Business, Boycott & Bureaucracy: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the Global Quest for Conflict-Free Diamonds

Business, Boycott & Bureaucracy: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
                         and the Global Quest for Conflict-Free Diamonds
          Prepared for presentation at the 7th Pan European Conference on International Relations
                        Stockholm City Conference Centre, September 9-11, 2010

                                                 Holger Meyer
                                                Ph.D. Candidate
                                        Department of International Affairs
                                           The University of Georgia
                                               holgerm@uga.edu

                                             Comments welcome!
                        Working draft - Not for citation without the author's permission

Abstract
The trade in so called “conflict” or “blood” diamonds has fuelled devastating conflicts in countries such
as Angola, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. The
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an international commodity tracking system,
designed to prevent the trafficking in these stones. Jointly created by diamond-exporting countries,
industry and civil society, the KPCS imposes extensive requirements on its signatories to enable them to
certify shipments of rough diamonds as „conflict-free‟. Based on an exceptional WTO-waiver and
employing a distinctive approach to multi-stakeholder diplomacy, it stands out as a unique tool to
advance international security and conflict prevention. While a substantive literature has evaluated the
success of the KPCS from the perspective of international law, few scholars have examined the
stakeholder‟s diverging viewpoints on benefits, burdens and future perspective of the scheme. This
paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by elaborating the interplay of economic and security
concerns in shaping the KP. Analyzing interviews conducted with representatives of the diamond
industry, government officials, and NGO spokespersons it provides a comprehensive assessment of their
diverging evaluations. The responses suggest that the prevailing dissatisfaction with the scheme is
rooted in the ongoing dispute about the KPs future area of responsibility rather than in a disappointment
with its past accomplishments. Critically assessing the challenges to and future perspective of the KPCS,
the paper concludes with an analysis of the scheme's usability as a model for regulating trade in other
commodities that have the potential to fuel domestic and international armed conflict.

I would like to thank Dr. Susan Ariel Aaronson, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington
University, for her helpful comments and suggestions. Research funding from George Washington University‟s Center for
International Business Education and Research (CIBER) is also gratefully acknowledged.

                                                                                                                         1

Introduction

During the second half of the last century, the trade in illicitly mined diamonds had become a major

means for financing large scale internal conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone (Hirsch 2001; Hirsch 2001; Campbell 2002). UN

General Assembly resolution 55/56 defines these so-called “conflict diamonds” as “rough diamonds

which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine

or overthrow legitimate Governments” (UN General Assembly 2001,1). While some sources claim that

conflict diamonds have had a world market share of up to 25% (Lamptey 2002), the generally accepted

figure for the late 1990s is 4 per cent (Wright 2004, 702).

       It is estimated that during Sierra Leone‟s decade long civil war alone, some $300 to $450 million

in diamond revenues were taken out of the country – of which over 90% bypassed government coffers

and exited through illicit channels via neighboring Liberia, Guinea or nearby Cote d‟Ivoire (Hirsch

2001). Although the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels were the main benefactors of these illicit

diamond proceeds, reports suggest that government forces, as well as the intervening Economic

Community Of West African States‟ (ECOWAS) cease-fire monitoring group and some West African-

based Lebanese diamond traders benefited from the smuggling of conflict diamonds as well (Gberie

2002; McGreal 2000). In another prominent case, the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de

Angola (UNITA) reportedly amassed about $3.7 billion in diamond revenues between 1992 and 1997 –

an amount which by far exceeds the sum it received in aid from the USA and its allies during the Cold

War (Grant and Taylor 2004, 387-88)

       When large scale campaigns by non-governmental organizations (including Amnesty

International, Global Witness, and Partnership Africa Canada) brought the issue to the attention of a

larger audience in consumer countries, an unprecedented coalition of national governments, corporations

operating in the diamond industry, industry associations and NGOs was formed to curb the flow of these
                                                                                                          2

illicit stones into mainstream markets. Their efforts resulted in the implementation of the Kimberley

Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), an international certification protocol for all rough diamonds

traded globally. It basically represents an export and import control regime. Producer countries control

the production and transport of rough diamonds from mine to point of export. Shipments of rough

diamonds are sealed in tamper-resistant containers and accompanied by a „Certificate of Origin‟ issued

for each shipment. Importing countries will inspect the seal and the certificate at the time of import.

Imports of rough diamonds not accompanied by a certificate issued by a Kimberly Process participant

are prohibited, as are exports to non-participants. As of today, the scheme encompasses 49 members

(representing 75 countries, with the Member of the European Union counting as one single participant),

industry groups and NGOs.

Research Question & Hypothesis

The KP was deliberately designed as a tripartite process. However, the current lively public, political

and scholarly debate about the scheme‟s efficiency and viability is – not surprisingly – dominated by

perspectives and assessments proliferated by NGOs (the third leg of the tripartite setup) in the

international media. While official governmental statements do come occasionally into view, the

perspectives of the diamond industry appear to be remarkably absent from this debate. In order to avoid

the drawing of premature conclusions about the success of the process by adopting the point of view of

one group of stakeholders, it is essential to consult all factions involved in the implementation of the KP.

         It is often implied that for the diamond industry, the Kimberley Process is nothing more than a

PR instrument. Chaim Even-Zohar1, for instance, asserts that “most people you talk to will give you the

party-line: anything that helps to preserve consumer confidence in diamonds is worth it. As long as the

1
 Even-Zohar is the principal of Tacy Ltd, a Tel Aviv-based consultancy specializing in all aspects of the international
diamond business.
                                                                                                                          3

consumer believes that KP is working and that diamonds are clean, the KP has served its purpose from a

business perspective. I surely agree with that. You will not find diamond merchants that will argue

against Kimberley, as no one would argue against the virtues of motherhood, the virtues of clean water

and the beauty of a clean environment” (Even-Zohar 2009).

       This paper is intended to address both of these issues. First, it attempts to provide a balanced

view on the Kimberley Process by portraying and interpreting the perspectives of members of all three

stakeholder groups involved in its creation and implementation – NGOs, the World Diamond Council,

and national governments. Second, it evaluates the “party-line” argument by analyzing interview

responses of industry representatives and comparing them to those of government officials and activists.

Ten years after the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, this paper attempts a

review of the scheme from its stakeholders‟ perspectives. By doing so it intends to shed light on the

ongoing discussion within and among the stakeholder groups about achievements, shortcomings and

future of the scheme.

Central research question:

Why and in how far do perspectives on the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

differ between NGO representatives, government officials and members of the World Diamond Council?

Will be guided by the following primary hypothesis:

Primary Hypothesis:

The current dissatisfaction with the Kimberley Process is rooted in the discrepant interpretation of the

Kimberley Process’ purpose by the three stakeholder groups today. Changes in the goal orientation of

all three stakeholder groups have led to considerable disagreements about the schemes current purpose

and future tasks.

                                                                                                           4

The Kimberley Process

In the late 1990s, so-called “conflict diamonds” had become the currency and primary financing vehicle

of rebel movements in diamond-rich countries like Angola, the Congo, and Sierra Leone. Controlling

the diamond mining regions, rebel groups used the proceeds to acquire weapons and wage brutal,

decades- long campaigns against unarmed civilians, perpetrating killings, rapes, mutilations, and

abductions into their armies or sexual slavery. As many as 3.7 million people ultimately lost their lives

to the diamond- financed conflicts, and as many as 6.5 million were displaced, not to mention the untold

thousands who suffered other abuses of their most fundamental rights (United States Congress 2003).

       Eventually, public outrage over the atrocities committed by diamond-funded rebels in Sierra

Leone jump-started an international campaign to curb the trade in “conflict diamonds.” Non-

governmental organizations began to thrust the issue into the popular conscience when they launched a

constant barrage of reports and criticism that ultimately drew the attention of diamond-producing states

and companies and the global community as a whole (Tamm 2002). Global witness, a non-governmental

organization that focuses upon the linkage between the exploitation of natural resources and human

rights, released a report titled A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan

Conflict (Global Witness 1998). Among other allegations, the report implicated that the diamond cartel

De Beers was buying diamonds from Angolan rebel groups in order to maintain market stability.

Confronted with the prospect of a potentially crippling consumer backlash and boycott, companies

engaged in the diamond trade and industry associations quickly took notice (Price 2003). In its 2000

annual report, De Beers, the world‟s largest diamond producer, acknowledged that “the possible effect

of conflict diamonds on consumer confidence is a threat to the entire legitimate diamond industry.” In an

interview with CNN, De Beers spokesperson Andrew Lamont cautioned that "there is a great danger of

throwing the baby out with the bathwater. We have heard the siren calls that diamonds could go the

same way as the fur trade” (Durham 2001).
                                                                                                            5

In May 2000, diamond producing countries of Southern Africa met to plan a method by which

trade in conflict diamonds could be halted. At the 29th World Diamond Congress, the International

Diamond Manufacturers‟ Association and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses issued a joint,

“zero tolerance” resolution on conflict diamonds, by which they created the World Diamond Council.

The WDC was intended to represent the interests of the diamond industry in the work to eliminate

conflict diamonds (World Diamond Council 2003). In December of the same year, the United Nations

General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/56, requesting the development of an international

certification scheme for rough diamonds. Forty-eight states sponsored the resolution, and it was

unanimously adopted without a vote (UN General Assembly 2001). This resolution imposed a timeline

on the process, with the UN requesting a report by December 2001. On January 1, 2003, after some two

years of negotiations the KP went into effect.

Literature Review

        Since its implementation the Kimberley Process was hailed as a unique and promising new

approach to international, multi-sectoral cooperation. Scholars assessing the novel concept of close

government-industry-NGO cooperation highlighted the speed of its implementation and promising early

successes. In 2003, Taylor and Mohkawa for example conclude that KP was “largely successful […] in

altering the foreign policies of the main diamond buying states” (Taylor and Mokhawa 2003, 164).

Others pointed to the advantages of a deliberately narrow and focused scheme. According to Wright, the

decision to limit the certification scheme to rough diamonds (excluding the cutting, polishing, and

retailing sectors) was essential in ensuring the political feasibility of the project. In 2004, he

acknowledges that “the KPCS demonstrates what is achievable in the circumstances: it is also something

to build on as the realities of implementation sink in. A year ago the international community did not

have even the basic tool for tackling conflict diamonds. Now it has, and is learning how best to use it”
                                                                                                          6

(Wright 2004, 707). The development of the KP seemed indeed promising: The ending of sanctions

against Angola and Sierra Leone after the ceasing of hostilities and encouraging signs of progress in

settling the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia all pointed “towards the

beginning of the end of conflict diamonds as a threat to international peace and security” (Wright 2004,

705).

        While most authors acknowledge that other factors, such as the ending of armed conflict in both

Sierra Leone and Angola, were influential in bringing down the share of conflict diamonds in

internationally traded rough diamonds to less than 1% in the late 1990s, they nevertheless attribute large

parts of this development to the existence of the KPCS. Wright, for example, highlights the degree of

discipline and sense of responsibility it has brought to the international trade in diamonds: “Paperwork

and accurate records, long anathema to the diamond industry, have become the norm under the KPCS.

Governments too have learned valuable lessons, not least in facing up to their responsibility to do

something to help to bring about an end to armed conflict. As a tool for international security and

conflict prevention, the KPCS stands out as a practical measure that the international community has

adopted” (Wright 2004, 702). In a similarly optimistic tone, Grant and Taylor remark that it is “apparent

that the conflict diamonds campaign and the whole Kimberley Process reflect an intriguing development

in global governance and multi-track diplomacy, blurring the line between „official‟ and „unofficial‟

diplomatic channels […]. Thus, the role of NGOs and states in ensuring that diamond-dealing

corporations live up to their commitments means that multi-level involvement and observation of the

situation will continue. It is this example of global governance that perhaps provides the best hope for

maintaining a watchful eye on the global diamond industry” (Grant and Taylor 2004, 399). Commenting

on the uniqueness of the scheme, Wallis points out that “the Kimberley Process was not a proclamation

crafted in the halls of the United Nations (UN) and foisted upon states and, in turn, impacted

transnational corporations without practical application or enforcement mechanisms. It was instead a
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movement initiated by those state governments and companies themselves, who devised and committed

themselves to an executable protocol and monitoring procedures” (Wallis 2005, 1).

       Seven years have passed since the implementation of the KPCS. The optimistic tone of the early

assessments has given way to pessimistic, at times devastating critical assessments of the scheme.

Recent studies critique the KP‟s inefficiency, lack of funding, support and enforcement mechanisms, of

incentive and speed of action. This increasingly negative assessment of the scheme reached a

preliminary peak when Ian Smillie, Research Coordinator at Partnership Africa Canada and one of the

architects of the KPCS, announced his resigning from the scheme. In an interview given in July 2009,

Smillie remarked that "A couple of years ago, I would've said that the Kimberley Process got a seven out

of 10. It wasn't perfect, but it was pretty good. But in the last couple of years, all kinds of problems

cropped up and the Kimberley Process seems unable or unwilling to deal with it. I wouldn't give it a

passing grade now. And frankly, I think it's getting worse” (Hildebrandt 2009). In a reassessment of the

KP‟s development in November 2009 he finally remarked that "[t]he whole thing is farcical,

irresponsible and a disgrace” (Berger and Thornycroft 2009). The KP‟s lack of action with regard to the

widely reported deaths of hundreds of people when the Zimbabwean army took control of the Marange

gem fields ignited international attention. As Smillie points out, “[h]ere we have a government that has

lied repeatedly to the KP - clearly stated in the KP report - has a tenuous grip on its diamond industry -

and that courtesy of gross human rights violations - and the regulatory body that is supposed to assure

consumers that the diamonds its certifies are clean ignores its responsibility and sets up an open-ended

tea party.[…] It will turn the KP into a laughing stock and give Zimbabwe more or less carte blanche for

business as usual”(Berger and Thornycroft 2009).

                                                                                                             8

Research Design

In order to evaluate the degree of and reasons for the contemporary disagreement about the KP‟s

original and current purposes, strengths, weaknesses and future perspectives, 16 questions were devised.

The questionnaire (see appendix) was sent out via email to all 67 members of the World Diamond

Council (WDC), all 49 member-governments and 4 representatives of the three centrally involved civil

society organizations, followed by telephone requests for short interviews concerning these questions.

As of August 1, 2010, 12 WDC members2 have granted interviews or answered the questions by email,

9 referred to other WDC members, 6 refused to comment and 40 did not (yet) respond. Of the 49

governments contacted (including the European Union as a single political entity), 9 representatives3

answered the questionnaire, two referred to the US-government representative, and 38 did not (yet)

respond. All three representatives4 of the major NGOs currently involved in the Kimberley Process

answered our questions, as well as Iain Smillie, former research coordinator for Partnership Africa

Canada.

2
  Andrew Bone, DTC/De Beers; Pamela Caillens, Cartier; Philip Claes, High Council for Diamonds Antwerp; Sean Cohen,
Codiam, NY; Chaim Even-Zohar, Tacy Diamond Consultants; Jeffrey Fischer, Fischer Diamonds; Cecilia L. Gardner,
Jewelers Vigilance Committee /New York; Paul Koppelman, London Diamond Bourse; Pierre Leblanc, Canadian Diamond
Consultants Inc.; Matthew Runci, Jewelers of America; Udi Sheintal, Israel Diamond Manufacturers Association, one
anonymous source (d). Please consult references for further information about the interviewees.
3
  Brad Brooks-Rubin (USA); Stephane Chardon ( EU); Suresh Kumar (IN); Molefhe Gofaone (BW); Louise Rawlings (AU);
Teresa Trevino (CA); three anonymous sources (a,b,c). Please consult references for further information about the
interviewees.
4
  Annie Dunnebacke, Global Witness; Susanne Emond, Partnership Africa Canada; Arwind Ganesan, Human Rights Watch.
Please consult references for further information about the interviewees.
                                                                                                                  9

Results:

Issue 1: Accordance with UN Mandate

Question: How well do design, strategy and structure of the KPCS match the mandate given by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/56?
                                                            Response categories:
                                     Very well           Well, with         Not at all          DK/NA
Representatives of:                                     reservations
NGOs                                     2                                                             2
National Governments                     4                   3                                         2
Industry                                  4                  6                   1                     1
Total                                    10                  9                   1                     5
                                                   19

Response: Very well

Of the four representatives of civil society organizations interviewed for this project, Ian Smillie

(Smillie 2009), and Susanne Emond (Emond 2009) confirm that the KPCS‟s design, strategy and

structure closely match the UN mandate. However, both activists voice serious concerns about the

usefulness of the original mandate in dealing with the issues facing the scheme today.

       Four of the interviewed government representatives stated that the current scheme closely

matches the original mandate. Teresa Trevino (Trevino 2009) is confident that “each and every shipment

of rough diamonds is certified by the participants‟ exporting authorities”. Gofaone Molefhe (Gofaone

2009) agrees that the mandate “asked the international community to develop a detailed yet simple

workable international rough diamonds certification scheme based on internationally agreed minimum

standards - and I believe KPCS fits that description.” Similarly, Suresh Kumar (Kumar 2009) states that

“[t]he mandate given by UNGA Resolution 55/56(2000) is clear and precise. The mandate is for all

diamond producing, processing, exporting and importing countries and the diamond industry to break

the link between conflict diamonds and armed conflict through simple and workable international

certification scheme for rough diamonds and its implementation through internationally agreed

minimum standards and ensuring compliance through periodic reporting and reviews while fully

                                                                                                           10

respecting sovereignty of States. […] The KPCS document, which was negotiated between

Governments, industry and civil society, reflects this mandate.” Louise Rawlings (Rawlings 2009)

underlines that “conflict diamonds now represent less than one percent of the international trade in

diamonds, compared to estimates of up to 15% in the 1990s”.

       Four industry representatives share this assessment. In Pierre Leblanc‟s view, (Leblanc 2009) it

“effectively ended the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Congo and Angola [with] no conflict diamonds – as

defined by the UN – left today.” Agreeing with Andrew Bone (Bone 2009) and Cecilia Gardner

(Gardner 2009), Sean Cohen (Cohen 2009) states that the Kimberley Process “effectively fulfilled the

task it was designed for, to help ending the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia and to strengthen

legitimate trade and legitimate companies”.

Response: Well, with slight reservations

Slightly skeptical views are being held by the EU‟s Stephan Chardon (Chardon 2009). To him, the

KPCS at many occasions appears to be “not always able to eradicate [conflict diamonds] quickly,

urgently, immediately where they are. Look at Cote d‟Ivoire: there, rebels are in possession of and

supervising producing areas. Only sending in a real army would be efficient. [The KPCS] is nevertheless

still efficient in making it more difficult and costly [for rebels to profit from diamond exploitation] by

closing doors in trading and consuming countries. We need to make it so costly that it is not even

advantageous. The Kimberley Process comes very close to this.” Two anonymous government

representatives (anonym 2009b; anonym 2009a) agree that the KPCS matches the original mandate well,

but show some concern about the mandate itself. The latter states that, “given the complexity of issues,

the KPCS was an amazing success at that time. It is a remarkable achievement, but by far not flawless.

There was a clear trade off: To get everybody on board one had to settle for the lowest common

denominator” (anonym 2009a).

                                                                                                             11

Acknowledging the overall success of the KPCS in their responses, Paul Koppelman

(Koppelman 2009) an anonymous source (anonym 2009c), Jeffrey Fischer (Fischer 2009), Matthew A.

Runci (Runci 2009), and Philip Claes (Claes 2009) concede that several compromises had to be made.

As Claes puts it, “everybody agrees that KP is functioning well, but that it is not a 100% watertight

system. But which system is? Concerning the controlling mechanisms in Belgium, we know what we are

talking about: the strictest and best regulated in the world. Every import and export is physically

inspected by experts from customs department – and yet, we still cannot have a full guarantee” (Claes

2009). Udi Sheintal, one of the founding architects of the KPCS summarizes the development of the

KPCS in the following way: “[W]e achieved what we planned. We designed a system of regulation from

scratch. Before, we had no controls of export and import of diamonds at all. The radical changes

introduced through the Kimberley Process are the maximum that could have been done. […] Of course,

people can still smuggle diamonds, but if you smuggle them and you know there are huge sanctions - for

example diamond traders are expelled from all bourses in the world if they are caught trading smuggled

diamonds - there is a small reward compared to a big risk. Consequently, funds generated for rebels are

getting smaller and smaller” (Sheintal 2009).

Response: Not at all

Even-Zohar is the only interviewee in who‟s opinion the “Kimberley Process has utterly failed and it has

not contributed at all to finishing the wars in Angola or Sierra Leone” (Even-Zohar 2009)5.

5
    For the remainder of the paper quotes will be identified solely by respondent names, not by in text citations.
                                                                                                                     12

Issue 2: Purpose and limitations

Question: Do you think the participants in the Kimberley Process (KP) share an understanding of its
purpose and limitations?
                                                            Response categories:
                                       Yes             Yes, with slight  Yes, with severe        No
Representatives of:                                     reservations      reservations
NGOs                                    1                      1                 2
National Governments                    5                    4
Industry                                2                     6                  3                1
                                        8                    11
Total                                                                            5                1
                                                  19

Response: Yes

In Emond‟s view, all participants “fully understand” KP‟s mandate. Five government representatives,

Gofaone, Trevino, Kumar and anonymous sources (a) and (b) share this assessment. In Gofaone‟s

words, “the participating governments, NGOs, Civil Society, human rights groups and various UN

bodies share the same resolve of ridding the world off conflict diamonds.”

        Agreeing with Gardner, IDMA‟s Sheintal states that all parties involved “understand perfectly

the limitations: local and domestic law is above the Kimberley Process, unless government are ready to

change local laws – look at the changes in Russia for example. They now declare their diamond

statistics; something deemed a national secret before. [All countries] understand that they have to

boycott trade relations [concerning diamonds] with non-participants. For this it was essential for the

WTO members to get a trade waver.”

Response: Yes, with slight reservations

Convinced that “in general people know the scope of the Kimberley Process,” Ganesan believes that

“the recent controversy is about inadequacy of rules and procedures, not a fundamental dispute about the

mandate [of the KP].”

        To Australia‟s Rawlings, “the Kimberley Process has a unique nature and this both creates

challenges and provides benefits as the parties involved bring different perspectives and objectives to the

                                                                                                         13

table and may at times have differing understandings of the process' purpose and limitations.” According

to anonymous source (b) there is a “general, common understanding, but [there are] nuanced

differences: some see it through lenses of trade, others see it more though lenses of human rights and

human security. Everyone understands that KP does both things, but the emphasis differs depending on

who you are in process.” Chardon shares this assessment, pointing out that “certainly everybody agrees -

but with nuances. Everybody shares and has a common understanding of the KPs core and its minimum

requirements. The core document is accepted by all without restrictions and questions. […] However,

over the years KP has developed. New challenges have appeared – look at Venezuela 2007-08 and today

Zimbabwe. What was foreseen in 2003 has been overtaken by developments on the ground and new

questions have arisen. At this moment we are still discussing and have not achieved a consensus yet.

How far does the mandate of the process extend?” Seconding this point of view, Brooks-Rubin believes

that “in general participants have an understanding of the purpose and limitations […], most agree on

the basic structure, the documents are very clear. The issue is: should we expand it? Diverging views

emerge when discussing how to assess its limitations.”

       Six of the twelve interviewed industry representatives mention slight reservations in their

responses to this question. Agreeing with anonymous source (d), and Caillens, Bone concludes that “any

sort of structure like this is not always a meeting of minds.” Like Runci, Claes believes that “everybody

shares the same opinion about the original purposes. However the discussion about enlarging [the

Kimberley Process] to polished diamonds as well is very, very difficult.” Leblanc notes that, while

“there is consensus to a large extend, the NGOs do not completely understand the limitations.”

Response: Yes, with severe reservations

Two civil society organization representatives, Dunnebacke and Smillie, are very skeptical about the

degree of consensus. Dunnebacke remarks that, “on the one hand there is definitely a shared

understanding of the basics, why it started, how it works, what to achieve. But mostly: no. Everyone
                                                                                                         14

involved has an own, often country specific agenda. NGOs have different agendas as well […]. There

are frequent disagreements during the meetings about what the real purpose is or how much reform is

necessary […]. While certain participants do not want to talk about human rights, this is at the core of

the Kimberley Process for the NGOs.”

        Three WDC members share this opinion. Like Cohen, Fischer detects “very different lenses,

aspirations and conceptions of [the KPs] purposes”. Koppelman observes that “the NGOs do not really

understand everything from an industrial point of view. Coming from a different ankle, they would like

to see immense restrictions on trade […]. NGOs are reluctant to be tough on African countries; they try

to avoid a “neocolonial” flavor. So, we are strict on the first world, but not on the third.”

Response: No

In Even-Zohar‟s view, “the industry sees KP simply as a PR instrument” and is not interested in setting

up a truly effective system.

Issue 3: Beneficiaries

Question: Who benefits most from the existence of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?
                                                       Response categories:*
                               Industry      Nat‟l Governments    People in producing           Consumers
Representatives of:                                                    countries
NGOs                             3                   3                      1
Nat‟l Governments                8                   9                     4                       2
Industry                         8                    2                     5
Total                            19                  14                    10                      2
*Multiple responses possible

Response: Industry

Three out of the four interviewed representatives of civil society organizations perceive the diamond

industry in general as one of the main beneficiaries of the Kimberley Process. Like Smillie and Ganesan,

Dunnebacke recognizes KPs function as “positive PR for the industry.”

                                                                                                            15

Eight out of the nine interviewed government representatives (Anonymous government sources

(a), (b), and (c) as well as Brooks-Rubin, Chardon, Rawlings, Kumar and Gofaone) mentioned the

diamond industry as a primary beneficiary. While Gofaone points to the important “benefit of improved

consumer confidence”, Chardon distinguishes between actors within the industry. To him, “big

companies in particular gain through improvements of their reputations”. Rawlings, referring solely to

the Australian diamond sector, indicates that “the success of the Kimberley Process is certainly in our

producers' interests.” Besides reputational gains, Rawlings explains that “the Kimberley Process has

brought large volumes of diamonds onto the legal market […]. For example, it is estimated that around

US $125 million of diamonds were legally exported from Sierra Leone in 2006, in comparison to almost

none at the end of the 1990s. The process has clearly assisted legitimate trade in rough diamonds and

made it harder for criminals seeking to trade in conflict diamonds.” In Kumar‟s assessment “the entire

diamond pipeline, starting from the mines to the diamond processing industry benefits from KP.”

       Eight of the interviewed industry representatives explicitly mentioned reputational gains for the

industry as a major effect of the establishment of the KP. Agreeing with Bone, Koppelman, Caillens and

Claes, Fischer concludes that, the major benefits to the diamond industry are “first and foremost, the

public image, survival and commercial interests.” To Sheinthal “legal diamond traders” are main

beneficiaries of the scheme because “it provides answers when people ask where your stones are from.”

Anonymous industry source (d) voices the hope that KP “gives diamonds a better position in the market

place.” In Even-Zohar‟s view, “KP has served its purpose from a business perspective […] as long as

the consumer believes that KP is working and that diamonds are clean”

Response: National Governments

Three of the interviewed NGO representatives mentioned the legitimization of formerly illegal segments

of the diamond trade and increased revenues for participating countries as positive results of the scheme.

                                                                                                          16

According to Smillie, “a huge amount of illegal diamonds has gone legitimate. The KP was supposed to

deal with conflict diamonds, not with illicit diamonds. But, as this distinction is practically impossible, it

drove these things to the surface […]. It has actually forced a lot of criminal and criminalized parts of

the trade to become legitimate. Where it works, it can benefit a lot of poor countries. It can turn

diamonds from a problem into an asset. Look at Sierra Leone: In the late 1990 the country officially

exported about $2 million worth of stones annually, last year this figure stood at $120 million. This is

not lastly due to the KP.” Like Emond and Smillie, Dunnebacke argues that “by and large producing

governments now have significantly increased official revenues from taxes on legally mined diamonds.”

       All interviewed government representatives mentioned government revenue as a major benefit of

the KP. Anonymous government source (c) points out that due to KP “rebels have largely lost an

important source of income.” Like anonymous government sources (a), (b) and Trevino, Kumar

underlines that “the legitimate trade in diamonds is an important source of revenue to many

governments around the world.” Chardon explains that it is important to consider “what was before, and

what is now: Since [the KP] was enforced you have good diamonds and bad diamonds […] It resulted in

a dramatic increase in official stones and government revenues.” Rawlings emphasizes that “the

Kimberley Process has assisted in stabilizing and supporting the development of fragile countries. It has

brought large volumes of diamonds onto the legal market which has increased the revenues of poor

governments.” Underlining the benefits to Botswana, Gofaone‟s explains that “a good, clean image for

our product increases consumer confidence and the respect for ruling and legitimate governments,

leading to development and economical growth as well as investor attraction.” Brooks-Rubin points to

the “examples of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola. They ultimately benefited from it and now have

substantial economic benefits as well.”

       Anonymous industry source (d) point to the significant leverage that comes with “increased

fiscal control”, while Bone points out that “government taxes and loyalties” help foster political
                                                                                                            17

development in Africa, citing Botswana as “a glowing example of democracy and good governance in

Africa.”

Response: People in producer countries

Ganesan is the only NGO spokes person who explicitly mentioned “people in affected countries” as

beneficiaries of the scheme.

       Four interviewed government officials consider the populations of producer countries to be

major beneficiaries of the KP. In Gofaone‟s view, “incentives channeling diamond proceeds into

development take us a step closer to attaining improved living standards and to attaining regional peace

in producer countries.” Agreeing with anonymous government source (b), Trevino states that “people in

affected areas […] benefit most from the implementation of the certification scheme.” In Chardon‟s

view, “as the KP came in contact with other issues such as human rights, smuggling and so on, it raised

development issues and - to some extent - helped solve these issues.”

       Agreeing with anonymous source (d), Bone, and Caillens, Koppelman states that especially

“people in developing countries benefit from the scheme, because there is less child labor, people get

reasonable wages and so on.” Fischer similarly perceives a “genuine concern for the humanitarian

issues” as being a core element of the process.

Response: Consumers

Out of all spokespersons interviewed, only two government officials, Chardon and Gofaone mentioned

consumers as beneficiaries of the scheme in their responses.

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Issue 4: Public-private partnership

Question: How would you rate the functioning of the public-private partnership?
                                                              Response categories:
                                      Very well            Well, with       Problematic           DK/NA
Representatives of:                                       reservations
NGOs                                                            2                  2
National Governments                     6                     2                   1
Industry                                  4                     6                                        2
Total                                    10                    10                  3                     2
                                                    20

Response: Very well

A two thirds majority of interviewed government representatives perceives the public-private

partnership to be functioning very well. Seconding Gofaone‟s assessment of a “blossoming public-

private partnership,” Rawlings commends “the collaborative approach of the KP […]. The joint efforts

of governments, industry leaders and civil society representatives have enabled the Kimberley Process to

curb successfully the flow of conflict diamonds since its inception.” In agreement with anonymous

source (a), Trevino, and Kumar, Brooks-Rubin remarks that “it works as well as it possibly can. This is

the only way to make something like this work […]: the industry cannot police itself, governments have

too many conflicting priorities and NGOs cannot put power on the ground.”

       To De Beers‟ Bone, the KP represents a “great example of public-private partnership,

notwithstanding its limitations.” Agreeing with Gardner, Fischer evaluates the partnership as “excellent -

from the realization of the problem to the formation of the World Diamond Council and the Kimberley

Process, only very little time passed.” According to Runci, “it evolved from competition in the early

days of negotiation to genuine collaboration today. Sometimes it is entirely cooperative, sometimes

somewhat conflicted. Today, the preponderance of behavior is collaborative, cooperative. Recent critical

statements from civil society are in fact a sign that the partnership is working, a sign of vitality.”

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Response: Well, with reservations

Acknowledging that “the international public-private partnership works fairly well”, Dunnebacke

cautions that “collaboration varies significantly on the national level. KP is much more successful on the

international then on the nation level.” Ganesan shares these reservations: “Given that multi-stakeholder

agreements are bound by rules and implementation is monitored, [KP] has pretty robust processes for

what it covers. However, political will for collaboration is sometimes lacking.”

       Anonymous government source (c) agrees that “in general, [the relations are characterized by]

fruitful cooperation, even though opinions on certain subjects may differ.” In Chardon‟s view the

process “works well, although we go through moments of crisis. As the NGOs are pushing for an

extension of the mandate it is normal that you have discussion and confrontation. Apart from this, the

partnership has worked well between 2003 and 2009. Industry and NGOs take part in discussions, they

are important in putting issues on the agenda and are useful in providing research, for example in the

cases of Venezuela and Zimbabwe […]. In some instances, the industry only provided surprisingly little

information and was more passively involved. But they were present at all stages of the discussion and

sometimes played a very useful role in pushing for solutions. In the case of Ghana, the industry for

example provided technical expertise and implemented an action plan, this will hopefully happen in the

case of Zimbabwe as well.”

       Anonymous industry source (d) remarks that cooperation “works quite well. In contrast to the

image portrayed in the diamond campaigns of the NGOs, we work closely with the NGOs. The public is

not aware of this. Many don‟t seem to realize that the knowledge levels of many lower service staff are

very low. For example, many people do not realize that the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

applies only to rough diamonds.” Agreeing with Koppelman, Leblanc states that “overall it works well”

but he cautions that “the NGOs are at times too pushy”. In Claes‟ view “everybody has their own role to

play and the three go generally very well together, however, there is severe criticism of the authorities:
                                                                                                         20

They have to step up - not everybody is always on the same page. Take the example of Zimbabwe.

Concerning the diamonds coming from the Marange mines […], the European Union has been the only

participant to take action. This puts European diamond dealers at a competitive disadvantage, trade

simply moves to other centers. We ask for a level playing field, the same measures need to be

implemented in the same way across the world.” Codiam‟s Cohen thinks that “some governments -

especially in Africa - are more reluctant to deal with NGOs then others - mostly those of in Europe and

the US. This might be due to different conceptions of sovereignty and different political cultures.” In

Sheintal‟s view “in many instances, governments would not take on an issue by themselves. They only

do so because the NGO‟s “mirror” shows that they do something good.”

Response: Problematic

In Ian Smillie‟s view, “there was some very good collaboration in the beginning […]. The agreement of

late 2003 to installing monitoring mechanisms was reached through some very good collaboration. Of

course, there was a lot of suspicion in the beginning; the NGOs thought that the industry was the

problem. However, the industry is usually very supportive of the NGOs positions. Today governments

are the problem, especially with regard to the necessity of unanimity in decision making […]. No matter

what the issue is, some governments do not agree.” To Emond, KPs “problematically slow reaction” is

mainly due to its inability to “force governments to be compliant because there are just too many

interests involved.”

       Anonymous government source (b) is equally skeptical about the state of collaboration in the

KP: “NGOs and industry almost walked away from the sluggish negotiations in the beginning. The

choice was: Get out or take as much as you can get. Was the decision to stay right? It remains

questionable.”

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Issue 5: Driving forces

Question: Which stakeholder groups are the primary driving forces behind KP and KPCS today?
                                                          Response categories:*
                                      NGOs             Governments         Industry            DK/NA
Representatives of:
NGOs                                    4                    2                   2
National Governments                    8                   8                    5
Industry                                10                   7                   7                1
Total                                   22                  17                  14                1
*Multiple responses possible

Response: NGOs, Governments and Industry

A majority of respondents agrees that all three groups involved in the Kimberley Process contribute

important impulses to the scheme. According to Dunnebacke, “NGOs were the initial driving force,

generating media attention and thus initially putting pressure on the industry. Today, however,

governments and industry people have become driving forces as well […]. NGOs continue to play a key

role in raising the bar, establishing standards, and pushing [the KP]. But of course, several governments

provide positive contributions and industry is very active, though sometimes not active enough in

pushing it. Of course there are some spoilers, some countries always say no.” Evoking the particular

setup of the scheme, Emond points out that “The Kimberley Process is a membership system: by

definition, members - observers and participants - are the driving forces behind it.”

        Five government representatives see all three groups as essential driving forces of the process.

Similar to Rawlings, Kumar states that “the driving force behind KP is the desire of governments, the

diamond industry and civil society to isolate conflict diamonds from legitimate diamond trade.” An

anonymous source (b) agrees that “all actors - Governments, Industry and NGOs - play an important

role. The most vocal are, obviously, the NGOs.” To Brooks-Rubin, “NGOs still play a very important

role in keeping issues alive and identifying issues to work on. They remain very important for pushing

the agenda. Obviously, the industry is in many ways still a key partner to governments, responsible for a

lot of activities, compliance, technical assistance, and so on. Anonymous source (c) states that “the real
                                                                                                         22

start were the independent field reports by the NGOs Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada in

the 1990s […] Industry and NGOs together approached the South African Government and keep [the

KP]going.”

       Echoing Caillens assessment, anonymous industry source (d) points out that “initially NGOs

drove KP, but trade has made a strong effort to take it under its own wings. The industry was very keen

to have a trade foundation to this. NGOs seem to have weakened down over the past two years, while

government input has become a stronger force.” Similar to Fischer‟s assessment, Runci views the

process as “driven by governments, civil society and industry […]. The three drivers all have particular

sets of needs and preferences.”

Response: NGOs and Governments:

Representing the European Union, Chardon points to the case of Venezuela in order to explain how a

coalition of NGOs and a number of governments steer the process: “Who is driving: At the surface of

things definitely the NGOs. They set the agenda; they put the issues on the table. In reality, however,

certain governments are essential in getting it going and keeping it going. After all it is governments

implementing the scheme, not the NGOs.” Gofaone states that “participating governments, NGOs, Civil

Society, human rights groups and various UN bodies share the same resolve of ridding the world off

conflict diamonds and are the driving forces behind it.”

       Recognizing that “NGOS are still in the driving seat, otherwise Kimberley would not have much

of a future and would disappear”, industry consultant Leblanc observes that “governments are

increasingly becoming the driving force, but at the cost of increasing bureaucracy. Implementation,

control, and so on is no longer as efficient as before.” In Sheintal‟s view, initially “governments and

industry did not understand what they were talking about […]. Today, the NGOs are still driving forces -

more PAC than Global Witness – we will see what will happen as Ian Smillie left. However, today 99%

of the countries presented in the process are presented by foreign affairs offices. Once you show
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diplomats a process you will never take it away from them again […]. Some countries are happier to

carry the burden then others. The United States, the European Union and Canada, South Africa and

Israel have become driving forces.”

Response: NGOs and Industry

Three industry representatives consider only NGOs and the Industry to be driving forces behind KP.

According to Bone, “officially, the driving forces should be the governments, as they own and run

Kimberley. In terms of driving inputs, however, it is clearly the NGOs and the industry.” Cohen shares

this view, explaining that “the industry brought the topic up and the industry approached the South

African governments to get it going. The Diamond Manufacturer Association saw a clear need for

action. The main driving energy today is really a partnership between the industry and NGOs. While the

“teeth” came through government involvement, the substance comes from industry and NGOs.” Claes

sees “still the NGOs in a leading position, taking over the main role, and main responsibility, but the

diamond industry has become more active itself in terms of signaling, identifying problems, urging

everybody to find solutions and to act. The role of the industry is growing bigger and bigger. The role of

the official authorities is a bit disappointing, especially in the African countries.”

Response: NGOs

According to Human Rights Watch‟s Ganesan, “NGO‟s are the drivers behind any type of standard

issues like this. While KP, as an institution has become a reflection of all its members, NGOs remain the

primary driving force.” Smillie complains that “no one actually takes responsibility: no one feels to have

a stake in it. Only the NGOs feel to have somewhat more to have at stake in it. Countries are going to

meetings, but if things are not working there is no big impact on your industry. If there are problems in

Venezuela this does not affect „your‟ world. No one says: „I am proud of KP it is part of our policy to

make sure that it works. While some are more concerned – like the United States, Canada, or Israel –

others like the EU, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have forgotten about it.” An anonymous
                                                                                                          24

government source (b) agrees that “NGOs are still the driving forces who keep the governments honest.

        Koppelman, concedes that “trade has an ambivalent attitude about this – we do not like

regulations: the less, the better. On the other hand, the industry is well aware of the possible

consequences of not dealing with the issue. When the NGOs came out against the animal fur market 10-

15 years ago the industry was decimated. In order to keep industry in good light with the general public

it has to abide with the NGOs incentives. It is in the industry‟s interest to see that it is well done.”

Response: Governments

Treviso, in accordance with Gardner argues that “the driving forces are clearly the international

community and the united nations.”

Issue 6: NGO efforts

Question: How important is the inclusion of NGOs for the functioning of the Kimberley Process?
                                                             Response categories:
                                       Essential           Important       Problematic             DK/NA
Representatives of:
NGOs                                      4
National Governments                      4                    5
Industry                                   7                   1                   3                  1
                                          15                   6
Total                                                                              3                  1
                                                    21

Response: Essential

Not surprisingly, all four representatives of civil society organizations believe that NGO involvement is

essential to the scheme‟s functionality. As Ganesan puts it, NGOs “highlight problems, they have the

expertise, and they bring an important perspective to the table. While consumers, producers and the

industry have material incentives, we contribute a human right and social conflict perspective.”

        Four of the nine interviewed government representatives voice a similar assessment. Anonymous

sources (a), (b), and (c) agree that “without the NGOs, the KP would not have come into existence” and

Brooks-Rubin likewise states that it was the NGOs who “got the idea of the KP up and running.”
                                                                                                           25

To De Beers‟ Bone, “the inclusion of NGOs was essential. They remain the driving force.

Although they are inclined to a more pessimistic view, they have proven to be a very constructive

element.” Runci remarks that he sees NGO involvement as “entirely positive at this moment. Quite

frankly, industry itself would not have taken up the call. It is reassuring that NGOs are there and lead the

call.” In Caillens view, NGO involvement is “indispensible, otherwise there would be a huge credibility

issue – they constitute an absolutely critical part of it. Without them there would be no review process.”

Agreeing with anonymous source (d), Claes, and Leblanc, Sheintal states that NGO participation is

“essential, if they were not there, the Process would have died.”

Response: Important

Respondents grouped in this category consider NGO involvement important, but not critical for the KPs

existence. Trevino remarks that “civil society participates in review missions and visits, which allows

for transparency in regard to the implementation of the scheme.” According to Rawlings, “civil society

organizations make an important contribution to the Kimberley Process, often in the form of monitoring

and advocacy.” In Gofaone‟s assessment, the key benefit of including NGOs in the process is that it

“allows perspectives from outside of governments to be brought to the table.” Chardon remarks that

NGO involvement is “important, but they are not always acknowledging the sources of their

information.” To Kumar it is important that NGOs “bring in their unique perspective as well as technical

expertise. They also actively participate in the deliberations of the working groups of the scheme.”

Codiam‟s Cohen considers NGOs to be “very reasonable partners, despite their reputation, most NGOs

are not looking for consumer action, but for ways to solve a problem.”

Response: Problematic

Three industry representatives consider NGO involvement as being problematic. Gardner complains that

“NGOs assign mandates to the Kimberley Process that were never intended.” Fischer acknowledges that

“the NGOs were essential as initiators – they truly shocked the industry into realization of the truth.
                                                                                                          26

Most of us had no idea what was going on. But today, the conflict diamond problem is very low on the

radar screen. This aggravates the NGOs […]. As they need to advertise the necessity of their existence

and to pay their bills there is a conflict of interest. Especially the less knowledgeable and less

respectable ones need to “create a 9/11” for the diamond trade. Moreover, some NGOs‟ inability to

accept the diamond industry as an ally is distasteful […]. They continue to threaten the industry. You

[the NGOs] woke us up, but now let us be. But they permanently want to increase the scope of the KP

and then to portray the Diamond Industry as slackers.” Koppelman similarly considers NGO

involvement as being “more of a burden, but if they were not there, the industry would drag its feet. The

NGOs make ridiculous demands but don‟t really know what they want. They all have different

perspectives. Just as much as a unified secretariat, an umbrella NGO would be better.”

Issue 7: Government compliance

Question: How well do participating countries comply with the provisions established by the KPCS?
                                                         Response categories:
Representatives of:         Very well         Well, with      Ambiguous          Not well            DK/NA
                                             reservations
NGOs                                                               1                 2                 1
Nat‟l Governments               1                 5                                  3
Industry                                          4                4                 3                 1
Total                           1                 9                5                 8                 2

Response: Very well

Of all 25 respondents, only India‟s Kumar is convinced that virtually all members of the process

“recognize the importance of the Scheme […] and comply with [the schemes provisions].”

Response: Well, with reservations

Botswana‟s Gofaone, confident that “all participants do comply with the required minimum

requirements of the scheme” admits that “a lot still needs to be done to fully enforce minimum standards

in cases of non compliance." Chardon, defining compliance as “adherence to the established minimum

                                                                                                             27

standards of 2003”, feels that “very few if any do not comply. For example, consider the presentations of

annual statistical reports and follow ups: Some are delayed but they are still overall satisfactory to very

satisfactory. Moreover, you can always argue that [countries] do not comply enough. However, this is

often caused by non-KP specific factors: How efficient can border controls be in an extremely poor,

developing African country? Compliance depends critically on institutional capacities: police, customs,

established institutions. This area is and will remain problematic, but these issues are way beyond the

scope of KP. Agreeing with anonymous source (b), Rawlings notes that “not all participating countries

comply with the KP. However, where a country fails to comply with the KP‟s requirements they are

suspended or asked to suspend themselves until they can meet its requirements. Venezuela and

Zimbabwe are good examples for this.” Brooks-Rubin believes that “there are view participants that do

nothing. In fact, last year we had 100% statistical reports and nearly 100% annual reports […]. The real

problem is that implementation is really left to governments.”

       Five of the industry representatives shared this assessment. Pointing out that “the European

Union has the most sophisticated and elaborate system in place,” Bone acknowledges that “some less

developed countries neither have the political will nor the logistics and resources to implement similar

systems.” Advancing a similar argument as Sheintal, Runci claims that while “most [countries] do take

KP quite seriously, certain instances of inaccurate statistics, smuggling, and even willful flaunting – like

in the Venezuelan case – do exist. Deeper national roots [of the KP] are needed in some countries.”

“Although only view countries do not comply,” Caillens thinks that “noncompliance represents a

problem.”

Response: Ambiguous

Considering non-compliance the exception rather than the rule, Smillie nevertheless points out that

“internal controls in many producing countries are very weak.”

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