ASSESSMENT 2020 LATIN AMERICA ANTICORRUPTION - Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020
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Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................................................i Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................ii Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ iv Methodology ........................................................................................................................................... v Scores ........................................................................................................................................................ vii I. Argentina .........................................................................................................................................1 II. Brazil ................................................................................................................................................6 III. Chile ............................................................................................................................................... 11 IV. Colombia ........................................................................................................................................ 14 V. Guatemala ..................................................................................................................................... 18 VI. Mexico ........................................................................................................................................... 22 VII. Panama .......................................................................................................................................... 27 VIII. Peru ............................................................................................................................................... 30 Regional Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 34 Regional Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 36 Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................... 38 The Lawyers Council ................................................................................................................................... 40 Final Notes ................................................................................................................................................. 41 DIGITAL VERSION http://bit.ly/LCEAL20
Abbreviations and Acronyms Abbreviations Section Meaning or Acronym LP Legal Professionals General CSOS Community Organizations OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guatemala CICIG International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala México SNA National Anti-Corruption System i
Executive Summary The Anti-Corruption Assessment in Latin America Country Final Score 2020 is a regional study involving eight countries Chile 7.86 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Argentina 5.95 Mexico, Panama, and Peru), which delineates legal Peru 5.86 efforts to prevent and combat corruption. Unlike Brazil 5.67 other efforts that focus on measuring corruption or Colombia 5.60 its perception, this study follows a strictly legal Mexico 5.51 approach to analyze legislative and regulatory efforts, Panama 3.97 in addition to the institutional framework, aimed at Guatemala 3.89 preventing, targeting, and prosecuting corruption. This report highlights the following findings: This report addresses the perspective of legal Argentina’s legal framework is generally professionals (hereinafter “LP” or “legal satisfactory, but its most significant shortcoming professionals”) engaged in anti-corruption practice in involves inadequate regulatory implementation various sectors, including law firms, businesses, resulting from the lack of (i) political will; (ii) political academia, civil society organizations (hereinafter independence of the anti-corruption agencies; (iii) “CSOs”), human rights defenders, and others. economic and human resources; and (iv) formal This study addresses for each of the countries mechanisms for civil society engagement and reviewed eight aspects that are key to the fight participation. Brazil’s legal framework has notably against corruption: public and private sector improved but, in addition to undue political influence corruption; complaint mechanisms; whistleblower and a lack of political will to effectively implement protection; specialized agencies; institutional the anti-corruption legal framework, there is a need coordination mechanisms; civil society engagement to establish corporate criminal liability in connection and participation; and transparency and access to with acts of corruption. Chile’s regulatory framework information. is generally effective, and the governmental agencies and authorities have the capacity and political The information obtained through two independence to implement effectively the anti- questionnaires completed by lawyers from member corruption regime. Colombia shows inadequate firms of the Lawyers Council for Civil and Economic implementation due to lack of political will and Rights (hereinafter the “Lawyers Council”) and absence of mechanisms for detecting and preventing members of the legal community of the countries corruption. evaluated, was divided into three categories: legal framework; implementation; and governmental In Guatemala, the legal framework is deficient and is bodies. With this information, the methodology characterized by significant institutional weakness. developed an overall score awarded to each country Anti-corruption efforts are led by certain individual on a scale from zero (lowest) to ten (highest). Of the government officials rather than by overall ratings, Chile scored the highest and institutions. Despite having a solid and Guatemala the lowest. comprehensive legal framework, Mexico stands out for a lack of regulatory implementation and reduced ii
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 institutional capacity. In addition, anti-corruption With regard to implementation of the anti-corruption authorities are subject to political influence. Despite legal framework, both the lack of political will and of being the only jurisdiction that maintains a beneficial independence of institutions represent the main ownership registry, Panama displays a deficient legal obstacles in preventing, targeting and punishing framework and a lack of institutional capacity and corruption. In some countries, the lack of political fundamental elements required to combat independence of the judiciary and criminal corruption. Finally, Peru has one of the strongest prosecutors, and the need for more human and legal frameworks, but its implementation is financial resources essential to countering corruption, negatively affected by flaws in procedural rules and a are of great concern. Although there are significant lack of political will. advances in transparency as a mechanism to prevent corruption, only Panama has a registry of beneficial This regional analysis shows that most Latin ownership of companies in place and is making American countries follow an ex-post facto approach efforts to implement it. Finally, in no country was of sanctioning corruption through the criminal there an emphasis on human rights in the fight system. Preventive efforts to reduce corruption, in against corruption. This has broad implications in the both the public and private sectors, are insufficient. exercise of the rights of victims of corruption and in Similarly, important factors to countering corruption, their ability to obtain redress as a result. including institutional coordination mechanisms, incentives to file complaints, and rules providing for The country and regional recommendations in this community engagement and participation in anti- report sound a call to action for the legal community corruption efforts are practically non-existent or to address the above-mentioned challenges. These minimal. recommendations highlight the importance of promoting 1) the use of technology in the Anti-corruption mechanisms and efforts in the public development and implementation of mechanisms to sector are focused on the executive branch, and prevent corruption, 2) regional cooperation and the largely absent in other governmental agencies and involvement of the private sector and the legal institutions. Regarding corruption in the private community in promoting best practices and 3) sector, most countries have anti-corruption establishing an anti-corruption rapporteur within the compliance programs in place. However, their Inter-American Human Rights System. implementation is optional and, except in one instance, there are no clear compliance and enforcement guidelines available. iii
Introduction foreign investment, and retaining national Corruption is a global phenomenon that affects the investment, which can go elsewhere in the absence rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights of investor protection. The rule of law is particularly of individuals. From a regional perspective, important for retaining and attracting capital. It is corruption in Latin America has had a significant important to recognize that, regardless of nationality, impact on government administrations and the public any investment analysis involves comparing potential sphere, thus becoming one of the largest and most investment alternatives based on the reliability of the complex problems that citizens identify in their rule of law (including legal and judicial protection society and environment. Controlling corruption has against the arbitrary use of power), the security of thus become an increasing priority on the public individuals, and the ability to prevent and combat agenda of the countries of the region. National, corruption. In addition to developing a business plan, federal, or regional administrations have issued investors assess the rule of law across jurisdictions general rules and approved public policies to prevent, and, particularly in connection with government- investigate, prosecute, and punish corruption-related related businesses, analyze the anti-corruption wrongdoing by public officials and individuals. In turn, enforcement regime, including the feasibility of civil society organizations, lawyers, schools, and mitigating the risks of state corruption, excessive universities among other groups, have become a delays or unpredictability in regulatory and judicial significant counterweight to the lack of proper decision-making, and other divergences from the rule implementation of anti-corruption legal frameworks of law. Risks of this kind raise the perceived cost of of countries across the region. doing business and, for law-abiding companies, deter The Lawyers Council, composed of leading lawyers investment. representing various countries of the American It is also important to note that corruption is highly continent, managed by the New York City-based associated with reduced confidence in governmental Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice, authorities, poorer tax collections considers corruption to be one of the scourges that and underinvestment in infrastructure. most affect the rule of law globally, given its complexity and difficulty in tracing and disciplining. In addition, the intersection between corruption and The welfare of a society depends on the proper human rights is becoming increasingly evident in functioning of the rule of law, as a basis for the matters that have direct impact and implications in exercise of civil and economic rights and for a the enjoyment of human rights. The Inter-American prosperous national economy. In the absence of legal Commission on Human Rights, in its "Thematic protection, both economic development and the Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human exercise of human rights are adversely affected and Rights "Corruption and Human Rights: Inter-American can deteriorate. Human rights violations, impunity, Standards,"1 has concluded that corruption has a violence, and insecurity flourish in a corrupt system. negative impact on human rights in general, and particularly on economic, social, cultural and As lawyers dedicated to the practice of private law, environmental rights, as it affects the availability of we acknowledge the key importance of the rule of resources, generates discrimination and ultimately law in achieving economic development, attracting poverty, and increases inequality and impunity. iv
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 From a human rights point of view, corruption also o Public sector corruption affects judicial rights recognized by international and o Private sector corruption regional human rights standards. Additionally, there o Complaints and whistleblower protection is particular concern about the impact that corruption o Specialized agencies can cause on certain individuals such as vulnerable o Institutional coordination mechanisms groups and people living in poverty. o Community participation o Transparency and access to information This assessment seeks systematically to map and guide legal efforts in Latin America to prevent and The report also presents a series of general and combat corruption. This first edition of the Anti- specific country recommendations and a regional Corruption Assessment in Latin America 2020 analysis that identifies similarities, trends, and assesses eight countries of the region regarding their differences across the region. legal framework and its implementation in practice: The countries in the report are presented in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, alphabetical order. Mexico, Panama, and Peru. The Lawyers Council hopes that, with this initiative, Unlike other efforts that focus on measuring Latin American advocacy will find specific paths to corruption or the perception of corruption, this systemic improvement of anti-corruption legislation assessment employs a legal practice perspective, and its implementation in the region. focused on regulatory efforts and the institutional The assessment also seeks to serve, beyond a purely framework to prevent, target and prosecute academic effort, as a call to action for the legal corruption in each country. It addresses the community, a tool to catalyze discussions among perspective of legal professionals engaged in anti- lawyers in different fields and ultimately lead to the corruption practice in various sectors, including reform, implementation, and enforcement of anti- practice in law firms, companies, academia, civil corruption practices. The Lawyers Council and the society organizations and human rights defenders, Vance Center will use the report to guide their efforts among others. to collaborate with the legal community of each This report includes eight sections with an analysis by country in the region on the legal frameworks, ethical country, divided into seven parts that correspond to guidelines and business practices needed to combat relevant issues of the anti-corruption legal corruption effectively. framework: METHODOLOGY For this report, the Lawyers Council developed, with Based on the information gathered, two the support of law firms and an expert consultant, a questionnaires were developed and addressed to the database of sources (international and regional legal community. “Questionnaire 1” was completed by treaties, reports, model laws and international attorneys belonging to Lawyers Council2 member guidelines) applicable to each of the anti-corruption firms, with 35 questions (involving 72 obligations under the United Nations Convention variables) divided into the following eight sections: against Corruption. 1) Anti-corruption framework and legislation v
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 2) Anti-corruption preventive policies and practices for these sub-categories was assigned a score, accounting the public sector for the number of sub-categories, adding up to the 10 3) Corruption in the private sector points of the corresponding category. 4) Whistleblower complaints and r protections 5) Strength and independence of anti-corruption Each sub-category, according to Questionnaires 1 and agencies 2, had a number of possible variables, and on these 6) National and International cooperation and variables, each country was assigned the coordination corresponding sub -category score. For example, the 7) Participation of civil society and of academia “General Legislation” sub-category of the “Legislation” 8) Access to information category has a total of 16 variables, equivalent to “Questionnaire 1” aimed to obtain information on 2 points. If a country had 8 of the 16 possible variables, these eight subjects derived from legislation, then the assigned score would be half, equivalent regulation, and practice. The questionnaire was to 1 point (out of 2 points). completed in the last quarter of 2020. For the “Implementation” and “Authorities” “Questionnaire 2” had 16 open-ended and multiple- categories, the information in “Questionnaire 2” was choice questions (involving 20 variables) with the aim used and the same process described above was of complementing the information in “Questionnaire followed. 1” focusing on the broader anti-corruption practices of To obtain the final rating, a percentage was assigned the legal community. This survey was translated from to each category, leaving 30% to “Legislation”, 30% to Spanish into English and Portuguese and distributed “Implementation” and 40% to “Authorities”. A higher widely among the legal community of the participating percentage was assigned to the “Authorities” category, countries.3 because the degree of independence and capacity of To assign a score, the data from the anti-corruption authorities is crucial to the anti- questions collected were divided into three corruption practice of the legal community and civil categories: Legislation, Implementation and society in the region, as will be addressed in the Authorities. Each category was assigned 10 points in assessment of each country. total and, in turn, was divided into sub-categories . according to the themes of the questionnaires. Each of vi
Scores The final score is displayed on a scale from zero (0) to ten (10), where zero is the lowest score and ten is the highest. The ratings by categories follows, ranked from highest to lowest: vii
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Guatemala Mexico Panama Peru Points Points Points Points Variable Points Points Points Points Points Categories and sub-categories Variables assigned Variables assigne Variables assigned s assigned Variables assigned Variables assigned Variables assigned Variables assigned Variables assigne d d A. Legislation (30%) 1. General legislation 16 2 13 1.63 12 1.50 14 1.75 9 1.13 11 1.38 15 1.88 9 1.13 13 1.63 2. Anti-corruption preventive policies and practices for the 15 1 14 0.93 10 0.67 14 0.93 15 1.00 5 0.33 14 0.93 7 0.47 13 0.87 public sector 3. Corruption in the private sector 25 1 22 0.88 14 0.56 24 0.96 19 0.76 14 0.56 22 0.88 8 0.32 22 0.88 4. Whistleblower complaints and protections 2 1 2 1.00 2 1.00 0 0.00 1 0.50 0 0.00 1 0.50 0 0.00 2 1.00 5. Existence of specialized authorities 1 2 1 2.00 1 2.00 1 2.00 1 2.00 1 2.00 1 2.00 0.50 1.00 1 2.00 6. National and international cooperation and coordination 5 1 5 1.00 5 1.00 5 1.00 5 1.00 4 0.80 5 1.00 4 0.80 5 1.00 7. participation of civil society and of academia 1 1 0 0.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 0 0.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 8. Access to information 7 1 5 0.71 3 0.43 4 0.57 7 1.00 3 0.43 6 0.86 6 0.86 5 0.71 Total 10 8.15 8.16 8.21 8.39 5.50 9.05 5.57 9.09 B. Implementation (30%) 9. Challenges to the implementation of the anti-corruption 12 4 4 1.33 3 1.00 6 2.00 3 1.00 2 0.67 3 1.00 2 0.67 3 1.00 legal framework in your country 10. 9. Challenges to the implementation of anti-corruption laws or regulations, due to a lack of specificity, clarity, or 1 4 0 2.00 0.5 2.00 1 4.00 0 2.00 0.2 0.80 0.5 2.00 0.3 1.20 0.5 2.00 definition in relation to other laws or regulations, or other deficiencies. 11. Mechanisms for the protection of whistleblowers and 1 2 0.5 1.00 0.65 1.30 1 2.00 0.5 1.00 0.6 1.20 0.50 1.00 0.5 1.00 0.5 1.00 access to official channels for reporting corruption Total 10 4.33 4.30 8.00 4.00 2.67 4.00 2.87 4.00 C. Authorities (40%) 12. Independence of anti-corruption authorities 1 5 0.5 2.5 0.4 2.00 0 3.50 0.4 2.00 0.2 1.00 0.3 1.50 0.2 1.00 0.4 2.00 13. Institutional capacity with respect to effectiveness and level 5 5 3 3 2.83 2.83 4 4.00 2.7 2.70 2.6 2.60 2.5 2.50 2.6 2.60 2.83 2.83 of impunity Total 10 5.50 4.83 7.50 4.70 3.60 4.00 3.60 4.83 Final score Out of 10: 5.95 5.67 7.86 5.60 3.89 5.51 3.97 5.86 viii
I. ARGENTINA ü Policies and procedures for identifying and Total Legislation Implementation Authorities managing conflicts of interest ü Gift acceptance policies for public officials 5.95 8.15 4.33 5.5 ü Policies on post-public employment obligations, Argentina has a comprehensive anti-corruption policy and restrictions on public officials working in the framework that includes over thirty-eight general rules private sector after concluding their public service and regulations governing ethics in the public sector4, ü Policies for training public officials in anti- powers of the anti-corruption agency5, sworn corruption measures affidavits6, anti-corruption strategy7, public Regarding sworn affidavits, the Argentine legal 8 employment disqualification , corruption-related framework provides that the following are publicly crimes and criminal liability for corporate entities10, 9 available: and a regime governing the contracting of public goods ü Asset Declarations and services.11 ü Statements of activities, including external According to the LPs consulted, the anti-corruption legal activities and participation in companies and framework is generally adequate, but there are areas of organizations opportunity for improvement. In general, LPs agreed ü Information on filing tax-related returns (payments that the ”law on the books” is not actually implemented, and refunds) accounting for the existing challenges faced at the The agency that oversees and coordinates the different levels of implementation, including the federal implementation of anti-corruption policies is the Anti- system. Corruption Office of the Ministry of Justice and Human The main challenges in connection with the Rights. implementation of Argentina's anti-corruption legal LPs have identified issues with the existing Ethics Act, framework, involve lack of political will, of judicial including those that have also been identified by the by independence and of political autonomy of the anti- the Organization for Economic Cooperation and corruption authorities, in addition to inadequate Development (OECD), as well as the challenges in its economic and human resources available to anti- implementation throughout the country. These include corruption agencies, an absence of inter-agency an inadequate institutional design and deficiencies in coordination, and restrictions on CSOs to counter assigned functions. In addition, the Anti-Corruption corruption. Office reportedly only focuses on the executive Moreover, lower social and economic sectors were branch and does not address the legislative and judicial identified as those most affected by corruption. counterparts. B. PRIVATE SECTOR A. PUBLIC SECTOR Argentina has an anti-corruption regulatory framework for the private sector. Of the elements analyzed in this Argentina’s anti-corruption policies include: evaluation, Argentina addresses most of the following, ü Standards and codes of conduct for the adequate as noted below: performance by the public sector 1
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 ü Codes of Conduct provide companies greater certainty when ü Standards for a culture with “tone at the top”12 encountering these scenarios. ü Control and audit measures Most LPs agree that the Law on Criminal Responsibility ü Risk advice for regulatory compliance programs of Legal Persons has been an important step forward in ü Internal complaints procedures regulation which has spurred anti-corruption policies ü Research protocols ü Training in compliance programs within companies. In addition, this law foresees that ü Risk assessment and evaluation of compliance Argentina would comply after several years with the programs international obligations assumed in this field by the OECD framework. However, a repeated comment by û Organizational chart and scope of the work of participants is that there is currently insufficient corporate officers information on compliance of such as guidelines and Pursuant to Law 27,401, Law on Criminal Responsibility directives, and therefore legal persons do not have all of Legal Persons, the judge may consider failure to the elements to fulfill their obligations under the comply with these elements as a factor for setting criminal liability system. In addition, the standard penalties. Under this law, compliance with anti- reportedly does not account for the size or type of legal corruption measures (implementing an integrity entity in order to determine the minimum elements or or compliance program with all legal requirements or requirements that a legal entity should implement in minimum standards provided by the law) is a developing a compliance program that meets the requirement for contracting with the Government. The requirements of the legislation. This, in turn, results in application of anti-corruption measures is otherwise not significant transactional costs and in compliance goals mandatory for other private legal entities; although it that are challenging for smaller entities. can be a mitigating liability factor in connection with any The Argentine legal system also prohibits the following penalty that a judge may impose if private legal entities acts: are involved in corruption.13 ü Establishment of accounts not recorded in Private sector companies in Argentina are subject corporate books; carrying out unregistered exclusively to criminal responsibility and not to transactions; the recording of nonexistent administrative or civil liability. According to the expenses, the use of false documentation, and the Repentance Act (Law 27,304), judges may reduce intentional destruction of corporate books. sanctions on those who, having committed a particular ü Bribery or facilitation payments, as well as their crime, if they provide relevant and substantial corresponding tax deduction. information to the advancement of the related investigation. LPs noted that this has led to positive C. REPORTING MECHANISMS AND PROTECTION FOR progress in the context of relevant processes, such as WHISTLEBLOWERS the “Caso de los Cuadernos.”14 However, they also Public servants have the obligation to report crimes of suggested that the penalty should not only be reduced which they are aware in the exercise of their functions, but that there be the possibility of eliminating it. in accordance with criminal procedural law but absent LPs noted that the legislation criminalizing companies any specific rules. for bribes to public officials and other related Regarding the ongoing debate as to whether existing misconduct (Law 27,401) has not yet been applied in complaint mechanisms are readily available to citizens, specific cases and has deficiencies in its drafting, LPs concluded that a change in implementation of these particularly in situations such as self-reporting and mechanisms is required. cooperation with the government that if solved, would 2
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 The anti-corruption framework defines specific The anti-corruption authorities do not have the protective measures for whistleblowers. Law necessary independence to prevent, investigate and 15 25,764 created the National Program for the prosecute corruption effectively. Protection of Witnesses and Accused Persons, which, while not exclusive to corruption offenses, may be LPs rate the institutional capacity of public bodies extended to such misconduct at the discretion of the empowered to prevent, investigate, and prosecute acts judicial authority and the Ministry of Justice and Human of corruption as low. Rights. Protection measures (no compensation The Office of the General Prosecutor for Administrative measures are provided) include: (A) personal or home Investigations was identified by participants as the most custody; (b) temporary housing in reserved places; (c) effective authority in combating corruption and the change of domicile; (d) provision of economic and Anti-Corruption Office as the least effective. housing resources for up to six months; (e) assistance in handling administrative paperwork and procedures; and Most of the experts agreed that the lack of (f) assistance in labor reintegration. independence of the Anti-Corruption Office is an impediment to its effective action, as its performance is The Criminal Code provides for reductions in penalties governed by the policy of each administration and by for corruption offenses to those who provide valuable political interests. In this regard, the Anti-Corruption and credible information. The complainants are liable, Office has recently relinquished its role as a plaintiff in according to the Repentance Act (Law 27,304), if they certain corruption cases initiated under the prior report acts of corruption to the press or media. administration involving officials of the current D. SPECIALIZED AUTHORITIES administration (regarding alleged acts committed while serving under the prior administration). The lack of The national authorities with powers to prevent, budgetary independence and the reduction of the investigate or punish acts of corruption are: budget of this office were also identified as one of the ü Anti-Corruption Office (Oficina Anticorrupción) problems. ü General Prosecutor of Administrative Within the identified challenges, the interference by Investigations of the Office of the Attorney General political and economic powers plays a key role in this of the Nation (Procuración General de lack of independence, especially in the selection Investigaciones Administrativas de la Procuración General de la Nación) processes of judges, in disciplinary procedures, as well ü Judiciary (Poder Judicial) as in the periodic monitoring of their performance. ü Financial Information Unit (Unidad de Información An additional challenge identified by LPs were lengthy Financiera) procedures and significant delay in the processing and While the Anti-Corruption Office is part of the executive resolution of investigations carried out by the relevant branch and its head is directly appointed by authorities. the President of the Nation, the General Prosecutor for E. INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS Administrative Investigations is part of the Office of the Attorney General and has a more complex appointment There is no mechanism for institutional cooperation or process in which it is selected from a pool of candidates coordination to prevent, target, investigate and punish proposed by the Attorney General to the President, and, corruption-related misconduct. LPs noted that the in turn, ratified by the Senate by a simple majority. ineffective action by the authorities is not only due to lack of independence of the public authorities, but also According to LPs: due to the lack of an adequate budget and to deficient institutional coordination. In particular, LPs have 3
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 reported that Argentina does not have a centralized Plan 2019 – 2023. According to LPs, this council is mainly system of data analysis and information gathering and composed of CSOs and business chambers. While this is that the lack of coordination among public agencies a step forward in civil society engagement, the way in hampers communication and effectively identifying and which actual participation by civil society will be carried targeting cases of corruption. forward, and the involvement of the Council, are yet to be specified. F. CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION Finally, LPs highlighted the role that the private The legal framework does not provide for a mechanism sector can play in advancing anti-corruption efforts, that fosters civil society engagement and participation particularly in terms of bidding and contracting of academia and other non -governmental actors in procedures. corruption prevention efforts. Despite this, civil society organizations have been involved in and have promoted G. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION anti-corruption initiatives, such as the “ Anti-Corruption In Argentina, information regarding public officials and Social Agreement ”.16 sanctioned private entities is publicly available. Public Although CSOs are identified by LPs as the actors who procurement processes are also public, however, primarily defend democracy and the rule of law, they information on officials working in public procurement face challenges such as securing funding and having processes is not public. access to the regulatory framework (including the In addition, Argentina provides for a system that allows General Prosecutor) for open civic space that for information to be requested from the government, encourages the proper functioning of these and any refusal to issue the information can be organizations. LPs also emphasized the importance of challenged before the Agency for Access to Public giving CSOs a more active role and providing support to Information, an independent body within the purview investigative journalism that has reported corruption of the Office of the Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet of cases. the Presidency of the Nation (Jefatura de Gabinete de The Anti-Corruption Office recently created the Advisory Ministros de la Presidencia de la Nación). Council for Monitoring the Implementation of the Initiatives incorporated in the National Anti-Corruption 4
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 H. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LEGAL COMMUNITY Strengthen the mechanisms of ethics in the public sector and the integrity of government authorities, with detailed regulations aimed at deterring, identifying and punish acts of corruption in the public sector Propose and promote mechanisms for the appointment of judges in Corruption in the public sector accordance with international standards that guarantee political independence of the judiciary, as well as ensure certainty of the judicial career, including mechanisms for professionalization of public service and discipline Undertake efforts aimed at clearly delineating the duties of legal persons in connection with anti-corruption prevention, establishing the applicable rules and regulations, particularly with regard to situations involving cooperation Corruption in the private sector with authorities and self-reporting (including by companies with regard to crimes committed by individuals who work for them) Undertake initiatives to promote mechanisms for strengthening institutions and prevent political interference, including, if necessary, modifying the appointment process Institutional Strengthening Promote institutional strengthening of anti-corruption agencies, including the allocation of adequate financial and human resources, staff training, use of technology and equipment Encourage the creation of coordination mechanisms among anti-corruption authorities, to prevent, identify, investigate, and sanction corruption more Institutional coordination efficiently mechanisms Promote formal mechanisms for civil society participation in the design and implementation of anti-corruption public policy Participation of civil society Establish mechanisms to disseminate information related to available reporting mechanisms to the general population and public servants Transparency Promote legislation and regulations to establish beneficial ownership registries in accordance with international standards and best practices 5
II. BRAZIL ü Policies and procedures for identifying and Total Legislation Implementation Authorities managing conflicts of interest ü Gift acceptance policies for high-level public 5.67 8.16 4.3 4.83 officials of the executive branch, prohibiting the Brazil has a comprehensive anti-corruption policy receipt of gifts other than gifts less than R$ 100 framework, which includes anti-corruption policies and (approximately US$ 18) practices for the public and private sector, protection of ü Policies on post-public employment obligations, whistleblowers and cooperation mechanisms, among and restrictions of public officials to work in the others.17 private sector after concluding their public service ü Policies for training public officials in anti- According to the participating LPs, the legal framework corruption measures is generally sufficient, but there is room for improvement, particularly in areas such as financing of In the area of sworn affidavits, the Brazilian legal elections (including setting limits on the amounts of framework provides: corporate donations) and financial secrecy, as well as ü Measures that require certain high-level public protection by presidents of their political allies that has officials to render assets declarations reportedly been widely used in recent years. The assets declarations are not publicly available. These Most LPs recognize the difficulty in implementing anti- are subject to evaluation by the Federal Court of corruption laws in Brazil. One of the recurring Auditors. There is no obligation to file a statement of comments is the lack of political will to effectively interest, although some federal officials are prohibited implement the anti-corruption legal framework, and from participating in private companies. However, they political influence on anti-corruption authorities. are permitted to be partners or have an interest, provided they are not management or have High-level politicians and public officials were identified management functions. as being more significantly experienced in anti- corruption efforts vis-à-vis other members of the civil Law 12,813 2013 provides for a six -month waiting service and the community at large. LPs agreed that period for some public officials before they can perform there are considerable challenges in connection with certain functions. This provision was adopted to aligning anti-corruption efforts in the different levels of prevent former public employees from using government arising from Brazil being a federation. Less confidential information. socially and economically favored sectors, including Brazilian legislation only establishes general limitations gender and racial minorities were identified as the on members of the judiciary, such as non-participation groups most affected by corruption. in political activities. A. PUBLIC SECTOR B. PRIVATE SECTOR Brazil has anti-corruption policies that include: Brazil has an anti-corruption regulatory framework for ü Codes of conduct for adequate performance of the the private sector and complies with the following public service (for high-level federal officials) and checked items: for the legislature ü Codes of Conduct 6
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 ü Rules for a “tone at the top” culture18 constitute prohibited conduct, as well as their related ü Control and audit measures expense deduction. It is interesting to mention that in ü Risk advice on regulatory compliance programs recent cases related to “Operation Car Wash” (Lava ü Internal complaints procedures Jato), the tax administration agency has collected taxes ü Training in compliance programs on the amounts of bribes as income. The contributing ü Risk assessment and evaluation of compliance companies have filed a number of administrative programs appeals with the Administrative Council on Tax Appeals, ü Research protocols but they have been largely denied. û Organizational chart and scope of work of In Brazil, private sector companies may be subject to corporate officers, but there is an obligation for administrative and civil liability, pursuant to the Clean companies to have an independent internal body Companies Act, but not to criminal with human, material and financial resources to responsibility. Companies may be fined 0.1% to 20% of implement the activities of the compliance their net profits in the fiscal prior year to the initiation program of an administrative proceeding20. As a method of According to Law 12,846/2013, Clean Companies providing redress, the aforementioned law may require Act19 and its Federal Decree 8,420/2015, these the company to disclose the decision imposing the requirements are not binding on companies, but serve sanction through the media. as criteria used by authorities to reduce In civil matters, the Clean Companies Act provides that sanctions. Companies that adopt a robust and effective companies may be liable to third parties for damages compliance program according to the parameters resulting from an act of corruption, in addition to the established by the Decree may have a decrease in fines fact that companies may be suspended from their from 1% to 4%. activities, or prevented from receiving subsidies, According to LPs, this legislation has been a watershed donations and other benefits from public agencies, for for defining corporate responsibility (in acts involving one to five years. 21 the State, not among private companies) and for setting Although the Criminal Code provides for penalties parameters for the effectiveness of compliance related to acts of corruption, in Brazil companies, programs in companies. as legal persons, are not subject to criminal liability, The Brazilian legal system prohibits the following acts: which LPs report as an obstacle in achieving justice and ü The use of false documents providing redress to victims of corruption-related ü The intentional destruction of corporate books or crimes. LPs pointed out the problematic interpretation documents may be a crime of obstruction of adopted by the Supreme Court that criminal justice, if it is related to improper acts or sanctions cannot be enforced until a decision is final, investigation by the authorities. increases the rates of impunity, as the court takes a long time to issue its final decision. The Clean Companies It does not prohibit the following: Act encourages companies involved in corrupt practices û Establishment of accounts not recorded in to reach settlements for the reduction of sanctions in corporate books, carrying out unregistered exchange for valuable information. However, LPs report transactions, the recording of nonexistent that, since the law establishes a "first in time, first in expenses, the use of false documents, and the right" rule, other companies involved may not feel intentional destruction of corporate books. incentivized to cooperate and provide useful Brazilian legislation does not distinguish between information for an investigation. Although cooperation facilitation payments and bribes, so they both agreements somewhat remedy the multiplicity of 7
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 authorities, enhance the efficacy of proceedings and ü Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Ministro da contribute to more settlements, LPs reported that Justiça e Segurança Pública) pursuant to this law, firms are required to deal with a ü Financial Activity Control Council (Financial considerable number of agencies, making the Intelligence Unit) (Conselho de Controle de settlement process more complicated. Atividades Financeiras é a Unidade de Inteligência Financeira do Brasil) Brazil’s criminal legislation provides for penalty ü Judiciary (Poder Judiciário do Brasil) reductions for individuals who enter guilty plea ü agreements in exchange for useful information. According to LPs, the perception of some agencies and C. REPORTING MECHANISMS AND PROTECTION FOR entities with the power to fight corruption in the WHISTLEBLOWERS country is that they have been captured politically, including the Federal Court of Auditors. Despite this, According to LPs, the channels for filing complaints LPs also recognize that, although they would benefit within the government are readily accessible. However, from strengthening their capacity, the Federal Public other than the case of government-owned companies Prosecutor's Office and the judiciary have managed to (which are required to maintain internal platforms for maintain a significant level of autonomy and filing complaints), these channels are not regulated. In successfully prosecute cases. 2011, a hotline was established to enable citizens to report suspected acts of corruption in the public The Comptroller General has also been identified by the administration. persons surveyed as an efficient authority in the fight against corruption. The Constitution and the laws, Pursuant to Law 13,964/2019, complainants may however, provide the President of the Republic with the receive compensation of up to 5% of the amount power to appoint the heads of the anti-corruption recovered as an incentive to report acts of corruption. agencies, including the Attorney General, the Federal This law also determines that whistleblowers have the Court of Auditors, the Comptroller General, the right to remain anonymous and to receive protection in Financial Intelligence Unit and the Minister of Justice. the event of retaliation or intimidation, including at the workplace and on a personal level.22 All participants agree that Brazil is going through an era characterized by lack of political will to effectively There is no provision in Brazilian legislation on reporting control corruption. A reflection of this phenomenon has corruption to the press or media. been the excessive time that it has taken authorities to D. SPECIALIZED AUTHORITIES vote on the approval of anti-corruption laws and decrees. The lack of judicial independence was also The following agencies, with powers to prevent, consistently reported by LPs, which conclude that: investigate or punish corruption were identified at the national level: Anti-corruption authorities generally have the independence to prevent, investigate, and prosecute ü Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Público Federal) corruption cases, but certain agencies are subject to ü Office of the Comptroller General (Controladoria- political influence. Geral da União) LPs rate the institutional capacity of public bodies ü Federal Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas da empowered to prevent, investigate, and prosecute União) acts of corruption as average. ü Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuradoria Geral da República) 8
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 LPs also highlighted that there is a perception of F. PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY impunity given the lengthy processes it takes to resolve Specific mechanisms regarding civil society corruption-related cases. participation in efforts to prevent corruption were not E. INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS identified in the legal framework. Notwithstanding, civil society organizations have been involved in and There is a mechanism of cooperation and institutional promoted anti-corruption initiatives, resulting in some coordination to prevent, target, investigate and punish success stories on accountability in Brazil 23 corruption, involving the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Federal Court of Auditors and the G. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION Ministry of Justice and Public Security, under the In Brazil, information regarding public officials and coordination of the Supreme Court. In 2020, these sanctioned private entities is available only to the authorities implemented a technical cooperation authorities. Public procurement processes are publicly agreement that sets out a number of parameters with available, but information on officials working in public respect to guilty plea agreements and procedures for procurement processes is not. the reduction of sanctions. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Comptroller In addition, Brazil provides for a system that allows for General have entered into two cooperation agreements information to be requested from the government, and in 2010 and 2014 with regard to information sharing any refusal to issue the information can be challenged and combating corruption. before the corresponding higher authority of the agency denying the request and, ultimately before the LPs identified working groups composed by people Comptroller General and the Committee on from various institutions that address specific Reevaluation of Information (which is not an corruption-related matters, as a good practice. autonomous body belonging to the executive branch). 9
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 H. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGAL COMMUNITY Assess and promote the legislative processes involving (i) limiting presidential pardon; and (ii) the enforcement of corruption related decisions prior to becoming final Promote initiatives to create a system of public declarations of interest Corruption in the public sector statements for public officials of the three branches of government and other autonomous bodies Promote legislation providing for criminal liability of companies engaged in acts of corruption Promote legislation to establish bans against companies for having Corruption in the private sector accounts outside corporate books and books with unidentified transactions Promote regulations providing for whistleblower protection, as well as to establish mechanisms that encourage the reporting of acts of corruption Reporting mechanisms Promote legislation aimed at establishing beneficial ownership registries in accordance with international standards and best practices Transparency 10
III. CHILE ü Statements of interest, including external activities Total Legislation Implementation Authorities and participation in companies and organizations 7.86 8.21 8 7.5 It is important to mention that assets declarations are mandatory for members of the judiciary in Chile. According to LPs, Chile has a lean but effective regulatory framework24 to prevent, investigate and With respect to post-employment obligations, Law punish acts of corruption. The legal framework that 18.575 prohibits former public officials from working governs corruption, although sufficient in general for a period of six months in enterprises that are subject terms, would benefit from improvements aimed at to supervision. strengthening the capacity of anti-corruption agencies The agency that oversees and coordinates the and providing for greater incentives to report implementation of anti-corruption policies is misconduct. According to LPs, there are gaps in the the Comptroller General and the Public Prosecutor's regulation of corruption by individuals, and areas of Office. opportunity for enhanced coordination among agencies. B. PRIVATE SECTOR Implementation of the anti-corruption regulations is Law 20.393 outlines a series of elements that generally effective, and authorities have the capacity companies can adopt to self-regulate and prevent and independence required for such implementation. punishable offenses or improper acts: Participants identified people in poverty and in rural ü Codes of Conduct areas as the most vulnerable to corruption. ü Organizational charts and scope of the work of corporate officials A. PUBLIC SECTOR ü Control and audit measures Chile has anti-corruption policies that include: ü Risk advice on compliance programs ü Internal complaints procedures ü Standards or codes of conduct for proper ü Research protocols performance of the public sector ü Training in compliance programs ü Policies and procedures for identifying and ü Risk assessment and evaluation of compliance managing conflicts of interest programs ü Gift acceptance policies for public officials ü Policies on post-public employment obligations, û The only element that this catalogue does not and restrictions of public officials to work in the include are norms for a culture with the “tone private sector after concluding their public service defined at the top”25 Specific policies for training public officials in anti- The existence of these elements is considered by Law corruption measures were not identified. 20.393 as a mitigating liability factor in connection with corruption-related misconduct. Regarding sworn affidavits, the Chilean legal framework provides that the following are public: The Chilean legal system prohibits the following acts: ü Assets Declarations ü Establishment of accounts not recorded in corporate books, carrying out unregistered 11
Latin America Anticorruption Assessment 2020 transactions, the recording of nonexistent It is important to mention that these four institutions expenses, the use of false documents, and the have constitutional autonomy to exercise their intentional destruction of corporate books. functions. There are innovative methods in place for ü Bribery or facilitation payments, as well as their selecting and appointing the heads of these agencies related expense deduction. whereby the three branches of government, as Legal persons in Chile are subject to civil, administrative opposed to just the executive, are involved in the and criminal liability for certain offenses, including process. bribery of national public officials, of foreign public Regarding specialized agencies, participants concluded officials and of individuals. The corresponding penalties the following: include fines, disqualification, loss of profits, and Anti-corruption authorities generally have the dissolution of a legal person. In addition, the independence to prevent, investigate, and prosecute publication of an extract of the conviction record may corruption-related matters, but are not exempt from be required at the expense of the company and the political influence. seizure of property related to the offense. C. REPORTING MECHANISMS AND PROTECTION FOR LPs rank the institutional capacity of agencies WHISTLEBLOWERS empowered to prevent, investigate, and prosecute acts of corruption as medium-high . Official channels are available to government officials and citizens for reporting acts of corruption. The recurring view among LPs is that the Attorney General's Office and the judiciary need to allocate more However, there is no specific legislation or public policy financial and human resources to strengthen their on mechanisms for the protection of whistleblowers, or institutional capacity and become more efficient. economic incentives for reporting acts of corruption. There is an incentive to report corruption-related LPs agree that Chile’s legal framework for transparency offenses in criminal matters, as it is considered a is one of the most effective channels for preventing mitigating liability factor. corruption, including the Transparency Council. There is no provision in Chilean legislation E. INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS on reporting corruption to the press or media. In Chile, coordination mechanisms exist between the LPs agree that the existing mechanisms in the legal authorities responsible for the prevention, targeting, framework are not sufficient to encourage the investigation and punishment of corruption. The Office reporting of acts of corruption. of the Comptroller General and the Public Prosecutor's Office have carried out cooperation arrangements D. SPECIALIZED AUTHORITIES for the exchange of information. Participants identified the following authorities with F. PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY powers to prevent, investigate or punish corruption: There is no legislation or regulation providing means for ü Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría civil society participation, including by academia and General) other non-governmental actors, in efforts to prevent ü Office of the Attorney General (Ministerio Público) corruption. However, the role of CSOs and the ü Judiciary (Judicatura) ü Transparency advice (Consejo para la media has been very significant in making public, and Transparencia) pushing for action in, specific cases, including the “Milicogate”, “MOP-gate” and “Caval” cases. 12
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