A GEOPOLITICAL SEA: THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN - ISPI DOSSIER July 17, 2020
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ISPI DOSSIER July 17, 2020 A GEOPOLITICAL SEA: THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN edited by Giuseppe Dentice, Valeria Talbot
July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
O
ver the last decade, the deep transformations that swept through the wider
Mediterranean region have risen new challenges that overlap with old crises. State
fragility, conflicts, security threats and socio-economic inequalities have turned the
area into one of the world’s most volatile regions, whose geo-strategic importance goes far
beyond its geographical borders. Here, more than elsewhere, diverging interests of several
regional and international actors are fueling rivalries and conflicts for power and control of
energy resources, intensifying fragmentation and instability. Today, the Covid-19 pandemic
and plummeting oil prices add new strains to this fluid geopolitical context where a new
balance of power is hardly emerging. What are the prospects for regional stability and order?
How do the interests and ambitions of the main regional players interact with those of external
powers? What room for cooperation initiatives in the region?
* Giuseppe Dentice is an Associate Research Fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Centre at ISPI.
Ph.D in “Politics and Institutions” at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan
* Valeria Talbot is a Senior Research Fellow and Co-Head of ISPI's Middle East and North Africa Centre,
in charge of Middle East Studies.
1. THE EAST MEDITERRANEAN: DECODING THE (IN)SECURITY COMPLEX
Bahgat Korany (American University in Cairo)
2. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND FINANCIAL HAZARDS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
Matteo Colombo (ISPI)
3. GEOGRAPHY AND RESOURCES: MARITIME BORDERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Nael Shama (independent scholar)
4. POWER COMPETITION WITHOUT SOLUTION: LIBYA AND SYRIA’S COMMON DILEMMA
Giuseppe Dentice (ISPI and Catholic University, Milan)
5. TURKEY’S STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
Valeria Talbot (ISPI)
6. WHAT THE MEDITERRANEAN MEANS FOR ISRAELI GEOPOLITICS
Ehud Eiran (University of Haifa), Aviad Rubin (University of Haifa)
|2
July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
7. EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: TESTING EGYPT’S GEOPOLITICAL AMBITIONS?
Alessia Melcangi (University La Sapienza and Atlantic Council)
8. PORTS AND POLITICS: UAE-QATAR COMPETITION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Camille Lons (IISS)
9. WHO CONTROLS THE RIMLAND: COMPETITION AND RIVALRY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Gianluca Pastori (Catholic University of Milan)
10. THE EU’S ADDICTION TO FALSE DILEMMAS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Haizam Amirah-Fernandez (Elcano Royal Institute)
11. BEYOND TRADITION: WHAT ROLE SHOULD ITALY PLAY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN?
Giampiero Massolo (ISPI)
|3
July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
W
hy did the January-2020 Berlin
Declaration on Libya fail to limit this
country’s flare-up, and the more recent
Cairo Declaration in June could face the same fate?
The East Mediterranean: It is because this Libyan case is but a reflection of
the predicament of the East Mediterranean and
Decoding the (In)security the whole MENA insecurity complex: the inter-
Complex
connectedness of different elements of instability,
geopolitical as well as domestic, entangling several
international/regional powers and local actors/
militias. So-called “new wars” are multiplying and
Bahgat Korany the State – this classical bedrock of international
American University in Cairo order – is declining. This insecurity complex tends
to be dominated by what Thomas Friedman of the
New York Times called in a different context Black
Elephants. As a metaphor, Black Elephants is itself a
combination of two well-known English metaphors:
the “elephant in the room”, which denotes a basic
or risky topic that we choose to ignore or neglect
; and “black swans”, which denotes unexpected
occurrences. I use this double metaphor to indicate
that both past policies and new events trap the East
Mediterranean into multi-layered conflicts, and a
Bahgat Korany is professor of international relations and
political economy at the American University in Cairo, direc-
tor of the AUC Forum, honorary professor at the University
of Montreal, and an elected member of the Royal Society
of Canada ISPI | 4
COMMENTARY
thick insecurity complex. While here the emphasis is “NEW WARS THEORY” DEMONSTRATED
mainly on domestic dynamics will be also taken into
As is known, when we think of the common and
account. Country examples such as Libya, Syria or
widespread phenomenon of war, we usually think
Lebanon are cited to demonstrate the argument.
of inter-state wars and classic contributions such
as those of the German General Clausewitz. But
CONFLICT PREDOMINANCE: OLD AND NEW data over the last 20 years or so show a different
In 2014 the MENA region accounted for 15.7% pattern: decline in the number of these inter-state
of global conflicts, three times higher than its wars and the rise instead of INTRA-state ones
percentage of the world’s population of 5.2%. Since (Kaldor 1991&2012). They are also different from
then, the region has continued to move, but without conventional civil wars because of the multiplicity
changing direction. While geopolitical inter-state of their warring components: religious sects, tribal
conflicts continue (e.g. Arab-Israeli), they are now groups, identity factions, different militias. Though
superseded by intra-state conflicts, so-called new protagonstic among themselves, they are united
wars. Amidst extreme fluidity and uncertainty, most against the state. Indeed, the state ends by losing its
issues tend to be securitized, i.e.to be conceived as most important characteristic: its monopolistic use of
threats and added to a constantly enlarging conflict force. The present situation in Libya – which boasts
map. the largest oil reserves in Africa – concretizes this
phenomenon of new wars.
Many of these intra-state conflicts – especially the
structurally basic ones or elephants in the room –
Libya’s fighting groups and “new wars”cost
have already existed for a few years. For instance,
population growth is on average around 2.4%. • Government of National Accord (GNA): centered
However, without an equivalent growth of resources in Tripoli and led by Fayez Sarraj and backed up
the existing resource gap is aggravated. Similarly, by UN.
the present urbanization pattern led – under the
• Libyan National Army (LNA): centered in Eastern
pressure of migration from the countryside – to
Libya, led by General Khalifa Haftar, and
the ruralization of the cities with its rise of informal
supported by a number of militias and Special
economy and tin-districts or slums. These structural
Forces unit.
problems reflected both misdevelopment and
misgovernance, as symbolized by rising youth • General National Congress (GNC): with the Libya
unemployment that largely motivated the 2011-Arab Dawn (equivalent of an “armed forces” led by
Spring. These uprisings were a consequence – and their ex-chief of staff General Jadallah al-Obaidi
not a cause – of these aspects of mis development and Libya Shield grouping).
and mis governance aspects. The post-Arab Spring • Jihadist Groups: ISIS: still maintaining itself in
context, however, brought in “new wars”. the central coastal city of Sirte, eying nearby oil
The East Mediterranean: Decoding the (In)security Complex ISPI | 5
COMMENTARY
of revenue. Ansar al-Shari’a: pro-al-Qaeda group, degree, quantitatively and qualitatively (for definition
active in eastern Libya and has battled the LNA in and measurement, Korany 2019). Lebanon’sdefault
Benghazi. Also present in cities of Derna and Sabra- on its economic obligations internationally and
tha. Responsible for the attack on US consulate in domestically, amidst mass protests to “change the
September 2012 and assassination of Ambassador system”, is the most recent addition on the fragile/
Chris Stevens. failed state list. Lebanon’s unprecedented doom
and gloom is confirmed by a recent assessment of
There are also less well-known groups such as the
the International Crisis Group (June 9, 2020). “Highly
Benghazi Revolutionaries: for example, Derna Muja-
import-dependent, Lebanon has run out of foreign
hidin Shura Council, Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura
currency to pay for what it consumes, while the
Council.
state is printing money to pay salaries and is unable
Because of this multiplicity of protagonists and to service the public debt. Banks have imposed
decision-making centers , new wars are wars within tight capital controls, which have staved off financial
wars and could continue endlessly at a high level of collapse until now, but only by bringing much of
human and financial cost. Though precise data are the economy to a standstill, manifesting soaring
hard to come by, estimates are still indicative. To unemployment. Many businesses have failed, and
date Libya’s death toll is around 32,000 people since the state of ‘medical emergency’ imposed since 15
2011. Financially the oil sector alone has lost $68 March to combat COVID-19’s spread will likely be the
billion in revenues since 2013 with ongoing oilfield last nail in the coffin for many more. While a curfew
shutdowns and port disruptions. The destruction stifled demonstrations and police cleared away the
goes further as nearly half of the infrastructure and protest camp in downtown Beirut, street actions in
production facilities have been destroyed, with GDP late April suggest that virus-related hardships could
falling from $81.87billion in 2012 to only $48.32 in 2018. trigger more unrest. Crunch time may come when
As in Syria earlier, foreign powers, especially the state, strapped for cash as tax revenue collapses,
regional ones such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia cannot meet the public-sector payroll or when
or the UAE, are seizing the opportunity to increase hyperinflation wipes out the real value of people’s
their influence. As a result, the multiplicity of actors incomes. State institutions, including the police, may
and factors gets more chaotic, and state authority start to disintegrate, and what have been mainly
declines further or even disappears. peaceful protests could turn violent”.
As the “State” has traditionally been since the
STATE FRAGILITY/FAILURE AND ITS 1648-Westphalia Treaties the basis of international
INTERNATIONAL SPILL-OVER order, its fragility/failure is affecting this order.
It is no wonder that the phenomenon of fragile/ Another international spill-over of state fragility/
failed state is increasing, both in number and in failure is the flood of refugees/migrants,
A Geopolitical Sea: The New Scramble for the Mediterranean ISPI | 6
COMMENTARY
demonstrating at more than one level the domestic- Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Cyprus
external interconnectedness. In its most recent shows that Turkey’s link with Europe and even
report, the UN High Commission for Refugees NATO is . Interconnectedness of conflicts and their
specifies that out of the 20.6 million refugees for widening/deepening continue to grow.
2019 , Syria tops the list accounting for more than
The way-out of this multi-layered insecurity
30%, exactly 6.6 million. Already in 2015, Leonard
complex is a regional architecture based on CBSM,
Doyle, spokesman for the International Organization
confidence and security-building measures. But this
of Migration, said “[…] nothing has been like this
is a topic of a separate article.
since World War II. Millions cross the Mediterranean
at great risk. For instance, of the 45 thousand
that crossed in 2013, 700 died in the process. The
following year this number rose more than four times
to reach 3224.”
Cingoli, Janiki (2016),The New Energy Resources in the
Indeed, the Mediterranean has shown itself across
Centre-East Mediterrenean. Rome, IAI
these recent years to be also a mass grave. The
photo of Syrian child Alan Kurdi, found lifeless by Dris-Ait Hamadouche,Louise :“ A New Approach for
a rescue ship on the Mediterranean beach, spoke Managing Conflicts “ in Korany ,Bahgat (editor,2014),
more than a thousand words. Arab Human Development in the 21st Century (10th
anniversary UNDP Arab Human Development
SECURITIZATION IS REPLACING Report) . Cairo and New York: American University of
INTERDEPENDENCE Cairo Press, pp. 167-214.
Though refugees and migrants could be a Kaldor,Mary (1991 & 2012), Old and New Wars.
needed source of new and youthful blood for Cambridge, Polity.
Europe’s ageing population, their flood is now Korany ,Bahgat (2019) ”The Middle East Since the
securitized- i.e. viewed as a threat. So are other Cold War: Movement without Progress “,in Louise
instances of interdependence such as the Fawcett (editor), International Relations of the Middle
discovery of new natural gas. The optimism of an East. Oxford, Oxford U.P. (5th edition): pp. 80-94.
IAI’s 2016-study (Gitlin) about the possibility of
trans-border pipelines with Turkey as a security
link between the Mediterranean and Europe has
not materialized. Instead, conflict escalated with
Turkey’s 2019-maritime demarcation agreement with
Tripoli’s contested government and its increasing
military involvement. Opposition by other Euro-
The East Mediterranean: Decoding the (In)security Complex ISPI | 7
July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
G
as discoveries in the Eastern
Mediterranean have been
enthusiastically received by international
observers, although the current price dynamics
Political Opportunities and advises caution. This commentary both explores
the opportunities of political and economic
Financial Hazards in the collaboration for the states of the region and
beyond, and analyses the financial hazards of
Eastern Mediterranean gas extraction and selling in a global scenario
characterised by low prices and decreasing
demand. The arguments put forward are that
Matteo Colombo considerable public investment from regional
ISPI and European states and a clear stance
towards Turkey are necessary conditions to
exploit gas opportunities and that the time
has come for governments to take these steps.
In greater detail, European states and regional
governments should soon make a final decision
on whether or not to build a pipeline from the
gas fields of Egypt, Israel and Cyprus to Italy
(EastMed) and on if Turkey should be included
in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum
Matteo Colombo is an ISPI Associate Research Fellow in
the MENA Centre. He obtained a PhD in Political Studies at
the University of Milan ISPI | 8
COMMENTARY
(EMGF): a regional platform to manage gas Eastern Mediterranean gas fields, in fact, are
prices and the energy flow from producing to located within a ray of 100-150 km6, and it is,
consuming states. therefore, highly cost-effective to connect
them for export. To understand this point better,
Opportunities for cooperation revolve around
it is worth mentioning that the current project
the shared economic interests for basin states
of transporting gas to Italy through a pipeline,
to exploit the local energy resources and export
as designed by Israel, Cyprus and Greece in a
them to Europe and elsewhere. The drivers
preliminary deal7, would require to connect all
of collaboration are a relatively high amount
the regional fields to maximise the project
of gas in the regional basin, the proximity of
profits. The alternative is transporting gas by
the gas fields, and the existing infrastructural
tankers, which would also benefit from existing
landscape. When looking at the Eastern
regional infrastructures. Gas can be brought
Mediterranean gas fields, the total reserves for
to the Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) complex of
Israel is about 886 billion cubic metres of gas
Damietta and Idku to reach both Europe and
(bcm) (Leviathan: 450 bcm; Tamar 318 bcm;
Asia by tank ships.
Dalit 55 bcm; Tanin 55 bcm; Karish 8 bcm); 850
bcm for Egypt (Zohr 850 bcm; Noor – yet to The financial hazards revolve around the cost
be established); and 299 – 359 bcm for Cyprus of extracting gas from the regional fields vis-à-
(Aphrodite 129 bcm; Calipso 170 - 230 bcm). vis current global prices. Eastern Mediterranean
Putting the data into perspective, the total of gas is often located tens of kilometres from
reserves is 2.035 – 2.095 bcm, which is roughly the coasts and in relatively deep waters. These
4 years of the gas consumption for all European two elements make its extraction expensive
States1 (554 bcm in 20192). When looking at the when compared to other sources in Russia
expected internal consumption, Egypt scores and the US. To better understand this point,
around 57 bcm for a year3, Israel is around 10 it is useful to look both at the estimation of
bcm for a year, and Cyprus is around 1 bcm for extraction costs and the existing contracts.
a year in 20135. It is worth stating that the fields Charles Ellinas, CEO of Cyprus-based energy
mentioned above comprise the entire gas consultancy ECP Natural Hydrocarbons
reserves for Israel and Cyprus, while Egypt Company and among the leading experts of
has more fields within its territory. It follows that the Eastern Mediterranean energy market,
Eastern Mediterranean gas will both cover the estimates the average extraction cost for
internal consumption and allow for exports. In the gas in the region to be around 4.5 $ per
such a scenario, coordinating the extraction mmBTU8. An agreement between the Jordan
process would lower prices, making the gas National Electric Power Corporation (NEPCO)
more competitive in the international market. and the Israel Leviathan consortium fixes the
Political Opportunities and Financial Hazards in the Eastern Mediterranean ISPI | 9
COMMENTARY
selling price for Leviathan gas to $4.79 for pipeline to be around 3.50 $ for mmBTU, and
mmBTU9. It follows that the breakeven point the profitable price of gas at 8 $ for mmBTU
of Eastern Mediterranean gas is probably when including the extraction cost14. It follows
somewhere between 4.75 and 5 $ for mmBTU that energy companies might find the pipeline
when selling it to the neighbouring countries. investment not worth the price. Therefore,
This price is similar to the average gas member states of the EU should step in and
selling cost for Europe in 2019, which scored fund the project to make it more competitive
4.80 $ for mmBTU10, but it would make the
The previous analysis suggests that the Eastern
Eastern Mediterranean gas uncompetitive
Mediterranean gas potential might remain
when including transport costs. Carrying the
untapped for the upcoming years unless
gas by LNG ships would not help in solving
European and regional states or European
the problem, as the average 2019 prices for
institutions give political and financial support
Europe (5.05 $ for mmBTU11) and Asia (5.53 $
to the pipeline. Such a decision would have a
for mmBTU12) are too low to make the Eastern
high political valence, as it reflects European
Mediterranean gas attractive for buyers.
and regional states stance to the current
Furthermore, the current low prices might
Turkish policy in the Mediterranean. Ankara
be here to stay when looking at the future
has made it clear that it opposes the EastMed
outlook in a time of gas bonanza. The Energy
pipeline15, which would hinder Turkey’s role
Information Administration (EIA) expects that
as energy bridge between iddle Eastern
the price for selling natural gas in the period
production and European consumption area.
between 2020 and 2035 will be around 4 $
Furthermore, Ankara might make a claim to
for mmBTU, while the price should reach 5
participate in the resource management
$ for mmBTU from 2035 to 205013. It follows
mechanism of the EMGF in the coming years.
that Eastern Mediterranean gas lacks
In a nutshell, the Turkish strategy points to
competitiveness due to the current price
obstacle the infrastructural project in the area
environment. This issue would be partially
as long as other states keep excluding Ankara
solved with a pipeline which connects the
from collective decisions. The signing of the
producing areas of the Eastern Mediterranean
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreement
to Europe. The infrastructure would surely
with the internationally recognised Libyan
reduce the transport costs, but such a project
government (Tripoli) and current gas exploration
requires a high financial investment to be
in the Turkish-recognised Northern Cyprus EEZ
completed. The estimated costs to carry 10
should be understood within this framework.
bcm of gas from the producing area to Italy
The deal with Libya also serves to obstruct the
by pipeline is expected to be around 7 billion
construction of the pipeline by putting up legal
euro. Ellinas estimates the unit cost of the
A Geopolitical Sea: The New Scramble for the Mediterranean ISPI | 10COMMENTARY
pretexts; the gas exploration in the Northern
Cyprus EEZ aims at finding gas to make a 1. European states includes Turkey but excludes Russia in
the British Petroleum Report
case for participating in EMGF as a country
2. Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, British
involved in the gas extraction in the area.
Petroleum
European and regional states currently lack
3. Egypt: Natural gas consumption, Ceic Data
a coherent strategy to respond to the Turkish
4. Egypt: Natural gas consumption, Ceic Data
plan, and such uncertainty is advantaging
5. There are not recent available data, but it is very likely
Ankara. A collective response can take two that the current data are not quite dissimilar to those of
possible paths. The first is to recognise Turkey’s 2013 due to the limited population of the country (1,17
political interests as legitimate and thus million), 23 December 2013:
engage Ankara as a partner in the Eastern https://cyprus-mail.com/2013/12/24/emergency-
meeting-called-on-interim-gas/
Mediterranean. This option would have the
6. Energy: A shaping factor for regional stability in the
advantage of calming some of the current Eastern Mediterranean?, Directorate General for External
tensions, but it also encourages Turkey to take policies – Policy Department (European Parliament)
an even more assertive stance in the region. 7. Paul Tugwell, Leaders from Israel, Cyprus, Greece sign
The second is excluding Ankara from the EastMed pipe deal, Bloomberg, 2 January 2020
infrastructural and decisional mechanism in the 8. Charles Ellinas, Changing priorities threatens viability of
Eastern Mediterranean to contain the Turkish EastMed gas pipeline, Cyprus Mail, 6 January 2020
outlook. Such a strategy would not only harm 9. Amiram Barkat, Leviathan gas: The good, bad, and
downright confusing, Globes, 9 January 2020
Turkey’s regional ambitions but also exacerbate
10. World Bank Commodities Price Data (The Pink
existing tensions with Ankara. Whatever Sheet), World Bank, 2 June 2020
decision is made, European and regional states 11. Regional LNG Prices (Monthly Average), BlueGold
should take a clear stance on Turkish activism Research: https://bluegoldresearch.com/regional-lng-
in the following months. The upcoming period prices
is decisive both because the Libyan conflict 12. Ibidem
will shape the regional environment vis-à- 13. Annual Energy Outlook 2019 with projections to 2050,
Energy Information Administration
vis competition between Cairo and Ankara as
14. Charles Ellinas, Changing priorities threatens viability of
well as because Turkey might find new gas
EastMed gas pipeline, Cyprus Mail, 6 January 2020
fields in the area, which would give this country
15. Ankara slams EastMed pipeline, opposes any gas
a claim to join the EMGF. At the moment, project excluding Turkey, Daily Sabah
Turkey is still the elephant in the room with
regard to Eastern Mediterranean gas. A clear
stance towards Turkey needs, therefore, to be
addressed before any project can be seriously
undertaken.
Political Opportunities and Financial Hazards in the Eastern Mediterranean ISPI | 11July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
A
fter many years of being the Middle
East’s backyard, the Mediterranean
has over the past decade become
its flashpoint, hosting a toxic mishmash
ofmilitarized conflicts, border disputes and
Geography and Resources: energy competitions. If these divisions are
Maritime Borders in the not contained using constructive diplomacy
and viable multiparty agreements, regional
Mediterranean instability will continue to pose a threat to all
Mediterranean littoral states.
Most countries in the region have not yet
Nael M. Shama signed bilateral agreements that delineate their
Independent scholar maritime borders. The 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) postulates that
a state can exercise maritime sovereignty in
an area of up to 12 nautical miles from its coast
and to establish an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), where it could claim rights over fishing,
mining and drilling activities, in an additional
area of 200 miles. However, in semi-closed seas
with multiple states and overlapping spheres
of influence, like the Mediterranean, where the
Nael M. Shama is an independent political researcher and
writer. His research focuses on the international relations
and comparative politics of the Middle East ISPI | 12COMMENTARY
distance between many neighboring countries To be sure, this legal dispute is the façade of
is less than 424 miles, a bilateral agreement is an imbroglio involving multiple parties who are
required to draw the dividing line between impelled by potent economic and realpolitik
each country’s economic zone. motivations. If fully utilized, the huge deposits of
natural gas in the Mediterranean could transfer
The discovery in the last decade of massive
billions of dollars to the coffers of the region’s
hydrocarbon riches in the region and the
countries. To that end, Mediterranean actors
intensification of the civil conflict in Libya
have pursued different paths: Egypt aspires
have altered the regional status quo, reviving
to become a natural gas hub in the Eastern
interests in drawing final maritime borders
Mediterranean; Greece, Cyprus and Israel are
between the Mediterranean states. Indeed,
planning to construct a 1,900 kilometer subsea
last November, the Turkish government signed
pipeline that would transfer Israeli and Cypriot
a maritime border agreement with Libya’s
gas to Europe through Greece (the project
Government of National Accord that delineates
has been put on hold due to the coronavirus
their EEZs in the Mediterranean. The deal, which
pandemic and falling oil prices); and Turkey has
was considered to be illegal by Egypt, Greece
deployed its hard power capabilities in Libya’s
and Cyprus, had created a maritime corridor
proxy civil war. Meanwhile, oil conglomerates
between the two countries. Italy and Greece
crave a piece of the cake, European states wish
inked a similar agreement in June, ending an
to see their current dependence on Russia’s
issue that had been pending for four decades.
natural gas lessened and the US is keeping a
Moreover, Greece and Egypt agreed to resume
close eye on regional developments.
talks on demarcating the maritime boundaries
between the two countries. To complicate things further, the politics of
maritime boundaries and pipeline competitions
The main bone of contention in the legal
takes place against the backdrop of simmering
dispute between Turkey on one hand, and
geopolitical conflicts, most notably the
Greece and Cyprus on the other, is concerned
longstanding Cypriot question and the
with the legal status of islands in maritime law.
decades-long Arab-Israeli conflict. The flow
Athens and Nicosia affirm their adherence to the
of refugees in recent years from the region’s
principles of UNCLOS in this regard. Yet, due to
hot spots, such as Syria and Libya, towards
the close proximity of a number of Greek islands
European shores has added a destabilizing
(especially Kastelorizo) to the Turkish coast,
element to the already fragile equilibrium.
Ankara, who is not a signatory to the UNCLOS
Unsurprisingly, the delay in finding viable
convention, claims that islands should not be
political solutions to these protracted disputes
entitled to the same rights to maritime zones
has led to the militarization of the region. This
as land territory.
Geography and Resources: Maritime Borders in the Mediterranean ISPI | 13COMMENTARY
has taken shape through huge arms purchases put on display that its intervention could be
(including a great deal of naval hardware), the decisive. In response, Egypt seems adamant to
rise in the number of military drills (especially prevent Turkey from further extending its grip
among the anti-Turkey axis states), deeper into Libya’s oil crescent, by force if necessary.
military involvement in Syria and Libya (chiefly Referring to a potential larger military role for
on the part of Turkey), the frequent harassment his country in Libya, the Egyptian President
of civilian and commercial vessels by warships, Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi warned on June 20th that
and the seasonal escalation of fiery rhetoric any direct Egyptian intervention “would have
among Mediterranean states’ officials. Perilously, international legitimacy at this point,” adding
such high levels of militarization, which take that the key central towns of Sirte and al-Jufrah
place within the framework of contested are red lines for Egypt’s national security.
sovereignties, undemarcated maritime borders
Within the larger framework of geopolitical
and overlapping licenses granted to oil
and geoeconomic conflicts playing out in
companies to operate in similar zones, create
the region, Libya is only a piece in a larger
a situation that runs the risk of maritime
puzzle of interwoven interests, ambitions and
accidents.
concerns, but it is an important one. As unjust
In recent months, all eyes have been gazing as it may sound, in international politics, the
towards developments in the Libyan civil law usually follows in the footsteps of power
conflict, notably the vital Turkish military politics, not vice versa. And so, redrawing
contribution to the series of battlefield victories the Mediterranean’s maritime borders will
by the forces of the internationally-recognized likely reflect the balance of power on the
Government of National Accord against the ground rather than institute a new balance.
forces of the eastern commander Khalifa Haftar. Seen through this prism, the outcome of the
The change in the front lines among the Libyan Libyan conflict stands to have an impact on
warring factions has proved that Turkey has not the leverage of the contending parties in the
only retained a foothold on Libyan soil, but also Mediterranean.
A Geopolitical Sea: The New Scramble for the Mediterranean ISPI | 14July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
T
he overlapping of civil and proxy wars
in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have
gradually turned the wider Mediterranean
into a land of conflicts, asymmetric threats
and geopolitical challenges. In particular,
Power Competition the implosion of some coastal states of the
Without Solution: southern shore has undermined the stability
and legitimacy of the old regional system
Libya and Syria’s built in the post-Cold war. This shift has
Common Dilemma unequivocally stressed a new perception of the
Mediterranean arena: an expanded and wider
space turned in one of the world’s most volatile
regions.
Giuseppe Dentice
The eruption of conflicts in some Mediterranean
ISPI and Catholic University of Milan
countries has helped to develop this area into a
new space of competition, even among global
players. The several wars and tensions that
have broken out in the Mediterranean since
the post-Arab Spring are partially influenced
by competition between various regional and
external players (especially Russia, Turkey
and Gulf monarchies), contributing to reshape
Giuseppe Dentice is an Associate Research Fellow at the
Middle East and North Africa Centre at ISPI. He obtained his
Ph.D in “Politics and Institutions” at the Catholic University of
the Sacred Heart in Milan ISPI | 15COMMENTARY
challenges to the security and stability of this of one side. This outcome cannot be averted
geopolitical arena. In fact, several adverse due to the involvement of proxy powers.
interests and problems, as well as a lack of
The ratio of this pattern of negotiation is based
support from regional and great powers,
on two main features: on the one hand, the
have thwarted any diplomatic negotiations
new international framework created after the
impeding progress towards a shared and
Cold war, in which aspiring powers tried to
peaceful solution.
leverage their involvement in different ways but
From this perspective, the crises in Libya did not get directly involved in the conflicts;
and Syria emerged as paradigm of the on the other, the fact that these civil wars did
contemporary chaos in the wider region, in not have clear winners and losers. A trend
which conflicts, power policies, expanding that repeats itself constantly from the Balkan
geopolitical pressures, as well as the lack of wars in the 1990s to the present day, adapting
clear fault lines and coherent political-military to the different international needs of uni/
strategies, have shaped this fragmented multilateralism. This pattern evolved over the
scenario in a new context of global competition. years, but its pillars have remained roughly the
In the wake of recent battlefield developments same: 1) managing compromises among the
in Libya and Syria, international powers are local actors, 2) protecting conflicting interests
manoeuvring for influence and supremacy, for the external powers.
with far-reaching implications for each national
The emergence of this framework in the
sovereignty, and cohesion.
Arab-Mediterranean conflicts has provoked
In fact, the latest developments in Libya a constant failure in all recent regional crises.
(General Khalifa Haftar’s strategic retreat from Libya and Syria wars, indeed, fall within the
the Western part of the country) and in Syria above picture, without altering the nature or
(the agreement between Russia and Turkey that the balance of power but with never ending
stopped fighting in Idlib) seem to be leading conflicts and humanitarian catastrophes. In light
towards a period of reassessments, which of this, international powers tried to update this
does not, however, seem to presage an end to multilateral approach, proposing a new model
the crises. In the same way, external powers based on a crystallization of conflicts and
attempt to freeze these conflicts to establish the protection of the interests of international
a settlement aimed at de-escalating tensions players involved in that confrontations. This
in the hope that a stalemate could lead to a new approach has started to widespread
de facto win-win situation for everyone. But in every crisis on the Wider Mediterranean,
managing these conflicts would fragment particularly in Syria, where Russia, Turkey and
coalitions, preventing or slowing a clear victory Iran – the main players involved – have tried to
A Geopolitical Sea: The New Scramble for the Mediterranean ISPI | 16COMMENTARY
manage the conflict by freezing the war. This solution to conflicts in this new phase of the
new model of negotiation is known as Astana multipolar era. It is therefore a diplomatic tool to
Process. An attempt was made to replicate it guarantee sharing power and to prevent military
also in Libya, with the same outcome of failure. escalations. The same framework that has
the Astana approach is not aimed to solve a been used – without any results – in Syria since
crisis but rather to freeze a conflict, waiting January 2017 and in January 2020 during the
for a good compromise between external Berlin Conference for Libya aimed at stopping
actors. Although this process could be an agile the violence and defining steps towards a truce
diplomatic tool to guarantee a tactical success for those on the ground. Despite international
in the power proxy strategy, it also highlights support, the deal reached in Berlin has been
the external actor’s inability (or unwillingness) to considered a failure, due to the developments
resolve the interminable crises. in the civil war2.
Clearly, the Astana approach cannot be a In conclusion, the most dangerous risk for Libya
model solution in Syria and Libya, where and Syria is that they could quickly find itself
even a potential Turkish-Russian deal would, facing protracted and expanded struggles,
at best, lead to a de-facto partition of these opening the doors to a new conflict dimension,
countries into spheres of interests. This means in which these crises could resemble
that conflicts would diffuse locally, with militia similar landscape, although persist different
groups contesting power and resources at peculiarities. A further internationalization
the local level, and that any truce could be of these conflicts could finally lead to an
potentially broken. In addition, other proxy overcoming of the local dimension causing a
powers in Libya (such as France, Egypt, UAE) total deadlock to the complete disadvantage
and in Syria (as Iran or Hezbollah) could dispute of the local populations and the emergence of
any agreement that doesn’t satisfy them and several war of attrition in increasingly smaller
their goals1. contexts.
In short, this approach doesn’t solve any
crisis, but it legitimizes foreign meddling
in local conflicts, elevating the external
players’ interests over those of local actors,
of which they become their undeclared
1. R. Alaaldin and E. Badi, Libya’s proxy sponsors face a
representatives in negotiations. Basically, the
dilemma, Brookings Institution, June 15, 2020.
Astana model is only useful for achieving
political compromises in the short term 2 E. Dacrema, “From Syria to Libya: Why the ‘Astana Appro-
without the definition of a comprehensive ach’ Doesn’t Work”, ISPI Commentary, I28 February 2020.
Power Competition Without Solution: Libya and Syria’s Common Dilemma ISPI | 17July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
O
ver the last years, Turkey has increased
its activism in the Mediterranean,
becoming a key and assertive player
in regional politics and crises. From the
Turkey’s Struggle Eastern Mediterranean gas dispute to the
Libyan war, Ankara has not hesitated to flex
for Influence in the its muscles to safeguard its interests and
achieve its goals. Turkey’s activism is part of
Eastern Mediterranean a wider foreign policy, which has become
more and more militarized since 2015, aiming
at extending its geopolitical influence in the
Valeria Talbot Middle East and its surrounding regions. This
ISPI includes a significant maritime component, the
so-called Mavi Vatan or the “Blue Homeland”
doctrine, for the control of waters in the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea and the Black
Sea through military power projection. It is not
by chance that Blue Homeland is the name
of the largest naval exercise (involving 103
military ships and 20,000 soldiers) in Turkey›s
history which was launched at the end of
February 2019 to test its ability to carry on war
Valeria Talbot is a Senior Research Fellow and
Co-Head of ISPI's Middle East and North Africa Centre, ISPI | 18
in charge of Middle East Studies.COMMENTARY
simultaneously in the Black Sea, the Aegean the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. A more active Cyprus to benefit from natural resources around
role for the Turkish Navy in national defence as the island, over the years Turkey has opposed
well as in energy geopolitics competition is unilateral initiatives by the Republic of Cyprus
one of the pillars of this maritime doctrine, (the Greek part recognized internationally) as
which also relies on the development of an well as the activities of international energy
indigenous defence industry. companies in disputed waters around the
island. Indeed, Turkey considers Cyprus’s
Positioning itself as maritime power Turkey has
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as infringing
intended to send a loud and clear message
on its continental shelf (Turkey claims a 200-
to other players, both regional and external,
mile EEZ). Furthermore, it has not signed the
that have their stake in the area: Ankara wants
United Nations Convention on the Law of the
its say in regional affairs and particularly in the
Sea nor agreed maritime demarcation deals
great game of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean.
with the other littoral countries, except for
This was addressed not only to Cyprus, Egypt,
Northern Cyprus and more recently Libya's
Greece and Israel that along with Jordan,
Government of National Accord (GNA) of Fayez
Italy and the Palestinian National Authority,
al-Serraj. Conversely, since 2004 Cyprus has
in January 2019 established the Eastern
signed demarcation agreements with the
Mediterranean Gas Forum to coordinate their
other littoral states. It is not surprising that in
energy policies and create a regional gas
this context the presence of Turkish drilling
market, but implicitly also to the European
vessels – Fatih in the west and Yavuz in the
Union and the United States that support
northeast of Cyprus – have escalated tensions
cooperation projects and have important
in the Eastern Mediterranean, provoking harsh
energy and geopolitical interests. Aspiring to
reactions in Brussels and Washington as well.
become an energy hub between hydrocarbon-
rich areas and the European markets as well Tensions escalated even further at the end
as to diversify its energy supplies Ankara, of the year when Turkey took a further step
which imports more than 90% of its energy signing an agreement with the internationally
requirements/demand, showed to be ready to recognized GNA, one of its few allies in the
challenge any initiative that does not include it wider Mediterranean, defining maritime borders
and may endanger its geostrategic interests. and EEZs with Libya. Although the legitimacy
of the agreement was questioned by the
Against this backdrop, the first move was taken
other littoral states, Turkey staked a claim on
in May 2019 when Foreign Minister Mevlüt
an area through which the EastMed pipeline
Çavuşoğlu announced the start of drilling
is supposed to pass, making its realization
activities in the waters west of Cyprus. Claiming
Turkey’s Struggle for Influence in the Eastern Mediterranean ISPI | 19COMMENTARY
more difficult. However, the construction of actors in Libya clearly shows that the great
this ambitious 1,800 km pipeline – which is game of energy is just one side of a greater
supposed to transport between 10 and 16 game for geopolitical influence in the wider
billion cubic meters per year from the Levant Mediterranean region. Up to now, it seems that
gas fields to Greece and Italy through Cyprus Turkey is succeeding in projecting its power in
and Crete bypassing Turkey – faced a number Libya and that the Ankara-Doha axis, of which
of challenges in terms of feasibility, costs, the support of political Islam is one of its main
and funding, even before the global economic pillars, appears solid and resilient to external
slowdown and the drop in energy demand amid shocks. However, how long it is sustainable
the Covid-19 pandemic put on hold drilling amid the recession of global economy, the
activities carried out by international companies drop in energy demand that tremendously
and made the investment for the project more affects hydrocarbons producers like Qatar,
unlikely. as well as the spectre of another financial
crisis in Turkey, remains an open question.
Even more important, the military dimension
While it remains to be seen whether or not
of the agreement between Turkey and GNA
the latest developments both in Libya and in
allowed Ankara to throw its weight behind
the Eastern Mediterranean will turn into an
Serraj’s government by providing GNA with
opportunity to de-escalate tensions and open
military equipment, training, armed drones,
new and unexpected channels of dialogue and
and forces. Turkey’s military support, along
cooperation, Turkish President Recep Tayyip
with Qatar’s financial backing, has reversed the
Erdoğan’s decision to transform Hagia Sophia
balance of power on the ground in the GNA›s
into a mosque was an unequivocal message
favour in a crisis that has gradually transformed
to the world, and especially to the Sunni
into a proxy war between regional and external
world: Turkey is here not only to stay but also
players. The involvement of a plethora of
to play a leading role.
A Geopolitical Sea: The New Scramble for the Mediterranean ISPI | 20July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
A
lthough the Mediterranean was
traditionally an afterthought in Israeli
geopolitical thinking, the 2000s
recorded a shift: Israel is turning to the sea.
The Mediterranean is capturing a growing
What the Mediterranean role in Israeli geostrategic thinking. This is
Means for Israeli in large part the result of the discovery and
development of gas in the Mediterranean
Geopolitics Sea beginning in the late 1990s. Developed
rather quickly, these gas reserves made Israel
energy self-sufficient, a significant geo-strategic
Ehud Eiran transformation. Prior to these discoveries,
University of Haifa energy was a serious concern. The state had no
Aviad Rubin energy resources, and for decades found it
University of Haifa challenging to secure supply in the face of
Arab hostility. With the gas discoveries, Israel
gained not only energy independence, but
also an economic and political tool. Israeli
agreements to export gas to Egypt, Jordan and
the Palestinian Authority gave Israel important
leverage. The gas discoveries in the
Mediterranean further offered the possibility
Ehud Eiran is an Associate Professor of international affairs
at Haifa University and a Board Member at Mitvim - The for export to Europe if indeed Israeli-Greek–
Israeli Institute of Regional Foreign Policies. He is also a
visiting researcher at Stanford University’s Political Science
Department.
Eviad Rubin is a Senior Lecturer of political science at
University of Haifa with expertise in religion and state in
Israel and the Middle East. ISPI | 21COMMENTARY
Cypriote designs to build an undersea pipe will Finally, Israel’s geostrategic turn to the sea is
materialize. The new maritime energy source fueled by its newish reliance on desalinated
contributed to the expansion of the Israeli water from the Mediterranean. For decades
navy. Once a junior player in the Israeli armed the country suffered from water shortages.
forces, in 2013 the navy was entrusted by the Following a 2008 government plan, it moved to
government to protect the gas depots, despite heavy dependence on desalinated water that is
the fact that they are held in private hands sourced in the Mediterranean, and processed in
(including by non-Israeli corporations) and are five coastline plants. Today, desalinated water
outside of Israel’s territorial waters. The new accounts for more than 50 percent of Israel’s
task, alongside the expansion of the submarine overall water consumption, and 80 percent of
flotilla (probably as part of a future nuclear its residential and commercial water needs.
deterrent against Iran), awarded the fleet a
Israel’s turn to the sea has the potential to
more important role in Israel’s national security
further affect its relations with the regions’
establishment and resource allocation. It also
actors around it. On the one hand, it holds the
allowed Israel to use the force for international
promise for greater Israeli integration into the
cooperation and military diplomacy in the
Middle East. Jordan who has limited natural
region. This turn to the sea also contributed to
resources is already benefiting from a close,
an emerging quasi-alliance with Cyprus and
affordable energy source and water supply
Greece, which includes, among many other
from Israel. The Palestinian Authority could
areas, the possible joint gas export project,
follow. Egypt, is importing gas from Israel, to
military exercises, and bi-annual trilateral
fill the gap between its current national gas
summits between these countries’ leaders. Like
resources, and the large needs of the Egyptian
its regional allies, Israel is affected by growing
economy. On the other hand, Israel’s self-
Chinese interest in the Mediterranean. Chinese
reliance, and maritime-based alliance with the
corporations contracted the expansion of
non-Arab, non-Muslim Greece and Cyprus,
Israel’s two largest ports, Ashdod and Haifa.
could also be seen as a way of distancing
The latter was substantial enough to irk the
itself from the Middle-East. The alliance
US, whose navy used the Haifa port in the past
with the Hellenic nations could also drag
for re-supply. Israeli and Chinese actors are
Israel into the seemingly escalating tension
in early phases of developing a Chinese funded,
between the Hellenic states and Turkey. Ankara
or owned, high speed train from Israel’s Red
began projecting more assertively into the
Sea port in Eilat to the Mediterranean port of
Eastern Mediterranean in the last few months,
Ashdod, that will serve as an alternate route
including the use of force in Libya, the signing
for the Suez Canal portion of Beijing’s Belt and
of an EEZ demarcation agreement with it, and
Road Initiative (BRI).
the prevention of commercial exploration
A Geopolitical Sea: The New Scramble for the Mediterranean ISPI | 22COMMENTARY activities in Cypriote waters, alongside Turkish tensions and make a direct confrontation gas explorations in Cypriot economic waters. between Turkey and Israel, especially over Turkey is the strongest maritime actor in the energy issues, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) region and invests considerable resources in demarcation or Gaza, more likely. Finally, Israel’s maintaining this status. Its domestic industries geostrategic turn to the sea might buttress develop capacities to build large naval existing regional institutions, such as the Union platforms, including submarines and an aircraft of the Mediterranean, or at least increase carrier, and to export warships to other states. Israel’s desire to support them or maybe even Turkey is also a key player in controlling the create new ones. After all, the Israeli reliance flow of refugees from the region to Europe on energy and water from the Mediterranean and is involved in most of the conflicts in the necessitates a greater involvement in Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus and Greece protecting and regulating this space. The joint might expect Israel, their militarily superior aspects of maritime-based gas exploration new ally, to help in curbing Turkish ambitions. and export have already led to the creation The disparity between Turkish strength and in early 2020 of a nascent Cairo-based, East- aspirations, and its seeming marginalization Mediterranean institution, the East Med Gas by the emerging power axis of Egypt, Israel Forum. Greece and Cyprus might amplify regional What the Mediterranean Means for Israeli Geopolitics ISPI | 23
July 17, 2020
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
A
fter an uncertain political transition
following the 2011 revolts, Egypt seems
ready to reshape its geopolitical
role in the Mediterranean area and fulfil its
Eastern Mediterranean: geostrategic goals, always maintaining their
national security principle to be an essential
Testing Egypt’s objective of its domestic and foreign policy. The
two main closely and interconnected scenarios,
Geopolitical Ambitions? where the country’s strategic ambitions are
projected, move from Libya to the contested
waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. In
Alessia Melcangi particular the latter represents an area that,
University La Sapienza and Atlantic Council in recent years, has become a hotspot for the
global energy market due to huge gas-field
discoveries. It is enough to imagine how the
fight for the control of these resources are
shaping the region, elevating it to a potential
geostrategic game-changer for the coastal
countries such as Egypt.
Following the success obtained in the
beginning of 2019, when the government
of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi officially
Alessia Melcangi is Professor of Globalization and
International Relations and of Contemporary History of
North Africa and the Middle East at the University La
Sapienza. She is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic
Council. ISPI | 24COMMENTARY
declared the achievement of its natural gas expand its production from the Levantine basin.
self-sufficiency thanks to the discovery of the A stance that firstly will aim to intensify the
Zohr and Noor fields, Egypt is trying to reassert production of the Zohr field (based along the
itself as a regional hub for energy trade and Egyptian-Cypriot maritime borders contested
distribution of liquefied natural gas (LNG). This by Turkey), and then to enhance its influence in
strategy, that would allow the country to meet the Eastern Mediterranean, further exacerbating
its internal needs and profit from gas exports, the dispute with Ankara.
led it to support the creation of the Eastern
Turkey, which is working to extend its control
Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a sort of “gas
over energy resources in the Mediterranean
cartel”, through which Cairo, together with Tel
– although at the center of the oil and gas
Aviv, Nicosia and Athens, could coordinate the
exports bound for Europe from Russia and
energy policies of its members, by managing
the Caspian Sea countries, it needs to import
the supply and demand flows. According to
about 75% of its energy needs – views Cairo’s
Cairo’s view this means also taking advantage
moves with increasing apprehension. Ankara
of future subsea pipeline projects (such as
reacted by taking the field in the Libyan crisis,
EastMed, despite some analysts being sceptical
which represents a strategic geopolitical node
on the real gains for Egypt), which promises to
for Egypt and where the country now seems to
supply Europe with Egyptian natural gas
get bogged down. Also in this scenario, al-Sisi
reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean Basin,
has to face Turkey as Egypt’s most dangerous
creating a direct link with Idku and Damietta
competitor.
liquefaction plants and shipping gas to global
markets. In addition, the latest Libyan developments in
favour of the UN recognized Government of
In light of a serious domestic and international
National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minister
economic recession, following the diffusion of
Fayez al-Serraj, and backed by Ankara,
Covid-19 pandemic, however, this production
created a new step in the Turkish-Egyptian
seems to have been hit hard enough to force
competition in the Mediterranean. In fact, the
the Egyptian government to suspend liquefying
inability of General Khalifa Haftar, supported by
and exporting natural gas and, in March 2020,
al-Sisi’s regime and Gulf monarchies, to resolve
to stop the production at the Idku plant. The
the crisis by military means and assure control
consequences of this decision could have
of the neighbouring Cyrenaica, led Egypt to
dangerous repercussions on the economic
rethink its strategy in the country.
and social stability of the country so much
that Cairo government declared the need to The tensions between Ankara and Cairo
increase its liquefied natural gas exports and have spilled over into the Libyan crisis, after
the Ankara’s signature of a memorandum
Eastern Mediterranean: Testing Egypt’s Geopolitical Ambitions? ISPI | 25COMMENTARY
of understanding with Tripoli along the refuted by Ankara and Tripoli, al-Sisi decided
maritime demarcation border that would allow to beat the drums of war, warning that Egypt
Turkey to drill energy resources in Cypriot could intervene militarily in Libya if Turkish-
and Greek offshore. This agreement on an backed government forces were to advance
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which violates on Sirte-Jufra frontline. Turkish-backed forces
international rules on the delimitation of should not advance to that line that is a “red line
national waters, can also be read as a for Cairo” or confront will be likely inevitable.
Turkish strategy to reshape its position in the
If a military conflict between Turkey and Egypt
Mediterranean energy dispute. Supporting
breaks out in Libya, it would certainly have
the UN-backed government of Serraj and
heavy repercussions on the whole region
the Muslim Brotherhood-linked factions who
and would cause Egypt to recalibrate its
belong to the GNA, Ankara was able to turn the
goals. The country is, in fact, facing a serious
tables ensuring that Tripoli would not fall. The
health and economic crisis, due to the serious
Turkish presence in this fundamental area is for
pandemic repercussions on vital sectors
al-Sisi an alarming threat. The long-standing
such as tourism. The Egyptian government,
conflict within the Sunni world that sees
has therefore been forced to request the
Turkey and Qatar, fierce supporters of political
support of the International Monetary Fund:
Islam, against the equally stainless United
in the beginning of June they reached a
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, was
staff-level agreement on a $5.2 billion stand-
transferred into the Libyan front.
by arrangement that aims to alleviate the
In this way, it is evident that Egypt cannot economic impact of pandemic. Embarking on a
tolerate a Turkish-friendly Islamist new war, in this context, would be a hazardous
government in Libya that controls the Libyan- move, to say the least.
Egyptian border, because Cairo needs to
Yet, it is precisely the economic sector and the
safeguard its porous western frontier bordering
national security problem, which has always
Cyrenaica and prevent dangerous jihadist
represented the workhorse of al-Sisi presidency,
penetrations from Eastern Libya. Furthermore,
that could push Egypt to move rashly in an attempt
the other relevant economic interests that
to roll back Turkish aggression. In this context,
historically linked the two North Africa
Egypt would risk being crushed in its geostrategic
countries, represent a priority for the Egyptian
and geopolitical aspirations, losing its grip on the
government’s strategy. After the failure to
neighbouring country. The late Egyptian “Show of
achieve a cease-fire and a possible agreement
Forces”, which led al-Sisi to move several armoured
with the GNA under the UN auspices with the
vehicles and a number of fighter planes to the
6 June Cairo Declaration, which was vigorously
border with Libya, would thus be justified.
A Geopolitical Sea: The New Scramble for the Mediterranean ISPI | 26You can also read
