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Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors Pre-release version of a chapter of the forthcoming UN Environment Emissions Gap Report 2018
© 2018 United Nations Environment Programme Acknowledgements UN Environment would like to thank the Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety of Germany, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy of the Netherlands and the Climate Works Foundation for their support to the work of the Emissions Gap Report. This publication is part of a collaborative series of reports by over 30 organizations released in concert with the 2018 Global Climate Action Summit, which showcase the extraordinary action of states, regions, cities, businesses and investors – and assess the opportunity for even greater impact. In this specific publication we focus on the role of non- state and subnational actors in enhancing global climate ambition and bridging the emissions gap. Disclaimer This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit services without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. UN Environment would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publication as a source. No use of this publication may be made for resale or any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing from UN Environment. Applications for such permission, with a statement of the purpose and extent of the reproduction, should be addressed to the Director, Communication Division, UN Environment, P.O. Box 30552, Nairobi, 00100, Kenya. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UN Environment concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. For general guidance on matters relating to the use of maps in publications please go to: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain. htm Mention of a commercial company or product in this publication does not imply endorsement by UN Environment. The use of information from this publication concerning proprietary products for publicity or advertising is not permitted. © Maps, photos, and illustrations as specified. Suggested citation Hsu, A.; Widerberg, O.; Weinfurter, A.; Chan, S.; Roelfsema, M.; Lütkehermöller, K. and Bakhtiari, F. (2018). Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non- state and subnational actors. In The Emissions Gap Report 2018. A UN Environment Synthesis Report. United Nations Environment Programme. Nairobi.
Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors Pre-release version of a chapter of the forthcoming UN Environment Emissions Gap Report 2018
5
Executive Summary
This publication is a pre-release version of a However, this pre-release Emissions Gap Report
chapter in the forthcoming UN Environment chapter shows that the additional emission
Emissions Gap Report 2018. It provides an reduction contribution made so far by non-
assessment of the role and potential impact of state actors is still quite limited in relation to
mitigation actions by non-state and subnational what countries have already pledged (up to
actors such as cities, states, regions, companies, 0.2-0.7 GtCO2e per year by 2030 compared
investors and foundations. to full Nationally Determined Contribution
implementation, and 1.5-2.2 GtCO2e per year
Many non-state actors are engaging in compared to current policy). A wider, more
mitigation action, across sectors and regions comprehensive overview of all non-state and
subnational climate action occurring globally is
Non-state and subnational actors have the limited by the current low level of available data
opportunity both to be part of implementing and lack of consistent reporting on tracking the
mitigation commitments made at national level impact of non-state and subnational climate
and to go beyond current pledges and raise action.
ambition. The number of actors participating
is rising fast: more than 7,000 cities from 133 Non-state and subnational actors are providing
countries and 245 regions from 42 countries, other crucial contributions that go well beyond
along with more than 6,000 companies with quantified emission reductions
at least US$36 trillion in revenue have pledged
mitigation action. Commitments cover large Non-state and subnational actors provide
parts of the economy and are gradually important contributions to climate action beyond
expanding in regional coverage. Many of the their quantified emission reductions. They build
actors are cooperating in what are called confidence in governments concerning climate
‘international cooperative initiatives’. policy and push for more ambitious national
goals. They provide space for experimentation or
Other actors need to join act as orchestrators in coordination with national
governments for climate policy implementation.
The numbers seem impressive, but there is Initiatives and actors also incentivize, support
still huge potential for expansion. Not even 20 and inspire additional climate action by
percent of the world population is represented exchanging knowledge and good practices, by
in current international initiatives, and most engaging in advocacy and policy dialogue, by
companies around the world still can and need assisting in formulating action plans, and by
to act. On the finance side, a record of just over rewarding and recognizing climate actions.
US$74 billion of Green Bonds were issued in the
first half of this year, but still only represent a Improving performance and transparency
very small fraction of the capital markets around
the world. Non-state actors should ideally adopt more
common principles when formulating their
Emission reduction potential from non-state actions. Such principles should include clear
and subnational action could ultimately be vast, and quantifiable targets based on relevant
but the current impact is still low and hard to benchmarks, technical capacity of the actors,
track availability of financial incentives, and the
presence of regulatory support. Monitoring and
The emission reduction potential from non- progress reporting, which are generally weak at
state and subnational actors is large. If the moment, are essential to document tangible
international cooperative initiatives are scaled results and gain credibility. Governments can
up to their fullest potential, the impact could be play a vital role by stimulating this growing
considerable (up to 15-23 GtCO2e per year by movement, and can for example support
2030 compared to current policy). If realized this non-state actors by providing collaboration
would be instrumental in bridging the emissions platforms, capacity building and technical and
gap to “well below 2 degrees Celsius”. financial resources.6 Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors
Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and
subnational actors
Pre-release version of a chapter of the forthcoming UN Environment Emissions Gap Report 2018
Lead authors: Angel Hsu (Yale-NUS College/Data-Driven Yale), Oscar Widerberg (IVM, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Contributing authors: Amy Weinfurter (Data-Driven Yale), Sander Chan (DIE, Germany), Mark Roelfsema (PBL, The Netherlands),
Katharina Lütkehermöller (NewClimate Institute), Fatemeh Bakhtiari (UNEP DTU Partnership)
1 Introduction to the publication and emission reductions from commitments
overview of its key findings currently pledged by individual actors compared
to the Nationally Determined Contributions
Global climate change governance is diversifying (NDCs) find that their additional contribution is
rapidly: in recent years, political attention has modest.
been acknowledging the increasingly important
role of non-state and subnational actors such Limited data transparency and a lack of
as cities, states, regions, companies, investors, consistent reporting that tracks implementation
foundations, civil society organizations, and of NSA climate action prevent a full picture of
cooperative initiatives. the global impact, although reporting practices
are improving and clearer results are emerging.
This publication, provides an assessment Nonetheless, there is still limited knowledge on
of non-state and subnational actors’ role in the extent to which NSAs are implementing their
enhancing global climate ambition and bridging actions and realizing their commitments.
the emissions gap, based on the most recent
literature. NSAs’ contributions to climate change action go
beyond direct emission reductions. For example,
Non-state and subnational actors (NSAs) can they can play a key role in building confidence in
take individual action to address climate change, governments concerning the implementation of
or they can cooperate with other actors and, climate policies and inspire higher national and
frequently, with national governments. This global ambition. In addition, NSAs can facilitate
report confirms that there is clear evidence catalytic linkages, act as orchestrators, and
that NSAs are increasingly committing to provide a basis for experimentation. Quantitative
individual climate actions and coming together analyses that emphasize NSAs’ direct
in international cooperative initiatives. In all contributions to climate mitigation may overlook
sectors and regions, more commitments have these aspects of the critical role that NSAs can
been formulated and registered compared to play in global climate change governance.
the assessment in the 2016 UN Environment
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2016). In recent years, great progress has been made
Furthermore, it is worth noting that only a in terms of understanding what fosters and
fraction of the NSA activity occurring globally is influences their performance. Solid design
being consistently reported and quantified at the principles and context markers are emerging,
international level. including: effective leadership, permanent
secretariat (for cooperative initiatives), clear and
The emission reduction potential from NSAs is quantifiable targets, monitoring and progress
large and could, if fully implemented, contribute reporting systems, technical capacity of actors,
significantly to bridging the 2030 emissions financial incentives, sustainable funding, and the
gap. However, realizing this potential requires presence of regulatory support. By following or
commitments and action that go far beyond establishing these principles and contexts, NSAs
current pledges made by individual actors or can help bridge the emissions gap and foster
single initiatives, and implies the scaling up of credibility, and governments can help establish
multiple initiatives across sectors and regions. the required support.
The few studies that estimate the 2030 global7
The publication begins with a brief overview of Programme 2017–2018). To this end, round
the increasing engagement of NSAs in the United tables were organized on how climate action and
Nations Framework Convention on Climate various Sustainable Development Goals could be
Change (UNFCCC) process (section 2), before mutually supportive.
examining the landscape and trends in terms of
NSAs’ individual commitments and international During the Conference of the Parties in 2017, the
cooperative initiatives (ICIs) (section 3). Section champions were asked to align the Marrakech
4 provides an assessment of the emission Partnership with the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue that
reduction potentials estimated by the latest takes stock of the efforts of Parties towards
studies and looks at, non-quantifiable, roles of goals set out in the Paris Agreement and aims to
NSAs that have important implications for global inform the preparation of new or updated NDCs
climate change governance. The final section by 2020 (Decision 1/CP.23, Annex II). They also
summarizes some of the key ways forward for presented the first ever yearbook on climate
harnessing the potential of NSAs’ climate action action that reports on actions by non-Party
to bridge the emissions gap (section 5). stakeholders (which is the term the UNFCCC uses
for NSAs) throughout the year. The yearbook,
2 Non-state and subnational actors and including the forthcoming 2018 edition, is
climate change negotiations: from Paris expected to inform the Talanoa Dialogue. By April
to Katowice 2018, 109 inputs from NSAs had been registered
on the Talanoa Dialogue online platform, and
The 2015 Conference of the Parties to the more are expected in time to inform the political
UNFCCC held in Paris showed an increased phase of the Talanoa Dialogue, which will take
institutionalization of processes and engagement place at the Conference of the Parties in Katowice
of NSAs (UNEP, 2016). Specifically, the Paris in December 2018.
Agreement:
In parallel with the UNFCCC process, national and
• Encourages Parties to work closely with regional initiatives have emerged to stimulate
non-Party stakeholders to catalyse efforts to and support NSAs in the European Union, Latin
strengthen mitigation and adaptation action America and Asia, among others (Chan et al.,
(paragraph 118) 2018). Fossil Free Sweden (Fossilfritt Sverige), for
instance, is an initiative launched by the Swedish
• Encourages non-Party stakeholders to government in which a national coordinator
register their climate actions in the Non- engages companies, municipalities and other
State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform non-Party stakeholders in showcasing climate
(paragraph 117) action, sharing experiences, and encouraging new
actors to take on commitments. The Argentinian
• Strengthens the technical examination government has launched the National Climate
process on mitigation for the period Change Cabinet (NCCC) initiative, with a view to
2016–2020 in various ways (paragraphs 109 increasing the participation of businesses and
and 110) civil society in tackling climate change nationally
through technical round tables and coordination.
• Convenes a high-level event building on In India, the Energy and Resources Institute’s
the Lima–Paris Action Agenda during the Council for Business Sustainability has been
period 2016–2020 in conjunction with each engaging corporate leaders in climate action
session of the Conference of the Parties since 2001 (Chan et al., 2018).
(paragraph 120)
3 Overview of non-state and subnational
• Appoints two high-level champions on actor initiatives and individual
behalf of the President of the Conference commitments
of the Parties to catalyse NSAs (paragraph
121). Cities, states, regions, businesses, civil society
and a range of other actors can take individual
The Decision also mandated a summary for and cooperative actions to address climate
policymakers based on more information change. Acknowledging that action by NSAs
gathering and an analysis of the potential of, and comes in many forms, this section focuses
results from, NSAs (paragraph 111(c)). In sum, on two categories: actions by individual NSAs
the process leading up to the Paris Agreement (section 3.1) and cooperative actions through
and the outcomes of Decision 1/CP.21 have paved international cooperative initiatives (ICIs)
the way for an increasingly prominent role for (section 3.2), both of which are on the rise. By 30
NSAs under the climate regime to support Parties August 2018, just over 12,500 commitments to
in reaching the mitigation and adaptation goals. action had been recorded in the Non-State Actor
Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), the largest
The Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate online platform showcasing climate efforts by
Action was launched by the first two high-level subnational and non-state actors. Almost two
champions1 during the 2016 Conference of the thirds of these commitments are by individual
Parties to continue mobilizing NSAs, support actors, while just over one third are by cooperative
the implementation of the targets set out by initiatives (including international cooperative
the Parties, and align NSAs’ actions with the initiatives. See also Box 1).
Sustainable Development Goals (MP Work
1 Dr. Laurence Tubiana (France) and Dr. Hakima El Haite (Morocco).8 Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors
Box 1 Defining international cooperative initiatives
Although there is no single definition of an international cooperative initiative (ICI), a number
of terms and common characteristics help characterize them. When non-state or subnational
actors from at least two different countries “adhere to rules and practices that seek to steer
behaviour towards shared, public goals” across borders (Andonova et al., 2017), they engage
in “transnational climate governance” (Andonova et al., 2009). Broader coalitions made up
of countries, companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, international
organizations or subnational public actors, such as cities and regions, form cooperative initiatives
(Blok et al., 2012). When these coalitions cross national borders they become “international
cooperative initiatives” (Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015).
3.1 Individual commitments by non-state governments to companies, investors, higher
and subnational actors education institutions and civil society
organizations. These actors often pledge climate
Individual NSA climate actions take a variety action through a range of networks that collate
of forms, referred to in the literature as individual climate pledges and inventories (for
‘commitment’, ‘action’, ‘initiative’, and ‘target’. example, C40 Cities for Climate Leadership) or
These generally refer to a “diverse set of reporting platforms such as the CDP (formerly
governance activities taking place beyond known as the Carbon Disclosure Project). The
strictly government and intergovernmental (or criteria for participation within these networks
multilateral) settings” (Chan and Pauw, 2014). and platforms vary: some networks require
When individual actors participate in ICIs or members to pledge specific commitments, such
transnational climate governance initiatives, as greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, or
they may define an individual commitment or to submit regular emissions inventories. Others
climate action according to the specific set of emphasize peer-to-peer knowledge sharing and
rules that an initiative or programme identifies. capacity-building, while some are membership-
When an NSA abides by that particular initiative, based networks that do not require actors to
it constitutes an instance of “participation” commit to specific goals.
(Andonova et al., 2017).
While these networks capture many NSA climate
The landscape of NSA actors and the actions, they do not comprehensively cover all
commitments they pledge on climate change NSA climate actions occurring globally.
are varied, ranging from city, state and regional
Table 1: Examples of the growth in individual NSA actor participation from 2015 to 2017
Actor group 2015 2017
Cities 7,025 from 99 countries, 7,378 from 133 countries,
representing 11 percent of representing 16.9 percent
the global population of the global population
States and regions 116 regions from 20 245 regions from 42
countries, representing countries, representing
11 percent of the global 17.5 percent of the global
population population
Companies and investors 4,431 companies from 88 6,225 companies and
countries and over 400 investors from 120
investors, with more than countries, representing at
US$25 trillion in assets least US$36.5 trillion in
under management revenue
Banks 15 of the 20 largest banks 34 of the 57 largest
banks, representing
US$3.1 trillion in market
capitalization
Higher education Not assessed 700 colleges and
institutes universities in the United
States, with a total student
population nearing 1
million and a collective
endowment of over
US$250 billion
Data source: Hsu et al., 2015b; Hsu et al., 2016, Hsu et al., 20179
Box 2 Framing climate action in developing countries
Linkages between sustainable development and climate change provide a powerful rationale for
climate action. Evidence suggests that citizens are more likely to take climate action, or to support
government action on climate change, if the sustainable development benefits of these efforts
are emphasized (Floater et al., 2016). Communicating the sustainable development gains that
are often co-generated alongside climate mitigation or adaptation may be particularly important
among NSAs in developing countries and the Global South.
One example is the Indian city of Rajkot, which “has emerged as a climate innovator” by
focusing on projects that deliver urban development benefits, and support climate action as
a supplementary goal or co-benefit. The political feasibility of climate action increases when
connected to “more familiar, and often more immediate, urban priorities” (Bhardwaj and Khosla,
2017). A survey of various climate action experiments also found that climate actions were
aligned with development priorities.
However, if actions and policies that generate substantial mitigation or adaptation benefits are
framed and registered according to their ability to reduce poverty, create jobs, foster economic
growth, or protect public health, they may fall under the radar of climate accounting efforts. This
might be one of the reasons for the lower representation of NSA climate action in developing
countries and the Global South.
For instance, national networks of NSAs Subnational governments – cities, states and
and individual actions that are not reported regions
in global climate action databases are not There are several networks connecting city,
included in the analysis here (see also Box 2). state and regional action on climate change.
Analysis suggests, however, that individual Figure 1 provides an overview of some of these,
NSA participation through these networks illustrating the number of NSA city participants
has increased since the 2015 Paris climate and their geographical distribution. Networks
negotiations (Table 1 - possible overlaps are include the Global Covenant of Mayors for
not taken into account). These positive trends Climate & Energy (GCoM), signed by 9,130 cities
indicate the continued and growing role of NSAs representing 775.5 million people worldwide
in global climate governance. The following or just over 10 percent of the global population
section captures an overview of some of these (Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy,
NSA constellations and their membership. 2018). The GCoM includes the EU Covenant
Figure 1: Regional distribution of NSA city participants in carbonn, C40 Cities, CDP Cities, Global
Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, and Climate Mayors
83%
Europe
7%
North 5%
America Asia and
the Pacific
no initiatives 0.3%
1-3 West Asia
2%
3 - 10
Africa
10 - 30
30 - 100
3%
100 - 330
330 - 1,000 Latin America
1,000 - 3,000 and the Caribbean
%
Share of actors
worldwide
Source: Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL (2018)10 Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors
of Mayors for Climate & Energy that reports 2018). The United States and China topped the
7,755 signatories with 252.6 million inhabitants list of countries where the most bonds were
within the EU (EU Covenant, 2018). All of these issued, and most proceeds support projects
members commit to either submitting individual in the energy, buildings, and land-use sectors
Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans or (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2018). The Low Carbon
pledging a 40 percent reduction in carbon dioxide Investment (LCI) Registry currently includes 53
emissions by 2030. ICLEI, a global network of investors from 21 countries, with US$50 billion
subnational governments, has developed the in low-carbon assets (Global Investor Coalition
carbonn Climate Registry that includes more on Climate Change, 2018) – a slight increase
than 1,000 cities, towns and regions, drawn from on the 2014 assessment, which found 45
89 countries and accounting for 9 percent of the investors reporting investments valued at US$24
world’s total population (ICLEI, 2018). billion, most of which (44 percent) focused on
renewable energy (Global Investor Coalition on
In terms of state and regional governments Climate Change, 2014).
taking action, the Compact of States and Regions
(2017) includes 110 regional governments from 3.2 International cooperative initiatives
36 countries, representing 658 million people and
18 percent of the world economy and baseline By engaging large and growing numbers of
emissions of 3.9 GtCO2e. These governments NSAs, international cooperative initiatives (ICIs)
have committed to 290 climate actions focused can lead to considerable emission reductions,
on emissions reductions, renewable energy and provided that their stated goals are realized and
energy efficiency that are estimated to result emissions reductions do not displace action
in total (cumulative) emissions reductions of elsewhere (Graichen et al., 2017; Blok et al., 2012;
21.9 GtCO2e between 2010 and 2050, if climate Hsu et al., 2015; UNEP, 2015; Widerberg and
targets are reached on time (The Climate Group, Pattberg, 2015; see also section 4).
2017).
In addition to direct emission reductions, ICIs can
Companies and investors play a number of other important roles, including
providing proofs of concept for low-emissions
CDP reports that over 6,300 companies development strategies, spurring technology
representing a combined purchasing power of development and diffusion, and helping generate
over US$3 trillion responded to their climate momentum for additional initiatives and
change questionnaire, and that over 650 activities (Weischer et al., 2012).
investors with assets of US$87 trillion participate
(CDP, 2018). In 2017, CDP recorded primary data Several databases collect information on ICIs.
from over 4,800 companies, of which 47 percent They vary in number of initiatives, often due to
noted an emissions reduction or renewable different definitions of ICIs, purposes, focus
energy target (CDP, 2018). areas, data collection methods and sources
(UNEP, 2016; Widerberg and Stripple, 2016). The
A few reports detail financial investors’ summary of trends in this section focuses on
actions on climate change. The Climate Bonds mitigation-related ICIs and is based on data from
Initiative’s 2018 Green Bonds Summary found the Climate Initiatives Platform, which is regularly
that US$74.6 billion in green bonds were issued updated, includes clear criteria for inclusion, and
during the first half of 2018, by 156 issuers is publicly accessible.2
from 31 countries (Climate Bonds Initiative,
2 The Climate Initiatives Platform is hosted by UN Environment and the UNEP DTU Partnership. It includes ICIs that fulfil the following
criteria:
• Includes several non-state actors taking voluntary action, and may also include states;
• Have an objective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or to increase resilience, or could bring about greenhouse gas emission
reductions or increased resilience;
• Have an international scope or the potential for significant impact on a global scale; and
• Have a focal point.
Source: http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Climate_Database:About.11
Figure 2: Number of international cooperative initiatives launched each year, between 2000 and 2018
50
44
40
34
Initiatives launched
30
20
15
12 11 10 10
10 7 8 7
5 5 5 6 5 6
3 2
1
0
2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Source: Climate Initiatives Platform [accessed 1 July 2018].
The main features of these ICIs are captured in Over the past two decades, the number of ICIs
Figures 2 and 3. has grown significantly, with peaks in launches
of new initiatives around large climate events
Trend in numbers of ICIs such as COP15 in 2009, the United Nations
Climate Action Summit convened by United
The Climate Initiatives Platform currently records Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2014,
244 initiatives, of which 220 are mitigation- and COP21 in 2015 (Figure 2). The slowdown
focused and are implemented in more than in the number of new initiatives in 2016, 2017
one country.3 Since the 2016 UN Environment and 2018 may reflect a shift in focus towards
Emissions Gap Report, 17 new initiatives have implementing the initiatives created in earlier
been added to the platform. years, as well as the importance of global
political forums in catalysing the formation of
ICIs.
3 As at 25 August 201812 Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors
Figure 3: Overview of features of 220 mitigation-focused ICIs
Global and regional distribution of ICIs
North Western Eastern
144 America Europe Europe
Global (only)
34 39 31
220
Total ICIs
29
7 26 Asia and
Unknown
25 25 the Pacific
Global Africa
44 and regional
Latin America and
Regional (only)
The Caribbean
Sectoral coverage of ICIs % of ICIs that include the given sector
70% 37% 30% 24% 22% 20% 20% 18% 13% 9%
200
150
Number of ICIs
100
50
0
Energy Industry and Transport Agriculture Urban Finance Other Forestry Buildings Waste
business
Type of commitment Monitoring and reporting mechanisms
48 Quantitative goal 167 Qualitative goal Non-specific 5 165 Unclear Irregular or underway 4 Regular 51
Lead organisation Function
121 Knowledge dissemination
13 Financing and exchange
57 International organisation
54 Network/Consortium/Partnership Tech
nic 74 Knowledge
18 Fundraising din
g 120
al
di production and
50 NGO/Civil Society un 90
innovation
al
F
og
15 Academic/Research institution
ue
60
13 Other intergovernmental organisation
18
30
11 Business
I m ple m e
b u il d i n g
Goal
10 United Nations or Specialised agency setting 59
Awareness
4 Financial institution raising and
44
c ity
nta
outreach
4 National government Technical
ti o
pa
operational
n
Ca
3 Corporate implementation
59 Training and
Pol
it i c a l d i a l o g u e education of
2 Local government 24 Norm and individuals
1 Other standard setting
28 Advocacy 54 Policy planning
and recommendations
Note: Many initiatives are active in several regions and sectors, and include multiple lead organisations and functions. The numbers
and percentages in this figure include all recordings by initiatives, explaining why totals for some elements are higher than 220
initiatives and 100 percent.
Source: Based on data from Climate Initiatives Platform [accessed 24 August 2018].4
4 Numbers for the lead organizations, type of action, region, and year of initiation are taken from analysis conducted by and published on
the Climate Initiatives Platform website at: http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/ICI_Analysis [accessed on 24 August 2018].13
Regional participation
of 29 initiatives contained explicit emissions
As Figure 3 illustrates, many initiatives operate mitigation targets tied to a particular year. A
in several regions. Although the overall increase study conducted by UNEP (2015) used a similar
in recorded mitigation-focused ICIs since 2016 approach to narrow a list of 184 initiatives
is relatively limited, regional participation in down to 15. However, among initiatives with
ICIs has increased in nearly every region of the clear emissions reductions targets, many have
world. The biggest increase is in Latin America made more ambitious emission reduction
and the Caribbean, where the number of ICIs commitments than national governments
has increased from 6 in 2016 to 25 in 2018. In (Graichen et al., 2017).
Western Europe, Asia and the Pacific, regional
participation has roughly doubled compared with Monitoring, reporting, and verification practices
2016. It is worth noting that global ICIs may be also remain weak across ICIs: just under
active in regions with relatively low participation 23 percent of ICIs on the Climate Initiatives
in regional ICIs, such as South-Eastern Asia and Platform noted regular monitoring or reporting
the Middle East. Furthermore, while ICI activities mechanisms. Other studies also report relatively
have been concentrated in high- and middle- low percentages of initiatives with established
income countries (Chan et al., 2015; Chan et monitoring and reporting mechanisms, ranging
al., 2018; Pattberg et al., 2012), the number of from 31 percent (Graichen et al. 2017), to 43
ICIs operating in lower-income countries grew percent (Pattberg et al., 2012) or 44 percent
dramatically between 2015 and 2017, rising (Chan et al. 2018). Hsu et al. (2015a) found that
by 56 percent in low-income countries, and 50 more than half (18) of 29 ICIs announced at the
percent in lower-middle income countries (United United Nations Climate Action Summit convened
Nations Climate Change Secretariat, 2017).5 by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon in 2014 included provisions for monitoring
Sectors progress, but that very few of these identified
specific indicators to track performance.
Most ICIs (149 out of 220) cover multiple Bansard et al. (2016) likewise noted that the
sectors, generally focusing on key sectors where type and stringency of monitoring requirements
the mitigation potential is significantly higher varied widely among city-focused initiatives.
than the emission reductions implied by current Furthermore, many initiatives do not conduct
policies and NDCs: the energy, industry, forestry, or share cost estimates or feasibility studies,
transport, agriculture, and building sectors adding an additional barrier to efforts to assess
(UNEP, 2017). An ICI’s sectoral emphasis often the feasibility and identify potential barriers to
shifts according to the needs and capacities of initiatives (Roelfsema et al., 2015). Striving for
the regions where it is implemented. Actions “more and better” data collection (Widerberg
focused on resilience and agriculture, for and Stripple, 2016) from initiatives is required
example, are most commonly implemented in to facilitate efforts to assess ICIs’ progress and
low-income and middle-income economies, while anticipate their contributions to climate action
initiatives addressing the industrial sector are and sustainable development efforts (Roelfsema
most prevalent in high-income or upper-middle et al., 2015; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015;
income economies (Chan et al., 2018). Hsu et al., 2016). Some ICIs have developed
approaches that demonstrate how this could be
Setting goals and tracking progress accomplished. The Bonn Challenge, for instance,
maintains an interactive online dashboard
The percentage of ICIs that have set tracking its signatories’ commitments, and
quantitative goals remains low, at around 22 their potential collective progress towards the
percent. Quantitative goals – defined as a initiative’s goal.6
specific, measurable goal made either by an
initiative or an initiative’s members – range Lead organization and secretariat
from focusing on emissions reduction (for
example, reduce emissions by a specific The existence of a secretariat and a lead
amount by a specific year), to fund-raising (for organization is likely to influence ICI
example, raise, distribute or invest a specific performance (Pattberg and Widerberg, 2016).
amount of funds), to capacity-building (for Initiatives with a permanent secretariat report
example, reach a specific number of people or both higher-than-average potential emission
communities). Similar low levels of quantitative reduction contributions in 2020 and 2030, and
goals are reported in other studies (Chan et al., higher indirect impacts, complementary goals
2018; Graichen et al., 2017; Hsu et al., 2015; and co-benefits, such as diffusion of information,
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017; Widerberg political effects, technology development,
and Stripple, 2016; Pattberg et al., 2012). reduced air pollution, improved health, and
strengthened energy security and economic
Graichen et al. (2017) found that 75 percent of development (Graichen et al., 2017). Similarly, the
the 174 ICIs they surveyed either did not include active involvement of NGOs, as either leaders or
sufficient information about their targets, had ICI members, has been shown to be associated
unclear goals, or did not propose concrete with higher potential emission reductions and
actions. Focusing on emissions reduction potentially larger co-benefits (Graichen et al.,
targets, Hsu et al. (2015) found that just 8 out 2017).
5 Part of the increase may include adaptation-focused ICIs.
6 See http://www.bonnchallenge.org/14 Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors
Almost all (217) of the ICIs included in this 1. Individual commitments: estimate the
report state that they have a secretariat, in many aggregate impact on emissions from
cases hosted by one of the larger organizations pledges by individual cities, regions or
participating in the ICI. Based on the information business actors that commit to fully
in the Climate Initiatives Platform, it is not implement the targets they set themselves.
possible to assess how many of these
secretariats are permanent. In fact, some 2. Single initiatives: estimate the potential
studies suggest that most ICIs lack a permanent impact on emissions from a single
secretariat (Graichen et al., 2017; Chan, 2018). cooperative initiative goal, assuming this
is implemented by all actors under the
Functions initiative. Often, individual actors subscribe
to a collective cooperative initiative (which
ICIs primarily provide information and can be an ICI) that together sets a goal for
knowledge-related services to their participants the initiative. The single initiative studies
(Figure 3). Although the distribution of functions assess the emission reductions of the
has remained relatively stable over time, a few initiative’s goals, rather than pledges
new functions have recently emerged, including that individual actors take themselves.
financing and fund-raising. In a recent survey The estimated emission reductions
of 75 ICIs, funding was found to be the most subsequently involve some scaling up of
common challenge, reported by approximately the potential.
30 percent of respondents (UNFCCC, 2017).
Meanwhile, financial and organizational capacity 3. Scaled-up potential of multiple initiatives:
tends to be associated with high-performing estimate the potential emission reductions
ICIs (Chan et al., 2015; Chan and Pauw, 2014; from several initiatives that would occur
Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions, if the initiatives reached a transformative
2015; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; Biermann et impact at the sector- or economy-wide
al., 2007). The recent growth in ICIs’ fund-raising level. These studies apply a range of
and financing activities is therefore promising significant assumptions on how actions are
and may suggest increased efforts to address expanded; from assuming that all members
the challenges reported. within a network will adopt an ICI’s
ambitious emission reduction goal, to that
4 The potential contribution of non-state membership will grow to a certain number
and subnational actors to enhancing of actors and cover a certain number of
ambition and bridging the 2030 additional sectors. These studies therefore
emissions gap estimate greater reduction potential at the
sector- or economy-wide level.
NSAs contribute to global climate change
governance in numerous ways. At the
international level, there is particular interest
in how much NSAs could contribute to global
greenhouse gas emission reductions by
2030 and the extent to which these potential
contributions are already included in national
current policy and NDC estimates. Section
4.1 assesses the most recent studies on
these issues, while section 4.2 addresses the
questions related to tracking the progress
and results of NSA action. NSAs also play
a number of critical roles that do not easily
lend themselves to quantification, but may
nevertheless be important to enhancing ambition
and bridging the 2030 emissions gap. Section
4.3 provides a brief overview of such roles.
4.1 Estimates of potential emission
reductions in 2030 of non-state and
subnational actors
The 2016 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2016)
published an overview of quantitative analyses
of the potential contribution of NSA actions to
global emissions mitigation in 2030, illustrating
a wide range of results. Since these estimates
were published, the number of studies that
quantify NSAs’ potential contribution to global
climate action has grown, with more networks
and researchers conducting analysis of
aggregate impact of member groups on global
emissions. These studies can be divided into
three categories:Table 2: Potential greenhouse gas emission reductions of selected individual commitments and initiatives (in MtCO2e per year in 2025/2030, by study).
Actors 1) Individual commitments 2) Single initiatives 3) Scaled-up potential of multiple initiatives
and
sectors
CDP ICLEI Kura Roelf Yale, New- Ameri Arup The Compact Global CDP and Roelfsema Graichen Erickson Yale,
(2016) (2015) mochi et sema Climate ca’s and C40 Climate of Mayors Covenant We Mean et al. et al., and New-
al. (2017) (2017) Institute, Pledge Cities for Group (2015) of Mayors Business (2018) (2017) Tempest Climate
and PBL (2018) Climate and CDP, (2017) (2016) (2014) Institute,
(2018) Leader Compact and PBL
ship of States (2018)
Network and
(2014) Regions
(2017)
Cities and 179 by 360–560 3–30 1,550– 500 in 402 740 1,290 3,700
municipa 2035 by 2025 2,200 2025
lities (current
policy
Regions 550
scena
Business 1,000 rio 1a); .026 in 3,200–
200–700 2025 4,200
(NDC
scenario
1b)
ICIs 5,500 5,000– 15,000–
11,000 23,000
Number of 1,089 116 cities 54 cities, 25 cities 2,175 155 228 110 360 cities 7,494 5 ICIs 11 ICIs 19 ICIs 600+ 21 ICIs
actors or compa 22 compa busines cities regional cities including cities
initiatives nies regions, nies, ses, 115 govern ~ 300
quantified 250 76 regions, cities, 20 ments compa
compa 5,910 states nies
nies cities
Baseline Not Not Current Current Current Business Business Compared Business Business Current Counter Current Current Current
scenario of specified specified national national policy as usual as usual to as usual as usual national factual national policy policy
the study - variable - variable policies policies + scenario (no ‘reference (no policy (no policy policies (no policy policies scenario scenario
according according scenario NDCs and NDCs policy technology baseline) baseline) scenario baseline) scenario and
to to scenario baseline) scenario’ plus NDCs
individual individual that NDCs Scenario
company city actor includes
actor current
policies
and the
NDCs
Overlaps
quantified?
15
Note: This table only evaluates reports that include estimated impact in 2025/2030 and excludes those with pre-2025 or post-2030 assessment timeframes. Source: Adapted from Hsu et al. (in review).16 Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors
Table 2 provides an overview of available studies, A major question with respect to NSA climate
organized according to these three categories. mitigation contribution is the extent to which
The table shows the wide range of potential this leads to emission reductions that are not
emission reductions estimated in various studies accounted for in current national policies or
– from companies based in the United States in the NDCs. A limited number of the available
of America contributing 0.026 GtCO2e in 2025 studies assess NSA mitigation impact relative
(America’s Pledge, 2018) to as much as 15 to 23 to global current policy and NDCs based on
GtCO2e in 2030 based on an evaluation of the an assessment of overlap scenarios (see
scaled-up potential of 21 cross-sector, multi- Table 2). These quantitative assessments
actor ICIs (Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL, of overlap determine the ambition level of
2018). NSA commitments vis-à-vis current policy
scenarios and NDC scenarios by comparing
Due to the variable baseline methodologies the rate of emissions decline in actors’ targets
and assumptions adopted by each study, as (Kuramochi et al., 2017). For instance, if a city’s
well as different scopes in terms of actors and emission reduction target results in a steeper
emissions covered, the wide range of overall rate of decline in overall emissions compared
impact assessment is unsurprising. Some to a national government’s NDC, a common
studies focus on NSA impact in a single country, assumption is to consider the emissions
such as the United States of America (for reductions that are beyond what a national actor
example, Roelfsema, 2017), while other single has pledged as “additional” reductions.
initiative studies evaluate emissions savings
relative to business-as-usual scenarios for the One analysis focused on the United States of
actor group, rather than comparing to a global America (Kuramochi et al., 2017), found that 17
scenario. states and 54 cities with recorded greenhouse
gas mitigation commitments comprise 40
Only some studies report a range of results that percent of national United States of America
take into consideration assumptions such as emissions after accounting for overlaps.
a lower and upper range of results (Kuramochi These commitments, which do not represent
et al., 2017; Roelfsema, 2017; CDP and We pledges made after the national administration
Mean Business, 2016; Graichen et al. 2017; announced its intent to withdraw from the Paris
Yale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL, 2018), and Agreement in June 2017, were found to have
even fewer conduct sensitivity analyses. Not all the potential to meet almost half of the United
studies include estimates of overlap between States of America’s NDC by 2025. Another study
actor groups to adjust the resulting emissions that quantified nearly 6,000 subnational and over
reductions accordingly. In some cases, studies 2,000 business commitments determined that
do not take into consideration overlap between emissions would be 0.2 to 0.7 GtCO2e/year lower
actor groups’ impact, while others may select in 2030 than with NDCs alone (Yale, NewClimate
for analysis only the most ambitious actor Institute, and PBL, 2018, Figure 4).
pledges from the same geography or sector
(Yale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL, 2018; Figures 4a and 4b illustrates the wide range
America’s Pledge, 2018). Other reports, such as of potential emission reductions estimated in
the U.S. Climate Alliance (2017) report analysing various studies. The figure includes the studies
15 regions’ contributions to greenhouse gas from Table 2 that have clear and comparable
reductions or the Nordic Council of Ministers’ baseline scenario definitions by which to assess
report on NSAs in Nordic countries (Nordic the magnitude of additional impact. Figure 4a
Council of Ministers, 2017), do not provide an includes estimates from studies that aggregate
aggregate quantified assessment of impact. from a bottom-up method of pledged 2030
They are therefore not included in Table 2. commitments made by individual actors. As this
figure illustrates, the pledged 2030 contribution
The studies included in Table 2 all assume by NSAs, if fully realized, is estimated to lead to
various baseline scenarios against which they limited additional emission reductions (ranging
assess additional impact of NSAs. These from 3 to 700 MtCO2e, as indicated in Table
baseline scenarios range from study-specific 2) compared to the full implementation of the
“business as usual” or no-action scenarios, to unconditional NDCs.
“current policy scenarios” that take into account
a range of existing government policies and Figure 4b includes estimates of scaled-up
pledges, to an “NDC scenario” that assumes potential emission reductions based on an
that countries implement their NDCs under the assessment of single initiative goals and
Paris Agreement (Table 2; Hsu et al., in review). multiple initiatives’ goals. These studies assume
Consequently, it is challenging to compare the that all actors participating within their initiative
estimated impact across studies, although fully implement and achieve the larger goal of
meta-analyses of methodologies applied in each an initiative and therefore represent “scaled-
study demonstrate similar approaches, including up” potential that is larger than the estimates
the use of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol in Figure 4a. The studies behind the estimates
standard for distinguishing between direct in Figure 4b apply a range of assumptions on
and indirect emissions (Hsu et al., in review). how actions are expanded, from assuming that
Specifications of baseline scenarios by which to all members within a network will adopt an
compare additional NSA contributions are also ICI’s ambitious emission reduction goal, to that
increasingly converging to common terminology membership will grow to a certain number of
and methods. actors and cover a certain number of additional
sectors.17
Figure 4: The range of estimated potential emission reductions in various NSA studies
Figure 4a: Emission reduction potential Figure 4b: Scaled up potential emission reductions
of pledged commitments by NSAs based on single and multiple initiatives
70
Individual commitments Single Initiatives Multiple Initiatives
No policy
65
Annual GHG emissions in 2030 (GtCO2e)
baseline
0.03 0.5 0.4 0.74 1.29
60 Current policy
59 scenario
5.5
0.46 Unconditional
1.85 55 NDC scenario
0.02 0.45 3.7
0.55
50
3.7
8 Baseline not based
on global scenario
Scaled up potential
40 based on
assumptions
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Notes
a) For studies that include ranges, median estimates are provided in Figures 4a and 4b.
b)Source:
StudiesBased on data
for which in Table
baseline 2.
scenarios are based on trajectories for the actor group as a whole, rather than compared to a global
Note: a)are
scenario, Forshown
studies thatnoinclude
with ranges, that
fill to indicate median estimates
the extent are provided
to which in Figures are
these projections 4a and 4b.
comparable to the Emissions Gap Report
scenariob)values
S
tudies
forfor which
2030 baseline
is less scenarios are based on trajectories for the actor group as a whole, rather than compared to a global scenario, are
certain.
shown
c) Studies that arewith no fill to indicate
cross-hatched that
indicate the extent
these studiestoevaluate
which these
singleprojections areICI
and multiple comparable to than
goals rather the Emissions
individual Gap Report
actors’ scenario values for 2030 is
recorded
less pledges.
and quantified certain. They rely on assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantified
analysisc)
ofSindividual
tudies that are cross-hatched
actors’ NSA pledges.indicate these studies evaluate single and multiple ICI goals rather than individual actors’ recorded and quantified
pledges. They rely on assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantified analysis of individual
d) Studies that are outline cross-hatched indicate that both b) and c) applies.
actors’ NSA pledges.
e) No extrapolation of 2025
d) Studies that estimates
are outline has been made.
cross-hatched indicate that both b) and c) applies.
e) No extrapolation of 2025 estimates has been made.
The figure indicates that NSAs have the potential Although the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate
to contribute significantly to bridging the 2030 Action acts as an umbrella for various NSA
emissions gap, but that realizing this potential climate action repositories, no comprehensive
requires commitments and action that go far database of NSA actions exists, with each NSA
beyond current recorded and quantified individual adopting various criteria for inclusion that are
actor pledges as well as single initiatives. often unclear or opaque (Widerberg and Stripple,
2016). The reported data are often not suited to
4.2 Tracking progress and results of calculating emissions impact, estimating overlap,
non-state and subnational actors or comparing NSA mitigation potential to the
emissions scenarios of other actors, such as
national governments.
Data limitations and gaps
As the previous sections illustrate, limited Key information, such as actors’ target and
availability, consistency and comparability of baseline emissions, emissions scopes (that
data pose significant challenges to evaluating is, direct or indirect), and inventory emissions
the potential NSA impact on climate mitigation with historic time-series available, are often
and their other benefits. For instance, Bansard inconsistently reported (if at all), with subnational
et al. (2016) found in their evaluation of cities actors from the European Union reporting the
participating in the C40 Cities for Climate largest amount of data required for mitigation
Leadership Network that out of around 40 impact assessments and the greatest gaps found
members evaluated, nine different base years in emerging and developing countries (Hsu et al.
with seven different target years were found, 2018, in review).
making an evaluation and comparison of targets
and level of ambition difficult.18 Bridging the emissions gap - The role of non-state and subnational actors
Box 3 Monitoring, reporting and verification success stories
Monitoring, reporting and verifying the emissions inventories and commitments of both national
actors and NSAs is key to global climate change assessment and governance, as there is a risk
that actors participate in transnational climate governance initiatives to “greenwash” or boost
their reputations, without setting or implementing meaningful climate action targets (Hsu et al.,
2016; Okereke, 2007; Mayer and Gereffi, 2010). Some NSAs, however, are making their emissions
inventories more transparent and making progress on implementing climate actions. For example,
Scotland, Wales, and the Australian Capital Territory all compile particularly comprehensive
greenhouse gas emissions inventories, which account for the emissions of one or more
greenhouse gases from sources within a defined space and time. Each government also goes one
step further, by having these inventories externally verified.
Scotland’s inventory (Scottish Government, 2017) covers a wide range of emissions sources,
and researchers draw on a variety of data sources – including government statistics, regulatory
agencies, trade associations, individual companies, and surveys and censuses – to develop
approaches that measure their contributions. Even as the inventory tailors and adjusts the
approach it uses to calculate emissions from a diverse range of sources, it remains consistent
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s international guidance on national
inventory reporting.
Similarly, Wales aligns its inventory with international guidelines and provides extensive
information on its emissions, recording how much heat seven greenhouse gases7 could trap in the
atmosphere over a 100-year period (Aether and Ricardo Energy & Environment, 2016).8
While the Australian Capital Territory receives annual emissions data from a national database,
these data are often too coarse for the Territory’s monitoring goals. The district therefore collects
its own electricity, gas, transport and waste data, to supplement the information it receives from
the national government (Australian Capital Territory Government, 2017).
Note: This box draws heavily on insights shared by The Climate Group’s Compact of States and Regions initiative.9
Finally, as the figures in this report exclude Tracking progress on NSA implementation
national cooperative initiatives and networks, achievement of targets
they underestimate the scale and spread of NSA Although efforts to improve the monitoring,
climate actions, particularly in regions where reporting and evaluation of NSA actions are
actors have less access or capability to engage increasing (see previous section and Box
with transnational initiatives. 4), studies and information regarding NSA
implementation – progress towards achieving
Some efforts under way to address data targets and whether actors are meeting their
reporting and methodological consistency goals – are still scarce (Chan et al. 2015; 2018).
should help improve the future data landscape Part of the difficulty of tracking implementation
for analysing NSAs’ contributions. For example, is that ex-post measurement of results is largely
the World Resources Institute’s Greenhouse Gas lacking, given the nascent nature of many NSA
Protocol Initiative released in 2015 (the Global climate actions. Therefore, most available
Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas studies quantifying the mitigation impact of
Emission Inventories (Fong et al., 2015)) and NSAs assess their potential emission reductions,
a consortium of non-government institutes, rather than ex-post or achieved results.
through the Initiative for Climate Action
Transparency (ICAT), are currently developing To bolster confidence in NSA contributions
guidance for NSAs, national governments and to bridging the 2030 emissions gap, data on
other audiences to account for and measure NSA implementation are critical to understanding
climate mitigation contributions (see also Box whether current targets and goals are being
3). These and other efforts should help improve reached and 2030 potentials are likely to be
consistency among NSA-reported data. achieved.
7 Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, nitrogen trifluoride and sulfur hexafluoride.
8 In more technical terms, the inventory shares the global warming potential of these gases over a 100-year time horizon.
9 In particular, we thank Milimer Morgado and Jean Charles Seghers for their help in compiling these examples.You can also read
