Bachelor Thesis The Populist Strategy in Times of Distrust
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[Bachelor Thesis]
The Populist Strategy in Times of Distrust
A Comparative Analysis of the Populist Successes in Italy and
Sweden
Author: Matti Welin
Supervisor: Heiko Fritz
Examiner: Christopher High
Semester: Spring 2021
Subject: Peace and Development Studies
Level: Bachelor
Course Code: 2FU33E
Abstract This essay researches the link between populism and political trust by comparing the development of these two phenomena in Sweden and Italy. Populism is defined as a political strategy in which one appeals to the people and uses anti-establishment rhetoric. The purpose of the study is to analyze if voters that are less politically trustful are also more prone to vote for anti- establishment populist candidates. By using a temporal comparative analysis with a historical perspective in mind, the development and linkage of political trust and populism is analyzed in the cases’ most recent four elections. The Swedish case is distinguished by relatively high levels of political trust but have in the latest decade seen an ever-growing proportion of their electorate turning to the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats. Italy, comparatively, is currently distinguished for low levels of political trust and has seen populist politicians thrive in the electorate ever since the 1990s ‘Mani Pulite’ scandal, and over a majority voted for the two populist parties Lega Nord and Five Star movement. The main research findings suggest that political trust, while not being a crucial determinant for contemporary populist successes, certainly helps populist parties gain attention and attraction. It also shows indications that the relation between populism and political trust can go in two directions. Sweden resembles a case where increased support for the SD have led to decreased political trust. In contrast, Italy’s political scandals, volatile voters and drastic decreases in political trust seems to have sparked increased support for populists. Keywords: Populism; Political Trust; Anti-Establishment; Voting Behavior; Sweden Democrats; Lega Nord; Five Star Movement. 2
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 5
1.1 Background .............................................................................................. 5
1.2 Purpose of Study and Research Questions............................................ 6
1.3 Relevance and Justification .................................................................... 6
2 Theory and Literature Review ............................................................... 8
2.1 The Populist Phenomenon ...................................................................... 8
2.1.1 Defining Populism ........................................................................................... 8
2.1.2 The Successes of Right-Wing Populism ........................................................ 11
2.2 Political Trust and Populism ................................................................ 12
2.2.1 Defining Trust and Political Trust ................................................................. 12
2.2.2 Political Trust, Electoral Behavior and Populism .......................................... 13
2.3 Model of Analysis .................................................................................. 17
3 Methodology ......................................................................................... 19
3.1 Temporal Comparative Analysis and Historical Perspective ........... 19
3.2 Selection of Cases................................................................................... 21
3.3 Material .................................................................................................. 24
4 Background .......................................................................................... 25
4.1 Sweden .................................................................................................... 25
4.2 Italy ......................................................................................................... 26
5 Research Findings ............................................................................... 28
5.1 Political Trust in Sweden ...................................................................... 28
5.1.1 Voter Turnout................................................................................................. 28
5.1.2 Voter Choice .................................................................................................. 29
5.1.3 Winners and Losers........................................................................................ 31
5.1.4 Trust in Government Over Time.................................................................... 33
5.2 Political Trust in Italy ........................................................................... 35
3
5.2.1 Voter Turnout................................................................................................. 35
5.2.2 Voter Choice .................................................................................................. 36
5.2.3 Winners and Losers........................................................................................ 38
5.2.4 Trust in Government Over Time.................................................................... 40
5.3 Development of Populism ..................................................................... 42
5.3.1 Populism in Sweden ....................................................................................... 42
5.3.2 Populism in Italy ............................................................................................ 44
6 Analysis and Discussion ...................................................................... 48
7 Conclusions and Finishing Remarks .................................................. 54
8 Bibliography ......................................................................................... 56
4
1 Introduction 1.1 Background Around the world, governments, parties and politicians are blamed by populists for being corrupt and working more for themselves than for the people they are supposed to represent. The core of the populist message is that they exclusively represent ‘the people’, while all other political actors have turned away from these people in favor of corrupt and selfish purposes (Müller 2016, 20). The nations of Europe have witnessed constantly increasing support for populist political parties for several decades, often manifested in anti- establishment messages and drifts towards authoritarian values amongst the electorates. Populists are undoubtedly popular and established parts of contemporary European political systems and are on the rise in many countries. In 2020, there were about three times as many populists in power around the world as compared to the decade shift in 2010 (Kyle & Meyer 2020, 3). There are many theories on the characteristics and causes of populism, but there is a gap in research surrounding its ties political trust, which is what this essay will analyze further. Because anti-elitism and anti-establishment rhetoric are crucial elements of the populist appeal, this essay will delve into the question of whether populist political candidates perform better or worse depending on the development of political trust in the nation in which they reside. Is it reasonable to think that a populist who frequently uses anti- establishment rhetoric also gain more attraction amongst an electorate that is already distrustful towards the established politicians? To analyze the effect of political trust on populist successes, the cases of Sweden and Italy will be analyzed comparatively due to their variance in international indicators of political trust. Sweden is traditionally known as a high-trust nation while Italy is currently one of Europe’s least politically 5
trustful nations. The time span that is in focus ranges between 2006-2018, thus
including the 2008 financial crisis and 2015 migration crisis, both of which
poses as challenges the political trust of a nation. Besides this time span, the
analysis will also include a historical perspective with regard to relevant
aspects of political trust and populism, in order to provide more depth, validity
and reliability to the analysis.
1.2 Purpose of Study and Research Questions
The purpose of this essay is to analyze the contemporary populist successes in
Europe from the angle of its possible linkage to political trust. The analysis
will focus on if populists are more prone to succeed in political systems where
political trust is decreasing, or if other factors are more likely to explain those
successes. A temporal comparative research design will be adapted between
Sweden and Italy that focuses on the time span between 2006 to 2018. By
comparing the development of populist parties and political trust in these
differing nations over time and combining those findings, this essay hopes to
contribute to the understanding of the determinants and causes of the populist
phenomenon, as well as why populist parties are still on the rise and what
governments and other political actors might be doing wrong, causing them to
lose their voters to populists. The research questions are formulated as follows:
1. How has political trust developed in relation to the successes of
populist parties in Sweden and Italy?
2. Are there indications of a link between changes in political trust and
responses in the support for the populist parties in those nations?
1.3 Relevance and Justification
The populist phenomenon is a global phenomenon and can be found in both
developed and under-developed parts of the world. While this essay focuses
on populism in Europe, understanding its determinants, characteristics and
effects on western political systems can still provide useful information and
6explanations for developments outside of the western borders. For instance, ever since the 1930’s and during the democratization processes in Latin America, populist leaders like Getulio Vergas, Victor Raúl and Hugo Chavéz have dominated those political systems, having serious effects on these nations’ political cultures and contemporary politics as a result (Torre 2017, 196). Another example are the recent political, social and economic developments in Africa, who have proven to in general provide a breeding ground for populism and populist political strategies resulting in large support from the people for both incumbent and non-incumbent parties. Populism is empirically proven to be most prevalent in Africa’s electoral democracies rather than in the non-democratic settings, and therefore poses as a possible threat to both democratization and democratic consolidation (Resnick 2017, 104). With this information in mind, the study of populism clearly does not solely belong to political science and is certainly relevant to peace and development studies as well. By studying what political systems and conditions are favorable for populists or what drives populists to power and happens when they actually obtain it, is useful information for policy makers, peacebuilders and diplomats throughout the entire world. 7
2 Theory and Literature Review The foundation of this essay relies in previously conducted research on the topic of both populism and political trust. What existing definitions exist, how should the terms be conceptualized, and what is known about their roots and causes. This chapter will delve into the existing literature and research on populism and political trust. How should the terms be defined, are there any known links between them and what is currently know about their determinants. Finally, the chapter will be concluded by presenting a model of analysis. 2.1 The Populist Phenomenon 2.1.1 Defining Populism Populism is a widely researched phenomenon, and there are several different theories that surround it. Cas Mudde began his research on populism in the early 2000s, and in The Populist Zeitgeist (2004), he formulated a definition of the term as: “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543). Within this definition, two distinct elements can be distinguished. First, populism is defined as an ideology, meaning it is conceptualized as a political belief system and systematic set of ideas. However, Mudde emphasizes that it is not as consistent, nor possess the same level of depth and intellectual refinement, as established ideologies such as liberalism or socialism, and concludes that it is a ‘thin centered ideology’ in that sense. This enables it to be combined with other ideologies, which is the reason why there exist both left- and right-wing populism (Ibid. 544). Second, Mudde’s definition includes an antagonistic relationship between the ‘elite’ and ‘the people’. This antagonism is moralistic 8
in the sense that the elite is seen as immoral in nature, while the people are seen as pure, virtuous and moral. Developing on Mudde’s definition is Jan-Werner Müller, who emphasized how anti-pluralism is another necessary condition of populism, in the sense that a populist claims that they, and only they, can represent the people. Any other political actor is part of the immoral elite and can therefore not be part of the people. There can be no such thing as legitimate opposition since they, and only they, are the true representatives of the moral people. Müller also states that identity politics is a crucial element of populism, due to its opinion that only some people are really ‘the people’ (Müller 2016, 20). So, how should ‘the people’ be defined? One researcher that discussed who the people are for a populist is Paul Taggard, stating that a key aspect of ‘the people’ is their number, as the way populists use the term ‘the people’ implies that they are numerous and a majority. In turn, this legitimizes the populists who claim to be the only ones who speak for the people, and therefore the majority (Taggard 2000, 92). An example of this is the ‘silent majority’- phenomenon, which has been part of North American populist discourse for a long time and has been brought to the surface again by former U.S. president Donald Trump. The silent majority is claimed to be the virtuous middle-class people, who works hard, pays their taxes and quietly gets on with their lives, whilst having no preference to join the elitist pursuits of the political life. Populists claim that politicians have broken their link with the silent majority, first because the corruption of politics has led to the corruption of essentially all politicians, and second because special interests such as those of bankers, pharmaceutical companies or minority groups wanting special rights, has ascended the entire political system (Ibid. 93-94). Taggard concludes his discussion on ‘the people’ by asserting a ‘heartland’- definition, stating that the people are for the populist, much like what the nation is for the nationalist; an imagined, constructed part of the population 9
that is virtuous and unified. The heartland gives rise to inclusion, even though it is vague who can actually be included, and perhaps most prominently exclusion. It is usually easier to define who is not part of the people than who is, since certain groups of people such as elites or minorities are demonized. Taggard states that the heartland is made as a justification to exclude the demonized (Taggard 2000, 95-96). Having a clearer sense of the core elements of populism and who ‘the people’ really are, how should populism be conceptualized? Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave moves beyond Mudde’s and Müller’s conceptualization of populism as a thin-centered ideology. In Populism as a Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties' Discourse in Belgium (2007), the authors identify the same three elements of populism as Mudde and Müller. They refer to the people, are rooted in anti-elitist beliefs and rhetoric and consider the people a monolithic and unified group and excludes anyone else. Jagers and Walgrave states that these three elements make up the ‘thick’ definition of populism and mentions that a ‘thin’ definition is to only include the first element. In that case, populism is defined purely as “a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people” (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, 3). It is no longer an ideology or view on politics as a whole, but rather a strategy any politician regardless of their beliefs can deploy to gain the electorate’s support. The definition of populism that will be used for this essay will be drawn from a combination of Mudde, Müller, Jagers and Walgrave’s theses. The essential elements of populism are drawn from Mudde and Müller, while the conceptualization is from Jagers’ and Walgrave’s thin definition. Populism, thus, is defined as a political strategy and communication style, in which the actor refers to the people, considers these people a specific, monolithic and exclusive group, and base their political claims using anti-elitist and anti- establishment rhetoric. 10
2.1.2 The Successes of Right-Wing Populism The old and most traditional theory of the right-wing populists’ successes claims that it is the result of politically mobilized and frustrated losers of globalization. People turn to radical populists only in times of crisis, and it is seen as a form of ‘pathology’ in Western political systems. This ‘normal pathology thesis initially originates in the 1960s, and states that the values of radical right ideologies are alien to those of Western democracies, but that a small potential to gather around 10-15% support still exist in all societies, and that these voters are mobilized only under extreme conditions (Mudde 2010, 1170-1171). This thesis is nowadays mostly overlooked, and Mudde attributes the successes to essentially the opposite. Instead, he argues that radical right- wing populism ought to be called a ‘pathological normalcy’. This thesis is underpinned by data that suggests that the core values of the radical right-wing populist parties correspond with similar but more moderate values held by the mainstream. Radical right values are currently successful because “ideologically and attitudinally, the populist radical right constitutes a radicalisation of mainstream views” (Ibid. 1178). In turn, that suggests that populist radical right have possibilities to go far beyond those 10-15% as the traditional thesis asserted them. Another factor that is thought to be a determinant of populism is the political convergence of Western party systems. Katz and Mair (1995), for instance, attributes the emergence of the so-called cartel parties a reason for the sudden successes of new populist parties. Western societies’ first party systems usually consisted of Mass parties, linking politics directly to social class and acting as a branch of the values of these groups. A combination of social boundaries breaking down and popularization of mass media, led to the emergence of ‘catch all’-parties targeting entire electorates. These parties successively pulled away from the civil society, no longer being a link between the civil society and the state but rather a ‘broker’ or mediator. Voters became 11
consumers rather than active participants, and the parties’ withdrawal from civil society resulted in the citizen’s withdrawal from the parties. In turn, also, the main financial resources of a party were no longer the citizens but state- subventions meaning parties were no longer as dependent on their members (Katz & Mair 1995, 6-7, 11-15). These events contributed to the latest development of the Western party systems, the emergence of the cartel parties. These party-systems are distinguished by high levels of inter-party competition as a result of parties becoming more homogenous and less incentivized to compete due to shared goals and values. They could be perceived to have more in common with each other than with the citizens they represent (Ibid. 19-20). Katz and Mair (2018) attribute the 2010s populist successes to these above- mentioned issues. First, the disengagement and detachment from the parties led to citizens losing a sense of ‘belonging’. Right-wing populists, often anchored in nationalism, manages to provide this which has proven vital for political mobilization. Second, the convergence and increasing cooperation between parties has for many led to a perception of established parties as agents of a larger institutionalized, international inter-party elite rather than for their people or society. Populists manage to use this to their advantage by using rhetoric claiming that “mainstream parties have become part of the problem rather than being part of the solution” (Katz & Mair 2018, 173-174). 2.2 Political Trust and Populism 2.2.1 Defining Trust and Political Trust How the public perceives their governments, political actors and institutions is one of the most important indicators of the health of a nation, and especially the health of democratic systems (Weber et al. 2017, 394). In Democracy and Trust (1999), author Mark E. Warren defines trust as “a judgement, however tacit or habitual, to accept vulnerability to the potential ill will of others by 12
granting the discretionary power over some good” (Warren 1999, 311). To trust, in this sense, means taking the risk of potential harm for some sort of gain or benefit. Warren investigates whether trust is feasible and even possible in political relationships such as the one between the state and the individual, since these types of social relationships are rooted in conflicts over goods, collective action, as well as means and questions of power. Additionally, political relationships are distinguished by an immense tension between possibilities and risk (Ibid. 311-312). The benefits of trusting the political system or the political actors are huge, since it can provide society with increased longevity with extensive health care, increased knowledge through education, organize defense-forces and a domestic monopoly of power to minimize harm, violence and conflict in everyday life, and much more. However, the risks are equally huge. Politicians and political systems can be corrupt and use the collective resource for selfish purposes, drag one’s society into undesirable wars or conflicts, make severe issues such as climate change even worse and so on. This is partly why trust and democracy go hand in hand. This essay defines political trust in accordance with Marc J. Hetherington’s definition from his article The Political Relevance of political Trust (1998), where it is referred to as “a basic evaluative orientation towards the government […] founded on how well the government is operation according to the people’s normative expectations” (Hetherington 1998, 1). The essential elements of political trust are thus that the core institution that is to be trusted or distrusted is the government, and that this should be seen as a person’s either positive or negative attitude towards it. 2.2.2 Political Trust, Electoral Behavior and Populism Claus Offe states that the process in which citizens must build their political trust is demanding, since it requires them to trust solely based on what they know about the systems and institutions in which the trusted politicians act. The citizen might actually have very little reason to trust these institutions, 13
because of the precarious conditions that are included in institutionally mediated trust. For instance, there is no sure way to affirm that they work according to the rules and regulations there are proclaimed to follow. The author suggests that populism is a form of response to this doubt that can emerge within citizens, as it risks creating cognitive dissonance. Populist political actors re-personalizes politics in the sense that they base their credibility on charismatic factors such as appearance, media skills and reputation of moral integrity. They do not base their credibility on political track records, programmatic political proposals or their possibilities and constraints they have based on their position in office, as other politicians would (Offe 1999, 76-77). In defining populism, no mentioned author contributes charismatic leadership as a necessary condition of populism. Mudde states that charismatic leadership facilitates, rather than define, populism. However, it is affirmed that it is a common feature of populist political actors, and that there is a general trend towards strong party leadership communicating directly to party supporters which corresponds to populisms contemporary successes (Mudde 2004, 544- 545). Müller also mention the vital role charisma plays in populist leadership. For instance, even though populists’ leaders are not necessarily ‘one of the people’ of ‘just like us’ as exemplified in Donald Trump who is part of Americas wealthiest and most influential, their leaders are very good at convincing and amplifying a message that they are. Müller states that a populist must be charismatic in order to convince the public that he or she is one of them. It is also stated that populists often want to cut out as many middlemen as possible that mediates between the politicians and the citizens. The media, for instance, is seen as an unnecessary middleman who distorts politics, often in favor of the elite or establishment. In some cases, as with Trump’s twitter account or Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement in Italy that 14
grew out if his own personal blog, it can be considered a populist strategy to offer and prefer direct communication with the citizen (Müller 2016, 32-35). There is a crucial link between political trust and electoral behavior in that distrusting citizens are less likely to mobilize themselves politically and are associated with both anti-incumbency and populist voting. In Trust and Elections (2018), author Marc Hooghe affirms this link between political trust and electoral behavior, in that the latter affects the former by three distinct factors. The first factor is electoral turnout, in the sense that citizens actually turning out to vote is the first step in any electoral process. Higher voter turnout-levels are more common in countries that also enjoy the highest level of resources, socioeconomic status etc. Low levels usually indicate that those who are most well-of in a society also have an unproportionally large impact on that country’s politics. It is also affirmed that higher levels of trust correlates independently and positively with voters turning out to vote, in advanced industrialized economies. It is also, however less clear, indicated that low levels of voter-turnout amongst those with little trust political might correlate with tendencies towards anti-establishment and elite-challenging political mobilization. What is clear is that it does not correlate with non- institutionalized forms of political behavior, such as demonstrations and protests (Hooghe 2018, 617-618). The second factor is voter choice, assuming that voters in systems enjoying high levels of political trust are more likely to vote for established, incumbent alternatives. Hooghe states that the logistics and circumstances of elections, specifically concerning the party system and form of government, makes political trust have an effect on the voter’s choices. Voters tend to prefer outsider candidates and lean towards favoring nonincumbent parties in political races. Hooghe states that the hostile, anti-establishment rhetoric of contemporary populist alternatives, therefore, matches perfectly with political systems that are plagued by low levels of political trust. Populist successes in 15
nations with higher levels of trust ought to be a result of other determinants such as skepticism towards immigration. Another crucial point made by the author, is that a vote for a populist party in itself expresses a low level of political trust. Voters are more likely to accept political messages from already incumbent parties, and especially from parties they themselves have voted for. Therefore, increased support for populist parties who constantly and repeatedly criticize the established incumbent parties, could in turn also lead to further decreasing levels of political trust (Hooghe 2018, 622-625). The final factor is election results, especially concerning the so-called winner- and loser-effects. The fundamental claim of the loser-effect is that the disappointment of those who voted for a losing party can result in a belief that their preferences will not be taken into account in the parliaments and governments policy-making process until the next election. The winner-effect works the same, but in the opposite manner. In turn, Hooghe claims that, “even if supporters of the losing party would agree that the elections have been completely free and fair, they will still feel inclined to be less trusting toward the political system” (Hooghe 2018, 625-626). These effects are distinctively more prominent in majoritarian or ‘winner takes it all’-party systems, but still has an important role in for instance proportional party systems (Ibid. 627). To conclude, populism and political trust are interlinked in the sense that populist politics is a short-cut to political trust, that is built outside of a society’s political institutions. The success of populism, rooted in charismatic leadership and anti-establishment rhetoric, proves an example of how difficult it is for citizens to build political trust towards established political actors and the institutions in which they work (Offe 1999, 77). 2.3 Research Gap While there are many theories and mentions of a link between populism and political trust, there is an apparent research gap in empirical studies 16
surrounding it. Besides the theories presented earlier in this chapter, only a few other studies have studied this link further. One study, for instance, researched a possible linkage between populism, trust and corruption scandals, but was only able to draw preliminary conclusions as no empirical data concerning those specific variables existed (Heywood & Fieschi 2004, 304). There is also research that analyses the relation between political trust and different types of political participation. finding that political trust is negatively linked to non- institutional or elite-challenging political participation (Hooghe & Marien 2012, 145). It is not, however, developed how it differs between countries. The research gap that forms the backbone of this essay, thus, is the lack of empirical data on the link between political trust and populism. While it is well-known the link exists, there is a lack of information regarding the links characteristics, causes and historical developments. This essay will attempt to expand the knowledge in this area, getting us one step closer to unravel the mysterious link between political trust and populism. 2.4 Model of Analysis The purpose of this essay is to investigate how political trust has developed in Sweden and Italy and putting it in relation to the successes and possibilities of populist political actors in those nations. The research will be conducted through a temporal comparative analysis of Sweden and Italy, who perform drastically differently in international indicators of political trust. By adapting a qualitative approach, the essay will be able to provide in-depth analyses that not only displays patterns, but that further seeks to explain why those patterns exist and whether they are valid and reliable or not. The data that is to be gathered through the analysis shall thus be applicable to the research questions. The analysis consists of three primary sections. The first section will analyze how political trust has developed in Sweden and Italy between 2006-2018. 17
Besides presenting the raw data, the section will also be delineating the context and development of the cases’ political trust based on Hooghe’s three determining factors (voter turnout, voter choice and winners/losers). While the time span between 2006-2018 is the core of the analysis, analyzing the cases through Hooghe’s factors will also have a historical perspective in mind that ranges back further than 2006 to provide context and depth to the analysis. The second section of the analysis concerns the development of populist parties in the cases. It will present the support for the main populist parties during the indicated time span, as well as outline what role populism has historically played in the nations. Finally, the third section will combine the data from the other sections by displaying political trust and support for leading populist party alongside each other in a scatter point diagram. These three sections outline the design of the analysis. The discussion that follows will analyze the research findings in relation to the research questions and theoretical framework, focusing on discussing the role of political trust in comparison to other possible determinants of populism. 18
3 Methodology
3.1 Temporal Comparative Analysis and Historical
Perspective
The analysis of this essay will investigate how political trust has changed and
developed over time, and if that has affected the support for the leading
populist parties in the cases of Sweden and Italy. This paves way for a temporal
comparative analysis, which includes the dimension of time in the research
method and design. Without the aspect of time, researching historical
processes and development is limited. A methodological argument to include
the time-dimension in a comparison is that when looking at time, it is a
fundamental criterion that the cause of something precedes the effect or
outcome that it resulted in. A theoretical argument is that every contemporary
phenomenon, such as the level of trust in politicians or support for a political
party, are the result of historical events and processes (Denk 2012, 115).
Besides these two aspects, the main reason why this essay relies on a temporal
comparison, is because the aspect of time is baked into the purpose of the study
and research questions. The purpose is to analyze determinants of populism in
Europe, based on why populist political parties are more successful in certain
countries than others. The development of populist actors requires the
dimension of time to be included in the research design and methodology.
A key aspect of any temporal design is that certain factors or phenomena are
studied at different moments of time, like years or decades. Denk presents two
different varieties of temporal design. The researcher can conduct a within-
case analysis where the task is to compare different aspects or characteristics
of cases over time. The second approach is to compare certain developments
or historical processes of cases. (Denk 2012, 115). Because this study is
interested in the development of trust and populism in the cases, the second
approach is more suitable and will be used for this essay’s analysis.
19Non-temporal comparative designs study correlations between factors at the same moment of time in two or more cases. While it enables the researcher to study if there is a correlation between the different factors, it does not grant the ability to interpret the direction of the correlation, or which factor is the cause of the other. With temporal design, the dependent factor can be analyzed at a time after the independent one, which enables the analysis to find if the independent factor has some effect on the dependent. This time-lag enables the researcher to find the direction of the correlation. Denk mentions three tasks, or challenges, that any researcher faces when integrating temporal design into their study. First is what time-interval that is necessary for the independent variable to have an effect on the dependent variable. In this essay, the main question is whether trust in government has an effect on populist political successes. Therefore, there is a necessity to investigate how long it would take for a change in political trust to have an effect. Too short of an interval, and the effect might not have had any effect. Too long, and the effect might begin to erode away. The second task is to identify and define the temporal units that are to be used, such as years, decades, months etc. One strategy is to define what time-unit is relevant for the analysis. Even though years might be a common unit in social sciences, for some analyses sequence of events with a year or over decades might be more relevant. The third task refers to investigating if the variables are independent of earlier times or if there is a temporal autocorrelation. The properties of something can be correlated to its properties at earlier times. Denk mentions, however, that even though temporal autocorrelation is a reoccurring issue, it is seldom that researchers implement it into their analyses (Denk 2012, 119- 122). In the political landscape, election years are a regular reoccurring pattern where the public support for political candidates are measured directly. To discuss the first and second tasks, declining or increasing trust whether in the 20
government, political parties or personalities, will have a direct effect on the public support for these actors in the following election year. Elections in the European democracies reoccur regularly, and no EU member-state have a term longer than five years. Using the interval of election years in each of the cases in the analysis, leads to a clear, regular and reoccurring temporal-unit. The trust in political institutions and actors in between elections will have its effect on other factors, such as the support for the leading populist party, in the next election. Even though opinion polls might indicate how the support is changing, only after the election day are the seats in parliament, changes in government and so on actually changed. The length of a term for the Swedish parliament is one year shorter than Italy’s, but parliamentary elections lined up in both 2006 and 2018. Therefore, the election years that will be analyzed in Sweden are 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 and in Italy the 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2018 general elections. Another way in which this essay incorporates the aspect of time, is by including a historical perspective in the analysis. To include a historical perspective in methodological terms, means using the past to study something in the present. Lawrence (1984) distinguishes historical research from historical perspective, in that the former means using artifacts and written documents to analyze the attitudes during a specific time, while the latter implies using historical information to study the differences in attitudes today (Lawrence 1984, 307). This essay will apply a historical perspective to the sections of the analysis with the purpose of providing depth and context to the contemporary developments of populism and political trust. With the historical perspective in mind, the validity and reliability of both the research findings and conclusions are increased. 3.2 Selection of Cases Being a qualitative case study, getting results with as high validity and reliability as possible requires careful case selection with thorough motivation. 21
This essay aims to analyze how changes in political trust might function as a
determinant for the opportunities of populists. The cases that have been
selected are Italy and Sweden, being representatives of countries that are
currently experiencing distinctly different levels of political trust. Italy has
been experiencing low levels of political trust for a long time, while Sweden
has historically been known as a high-trust country. Figures 1-3 display Italy
and Sweden in comparison to the other EU member states, in three different
indicators of political trust.
The first indicator is OECD’s survey database that researches Trust in
Government. The data is displayed as the percentage of all survey respondents.
Figure 1 illustrates a snapshot of political trust from the 2020 survey-responses
for all member states of the EU (except Cyprus, Croatia and Malta). Sweden
along with the other Nordic member states are within the top five nations
where trust in government is the highest, enjoying a majority of their
populations’ support. Meanwhile, Italy and some other Mediterranean
countries like Spain and Greece are next to each in the bottom with levels
below 50%. Italy’s government does not currently enjoy the support of a
majority of its citizens.
Figure 1:
Trust in Government
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
(OECD 2021)
22Another indicator of political trust is displayed in Figure 2, presenting the
World Bank’s GovData360 that indicates Public Trust in Politicians,
stemming from their Global Competitiveness Index survey. Trust in politicians
is a more general indicator of political trust but displays an overall image of
whether politicians, populist or not, are well-regarded and honest. The figure
displays the average, on a scale from 1 to 7 for all EU member states based on
the latest survey responses, which was collected in 2017. Sweden is once again
positioned within the top five with a lot of public trust in politicians, while
Italy has the worst score of all countries.
Figure 2
Public Trust in Politicians
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
(World Bank 2021)
Figure 3 displays Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI). This survey analyses how citizens perceive corruption levels in their
countries, which is directly linked to trust in institutions and politicians
because corruption lowers both political and social trust (Uslaner 2018, 8). The
CPI data is then used to give an index score ranging from the worst 0 to the
best 100. In figure two, the member states of the EU are displayed from worst
to best. In the CPI, Sweden is the second-best performing nation squeezed in
between the two other Nordic member states, while Italy once again performs
severely worse closer to the bottom.
23Figure 3:
100
Corruption Perceptions Index Score
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
(Transparency International 2020, 1-2)
3.3 Material
To measure the state of populism over time, the main resource will be election
results, opinion polls and country-specific research on populism. Election data
contains information of what the public opinion and popularity of the populist
party is, and how it has been developing over time. The data set that will be
used to measure political trust is OECD’s Trust in Government Indicator, due
to its correspondence with Hetherington’s definition of Political trust. This
data derives from a survey where respondents were asked if they had
confidence in their national parliament, given the possibility to answer ‘yes’,
‘no’ or ‘don’t know’. To indicate a country’s trust in government, the share of
people responding ‘yes’ is displayed as a percentage. Thus, by inverting this
percentage the indicator also displays distrust in government over time
counting respondents that either do not have confidence or are uncertain about
their confidence in their national government. Combining the data from these
two indicators gives rise to investigate the potential correlation between
populism and public trust that this essay’s research questions are concerning.
For information regarding the political systems of the cases, primary sources
in the shape of the countries’ constitutions are the main resources.
244 Background In order to make a good comparison these background sections will present the political systems of the cases in order to lay down a foundation which the analysis and discussion can rely on. Both political systems will be analyzed with the following dimensions for comparative analyses in mind: (1.) Political History; (2.) Form of government; (3.) Polity and distribution of power; (4.) Party System; (5.) Electoral System; and, (6.) Distinctive characteristics and trends (Denk & Anckar 2015, 15). 4.1 Sweden Sweden is a Constitutional Monarchy positioned in the Scandinavian northern region of Europe. Although having been amended and revised, the Swedish Instrument of Government that is still effective in power today was first established in 1809. It consists of four fundamental laws that all other laws in the Swedish judicial system abide under. These are: (1.) The Order of Succession, presiding the heritage and line of succession of the Swedish monarchy; (2.) Freedom of Press Act, which affirms each person’s undisputable right to create and distribute written scripture without censorship; (3.) Fundamental Law of Freedom of Expression, which encompasses other media’s right to freely report without censorship; and (4.) The Instrument of Government which sets out political principles, the shape of the government, parliament and other political institutions as well as fundamental rights and freedoms that all Swedish citizens may enjoy (Government Offices of Sweden 2014). According to the Instrument of Government, Sweden is a parliamentary state which means that the government is always dependent on the support from the 349 members of the Swedish parliament (Riksdag), and that the Head of State has no political power. If the government has a support from the majority of the parliament, the power is concentrated to the executive power. In 25
contemporary times, however, Swedish governments have been minority coalition governments which means more power is directed to the Riksdag. Even though citizens can vote for specific political candidates, the Swedish democracy is representative as citizens do not participate directly in decision making, instead relying on the members of parliament to do so. Exceptions have been made though, as referendums has been held for instance concerning joining the EU and Eurozone. The Swedish division of power is also divided vertically, in the sense that most of the public sector is made up of local authorities at a municipal and regional level (Government Offices of Sweden 2013, 4). Sweden’s party system is proportional, as all parties that manage to get support over the threshold of 4% gain a number of seats in the Riksdag in proportion to their number of votes. 4% is equal to 14 seats in the parliament (Government Offices of Sweden 2013, 6). The party system is fragmented and throughout most of the 20th century it consisted of five parties, tree of which were strongly linked to social class. 4.2 Italy Italy is a Constitutional Republic located around the Mediterranean ocean in southern Europe. Their contemporary constitution was formally put into force after the second world war in 1946 but has been amended several times thereafter. The Italian parliament is bicameral, split into the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic, both of which are elected through direct and universal suffrage. The election to the senate, however, is conducted regionally, and some seats are appointed by different measures. For instance, all former presidents are automatically elected president for life, and the current president may appoint five citizens whom they motivate has done outstanding work for Italy to lifetime senators. The Chamber of Deputies consists of 630 seats, while the senate consist of 315 (Senato Della Rebubllica n.y, 19-20). 26
Italy’s is a parliamentary republic, since president and government must have support from the parliament in order to execute their power. The President is elected by a large majority (two thirds) of the Parliament and obtains his or her position for seven years. The president possesses a lot of power. For instance, they are commander in chief over the national Armed Forces and presides over the Supreme Council of Defense and the High Council of the Judiciary. They are also able to dissolve either chamber of the Parliament, only in consultation with their presiding officers. The executive power of Italy consists of the President of council along with their board of ministers who together form the Council of Ministers, all of which are appointed by the President of the Republic (Senato Della Republica n.y, 22-23). Italy’s party system after the creation of the first republic in 1946, can be distinguished by five characteristics: (1.) It had a quite high number of political parties; (2.) There was a considerable ideological distance in-between these parties; (3.) The party system became highly institutionalized quickly after the formation of the republic; (4.) The Christian Democrats (DC) dominated and were part of all majority coalition governments between 1946 and the early 1990s; and (5.) The party competition structure was both closed and limited die to the domination of the DC (Mershon 2015, 145). In the 1990s, electoral reforms combined with corruption scandals in the DC resulting in them splitting apart in 1994, led to an even more fragmented party system. This time-period is characterized by the formation and electoral successes of new parties. The Italian voter’s volatility spiked, and the new dominating party became Forza Italia led by Silvio Berlusconi. The electoral volatility spiked yet again in the 2013 general elections when the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) who were created just years before, became the most voted- for party with around 25.5%. M5S refused a position in the government, which led to the first grand coalition in the Italian executive power ever since the formation of the republic (Mershon 2015, 149, 152). 27
5 Research Findings
5.1 Political Trust in Sweden
5.1.1 Voter Turnout
Sweden has generally been distinguished by high levels of voter turnout,
although it has not historically been amongst the absolute top performing
nations. Figure 4 displays the development of Sweden’s voter turnout in
relation to all eligible voters in Sweden from 1973 to 2018. The late half of the
20th century illustrates a distinct downward trend in voter turnout in the
Swedish electorate, suddenly shifting upwards ever since the election in 2012.
Figure 4:
Voter Turnout in Parliamentary Elections, Sweden
94.0
92.0
90.0
88.0
86.0
84.0
82.0
80.0
78.0
76.0
74.0
1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
(Statistics Sweden 2021)
Sweden’s voter turnout in the European parliamentary elections is displayed
in Figure 5, illustrating a general upwards trend from the entry to the union in
1995 to the latest 2019 elections. Although it has been above the European
average in the three latest EU elections, it is distinctively lower than the
turnout in the national elections.
28Figure 5:
Sweden's Voter Turnout to the European
Parliament
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
1995 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019
(Statistics Sweden 2019)
In sum, ever since a peak in 1976 when the parliamentary election reached a
voter turnout of 91.8%, voter turnout was declining and reached a bottom in
2002. The 21st century has so far illustrated a shift to regular increases with
each election. In the EU elections, Sweden has been performing slightly above
average in regard to voter turnout, but the number is distinctively smaller
compared to the turnout in domestic elections.
5.1.2 Voter Choice
Hooghe describes voter choice as a determining factor on political trust, in the
sense that high trust societies are more likely to vote for incumbent parties. It
is also stated that the shape of the political system has an effect as well.
Proportional electoral systems usually make it easier for non-incumbent
parties to enter the parliament, but due to Sweden’s 4% limit, non-incumbent
parties have a harder time obtaining political power compared to other nations
with proportional systems with lower or no such limit. Throughout the second
half of the 20th century, only three new parties arose to levels high enough to
enter the Swedish government, one of which was New Democracy that
disappeared after serving only one term. One of the parties that came to last
29were the Greens, created in 1984 and entering the parliament shortly after in 1988 with 5.5% support. The Greens fell below the 4% limit in 1991 but recovered to last once again in 1994. The other lasting party was the Christian Democrats who got 7.1% in the 1991 election, several decades after its official formation (Aylott 2015, 159). Besides these parties and the recently successful SD, all parties that have governed and gained any substantial support from the Swedish electorate have their roots way back in the 19th century. Throughout most of Sweden’s modern political history, the same five established and already incumbent parties have been dominating in the domestic elections. For nearly half a decade between 1932 to 1976 the Social Democrats governed the nation almost entirely by themselves, gaining majority twice (Aylott 2015, 153-154). Voter choices in Sweden have thus historically been strongly characterized by voting for incumbent parties, making the recent successes for the SD unique as they have broken this trend. 2010 marks the first election year since 1991 when a large enough proportion of Sweden’s electorate voted for a non-incumbent party, for that party to gain seats in the Riksdag. Sweden’s public statistics agency, in an analysis of the 2010 elections, attributes SD’s success that year to support votes from other parties. Both them and the Christian Democrats would be below the 4% limit if it were not for the record levels of support voting that occurred in the 2010- election (Statistics Sweden 2011). Further, incumbent voting could still be considered a characteristic of Sweden’s voter choices from the 2000s and even after the results of the 2010 elections, as 4/5 voters still voted for one of the old five parties (Aylott 2015, 163). Other major trends of the party system, and in turn voter choices, of Sweden in the 2000s and early 2010s are block politics and minority governments. In 2004, the center-right opposition-parties created a collective governmental option that, if they were to obtain over 50% in the upcoming 2006 elections, promised to form a coalition government together with. The other block, or 30
government option were called the ‘red-greens’ and consisted of the Social Democrats and the Greens with outside support from the Left party. Although the party system consisted of seven different parties, the voter now decided between two teams with two distinct and clear prime minister candidates. In a sense, Sweden had become a redesigned two-party system, with the 2010 elections essentially resembling an ideal-typical two-party race (Aylott 2015, 161, 163). From 2010-2020, the Alliance and Red-Green blocks have been the foundation of the Swedish political system, at least up until the 2018 elections. The major change to voter choice has been the ever-increasing size of SD each election 5.1.3 Winners and Losers Between the time span that this essay is interested in (2006-2020), there has been 4 elections, all with different winners and losers. Figure 6 displays the number of seats in parliament that each party over 4% got in those four elections, plus the size of each block. The 2006 election resulted in a majority for the Alliance, which led to the first non-social democratic government in twelve years. The victory was marginal with only seven parliamentary seats differing between the blocks. However, the 2010 elections increased this gap between the blocks. No incumbent party wanted anything to do with the newly elected SD who managed to get hold of 20 seats. The Alliance loss of five seats put them just below 50%, which gave the SD their first real political power to decide which block should be able to establish Sweden’s next government, and the Alliance were able to continue their position in government. The 2014 elections changed the Swedish political landscape, as the SD grew to the third largest party, and the Alliance losing 32 seats in the parliament. The Red Greens were now larger than the Alliance, but because of SD’s size, they once again occupied a pivotal position with the power to enable or disable 31
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