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Kerr, K. 2020. Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments:
stability The Case of Colombia. Stability: International Journal of
Security & Development, 9(1): 5, pp. 1–21. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.5334/sta.720
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War
Environments: The Case of Colombia
Katie Kerr
Countries emerging from armed conflict often experience heightened violence and
youth gang activity. Following the signing of peace accords with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (FARC-EP), what are Colombia’s risks
in terms of youth gangs? To assess these risks, this article draws from gang
research and literature on post-war violence to identify six factors that recur in
post-war environments and are likely to fuel a rise in gangs: illicit economies and
criminal networks, exposure to violence, marginalization, social disorganization,
security gaps and state responses, and former combatants. After analyzing
Colombia’s risks with reference to each of these, the article concludes that the
strengthening ties between youth gangs and Colombia’s illicit economies, mediated
by adult-run criminal networks, increase gang numbers and violence. Moreover,
some disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods are vulnerable to gang escalation due
to the effects on local youths of protracted violent exposure, marginalization, and
social disorganization. Finally, while ex-combatant recidivism and security gaps are
prominent concerns in Colombia, they are not expected to contribute significantly
to youth gang dynamics in urban areas.
Introduction and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército
In November 2016, the Colombian govern Popular de Liberación — EPL) (International
ment signed a peace accord with the Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 2019),
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — while many former FARC-EP strongholds are
People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolu experiencing a return to violence (Fundación
cionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Paz y Reconciliación -Peace and Reconciliation
Pueblo — FARC-EP), the country’s largest Foundation [PARES] 2019).
guerrilla group. Over three years later, mul That post-accord Colombia does not fit
tiple armed conflicts are still under way in neatly with any common-sense concept of
the country, involving FARC-EP ‘dissident’ or post-war is not unusual. Countries emerging
successor elements, the National Liberation from armed conflict often see an escalation
Army (Ejército Nacional de Liberación — ELN), in violent crime, which can topple peace pro
the Clan del Golfo (also referred to as Urabeños cesses. Even when a negotiated settlement
or Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), holds up, protracted insecurity precludes
real recovery and erodes support for peace
(Darby 2006). In an effort to reconcile such
Independent, US tendencies with a ‘post-conflict situation,’
katiekerr@hotmail.comArt. 5, page 2 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Brown, Langer and Stewart (2011: 4–5) sug ethnographic, case study, and quantitative gest that post-conflict is best understood as research analyzing risk for gang recruitment a process continuum that can suffer regress. and intensification, including compara Colombia’s peace accord, ceasefire, and tive research on other forms of organized demobilization of most FARC-EP members youth violence to supplement gang-specific are milestones on that continuum, represent research in developing country contexts. ing a significant reduction in political vio I then reviewed the growing body of litera lence and creating space for peacebuilding. ture on post-war violence to identify recur I worked in Colombia for the International ring features of post-war environments that Organization for Migration (IOM)1 from 2000 intersect with major risk factors for gangs. to 2002, during the peak of paramilitary vio This exercise generated a short list of risks lence, and again from 2011 to 2017, during that were likely to emerge in the aftermath the FARC-EP negotiations and the start of of armed conflict and to contribute to gang peace implementation. My work involved intensification. Finally, each of these factors ex-combatant reintegration, rehabilitation was applied to the Colombian context, taking of child soldiers, and prevention of child account of its experience of armed conflict, recruitment into illegal armed groups. After the overall security context, and youth gang the FARC-EP accord was signed, the ques dynamics drawn from academic and institu tion of Colombia’s susceptibility to youth tional literature, media reports, and personal violence was a frequent subject of debate communications with Colombian experts. within the peacebuilding community. Since This paper is presented in three main the rise of maras in post-war Central America parts. The first one provides an overview of was both the closest-at-hand and most noto Colombia’s current security environment and rious example of gang intensification in the gangs. The second part mines studies of gangs aftermath of civil conflicts, these discussions for major risk factors and the newer literature often turned to how Colombia was — or, on post-war violence to posit — where these more often, was not — perceived as similar to two bodies of scholarship intersect — prob El Salvador and Guatemala in the mid-1990s. able risk factors for post-war gang escalation. This framing seemed to fall short. Post- The third part analyzes Colombia’s risks with war gang intensification has been observed reference to each of these factors. The article across continents and has historical roots. concludes that some disadvantaged, urban In addition to El Salvador (Cruz 2005, 2014), neighborhoods in Colombia are vulnerable Guatemala (Demoscopia 2007; Kurtenbach to increased gang activity in light of their 2008), and Nicaragua (Rodgers 2003, 2012), prolonged exposure to violence, marginaliza increased gang activity has been reported in tion, social disorganization, and the strength post-war and transition settings in Europe of illicit economies. Ex-combatant recidivism after World War II (Cavan and Cavan 1968; and security gaps, though acute in Colombia, Fyvel 1961) as well as in South Africa (Covey do not represent a first-order threat of escalat 2010; Jensen 2014), Sierra Leone (Utas 2014), ing urban street gangs. Moreover, Colombian East Timor (Timor Leste Armed Violence authorities may attenuate these risks by 2009), Cambodia (Kurtenbach 2012), Nepal expanding preventive measures grounded in (Upreti et al. 2010), and Haiti (Kolbe 2013). citizen security and avoiding overly repres While these accounts often describe the sive, militaristic approaches that have exacer impacts of armed conflict and peace on bated gang violence elsewhere. local gang dynamics, what is missing is a framework for identifying those features of Colombia’s Security Landscape post-war situations that are most likely to Traditional FARC-EP strongholds with sig fuel a rise in gang numbers and violence. To nificant criminal assets, like coca crops and develop such a framework, I first reviewed illegal mines, have been hard hit by post-war
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 3 of 21 violence as different criminal actors have and has 2,500 members (ibid.). The FARC scrambled to fill the vacuum. PARES (2019) ‘dissident’ or successor groups have also reports that 107 municipalities of the 242 strengthened, with estimates in August 2019 vacated by the FARC had suffered a significant of over 2,200 members, including at least incursion by other criminal actors by August 400 new recruits, spread across 23 groups 2019. In these municipalities, the homi and active in 85 municipalities (ibid.). Recent cide rate increased enough in 2018 to offset high-level defections from the peace process reductions elsewhere and raise the national and calls to rearm by demobilized command murder rate for the first time since the peace ers may herald greater military and ideologi talks started in 2012 (Castillo, Lleras, and cal consolidation among these groups (The Suarez 2018). Economist 2019b). Underlying these developments is a crimi Colombian politics shifted to the right in nal underworld that feeds off the cocaine 2018 with the election of a president who trade. Coca production increased throughout opposed the peace process throughout his the peace talks and the start of peace imple campaign. President Iván Duque’s adminis mentation, breaking historic records in 2016 tration launched a new national security pol and again in 2017 (Asmann 2018). According icy in 2019 that favors military solutions over to the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación negotiated settlements with armed groups Ideas para la Paz — FIP), a Colombian like the ELN and Clan del Golfo (Alonso and think tank, the rise is partly attributable to Robbins 2019). The policy is largely focused increased output by small-scale farmers in on rural strategies and is unlikely to impact anticipation of volunteer eradication pro security conditions in cities (The Economist gramming that many believed would com 2019a). pensate farmers based on their production (Llorente and Garzón 2018). Although the Colombia’s gangs number of coca-growing crops levelled off in For the purposes of this discussion, youth 2018, more intensive cultivation meant that or street gangs are groups that display some production continued to rise (Colombian continuity over time, engage in illegal behav Observatory of Organized Crime 2019). ior, and consist mostly of members under the The ICRC (2019) identified five ongoing age of 25 (Rodgers and Hazen 2014: 8). The armed conflicts in Colombia. Four involve gangs that first appeared in Colombia in the the Colombian army against illegal armed 1960s were hierarchical, with large member groups: the ELN, the EPL, the Clan de Golfo, ships and territories, and well-established and successor FARC-EP groups. The fifth rituals (Perea 2007). Starting in the 1980s, refers to a conflict between the EPL and however, these gangs have undergone con the ELN. The five conflicts are in addition tinuous transformations, and vary from to the ‘other situations of violence’2 identi one city to another, depending largely on fied in numerous cities, such as Medellín, the city’s relationship with armed conflict Buenaventura, Cali, and Tumaco (ibid.). and illicit economies. The number of gangs The ELN has grown in numbers, territory, has increased over time, but they generally and capabilities since the signing of the have fewer members and control smaller ter accord, rising from 1,100 to 3,000 combat ritories (Semana 2018). Their structures are ants and establishing a presence in 35 new looser and more horizontal, and the old rules municipalities (101 to 136 out of a total of and rituals have largely disappeared (Perea 1,122 municipalities in Colombia) (PARES 2007; Semana 2018). They are also more 2019). The Clan del Golfo, the strongest of violent, more criminal, and better armed, the so-called bacrim, or criminal bands, has especially in those cities where links to the also expanded into 26 new municipalities, adult criminal world are strongest (Resource up from 276 when the accord was signed, Center for Conflict Analysis [CERAC] 2014).
Art. 5, page 4 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments In its recent report on gangs in seven cit to focus on gangs’ (Perea 2007: 14). When a ies, Colombia’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Colombian senator brought the issue up for observed that contradictory estimates, parliamentary debate in 2017, he remarked incomplete data, and divergent methods that the gang threat grew without notice while made it impossible to estimate the number the country worried about the armed conflict of gangs and their members in Colombia (HSB Noticias 2017). (MOJ 2017). The ministry hazarded to say that in the seven cities in its study, there may Understanding the Risks: be some 1,200 gangs with 21,000 members Contributions from Gang Research (ibid.). Credible research from other sources and Literature on Post-war Violence suggests that gangs are viewed as problem Risk factor analysis in gang studies atic in at least 12 Colombian cities, with Cali Risk factors here refer to experiences and and Medellín at the top of the list (El Tiempo characteristics that increase the probability 2015; Semana 2018). Gang activity is concen that a young person will join a gang. Gang- trated in crowded neighborhoods set apart related risk is often discussed on two levels: from the city, with low-quality education at the micro level, research looks at risk across and jobs, where young people are effectively five domains of the individual, family, school, excluded from the practices of citizenship peer group, and community; the macro level (MOJ 2017). Gang members tend to come takes on the larger forces at work in society from dysfunctional families with high rates — the ecology that surrounds and shapes the of domestic violence; they typically neither smaller domains (Howell and Griffiths 2016). work nor go to school (Semana 2018). Much of the evidence-rich analysis on risk With some exceptions, Colombia’s gangs has emerged from the US, which benefits are not as persistent or rooted as many gangs from the ‘longest and densest’ gang scholar in Central America or the US, but they may be ship in the world (Rodgers and Hazen 2014: on a development path that is headed in that 9). While there is substantial research on direction. In his historical analysis of street gangs from Central America, and, to a lesser gangs, Howell (2015) mapped five phases extent, from South Africa and Brazil, much that describe the development of gangs in of this literature lacks the statistical rigor to much of the US. The path starts with social pinpoint and assess predictors of gang mem disorganization in phase 1 and low neighbor bership. Comparative research on youth hood and family control in phase 2, followed engagement in a broader sample of armed by the formation of gangs in phase 3 and the groups, like Dowdney’s (2005) research on interplay with ‘gang violence facilitators’ like youth involved in organized armed violence, drug trafficking and weapons availability in can help fill the gap. phase 4, and culminates with widespread, While findings from global literature must transformed gangs in phase 5 (ibid.: 76–94). be applied cautiously to the Colombian case, Many Colombian gangs would be classified in risk profiles across countries and group types phase 3 or 4, but almost all gangs in Medellín are surprisingly similar (Dowdney 2005; and some in Cali meet the description for Hagedorn 2008). It is possible to identify phase 5. Nationally, the major gang violence core risk factors supported by solid evidence facilitators have been adult armed groups from the US and emerging support from that bring drugs and weapons, and also gen other countries. Drawing from Howell and erate the cultural conditions for violence. Griffiths (2016) and Thornberry et al. (2003) While cities like Medellín and Cali have in the US, as well as the Small Arms Survey made sustained efforts to address youth gangs, (2010), Higginson et al. (2018), Dowdney national government attention to gang issues (2005) and Covey (2010) for international is relatively new, in part because the ‘complex perspectives, the following factors may be ity of the armed conflict did not leave space relevant to gangs in Colombia.
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 5 of 21 In the individual domain, prior involvement communities are uprooted, schools are with violence and drugs; antisocial attitudes, destroyed, firearms are cheap, and social including the belief that aggression is neces bonds are tenuous. Three areas of major risk sary to resolve conflict; traumatic life experi identified in gang literature that feature heav ences, especially victimization or exposure to ily in post-war settings are discussed below. substantial violence; as well as being young, marginalized, and male, increase the risk of Exposure to violence gang involvement. Within families, economic One explanation for the noted rise in homi disadvantage, domestic violence, family dys cide during and after wars is that wars change function, and gang membership within the societal norms and attitudes toward non- home are risk factors. In the school domain, combat violence (Archer and Gartner 1976). low educational attainment and attachment The rationale is that people whose daily lives to school, together with dropping out, are are imbued with violence will cease to see associated with higher rates of gang involve violent acts as exceptional, while the tradi ment. Regarding peers, having friends in a tional prohibitions on violence lose cred gang is one of the strongest factors in the US ibility when they are breached repeatedly and elsewhere. At the community level, high- without consequence. The effects deepen risk neighborhoods tend to be urban and over time: as people become inured to vio marginalized, with few opportunities, scarce lence, they are quicker to commit — and services, and inadequate security provision. slower to punish — violent acts (Bos 2013). Firearms and drugs are often on hand, and Increased violence reaffirms its normality the bonds among neighbors are weak. and erodes communal capacities to resolve More research on the risk factors for gang conflicts pacifically, further entrenching involvement for girls and young women violence into day-to-day affairs (Steenkamp is needed (Howell and Griffiths 2016; 2009). Violence imprints on value systems Organization of American States [OAS] 2007). as well as emotional and moral lives, thereby Research to date suggests that risk profiles leaving a ‘legacy’ that makes violence more overlap, but some factors weigh more heav likely in the aftermath of war (ibid.: 8). ily in girls’ decisions to join a gang, including Persistent violence has serious consequences domestic violence and sexual abuse (Kinnear for young people whose development, sociali 2009; Taylor 2008), early sexualized behav zation, and transitions to adulthood are iors, and difficulties in school (Howell and threatened. Kurtenbach (2012: 8) explains that Griffiths 2016; Thornberry et al. 2003). for a young person ‘whose identity has been At the macro level, Thrasher’s (1927) views shaped by the experience of violence and a on social disorganization resonate with the lack of even rudimentary forms of security, international literature. Social disorganization the development of a stable personality will describes a situation in which conventional be much more difficult.’ She further describes institutions like families, schools, and neigh how conflict alters or destroys the sources of borhood structures lose the ability to control socialization — families, schools, peers, media, delinquency. Such disorganization results institutions — and creates obstacles for transi from rapid and unpredictable change that tions to adulthood (Kurtenbach 2012). dismantles old institutions without giving The consequences of youth exposure to, new ones a chance to consolidate (Hagedorn victimization by, and participation in vio 2008). The impact on gangs is twofold: com lence on future behavior are echoed in the munities lose the power to mediate juvenile gang literature. In their statistical analysis misconduct and gangs emerge to provide the of children aged nine to fifteen years in dis missing order (Papachristos and Kirk 2006). advantaged neighborhoods in a midwestern Most of these risks are heightened in post- city, Patchin et al. (2006), find that those war environments: families are fragmented, who were more exposed through personal
Art. 5, page 6 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments
experience to community violence self- to exclude young newcomers, especially
reported higher rates of weapon possession in communities under strain. The UN has
and aggressive behavior. Youths who witness noted that refugees and internally displaced
firearm violence are about twice as likely to persons are at increased risk of recruitment
engage in serious violence within the follow by armed groups due to the discrimination
ing two years (Bingenheimer, Brennan, and and deprivation many confront (UN 2015;
Earls 2005). Writing about gang dynamics IOM 2017). For forced migrants, the element
in Central America, Cruz (2005) views the of negative change may increase the risk
ubiquity of violence in the home and school of gang involvement beyond the usual cor
lives of many poor, urban youths as a key relates of marginalization. Cruz (2014) cites
to understanding the extreme violence dis research in El Salvador that suggests that
played by the maras. young people who are forced to move into
poor neighborhoods or drop out of school
Marginalization are more susceptible to joining a gang than
The concept of marginalization refers to those who have always been poor and never
pushing certain people and groups out of gone to school.
mainstream society, away from opportuni
ties, and relegating them to the economic, Social disorganization
social, and geographic ‘fringes of society’ Post-war research in countries involved in
(Vigil 2002: 7). It can facilitate gang par World War II identified a cross-national rise
ticipation when marginalized youths look in juvenile delinquency and an intensifica
to the gang for a sense of belonging, social tion of gang activity (Fyvel 1961). Cavan
recognition, and success. Marginalization and Cavan (1968) found that juvenile delin
is rife in countries coming out of conflict. quency increased during and after World War
The structural conditions that underlie II even in countries that were not exposed to
marginalization, such as economic inequal combat or occupation. War destroyed social
ity, political exclusion, social divisiveness, institutions and ‘postwar conditions brought
and discrimination, are at the root of many new problems’ (ibid.: 195). Through the
civil conflicts. These conditions are rarely lens of gang studies, the picture that forms
resolved — and are frequently exacerbated — is social disorganization on a massive scale,
by wars that act as ‘development in reverse’ with the corollary impairment of traditional
(Collier 2007: 27). Internal wars often reduce mechanisms to control youth delinquency.
incomes, exports, investment, and food pro Although the battles of many internal
duction and they weaken government and wars take place in rural areas, civil conflict is
social institutions; their costs are rarely dis linked to urban social disorder (IOM 2015).
tributed equitably, and internal wars can Conflict chaos enters cities when armed
increase individual and horizontal inequality actors use cities to recruit, restock, and recu
(Fakuda-Parr 2011). perate; war-fueled criminal networks set up
Furthermore, forced migration produced shop in urban areas; economic losses impact
by war often exacerbates marginalization. on urban livelihoods; and depleted state
Migrants can face discrimination and stigma resources mean fewer or worse services in
upon arrival in new communities (IOM cities, including security services.
2015), compounding the difficulties of social Internal displacement also interacts with
and economic integration. Immigrant youth social disorganization. According to IOM’s
are especially vulnerable to marginaliza World Migration Report for 2015, forced
tion (Vigil 2002). Differences in language, migrants often move into cities for safety and
culture, religion, ethnicity (van Gemert and opportunities. Cities that are already reeling
Decker 2013), rural backgrounds, and per from the urban impacts of conflict are ill-
ceived political loyalties are used as grounds equipped to meet the basic needs of newKerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 7 of 21
residents. These migrants may be required to war economies (Geneva Declaration 2008),
start new lives in informal, poorly planned, weak governance, gaps in public security,
and spatially segregated neighborhoods with mass trauma (Boyle 2014), former combat
numerous risks, including violence (ibid.). ants, and widespread availability of arms
IOM also suggests that urban mobility is (Kreutz, Marsh, and Torre 2012). Although
more likely to expose newcomers to violence each of these could contribute to collective
when migration is forced, likely due to the youth violence, the following discussion is
‘disintegration of established community focused on three post-conflict features that
dynamics that provide a degree of control intersect in obvious and recurring ways with
over crimes’ (ibid.: 78). youth gangs.
Human mobility patterns around war may
also connect with gangs by facilitating the Security gaps and state responses
transmission of gang cultures and meth States struggle to establish adequate secu
ods (Maxson 1998). For example, during El rity in the aftermath of conflict for at least
Salvador’s conflict, hundreds of thousands of five reasons. First, some war-ending accords
Salvadoran families became refugees in the call for security sector reform, which can
US. As a response to intense, layered margin debilitate enforcement capabilities in the
alization, and their need for protection, some short term (Stanley 2000). Second, where
Salvadoran youth joined gangs, including the law enforcement efforts have been focused
MS-13 and 18th Street gangs (Vigil 2002). narrowly on winning a war, the state may be
Starting in 1996, the US increased deporta short on the skills required for peacetime
tion of Salvadorans, including an unknown policing (Malan 2000). Third, a state may be
— but significant — number of gang mem unable to move into zones previously domi
bers (ibid.). On arriving in El Salvador, these nated by non-state actors fast enough to fill
youths again found themselves culturally a security vacuum (Boyle 2014). Fourth, if
dislocated and marginalized, with the added police played a combat role during conflict,
stigma of gang membership (Covey 2010). communities may be resentful or untrusting
They transmitted to El Salvador’s street gangs (Malan 2000). Fifth, conflicts often take a toll
the organizational culture, brutal violence, on national revenues, which has impacts on
and brands of their US-based gangs (Cruz service delivery across sectors, including law
2014; Rodgers and Baird 2015). enforcement.
The resulting security gap leaves some
Contributions from literature on violence parts of a country or groups feeling vulner
after wars able to violence or crime, which incentiv
The frequency with which countries emerg izes gangs. Young people frequently cite the
ing from armed conflict see security condi search for protection as motivation for their
tions worsen during peacetime lends support entry into gangs (Howell and Griffiths 2016).
to Boyle’s hypothesis that the experience of Further, residents who feel that the state
war changes the landscape for violent actors cannot provide for their safety may seek out
and ‘primes’ post-conflict states for high lev non-state security providers, including street
els of violence (Boyle 2014: 52). Research gangs (Geneva Declaration 2008).
across countries converges around common Faced with a security gap and a perceived
drivers of violence in post-conflict situations, gang problem, many states have added fuel
including the presence of ‘spoilers’ who use to the fire by adopting repressive, militaris
violence to prevent peace (Stedman 2000), tic tactics under the label of zero tolerance.
inadequate social services and infrastruc It is easy to see how a country emerging
ture, high rates of unemployment, property- from armed conflict could follow a path
related disputes, changes in power relations of least resistance from a war against, say,
and the emergence of power vacuums, illegal insurgents, to a war against gangs. HagedornArt. 5, page 8 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments
(2008) observed how one war replaced the recidivism, while educational attainment,
other in El Salvador. Wartime leaders who family bonds (including having children),
retain overt or behind-the-scenes power may and effective policing reduced risks (ibid.).
well be more comfortable with militaristic These same risk factors for recidivism can
approaches or see these as one way to main spur young former fighters to form gangs
tain status in a shifting political landscape (Marcy 2014). Rodgers (2012) described how
(Mani 2000; Stanley 2000). demobilized youth in Nicaragua, Guatemala,
If post-war settings make zero tolerance a and El Salvador responded to insecurity and
more likely choice by lawmakers, they also exclusion by starting territorial gangs or pan
render it a less promising one. Dowdney dillas to protect themselves and their neigh
(2005) found that such policies routinely fail borhoods. He observed that while gangs
in countries lacking social investment and predated civil conflict in these countries, the
economic opportunities, which are recurring ex-combatants brought weapons and mili
features in post-war contexts. Cruz (2014: tary skills, resulting in better organization
124) described how El Salvador’s harsh anti- and more violence (ibid.). In Sierra Leone,
gang laws — interwoven with the ‘politics street gangs that formed following independ
of violence’ or the institutions, actors, and ence were recruited into combat roles dur
policies that made extreme violence nor ing the civil war in 1991 (Hagedorn 2008).
mal among youth gangs — played a decisive According to Utas (2014), in the aftermath
part in the evolution of El Salvador’s maras. of war, demobilized child and young soldiers
In post-war settings where violence has recreated gang structures and infused them
become engrained in institutional and com with more serious violence learned during
munity culture, zero tolerance pits the gangs war.
against almost everyone. As Thrasher (1927)
observed, conflict forges the gangs, deepens Illicit economies and criminal networks
the bond, and incentivizes better organiza The criminal underworld is a major factor
tion to survive the onslaught (Howell and in the prolongation of armed conflict and
Griffiths 2016). the persistence of violence after hostilities
end. Boyle (2014) described how criminal
Former combatants networks can proliferate during wars where
Former fighters sometimes challenge post- weak law enforcement is coupled with high
war security with harmful behaviors that societal tolerance for violence. Parties to a
range from thuggery to derailing a peace conflict often engage heavily in illicit com
process (Gamba 2006; Wessells and Jonah mercial activity, first to fulfill military goals
2006). Based on his research in Congo and and later, often, as an end in itself.
Sierra Leone, Themnér (2011) concluded Illegal economies are dominated by adult
that former fighters from groups that lacked structures designed primarily to perpetrate
economic opportunities, felt threatened, crime. Youth gangs are not the same thing.
failed to reintegrate politically, retained Generally, their members are younger and
access to weapons, and lived in insecure set they sustain a mix of criminal and non-
tings were more likely to rearm. Kaplan and criminal purposes (Covey 2010). With some
Nussio (2016) were able to identify risk fac important exceptions, youth gangs rarely
tors in the individual domain by tracking play leadership roles within illegal econo
recidivism among a sample of almost 1,500 mies, in part because gangs have typically
Colombian former fighters. They found that lacked the discipline, organizational skill,
having strong personal reasons for joining and diligence to compete with more sophis
the group, the duration of a combatant’s ticated criminal networks (Hagedorn 2008;
stay with the armed group, and resettlement Kinnear 2009). However, the effects of illegal
in areas with criminal bands correlate with economies on gangs are powerful. HagedornKerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 9 of 21
(2008: 37) described how organized crime Third, youth gangs’ relationships with organ
‘bends the form of area youth gangs to the ized crime have transformed — and continue
needs of older armed groups.’ to transform — youth gangs, with harmful
Drugs, in particular, have altered gangs in consequences for youths, their communities,
ways that make them more problematic all and national security.
over the world. Drug use is rampant in many In general terms, Colombian street gangs
gangs and dealing is increasingly common in are younger, bounded to a smaller territory,
many contexts (Covey 2010; Kinnear 2009; and combine criminal activity with some
Rodgers and Baird 2015). Escalating violence social, identity, and noncriminal interests
by gangs is often attributed to their involve that set them apart from criminal bands and
ment in the drug trade (Jütersonke, Muggah drug-trafficking organizations (CERAC 2014;
and Rodgers 2009). Looking at gangs together Giraldo et al. 2015). These gangs are also
with other organized armed groups that more visible than their adult counterparts;
involve children, Dowdney (2005) noted how they call attention to themselves and seek
the demands of drug dealing make groups the recognition that comes from public mis
more territorial, combative, and violent. behaving (Covey 2010; Perea 2007). Even in
Medellín, where distinctions between organ
The Impact of Identified Risks on ized crime and youth gangs are at their murki
Gang Development in Colombia est (Semana 2018), the youth gangs or combos
Six major risk factors for post-war gang are distinguishable from older, more power
intensification were identified in the discus ful criminal groups. Blattman et al. (2019)
sion above: illicit economies and criminal explain the relationships and points of differ
networks, exposure to violence, marginaliza ence between the city’s street gangs or com
tion, social disorganization, security gaps and bos and its more powerful, mafia-like groups
state responses, and former combatants. The or razones. Based on interviews with combo
following discussion situates these factors in and razón leaders, administrative crime data,
the Colombian context to gauge their rele and surveys of city residents, they observe that
vance and assess the risks of gang escalation. combo members are typically youths under
the age of 25 who come from and reside in
Illicit economies and criminal networks the neighborhood where the combo is active
Among the post-war ills that can contribute (ibid.). Razones manage broader, often non-
to gang growth, Colombia’s gravest con contiguous territories, and are primarily made
cern comes from organized criminal activ up of men aged between 30 and 50 years who
ity around the production and distribution tend to live in Medellín’s more affluent neigh
of cocaine and other illegal markets. These borhoods (ibid.).
include illegal gold extraction, extortion, In many Colombian cities, criminal bands,
arms trafficking, and contraband (InSight drug-trafficking organizations, mafia-like
Crime 2018). To assess this factor in the structures, or intermediaries hire gang mem
Colombian context, it is necessary to under bers for a variety of criminal tasks. Gang
stand how gangs relate to these markets members provide labor for local drug sales,
and the criminal networks that dominate and act as messengers, lookouts, transport
them. Their interactions vary enormously ers, dealers, debt collectors, and contract
between cities, but the three defining char killers, but generally do not play leadership
acteristics explored below are generally true roles in domestic or international markets
in Colombia. First, youth gangs can be dis (CERAC 2014; Ordóñez Valverde 2017).
tinguished from the adult actors that domi Within these adult groups, gang members
nate the criminal underworld. Second, gang are generally treated as ‘expendable’ (Bargent
members sometimes participate, but rarely 2015), and their access to upper manage
play leadership roles, in organized crime. ment is restricted (Semana 2018). In citiesArt. 5, page 10 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments
like Medellín and Cali, where recruitment by or being squeezed out by them. The MOJ
adult groups is highly structured, many gang (2017: 213) suggests that the gangs’ relative
members communicate only with interme autonomy and fights for territory may soon
diaries without learning the identity of their be ‘a thing of the past.’ Gang transformations
employer (Durán-Martínez 2018). Youths in are occurring at different rates and degrees
gangs are attractive recruits because of their among Colombia’s cities. The process is most
knowledge of urban geography and warfare advanced in Medellín (CERAC 2014, MOJ
(Riaño-Alcala 2006), as well as their inno 2017), where the vast majority of combos are
vation, creativity, and technological skills dedicated to criminal purposes and subordi
(Semana 2018). Such recruitment is not new nate to older, more powerful actors in organ
in Colombia, but the practice has increased ized crime (Blattman et al. 2019).
since the 1990s as criminal structures have In Cali, where gangs and adult groups
fragmented (Bargent 2015) and sought to have likewise co-existed for several decades,
exploit growing domestic markets in cocaine the police believe that 31 of an estimated
and marijuana (ibid.). 104 gangs city-wide have been co-opted
There are two common patterns of recruit by criminal organizations, while others
ment in Colombia. In one, gang members are retain some autonomy (MOJ 2017). The Cali
recruited by an adult organization, based on Mayor’s Office finds support for these esti
their reputation for violence and capabilities mates in its implementation of an exem
navigating and securing territory, to perform plary program to reduce gang involvement.
services connected to local drug sales, includ Rocío Gutiérrez Cely, Cali’s Peace and Citizen
ing street-level dealing and transportation Culture Secretary (2016–2019) explains that
(Ordóñez Valverde 2017). As these gang mem the program team has been able to inter
bers prove themselves, they may be assigned vene in about 70 per cent of the city’s gangs
a gun and enlisted to perpetrate additional to persuade some members to exit.3 While
criminal tasks, including murder-for-hire (MOJ efforts are continuing among the remaining
2017). In this pattern, individual gang mem 30 per cent, Gutiérrez recognizes that some
bers, as opposed to the gang as a collective, of these are too attached to organized crime
work for the adult group (Castillo V 2015; to allow for members to explore exit strate
Ordóñez Valverde 2017). They may be com gies with municipal authorities.
pensated with cash, motorcycles, or weapons, Gangs in other cities are less attached
and motivated by a boost in status from asso to adult criminal networks. For instance,
ciating with an adult group (Semana 2018). Cartagena lies at the far end of the spec
The second pattern, which is well-estab trum with gangs that are minimally related
lished in Medellín and increasingly employed to organized crime (Álvarez 2016). Cartagena
by the bacrim elsewhere (Ávila 2019), involves confronts similar conditions of marginaliza
co-opting the gang as a whole. Durán- tion and social disorganization as Medellín
Martínez (2018: 15) describes this practice as and Cali but was not impacted to the same
‘criminal outsourcing’ or ‘a situation where degree by the armed conflict or the ‘criminal
business activities are allocated to an exter sagas’ described in the next section.
nal source, and where lines of authority are The engagement of gangs by organized
fuzzy, but there is a clean alignment between crime is deeply concerning. In their work
organizations and contractor and some level on Central American gangs, Jütersonke,
of control.’ Muggah, and Rodgers (2009: 385) conclude
that ‘professionalization is ominous, insofar
Gang transformations as the corrosive roles that organized crime
These interactions with organized crime have can play in developing contexts is extremely
a powerful impact on Colombian gangs. well-known.’
There is a sense that youth gangs are los Colombia’s gangs become better armed,
ing space, morphing into adult structures exposed to more violence, and increasinglyKerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 11 of 21 combative over territory because of their Given the strength and numbers of adult links to organized crime (Castillo V 2015). criminal groups in many cities, it is remark The situation in Quibdó, the departmental able that many gangs still stand as distinct capital of one of Colombia’s poorest states entities with some of the territorial, social, (Chocó), illustrates a pattern that is repeated and identity concerns that typically charac in war-torn cities around the country. Gangs terize youth gangs (CERAC 2014; Semana there started spontaneously, spurred by con 2018). Their continued existence in cities ditions of marginalization and social disor dominated by adult criminal actors sug ganization with roots in the armed conflict. gests that gangs fulfill a different purpose According to local officials, youths probably for young people than adult criminal struc joined these gangs for social reasons, but the tures. The availability of criminal jobs does situation spiraled when adult groups started not eliminate the organic demand for youth offering members ‘an immediate future’ with gangs. Borrowing from Hagedorn (2008: 49), guns, phones, and salaries in exchange for a criminal job may solve a gang member’s criminal labor (Semana 2018: 55). problem of ‘survival,’ but leaves unaddressed This association also means worse out his problem of ‘meaning.’ comes for the young people who join gangs. In their research on US gangs, Howell and Exposure to violence Griffiths (2016) explain how gang member Colombia’s conflict encroached on the ship, which is a step in escalating delinquent everyday life of civilians. In the government’s behavior, sets up an individual for increased database, the number of civilian victims risks into adulthood, with higher probabili since 1985 is close to nine million, primar ties of prison, drug use, poor health, and ily victims of forced displacement, followed unemployment compared to former delin by homicide, threats and forced disappear quents who did not join gangs. In Colombia, ance (Unit for Assistance and Comprehensive there is a worrying trend in which young Reparations to Victims 2020). The National people join gangs, start using drugs, start Center for Historical Memory (2013: 32) dealing, take on escalating criminal tasks reported that civilians were killed in much for adult groups (CERAC 2014; Giraldo et al. larger numbers than parties to the conflict: 2015), and — in exceptional cases —become 82 per cent of the 220,000 conflict deaths full-fledged members of adult armed struc were non-combatants. tures (Durán-Martínez 2018). Further, armed actors exerted a powerful Another negative consequence of criminal and lasting influence in some Colombian outsourcing is that it appears to generate cities. The MOJ (2017: 99–101) traced what more violence than what criminal groups it called ‘criminal sagas,’ in which different produce when they rely on internal human armed actors arrived in waves to Colombia’s resources (Durán-Martínez 2018). Based largest cities, each taking on a mythical status on research in five cities in Colombia and for the cities’ youths. Cali is a case in point: Mexico, Durán-Martínez (2018: 15) explains in the 1980s, as part of peace negotiations, that ‘where criminals outsource to youth the M-19 guerrilla group was authorized to gangs, they…lose the ability or willingness to set up urban camps in Cali, where members control their “soldiers.”’ Looking at Medellín, provided political training to youths; the the author observes that the city’s most vio 1990s brought in drug-trafficking organiza lent periods are characterized by outsourcing tions that employed brutal tactics to main to gangs (Durán-Martínez 2018). Colombian tain territorial control; in the late 1990s, the analysts are concerned that youth gangs pro ELN and FARC-EP committed large-scale kid vide organized crime a ready stream of urban nappings in Cali (MOJ 2017). This may have labor and enable more sophisticated crimi paved the way for the right-wing and ostensi nals to evade law enforcement by reducing bly anti-guerrilla paramilitaries to exert more their visibility (Ávila 2019; Semana 2018). influence in Cali in the 2000s; after their
Art. 5, page 12 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments demobilization in 2005, the so-called crimi MOJ (2017), in cities like Cali, Medellín, and nal bands or bacrim filled the vacuum (ibid.). Bogotá, youth groups learned how to com The incursion of armed actors into some mit violent crime from a succession of armed Colombian cities exacerbated urban conflict, actors, whose methods are mirrored in today’s normalized violence, and supplied gangs gang activity. Gangs learned about local net with new criminal skills and brutal meth working and weapons from the guerrillas; ods. Describing Medellín, Pécaut (1999: 142) workforce organization from drug-trafficking characterizes urban conflict as an interplay organizations; and recruitment and territorial of ‘extremely heterogenous’ violence, includ control with ‘invisible frontiers’ from paramil ing armed confrontations between guerrillas itaries and criminal bands (ibid.). and state forces, extortion by urban militias, paramilitary operations, drug trafficking, Marginalization and social disorganization political assassinations, delinquency, organ Though costly, Colombia’s conflict did not ized crime, and inter-gang warfare. Perea destroy the national economy as often hap (2007: 2) describes youth gangs as being at pens in protracted internal wars. Poverty, the ‘heart of the urban conflict,’ rejected by extreme poverty, and, to a lesser extent, income communities, intermittently hunted down inequality declined from the mid-2000s until and recruited by organized crime and armed 2017 (Joumard and Londoño 2013, World Bank groups, and continuously battling for terri 2019). Nonetheless, economic marginalization tory with other gangs. is a significant risk factor in Colombia, which The prolonged exposure of Colombia’s cit remains one of the most unequal countries ies to conflict has normalized violence for globally and, contrary to expectations on post- some urban youth. The MOJ (2017) concludes conflict economic growth, experienced a rise that one legacy of the criminal sagas was to in both poverty and urban income inequality position violence as the principal method in 2018 (World Bank 2019). of resolving disputes. Waldmann (2007: 66) Young people who were uprooted by armed sees evidence of cultural norms that pro conflict are especially prone to layered mar mote violence in Colombia in its widespread ginalization. A report on protracted displace incidence, high homicide rates, entrenched ment by the UN (Kälin and Entwisle 2017) armed actors, and the ‘glaring discrepancy concludes that most internally displaced per between the brutality of means and mod sons (IDPs) in Colombia were forced to reset esty of the ends pursued.’ The consequences tle in precarious settlements or slums. Kälin creep into everyday life. Santos (2015) notes, and Entwisle (2017) observed that even years for instance, a high correlation between after displacement, these families remain at household exposure to armed conflict and a stark economic disadvantage, and many domestic violence against women, leading displaced youths face stigma and discrimina him to argue that Colombians are ‘sick with tion in underserved, high-crime areas, with violence,’ which makes them believe that out access to formal education or livelihood violence is ‘a valid mechanism to resolve dis opportunities. putes.’ Prolonged exposure to brutality may Internal displacement and other conflict also deaden societal responses to loss of life. shocks can produce social disorganization. Looking at Colombia and Mexico, Lemaitre Based on a survey of more than 2,000 dis Ripoll (2014: 4) finds the absence of ‘moral placed households throughout Colombia, indignation’ to homicides, especially of poor, Ibañez, Moya, and Velásquez (2006) find young men of color, as a sign of widespread that forced displacement stripped victims habituation to violence. of their customs, ways of life, and identi The Colombian case sheds light on an ties, and deprived them the support from additional outcome of violent exposure on social networks and decision makers they gangs: criminal learning. According to the relied on in their places of origin. Displaced
Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 13 of 21
persons typically moved with their nuclear and Bogota are recognized for their innova
families, only rarely migrated with neigh tive preventive approaches (Cousins 2019;
bors or other relatives, and sharply reduced Muggah and Aguirre 2018; Muggah, cited in
their participation in communal and civic Gagne 2015).
spaces after displacement (Ibañez et al. In general terms, Colombian policy makers
2006). The writers conclude that ‘displace have demonstrated awareness of the soci
ment obstructs the formation of commu etal factors at play in the creation of urban
nity organizations and contributes to the gangs and the importance of integrated
destruction of social networks and social carrot-and-stick solutions. For example, in its
capital’ (ibid.: par. 15). recent report on gangs, the MOJ’s foremost
recommendation to the government is to
Security gaps and state responses reduce the factors that make young people
As described above, post-war security gaps ‘easy prey’ to crime and violence by invest
can increase gang activity both by moti ing in education and economic opportuni
vating youths to join gangs for protection ties in problem neighborhoods (MOJ 2017:
and by triggering counter-productive state 234). Law 1622 on Youth Citizenship calls for
responses. Regarding the first effect, just as intervention in the social and political lives
Howell and Griffiths (2016) find among US of youths to prevent their engagement in
gangs, the search for protection is a common violence and crime (L. 1622, abril 29, 2013,
motive for a youth to join a gang in Colombia Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.). Law 1577 —
(CERAC 2014). The strength of this motive the first national law dealing expressly with
may depend on both objective and subjective gangs — seeks to rehabilitate young people
factors. Objectively, Colombian youths are dis at risk of joining or already involved in gangs
proportionately impacted by violence: almost and foster their social and economic inclu
half of all murder victims in 2016 and 2017 sion (L. 1577, septiembre 20, 2012, Diario
were aged between 15 and 29 years (Castillo Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.).
2018). Subjectively, Colombian city and town- Finally, the same survey that found that
dwellers perceive themselves as highly inse Colombian city and town dwellers are fear
cure. In a national survey from 2017, 78 per ful of murder also found that a large majority
cent of respondents reported feeling fearful of them (70 per cent) favor preventive meas
of being murdered, mostly by common crimi ures, such as job and education opportunities
nals rather than by conflict actors (FIP 2017). over increasing punishment (28 per cent), as
In terms of state responses, there is reason the preferred way for government to reduce
to be optimistic that Colombia can avoid the homicides (FIP 2017).
kind of zero- tolerance approaches to youth
gang reduction that backfired in Central Former combatants
America. While the Duque administration As in other countries emerging from conflict,
has adopted a more militaristic approach to Colombia’s former combatants are viewed as
organized criminal groups, with fewer options a source of insecurity. And indeed, the deci
for negotiations (Alonso and Robbins 2019), sion by some FARC-EP members to rearm rep
street gangs are generally treated as issues resents a serious threat to national security
of urban crime and youth development that and the peace process (The Economist 2019b).
fall within the purview of city mayors and However, demobilized combatants of the
police departments (International Institute FARC-EP are unlikely to join street gangs. First,
for Strategic Studies 2018). Colombia was the while some former fighters are moving into cit
first country in Latin America to launch citi ies, ex-combatants are mostly from rural areas
zen security programming, with a heavy focus and the majority have expressed an interest in
on rights, civic engagement, and government working in agriculture (Kaplan 2017). Second,
responsibility, and cities like Medellín, Cali, the demographics of the group do not alignArt. 5, page 14 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments
with the profiles of Colombian gang members. By looking at how Colombia’s gangs have
At the time of demobilization, the average age developed over time and the differences
among the ex-combatants was 33, almost a between cities, there is no doubt that asso
quarter were women, and over half were par ciating with organized crime underlies gang
ents (ibid.). mutations that are injurious to gang mem
While the FARC-EP historically recruited bers and their communities.
children in large numbers, recruitment was Furthermore, absent concerted preventive
sharply reduced during the peace talks, and efforts, gang membership is likely to grow
only 123 were released under the accord, among urban youth in cities where conflict
most of whom are now adults (UN 2019). exacerbated the conditions of marginaliza
The risk that children released from the tion, social disorganization, and violent expo
FARC-EP will join urban gangs is minimal. sure. Notably, Colombia’s conflict has resulted
Former child combatants benefit from com in the marginalization of many young peo
prehensive rehabilitation support from the ple who were forcibly uprooted from their
government until they reach adulthood, at homes, saw their opportunities reduced, and
which point they are entitled to adult social put at sharp economic disadvantage. The
and economic services (Colombian Family armed conflict also damaged, and sometimes
Welfare Institute n.d.). Like their adult coun destroyed, the social institutions that enabled
terparts, most children released by the FARC communities to mediate youth misconduct,
are from rural areas and many are expected resulting in widespread social disorganiza
to opt for rural reintegration. tion. Many young people have been exposed
More generally, Nussio (2018) argues that to extreme violence and socialized within
focusing on the relatively small number of neighborhoods where violence has become
former combatants may distract authorities normal, tolerated, and even encouraged.
from addressing potentially larger sources of The risk that former combatants could
insecurity. He notes that youths, especially create or join gangs was the least relevant
young males, living in Colombia’s marginal of the six factors to the Colombian context.
ized neighborhoods are at risk of becoming Recidivism by the FARC-EP is a security threat,
the ‘human resources of post-conflict violence’ but members’ demographic profiles and rural
(ibid.: 143). Children and youths who have aspirations make it unlikely that they will
been recruited by criminal bands and drug- engage with youth gangs in a significant way.
trafficking organizations may be especially vul The final factor related to post-war inse
nerable. They rarely receive the kind of holistic curity and state responses. Urban insecurity
and sustained support provided to children and homicide rates remain high, especially
associated with paramilitaries and guerril for youths, and some youths will continue
las even though they face many of the same to seek out gangs for protection. State
vulnerabilities and reintegration challenges. responses are difficult to predict, but the
article posited that Colombia may well avoid
Conclusion so-called zero-tolerance approaches to gang
In order to gauge Colombia’s future risk of reduction that have proven counterproduc
gang violence, this article drew from gang tive in other post-war environments.
research and literature on post-war violence The Colombian government can mitigate
to identify six factors that recur in post-war the risks identified in this article by investing
settings and tend to drive gang escalation. in prevention, including by increasing oppor
Their application to the Colombian context tunities for marginalized urban youths, devel
suggests that Colombia’s street gangs are oping law enforcement approaches to sever
likely to become more violent, harmful, and links between street gangs and organized
criminal if they continue to strengthen ties crime, and supporting communities to design
to illicit economies and criminal networks. solutions locally. In doing so, Colombia canYou can also read
