BEGA VALLEY FIRES INDEPENDENT REVIEW - OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Department of Justice - Emergency NSW
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FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018
BEGA VALLEY FIRES
INDEPENDENT REVIEW
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
Department of Justice June 2018
FOREWORD
Fires and especially bushfires are here to stay. another’s information system. She commented There are some natural disasters and bushfires
As pointed out by former High Court Judge that no comparable electronic links existed that are beyond human intervention to control.
Michael Kirby AC CMG in an address to the between the London Fire Brigade and any other It is therefore incumbent upon all of us to
Australasian Fire and Emergency Service emergency service, or between the London ensure we use an integrated and contemporary
Council in 2010: Ambulance Service and the British Transport approach to those challenges to make our
Police or City of London Police. 2 communities safer and more resilient.
The largest fires in recorded Australian history
were in 1851 when a quarter of Victoria (5 million Again New South Wales is no different in facing M.Keelty, AO, APM
hectares) fell under fire; through to 7.3 million these challenges. This review discovered that
hectares in Queensland in 1974-5; 15.5 million each emergency service has varying degrees 1
After the Fires Die Down and the Lawyers Depart
hectares in Western Australia in 2003; 16 million of capability to manage and share real time – AFAC 9 September 2010
hectares in South Australia in 1974-4 and four operational information.
2
occasions in the Northern Territory since the Coroner’s Inquests into the London bombings
While there has been much recent commentary of 7 July 2005: Review of progress
1960s where bushfires have burnt no fewer than
suggesting that a single, joined up fire
40 million hectares. 1
service would address these challenges, it
Despite the ever present risk of bushfire and its is clear that agency and volunteer culture
extended season we have adopted a federated in New South Wales would not make this a
approach to the problem with each Australian practical proposition at this time. In looking
jurisdiction having in place a slightly different at arrangements for ‘call and dispatch’ this
arrangement to deal with the threat. review has opted for the next best thing. I am
proposing a fully integrated call and dispatch
New South Wales is no different.
centre for all New South Wales fire operations
Following the London tube bombings in July (and other emergencies) using the State’s
2005: resources to deal with the State’s challenges
and badged as a State asset. Automatic Vehicle
The Coroner raised a concern that despite the Location devices fitted to the NSW Rural
emergency services using electronic information Fire Service fleet will provide better levels of
capturing systems (such as the computer aided safety for volunteers and accurate resource Photo: Paul Cavalier
dispatch system used by the police) there deployments.
was no means by which an agency could see
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 2
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword 2
Contents 3
Approach 4
Timeline of Conditions 6
Timeline of Resources 7
Wordclouds 8
Perception vs Reality 9
Independent Review 10
Findings 16
Recommendations 24
Annexure A and B 26
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 3
APPROACH
The independent review into the Bega Valley In all, a total of 25 people or agencies were
bushfires that occurred on 18 March 2018 was interviewed, there were five focus group
undertaken at the request of the Minister for meetings and site visits and 183 submissions
Police and Emergency Services, the Hon Troy from members of the public and stakeholders.
Grant MP, and was formally commissioned by A list of persons interviewed is attached at
the NSW Office of Emergency Management. Annexure B.
The Review terms of reference are attached at The ‘word clouds’ on page 8 of this report were
Annexure A. developed from the interviews and submissions
made during the Review.
The Review was conducted with the support
of the Office of Emergency Management.
The Review had no powers to seek witnesses
or documents and was undertaken in a co-
operative way.
Agencies and stakeholders were asked to
provide information and exchanges occurred
where further information or clarification was
sought.
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 4
“Create an agnostic approach to the
threat of fires from both a departmental
and organisational perspective.”
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 5
BEGA VALLEY – TIMELINE OF CONDITIONS – 18 MARCH 2018
1228 Hrs: First 000 Call
Incidents: 3 Incidents: 3 Incidents: 6 Incidents: 12 Incidents: 13 Incidents: 18 Incidents: 20 Incidents: 21 Incidents: 21
1200HRS 1230HRS 1300HRS 1330HRS 1400HRS 1430HRS 1500HRS 1530HRS 1900HRS
37.1 degrees celcius 36.9 degrees celcius 37 degrees celcius 37.5 degrees celcius 38.4 degrees celcius 37 degrees celcius 38.4 degrees celcius 36.8 degrees celcius 29 degrees celcius
18% humidity 18% humidity 17% humidity 18% humidity 17% humidity 17% humidity 15% humidity 18% humitidy 23% humidity
Wind NW 32km/h Winds NW 44km/h Winds NW 44km/h Winds WNW 32km/h Winds WNW 24km/h Winds NW 41km/h Winds WNW 30km/h Winds WNW 41km/h Winds W 17km/h
Gusts 50km/h Gusts 72km/h Gusts 72km/h Gusts 54km/h Gusts 48km/h Gusts 65km/h Gusts 57km/h Gusts 59km/h Gusts 32km/h
*Incident numbers for the Bega Valley fires recorded by RFS, 18 March 2018.
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 6
BEGA VALLEY – TIMELINE OF RESOURCES – 18 MARCH 2018
CONFIRMED TOTAL RESOURCES
1228 Hrs: First 000 Call
Incidents: 3 Incidents: 3 Incidents: 6 Incidents: 12 Incidents: 13 Incidents: 18 Incidents: 20 Incidents: 21 Incidents: 21
Resources deployed: Resources deployed: Resources deployed: Resources deployed: Resources deployed: Resources deployed: Resources deployed: Resources deployed: Resources deployed:
4 15 24 39 44 41 49 59 71
1200HRS 1230HRS 1300HRS 1330HRS 1400HRS 1430HRS 1500HRS 1530HRS 1900HRS
RFS RESOURCE FIGURES
RFS RFS RFS RFS RFS RFS RFS RFS RFS
• 2 heavy units • 6 heavy units • 10 heavy units • 11 heavy units • 13 heavy units • 11 heavy units • 13 heavy units • 14 heavy units • 15 heavy units
• 2 light units • 7 light units • 9 light units • 17 light units • 18 light units • 17 light units • 21 light units • 24 light units • 19 light units
• 2 group captains • 4 group captains • 7 group captains • 7 group captains • 7 group captains • 6 group captains • 6 group captains • 8 group captains
• 1 aviation asset • 1 aviation asset • 1 aviation asset • 2 aviation assets • 2 aviation assets • 6 aviation assets
FRNSW
• 1 appliance FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW
• 3 appliances • 3 appliances • 3 appliances • 3 appliances • 3 appliances • 6 appliances
NPWS NPWS NPWS
• 2 units • 7 light units • 3 light units
FCNSW
• 5 light units
• 1 heavy unit
• 1 heavy plant
*Red figures illustrate the FRNSW RESOURCE FIGURES
discrepancy in the operational
understanding of resources FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW FRNSW
• 1 appliance • 3 appliances • 5 appliances • 5 appliances • 5 appliances • 6 appliances • 13 appliances
deployed.
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 7
Underground
Community
Easements
Power
lines Preparedness spirit
Funding
Climate
wiring
media
Social
Information
Fires near me
change
Mobile
connectivity Community
THE PUBLIC
History
Hazard
Heroes
(INDIVIDUALS)
Safety
Utilities
near me
updates
reduction
Fires
Neighbour
Emergency alerts
Evacuation
Alert status
Technology
contoller
Incident
Culture
District
Internal
agency
politics
Situational awareness
boundaries Automatic vehicle
cooperation
Hazard
reduction Call and dispatch location
Positive
000 THE Volunteer
FIREFIGHTERS
training
Connectivity
Incident call out
Joint
location
Local knowledge Bureaucracy
RFS central
dispatch Safety Communication Volunteer availability
equipment
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 8
RFS CALL AND DISPATCH PERCEPTION
Location map
Response
protocols
000 Brigades
Emergency Operational
Recommends Communications
brigades to page and/or Duty Officer
Local
information
RFS CALL AND DISPATCH REALITY
Situational awareness Situational awareness
RFS HQ
(OCC dedicated
Central
staffing)
Dispatch
12/45 Districts
disconnected to
Computer
Detail & Volunteers
000 caller
aided Volunteers
call RFS
000 FRNSW incident RFS attend
Fire dispatch Brigades chosen pager and assemble
Emergency ComCen type fire
& district SMS
recorded
boundaries
33/45 Districts
24/7 District (Bridge/conference line,
Duty Officer up to 25 people)
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 9
INDEPENDENT REVIEW
of the Operational Response
to the Bega Valley fires
The Review of NSW that no government could afford. They there was no interference with their respective
and the community members who help them in functions.
We are used to pouring accolades upon a time of crisis are an outstanding example of
our firefighters who alongside with other The Review received some 183 submissions
the pathway to building resilient communities.
emergency services personnel and many many of which were from members of the
members of the community, place themselves What was known as a typical bushfire season community with the majority submitted by
at risk to save lives and protect property in lasting a few months over summer has now firefighters both volunteers and full time
times of fire, natural disasters and emergency extended to almost eight months of the year employees.
situations. Nothing in this Review should not including hazard reduction activities and
change that very positive and realistic strategies. Bushfires burning in south east
perception. Sydney in the middle of April 2018 is a good
example of the extension of the bushfire
For instance, the Bega Valley fires on 18 March season.
2018 burnt through more than 1,250 hectares
destroying 65 homes and 70 caravans or This Review had a specific focus:
cabins. Importantly, no one lost their lives and
• The adequacy of the fire services response
810 houses were saved through the combined
to what is now termed ‘the Bega Valley fires’
efforts of firefighters, police and residents.
on 18 March 2018, and
While this Review is critical in some parts, it • The call taking and dispatch arrangements
should not be seen as anything other than a of both FRNSW and the RFS.
strong supporter of the 85,000 volunteers
in organisations such as the NSW Rural Fire Importantly, the Review was not a formal
Service (RFS), Fire Rescue NSW (FRNSW) inquiry and it had no powers to seek
and the NSW State Emergency Service (SES). information or examine witnesses as is
These people give of their time week in and sometimes common in these matters. The
week out to provide a capability to the State Review liaised with the NSW Coroner and the Photo: Paul Cavalier
NSW Police Force Arson Squad to ensure that
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 10Adequacy of the response This Review did not look at merging the two The call and dispatch arrangements between
fire services, but the current arrangements a 000 caller, FRNSW and the RFS are
to the Bega Valley fires lack a truly collaborative approach and can be flawed and in need of urgent reform. Even
As noted in this Review in a timeline of events improved. the executives of the RFS and the Rural Fire
surrounding the Bega Valley fires, all agencies Service Association acknowledge that they
The Review noted the positive steps taken by
increased their resource deployments to the are flying blind for a period of time when both
both fire Commissioners who had recently
fires commensurate with the increased risk as the deployment of resources and situational
issued two joint statements reassuring both
the day unfolded. It should be noted that other awareness are not available. This in turn
the community and their organisations of steps
parts of the State experienced similar weather creates a knowledge gap for the FRNSW Fire
taken to work more closely.
conditions on that day (18 March 2018) which Communications Centre (ComCen) taking
required decision makers to make judgements The desire to create a dossier to point multiple 000 calls for assistance.
about how much resource was in reserve for out purported failures or sub-standard
It was asserted to the Review team that flying
other fires burning in the State. performance by a partner agency belies the
blind equates to the ‘fog of war’. It is accepted
excellent and sometimes life-threatening
The Review has concluded that despite some that there will be periods in most fire events
work of both agencies. To bring the animosity
of the media commentary many more homes where there is a high degree of absent or
forward in the hours following people losing
might have been destroyed in the Bega conflicting information until full situational
their homes and life possessions is deplorable.
Valley fires and even lives lost had the efforts awareness is achieved. However, this review
of firefighters and residents not been so Across Australia emergency services volunteer contends that improved awareness of the
successful. numbers are in decline as country towns lose location of the RFS and other operational
populations to the cities and the demographic resources clearly needs to be improved.
Problems Identified of the volunteers sourced from farming
No better example of flying blind was the RFS
From the outset of the Review it became clear generations has reduced. It is the responsibility
and FRNSW providing two completely different
that staff within FRNSW had been building a of the leadership of the agencies and their
pictures to this Review on what resources were
dossier of incidents where it is claimed the RFS employee representative bodies to create the
available to fight the Bega Valley fires on 18
had not responded appropriately to some 110 conditions that encourage the volunteer ethos
March 2018. Thankfully, the error was in favour
fires across the State. This Review looked at and tradition rather than allowing it to be
of the community with more FRNSW resources
some of those events in a similar fashion to the denigrated.
being available than that shown by the RFS
Bega Valley fires. Incident Control Online (ICON) system.
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 11The reliability of information provided to the agency agreements and business rules in place, committee, the Fire Services Joint Standing
community during a fire (either through the at the time of the Bega Valley fires and other Committee had failed to provide the Minister
Fires Near Me app, or through the RFS; social fires complained of by both organisations, with a yearly report in accordance with its own
media) is largely reliant on the accuracy of it is clear that the power imbalance of one policies.
operational systems. When these systems agency managing call taking for both agencies
Based on interviews and material sent to the
do not have up to date information, there is is the nub of the problem. Equally, FRNSW
Review, many Mutual Aid Agreements that are
potential for the community to not accept or ComCen forward deploying assets without the
in place at the local level are either ignored or
trust the reliability of the available information. knowledge of the RFS merely exacerbates the
no longer relevant.
It follows that a single source of truth is not situation.
available for the community in a timely manner These type of issues render the current
To their credit, both fire commissioners have
through the Fires Near Me app or social media. governance structure ineffective.
taken steps during the conduct of this Review
The adoption of an Automatic Vehicle Location to place a RFS officer into FRNSW ComCen Fire is agnostic. Along with natural disasters
(AVL) device, interoperable with those already but a significant amount of mistrust about it gives no credence to the agency used to
in use by FRNSW and the SES will go some way the dispatch process remains in the middle combat it, the jurisdiction in which it burns
towards addressing some but not all of these management ranks. or to the people who respond to it. So why
problems. Situational awareness will still need do we make the response arrangements so
There is a plethora of Memoranda Of
to be communicated back to decision makers bureaucratic?
Understanding (MOU), policies and legislation
and the public. This solution or a version of it,
as well as mutual aid agreements creating a
is yet to be implemented by the RFS and this
bureaucratic process to give jurisdiction to
should be addressed as a matter of immediate
one fire agency over another for different
priority.
geographical areas. The Review noted that
The Review could not ignore the elephant there had been delays in reaching agreement
in the room that members of both fire on fire boundaries such as those for Bathurst,
organisations are often critical of each other Cumberland and Blue Mountains, which only
with the animosity at times, palpable. It seems highlights the need to cut through this red tape
that the common enemy of fires is sometimes and focus on fighting the fires.
overlooked through the distraction of finding
The Review identified that the MOU between
fault with each other.
FRNSW and the RFS had not been updated
This contention is made worse by the fact the since 2011 despite the appointment of a new
FRNSW ComCen manages call taking and FRNSW Commissioner in 2017. The Review
relays information to the RFS. Despite the inter also noted that the peak fire co-ordination Photo: Paul Cavalier
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 12Potential Solutions The Review examined other call and dispatch The NSW Police Force operates civilianised
centres in NSW and other Australian states and call and dispatch centres and has done so for
There is a way forward but it will be a challenge formed the view that the Ambulance Service of many years. Given the breadth of calls from
for both government and the leadership of the NSW has an excellent model. It is a model that lost children to counter terrorism, a lot can be
fire organisations. is being implemented in other jurisdictions and learned from their capability including their
Reform can begin through firstly one that accurately tracks and preemptively use of situational awareness and resource
acknowledging that, by definition, any positions resources according to demand deployments.
volunteer organisation may not have the and availability. The Review recommends
This Review recommends taking an agnostic
same response time to an event than full time benchmarking off the Ambulance Service of
approach to fires and eliminating the
equivalents and even some retained employees. NSW for both Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD)
bureaucratic policies that reinforce agency
and AVL.
The operational responses required for disputes rather than ameliorate them. To better
bushfires and structure fires are different, and The SES is an agency dealing with some protect the volunteers serving the RFS and
require a different mobilisation of resources 170,000 calls per year and has developed a provide timely situational awareness about
and appliances to combat them. The basic mobile app to increase efficiency in notifying fires, the RFS should move to install AVL to its
tenet for full time staff fighting structure fires volunteers and dispatching their resources. vehicles immediately.
is linked to Key Performance Indicators for The app is linked to personnel records thereby
Further, this Review takes the view that while
call, dispatch and response and of course, they giving details on the currency of qualifications
AVL is being installed on RFS vehicles then
are appropriately remunerated. We are not and the skills of people deployed or available
the nearest and quickest fire appliance with
comparing apples with apples and volunteers for deployment.
appropriate capability – whether it be FRNSW
will always have their daily employment and In the modern era, if staff are not provided or RFS – should attend to the fire. Eventually,
livelihoods to look after. modern technology by their employer they details on skills and qualifications of deployed
It follows that, at every opportunity, an effort will create workarounds which appears to have personnel as well as situational awareness
should be made to explain the differences happened with the RFS. Some brigades are should complement the RFS AVL.
rather than seeking to criticise one agency for using a system known as BART (Broadcast,
not having the same call and dispatch timelines. Alert, Respond, Turnout) but it is not used by
the whole agency.
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 13Future State A strategic and long term solution needs to be The future state should be a position where the
found that sees each of the agencies working nearest and most suitable firefighting capability
The Review found that there had been previous side by side in a civilianised call and dispatch is sent to combat a fire regardless of agency.
reviews of call and dispatch centres and their centre that could also utilise the new SES The Review acknowledges that the question of
efficient operation by large and respected facility at Wollongong for redundancy. The ‘nearest’ is an objective one. A combined fully
private sector consultancies. A comprehensive Review was informed of a future move of the integrated communications centre will need
review that envisages a State Level Operation RFS communications centre to new premises. to decide the ‘most suitable’ always bearing
and Co-ordination capability has also been This is an excellent opportunity to rebadge the in mind that it is the fire that needs to be
undertaken by the Office of Emergency new centre as a State asset of the Department attacked.
Management within the Department of Justice of Justice, Office of Emergency Management,
and like the reviews before it, is an excellent FRNSW could also be accommodated into the
body of work. facility.
As each emergency management organisation Some of the problems identified in this review
moves towards improving their current call and have been overcome by the RFS Commissioner
dispatch capabilities they should look towards moving to second staff into the FRNSW
adopting a common operating picture using ComCen. However, this is an interim measure
technology that is interoperable between them. and does not address the question of ‘who’s in
A stovepipe approach appears to characterise charge?’ of an agnostic approach to deploying
the adoption of some new systems to date resources to combat fires. In establishing to
leading to agencies using different vendors a civilianised call and dispatch centre, a role
that in turn denies decision makers a common should be designated to a person who is
understanding of the event. authorised to dispatch units to an emergency
Once a common operating picture is achieved, that transcends individual agency chain of
other tools such as the Fires Near Me app and command arrangements.
social media can be fashioned to provide a
single source of truth to the community.
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 14“We are conscious of the differences in our
roles, but more so in their commonality;
that of saving lives and property.”
Photo: Highway Patrol Images
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 15FINDINGS
Finding 1 Finding 2 suggest that any better outcome could have
resulted on the day
The Bega Valley fires on 18 March 2018 were Repeated successes in the fighting of fires
five separate fires that were extremely fierce in NSW is a result of the combined effort of • A Deputy Incident Controller was not
and quick moving - limiting combat options. a mixture of volunteers, salaried personnel, appointed at the Bega Valley fires which
Despite this, the number and scaling up of retained staff and members of the community could have allowed the Incident Controller
resources allocated to the fire as well as the delivering a level of co-ordinated responses more time to focus on resource deployments
efforts of residents both before and during the that is comparable to other parts of Australia rather than incoming calls which for a period
fire means that it is difficult to suggest that any and follows a long tradition of integrated and of time were overwhelming
better outcome could have resulted on the day collaborative approaches • There were delays in feeding information
back to the FRNSW ComCen which was
• There were large numbers of 000 calls that • 73,223 RFS volunteer firefighters 1
taking a large number of repeat 000 calls
reported the fire across a large geographic
• 5,891 Community Fire Unit Volunteers 2
from persons either reporting the fire in
area
• 3,517 FRNSW full time firefighting staff 2 a different location or who were seeking
• An independent assessment by the advice as to whether or not they should stay
Commonwealth Scientific and Industry • 3,341 FRNSW retained firefighting staff 2
or leave their homes
Research Organisation (CSIRO) confirms the • 878 RFS full time equivalent positions 1
• This lack of feedback was partly due to the
fire was fast moving and intense
fast moving nature of the fires and led to
• Interviews with staff fighting the Bega Valley Finding 3 delays in updating the Fires Near Me app
fires confirm the ferocity and speed of the which remained ‘advice only’ for the bulk of
Fire and other natural disasters are agnostic as
fire the time that the fire was raging
to which agency in which district will respond.
• Observations of the fire ground made during This is despite the detailed and instructive inter-
the Review established that it was fortunate agency policies in place to deal with them
that no residents or firefighters lost their
• Some of these policies were not followed on 1
NSW Rural Fire Service, NSW Rural Fire Service 2016-17
lives on the day
the day of the Bega Valley fires and while Annual Report https://www.rfs.nsw.gov.au/resources/
• The fire danger rating for the 18 March 2018 publications/annual-reports
it is impossible to determine the impact,
was the fourth highest on record in that area given the extreme conditions it is difficult to 2
Fire & Rescue NSW, Fire & Rescue NSW Annual Report
2016/17 https://www.fire.nsw.gov.au/page.php?id=453
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 16• The RFS District Duty Officer was not • The continued practice by FRNSW to ‘self Finding 4
made available for interview during the 6 deploy’ to fires is a cause of significant angst
weeks of this Review, the RFS advised that between both agencies Without getting into a debate about climate
the officer was overseas on pre-approved change, the experiences of recent years has
• The decision to refuse FRNSW offers of been that the bushfire seasons have been
annual leave. The Duty Office was located in
assistance had no impact on the outcome of getting longer and opportunities to reduce fuel
Moruya, away from the fire ground. It is likely
the incident due to the severity of conditions loads is getting shorter, evidenced by existing
that assistance from FRNSW was initially
declined without full situational awareness of and speed of the fire, and the competing NSW Government and various scientific
the intensity and speed of the fire demands for resources to fight other publications. The extended season also means
nearby fires. Notwithstanding this, other aerial firefighting assets have often returned to
• The Review was provided audio recordings submissions to the inquiry have suggested
of the decline for assistance by the District the northern hemisphere
that such offers are routinely declined,
Duty Officer which happened on two Collectively this creates a greater need for
sometimes in less clear cut circumstances
separate occasions at 12.33pm and again at
more efficient and accountable call and
12.58pm during the first hour of the Bega • ABC radio continued normal broadcasts on
dispatch systems. The following references
Valley fires the day of the fires rather than broadcasting
provide greater detail of the challenges being
updates to the community which has been
• FRNSW ComCen overruled the decision of created by climate change
the practice in the past
the RFS District Duty Officer and deployed
to the Bega Valley fires without being called • An internal review by the ABC is addressing • The NSW Office of Environment and
out, but as it happened this was very useful this problem however, the ABC would have Heritage paper ‘Climate Change Impacts on
for the overall protection of homes suffered from the same lack of updated Bushfire Risk in NSW’ 1
• This action by the FRNSW ComCen appears information and does not have anyone • CSIRO publication on Climate change and
to be a regular occurrence and it leaves the embedded in the RFS headquarters or the extreme weather: understanding the link 2
RFS Incident Controller unaware of the total RFS Incident Management Team to provide
firefighting resources made available to the informed broadcasts
Incident Management Team • The position of the Public Information 1
NSW Office of Environment and Heritage, Climate
• The Review team was only able to reconcile functional area co-ordinator could liaise with Change Impacts on Bushfire Risk in NSW
the final resourcing of the Bega Valley fires any ABC manager appointed to assist with http://climatechange.environment.nsw.gov.au/~/
some six weeks after the event and the messaging media/3FA0B16F406F43EDA9536028A88C539F.ashx
FRNSW figures were different to the RFS
• Broadcast by radio can overcome 2
CSIRO, Climate change and extreme weather:
figures confirming that the RFS Incident understanding the link
information flows when mobile and internet
Controller did not have a full picture of the https://blogs.csiro.au/ecos/climate-change-and-
services are not available to issue warnings extreme-weather-understanding-the-link/
total resourcing for that fire
to the community
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 17Finding 5 • Despite being required by its charter of • Many of the public submissions made to
agreement – there has been a failure by the the Review highlighted a cooperative and
Despite the existence of comprehensive Fire Services Joint Standing Committee to effective operational relationship between
governance arrangements both FRNSW and provide a strategic report to the Minister in the agencies ‘on the ground’, but the
the RFS are apparently not always complying more than twelve months weight of submissions painted a picture of
with key requirements of the policies animosity and mistrust between FRNSW and
• The overarching Memorandum of Finding 6 the RFS in many districts and at the middle
Understanding between both agencies has management level
The relationship between FRNSW and the RFS
not been updated since 2011 and in any at the executive level is excellent but the review • Interviews conducted during the Review
event, since the appointment of the new has identified examples of significant animosity made it clear that there is a perceived power
FRNSW Commissioner in 2017 at the middle management level rendering any imbalance in favour of FRNSW who take
• Two joint messages from the FRNSW and proposal to integrate the two agencies into one all calls of all fire events in NSW and then
RFS Commissioners issued on 21 March organisation with the current organisational decide whether or not to refer the incident
2018 and 9 April 2018 outlined steps to be cultures implausible to the RFS depending upon an interpretation
taken to improve the working relationship as to which fire boundary the fire is believed
• A dossier presented to The Daily Telegraph to be burning within
between both agencies for call and dispatch
appears to have been compiled against the
arrangements are commendable but should • Call logs prepared by FRNSW of the Bega
RFS by members of FRNSW who have taken
already have been in place Valley fires identified the decline of the offer
photos and noted details of RFS responses
• A flow diagram provided to the Review of resources, but their own AVL logs, which
to fire events for the past twelve months
by the RFS does not accord with a revealed the self-deployment of FRNSW
• A comprehensive table prepared by FRNSW assets, had to be requested multiple times
Memorandum of Understanding specifically
and presented to the Review appears to before the complete picture of resourcing
written to address the communication
support the dossier presented to the Daily was understood
arrangements when 000 calls are made
Telegraph
to FRNSW ComCen for bushfires (ie: no • Disingenuous public comments have been
feedback loop to FRNSW ComCen or 000) made criticising the RFS despite the success
which may be an oversight but the lack of a of a number of operations where lives and
common operating picture has been a major property have been saved
issue during this Review
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 18Finding 7 Finding 9 imposed to achieve co-ordination and
overcome demarcation disputes between the
This animosity between members of the There is a plethora of agreements, memoranda firefighting agencies are not working effectively
agencies has been evident during the course of of understanding, policy and legislation
the review and has been the subject of previous controlling both FRNSW and the RFS that • NSW communities do not appear to face
inquiries and media reports – however and attempt to create high level co-ordination and the same issues when it comes to the SES,
importantly, the apparent animosity belies the help ameliorate the demarcation issues but it Ambulance Service of NSW and NSW Police
actual success achieved by the agencies in the has simply focussed the dispatch system on fire Force call and dispatch functions
majority of fire operations boundaries rather than the ‘fires’ • The review has been advised of a number
• If middle management is not supportive At the time of this report Cumberland, Bathurst of instances of FRNSW and the RFS
of their fellow organisations then it follows and Blue Mountains are just some of the undermining the agreements in place by
that the animosity and mistrust is likely to areas where disputes remain as to agency ‘self deploying’ or refusing assistance
continue despite this and other Reviews jurisdiction. Some of the key policy documents
unless there is a sustained intervention at establishing coordination between the agencies Finding 11
the executive level for organisational change include: Elimination of the fire boundary system for
to the cultures the purpose of dispatch will go a long way to
• Fire Services Joint Standing Committee Act
improving the efficiency of call and dispatch to
Finding 8 • State Bush Fire Plan fires in NSW while at the same time reducing
The vision of the 1994 Bushfire Inquiry • Memorandum of Understanding the competition between agencies
conducted by the then NSW Government that • Fire Service Delivery Provisions • Existing legislation does not prevent an
the two fire services cooperate rather than agnostic response to fires. The Review
• Operational Communications Service Level
compete has unfortunately not been fully observed that the vision of responsibility is
Agreement
realised which reflects poorly on all parties an overlay put in place by the Fire Services
given the time since these issues first came • Bega Valley Mutual Aid Agreement Joint Standing Committee
to light. This competitiveness unfortunately
• The division of responsibility could be easily
plays out in the ‘Call and Dispatch’ function Finding 10 removed or amended to reflect the thrust of
where offers of assistance have been refused or
Communities across NSW are not experiencing this review
jurisdiction of fire boundaries disputed
the optimisation of a call dispatch and response
model to fire events that are enjoyed by other
states because the bureaucratic processes
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 19Finding 12 Finding 13 • Submissions to the Review confirm the
slowness of RFS call handling and response
Unlike the NSW Police Force, Ambulance When the RFS ICON system is not updated it including submissions from RFS brigades
Service of NSW and FRNSW – the RFS relies can deny situational awareness to firefighters themselves
solely on radio and telephone communications, who are deployed in the field, and may lead
and does not have AVL technology or other to the Fires Near Me app not being updated, • The slowness is not necessarily a criticism
GPS trackers in its vehicles or on its staff which in extreme cases could potentially put in all cases – it is a fact of life for volunteer
denying the State both situational awareness lives at risk agencies although to their credit, the SES
and efficiency in resource allocation appear to have made some headway
• In some cases the Incident Management through the use of an app to reduce call out
• The lack of update can indicate a lack of Team is overwhelmed by the volume of time and understand the qualifications of
appreciation of the speed and intensity of information referred to it people being deployed through a link to SAP
the event data
• If ICON is not updated the Fires Near Me
• The other NSW emergency service agencies app is not updated which was a common • Interviews of the RFS executive conducted
see the workplace health and safety issue complaint following the Bega Valley fires during the Review admit that they are ‘flying
for staff and have acted accordingly even blind’ for brief periods depending upon
• Many submissions to the Review complained
down to introducing GPS capability for hand the available resources and the feedback
that during the Bega Valley fires the Fires
held portable radios. It is noted that the SES received
Near Me app provided an ‘Advice Only’
has recently introduced AVL technology for
reading when in fact people should have • The RFS has centralised dispatch capability,
its fleet of rescue vehicles, and is exploring
been evacuating however it is not implemented statewide
options to extend the technology to its
storm vehicles • The RFS has worked hard with Telstra to
Finding 14 improve their call out and they do have the
The inter relationship between a 000 caller, largest population of volunteers to engage
FRNSW ComCen and the RFS call and dispatch so the problem is not being ignored
is cumbersome, and leads to a period of time
when situational awareness is unavailable. This
impacts the volunteers, the community and
the RFS executive leading to less than optimal
briefings of government and partner agencies
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 20Finding 15 • Other cases referred to the Review were Finding 18
found to be just as efficient, driven by good
Interviews conducted during the Review people trying to do the right thing but Eliminating fire boundaries coupled with AVL
reinforced that the emergency agencies rumours and hyperbole undermine the great capability for the RFS will offer the opportunity
appear to be operating in silos when it comes efforts undertaken by all agencies including to fight fire with the quickest and most
to selection of call and dispatch technologies community members who get involved appropriate resource regardless of agency.
except for the SES which seems to have taken when the situation demands it While the capability is being acquired by RFS,
some excellent whole of government decisions it should not follow that because there is an
by adopting technologies from FRNSW inherent delay in their deployment that their
Finding 17 services will not be called upon for the interim
• The RFS has 99% of its total of A number of submissions and interviews because in many instances, the RFS is the most
approximately 70,000 staffing resource highlighted the time taken to establish suitable agency to deploy. A mature common
through volunteers so keeping them whether or not a volunteer RFS brigade has sense approach is needed at FRNSW ComCen
engaged through appropriate technologies been able to contact its members and form if this recommendation is adopted
is important a crew for deployment. This puts pressure on
• Such a move will capitalise on the continued the community, the RFS management and Finding 19
willingness of volunteers to participate in volunteers as well as FRNSW ComCen (who are
At the executive level the NSW Police Force,
RFS and SES operations receiving subsequent 000 calls and requests
FRNSW, SES and RFS there is support for a
for information)
single, civilianised call and dispatch centre for
Finding 16 • Since the commencement of this Review a dealing with fires and other natural disasters.
In the Bega Valley fires the first 000 call did not better integrated call and dispatch approach This review found however, unless there is total
accurately pinpoint the seat of the fire and the has been taken by both fire commissioners support from all stakeholders including the
call taker was attempting to establish whether through the placement of RFS officers in unions, any move to favour one organisation
or not the fire was within the FRNSW boundary FRNSW ComCen over another in hosting such an arrangement
or the RFS boundary. An incident number was is likely to draw criticism and continue the
• This step towards an integrated approach
created and the RFS was contacted but this existing animosity
will go some way in overcoming delays
process quickly became irrelevant as a senior in call and dispatch to fires achieving
member of the RFS corrected the location in a the stated goal of the RFS to “engender
transmission made moments later that included better cooperation and collaboration on
photographs of the fire emergencies reported to it”
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 21Finding 20 Finding 21 Finding 23
Commentary and criticism of the role and Each of the NSW Emergency Service agencies The review has examined call and dispatch
responses by the RFS and FRNSW often in NSW uses a different type of CAD system experiences in other fires, including at Port
does not take into account that the two however, the Review noted that not only Macquarie, Taree and Nimbin. It is not proposed
organisations cannot be compared on an does the Ambulance Service of NSW have a to detail the examination of these other
equitable basis given the permanent and part comprehensive system – their staff have been incidents in this report, however, it is noted that
time nature of the respective organisations providing expert assistance on CAD design for these other instances reinforce the review’s
other Australian jurisdictions findings in relation to the call and dispatch
• Submissions received by the Review
arrangements arising out of its examination of
reinforce this point
Finding 22 the Bega Valley fires
• Interviews with FRNSW regarding their
It is important to note that while few
‘retained fire fighters’ also reinforces this
submissions made by firefighters or their
Finding 24
point
representative bodies reported a positive Significant bodies of work have already been
• Examination of media articles generally
relationship between the agencies at undertaken by various government agencies
discloses a lack of understanding about
the middle management level, almost all in NSW examining better models for Call and
the complexity of the arrangements and
submissions stated that they, collectively, still Dispatch; Public Safety Mobile Broadband and
the different operational responses that are
‘got the job done’ at the coal face Operational Communication Strategies to make
required
them more efficient and cost effective
• The State enjoys the services of volunteers
at little cost and could not survive without
them whether it be in the RFS, SES and
many other roles where volunteerism is
sustaining communities
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 22“Automatic Vehicle Location capability…
will offer the opportunity to fight fire with
the quickest and most appropriate resource
regardless of agency.”
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 23RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the NSW Recommendation 2 Recommendation 4
Government:
Take immediate steps to eliminate fire The Commissioners of FRNSW and the RFS
boundaries for call and dispatch purposes issue an instruction to FRNSW ComCen that
Recommendation 1 to create an agnostic approach to the threat while AVL capability is being made available to
of fires from both a departmental and the RFS vehicle fleet, no offers of assistance by
In recognising the success of the work of both organisational perspective one agency to the other in combatting a fire is
the volunteer based RFS and the full time rejected or delayed if what is being offered is
Applies to:
FRNSW members in joint operations – both appropriate
agencies should be represented at major • Finding 3
Applies to:
briefings or press conferences to reinforce • Finding 11
successful integrated collaborative efforts • Finding 6 • Finding 12
• Finding 20
rather than individual agency achievements • Finding 7 • Finding 13
Applies to: • Finding 8 • Finding 21
Recommendation 3
• Finding 1 • Finding 7
• Finding 2 • Finding 8 Remove those policies, guidelines, memoranda Recommendation 5
of understanding and committees that are
• Finding 6 • Finding 23
made redundant as a result of adopting Use the model and system in place at the
recommendation #2 while updating any Ambulance Service of NSW as a benchmark
remaining policies that are considered to for call taking, dispatch and the provision
still be relevant of situational awareness when deploying
resources. This will overcome the lack of a
Applies to:
feedback loop in current bushfire operations
• Finding 3 • Finding 11
• Finding 5 • Finding 18
• Finding 9
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 24Recommendation 6 Recommendation 8 Recommendation 10
As a matter of priority commence the roll out Until a single call centre is developed, continue Explore better options for call and dispatch,
of AVL capability for the RFS fleet, completing deployments of a senior RFS officer to FRNSW telecommunications and information sharing
as much work as possible before the 2018/19 ComCen on a 24/7 day basis. This arrangement capability across the emergency management
bushfire season, capitalising where necessary should determine the quickest most suitable portfolio including the adoption of a multi-agency
on current and future work undertaken with resource and who is ‘in charge’ of an incident emergency management operations complex
the NSW Government Radio Network to ensure
Applies to: Applies to:
both officer safety and situational awareness
• Finding 10 • Finding 13
Applies to:
• Finding 15 • Finding 22
• Finding 10 • Finding 14
• Finding 17 • Finding 25
• Finding 12 • Finding 17
• Finding 13 • Finding 18
Recommendation 11
Recommendation 9
Recommendation 7 While the proposal to establish an integrated
Take steps to ensure that both fire
commissioners are seeking opportunities
call and dispatch centre is being implemented, to engender a culture in their respective
Implement a fully integrated civilianised
FRNSW should take steps to civilianise ComCen organisations that seeks to attract and foster
single call and dispatch centre, that includes a
and maintain experienced senior officers from the volunteer ethos and experience
redundancy option outside the Sydney CBD,
both agencies as supervisors similar to how the
which will adopt an agnostic approach to
NSW Police Force and Ambulance Service of
deploy the quickest most suitable resource to an
emergency. Such a centre should be managed
NSW operate Recommendation 12
by either a non uniformed public servant staffed Applies to: Review the effectiveness of emergency public
organisation like the Office for Emergency
• Finding 10 information arrangements, and give consideration
Management, or the NSW Police Force
to embedding an ABC Manager (not a journalist)
• Finding 19
Applies to: into the RFS headquarters during emergencies to
broadcast warnings to the community that can be
• Finding 4 • Finding 15 pooled to commercial media outlets
• Finding 10 • Finding 16
Applies to:
• Finding 11 • Finding 17
• Finding 3
• Finding 12 • Finding 21
• Finding 14 • Finding 24
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 25ANNEXURE A
Bega Valley fires Independent Review Terms of Reference: • Ken Middleton, President, Rural Fire Service Association
• Review and report on the adequacy of the fire services response to • Leighton Drury, State Secretary, Fire Brigades Employees Union
the Reedy Swamp fire near Bega that occurred on 18 March 2018, and • Leslie Mabbutt, NSW State Coroner
subsequently impacted upon the township of Tathra; • Mark Smethurst, Commissioner, NSW State Emergency Service
• Review the call taking and dispatch arrangements of both Fire and • Mick Fuller, Commissioner, NSW Police Force
Rescue NSW and NSW Rural Fire Service across the State, and make
• Paul Baxter, Commissioner, Fire & Rescue NSW
recommendations to ensure they are best practice, address emerging
technology, and provide the best possible service delivery to the • Peter Marks, Manager Telecommunications Emergencies, NSW Telco
community of NSW. Authority
• Peter McKechnie, Manager State Operations, NSW Rural Fire Service
ANNEXURE B • Rob McNeil, Assistant Commissioner, Fire & Rescue NSW
• Rob Rogers, Deputy Commissioner, NSW Rural Fire Service
• Rosemary Milkins, Deputy Commissioner Corporate Services, NSW
Interviews Police Force
• Brian McDonough, Vice President, Rural Fire Service Association
• Sascha Rundle, Manager Diversity Emergency & Strategy, Australian
• Chris Read, Senior Industrial Officer, Fire Brigades Employees Union Broadcasting Corporation
• David Dutton, Executive Director Clinical Operations, Ambulance • Shane Fitzsimmons, Commissioner, NSW Rural Fire Service
Service of NSW
• Garry Cooper, Operational Officer, NSW Rural Fire Service Visits
• Greg Buckley, Chief Superintendent, Fire & Rescue NSW • Bega Fire Control Centre, NSW Rural Fire Service
• Greg Mullins, Retired Commissioner, Fire & Rescue NSW • Fire Communications Centre, Fire & Rescue NSW
• Greg Newton, Deputy Commissioner, NSW State Emergency Service • RFS Headquarters, NSW Rural Fire Service
• Jamie Vernon, Director Control Division, Ambulance Service of NSW • Sydney Ambulance Centre, Ambulance Service of NSW
• Jim Hamilton, Deputy Commissioner, Fire & Rescue NSW • Sydney Police Centre, NSW Police Force
• John Cullen, Superintendent, District Manager, NSW Rural Fire Service
• Katarina Carroll, Commissioner, Queensland Fire and Emergency Submissions
Services The Review received 183 submissions from members of the public,
• Kate Foy, Managing Director, NSW Telco Authority stakeholder organisations, volunteer and paid firefighters.
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018 2627
FINAL REPORT: JUNE 2018
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