Beyond the Principal Warfare Office - a respectful retort Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare The Republic of Singapore Navy
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ISSUE 144
June 2012
Beyond the Principal Warfare Office
– a respectful retort
Positioning the RAN for
Future Maritime Warfare
The Republic of Singapore Navy
Engaging Former JI Detainees in
Countering Extremism: Can it Work?
A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities
of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict
The Yawning Capability Gap:
the ADF and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare
Assessing the 2009 White Paper
Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea.
A cause for concern
CN SPEECH – Australian Navy Foundation Day
Journal of the
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Issue 144 3
E R R AT UM Contents
Vernon Parker Oration, Australian
Naval Institute – 4 August 2011
Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer
Apologies to author, RADM James Goldrick, RAN
– a respectful retort 4
(Errata page 6, Headmark 143)
However, although substantial generally produce very high quality Positioning the RAN for Future
efforts were made to create an work), many governments funded Maritime Warfare 8
indigenous naval shipbuilding and naval shipbuilding at levels so low
repair industry, the way in which the that they caused building schedules to
new Service was grown also meant that become unduly protracted and their The Republic of Singapore Navy 14
many of the inherent risks were not products even more expensive than
fully understood by the government, they should have been. This was true
by the electorate or by industry. In for the cruiser HMAS Adelaide, known Engaging Former JI Detainees in
particular, Australia had little or no as HMAS ‘Long Delayed’ in the early Countering Extremism: Can it Work? 19
exposure to just how difficult it is to 1920s and true for the destroyer and
identify the right technologies and frigate programs in the 1950s. Here we
get them into service. The British did can see a direct relationship between A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the
the job and carried the risks and all the size of the fleet unit that the nation capabilities of the Argentine Military in
Australia had to do was acquire and was willing to support and the ability the Falklands Conflict 21
adapt in very limited ways to meet our for that unit to be generated efficiently Front page photograph:
needs. and at reasonable cost within Australia. HMAS Choules (L100),
There was also the question of There were other, more subtle The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF Navy’s newest addition
resources. A sustained in-country problems. The new Service was and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare 33 to the fleet, and HMAS
shipbuilding effort was just possible, sometimes viewed by outsiders Labuan (L128) off
but only if money was consistently as uncritically reflecting British Cowley Beach for
committed. Unfortunately, although views when in fact its people were Assessing the 2009 White Paper and Exercise Sea Lion 2012.
matters got off to a reasonable, albeit demonstrating a naval outlook,
its Outline of Force 2030 as a Maritime The ships are part
expensive start in 1911, post-war particularly an outlook that appreciated
Strategy in the Light of Corbett’s of a simulated Non-
economies would soon slow and that national security was more
‘England In The Seven Years War’ 43 Combatant Evacuation
then halt new warship construction, than the simple defence of national Operation. Note the 2
initiating a series of stops and starts territory. This should not have been degree incline of HMAS
that punctuated the remainder of the surprising, particularly as some in the
Submarines, ASW and the South China Choules due to the
century. It would always be a dilemma RAN failed to make the distinction
Sea. A cause for concern 49 flooding of her well dock
for governments to make the choice between the United Kingdom and the which allows landing
between expensive and protracted navy themselves and were occasionally craft to drive inside the
local construction, with the significant ‘captured’ by the ethos of Britain to a
CN SPEECH – Australian Navy hull whilst the ship is
set-up costs involved but with real degree that made it difficult for them to
Foundation Day, Creswell Oration 65 at sea ( photo courtesy
benefits for national development or operate comfortably in the Australian of RAN, Credit: Darren
purchasing off others’ building lines national environment1, but it also Hilder)
and enjoying the economies of scale tended to make it very hard for them
Book Reviews 72
and reduced risks. to argue a naval case amongst national
However, notwithstanding the high defence policy makers.
The focus on professional training…
Visions from the Vault 79
cost of Australian workers (who did Issue Number 144
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
4
Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer
– a respectful retort
By Lieutenant Commander Edmondson
O n reading Rear Admiral
Goldrick’s article Beyond the
Principal Warfare Officer in the
1
the focus of training the future PWO
should be on the set up and operation
of the systems which they will utilise
debate to ask how the RAN intends
to develop warfare officers capable of
operating at Task Group/Force level.
June 2011 edition of Headmark, I felt to fight their ships. This is a move The Defence White Paper of
compelled to take up his challenge away from the current practise of rote 20093 brings a distinctly maritime
and join in the debate. Although a learning of pre-planned reactions to emphasis to the question of Australia’s
recent lateral transfer from the Royal respond to a threat. In responding I security needs, and this strategy is
Navy, I am acutely aware of Admiral argue that whilst system knowledge is a clearly brought into focus by the
Goldrick’s reputation as a Naval Officer key enabler to the professional warfare procurement programme for the RAN
with significant operational experience officer, the implications of future as part of Force 2030; in particular the
and additionally, as a world-renowned maritime warfare will demand more Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD) and
historian and masterly author. than system knowledge and software Docked Landing Vessels (LHD). The
However, before committing myself expertise. white paper is the blueprint that is
to the discourse I take courage from It is my intention to put forward shaping the Navy for what Professor
Professor Geoffrey Till’s adage that a a case for a more generalist, broadly Till describes as the modernist
Navy where ideas are freely distributed, educated PWO who relies upon approach, where weapons and sensor
discussed and challenged, irrespective warfare directors at the Senior mixes emphasise defence against such
of their origin, performs better. This
2
Sailor level to oversee the automated capabilities that can only be held by
paper proffers a different perspective response of the weapon systems whilst other states.4
on the future of the Principal Warfare he or she looks outward from the Ship. Three years on from the publication
Officer (PWO), their education and Congruous to the strategic direction in of the Defence White Paper the work
training. which COMWAR intends to develop to develop the Navy from a single
The key tenet of the article was that the surface forces I also expand the frigate ‘boarding’ Navy to a force
How best to fight the
ship? German Navy
Sachsen-class air
defence frigate FGS
Hamburg (Photo by
Michael Nitz)
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Issue 144 5
centred on fighting a Task Group his thesis for
from the high seas into the littoral is future conflict
being taken forward with gusto by the around the
warfare community. This was clearly persuasive ‘hybrid
evident to the author at the Fleet war’ argument of
Warfare Forum held at HMAS Watson Frank Hoffman7
in December 2011. At this event it ‘that blend the
was both energising and interesting lethality of state
to hear about the work being done conflict with
at the various projects to achieve the the fanatical
ambitious but deadly serious goal of and protracted
having a ‘modern’ navy within such a fervour of
challenging time scale. irregular warfare’. ineffectiveness to exert the soft power PWO command extends
In the context of these major Obviously it is inordinately difficult to of influence with any great effect. to more than one ship
warship procurement projects for predict the exact nature of warfare in What are the implications for the
- the flotilla concepts
demanded of new
the RAN, Admiral Goldrick’s article the future, but the ‘hybrid war’ model PWO in this world? Without doubt
battlegroups will be
chimes with many. The leap in seems as valid as many other schools of they will be operating in an increasingly high. Graphic of LHD
capabilities from the FFG to the AWD, thought. complex and confusing environment, alongside
and for the ASMD upgrade for the FFH This not so distant future features with more technology at their control
will require a step change in systems the increasingly likely scenario of state than ever before. The PWO will
knowledge and exploitation. PWO on state conflict, superimposed onto need to be equipped to deal with the
training must move with the times and a world influenced by international decisions he/she has to make beyond
it needs to evolve from the 1960’s RN non-state actors. All this will be set the confines of the Operations Room
model; in this I am in full agreement. within the globalised system where and its sensors. Without exception the
My concern, however, is what will be the competition for resources and the sensors and system must be configured
the product of a PWO whose training devastating effects of natural disasters correctly for the necessary information
takes him or her deep into the world will be played out in increasingly to arrive at his console/command desk,
of 0s and 1s; to develop expertise in populated littoral areas. The sliding but this is the job of the engineers
‘understanding the software and of its scale of future conflict and interaction embedded within the Operations room
permutations of the data flows and will be conducted amongst people; and its annexes.
the factors acting on their rate and reported on not only by the ubiquitous It is the job of the PWO job to lead
consistency.’ Operational knowledge
5
media but also before the citizen and manage his/her team in order to
of these new systems is axiomatic, journalists armed with smart phones arrange the facts within the context
however, the world in which these and instant connectivity to the internet. of the operational environment and
ships will be utilised will demand other This ‘war amongst the people’ as present the case to the Commanding
vital skills sets from the PWO. coined by Rupert Smith will not be
8
Officer who will ultimately make the
I have already touched upon limited to just land forces. Emphasis decision that will most probably have
the Defence White Paper’s on soft power versus hard power will to be defended at some point to a
acknowledgement of the importance be the key to mission success. In a higher authority. I question whether a
of the maritime environment to recent book, two British military
9
PWO whose training has focused on
Australia’s place in the world. It is officers, Andrew Mackay and Steve systems and software exploitation will
undisputable that the global world Tatham, analyse recent conflicts in be best placed to achieve this role.
in which we live is dependent upon which they have both been personally There is a precedent regarding
trade and technology, and that involved over the previous 30 years, focusing on the technology in the
the importance of the sea is a key with particular focus on Iraq and training for war fighting. Navies have
component to the system. But what of Afghanistan. They come to the always faced a problem of keeping
the nature of warfare and conflict in the conclusion that the common weakness abreast of advancing technologies, and
future? to all western militaries has been the a useful example is the revolution in
In his prize-winning essay,
6
inability to identify the character and naval affairs facing the industrialised
Lieutenant Commander Pitcher builds nature of the opponent and thereby the nations at the end of the 19th century.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
6
Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer– a respectful retort
The pre-eminent navy of the day was the PWO to
the Royal Navy, and in a 2002 Naval take a step
Review article Professor Dickenson
10
back, and with
argues the case for naval education appropriate
drawing upon the experience of the delegation of
RN during this period. He makes the ‘command
point that despite the challenge of by veto’, he or
the technological advances and the she is able to
undisputed evidence that warfare was defend the ship
changing rapidly ‘the value of ships using control
as fighting instruments tended to be orders. The
studied from an exclusively technical senior sailor,
viewpoint’. There was little time within having spent
the training spectrum ‘to thinking considerably
about matters such as who the enemy more time on
might be or where and how a future the operation of the Ship’s command is running within TA-MW. In Seamless integration
of all sorts of
battle might be fought’. system, will be more proficient at this researching this paper the author spoke
platforms are
Dickenson goes on to describe that task than the PWO. with a number USN SWO colleagues demanded from
at the outbreak of World War I the Weapon engineers are primarily who had attended this course. The PWOs of the future.
Service had generally high standards of selected for the branch based on their overriding message was that although Royal Norwegian
seamanship and navigation, yet there ability for technical reasoning. Their an excellent course, aimed at bringing Navy Oksoy-class
was little in the way of imagination training is arduous and extremely prospective Department Heads up
minehunter, HNoMs
Maloy (Photo by
and tactical awareness. The naval detailed, enabling them to understand to speed on the system in order to
Michael Nitz)
community awaited with a misplaced how a weapon system is set up, utilise it tactically, it by no means made
confidence a second Trafalgar and maintained and fixed when defective. them subject matter experts – that
‘wondered in what manner the new If correctly utilised, managed and led, takes years of education and on the
Nelson might appear’. What followed the WE department should work in job training and is what the technical
at the battle of Jutland has been well synergy with the operations team. senior sailors do.
studied and is not for further analysis The PWO needs to have an So with the senior warfare sailor
here, but what I wish to emphasize understanding of the equipment operating as the director of the system
from this broad lesson is that this is not available to him or her, however, the and the WE department providing
a new position we find ourselves in, and days of having a combat system such optimum set up and operation of the
the consequences for getting it wrong as the main armament to fine tune equipment, how do we get a PWO
are not comforting. If it is agreed that are over. Today’s PWO is fighting a who is capable of providing the level of
PWO training must move beyond battle for information; literacy and tactical expertise to fight the ship on
the 1960’s RN paradigm, what then knowledge of the vocabulary associated behalf of the Captain?
are the alternatives to Rear Admiral with the technology is required, but First principles of warfare and
Goldbrick’s proposed deep system and not the ability to re-write computer basic theory need to be ingrained with
software knowledge model? programmes. the PWO early and this can be done
RAN warfare senior sailors and The systems knowledge of the remotely via the DSN, something
weapon engineers respectively need PWO in the RAN (and RN for that that is currently being progressed by
to be utilised to control the automated matter) is not adequate. With the a working group at the PWO Faculty
defensive reactions and set up the arrival of the AEGIS platforms and at HMAS Watson. This is a simple
sensors of the ship under the tactical hopefully the use of the USN training philosophy, but similar to an innovative
direction of the PWO. The warfare programme associated with this idea being pioneered in the US by a
senior sailor is utilised as a director equipment the system knowledge will non-for profit organisation called the
(EW Director, ASW Director and the improve. PWOs heading to the AWD Khan Academy.11 A recent newspaper
Missile Director) by the Royal Navy, will probably attend the nine week article12 reports of exceptional results
and it is the experience of the author Combat System Officer (CSO) course being achieved by students being able
that this works extremely well. It allows in the USA until a similar programme to study, take tests and have their
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Issue 144 7
progress monitored and mentored This education into all the effects envelope. It is hoped that this article
online all before they reach the of maritime power taught on PWO will play a small part in furthering
classroom. course and then put into practise debate around the optimisation of
Once they reach the classroom during their tours at sea as PWOs will future warfare officer training. t
the concepts learnt on line are put equip them to move into the next level
into practice utilising the teachers in of their warfare careers and provide
person. This translates neatly in the the continuum to man and lead the
PWO students arriving having studied ‘modern’ navy.
the basics before they arrive on course; In concluding, this paper’s
classroom and simulator time can then intention was to counter Rear Admiral
be best utilised with the instructors in Goldrick’s proposition that the
explaining/demonstrating/practising training of PWO needs to shift away
what they have learnt on APWO. from the 1960’s era of pre-planned
This remote learning will free up responses moving towards a training
instructional time which is where the focused on optimising the operational
PWO students will begin to build the effectiveness of the weapon, command
skill sets required to deal with the and information management systems.
future of hybrid warfare. Knowledge This paper has argued for a swing
exploitation, influence activities, towards educating the PWO on a
psychology, behavioural studies, much broader level, taking into account
Lieutenant Commander James
regional studies into patterns of life, the likely future nature of warfare Edmondson, RAN, is serving as a PWO
and cyber warfare, need to be studied consisting of a hybrid of state-on-state in HMAS Newcastle. He spent 14 years
alongside the more conventional conflict and trans-national violence as a warfare officer in the Royal Navy
issues such as tactics, threats, the within an increasingly busy area of
before emigrating to Australia in
physical environment, command and operations.
weapon systems. It could be argued It is assessed that this future will
September 2011.
that this would become more of a staff involve much more interaction with the
(Endnotes)
course than warfare course, but it is peoples on the sea and in the littoral,
1 Rear Admiral James Goldrick, Royal
recommended that the PWO of the and thus non-kinetic measures and soft Australian Navy, ‘Beyond the Principal
future needs an introduction into these power will have an equally important Warfare Officer’ (Headmark, Issue 140, p13
– 15)
subjects early and the PWO course is place to the decision makers. Historical
2 Professor Geoffrey Till, Seapower
the optimum place to start. precedence has been drawn with – A guide for the Twenty-First Century.
A divergence from the focus on comparison to the state of the RN at (Routledge, 2009), p 139
3 Defence White Paper 2009, ‘Defending
systems exploitation and equipment the end of the 19th Century with regard
Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force
knowledge is going to equip the to training and education in technology 2030.’
PWOs in the AWDs, LHDs, FFHs and the subsequent consequences 4 Till, ‘Seapower’, p 15
and other future surface combatants seen at the battle of Jutland. The 5 Goldrick, ‘Beyond the PWO’
6 Lieutenant Command Paul Pitcher
to fight successfully and intelligently suggested format to achieve the
RN, ‘The Maritime Implications of Future
in the complex future maritime more broadly educated PWO is Warfare’(JSCSC Shrivenham, 2009)
warfare environment. It will also be the innovative use of information 7 Hoffman, ‘Conflict in the 21st Century’
(as cited by Paul Pitcher)
the beginning of developing a broad technology to reduce instructional
8 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force – The
and thorough professional warfare time on the basic principals of warfare Art of War in the Modern World. (Penguin
knowledge required at the next level and tactics, and introducing subjects books 2005)
9 Mackay and Tatham, ‘Behavioural
by officers who will be required to more recognizable to staff course into
Conflict’ (Military Studies Press, 2011)
man the battle staff of the Australian the PWO curriculum. This paper has 10 Professor H.W.Dickinson, ‘Athens in
Amphibious Task Group. These also suggested that the RN concept Sparta: Making the case for Naval Education’
(The Naval Review, Vol 90, No 3, July 2002)
officers working at border between of utilizing warfare senior sailors as
11 www.khanacademy.org
tactical and operational level will warfare directors is considered to
12 Amanda Bower, ‘Substitute teacher’ (The
need to know what influence the allow the PWO to take a step back and Australian Business Magazine, Vol 4/No
11,December 2011)
forces under their control will wield. focus outside of the weapon systems
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
8
Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare
By Captain PJ Leavy, RAN
R ear Admiral James Goldrick
recently published a piece
in Headmark on the future of the
focus on the systems, hardware and
networks that will see the ADF evolve
into a seamless force under a unified,
advanced weapons and sensors
entering the international market.
Most countries can now buy highly
Principle Warfare Officer (PWO) joint command. However, the key to capable weapons. They do not have to
in the RAN. This article seeks to
1
any Network Centric Warfare (NCW) spend years developing their own or
contribute to that debate by exploring initiative is the human factor: people be a “technologically advanced” nation
the human dimension of the future fight, not computers. Navy must to own them. Indeed technological
networked Australian Defence Force develop the right people, with the advantage is becoming less relevant at
(ADF) articulated in Force 2030. It 2
right skills, to successfully operate in the individual ship system and platform
recommends an expanded role for the future, networked environment. level and is increasingly a function of
technical personnel in the Operations Personnel will be required with the how well the platforms and systems
Room, greater systems knowledge for technical skills to keep the networks integrate and share information
warfare personnel and more specialised and systems optimised together with across the entire battlespace: the core
warfare sailors, allowing PWOs to the educated, agile and informed concept of NCW.4 Additionally, the
move away from the mechanics of decision makers able to interpret what Information Technology (IT) that will
conducting weapon engagements and they see and to react appropriately. drive the future of any networked force
focus on decision making. To prepare the future workforce is not a field within which any military New challenges for
The Department of Defence has a Navy must understand the maintains an advantage. Commercial Australia. Spain’s
range of documents aimed at shaping environment within which they applications now drive IT innovation.
Alvaro de Bazan Air
Warfare destroyer
the ADF’s future capabilities to ensure will operate. Maritime warfare is Militaries have become the users of
shown on her visit to
success in combat operations.3 They becoming more complex with an ever- well-understood and widespread Australia-photo by
generally, although not exclusively, increasing array of technologically commercial technologies, rather than Chris Sattler
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Issue 144 9
developers of unique technology. on HF/UHF radios, but now include defence situations will see everything
The key to future warfare will be web-based applications. Electrical automated except firing. That is, the
in deciding if and when to engage a Technical (ET) sailors maintained the system will make threat assessments
contact and not the actual mechanics “combat system”, weapons, sensors and and provide recommendations but
of undertaking the engagement, which communications equipment, while will require an operator to accept the
will be increasingly automated. The CSO and Communications sailors recommendation before a weapon is
speed and strategic impact of the operated them. released.
modern media and internet mean that Email, persistent chat, secure web Given that computers and the
the decision not to engage can be just browsing, Voice Over Internet Protocol seamless movement of electronic data
as important as the decision to engage. (VOIP), video teleconferencing and are already fundamental to maritime
Using a kinetic weapon will be only high data-rate tactical (and strategic) warfare - and becoming increasingly so
one option available to meet a specific links are all now used for planning and - future systems will require dedicated
aim. The Navy must have warfare C2 functions at sea. While many of systems managers to monitor,
teams able to respond appropriately to these functions are currently hosted configure and optimize the various
a wide range of situations in the face of on stand-alone systems, the future will systems and networks. This will be a
incomplete, inconsistent or even wrong see such capabilities integrated into the new and different role to the ‘users’ of
information. combat system as core components. the system as it is currently understood
The future ADF will require all The interfaces between platforms (ie CSO, FC operators). Indeed, many
nodes (in Navy’s case the ships, (sea, land and air) will be as seamless, of the functions currently focused
submarines, aircraft and headquarters), permanent and at least as important, on by “operators” are becoming
to be “connected” electronically so as those within the platform. These automated. Future systems will not
that a wide range of information, data interfaces will all rely on high speed need operators to manually work their
and orders can be moved around the digital data communications between way through an engagement sequence
various sensor, weapons and command software intensive systems utilising the to fire a missile – once the decision is
and control (C2) networks. While same commercial technology that will taken to shoot, the mechanics will be
this concept is clearly aspirational, and ultimately power the envisaged sensor, computer controlled.
there are some significant legal and weapon and C2 nets across the entire While firing weapons will be
practical issues to overcome before it force. automated, people will still be required
matures, it is the direction in which Modern technology is also to monitor the automated systems that
the ADF, along with most comparable increasing the speed of engagements. control the process. Consequently
militaries around the world, are The introduction of the AEGIS WEE personnel will be required to
proceeding. combat system in the Air Warfare take an ongoing and active role in
Advances in IT and computing Destroyers (AWD) will bring an order the Operations Room as the data
power have already fundamentally of magnitude increase in Air Warfare communications specialists to monitor
changed the way militaries operate. capability of the RAN; a timely increase and optimise computer performance
Computer based systems are now used given the range of threats now faced. (akin to the tech support people at
throughout most navies, leading to a The speed and lethality of modern your Internet Service Provider – you
change in how the “combat system” in missiles will mean that computers don’t see them and they aren’t using the
a ship is defined. Historically a ship’s will increasingly be central to decision applications, but their ‘back room’ work
combat system (for example, NCDS ) 5
making and execution. Since the is vital to an efficient service.)
was a stand alone computer system mid 1990s the ANZAC Class has had In the 1990s the former branches
that managed the ship’s sensors and the ability to automatically detect an of Radar Plot (RP), Electronic Warfare
weapons to present the Command air contact, assess it as a threat and (EW) and Underwater Control
a tactical picture. Information from engage with missiles until the target is (UC) were amalgamated to form the
the combat system was passed to destroyed or is no longer a threat – all Combat System Operator (CSO)
separate weapon control systems to without any human input other than category. As a result, the sailors
conduct engagements with organic the original system setup. While it operating RAN combat systems are
weapons. Communications were via will be a brave Captain who allows a not as deeply specialized as they once
stand-alone systems, originally limited computer to do everything including were, particularly in EW and Sonar
to formal message traffic and voice firing a missile, the norm in most self where true proficiency only comes
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
10
Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare
with practical experience. While Courses (such as those previously so necessary to move off their “P
warfare has certainly benefited from conducted at CDSC for the DDG and Plates”. As a result warfare serials are
technological advances, the conduct FFGs) have either been removed or often quite scripted with the PWO
of maritime operations is more art restructured to focus on operating the managing a sequence of events, rather
than a hard science –although it is system rather than imparting a deep than standing back and applying the
an art based on a sound technical technical understanding of how the tactical and strategic appreciations to
understanding of the systems in system works. This has, at least in an unfolding situation. In short, the
use. One must always be careful part, contributed to an often unhealthy RAN has been through a phase – from
to guard against the assumption acceptance of believing “the system” which it is now emerging - where it was
that technology will provide the without an understanding of how the ‘training to train’ rather than ‘training
“answers” and inadvertently make the system got to that point. to fight’.
operator subordinate to the system. The current PWO Course aims This is certainly no criticism of
A knowledgeable operator, who to develop the skills to manage an the individuals involved. Indeed, it
understands their system (radar, sonar, Operations Room (and external assets), has been impressive to see warfare
EW etc) and can correctly interpret the maintain situational awareness and capabilities rise over a relatively
information presented, is vital to the develop a range of response options for short period when dedicated training
overall capability. This only comes with the PWO to draw upon. The course time and the right opportunities and
knowledge combined with experience. trains officers by teaching the relevant assets are available. This indicates
Navy has already identified this issue threats and the theory of each warfare that the individual CSO and PWO
and there are a number of initiatives discipline, and providing practical core skills are sound but personnel
underway to specialise CSO sailors training in managing the reaction require more exposure to realistic
in the sonar and EW areas. It will, to threats as they emerge. It must, training opportunities to build a sound
however, take time to re-gain those by necessity, be quite scripted with experience base. This was not such an
deep specialist skills throughout the students essentially running through issue when weapons were only capable
organisation. a checklist of actions appropriate of unit self defence due to their range
Coupled with the Navy’s reduction to the situation with which they are relative to the threat. In Air Warfare
in deep warfare expertise, over the last faced. While this training is essential exercises for example, aircraft have
decade there have been less training for building the individual foundation usually been tasked to pass almost on
opportunities in core warfare skills (ie skills, successful completion of the top of ships in order to practice missile
reduced training with submarines, high course is only one part of generating a engagements and to get the maximum
speed jets, sophisticated EW training capable PWO. training benefit for all weapon systems.
aircraft) plus a focus on boarding and The real skill for a PWO is to put This means warfare team are acting in
constabulary operations for operational the right mix of responses together self-defence in all but high level serials
deployments. This is understandable when faced with a real situation. The which reduces any requirement for
given the contemporary threats the ability to apply the right set of tools strategic level appreciation or tactical
Navy has been tasked to address, but to each unique situation can only thought beyond anticipating when a
means that there are now more junior come from practical experience and strike may occur. Even this aspect is
and less experienced personnel in key positive mentoring plus a thorough removed in a serialised program.
positions around the Operations Room understanding of how the combat While procedural training is
when it comes to traditional warfare system works. Gone are the days when important for building the basic
skills.6
a newly graduated PWO would join a operator skills and practicing pre-
As a result of the above factors, ship having undertaking a dedicated planned responses, it must be
over the last decade PWOs have Combat System Course and join three recognised that this is only one aspect
moved away from their core role as other PWOs, two of whom were of modern air warfare. Self defence
high level decision-makers, becoming second or third job LCDRs. Newly measures are reactionary in nature
more hands-on operators and even graduated PWOs now often join their and therefore following a series of pre-
at times helping to compile the ships without a deep understanding planned responses works. However, the
tactical picture. Additionally the of their combat system and without future of maritime warfare will be very
system’s knowledge of AIO personnel appropriate mentors, making it difficult different. New long range weapons
has reduced as dedicated Systems to learn the lessons of experience and systems (SM2 is already here,
Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteIssue 144 11
AEGIS is coming), coupled with the and equally important, aspects of weapons, sensors and associated
ADF’s planned networked capabilities maintaining a Common Operating networks that allow data and
(incorporating Link 16, AEWC, JSF Picture. No longer can the system information to seamlessly move around
etc), will provide much greater scope be ‘used’ by CSOs until a problem the Force. There will be a merging
for discretionary engagements where develops, at which time an ET sailor of the current ‘combat systems’ and
making the right decision becomes the ‘fixes’ the problem and hands it back ‘communications systems’ as digital
key factor. to the operators. ET sailors must be data transfer, both within and between
PWO training (not just the constantly monitoring and optimising units, becomes the norm.
PWO Course) must evolve beyond the flow of electronic information This technology will require
reactionary, tactical warfare into and system performance, regardless dedicated specialists to maintain,
strategic decision making and of whether the system is a radar, a monitor and optimise system
deliberate engagements. The same missile system, a threat evaluator or a performance, in addition to the CSOs
technology that allows the ADF to be communications path back to higher who actually use the information. The
networked also allows images and news headquarters. All are equally as last two decades have seen an increased
to be flashed around the world as the important and all will be based on the reliance on technology to provide
events unfold so, as mentioned earlier, same commercial technology. contact detections, assessments and
the decision not to engage may be just This is not revolutionary: the RAN recommendations, particularly in the
as important as the decision to engage. has been on this path for some time. In EW and sonar areas. This has resulted
PWOs also need to appreciate and the 1980s Fire Control sailors from the in less operator ‘value adding’ and an
incorporate ROE (both ADF and allied Seaman branch were replaced by WEE increase in simply reporting ‘what the
- much more difficult when it is not a sailors who assumed responsibility system says’. Coupled with changes to
self defence issue), National Intent and for controlling major weapons. This training and branch structures over
the second and third order effects of an concept must continue to evolve as the same period, the RAN’s general
action. This is the direction in which computer based systems become experience levels in core warfare
RAN PWOs must head: to be primarily integrated and ubiquitous. Perhaps disciplines has reduced in recent
decision makers. Their core task will two “Operations Room Supervisors” years and PWOs have become more
be to determine who to engage and are needed: an “ORS Operations” ‘hands-on operators’ at the expense
when - not to execute the mechanics (based on the current POCSS model) of being ‘stand-back decision makers’.
of firing a weapon. Indeed, modern focused on the content on the system The introduction of long range
weapons mean that conducting Anti and an “ORS Systems” (a WEE sailor) weapons and sensors, such as SM2 and
Ship Missile Defence (ASMD) will focused on the performance of the dipping sonar equipped helicopters,
require reactions so fast that responses system. The ORS Systems would will provide much greater scope for
will need to be computer controlled - manage a team who are constantly discretionary engagements in addition
providing the computers are optimised, monitoring and maintaining system to reactionary self defence measures
which reinforces the importance of performance to ensure the means and this will require organisational,
having the right people monitoring to pass information is available and structural and training changes to
system performance and the PWO optimised. This information may be ensure that the future PWOs are
understanding how the system will data from a gyro to a missile or from equipped to execute the full range of
react and why. a threat evaluator to a console for contemporary maritime warfare tasks.
To ensure that the right information display, Link information passing from The following recommendations
is available to decision makers, the one ship to another or a chat circuit are designed as a basis for discussion.
manning and operation of the Action back to Australia –all will require the They are initial thoughts on how to
Information Organisation (AIO) must same technical skills to monitor and move our warfare training, manning,
also be reviewed. The Navy of the maintain. skills and mindset in the right direction
future will require sailors who both In conclusion, the future ADF and are offered as a starting point for
‘operate’ (CSOs – manage the picture) will be networked under a joint, discussion:
and ‘monitor’ (ETs – manage the unified command. High speed data The current CIS and ET(C)
system) the combat system. Both the communications will be the core, categories amalgamate, under the
CSO and ET personnel will need to enabling technology empowering WEEO, and become responsible
report directly to the PWO as integral, the Navy’s future combat systems, for all data communications within
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute12
Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare
and external to the ship. Over time dedicated training effort introduced to deep systems and technological knowledge plus the requisite
this role will become the core WEE rebuild and maximise the experience experience base to make decisions in both the traditional
responsibility as data communications base of these specialised groups. warfare disciplines and the emerging technologies that will
technology becomes ubiquitous. PWO course be structured to (indeed, already are) be fundamental to maritime warfare. t
The WEE community position to provide a stronger foundation upon
assume responsibility for the set-up which our PWOs can develop their
and constant monitoring of system skills in maintaining situational
performance rather than as “on-call” awareness, fighting the ‘fog of war’,
maintainers to fix problems. This will understanding ROE, National Intent,
be vital in the AWD, but is required strategic guidance, strategic impacts
even now in managing stand alone of decisions (media coverage etc),
systems. (This is essentially a mindset in addition to the basic, ship borne
shift for the current ‘operators’ and warfare skills that they have always
‘maintainers’ who, rather than work in received. The new PWO training
‘series’ as previously, will need to work continuum commencing in 2013 will
in ‘parallel’ in the future) be a major step in the right direction
The concept of an “ORS Systems” The RAN develop, and PWO course
(ideally a WEE sailor) be trialled with teach, tactics and procedures to best
a view to developing an understanding employ the longer range weapons being Captain Leavy is currently the Director of the Sea Power
of the specific requirements (and introduced (most noticeably SM2, but
Centre - Australia in Canberra. He is a Principle Warfare
more importantly, the future skillsets) also AEWC, F-18, JSF etc) that will
of the job. This concept was started allow for action well beyond the firing
Officer with service in DE, DDG, FFG and ANZAC Class ships,
in HMAS Sydney during 2011 unit. In time, this must expand to cope including his most recent tour as CO HMAS Stuart where a
when a dedicated Leading Seaman with weapons being ordered from one large part of the inspiration for this article evolved.
(CSO) position was used to monitor unit, controlled by a second and fired
the Combat System setup and from a third as the NCW concept
performance. matures across the ADF.
The current warfare community Sea Training Group be enhanced
allow the WEE Department to have and assume much of the responsibility
a more active role in the Operations for managing the at-sea training for
(Endnotes)
Room. The current CSOs will the more advanced training activities,
1 Goldrick, J., Beyond the Principle Warfare Officer, Headmark –
retain responsibility for the tactical including the tasking of assets. This Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Issue 140, January 2011.
information that goes into the system, will ensure ships are not pre-warned 2 Defence White Paper 2009 – Defending Australia in the Asia-
but managing the technology will be of what is coming and is the only Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, May 2009.
3 These documents include: Defence White Paper 2009 –
a full time job in itself and the WEE way of developing the PWO skill of
Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030,
Department is best placed to undertake appreciating an unfolding situation in Department of Defence, May 2009; Force 2020, Department of
Defence, June 2002 (CDF’s Future Force Vision); Joint Operations
this role. the face of uncertainty.
for the 21st Century, ADDP D.3, Department of Defence, June 2007;
A review of the current PWO and None of this should be construed Future Maritime Operational Concept 2025, Department of Defence,
CSO training schedules be undertaken to imply that Navy’s people are not 2009; NCW Roadmap 2009, Department of Defence, 1 Oct 09;
Defence Information and Communications Technology Strategy 2009,
to ensure that the right ‘education’ performing nor that the RAN has not Department of Defence, 2009.
(in addition to training) is provided met its mission. Indeed, the calibre 4 While Australia can expect to retain a certain technological edge
in some areas it won’t be as great as it has been, nor as enduring.
to enable a full understanding what of RAN officers and sailors today is
5 NCDS – Naval Combat Data System which was installed
is going on behind the HMI in order the best it has ever been and the skills in the Perth Class DDGs and Adelaide Class FFGs prior to their
to optimise the system, interpret the and missions the Navy has trained upgrade. While NCDS had Link 11 and was therefore able to share
information between ships, it was essentially a stand-alone system
information presented and value-add. for have been what the government when compared to the future networked environment envisaged for
The re-introduction of detailed Systems has called upon the organisation the ADF.
Courses is a major step in the right to deliver. However the emerging 6 Rebuilding these skills is the focus of Commodore Warfare’s
(COMWAR) Project Pelorus which, coupled with a move back
direction. threats, technological advances and towards more specialisation in our warfare sailors, should see Navy’s
The training continuum of the the warfighting concepts behind Force high end warfare skills mature.
PWO and CSOs be enhanced with a 2030 mean the RAN must now build
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute14
The Republic of Singapore Navy
By Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe
W hen Singapore attained
independence from Malaysia
in 1965, its navy had only three
entirely on importing from overseas
its food, water and energy to survive.
In fact, for decades Singapore has
a forum for defence and security
cooperation, particularly in training.
Furthermore, Singapore’s political and
ships and a small force complement obtained much of its fresh water from military leadership has continually
numbering several hundred personnel Malaysia, and, since 2001 has also strived to keep abreast with the latest
and capable of only rudimentary imported its supply of natural gas from developments in military hardware
coastal and inshore operations. Indonesia through a 656km pipeline and capabilities and emphasized the
However, today much has changed that connects both countries. necessity for a high state of defence
and the modern Republic of Singapore However, Singapore’s dependence readiness.
Navy (RSN) has since expanded, on both Malaysia and Indonesia By developing a modern well
diversified and transformed into a has not come without problems, as equipped and trained military, the
world-class naval outfit at the cutting seen on occasions during the 1990s Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have
edge of technological development. when bilateral tensions led Malaysia developed not only the ability to act as
to abruptly refuse the Republic of a credible deterrent against a would-
Defence Policy Singapore Air Force (RSAF) and be aggressor, but also the capabilities
RSN access to Malaysia’s air and sea required to project force hundreds
Evolution space. Indeed, such tensions have of kilometers outside its sovereign
As a small island-country neighbouring continuously served as a pressing territory by air, sea and land. In this
both Malaysia and Indonesia, and with reminder of Singapore’s strategic context the role and capabilities of the
a population of just over 4.5 million deficiencies. RSN has been particularly important in
people, Singapore’s strategic location Given the nature of Singapore’s ensuring Singapore’s capacity to secure
astride the world’s busiest shipping strategic challenges it has actively control over its maritime domain.
lanes has provided unique and complex sought to maintain its security by
security challenges. cultivating relations as a reliable
Formation,
Economically, Singapore’s very partner of the Western Alliance, as
prosperity is dependent on the seen by its enthusiasm to be apart of Development and
continued flow of maritime trade the Five Power Defence Arrangement, Expansion
through its world-class port facilities. involving Australia, Malaysia, New The now formidable RSN of today
Having no natural resources of its own, Zealand, Singapore and the United can trace back its origins to the era
Singapore has no choice but to rely Kingdom. This has since provided of British colonialism when in 1934
A full moon rises
above the U.S.
Coast Guard cutter
Boutwell at anchor
at Changi Naval
Base, Singapore
Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteIssue 144 15
the Straits Settlements Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve was raised to act
as a trained manpower reserve for
the defence of Singapore in times of
emergency.
Subsequently, its evolutionary
linkages to the naval establishments
of colonial and post-independence
Malaysia include the Singapore
Division of the Malayan Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve during World War
II and thereafter to the Royal Malaysian
Navy under the title “Singapore
Volunteer Force.” After Singapore
ceded from Malaysia in 1965 its name
The Republic of
again changed to the Singapore Naval Group, Underwater Demolition Group built Endurance-class LSTs, namely
Singapore Navy
Volunteer Force. At its inception and Combat Diving Group. Under the Endurance, Resolution, Persistence frigates RSS Stalwart
the force consisted of 89 mobilized its purview the NDU commands all and Endeavour. The Endurance-class (72) and RSS Intrepid
personnel and 278 reservists and combat diving operations, search and LSTs have a flight deck that can fit (69) and the tank
only three ships: the RSS Panglima, seizure operations at sea and explosive two medium-lift helicopters and the landing ship RSS
Endeavour (210)
Singapura and RSS. Latterly, there were ordnance and mine disposal for the capacity to furnish four landing craft
maneuver with USS
several more name changes such as SAF. onboard simultaneously, which proved Harpers Ferry (LSD 49)
the Sea Defence Command, Maritime Second, the expansion of the valuable for operations outside of and USS Chafee (DDG
Command, and finally in 1975, to the RSNs naval capabilities began with Singapore in later years. Following the 90), and USS Chung-
Republic of Singapore Navy. the procurement of six German- addition of LSTs the RSNs capabilities Hoon (93) during
Starting with improvised facilities, designed Sea Wolf-class missile were given a further boost in 1990 CARAT 2009.
(US Navy photo)
the RSN made gradual progress in gunboats commissioned as RSS Sea and 1991 respectively when six
obtaining new basing facilities, raising Wolf, Sea Lion, Sea Dragon, Sea Tiger, German-built Victory-class missile
units and procuring ships. For example, Sea Hawk and Sea Scorpion. Third, corvettes were commissioned: Victory,
in 1974 Singapore’s first naval base the RSN acquired two former-US Valour, Vigilance, Valiant, Vigour and
was opened in Pulai Brani. Similarly, Navy Redwing-class mine sweepers, Vengeance. Again in 1997 the RSN also
the year 1975 proved to be significant both of which were re-commissioned added twelve locally-built Fearless-class
one for the RSN with the formation as Bluebird-class and renamed patrol vessels to its fleet to augment
of the Naval Diving Unit (NDU), the RSS Mercury and Jupiter. After its coastal and inshore operations. The
acquisition of six German-designed Sea both ships were either scrapped or patrol vessels commissioned include
Wolf-class missile gunboats and two decommissioned in 1986 and 1993, it Fearless, Brave, Courageous, Gallant,
Bluebird-class minesweepers. would not be until 1995 when the RSN Daring, Dauntless, Resilience, Unity,
First, the reconstitution of the Royal replaced them with newer Swedish- Sovereignty, Justice, Freedom and
Navy’s Far East Fleet Clearance Diving built Landsort-class vessels. These were Independence.
Team a demonstrated by the creation re-commissioned as Bedok-class mine Meanwhile, the steady expansion
of the NDU, was the initial step in the countermeasure vessels and renamed of the RSN fleet throughout the 1980s
evolution of what is today a highly RSS Bedok, RSS Kallang, RSS Katong and 1990s there was a requirement
specialized and elite unit. Initially, and RSS Punggol. for a more effective command
the NDU engaged in basic diving Subsequently, in 1978 the RSN structure and base facility. As such,
and operational tasks, which by the acquired a useful sealift capability with the RSN created three new commands
1980s also encompassed underwater the requisition of five decommissioned exemplified by Naval Logistics
explosive ordnance disposal and harbor US Navy County-class LSTs that Command (NALCOM) in 1986,
security. remained in service until 2000-01. responsible for logistics support to
Today the NDU contains three Upon been decommissioned they were RSN ships and bases installations;
groups, namely the Clearance Diving supplanted by four locally designed and Coastal Command (COSCOM) in
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute16
The Republic of Singapore Navy
1988, responsible for the security of such a vessel without getting the men
the Singapore Strait maritime domain, Capabilities into too close contact with a suspicious
and Training Command (TRACOM) boat, which may have undesirable
in 1994, which oversaw the training at As such, the period from the year intentions,” stated a senior-official at
the RSN Officers’ Cadet School, Naval 2000 onwards represented a new era the Singapore Ministry of Defence.
Advanced Officers’ School and the in the development of the RSN. The Subsequently, in 2005 the platform
Command and Staff College. decommissioning of older-model ships made its operational debut with the
Latterly, this also included the RSN’s such as the RSNs County-class LSTs RSN. Prior to the operational debut of
Institute of Maritime Warfare, Institute and Sea Wolf-class missile gunboats the Spartan USV, in 2004-05 the RSN
of Maritime Operations and Systems, in 2000-01 and 2008 respectively was also used the 9m-long RHIB Israeli-
Institute of Naval Technology and followed by a major capacity-boost built Protector USV for the first time
Operations and the Institute of Marine in other areas. These included the in an operational setting, notably in
Systems. In addition, the growing size acquisition of two models of advanced maritime interdiction in the Persian
and capabilities of the RSN meant that Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) Gulf as part of the force complement
a larger and modern basing facility systems, the RSNs participation for the of Combined Task Force 158. Indeed,
was needed, especially in light of the first time in naval operations far from the capacity of the RSN to engage
closure of the Brani naval base due its shores, opening of another brand in maritime operations well outside
to space constraints and inadequate new base facility, the commissioning of Singapore waters was a direct result
infrastructure. Hence, in 1994 the six brand new Formidable-class stealth of its investment in the Endurance-
opening of the Tuas naval base in frigates with a naval air wing capability, class LSTs which in turn enabled the
western Singapore became the new two refurbished and modern Archer- Protector USV operational-trials. At
main fleet base for the RSN’s missile class submarines, a submarine rescue various stages throughout the mission
corvettes, LSTs, mine countermeasure capability, and finally, the creation of from 2003 to 2006, the RSN deployed
vessels and new patrol vessels. two new joint-operational coordinating all five of its Endurance-class LSTs
In a major development for agencies. to safeguard Iraqi oil infrastructure,
the RSN, taking place in 1997, the Starting in 2002 the RSN engaged conduct regular patrols and board
introduction of a diesel-powered in joint-collaboration with the French and inspect ships passing through
submarine capability represented and US Navies in developing the the area. The LSTs were also used in
an unprecedented step on part Spartan Scout USV, a 7m-long Rigid basic seamanship and medical training
of Singapore to develop offensive Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) that can be exercises and joint-operations with the
maritime capabilities. The four used for intelligence, surveillance and Iraqi Navy. Singapore Navy
retrofitted former Sjoormen-class reconnaissance, mine countermeasure Furthermore, in 2004 the Changi Formidable-class
Swedish submarines, were accordingly and anti-submarine operations. naval base was made operational frigate, RSS
based at Changi naval base and “The USVs allow ships to deploy after construction first began in 1992. Tenacious-photo by
Michael Nitz
re-commissioned as RSS
Challenger, Conqueror,
Centurion and Chieftain.
While such major capability
enhancements benefitted
the RSN, since the year
2000 Singapore’s political
and military leaders
have continued to invest
increasingly greater resources
to strengthen and expand
their RSN’s naval capabilities
with new and more powerful
platforms.
New Era, Enhanced
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