003:122). In addition, Godehardt and Nabers
(2011:143) stress that Young constantly refers to the term of leadership as a role in IR but
does not provide further explanation of the leader role from a theoretical perspective
(Godehardt and Nabers, 2011:143). Malnes (1995:106) notes that these divided “types of
leadership are far from perfect”, however, as argued above, Young’s leadership theory is still
relevant to examine China’s leadership roles in relation to both the African region and on the
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global scale.
Young’s leadership theory is primarily and explicitly concerned with leadership
questions of international regime formation in world politics. Thus, three types of leadership:
structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership allow this research to analyse the
different capabilities of China’s leadership role in the international bargaining process. These
capabilities include: the practice of the bargaining leverage, practise of the negotiation skills
and practise of the intellectual innovations. Therefore, the adaptability and credibility of this
theory are highly appreciated in this paper.
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CHAPTER 4
Research Method for Studying the Leadership Role of China
The methodology section aims to provide clarification about the proposed research
framework. In order to create an understanding of the conduct of the inquiry and to present
how collected data will be used in the analysis, this chapter is divided into four parts: (1)
explains the chosen research method that is used in this paper; (2) describes the data sources
and data collection process; (3) presents validity and reliability and; (4) highlights the
limitations of the chosen methods of inquiry.
4.1 Approach to Research
This paper employs qualitative content analysis as a text interpretation method in the
theory-driven case study research. Babbie (2001:304) defines content analysis as "the study of
recorded human communications". In other words, this study collects and transforms the ‘raw
data’ such as official documents and speeches into an organised form (Babbie, 2001). The
content analysis will organise the data into specific phrases and short statements that will
support the research. Additionally, theory-guided analysis “constantly compare theory and
data—iterating toward a theory which closely fits the data" (Eisenhardt, 1989:541). Therefore,
there is a relevant connection between China’s leadership role in the FOCAC process and
Young’s leadership theory. Through a combination of the theory, qualitative content analysis
and FOCAC official documents and speeches this relevance will be shown. Figure 1 visualizes
the chosen method approach: qualitative content analysis from the theory to the analysis and
interpretation.
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Figure 1. Visual presentation of qualitative content analysis in theory-driven case study
research
Source: Kohlbacher, Florian (2006)’ The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research’,
Qualitative Social Research, (7:1), p.18.
Explaining the use of figure 1. Young’s theory is divided into three types of leadership. The
FOCAC documents and speeches were coded with these three types. The documents were
summarized, explained and structured into organised information. The organised information
is applied and interpreted in the analysis chapter.
There are several reasons for applying qualitative content analysis in the theory-driven
case study research. The first strength of a qualitative method is that it allows detailed analysis
through the use of many different sources and addresses a broader range of historical,
attitudinal, and behavioural issues (Yin, 2003:97). Thus, since qualitative content analysis
includes methodologically controlled step-by-step procedures, it has an ability to investigate
difficult-to-observe phenomena and hard-to-define concepts (Halperin and Heath, 2017:14).
Hence, Stake (2010) notes that qualitative research allows for inquiry into what is not known.
Besides, qualitative content analysis has an ability to “synthesize two contradictory
methodological principles: openness and theory-guided investigation” (Kohlbacher, 2006:12).
As a result, this thesis demonstrates how this research, in some way, contributes to a chosen
theory by establishing the relation between both theory and empirical observation.
This paper employs theory-based ‘category system’. Titscher et al. (2000:58) refer it to
coding: “every unit of analysis must be coded, that is to say, allocated to one or more
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categories”. Thus Kohlbacher (2006:14) affirms that the central tool of qualitative content
analysis is a category system (coding). The main strength of coding is that it, “forces the
researcher to make judgments about the meanings of contiguous blocks” (Kohlbacher,
2006:10). Additionally, a theory-based category system is more open and flexible when it
comes to the “extraction when relevant information turns up but does not fit into the category
system” (Kohlbacher, 2006:17). Category system, in this view, can be adjusted consistently in
the analysis.
4.2 Data Sources and Collection Process
This section presents a presentation of what type of data has been used, where it has
been collected and how it has been collected. In other words, it presents the data collection
process by highlighting the main undertaken steps.
Overall, this research project used desktop research. One common type of data for
desktop research is secondary data (Halperin and Heath, 2017). The secondary data sources
included speeches, official documents, reports and statistics from governmental sites,
scientific articles, journals, books, internet sources and other literature. By using desktop
research this study dealt primarily with reanalysing data that have already been collected for
other purposes.
The main object- ‘text’ (figure 1) of qualitative content analysis is secondary sources
that are produced and related to the FOCAC ministerial conferences between 2000-2018.
These sources include official documents and speeches. The official documents and speeches
from the seven FOCAC ministerial conferences are currently available on the FOCAC
website. The coding of the data limited itself to notions concerning place, participants and,
primarily, commitments. The summaries of the seven FOCAC ministerial conferences can be
found in appx. 1.
The data for official documents and speeches is gathered from the following sources:
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China (FMPRC), Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China
(MOFCOM), official websites of Chinese Embassies in Zambia, Botswana and others.
Additionally, the numerical data is collected from the following databases: The World
Factbook in The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), UN Comtrade Database, China Africa
Research Initiative (CARI) and Trade Map in The International Trade Centre (ICT).
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The data collection is based on three theoretical categories. The coding divided
FOCAC commitments and speeches according to the nature of each leadership type. For
instance, since the structural leadership is about structural power, one must view the material
indicators such as Chinese provided loans for the African countries. This is just one example
of how data collection helps to organise raw materials into a useful form. Table 1 visualizes
how the data were coded according to the different types of leadership.
Table 1. Collecting categories in a coding agenda
Source: author’s own compilation
Since each of the leadership types is quite different in their nature, therefore the data
collection is extended in a few cases. The structural leadership examines asymmetries in the
distribution power among FOCAC countries. The numerical data is collected from the year
2018 to compare China and four other FOCAC members: South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and
Ethiopia. The selected African countries are the wealthiest countries ranked by GDP, followed
by Ethiopia being number eight in the top ten (CIA, 2020). The selected countries are through
the data compared with China in their size of population, territory, economic and military
capabilities.
Such data is, arguably, more applicable for this analysis as it provides more concrete
and clearly visualised information about asymmetries in the distribution power among
FOCAC members. As a result, this data gives more depth to the understanding of the problem.
Moreover, the study examines China’s share in the selected countries’ imports and their
exports. This includes finding statistics of these countries’ total export and import with China,
divided by their total trade worldwide. This type of information shows the dependence and
independence between China and their trading partners.
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The data collection for intellectual leadership depended on the speeches at the FOCAC
opening ceremonies from 2000-2018. These speeches, arguably, represent the Chinese way to
express their views and ideas to the wider FOCAC public. The key phrases in the data were
based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These principles guide the FOCAC
platform. Overall, all data collection for intellectual leadership aims to examine China’s ideas,
views and their sustainability or flexibility to change over the period of FOCAC existence.
4.3 Validity and Reliability of the Method
This section presents the criteria of validity and reliability for qualitative content
analysis method in theory-driven case study research. When discussing validity, the
importance is on the theoretical relevance to the empirical analysis (Halperin and Heath,
2017:355). In this study, the materials are reconstructed under the three theory-driven
categories: structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership and intellectual leadership. Each
category is followed by theoretically based definitions (table 1).
Such data collection allows for precise sampling. In this view, the validity is material
oriented. Moreover, the chosen method shows process-oriented validity. The thesis
emphasizes the clear process of the collection of the data. Finally, to strengthen the validity of
the study, several kinds of data collection processes were used. For instance, the numerical
data approach is employed to support the results of structural leadership. Also, secondary
sources such as academic journals and books were used to support the findings.
The reliability of this paper depends mainly on two factors. First, to ensure reliability it
is important to have consistent methods (Harrison, 2013:129). For example, by the use of
figure 1, this study follows a consistent method of coding. Second, qualitative methodologist
stresses the importance of transparency (Armstrong et al, 1997:598). Therefore, all sources
used are represented in the reference list. Through these two considerations, the study has
concern itself with the aspect of reliability.
4.4 Limitations of the Method
As with every study, this study has several limitations. This section of the chapter will
go through the restrictions to help to comprehend the results of the research in a broader
manner.
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Halperin and Heath (2017:14) highlight the limitations of qualitative content analysis
methods by stressing that “its findings might not have wider relevance to contexts outside the
immediate vicinity of where the research was conducted”. Thus, Kohlbacher (2006:1) affirms
that qualitative research method as data analysis is described as unscientific, or only
exploratory and subjective. In this case, any outcome of this research is unlikely to make
predictions about the future of China’s position as a global leader in general and China’s
leadership role within multilateral platforms in particular, nor about the Sino-Africa relations,
but is rather limited to theoretical beliefs. In this case, one may argue that a case study method
does not adequately address the complexity of China's leadership role in the international
regime formation.
To some extent, these arguments are applicable to this paper as well. However,
Flyvbjerg (2014:120) argues that such criticism can be applied to all research methods and
other qualitative methods. Therefore, this paper does not deny the existence of limitations that
exist through the chosen method, rather it shows its potential weaknesses. Yet, despite these
limitations, this thesis aims to overcome these shortcomings by producing coherent knowledge
and having a clear focus. In addition, it examines a variety of academic sources, including the
use of political theory.
When discussing data collection, since data comes, mainly, from secondary sources, it
comes with a challenge to avoid bias information. The official Chinese publications often have
a highly promotional nature and use grand language to describe China-Africa cooperation. For
instance, the White Paper on China’s African Policy 2006 reads as follows: “China and Africa
have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national
liberation and forged a profound friendship” (White Paper, 2007:376). In order to avoid bias
information in secondary data, the study critically collected data from official FOCAC
documents.
Although large numbers of FOCAC and Chinese foreign policy documents, official
reports and speeches can be found online, for example on the FOCAC official website, yet
documents are quite limited in their public nature. Meaning, that the insight into the direction
and the scope of the documents are quite limited. Additionally, several events are described
very briefly while others contain more information. For instance, the FOCAC official website
provides limited information about the FOCAC II ministerial conference held in 2003. It
misses wider insights and has quite limited information about commitments. In order to avoid
such weakness, it looks at these findings critically and seeks confirmation from other sources
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